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2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › 2AC – Economic Rationality Good – AT Nitsch

The data they studied isnt conclusive – the research subjects were too broad and they cannot account for social priming of subjects

Nitsch et al 2022 - Comparative Psychology, Institute of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

Felix J. Nitsch, Luca M. Lüpken, Nils Lüschow, and Tobias Kalenscher July 26, 2022 “On the reliability of individual economic rationality measurements” Psychological And Cognitive Sciences 119 (31) e2202070119 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2202070119

A more general point we want to raise here is the validity of economic rationality as a psychological construct, which is a prerequisite to valid measurements (39). Strictly speaking, economic rationality describes whether or to what extent a set of choices can be described by a utility function. In the recent literature, however, economic rationality of a finite set of choices of an individual has been compared with decision quality (11, 29, 40), policy responsiveness (41), or variability in the neural computation of value (27) based on face validity and correlational evidence,** all of which are arguably related but not identical constructs. Given this lack of a clear definition of the psychological construct to be measured and lack of evidence of validity for widely used measures, advances in psychological theory and measurement appear necessary. A recent, particularly promising approach for the applications outlined here are generative models,†† which can serve to formalize psychological constructs and increase the reliability of behavioral measurements (43, 44). The theoretical basis to inspire the development of such models could be provided by cognitive science: past studies have shown that cognitive skills (e.g., executive control, working memory, and intelligence) pose a common factor of many aspects of decision making, including choice consistency (45–50). Limitations. A limitation to our assessment might be that the upper limit of effective trials considered for our reliability assessments was 80, which is below that of a few particularly high-powered studies (e.g., [27] used up to 108 trials). Optimistically, it could be possible to improve the reliability of rationality measurements by increasing the number of trials in behavioral experiments to further reduce measurement error. However, a high number of trials (i.e., at least more than 80 trials) comes at the cost of practical feasibility in many studies and the risk of increasing fatigue due to prolonged measurement durations, which in itself might bias the measurement (ranging from relative changes in preference to qualitative changes of decision strategy). To give a benchmark, in study 2, the number of participants indicating that they were “very much fatigued” tripled from after 20 to after 40 trials (after measurement 1: n = 10; after measurement 2: n = 29; SI Appendix, Fig. 2). Another potential limitation is that we could not replicate the finding of Breig and Feldman (31) that allowing participants to revise their choices leads to an increase of revealed preference consistency in the choice set. We acknowledge that, as the authors also demonstrate in their paper, the effectiveness of such an intervention depends on the specific configuration of the choice interface. Hence, due to the ineffectiveness of the intervention, we cannot rule out that a more effective intervention could increase the reliability of rationality measurements. Lastly, we acknowledge that while the qualitative results for each dataset are similar, there is some variability in the quantitative reliability estimates, which could be driven by the heterogeneity of the included datasets.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Affirmative › Neoclassical Economics Good

Neoclassical Economics is good – they are linked to science and progress and shed light on priceless information on the economy that benefits the public.

Weintraub ‘23 – E. Roy Weintraub is an economics professor at Duke University and associate editor of History of Political Economy. [Neoclassical Economics, By E. Roy Weintraub. Source: Liberty Fund, Nonprofit. Liberty Fund, Inc. is a nonprofit foundation headquartered in Carmel, Indiana which promulgates the libertarian views of its founder, Pierre F. Goodrich through publishing, conferences, and educational resources, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NeoclassicalEconomics.html] GP

Neoclassical economics conceptualized the agents, households and firms, as rational actors. Agents were modeled as optimizers who were led to “better” outcomes. The resulting equilibrium was “best” in the sense that any other allocation of goods and services would leave someone worse off. Thus, the social system in the neoclassical vision was free of unresolvable conflict. The very term “social system” is a measure of the success of neoclassical economics, for the idea of a system, with its interacting components, its variables and parameters and constraints, is the language of mid-nineteenth-century physics. This field of rational mechanics was the model for the neoclassical framework. Agents were like atoms; utility was like energy; utility maximization was like the minimization of potential energy, and so forth. In this way was the rhetoric of successful science linked to the neoclassical theory, and in this way economics became linked to science itself. Whether this linkage was planned by the early , or rather was a feature of the public success of science itself, is less important than the implications of that linkage. For once neoclassical economics was associated with scientific economics, to challenge the neoclassical approach was to seem to challenge science and progress and modernity.

The value of neoclassical economics can be assessed in the collection of truths to which we are led by its light. The kinds of truths about incentives—about prices and information, about the interrelatedness of decisions and the unintended consequences of choices—are all well developed in neoclassical theories, as is a self-consciousness about the use of evidence. In planning for future electricity needs in my state, for example, the Public Utilities Commission develops a (neoclassical) demand forecast, joins it to a (neoclassical) cost analysis of generation facilities of various sizes and types (e.g., an 800-megawatt low-sulfur coal plant), and develops a least-cost system growth plan and a (neoclassical) pricing strategy for implementing that plan. Those on all sides of the issues, from industry to municipalities, from electric companies to environmental groups, all speak the same language of demand elasticities and cost minimization, of marginal costs and rates of return. The rules of theory development and assessment are clear in neoclassical economics, and that clarity is taken to be beneficial to the community of economists. The scientificness of neoclassical economics, on this view, is not its weakness but its strength.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Framework › 2NC – Framework – Plan Focus – Climate Affs

The aff’s model of debate is neoclassical economics par excellence. The simplification of the entire 1AC down to the plan causes “meaningless results.” Epistemology should come first. Anything else is the worst form of climate policymaking, whereby theories no longer need to be “continually tested against observation.”

Roo and Hoffart 20 – Dr. Michael Roos is a professor and researcher in the field of green technology and economics; Dr. Franziska Hoffart is an economic transition researcher interested in energy transition, hydrogen, climate crisis, and scenario analysis at DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, [“What’s Problematic About Mainstream Climate Economics?” Chapter from “Climate Economics”, Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-48423-1_4]RA

Neoclassical economists believe in the existence of universally applicable economic laws. In order to discover them, abstraction and stylisation are justified and even necessary. The abstractions can go to the point where they are in open contrast to reality. The usefulness of this approach is often claimed without further proof by reference to the plausibility of unrealistic assumptions as reasonable first approximations and the predictive success of the approach. One of the main problems of this approach is that it is strongly driven by the aim of stating the economic laws in precise mathematical equations, for which often strong simplifying assumptions are necessary. Without simplifying assumptions, the mathematical models are not tractable and the desired “theorems” cannot be derived. But as we argue below, the simplifications are not harmless in many cases and lead to meaningless results. The very core of DICE and similar models is the maximisation of the intertemporal welfare function (equation [1] in Chap. 3). The whole purpose of the model is to find the optimal, welfare-maximising price that should be imposed on carbon emissions in order to eliminate the externality problem. The approach of maximisation the welfare function is flawed for several reasons. Nordhaus and others use the conventional social planner approach to find the societal optimum. Since there is no global social planner, this method is defended by the argument that it is equivalent to a decentralised economy with intertemporally optimising households and profit maximising firms in a perfectly competitive market equilibrium. Yet these conditions are not met either. There is considerable evidence from behavioural economics that the conventional discounted utility model, which is the core of the Ramsey growth model, is not a good description of households’ intertemporal consumption choice. Frederick et al. (2004, p. 201) conclude their review article as follows: The DU model, which continues to be widely used by economists, has little empirical support. Even its developers—Samuelson who originally proposed the model, and Koopmans, who provided the first axiomatic derivation—had concerns about its descriptive realism, and it was never empirically validated as the appropriate model for intertemporal choice. Indeed, virtually every core and ancillary assumption of the DU model has been called into question by empirical evidence collected in the past two decades. In addition, consumers are heterogeneous and differ considerably in their planning behaviour (Ameriks et al. 2003; van Rooij et al. 2012) and in their desire to use a maximising or a satisfying decision-making style (Parker et al. 2007). Due to the heterogeneity of consumers, it is not surprising that the empirical support for the neoclassical model of intertemporal consumption choice is rather weak (D’Orlando and Sanfilippo 2010). In a similar vein, complexity economists reject the assumption that firms maximise profits (Beinhocker 2007). While sufficient profitability is a necessary condition for firms to endure, the objectives of firms are multidimensional and include the interest of many different stakeholders apart from the owners. Post-Keynesian economists share the view that the management of firms pursues multiple objectives, of which firm survival is an important one (Lavoie 2006). In order to survive, firms have to grow and to acquire power, for example, by larger market shares. Finally, evolutionary economists in the tradition of Nelson and Winter (1982) would also agree that firms do seek profits, but that the maximisation of profits is impossible due to uncertainty, bounded rationality and organisational complexity. A related point is that most non-mainstream schools reject the assumption of perfect competition and price-taking behaviour as an adequate description of the real world. Firms permanently strive for monopoly and price-setting power and many markets are oligopolies with rather small numbers of strategic competitors. In most countries, there are also various forms of state intervention in markets that prevent perfect competition. If neither households nor firms maximise their objective functions and if markets are not characterised well by a perfectly competitive equilibrium, the market outcome will most likely be different from what a social planner would have done in order to maximise social welfare. But then climate models using the social planner approach are purely theoretical exercises with little external validity. One might argue that models built on these stylised and unrealistic assumptions still capture many observed facts of the real economy. Even if this were true, there is no basis for the claim that the market outcome is maximising societal welfare. A final problem applies to the interpretation of the utility and the welfare function. Nordhaus (2013) stresses that the utility levels of each period concern the respective generation or cohort of people on earth. Hence, the welfare function is a social welfare function, which relates the welfare of different generations to one another over time. As a consequence, he does not consider the key parameters α and ρ as psychological characteristics of individuals but rather as social parameters that refer to large groups of people. This interpretation is in contrast to the usual interpretation of the utility function describing the utility of the representative agent, in which an explicit connection between the aggregate social level and the individual level is made. In line with textbook treatments and the usual approach in the literature, Nordhaus (1992, p. 1315) says that “the DICE model treats the world as a single economic entity and analyses the optimal policy for the average individual”. In the representative agent framework, it is assumed that the utility function describes the preferences of individuals such that the parameters of the utility function are psychological traits of persons that could in principle be measured. The individual preferences are then aggregated into social preferences of society assuming that the social preferences are equal to the preferences of the “average individual”. Although Kirman (1992), Hartley (1997) and others have shown long ago that the use of representative agents in macroeconomics is fundamentally flawed, they are still widely used in macroeconomic models. Blanchard (2009, p. 208) claims that “the state of macro is good” and the main merit of macro models with microfoundations is that welfare analysis with the correct welfare criterion is possible. Kirman (1992) demonstrates with a simple example that the interpretation of the representative agent as an average of different individuals does not make sense, because aggregating the revealed preferences of two individuals between two options into the choice of one representative agent can lead to the opposite choice of the representative agent relative to the choices of both individuals. Hartley (1997) shows that the representative agent constructed from individual choices in general is not stable if there is income redistribution. Only if all individuals have identical homothetic preferences generating parallel linear Engel curves, consistent aggregation is possible. Furthermore, they must have identical incomes in order to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a general equilibrium (Kirman 1992). Assuming that all individuals have very specific and identical utility functions and identical incomes is clearly counterfactual. Yet, if the utility function and the welfare function are not the result of the aggregated individual’s preference, it is unclear what the welfare levels of generations might be and how they could be measured. Nordhaus (2013) tries to argue that a descriptive approach of determining the social preference parameters could be used. Under the assumptions of utility and profit maximisation in a competitive equilibrium, the Ramsey Equation should hold: r∗=ρ+αg∗. (18) The Ramsey Equation relates the equilibrium real interest rate r∗ to the equilibrium long-run growth rate g∗ and the two preference parameters. Even if the two equilibrium levels of the interest rate and the growth rate could be observed, which is questionable, one of the two parameters remains undetermined. As Nordhaus (2013) demonstrates himself, the choice of the two parameters has a strong impact on the estimated social cost of carbon. Because there is no objective way of measuring or estimating the free parameter of the hypothetical social welfare function, the neoclassical approach of climate economics does not meet its own epistemological requirement according to which “[t]heories … are continually tested against observation. … The process of testing and refining theories is central to the development of economics as a science” (Robert and Rubinfeld 2018, p. 28). Because of the discussed epistemological problems of the neoclassical approach, we doubt that mainstream climate economics can achieve its goal of deriving optimal policies to respond to climate change in a meaningful way.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Growth Good – Poverty

Inequality, poverty, and dehumanization born of neoclassical economics hurts women most.

Morally 20, El Morally, R. (2020), El-Morally is a PhD in international development and Assistant Professor in International Relations & Security, Department of Political Science, American University in Cairo. “Women in development: a critique of neo- classical economic theory as one of the causes for gender inequality”. Open Journal of Political Science, 10 (1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 2164-0505 doi: https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2020.101001 Available at https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/90593/

It is important to take into account the social exclusivity of neoclassical theory. One can make the argument that neoclassical economic theory possess the power of targeted-lending, i.e. the lending agent is reigned with the responsibility to determine who the beneficiaries within a particular nation are by set- ting forth criteria for eligibility (e.g. in order to “qualify” for microfinancing, the household’s daily income ought to be less than $xy). Based on such understand- ing, and as Atkinson (1998) contended, social exclusivity is intrinsically focused on the dynamics which have permitted the deprivation of some and inclusion of others to arise, be socially and institutionally reproduced, and structurally per-petuated.14 Furthermore, adopting social exclusion analysis lends itself to in-depth investigations regarding structural injustices within a particular society and situation, mindful of the intersectionality of characteristics, experiences, and realities (e.g. age, religion, physical ability, land-ownership, class, etc.), which could characterize and generate exclusion15 (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez, 2014:50). Additionally, mindfulness towards exclusion analysis allows for a shift in narrative where distributional issues and allocation of resources are problematic. Stuart Mill16, took note of the exclusion and oppression of women. He argued for the devaluation of their productive contributions in 1869 and stated “All women (...) are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others...it is their nature to live for others”.17 This bias view of women and the belief that it was their nature to live for others caused the influential neoclassical economists to label certain laborious activities as “women’s work”; categorizing certain activi- ties as natural duties rather than productive work worthy of material reward in exchange. When addressing the effect of neoliberal policies, we must pay greater focus and directed our attention towards women and their specific experiences and issues regarding poverty. One of the major concerns for women is the accessibility of affordable services—an increasingly scarce resource.18 As part of the neoclassical agenda, increasing prices of commodities will lead to market equili- brium. However in lower-income working classes this is not the case, seeing that an increase in prices makes the commodity inaccessible for the poorer working classes in the developing countries. Women are more affected by the increase in prices than men, mainly because women are the financial managers of the household, making them the ones responsible for the purchasing of commodities. When an increase in prices occurs women usually seek jobs to help support their families. Therewith women carry the double-burden of housework and public employment. Consequentially this has come to be criticized and rejected by many, as policy makers are taking more from those who have less, for the sake of market equilibrium. One of the critiques is that the increase in prices widens the gap between the rich and the poor and perpetuates income inequalities, rather than decreasing the gap and satisfying the majority of the population.19 Furthermore, neoclassical economics treats labor as a commodity, which alienates and dehumanizes the labor. Commodifying the labor to neoclassical economics means the reduction of wages to increase profit. With that reduction of labor and the substitution of human labor with heavy machinery, decreased the opportunities for employment. The patriarchal nature of developing societies increases the probability of males’ presence in public spheres and consequential- ly in the labor market. This increase in male presence in the labor market lowers the probabilities of female employment, resulting in the absence of women from the public sphere. This dilemma ultimately leads to the oppression of women and the violation of their rights to politically and socially participates.20 Additionally, with the treatment of labor as a commodity [means] gender discrimination and gendered division of labor are further perpetuated, by further denoting women’s role in productivity as one that is inferior to that of men.21 3. The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Gender Dynamics Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are a derivative from neoclassical eco- nomic theory, because at the time when the programs were initiated neoclassical economic theory was the dominant model and the one that seemed most successful. This helps in explaining the liberal approach apparent in the Structural Adjustment Programs.22 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a difficult period had fallen upon the developing countries. This difficulty originated from high inflation causing the economy’s growth rates to slow down dramatically, which led to the decline of earnings from exports, creating what we know as “trade deficit”. These economic factors led to the intense deterioration of the national incomes of developing states, causing a depreciation of standards of living. In the 1980s however a glimpse of hope started to appear for the developing world when the Bretton Woods Institutions introduced stabilization and adjustment packages to them.23 The term “adjustment” connotes a variety of macro-economic mechanisms suggested by the Bretton Woods Institutions to rescue the economies of the developing countries. It frequently involved cutbacks in government expenditure. Consequently, government expenditure per capita fell in over half the countries of the developing world in the period 1980-1984.24 However this was not without a cost, the cuts in the government’s public expenditure led to governments increasingly “laying off” workers, consequentially a melodramatic increase in the unemployment ratio in the developing world was to become visible. An analysis of several Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s illustrate that countries that had adopted the SAP had a relatively lower women’s employment ratio than countries that did not.25 The study put an emphasis on the normalization of patriarchy in Latin American and lists it as one of the main causes for the unemployment of women in Latin America. The study also illustrates that when cut- backs in wages led to women seeking more than one job vacancy, yet there were none to be found because they were all reserved for men, who had physical superiority to women.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Growth Good – Poverty

Under neoclassical economics, wealth accumulation means poverty.

Reda 18 Reda, Ayman. (2018). Ayman Reda is a professor in the Economics department at University of Michigan - “Wealth and Poverty: Neoclassical Economic Thought and Its Critics.”

In other words, much of the form and substance of economic discourse can be inferred from an investigation into the changing nature of the relationship between wealth and poverty. This means that wealth can only be understood if examined in relation to poverty, and vice versa. It also means that any theoretical attempt to rid both concepts of this fundamental association is itself symptomatic of the changing tides of intellectual discourse. The relationship between wealth and poverty has had an interesting tenure in the history of ideas, with schools and scholars adopting more than one theme at the same time. Also, each theme, examined individually, can be traced through all episodes of intellectual thought, with varying levels of emphasis. As a case in point, one of the major themes in this discourse is the view that wealth is superior to poverty, or that a state of affluence is preferred to that of poverty. This view is documented in the writings of pre-Socratic scholars, emphasized to a lesser degree by Aristotle, passionately argued by the scholars of the Enlightenment, glorified by the likes of Andrew Carnegie, and religiously accepted in contemporary society. Iterations of this view can also be detected, albeit in a more cautious manner, in Biblical literature and Islamic scripture. The opposing view, which considers poverty to be superior to wealth, has also enjoyed some support among intellectuals and schools of thought. The Cynics of ancient Greece belong to this view, with Socrates believed to be one of its earliest proponents. This view can also be inferred from Biblical literature and the writings of the early Fathers; in this regard, the concept of voluntary poverty has had a significant impact on the Christian way of life. To a lesser extent, this view did exist among some Islamic scholars, with Al Ghazali believed by some to be implicitly in favor of such an ascetic lifestyle. A somewhat different perspective also existed, equally suspicious of wealth, but that did not necessarily view poverty in such positive terms. Advocates of this view, such as Aristotle, the Stoics and some of the Cynics, believed other ideals such as virtue and wisdom to be the ultimate ends to which all action must be directed. And yet a slightly different view considered wealth as simply a means to a higher end, be it God, material abundance, cultural refinement or social harmony. This view included a broad range of scholars, the likes of Xenophon, Aristotle, Augustine, Smith, Tawney and Keynes. This perspective can also be spotted in the Old Testament, papal encyclicals, and some of the writings of Islamic theologians and jurists. Slight variations on this perspective included the view that wealth, per se, is to be shunned, but that its use must be geared towards a more sublime or spiritual way of life. This view was shared by some of the early Fathers of the Church and Aquinas, among others. A more common view held that poverty and wealth are two objectionable extremes, and that a mean position should ideally be sought. This perspective emphasizes the virtue of moderation, and is especially prevalent in the Aristotelian tradition, Biblical literature and Islamic scripture. While these views focus on the relative merits of wealth and poverty, others seek to establish a causal relationship between the two. One such view held that wealth [is] was a direct cause of poverty, on the basis that the accumulation of wealth by some will, for the most part, result in social and economic injustice that contributes to the poverty of others. In a sense, wealth reproduces itself for the price of poverty. This view is fairly common in the history of ideas, and is present in the economic thought of Plato, Marx, Henry George, and is somewhat implicit to Smith and Keynes. It is especially explicit in the literature of the Old and New Testaments, the Qur'an, and the writings of Islamic scholars. This view simply does not believe that more wealth necessarily contributes to less poverty, but that amidst plenty, many live in poverty. In contrast, many scholars believed wealth to be the primary, if not the only, means of alleviating poverty. Historically considered as the "liberal" solution, this view postulates that the creation of wealth will ultimately benefit all through a trickle-down mechanism inherent in market economies. This view is normally attributed to the classical and neoclassical schools of economic thought. Finally, another view takes issue with the conventional usage of the terms wealth and poverty, and offers alternate definitions. The Cynics, for example, considered poverty as the proper wealth, and the wealthy as the true poor. This view is also present in Xenophon's Socrates, the New Testament, in addition to Islamic scripture and literature. It is clear that these many views of the relationship between wealth and poverty are not mutually exclusive; that a scholar or school may subscribe to more than one view at a time, without necessarily falling into a theoretical contradiction. It is also clear that wealth or poverty have always been viewed in contradistinction to one another, either to impart an appraisal of their relative merits, or to establish a necessary relationship between the two. The careful examination of these considerations will constitute a substantial part of this chapter, and one of its primary objectives. An additional objective, and equally significant, is that the chapter will serve as an extension of the previous chapter on scarcity and abundance, providing more nuance to some of the arguments developed and their theoretical and practical implications. A complete understanding of the intellectual history of scarcity and abundance is only possible if studied in conjunction with the development of wealth and poverty in the history of ideas. The neoclassical school of economics defines wealth in terms of scarcity, which means that as scarcity increases, so does wealth. And so while it may seem that the theoretical relation between wealth and scarcity reached its zenith with this school, it was a strictly formal link, stripped of all philosophical and ethical substance. Part II aims to revisit the rich intellectual history of these parallels and links as they developed within schools of thought and across traditions. The structure employed will be similar to that of Part I: we begin our survey with an examination of Greek economic thought and end with Islamic economic thought. In the previous chapter of this book, we discussed the "switch from a well-being, material production view of wealth to a scarcity view;" the former view being characteristic of the Classical School, and the latter of the Neoclassical School. This "switch" occurred in the midst of several major intellectual transformations: from "objective" to "subjective" theories of value, from social to individual categories of explanation, the movement towards generalized abstractions and away from historical or cultural contexts, and the increasing use of mathematical modeling techniques. In economics, these transformations materialized in the Marginal Utility "revolution" that occurred towards the end of the 19th century (Clark 2006, 41). This "revolution," however, was mainly formative in nature, with only minor changes in the substantive core of the discipline. On the topic of wealth, specifically, the neoclassical school, for the most part, extended the views of the Classical School to their logical and empirical conclusions. According to Whittaker (1940, 117), the English economist, W. S. Jevons, and in developing the theoretical structure of the "Marginal or Neo-Classical School of economics, went back to Benthamism." In the preface to his Theory of Political Economy, Jevons declares that, In this work I have attempted to treat Economy as a Calculus of Pleasure and Pain, and have sketched out, almost irrespective of previous opinions, the form which the science, as it seems to me, must ultimately take. I have long thought that as it deals throughout with quantities, it must be a mathematical science in matter if not in language. I have endeavoured to arrive at accurate quantitative notions concerning Utility, Value, Labour, Capital, etc., and I have often been surprised to find how clearly some of the most difficult notions, especially that most puzzling of notions Value, admit of mathematical analysis and expression. The Theory of Economy thus treated presents a close analogy to the science of Statical Mechanics, and the Laws of Exchange are found to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a lever as determined by the principle of virtual velocities. The nature of Wealth and Value is explained by the consideration of indefinitely small amounts of pleasure and pain, just as the Theory of Statics is made to rest upon the equality of indefinitely small amounts of energy. (Quoted in Whittaker 1940, 117) Thus, the philosophical basis of the Neoclassical theory is that of "classical liberalism," the intellectual tradition developed by Hobbes, Locke and Bentham. The theory postulates an "economical calculus" of decision-making, where the "pleasures or satisfactions of consuming wealth were balanced against the efforts or pains of producing it, and the working of the human mind in the economic sphere was represented as a matter of equilibrating the two."

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Growth Good – Poverty

Neoclassical economic policies only push self-interest, they leave no room for poverty alleviation.

Chiti 10, Leonard Chiti, SJ, 2010, Chiti is director of the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection in Lusaka, Zambia. “Markets, Inequality, and Poverty” BHO

Neoclassical economic theory assumes that a given rate of growth of GDP translates into poverty reduction. Increases in GDP in any given country represent the best route towards lifting people out of poverty. Such growth maybe accompanied by rapid rates of industrialization giving rise to new jobs, increasing incomes and improving the living standards of the poor.33 According to this line of thinking growth occurs when market forces are allowed to determine the prices of different products on the market to stimulate productivity and innovation. Consequently, a self-regulating market economy responding to price signals is able to stimulate economic activities driven by supply and demand forces to ensure that economic actors pursue self interests that culminate in economic growth. Narrow economic interests are primary and no other considerations are allowed to play a part in economic endeavours. Neoliberal economic policies believe that the State is an inefficient and ineffective actor in allocating scarce resources. The assumption is that the market is a better instrument at allocating resources.34 Neoliberal economic models are predicated on the existence of free and perfect markets. These markets allow free entry and exit of economic actors into the market. This facilitates market forces to play the role of determining prices and consequently allocating resources according to the dictates of supply and demand. The logic of markets embedded in neoclassical economics is predicated on the assumption that economic actors are motivated and solely preoccupied with maximizing utility. Consequently an economy can only reach optimal efficiency when there is no attempt to regulate self-interested economic actors. This kind of economics would go so far as to posit that those who are poor and unemployed have failed to take advantage of market opportunities to earn a livelihood. In its purist form classical and neoclassical economic theory does not have a place for poverty alleviation programs particularly the type that are undertaken by the State. Neoclassical economists see poverty reduction efforts as slowing down growth.36 This in some ways explains the neoclassical economists’ antipathy towards the State’s intervention in the economy. For neoclassical economists the market is superior to the State in resource allocation and therefore the latter should be limited in its interventions in the economy. Market fundamentalists are obsessed with growth. Growth comes from the entrepreneurial activity of a rational economic actor operating in an enabling environment. There is no questioning that growth is necessary for development and that markets can play an important role in facilitating this growth. However, growth for its own sake is not a sufficient condition for development and poverty reduction. What is crucial is to recognize the limitations of both the State and markets in development activities.37 The State, however, can play a meaning role in limiting or even compensating for market failures. Perhaps the basic question that can be asked is ‘What can government do best?.38 Neoclassical economic theory fails to take into account the fact that markets can experience failures. For markets to work efficiently several conditions need to occur such as perfect information, unhindered entry and exit into the market, perfect competition just to mention a few. Seldom are many of these conditions met. Consequently, market failures are common particularly in Low Development Countries.39 It has been frequently stated that the market is a good servant but a bad master.Left to itself it cannot guarantee the integral development of every human being. What is required is to harness the good side of the market, as represented its ability to generate wealth, and reject its bad side which is seen mostly in its unintended effects such as increase in inequalities. Neoclassic economic theory with its attendant methodological individualism places a heavy premium on a rational actor pursuing self-interest in a bid to maximise material well-being. This displays a reductionist world view where everything is reduced to economic interests. This effectively rules any other way of conceiving human well being. A flawed vision of the world. Neoliberalism’s worldview revolves around material concerns. The basic quest for rational beings is to achieve as much material success as possible. When human beings are given the freedom to pursue their private interests aided by the price mechanism society benefits from increased growth of the economy41 Their anthropology is founded on the notion that human beings are solely preoccupied with the pursuit of economic self-interest. This vision of the world is flawed. It is purely a mechanistic worldview that gives too much responsibility to the market to address the society’s challenges. Much of the conflict between the proponents and opponents of the market stems from differing ideological positions. The former have received backing from conservative political forces believe that society’s challenges can be resolved by strengthening the rights of individuals to pursue individual interests. Conservatives who espouse capitalist approach to economic activity believe that negative freedoms such as the right to non-interference to economic actors to participate in economic affairs should be strengthened in order to enable the fruits of such endeavours to ‘trickle down’ to the rest of society. On the other hand, civil society perspectives that the rights of individuals should be matched with their corresponding duties to aid the collective should be retained and promoted. The market cannot assure these rights only the State can guarantee them. The goal of development from a neoliberal point of view is to increase the nations’ GDP. The higher the GDP the more prosperous the country is reckoned.42 However, GDP misses many aspects of our existence. Besides, much of the progress in important areas of life is invisible to most people.43 The neoliberal paradigm simply promotes the materialistic motivations of individuals.44 Ethical Concerns The main normative aspect of neoliberalism is the promotion of individual achievement and protection of negative rights45 Right wing political forces in the 1980s and early 1990s at the time of the hegemony market economy economic theories supported such approaches. However, as Allen and Thomas point out that social forces such as solidarity and other non-market forces play crucial roles in improving the living standards of the people.46 This would be in sharp contrast to the moral voice of the Church which encourages the promotion of social values. Commenting on the crisis that beset the capitalist world in 2008, Frank Turner wonders whether part of the problem of the Global Economic Crisis could not be ascribed to the absence of ‘a moral or systemic crisis’.47 It surely can be argued that the absence of ethical and moral consideration did play a part in the Financial crisis that engulfed much of the Western World in 2008. The greed and irresponsibility exhibited by some economic actors in these financial markets played a critical role in its unravelling. Neoclassical economic theory would consider this normal as part of the motivating factor of ‘rational self- interested’ economic actors. Ethical and moral concerns are important in the Christian approach to interactions in the market place. The Church Social Teaching is clear on the need to promote ethical values such as solidarity, the common good and a special concern for the poor48 The economy and by extension the market should serve the interest of those who are weak and unable to actively take advantage of the market to advance their economic and material interests. The market cannot guarantee this facilitate. And free markets cannot work in a moral vacuum.49 The State who primary responsibility is to promote the common good is expected to supplement the actions of the market. Such goods as shelter, health care, education, transport and welfare cannot be left to the market50 Civil society groups who oppose the self-regulating market in development activities point to similar concerns. As a practical example, the JCTR, a faith based organisation that engages in research, advocacy and education has always advocated for a value based approached to development endeavours. It employs the CST to call for the respect of human dignity and the promotion of human rights as a holistic approach to development. Such an approach recognises that the market on its own cannot deliver on development. The market is amoral and needs moral input to ensure that the ‘trickled down effect’ reaches all corners of society. Free markets need appropriate political direction to ensure that the goods of the earth are enjoyed by all its inhabitants. Conclusion The preceding sought to suggest that the theoretical assumptions underpinning the neoclassical economic theories are flawed. Neoliberal models of development advocated by pro-market fundamentalists in the 1980s and 1990s failed to lift the vast majority of people out of poverty. Such policies promoted by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF have done very little to significantly reduce poverty and narrow existing inequalities. CSOs including the church have been advocating a tempering of the push for market oriented reforms in order to less the adverse impact of neoliberal economic reforms.51 This essay attempted to show that different ways of perceiving the world yield different ways of intervening to bring about positive social change. A neoliberal worldview sees social change in terms of increasing aggregate wealth which then is redistributed by inhuman market forces to bring about a convergence in living standards between the rich and the poor. This way of perceiving the world has been found wanting. Economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction and declining inequality. The evidence adduced above suggest that in some cases economic growth does very little to change existing poverty situation and inequalities. Neoliberalism with its stress on individual action as a precursor to group welfare has not fared well in Zambia. Much of the failure of neoliberalism can be located in its universalist pretensions of what works in one place can work everywhere. The one –size fits all approach has now been discredited even though the fall of communism appeared to give a thumbs up to capitalism. In recent times, the once derided economic planning has made a comeback and the State has been reinstated in order to curb the excesses of the market and strengthen the distributive dimension of human well being.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Growth Good – Poverty

Neoclassical economic policies do not help poverty levels, instead they lower quality of living – Zambia proves

Chiti 10, Leonard Chiti, SJ, 2010, Chiti is director of the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection in Lusaka, Zambia. “Markets, Inequality, and Poverty” BHO

Neoliberal economic policies derived from neoclassical economic theory hypothesis that establishing markets and providing a laissez faire environment leads to increased productivity. This increase will yield increased incomes and raise the standard of living for all concerned. This implies that the solution to high levels of poverty and wide inequalities lies in increased economic growth. In the initial stages such growth may not be sufficient to wipe out inequalities pace but eventually with long term sustained growth such inequalities will disappear and poverty levels will fall.19 Application to Zambia Since 1991, Zambia has been implementing neoliberal economic policies following the election of right wing leaning government. The introduction of market reforms followed an economic crisis in the 1980s, growing out of an inefficient economic system, decline in copper prices and a protracted drought.20 The Zambian government instituted market oriented reforms that entailed reducing subsidies, privatizing government owned firms and liberalizing the trading environment. These reforms formed part of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ a raft of economic reforms sponsored by the World Bank, the IMF and the US Treasury. The goal was to replace State intervention in the economy and allow markets through the private sector to drive the economy. Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world. 64% of its population lives below the poverty threshold while 51% live in extreme poverty.21 It is ranked 164 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index.22 It is also considered to have high inequalities amongst its population23 Statistics show that Zambia has one the highest Gini coefficients in the world, with the latest figure standing at 50.824. The latest government review on the performance of the Fifth National Development Plan indicates that in 2006 the Gini coefficient representing income distribution was as high as 60.25 The transition to a market oriented economy took the form of structural adjustment programes (SAPs) in 1991. SAPs were intended to arrest a declining economy that had been in free fall since the mid 1970s. Market reforms will restore efficiency, stimulate growth and ultimately improve the quality of life of the Zambians. The introduction of market reforms was expected to lead to greater equity.26 At the time up to 71% of the population was classified as poor.27 In terms of poverty levels, a reduction from 71% to 64% was achieved between 1991 and 2009. However, in terms of inequality, Zambia remains a very unequal society. The 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey shows that 50% of the population earns 15% of total national income while 10% of the population earns 48%.28 The implementation of neoliberal economic policies through SAPs did not immediately yield the kind of economic growth that would reduce poverty levels significantly. Even though Zambia achieved some stability following the introduction of a market economy and scored growth rates of around 5% over several years, nonetheless inequalities remain high as indicated by the Gini coefficient. The notion that growth will lead to poverty reduction and equity has not matched the neoclassical economy theory in the case of Zambia. The so called ‘trickle down’ effect has hardly touched the majority of Zambians. The prediction of neoclassical economic theory that the action of self-interested individuals pursuing maximum utility in a market system would lead to the improvement of the general welfare of a population29 has yet to produce improvements in the quality of life of Zambians. The expectation that high and sustainable growth will automatically translate into poverty reduction.30 has not occurred 20 years after neoliberal economic policies were introduced in Zambia. This link between poverty reduction and increased productivity is the preferred approach of the neoclassical economists.31 Poverty can be eliminated if market forces are unleashed to do what they do best, induce growth and the growth will culminate in more incomes for everyone concerned. This will translate into a more equitable society with ease access of the citizens of the country to the basic needs essential for survival. However the evidence in Zambia does not fit the theory. Surveys conducted by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) since 1996 show that the cost of living for the majority of Zambians has been on a steady rise while the corresponding income levels have not risen to match the cost of living.32 The evidence adduced above supports the theory that neoclassical economic theory and its attendant neoliberal economic policies do not in all cases lead to sustainable development. Sustainable development in this sense is seen as enabling many more citizens of a country to enjoy a high quality of life. Neoliberal economic policies which further the free actions of market forces to spur on development have yet to show convincing evidence that the growth leads to equity.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Growth Good

The aff’s ideological error of a universal system ignores society and its complex arrangements – this view on the system is inherently erroneous – taking out all warrants for economic growth.

Henry 15 - JOHN F. HENRY, 2015 [“Classical political economy”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, WINTER 2015, Vol. 38, No. 2 (WINTER 2015), pp. 280-301https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48540606.pdf?casa_token=DTpTdL6H0pUAAAAA:-qcapoeaiDGhGHfKOMbGTTXQ32T9MzUaP4DWBDVm0xPEC5Ww9zGxW3GA6QQoxZDs52TxjYQ9cIdFPbMfMsIJn_ZTLh4ZvOGxD-An1yI3OFuNwYx5RL4]

But, should the JG wage be set at some poverty level rate? If one returns to the classical position in the context of a more recent work, Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960), a more nuanced argument might be tendered. Sraffa’s work is highly technical and seems to be merely a demonstration of the interrelationships of the various elements (inputs and outputs) that constitute the production relations of an economy, specifically a capitalist economy. “Hidden” within this argument, however, is a most important notion—that a successful capitalist society requires that the population, in particular the leading segments of that population—government officials, large business leaders, and so on—accept the idea that all members of a country’s population must exist in a state of “viability.” In order for a relatively healthy economy to exist, the society that supports that economy must not only exist but itself be healthy. One cannot examine merely the economic organization as a separate entity with a supposed life of its own. One must understand that economy in relation to the larger social order within which it functions. In a sense, this is a return to the “embedded,” “disembedded” debate of the 1950s that was prompted by Karl Polanyi’s argument in The Great Transformation (1944). Whereas conventional (neoclassical) economic theory seeks to examine a hypothetical economy independent of society, Polanyi (among others) argued that such an approach was fundamentally flawed: all economies, whatever their specific form, were contained (embedded) within society. CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 295 This content downloaded from 86.38.32.109 on Sun, 02 Jul 2023 00:09:10 +00:00 All use subject to https To ignore society, and thus social relationships, institutions, various arrangements, and so on, implies that all economies were essentially the same (hence, the “universalist” theory of neoclassical economics, independent of time and place), which means that one could never examine or understand any specific economy.11 “Viability” for many “heterodox” economists is merely a specification of the necessary technical features of an economy that allow for that economy’s reproduction. For Sraffa, however, viability means “survival of the system as a whole—a characteristically holistic goal to be pursued by any human community” (Chiodi, 2010, p. 324). Economic surplus, the output that allows an economy to grow, is “a social construction, an ultimate reflection of ethical, religious, and political values existing in the system and shaping …the relationships among people” (ibid.).

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Neoclassical Economics Good

Neoclassicism is the problem in and of itself. Reject appliances of amoral practices that consistently violate prejudice and moral constraint.

Henry 15 - JOHN F. HENRY, 2015 [“Classical political economy”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, WINTER 2015, Vol. 38, No. 2 (WINTER 2015), pp. 280-301https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48540606.pdf?casa_token=DTpTdL6H0pUAAAAA:-qcapoeaiDGhGHfKOMbGTTXQ32T9MzUaP4DWBDVm0xPEC5Ww9zGxW3GA6QQoxZDs52TxjYQ9cIdFPbMfMsIJn_ZTLh4ZvOGxD-An1yI3OFuNwYx5RL4]

In the propertied economy termed capitalism, ownership (or control) of productive property must meet certain conditions if private property itself is to be considered ethically sound. Such an economy over the course of its development will be composed of a minority (in the modern era, a small minority) of owners, and a large (and increasingly larger) portion who are propertyless. As a consequence, those who end up without property are dependent for their income— thus, their subsistence—on securing employment offered by those who control the means of production through which output is produced. The constraints imposed on property owners for an ethically sound propertied society go back to John Locke, generally considered to be the father of property rights theory. Locke, while certainly condoning private property in land, and so on, in the second volume of his Two Treatises of Government imposed two constraints that must be satisfied if such a regime is to be morally tenable. Initially, any property taken from “the commons” (public or collective property) had to be based on one’s labor that was expended to improve that property. (Although Locke focused on landed property, his argument applies more generally.) However, two further conditions had to be met, labeled the “prejudice” and the “spoilage” constraints—and these were seen as moral constraints. Essentially, the prejudice constraint means that no one can be disadvantaged by another’s appropriation of property; all must benefit, though some may benefit more than others. The spoilage constraint connotes that none can seize property beyond that which can be used by one’s own labor. If either constraint is not satisfied, two options are proposed: the disadvantaged have the right to revolt and overturn a private property regime, or government has the obligation to intervene to rectify the situation in the interests of the community at large. In Locke’s argument, there is a right to subsistence as the emergence of property may mean that members of the community have lost their All use subject to https ability to provide for themselves from the commons, and this is a “prejudice”—some have been disadvantaged.10 We first note that both constraints have been violated, even though Locke continues to be invoked in the theoretical defense of a capitalist propertied order. Capitalism since at least the industrial revolution period (and this varies from country to country) clearly violates the spoilage constraint insofar as modern property holdings far exceed the ability of owners to work that property with their own labor. Second, unemployment—a singular characteristic of modern capitalism—clearly “prejudices” those who are required to find employment to secure their subsistence. Hence, governments are required to rectify at least the second, prejudice, condition, and this requires governments to seek ways to do so. Thus far, the “solution” has been limited to palliatives such as unemployment insurance, various welfare schemes, and so on. These have proved insufficient at best. A far better remedy is that of a job guarantee program because the basic problem is unemployment itself.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › 2NC – AT Neoclassical Economics Good

Doctrine of neoclassicism in its reliance on homo economicus and absence of exogenous factors is deadly for the proletariat – culminating in poisonous wars between the ruling class and the workers.

Henry 15 - JOHN F. HENRY, 2015 [“Classical political economy”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, WINTER 2015, Vol. 38, No. 2 (WINTER 2015), pp. 280-301https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48540606.pdf?casa_token=DTpTdL6H0pUAAAAA:-qcapoeaiDGhGHfKOMbGTTXQ32T9MzUaP4DWBDVm0xPEC5Ww9zGxW3GA6QQoxZDs52TxjYQ9cIdFPbMfMsIJn_ZTLh4ZvOGxD-An1yI3OFuNwYx5RL4]

Marx is very clear that this socially determined subsistence is an average, aggregate concept around which the market wage will revolve and various deviations will occur—different skill levels, for example. Thus, he was clearly in-line with the understanding of the classical giants. Note, however, his overt inclusion of a moral element. What is the theoretical significance of the classical concept of a socially determined subsistence wage? One first notes that the natural or subsistence wage is determined exogenously. This has significant import. In his contretemps with Paul Samuelson (and, in passing, Samuel Hollander), Pierangelo Garegnani, arguing from a modern classical (Sraffian) position takes issue with the neoclassical supply–demand interpretation of classical theory. To be sure, Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and others did use such terms, but never in a neoclassical, functional sense. Such references were merely to “points” representing deviations from “natural” prices, including the price of labor (power).3 In the neoclassical story, if unemployment exists, “one would then have to admit as possible, or even normal, [that] the wage could tend to zero or, in any case, to levels intolerable for the workers, in contrast with experience and indeed with the possibility of survival of society itself” (Garegnani, 2007, p. 193). On the contrary, “with regard to the general level of the wages, institutional elements would constrain the wage bargains… within limits set by the previous history of the wage, and, in particular, by the notion of subsistence accepted by the community” (ibid., 3See Aspromourgos (2007) for Smith’s position on supply and demand. CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 287 This content downloaded from 63.141.49.27 on Sat, 01 Jul 2023 15:48:55 +00:00 All use subject to https p. 194). From the vantage point of a socially determined subsistence wage, one is outside the neoclassical theory. Further, it should be noted that in classical theory, wages were perceived as income. In the orthodox, neoclassical approach, a wage is a price, set in and by “the market.” This difference has serious implications in distinguishing a Keynesian (or Sraffian) approach to employment issues in which a market mechanism is rejected in determining the historically determined wage.4 The second significant theoretical aspect of the subsistence wage approach is that exploitation and power relationships enter the picture. Observe that in Smith, profits and rents are “deductions” from the “produce of labour.” With the exogenous setting of the “natural” wage level, the difference between total output (income) and wages is established. Because labor produces all output—the labor embodied theory of value—the share of nonlabor income is thus determined. This would constitute what Marx termed surplus value and represents that portion of output produced by labor but that is not returned to (the “productive” portion of ) this class—that is, exploitation. In neoclassical theory, no such term exists because in competitive equilibrium—the standard for this approach—all “factors of production” receive the full value of their contribution to output.5 As exploitation is then a normal and necessary characteristic of capitalism, one would expect that those on both sides of this relationship would exert force to either increase or decrease the rate of exploitation. In Smith, this is the contest between the “masters” and workers. It is also the contest between capitalists and landlords surrounding the distribution of the surplus. Ricardo seems clear on these “class struggles” (in Marx’s terminology), though his technical appurtenances somewhat conceal this aspect of his general theory. Nonetheless, some observers saw this feature of Ricardo’s line of argument as damning. As Henry Carey wrote in 1847: “Mr. Ricardo’s system is one of discords.…Its whole tends to the production of hostility among classes and nations. …His book 4See Roncaglia (1988). Some confusion on the issue exists as Keynes did use Marshallian language in discussions of a so-called labor market. However, as James Galbraith has pointed out, there is no “labor market” in The General Theory. See Galbraith (1997). 5 In “imperfectly” competitive markets, a form of technical exploitation does exist in that “factors of production” are not paid the value of their marginal product. 288 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS This content downloaded from 63.141.49.27 on Sat, 01 Jul 2023 15:48:55 +00:00 All use subject to https is the true manual of the demagogue, who seeks power by agrarianism, war and plunder” (Carey, 1967 [1847], p. 75). Keynes reported that Herbert Foxwell “failed to deliver his presidential address on Ricardo to the Royal Economic Society …on the ground that his onslaught on the man, who had convinced the world of the dreadful heresy of a necessary conflict between the interests of capital and labour, would have been too provocative” (Keynes and Collet, 1936, p. 592). As Thomas Sargent put it recently, “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution” (in Milanovic, 2011, p. vi).6 The third aspect is that of the “moral” element à la Marx (though usually implicit in Smith and Ricardo). In classical theory, a societal element strongly influences the determination of wages, thus, the determination of all incomes (as above). Incomes and income shares are not simply the result of the “technical coefficients of production,” as in the neoclassical story, but are strongly influenced by social norms: there is an ethical standard to which wages are to conform and this tempers, to some degree at least, the self-interested behavior that, in part, characterizes capitalism. The “class struggle” is contained, in a sense, within limits established by an ethical component that precedes and lies outside capitalism itself. A value system underpins and logically exists prior to economic analysis. Another way of saying much the same thing is that the economy is embedded in the larger, value-laden society. Clearly, this represents a distinct difference from neoclassical theorizing in which such matters are to be eliminated from consideration. Concern with ethical matters transcends classical theory. It was clearly a component in the early protosocialist movements of the post–Industrial Revolution period in England. Robert Owen, William Thompson, John Gray, and others all put forward ethical arguments surrounding the attempt to found a “moral economy” (see Claeys, 1987). One finds similar positions in Keynes and Veblen. It can be noted that the early, pre–General Theory Keynes spoke to the issue of wages as an income share both outside some 6To be fair to Sargent, his argument focused on redistribution as a solution to poverty, arguing that increased production has had a much greater effect on poverty alleviation. However, the standard economists concern regarding the “poisonous” nature of inquiries into distribution remains valid. CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 289 This content downloaded from 63.141.49.27 on Sat, 01 Jul 2023 15:48:55 +00:00 All use subject to https hypothetical labor market, and also to be established on the basis of some notion of fairness, of reasonableness: It is not only in the direction of the regulation of capital that the state must be prepared for new functions. It must be prepared to regard the regulation of wages of great industrial groups as being not merely of private concern, and it must quite deliberately in its wages and hours policy treat the gradual betterment of workers as the first charge on the national wealth. (Keynes, 1981 [1927], p. 646) Further, it is time to raise the question as to whether society should institute a policy of paying wages on a “fair” and “reasonable” basis. (Keynes, 1972 [1925], p. 303)

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › Impact – Turns Environment

The 1AC’s assumptions about the economy are based on conceptual and ignored flaws regarding the environment – this obfuscation of fact turns every AFF environment scenario.

Hall et al. 01 – Charles A. S. Hall is an American and ESF Foundation Distinguished Professor at in the College of Environmental Science & Forestry. [Charles Hall and others, The Need to Reintegrate the Natural Sciences with Economics: Neoclassical economics, the dominant form of economics today, has at least three fundamental flaws from the perspective of the natural sciences, but it is possible to develop a different, biophysical basis for economics that can serve as a supplement to, or a replacement for, neoclassical economics, BioScience, Volume 51, Issue 8, August 2001, Pages 663–673, ] GP

Contemporary economics pays only marginal attention to the first and second laws of thermodynamics. This is a serious conceptual flaw and an obstacle to the design of economic policies that can successfully meet the challenges of pollution, resource scarcity, and unemployment. The two laws say that nothing happens in the world without energy conversion and entropy production, with the consequence that every process of biotic and industrial production requires the input of energy. Because of unavoidable entropy production, the valuable part of energy (exergy) is transformed into useless heat at the temperature of the environment (anergy), and usually matter is dissipated, too. This results in pollution and, eventually, exhaustion of the higher grade resources of fossil fuels and raw materials. Human labor, living on food, has been and continues to be replaced (at least in part) by energy-driven machines in the routine production of goods and services.

Although the first and second laws of thermodynamics are the most thoroughly tested and validated laws of nature, and they state explicitly that it is impossible to have a perpetual motion machine—that is, a machine that performs work without the input of exergy—the basic neoclassical economic model is a perpetual motion machine, with no required inputs or limits (Figure 1a). Most economists have accepted that incomplete model as the basis for their analyses and have relegated energy and other resources to unimportance in those analyses (e.g., Denison 1979, 1984). This attitude was fixed in the minds of most economists by the analysis of Barnett and Morse (1963), who found no indication of increasing scarcity of raw materials, as determined by their inflation-corrected price, for the first half of the 20th century (Smith 1989). Their analysis, although cited by nearly all economists interested in the depletion issue, was nonetheless seriously incomplete. Cleveland showed that the only reason that decreasing concentrations and qualities of resources were not translated into higher prices for constant quality was because of the decreasing price of energy and its increasing use in the exploitation of increasingly lower-grade reserves in the United States and elsewhere (Cleveland 1991). Thus, although economists have argued that natural resources are not important to the economy, the truth is that it is only because of the abundant availability of many natural resources that economics can assign them low monetary value, despite their critical importance to economic production.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Impact › Impact

Neoclassical Economics fuel the deepening of ecological crises, undermine physical and psychological welfare, and destabilizes the economy. Rejection and critique of the reduces this archival pollutant and erodes its hold over the discipline of economics.

Panayotakis 12 — Costas Panayotakis is Professor of Sociology at the New York City College of Technology at the City University of New York [Review of Radical Political Economics XX(X) 1–18 © 2012 Union for Radical Political Economics, ] GP

Moreover, the persistence of scarcity in a society which did not artificially inflate people’s material desires but increased people’s desire for free time would not represent an unfortunate development but a manifestation of a changed, and richer, way of life for all human beings. In fact, the persistence of scarcity in such a society would be less important than the difference between the configurations of scarcity produced by this society and the configurations produced by capitalism. Indeed, in capitalism the gap between people’s wants and the goods available for their satisfaction takes very destructive forms. A profit-driven consumerist culture undermines people’s physical and psychological welfare, pushes them into debt that destabilizes the economy, leads them to work long hours, thus undermining their family and community life, and so on.16 When one turns to the supply-side parameters of scarcity within capitalism, one finds the great social and economic inequalities, which Dugger and Peach rightly highlight and which account for the persistence of obscene levels of misery and deprivation in the midst of unprecedented levels of material wealth. Last but not least, the ability of economically powerful groups to translate their wealth into political power makes it possible for them to shift the ecological costs of their economic activity on to future generations as well as on the economically and politically least powerful groups in the world today (Boyce 2002). This ability, along with the ecological implications of the consumerist culture generated by the capitalist system, fuels the deepening ecological crisis, with all its implications both for the supply-side parameters of scarcity and for the ecological integrity of the planet. As this quick overview makes clear, if there is anything tragic about the human predicament today, this is not the existence of scarcity in the abstract, but the specific configurations of scarcity that result from the impact that capitalism and its socio-economic inequalities have both on people’s wants and on the means to the satisfaction of the wants that people have at their disposal. Compare the configurations of scarcity generated by capitalism to those of a post-capitalist society that eliminated unnecessary human suffering and the rampant ecological destruction characteristic of capitalism, but increased people’s ability to enjoy free time and thus their desire for it. In the former case, the persistence of scarcity signifies the existence of a socio-economic system willing to sacrifice the lives of billions of people and the ecological integrity of the planet for the sake of profit, while in the latter case the persistence of scarcity would signify the arrival of a socio-economic system that served, rather than obstructed, the enrichment of human life. This contrast suggests the wrong-headedness of basing one’s critique of neoclassical economics on the claim that a society beyond neoclassical scarcity is possible. A critique of neoclassical economics along these lines amounts to an implicit acceptance of Robbins’s view of scarcity as a necessarily tragic phenomenon. This view owes its plausibility to the fact that such a view reflects the realities of a capitalist socio-economic system, which does indeed generate configurations of scarcity that deserve to be described as tragic. Integrating this view in one’s critique of neoclassical economics has the ironic result, therefore, of naturalizing the effects specific to the forms of scarcity generated by capitalism. Indeed, the implicit acceptance of this view by critics of neoclassical economics obscures the possibility of radically different configurations of scarcity, ones made possible by post-capitalist socio-economic systems designed to reduce human suffering and enrich human life, on the one hand, while protecting the ecological integrity of the planet, on the other. This argument suggests, therefore, a focus on the specific ways in which scarcity is produced by capitalist and other socio-economic systems. Instead of treating scarcity as a fundamental axiom, the way neoclassical economics does, one has to examine how the logic driving a socioeconomic system forward shapes both the demand- and the supply-side parameters of scarcity. Despite the various weaknesses in their work, Sahlins, Xenos, and Dugger and Peach made advances over neoclassical economics by illustrating how the logic of economic systems impinges on both people’s wants and on the production of goods and services. This project has to be carried forward and combined with the insights of other scholars linking the socio-economic logic of the capitalist society, on the one hand, to the production of people’s wants and of the material means to their satisfaction, on the other.17 Approaching scarcity in this way represents a challenge to neoclassical economics in a number of ways. On the one hand, it challenges the neoclassical treatment of people’s wants as exogenously determined facts. On the other hand, it also challenges the neoclassical claim that capitalist markets (with a little help from the government) can lead to an efficient management of scarce resources. One of Dugger and Peach’s contributions is to show how socio-economic inequalities and unemployment lead to rampant waste of people’s talents and to a much smaller economic pie than would be possible given our existing level of technological development. Others would point to the pervasiveness of “externalities” that misallocate resources and contribute to the deepening ecological crisis confronting humanity and the planet. The fact that these externalities usually persist unchallenged is not a “non-economic” detail but an endogenously produced effect of a capitalist economic system that is based on great economic inequalities that can be readily translated into influence over policy (Hunt 2002; Boyce 2002). It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the arguments used to support non-capitalist economic systems, such as market socialism, is that by producing more egalitarian economic outcomes, such systems would likely reduce the production of public bads, such as pollution (Roemer 1994). Last but not least, this article’s discussion of scarcity also challenges the move of the discipline of economics away from political economy that, as Sackrey et al. (2002: viii) have pointed out, was facilitated by the rise of neoclassical economics into prominence. The problem of externalities and their unchallenged persistence is only one example of how a continued neglect of the indissoluble interconnection between economic, political, and other social processes makes it impossible for neoclassical economics to reach a proper understanding of scarcity and its socio-economic determinants. It is a telling indictment of the neoclassical approach that its rejection of political economy makes it singularly incapable of understanding the foundational concept upon which it purports to erect the entire discipline of economics. In this sense, fleshing out this indictment further can only contribute to the ongoing erosion of such hold over the discipline of economics as the neoclassical tradition continues to enjoy.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Alternative › 2NC – AT Perm – Pseudoscience DA

Pseudoscience DA: Neoclassical economics’ reliance on maximization of competition perpetuates intra-societal conflict through the pursuit of increasing returns. The alt forces economists to admit that choice is not determinate, and advocates for the collapse of competition in favor of cooperation as the optimal organizational form for human society. Frederic 22

[Jennings Jr, Frederic. "The opportunity costs of neoclassical economics." Journal of Philosophical Economics 15.The Economists’ Philosophy Day–A Journal of Philosophical Economics celebration of philosophical reflection in the economic science (2023)., ]

Increasing returns should change all that. Instead of embracing complementarity, increasing returns and network models, static constructions still litter the field. Instead of addressing chaotic complexity in all its unfolding cumulation, narrow equilibrium models and partial analyses steer economics away from pressing concerns. Instead of forcing economists to admit that choice is not determinate, the positivist definition of ‘science’ says testability by prediction is the only acceptable justification for inferential claims. Instead of framing conscious awareness into all models of human decision, many economists still abstract away from bounded attention into rational expectations, perfect knowledge and complete information. Such suppositions state the conditions under which our results apply: any unrealism in assumptions will limit the applicability of findings so derived. Realistic conceptions matter, in contrast to what Friedman (1953) contended. The real world in which we live is one of increasing returns save for short-term phenomena. So any economic construction built on decreasing returns should not be used to guide decisions, since it will squander resources somehow. We need to fit our analyses to the prevailing conditions at hand to rely securely on the outcomes so wrought. Otherwise, we run a risk of ‘knowing not what we do.’ Several examples have been described. If education is suffused with complementary interdependencies, substitution does not apply: incentives structured on a competitive frame must fail in this setting. Cooperation is the efficient institutional form in the presence of positive feedbacks such as suggested by complementarity. If embracing increasing returns will make ‘complementarity … far more important’ than substitution in economics (cf. Kaldor 1975, p. 348), so will the case for competition collapse in favor of cooperation as the optimal organizational form for human society. This shows a core reason for the failures suggested here: rivalry in academics is simply counterproductive in the presence of dominating complementarities in this sector. The failure reaches from theory into behavior and our institutional frames. The opportunity costs of what we do remain unseen, except through a theoretical lens. Suppositions – set apart from the facts – shall lead us astray. In an academic community organized in a cooperative frame, new ideas and diversity would be welcomed and not shunned. The impact of competition on our learning activity has been disastrous, shutting off advances in knowledge. All this is so, even without any mention of planning horizons (H*). As one of the aims of this paper is to point the way to a novel approach, it is appropriate to address some ‘horizonal’ implications. As noted above, with marginal cost defined as M(Q,H) – where MH < 0, and where MQ > 0 only for short horizons which, extending, open the cost curve until MQ < 0 – the case for increasing returns and complementarity is thereby strengthened. But there is another aspect of horizonal interdependence that reinforces the case against substitution in favor of complementarity for which we use the term ‘interhorizonal complementarity.’ Your planning horizons interact directly with mine. Horizon effects spread contagiously across social space. If so, when I become more intelligent and predictable in my decisions, you can plan better too: I thus stabilize (as a disturbance term) in the causal projections on which you base all your actions. Equally, if I ‘lose my cool’ and confidence in what I know – or if my decision environment grows less certain – a shrinkage of my planning horizons will likely influence you. Horizons shift together, radiating outward to others. Such phenomena – with respect to the interpersonal linkage of horizon effects – show ‘interhorizonal complementarity,’ and they appear in many arenas unexplored by economists. These are but a few indications of many new research opportunities stemming from horizon effects. The whole field is unexplored and open to scientific inquiry. Substitution, decreasing returns – ‘The Hicksian Getaway’ and ‘The Hirshleifer Rescue’ – offer reasons why new approaches have not yet emerged. An economics standing on increasing returns will differ in many ways still undiscovered. There is work to be done to repair the damage of false suppositions and to revise our ‘habits of thought’ (Veblen 1898) along with our many unconscious assumptions. So once again, by instigating conversation among economists – with an open mind and a thirst to learn and thus to increase understanding – could there be another formative moment in economics to come? One can only hope… The issue of what an unexplored economics of complementarity would be is hard to imagine from our current cultural context. Within such a sphere, helping you is really helping myself – with our interests and needs aligned – so we will look out for each other rather than just satisfying ourselves. There is no inherent boundary between your aspirations and mine. We would work and belong together in a mutually supportive frame of economic relations within a cooperative system. We would develop together a passion for learning about how our world truly works, and also decide on encompassing plans stretching as far as sight will reach. So, this is the opportunity cost of a myopic culture of conflict and denial – of cascading ecological and ethical losses – set in place through an Age of Denial legislated by orthodox theory in neoclassical economics. Our very planet is in deep peril, because of a dangerous shortsightedness stemming from competition based on substitution and decreasing returns suppositions, stemming from our refusal to deal with increasing returns, complementarity and a strong economic case for cooperation. From my perspective, we are enduring catastrophic consequences spilling out of frameworks simply unfit to their applications. Shall we awake and change? The urgency cannot be overstated. There is nothing more important than this. When the opportunity costs of whatever we do exceed its worth to us, there emerges an urgent need to change direction and revisit our choices. Is that time not here?

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Alternative › 2NC – AT Perm

Incorporating growth into the alternative DOOMS it to failure

Temesgen et al. 19 – A.K. Temesgen, V.M. Storsletten, and O.D Jakobsen are researchers and theorists about neoclassical economics and economics broadly. They are all deeply interested in economics. They are also deeply interested in neoclassical economics, [“Circular Economy – Reducing Symptoms or Radical Change?Philosophy of Management, DOI: 10.1007/s40926-019-00112-1]RA

Conclusion Our civilization faces an unprecedented combination of social, economic and environmental challenges that require fundamental changes to the global economy. These problems are often interdependent, complex and plagued by uncertainty. Therefore, they require a close examination of the foundations of our economic system. Circular Economy (CE) has gained prominence as part of the solution to these challenges. In this article, we argue that to explore whether CE is a solution to these challenges, we need to examine the foundations of its development (its worldview, ontology, epistemology and axiology). Circular Economy that fails to critically examine and challenge the foundational basis of unlimited economic growth operates within the same mechanistic worldview as mainstream economics. Economics based on the mechanical perspective is characterized by the idea that individuals are isolated actors and society represents no real unity in itself. Unlimited economic growth is a societal good and the ultimate goal of economic policies. Nature has no intrinsic value and is seen as an instrument towards this goal. It this worldview, CE will operate as a protective belt to the hard core of mainstream economics. Circular Economy that operates within an organic worldview recognizes and values networks and relationships in nature and society. It accepts that the economy should serve society and nature. It aims to build communities and reduce social injustice. In this worldview, CE can contribute to finding creative solutions that will not be restricted by the demand of maintaining unlimited growth. It will also be easier to accept (as industrial ecologists recommend) that any discussion of moving towards a circular economy needs to be accompanied by the conviction to reduce our consumption of natural resources (even at the expense of an ever expanding economy). To solve the complex challenges connected to environment, society and economy, implementing a circular economy could, in both contexts, be an important part of the answer, within the existing mechanical system by reducing symptoms (reactive), in an alternative organic system by increasing the life forces (proactive) in economy, society and nature.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Alternative › 2NC – AT Perm

It’s mutually exclusive – Only decoupling the wellbeing of all organisms from economic growth can prevent [aff impact].

Temesgen et al. 19 – A.K. Temesgen, V.M. Storsletten, and O.D Jakobsen are researchers and theorists about neoclassical economics and economics broadly. They are all deeply interested in economics. They are also deeply interested in neoclassical economics, [“Circular Economy – Reducing Symptoms or Radical Change?Philosophy of Management, DOI: 10.1007/s40926-019-00112-1]RA

12 Circular Economy – challenging the hard core or forming a protective belt? Comparing the two fields of Neoclassical (NE) and Ecological Economics (EE), we find that they take radically opposing views. Most notably, NE emphasizes economic growth while EE focuses on research that decouples human wellbeing from economic growth. NE emphasizes competition as the primary form of interaction between economic agents while EE emphasizes the important role of co-operation in social interactions that has ensured evolutionary survival of our specie. NE emphasizes self-interested, atomistic actors while EE emphasizes relational actors embedded in social and environmental contexts. In light of this comparison, we will examine if Circular Economy plays the role of a protective belt or a challenge to the hard core of NE. Circular Economy problematizes the linear, extract-produce-use-throw model of our economic system where products are designed for short lifespans. Circular Economy proposes to extend the use value of products through reuse, repair, refurbishment and remanufacturing. This reduces the demand for virgin raw materials to produce consumption goods. When the use-value of products are exhausted, then the products can be recycled for raw materials. Once the economic value of the products are thoroughly utilized and only then should the products be combusted for energy (alternatively termed ‘recovery for energy’). These are the 4R framework components (reduce, reuse, recycle and recover) of CE and a definition promoted by practitioners (Kirchherr et al. 2017). Researchers studying the role of CE for sustainable development explore its implications for the three pillars of sustainable development: environmental, economic and social sustainability (Korhonen et al. 2018a; Korhonen et al. 2018b). On environmental sustainability, the main emphasis is on reducing the extraction of virgin raw materials that go into the production process and reducing the burden on the environment from excessive production of waste and pollutants. There is an aspiration of creating a symbiosis between the economic and eco-system where the byproducts of the economy are taken up by natural processes and assimilated into the biosphere (Korhonen et al. 2018a). On economic sustainability, one goal is to reduce production-costs. For example, costs associated with extracting and processing raw materials, waste management costs and emissions control costs. Another aim is to maintain the value in products for as long as possible by extending their use. Branding results in economic gain when goods are marketed to consumers as environmentally friendly, and businesses can brand themselves as responsible businesses and attract investment. CE’s contribution to social sustainability is an area where there is limited research. Korhonen et al. (2018a, p.40) list three potential social advantages of CE: ‘1) new employment opportunities through new uses of the value embedded in resources, 2) increased sense of community, cooperation and participation through the sharing economy and 3) use groups share the function and service of a physical product instead of individuals owning and consuming the physical product’. 13 CE is a young field (Murray et al. 2017) where practitioners (policy-makers, business consultants, business associations, business foundations etc.) play a leading role in its development and implementation (Korhonen et al. 2018a). The concept’s orientation towards practitioners mean that there is limited reflection on the worldview, values and societal structure that drive its development (Korhonen et al. 2018b). National governments, the European Commission and business foundations promote CE by claiming that it will lead to billions of Euros in annual economic gains (Korhonen et al. 2018a) and that it will boost economic growth. The focus on economic growth influences which aspects of Circular Economy make it into policy and public awareness. Practitioner definitions of CE ‘overall are found to feature reuse and recycle… An explanation is that practitioners have little interest in promoting reduction since this may imply curbing consumption and economic growth’ (Kirchherr et al. 2017, p.226). CE, seen from this perspective, does not critically engage with worldviews and values. Engagement with worldviews may even at times be dismissed as a distraction from the real issue of reaping economic profits. For example, Webster (2015, p.12) states ‘[s]ome people really don’t like stories or narratives about the economy, or pretend that they simply don’t need one: all they want to do is find the business opportunity therein, see which way the wind is blowing and take advantage. One of the advantages of a circular economy is that it is perfectly possible to work this way, starting from today… The point is one does not need a change of values to get involved’. He continues to argue that a circular economy has three objectives: ‘more growth and more jobs in combination with substantially reduced resource consumption’ (Webster 2015, p.100). ). Such a position places Circular Economy in the protective belt of mainstream economics. Its role is to protect the hardcore imperative of maintaining economic growth in the face of environmental and social challenges. It ignores the concern raised by industrial ecologists and environmentalists that a selective focus on recycling will not be enough to solve the problems associated with production and consumption systems. CE must be accompanied by a reconsideration of the foundations of the economic system. Sustainability oriented researchers of CE see it as a possibility for the business sector to contribute to sustainable development. There is a recognition that for CE to make a significant contribution, there has to be a paradigmatic change (in culture and values) (Korhonen et al. 2018a). Otherwise, CE will be relegated to a watered-down, ‘feelgood concept’ avoiding the heavy task of rethinking the entire production and consumption process (Kirchherr et al. 2017, p.227). We find approaches that call attention to the complex processes in nature and society and incorporates them in a circular economy. Korhonen et al. (2018a) advocates for a definition of CE where the throughput flow of resources and energy does not exceed planetary boundaries. Others allude to the complexity of natural and economic systems. For example, ‘the vast majority of real-life natural, social and economic phenomena belong to the realm of complexity. Indeed, natural systems, whether physical, social or economic only rarely exhibit simple causality or weakly connected causality’ (Sally Goerner quoted in Webster 2015, p.47). This calls for a new way of conceptualizing business and community informed by systems thinking. This strand of argument also advocates the re-invigoration of local economies by slowing the speed with which materials flow through the production process. Changing the production process of goods gives the advantage of improving material utilization and generating local employment. By reducing the scale of production and using local resources for local use, local employment is created. Adjusting taxation away from labor and renewables and towards pollutants and financial markets helps to invigorate the labor market. Social innovations such as community currencies, rooftop agricultures and sharing initiatives, are presented as ‘circular economy in practice’ and as examples of how local communities are generating their economies with local resources (Webster 2015). The sharing economy represents a new culture where communities/user groups share the function or value of a product as opposed to individuals owning and consuming products. The sharing economy is expected to ‘increase sense of community, cooperation and participation’ (Korhonen et al. 2018a, p.40)4 . The latter considerations show distinct characteristics that depart from the neoclassical worldview. There is a consideration for the physical limits imposed by the ecosystem in production and consumption systems. There is a recognition of the complexity of social and natural systems and a call for systems thinking. And in advocating for the sharing economy, there are value systems that advocate building local communities (as opposed to maximizing individual utility), that emphasize cooperation and participation than competition. These are manifestations of values that challenge the hardcore of neoclassical economics and align more with the principles of Ecological Economics. In the following two sections, we elaborate on the implications of the conceptual discussions we have conducted so far in the paper for business and communities. Implications for management of businesses and communities Implications for business Practitioners from the business world are important contributors to the development of Circular Economy. In earlier sections, we have discussed the ambitions, visions and enthusiasm around CE. We have also expounded reservations from industrial ecologists and CE researchers regarding the limitations of CE. It is particularly important to be observant to the tendency to use CE as a ‘feel-good’ remedy to the consumerist culture that has brought havoc to the environment. These experts state that a genuine desire to bring about a fundamental change to the production and consumption system must engage with the wider issues of the worldviews and values that underly the economic system (Cullen 2017; Price and Joseph 2000; Korhonen et al. 2018a). Businesses as engines of the economic system play an important role in the development of CE. Firms can take an active role in raising awareness about the potentials and short comings of CE both internally and in the wider community. They can take heed of the caution sounded by researchers that CE is still a young field and much can be achieved by reducing the firm’s production of waste and extending the value of products. Environmental management systems such as EMAS (Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) and ISO 14001 (the International Organization for Standardization) are anchored in neoclassical economics and do not ask critical questions of the hard core of the research program. There is a limited focus on the value of reducing the scale of the economy but rather a focus on selective practices such as recycling. There is limited awareness about where the recycled goods come from and what happens to them after recycling. There is even less focus on how recycling itself can demand energy intensive processes and may even require virgin raw materials to enter the production process (Price and Joseph 2000). Firms can adopt a holistic view of the economy, ecosystem and social systems, examine the role they play in the system and work towards a better world by networking with other socially and environmentally engaged firms. Networking with other firms will also contribute towards alleviating one of the challenges identified by Korhonen et al. (2018a) regarding the difficulty of overcoming spatial and temporal boundaries in the implementation of CE. One of the practical solutions he proposes is adopting an ‘inter-organizational sustainability management’ (Korhonen et al. 2018a, p.44). This will be possible only when firms build cooperative networks where they can address such cross-cutting issues. Establishing mutually binding co-operative relations is also an important first step to bring about a change to the neoclassical worldview where competition rather than cooperation is given a central role. Firms can both compete and cooperate with each other. However, a firm’s social and environmental responsibility will be better served through cooperative networks. Reflections on foundational issues (worldviews, ontology and axiology) will also have an impact on the organizational culture and the wellbeing of employees. A shift from value monism to value pluralism will help firms live up to their social responsibility. Arjoon (2010, p.62), in this journal, envisages businesses as ‘society of persons’instead of a ‘society of capital goods’. He asserts the moral justification for businesses is their contribution to human flourishing and advocates for valuing intrinsic rewards such as (learning new skills, personal development, and the application of virtues) in addition to extrinsic rewards (for e.g., monetary compensation). Based on empirical evidence, George and Sice (2014) show how organizations can contribute to the wellbeing of employees and the wider community by adopting a holistic perspective of wellbeing. Active reflection on worldviews and values can encourage firms to adopt a wider focus than just on economic gains and orient themselves towards a more collective focus on serving the development of the good society. Implications for communities In our discussion of Circular Economy, we have shown that the concept incorporates different interpretations and practice. We showed that a circular economy's activities play either the role of the protective belt or the role of challenging the hard core of neoclassical economics. Community initiatives such as the sharing economy and local currencies are initiatives that play the latter role (of challenging the hard core) and aim to bring fundamental changes to the way the economy is currently organized. Longhurst et al. (2016) argue that these initiatives are ‘counter-narratives’ engaging in ‘transformative social innovation’ (p.2). They define transformative social innovation as ‘changes in social relations, involving new ways of doing, organizing, knowing and framing’ (Longhurst et al. 2016, p.2). Initiatives such as transition towns, ecovillages, sharing cities and solidarity economy are all seen as transformative social innovations. Many of these initiatives congregate around the degrowth movement where the central unifying aim is to question the whole notion of unlimited growth. ‘Proponents of degrowth … argue that exponential economic growth cannot continue indefinitely in a world of finite resources …, calling for a reorientation of economic activity away from continuous expansion and toward lower material production and consumption’ (Longhurst et al. 2016, p.2). Other researchers of sustainability transitions highlight how these initiatives encourage innovations by providing a protective space where these ideas can take root and grow outside of the rules of the competitive market (Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012). These community initiatives 16 align themselves with the principles of ecological economics such as value pluralism (as opposed to value monism), favoring co-operation over competition, a holistic view of co-existence within a community (as opposed to atomism) and their focus on a circular instead of linear material flow. There are thousands of such initiatives around the world today (Longhurst et al. 2016). However, establishing such alternatives is not easy. Around 90 percent of aspiring community-level initiatives fail for lack of a unifying community vision (Christian (2003) in Guillen-Royo 2016). The implication of our paper for managers of such processes is to highlight the importance of closely examining the ontological basis of values and norms that define their communities. An atomistic worldview (of autonomous independence) and a holistic view (of interdependence and reciprocity) may lead two community members into a conflict if not clearly understood beforehand. An aim of perpetual growth/expansion and profitability may lead to a different community than a vision of simplicity that focuses on non-monetary sources of wellbeing. Citizens that aspire to establish community level initiatives or those that are at the initial stages of community formation are best served if they find ways to explore and understand the foundations of their values before initiating the hard work of starting up an initiative together. Dialogues and workshops are well-tested ways of shedding light on these issues that lay deep in our consciousness but are rarely critically examined.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Alternative › 2NC – Alt Solves – Sequencing – CE

The alternative is a sequencing question. Complexity economics must emerge as the response to neoclassicism. This is the only way to understand the messy, complex, and ambiguous nature of climate policymaking. Vote neg to reject fiat’s apolitical, linear view of the policy process.

Roo and Hoffart 20 – Dr. Michael Roos is a professor and researcher in the field of green technology and economics; Dr. Franziska Hoffart is an economic transition researcher interested in energy transition, hydrogen, climate crisis, and scenario analysis at DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, [“What’s Problematic About Mainstream Climate Economics?” Chapter from “Climate Economics”, Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-48423-1_4]RA

4.4.4 Understanding the Effects of Climate Change on the Economy

From a complexity perspective modelling the social world as if it would not change fundamentally in response to climate change is an important flaw of neoclassical climate economics. As Arthur (2015, p. 1) puts it: We also see the economy not as something given and existing but forming from a constantly developing set of technological innovations, institutions, and arrangements. Complexity economics thus sees the economy as in motion, perpetually `computing´ itself—perpetually constructing itself anew. Where equilibrium economics emphasizes order, determinacy, deduction, and stasis, complexity economics emphasizes contingency, indeterminacy, sense-making, and openness to change. Climate-induced change of society could lead to very different futures. Using the method of qualitative scenario development, Raskin et al. (2002) distinguish three different kinds of futures: (1) Conventional Worlds, (2) Barbarization, and (3) Great Transitions. Conventional worlds are futures that are similar to the present and marked by adjustments to climate change either induced by markets or by policy reforms. In contrast, great transitions involve major, actively pursued transformations of society and the economic system. The barbarisation scenarios suggest that there could also be a breakdown of societal order with conflict and institutional disintegration. The possibility of societal collapse is also discussed in political science (Brunk 2002a), geography (Diamond 2005), archaeology (Tainter 1988), physics (Livni 2019), sustainability science (Abel et al. 2006), and Marxian economics (Foster 2016). Historically, many civilisations such as the Roman Empire or the Mayan Civilisation collapsed due to a combination of external triggers and complex internal dynamics. The concept of self-organised criticality from complexity science postulates that systems that developed more and more complexity and have been stable for considerable time, very suddenly can become unstable due to sometimes trivial and small events (Brunk 2002b). Against this backdrop, some scholars discuss whether the concept of sustainability should be replaced by the concept of resilience in the field of socio-ecological analysis (Davidson 2010; Benson and Craig 2014). The flip side of resilience is vulnerability, that is, the inability of a system to withstand external shocks. The ideas of vulnerability and resilience of social systems imply that climate economics should pay more attention to two issues. First, a detailed investigation is needed of how climate change might alter the social environment in which economic activity takes place. For instance, climate change is likely to induce large-scale regional and international migration, which does not only affect labour markets, but also the social and political system. Political resistance against immigration might lead to a reversion of economic globalisation with structural implications for open economies and lower growth prospects. Second, climate economics should put less emphasis on forecasting the likely effects of climate change and more on foresight or anticipation of possible effects (Boyd et al. 2015; Roos 2016, 2018). The problem with forecasts is that they are almost always wrong, especially if the forecast horizon reaches far into the future. Policies to increase the resilience of a system, which are based on most likely forecasts, will only work well if the forecast is realised, but might perform poorly if the forecast was wrong. Anticipating possible futures instead of predicting the single most likely one allows policymakers to take precautionary actions for different scenarios. Being prepared for several states of the world instead of just one lowers the vulnerability against external events that might appear unlikely. 4.4.5 Political Economy and Climate Change The implementation of mitigation and adaptation policies does not only depend on conflict-resolving institutions, but also on the political process or the politics of climate change. Tanner and Allouche (2011, p. 2) define the political economy “as the processes by which ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by different groups at different states”. While the issue of conflict and power relations overlaps with the interest of institutional economics, political economy puts an emphasis on the ideas and ideologies of the involved groups. They are important because they define whether there is a problem that should be tackled by society and the government and how this should be done. Levy and Spicer (2013, p. 660) speak of imaginaries that provide a shared sense of meaning, coherence and orientation around highly complex issues. Imaginaries are closely linked to the ways in which institutions and economic activity are organised and structured and to the ways people think they ought to be organised and structured. They analyse how NGOs, business and state agencies contested four climate imaginaries in the US since the 1990s: ‘fossil fuels forever’, ‘climate apocalypse’, ‘techno-market’ and ‘sustainable lifestyles’. In politics, the different groups and parties aim at making their own imaginary or worldview the dominant one in order to gain control over societal resources and the decisions how they should be used. The neoclassical view on climate policy is apolitical and has an apolitical understanding of the policy process. It assumes a linear policy process in which a problem is first identified by the government or science and then tackled in an orderly process governed by economic rationality. Real political processes, however, are messy and characterised by ambiguity. Political goals are often not clearly defined and neither are the problems. According to Tanner and Allouche (2011, p. 11): the growing importance of climate change in the development arena and the frequent assumption of linear policymaking and apolitical, techno-managerial solutions make the development of a new political economy emphasis vital to determining efficient, equitable and effective responses. … [W]e suggest that explicit attention is given to the way that ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and implemented by different groups at different scales. 4.4.6 Rethinking of Capitalism and System Change A key issue in ecological economics is whether permanent economic growth and sustainability can be reconciled. Ecological economists distinguish absolute and relative decoupling. Relative decoupling means that the resource intensity per unit of produced output declines, which means that the total resource impact of production still can rise if the economy grows. Therefore, relative decoupling does not solve the problem of hitting the planetary boundaries at some point in time if there is ongoing growth. Some ecological economists hence conclude that either absolute decoupling is necessary, that is, an absolute decrease of resource impact, or the economy must stop growing. Since they doubt that absolute decoupling is possible, they favour the idea of the steady-state economy (see Daly 1977; Jackson 2009) which does not grow. The steady-state or post-growth literature raises two important questions. The first question is about the purpose of economic growth and economic activity in general. Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012) argue that economic activity should be a means to the end of a good life, but not an end in itself. But this raises the question of what makes a good life and which role employment, consumption and material wealth play. These reflexions often imply a critique of consumerism and capitalism, that is, of the current economic system in Western countries, because this system sets the wrong priorities. The second question is whether capitalism can be reformed to become more sustainable or whether this is not possible. Marxian economists such as Foster et al. (2016) argue that capitalism should be overcome in an ecological revolution and replaced by a system that allows sustainable development. Others debate whether there is a growth imperative in capitalist market economies or not (Gordon and Rosenthal 2003; Binswanger 2016; Richters and Siemoneit 2017, 2019). If there was no growth imperative, it might be possible to reform capitalism in order to reach post-growth market economies. Neoclassical climate economics shuns these fundamental questions about the role of economic activity in society and the life of people and how it could and should be organised. Yet they are of prime importance, because if the current economic system is fundamentally unsustainable, tinkering with policy instruments such as a carbon tax without major transformations of the system might not avoid climate disasters.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L - Conflict

Neoclassical economic thought fails and traps nations into cycles of societal collapse through its linear scripting of economic growth. The 1AC’s model as a template of global stability exacerbates pre-existing internal conflicts, setting the stage for broader instability.

Cramer 02

[Cramer, Christopher is an . "Homo economicus goes to war: methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war." World development 30.11 (2002): 1845-1864. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X02001201]

In The Periodic Table, Primo Levi (1986) finds in one of his tales the following moral: that one must distrust the almost-the-same... the practically identical, the approximate, the or-even, all surrogates, and all patchwork. The differences can be small, but they can lead to radically different consequences, like a railroad’s switch points; the chemist’s trade consists in good part in being aware of these differences, knowing them close up, and foreseeing their effects. And not only the chemist’s trade. If there is anything substantial in the rational choice economist’s models of violent conflict, it will emerge through empirical testing. But, where this testing has been done it has been, inevitably, through the use of proxies. What matters, then, is whether the difference between a proxy and the reality to which it is meant to be tagged makes a difference: whether their signals might divert the train of analytical and policy-making attention onto a siding. Do the proxies actually measure what they purport to measure? There are two dimensions to answering this question: are the data adequate and are the proxies conceptually or substantially equivalent to the thing they are meant to represent? 16 The most widely known use of proxy measurements for rational choice models of violent conflict or civil wars currently is in the work of Collier and Hoeffler. An early version (Collier & Hoeffler, 1996) posited that the utility of choosing rebellion (Uw) was a function of the probability of victory (p) and the gains to rebels upon victory (T), the potential for government defence spending (D), the expected duration of the conflict (M) and the co-ordination costs of mobilizing for rebellion (C), such that: 17 Uw ¼ fpðDÞ:T ; M; Cg The proxies chosen for the incentive for rebellion aimed to capture potential government military expenditure and revenue-raising capacity through three variables: income per capita, the natural resource base, and the degree of inequality in a society. Hence, poorer countries are more prone to conflict because, with income per capita at a low level, there is insufficient tax-raising capacity to deter rebellion. The use of inequality, measured in Gini coefficients, as a proxy for potential government defence spending is especially interesting. The reasoning adopted in Collier and Hoeffler (1996) is that high inequality reflects the presence of an elite liable to encourage the government to raise taxation of elite wealth if this is temporarily necessary to repel rebellion and thereby preserve this unequal status quo. The gains to rebellion conditional upon victory are assessed via the proxy of the natural resource endowment, which has uncertain consequences given that resource endowment also affects the government’s potential defence spending. The proxy for the costs of rebel co-ordination is the ‘‘ethno-linguistic fragmentation index’’ (with complete homogeneity scoring zero and maximum fragmentation scoring 100). The proposal here was that the cost of co-ordination is... a quadratic function of the degree of cultural fractionalization, initially decreasing in it as potential rebels are distinguished from governments supporters, and then increasing in it as potential rebels are distinguished from each other (p. 5). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) amend this model, retaining its core hypothesis and some of the proxies but combining ethno-linguistic with religious fractionalization and dropping inequality completely from the model. The purpose of econometric analysis using proxies to quantify indirectly the proposed variables in the models is, of course, to achieve predictive (probabilistic) power and Collier and Hoeffler (1998) generates implications such as: ‘‘For example, a highly fractionalized society such as Uganda would be about 40% safer than a homogeneous society, controlling for other characteristics.’’ Collier and Hoeffler (1999) and Collier (2000) engage more directly in the greed versus grievance question, separating the two motivations and selecting proxies for each. Greed or loot seeking is proxied by the share of primary commodities in total exports––because this represents the ease of instant taxation by looting––and by the proportion of young males in the total population combined with average years of schooling (the latter supposed to capture the availability of economic opportunities other than violence and looting in an economy). Grievance or justice-seeking as a cause of civil war is captured by the ‘‘almost-the-same’’ or ‘‘practically identical’’ proxies of economic growth in the five years prior to a conflict, scores of repression and restricted political rights, inequality (reappearing not as a proxy for potential government revenue but for grievance), and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. A little confusingly, some of these proxies, e.g., dependence on primary commodities, are switched in Collier and Hoeffler (2001) to stand not for motive (i.e. greed) but for opportunity. 18 The use of these proxies does seem to be patchwork. The argument that high degrees of inequality generate a greater capacity for taxation of capital is derived from Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Their argument, however, had nothing to do with the self-preservation instincts of the wealthy but rather proposed that where there is high inequality there will be democratic pressure, exercised by the median voter, for higher capital taxation, which in turn would harm growth prospects as this taxation would reduce incentives to invest. The inequality/taxation proxy for potential government military expenditure and hence for the incentive/disincentive for rebellion is also flawed in two other respects. First, it makes something of a naive assumption about the willingness of elites to be taxed: it is not clear that even in democratic Latin American states, for example, high inequality has made a substantial dent, through effective tax increases, in the Gini coefficient (Szekely & Hilgert, 1999). Tax evasion remains extremely widespread in many such countries. In countries threatened by conflict capital flight also has to be expected. 19 Second, the financing of war is rather more complex than is conveyed by this notion of readily flexible tax rates. Most wars have been financed to significant degrees, historically, by borrowing and by inflationary money printing (Galbraith, 1975). Certainly tax increases have been critical over the long-term but where this has been so, for example, during the consolidation of most European states, this has tended to involve hard-won innovations in fiscal institutions rather than quick fix appeals to the coffers of the rich (Tilly, 1992; Ferguson, 2001). The commitment by the wealthy, or by capitalists, to supporting the funding of war has been more complex, varied and politically contested than can be captured by a proxy like this. Confidence in these proxies must be undermined, also, by the way in which one proxy, inequality, is used across models: first it is taken as almost-the-same as the self-preservation instinct of elites and hence of the fiscal prospects for war finance; then it is dropped as not the same as anything; then it is reintroduced as almost-the-same as the source of injustice and hence potential grievance-fuelled conflict. Ethno-linguistic fragmentation is used fairly constantly as a proxy for co-ordination costs and so for the likelihood of collective action. For this to be effective as a proxy, to be ‘‘practically identical’’ to the actual possibilities of and constraints on mobilization for collective action, two conditions must be met. The first is that ethnicity is the only significant category of collective identity and affiliation, and that it operates in the same way across all societies such that more, or less, of it (fragmentation) will have much the same consequences irrespective of geographical and historical context. The second condition is that there are no other effective sources of mobilization. Evidence suggests that neither condition holds. Ethnicity has played a very secondary role at most in many conflicts and the intensity of ethnic animosity does not seem to vary with differences in the index of fragmentation. Its significance has been highly particular and very different across, for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. Likewise, ethnicity may have played a role in Central American conflicts but it has hardly been a dominant cause in many, and clearly its role has varied between El Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua. In Yugoslavia ethnicity only came to matter politically in a distinctly ‘‘modern’’ way, that is, as an outcome of economic, administrative, and political policies and experiences from the 1950s onward (Schierup, 1992, 1993); and then in a cumulative, modular or mimetic way drawing on real and imagined pasts in a way very similar to the spread of nationalism as an ‘‘imagined community’’ (Anderson, 1991). What matters more, then, is surely how ethnicity or race or whatever form collective identity takes does or does not come to play a significant role in the origin and feasibility of conflict (Turton, 1997). 20 Meanwhile, regarding the second condition, it is increasingly clear that in apparently obviously ideological conflicts such as the Zimbabwean liberation war and in apparently clearly ‘‘ethnic’’ conflicts such as Rwanda, there is a range of sources of mobilization, and motivation, enabling violent collective action. Primary among these is force itself. Coercion, whether subtle or brutal, is a common constant of most contemporary conflicts. This in itself suggests that, however neat the ‘‘fit’’ with some quadratic function of the role of ethnic fractionalization or indeed with the availability of instantly ‘‘taxable’’ primary commodities, such incentives and organizing principles are typically insufficient to make war work, either for rebels or incumbent governments. Meanwhile, there is evidence of a range of agendas of social conflict that affect people’s readiness to fight or logistically to support civil conflict, aside from straightforward profitability at the margin. These include gender and generational conflict and highly personal or interpersonal relations of rivalry and envy. A further difficulty with the proxies used in these models is that it is far from obvious that the proxy is being assigned to the appropriate object. Preponderance in exports of primary commodities might indicate the availability of lootable goods and so make violence more profitable at the margin than the dreary grind of underemployment and poverty. But in doing this it might just as well be a proxy for failed policy, missing economic dynamism, a probable shortage of consumer goods and imports and widespread grievance or dissatisfaction with this predicament. There is the further problem that the category ‘‘primary commodities’’ is absurdly broad. Open cast or alluvial diamonds might be easy to loot (for soldiers) but not deep-mined diamonds, or aluminum, oil, etc. Other primary commodities like cotton or cocoa do not generate profit levels associated with conflict commodities. Others still, such as coffee, have often been associated with conflict but not in a direct way through lootability. One approach that has added a much needed detail to the analysis of commodities in conflict––and that finds still that commodities are subsidiary to political dynamics––is the political geography of Le Billon (2001). Similarly, a low average for years of schooling might represent the lack of decent opportunities for (nonconflictual) gainful employment and therefore reveal a low opportunity cost of conflict: however, it might just as well reflect or be directly a source of social anger. 21 Evidence for this is especially sharp for Sierra Leone, where poor educational attainment has, reportedly, fuelled grievances among young age cohorts who have appealed for improved resource allocations to schools, in a country with a particularly strong educational heritage in sub-Saharan Africa (Richards, 1996). Since loot has been a central feature of the Sierra Leone conflict, within the framework of the orthodox economic models of conflict this presents a paradox of apparently coexisting grievance and greed. 22 One way to resolve the paradox is to appeal to the ‘‘false consciousness’’ argument, as Collier (2000) does by arguing that the ‘‘narrative of grievance’’ has ‘‘no informational content.’’ 23 Another is to reject the categorical distinction between greed and grievance as false. In this case it becomes clear that greed and grievance do not just coexist in the origin of conflict, but that they might be internally related to one another. 24 Put differently, where does ‘‘greed,’’ or loot-seeking, or aggressive goods and profit acquisition behavior come from? Is it not feasible that greed emerges from grievance? 25 If Kosovo Albanians want better material conditions (and even if some of them emerge as wartime entrepreneurs, profiteers, etc.) is this a manifestation of the aggregated greed of individual Kosovo Albanians or of a historical and relational grievance given particular historical and political opportunities? 26 How big is the difference and might the two combine in the mobilization and decision making of individuals? Another example of the ambiguous mingling of greed and grievance as a motivation for violence is given in the widespread political violence during the 1990s in Congo-Brazzaville, chiefly by a range of militias with different political affiliations. Looting in Brazzaville in 1997 was known as ‘‘slaughtering the pig’’ or, referring to the Elf Aquitaine-controlled oil field of N’kossa, ‘‘N’kossa, everyone gets his share,’’ both capturing a criticism of the failure by the political elite to redistribute the wealth of the country. As one militiaman put it, when accused of theft: You call that stealing? When they incite us to kill, they call it human folly, then afterwards they drink cham pagne together. That is called national unity. While this is going on, we get nothing. Have you ever seen any of the national leaders losing one of their own children in this war? Why is it always us? This has gone beyond a joke. We are going to loot all their houses and tomorrow, when we rebuild the country, perhaps we will finally have a job to go to (quoted in Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999, p. 48). 27 The claims of political leaders or the statements of individual rebels or soldiers are bound to be partial and subjective, but surely it would be absurd to regard them as having no informational content? As Keen (2001) argues, a more useful focus for research than the separation of greed and grievance is the way in which they interact, most notably how the greedy manipulate the grievances of others. Further, to complicate matters, it is far from obvious that a given conflict, e.g., a ‘‘civil war,’’ is a single phenomenon whose quantifiable aggregates clearly ‘‘reveal’’ individual preferences. For example, participants in a conflict may take part through varying degrees of coercion or voluntary choice and may represent a range of agendas of differing passions and interests that overlap in the overall conflict. Kriger (1992) shows how many different forms of conflict were fought under the mantel of the liberation war in Zimbabwe. Among these conflicts, many women were more or less coercively mobilized behind the Zanu-PF war effort but still used the war to advance their own gender-related conflicts. Similarly, part of the motivation for young males joining the war was not necessarily grand hopes of relief from racial discrimination, or immediate material gains, but escape from the oppressive hierarchy of rural life dominated by male elders. Each of these levels or types of conflict subsumed in the greater war contains its own specific history of social relations, and its own complex mixture of direct interest in material gain with a push for changes in the rules or customs of social relationships. This degree of complexity has not, to date, been captured by neoclassical theory, nor by the proxies used in applications of the theory. The false consciousness argument is based on a rigid conceptual distinction between greed and grievance, it is sustained by the conceit that the proxies used in applications of the models are genuinely ‘‘almost-the-same’’ as their objects, and lastly it depends on the reliability of the data explored to test the model. But, there are hugely significant empirical weaknesses with most, probably all of the proxies employed. Inequality data are notoriously frail, especially for use in cross-country comparisons (and a fortiori for sub-Saharan Africa, where many recent conflicts have taken place). 28 Production data emphasizing the preponderance of primary commodities are prone to errors, thanks to unrecorded manufacturing activity and the elision in some data sets (particularly concerning mining) between manufacturing and primary commodity activities (Riddell, 1990; Yeats, 1990). Data on educational attainment have their weaknesses, but beyond the crude figures there are problems in assuming a direct, universal and predictable relationship between educational attainment and viable ‘‘economic opportunities,’’ e.g., in employment (Bennell, 1996; Pritchett, 1997). The relationship depends, among other things, on the availability of agricultural wage labor (rarely captured effectively in rural survey data) and on the particular set of policies adopted by governments. Finally, the ethno-linguistic fragmentation index is far from foolproof (McIlwham, 1998). Needless to say, data observations for countries already affected by conflict are even more unreliable, when many goods are traded illegally and statistical services do not have the same reach as in peacetime (Cramer & Weeks, 2000). The use of conceptually and empirically vague proxies is an instance of the more general problem of the empirical weakness, arbitrary prioritization of particular variables, and manipulation of technique over and above the search for ‘‘truth’’ in econometrics. Mainstream economists and econometric practitioners such as Mayer (1993) and Leamer (1983) have often cautioned against the frequent, almost institutionalized abuse of technique. More radical critics, such as Lawson (1997), have argued for the more fundamental failure as an analytical device of econometrics.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L - Conflict

The 1AC’s intervention against “global conflict” is ideologically fragile and an analytic failure. Their elegant orthodox economic explanation of conflict is nothing more than a mask for material interests at play. Their absurd simplicity and rationality are a veneer, priming the citizenry to engage in normalized armed conflict. Cramer 02

[Cramer, Christopher is an . "Homo economicus goes to war: methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war." World development 30.11 (2002): 1845-1864. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X02001201]

2. OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEOCLASSICAL MODELS OF CONFLICT Rational choice, methodologically individualist models of conflict typically build on the idea of two groups or ‘‘players.’’ In some the game pits a ruler or incumbent against a rival. Others (Grossman, 1991; Azam, 2001) have the state in conflict with subject-rebels. In each case there is little or no disaggregation or stratification of the players. 4 In some models outcomes (in terms of social waste and political instability) may depend on whether the incumbent or state has an edge (Mehlum & Moene, 2000); in others, e.g., Collier (various), the presumption is that wars start with the decision of rebels and the analysis abstracts from much of state policy and from state violence. There is no discussion of where the ‘‘players’’ come from other than as the product of relevant economistic calculations, to be discussed below. While in some models the players are simply rivals for the rent associated with power, in most they are granted some social or collective identity, typically in the form of ethnic or religious labels. This is discussed further, below; but it might be noted that in Hirshleifer (1994), for example, collective identity is regarded as a residue of Darwinian survival processes generating durable animosities, rather than having modern, political and ideological roots and influences. Both players or organizations are assumed to be maximizing agents and the paucity of discussion of either group leads to a common elision between these agents and ‘‘individuals.’’ Typically, they are driven by the urge (this seems to be the only occasion where compulsion is relevant, all else being decided in the realm of choice) to maximize power or windfall gains from victory (or just from conflict itself). This is particularly stark in Collier and Hoefflers models, stressing as they do greater predictive power in the causation of civil war for ‘‘loot’’ than for ‘‘justice,’’ for ‘‘greed’’ than ‘‘grievance,’’ but actually the same core reasoning holds in all such models, including those from which their work is derived. For the common key to these models is the idea of a tradeoff. For Hirshleifer people face a choice between producing and appropriating. If the opportunity cost of appropriative activity, i.e. violence and conflict, is not prohibitive then violence will ensue; put differently, actors choose conflict where this is more profitable at the margin than exchange. Grossman (1991), Azam (2001), and others similarly focus on a risk versus payoff tradeoff: conflict is dangerous but if the payoff outweighs calculated risk, war is chosen or more time is allocated to insurgency. Conflict, civil war, or insurrection is then an investment or resource allocation designed to raise the probability of toppling the government or of drawing monopoly profits from the loot or instant taxation of primary commodities. Rebellion is thus clearly akin to rent seeking (Neary, 1997): it is a distortionary devotion of resources to the pursuit of the fruits of imperfect competition. 5 The occurrence and implications of conflict may be influenced by the symmetrical or asymmetrical features of the strategic ‘‘game,’’ e.g., by whether the incumbent powerholder has an ‘‘edge’’ (Mehlum & Moene, 2000). If this tradeoff is the basic premise of models of conflict, then it is necessary to determine the factors that might trip the switch activating the choice of war. In other words, under what circumstances do groups develop ‘‘mutually inconsistent opportunity sets’’ (Hirshleifer, 1994) that make fighting more profitable on the margin than peaceable exchange? One of the most basic circumstances is poverty or slow growth. Poverty may ‘‘cause’’ conflict in various ways, but the clearest expression of its treatment in neoclassical models of conflict is Hirshleifers argument that the poor have a comparative advantage in violence. While it seems obscene in the light of the widespread and persistent evidence of coercive recruitment of children and young adults into military groups in, e.g., Sierra Leone or Angola, the argument is nonetheless made that the opportunity cost of insurgency for, especially, young males in poor countries where there are few alternative opportunities for gainful employment is clearly low. Essentially, this is simply a formal version of the widespread common sense assumption that in poor countries ‘‘life is cheap.’’ There are other factors, however, affecting the probability of the relative profitability of violent conflict. For example, Azam (2001) claims that the likelihood of war turns on whether there are credible signals of inter- and intraethnic redistributive resource allocations, given an initial endowment of ‘‘ethnic capital.’’ Redistributive mechanisms may take various forms. For example, high public sector wages for officials drawn from across ethnic groups, enabling an intra-ethnic trickle down, might be more effective in keeping the peace than relatively anonymous provision of public goods (Azam, 2001). Collier (Collier & Hoeffler, 1996, 1998) begins by stressing the gains from victory and the governments potential expenditure on defence as the factors determining the utility of rebellion. The calculation by prospective rebels is mediated by how easy it will be to mobilize support, i.e. by the characteristics of the collective action challenge in a given society. As shown in greater detail below, this is understood principally in terms of ‘‘ethno-linguistic fragmentation.’’ Later versions of Colliers models (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 1999, 2001), placing less emphasis on the probability of victory, highlight the availability of lootable primary commodities and the availability or otherwise of peaceable economic activities to young males. So-called greed variables such as these are found by Collier and Collier & Hoeffler to be far more robust predictors of civil war than ‘‘grievance’’ factors such as repression or exclusion, somewhat contrarily to Azams (2001) otherwise analytically related model. The orthodox economists toolkit has other compartments too, yielding nuanced variations around this basic model. Hirshleifer (1987), for example, wields diminishing returns, comparative advantage, and Cobb–Douglas production functions as relevant to the incidence and outcomes of conflict. Thus, production functions may relate fighting inputs on two sides to outputs in the form of victories and defeats. Azam (2001, p. 432) introduces the assumption that there are ‘‘locally increasing returns to scale in rebellion, such that there is a critical mass of resources to be invested in rebellion activity before there is any chance of overthrowing the government.’’ Few would argue with this probably: though this is insufficient to legitimate the overall model. Meanwhile, another compartment of the toolkit reveals a kind of adhesive holding the model together, i.e. ‘‘uncertainty.’’ Imprecision and inconsistency in the application of this variable in the models suggests that it is something of a residual used to patch up the holes in a model and stop it from collapsing. Hirshleifer (1994, p. 5) suggests that ‘‘uncertainty on the conflict side swamps that on the side of co-operation;’’ but acknowledges that it is not clear how exactly uncertainty will affect the likelihood of conflict as an outcome of the interaction of opportunities and preferences (on preferences, see below). Finally, again in the more applied models there is more attention to collective action problems and varieties of market failure. For example, Colliers (2000) explanation for his empirical findings that greed variables predict civil war better than do grievance variables turns on these issues. Rebellion against injustice has something of the qualities of a public good and, therefore, will also display the weaknesses of a public good, primarily susceptibility to free riders: hence, injustice might exist but will not produce sufficient conflict. Similarly, there is a time-consistency problem in that actors of violence are presumed not to trust the promises of leaders, reasonably expecting them to renege on their mobilizing pledges to put right a range of social wrongs or sources of grievance. On the other hand, appealing to peoples demand for instant gratification through loot nicely overcomes these difficulties. Such are the axioms, assumptions and logic that have informed much recent thinking on the economics of war, particularly of so-called civil wars in developing countries. They have also filtered into policy debates, especially through their influence on the research initiative of the World Bank on the economics of civil war, crime and violence. 6 (The debate has in some arenas been reduced to the overly simplistic ‘‘greed versus grievance’’ dichotomy.) This kind of explanation of conflict has a wider appeal too, perhaps for three main reasons. Firstly, many of those concerned by a high prevalence of civil conflict––a crude term used here simply for convenience––tend to recoil in righteous horror from the implications of the widely cited new barbarism thesis associated with Robert Kaplan. 7 Kaplan (1994) suggested that West African and Yugoslav wars manifested a problem of ‘‘loose molecules’’ stirred into a frenzy of violence by, essentially, Malthusian pressures and the nightmare of urbanization. The rational choice theory of conflict offers an analytical godsend to those made viscerally anxious by the ‘‘senseless anarchy’’ story. 8 Second, neoclassical economic explanations of conflict offer a corrective to the assumption that inequality produces resistance and conflict. Since Plato at least it has often seemed obvious that injustice and gross inequality would produce conflict. Much work on Central American conflicts prioritises the causal role of inequality (Boyce, 1996; Booth, 1991), while others find a more general significance (albeit probabilistic and along with other factors) of income inequality in the origins of ‘‘complex humanitarian emergencies’’ (Nafziger, 1996). But, as Trotsky and others have suggested, if the objective conditions of revolution were sufficient to cause revolutions, then much of the world would be in a more or less permanent condition of revolution. Moreover, it has become clearer that injustice and inequality do not inevitably or in any direct, functional sense produce conflict. 9 Grenier (1996), for example, shows well how structural injustice explanations tally weakly with the incidence, timing and outcomes of Central American conflicts. 10 In another example, from the Jubba Valley in southern Somalia, the question is how to understand Gosha peoples choices to participate within and actively seek incorporation into a society which subjugated them, and how to understand their creative ability to manage the juxtaposition of domination and accommodation (Besteman, 1999, p. 9). Third, the appeal of the new economics of conflict lies in the fact that it is a materialist explanation of conflict. Whatever else contemporary armed conflicts are about, powerful material interests clearly are significant in shaping the conflicts and in their causation. This dimension was often neglected in overdependence on global ideological explanations of Cold War conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 11 It has also been sidelined in the more naïve explanations of more recent conflicts in terms of primordial ethnic antipathies, in which this rigid hatred was seen as more important than any other factor. Yet there is no denying the significance of material interests in the origins of conflicts, even if at times (e.g., in Colombia) it is difficult to separate their role in the origins of conflict from their influence on the characteristics and durability of conflict. Timber and diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone, opium in Afghanistan, coca in Colombia, land and qat in Somalia, oil and diamonds in Angola, tropical hardwoods in Cambodia, and so on all feature large in any understanding of conflict. Arguably, pressure of population on land combined with collapse of international coffee prices was critical to the background to the Rwandan genocide (Andre & Platteau, 1998; Austin, 1996). Vicious processes of asset transfer are common to the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and many other places (Besteman, 1999; Duffield, 1994; Ndikumana, 1998, p. 32). Meanwhile, conflict in the Kivus (north and south) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been driven to a significant extent by a contest for control over the profitable local section of the ‘‘marketing chain’’ for tantalite, the heat-resistant metal used in space craft, mobile phones and computer game consoles (Jackson, 2001; Moore, Nabudere, & Kibasambi, 2001). Time preference and credibility problems do seem to be overcome where, as is extremely common, there is evidence of instant gratification by soldiers in the form of looting. The capacity of orthodox economic theory to make of these material issues something more than the stuff just of rich description or of consumer campaign morality has given them considerable advantage. Despite the apparent appeal and formal elegance of orthodox economic explanations of violent conflict, there are strong grounds for arguing that these explanations are extremely reductionist, highly speculative, and profoundly misleading. For example, the presence of primary commodities in an economy or their ease of lootability is an absurdly simplistic, overly direct rationalization of the role of material resources in conflict. This approach may be contrasted, e.g., with analyses of the origins of three distinct and competitive liberation movements in Angola fighting for independence from Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s and laying the basis of the MPLA/UNITA war since independence. 12 For these analyses stress different material interests underlying political mobilization and ideology in each of the parties contending to dominate the anti-colonial war and post-independence politics: the FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA (Clarence-Smith, 1980; Birmingham, 1992). Relevant interests included the frustration of dispossessed northern Angolan coffee farmers (in the area providing most support to the FNLA) whose farms were expropriated by Portuguese settlers and whose prospects of wage employment were cut short by settler use of migrant labor from the Ovimbundu highlands. They included these migrant laborers and the farmers of the central highlands plateau (the heartland of UNITA support). And they included the interests of those employed in manufacturing and clerical positions in and around Luanda (the MPLAs domain). To reduce the role of the material to the lootability of primary resources (and therefore the profitability at the margin of conflict and violence over co-operation and exchange) conjures up Gramscis definition of economism, in which by an economic fact it means the self-interest of an individual or small group, in an immediate... sense... [it] is content to assume motives of mean and usurious self-interest, especially when it takes forms which the law defines as criminal (Gramsci, 1971, p. 163). Gramsci defined economism as presenting causes as immediately operative that in fact only operate indirectly, overestimating mechanical causation and indulging in ‘‘doctrinaire pedantry’’ (p. 178). The economism and reductionism of these models is certainly worse than anything to be found in Marxism, other than in its most vulgar forms. Even if axiomatic abstractions are merged with variables imported by selection from stylised facts, neoclassical economic theories of conflict remain, as theories, abstract. They are completely speculative until some empirical content is added. Given that the social, the cultural, the historical, etc. are left out of the initial framework, when they are brought back in later (which is inevitable) their incorporation is arbitrarily selective. What is the basis for assuming that people everywhere experience a choice of conflict or co-operation defined solely in terms of profitability, where historical evidence suggests that conflict often is institutionalized (i.e. the rules of the game are conflictual) and that the conditions of cooperation and exchange are typically forged, often slowly, out of conflict (Tilly, 1992; Howard, 2001)? What is the basis for deciding that people cannot be mobilized by ideology or promises of change (including change in material conditions of employment or production) because of time-preference or leadership credibility problems, when history and contemporary democratic politics are virtually defined by political enthusiasm for all manner of pledges despite their frequently being unfulfilled? 13 What is the basis for deciding that collective action is necessarily framed in terms of historically fixed ‘‘ethnic capital’’ or scores of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, where evidence suggests that ethnicity is commonly historically dynamic and far from even in its organizing hold on people, and where there is no evidence that ethnic affiliation is always prioritized over other sources of collective identity, including class? Moreover, why must it be accepted that social phenomena are best apprehended through individual rational choice (and a very narrow notion of rationality) rather than relational rationality and social and historical constraints on choice? 14 On what grounds should we ignore the gray areas between choice and compulsion in human activities including conflict? For fear and obeisance to de facto authority––as well as acquiescence with strong mobilizing ideologies not through acceptance but through desperate efforts to resist local structures of oppression––are motivations that might be more significant than either greed or grievance, individual choice or unambiguous coercion, in some circumstances. 15 Building on these doubts, the rest of this paper introduces three main sources of weakness in orthodox economic theories of conflict and their relevance to contemporary ‘‘civil wars.’’ The first weakness lies in the choice of proxies used in attempts to add empirical content to the theoretical postulates: these proxies are empirically and conceptually fragile. Second, theories of conflict rooted in micro-foundations of methodological individualism and rational choice cannot avoid somehow bringing in ‘‘the social’’: yet this endeavor is, again, empirically and analytically a failure. Third, even if these orthodox economic theories and econometric applications might capture a portion of the reality of conflicts, albeit crudely, they completely fail to capture one of the most significant features of all conflicts, i.e. structural and relational change.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 2NC – L – Fiscal Redistribution

The politics of the 1AC uses market social institutions as a vessel to exclude the individual from society. Their appeal to social welfare programs inverts Keynesian economics, forcing the market to implement socially uplifting policy. This fails

Bohl 12 [Kenneth Bohl, PhD in Philosophy at Duquesne University, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: ENGAGING COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS IN AN ERA OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS, https://media.proquest.com/media/hms/ORIG/2/wIMBK?_s=QABOCX6qK1jKGkwqEuLul0eNTUY%3D, LTEC]

Keynes had great concerns regarding individualism, self-interest, and the ability of laissez-faire to provide for public social interests the world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals 15 acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. (Keynes, Laissez-faire loc. 360) Keynes spoke of the need to separate "those services which are technically social from those that are technically individual" (Laissez-faire loc. 449) (emphasis his). "Technically social" services are those that remain unprovided unless provided by the State. Keynes furthermore advocated for the central control of currency as well as "full publicity, by law if necessary, of all business facts which it is useful to know" (loc. 449), a precursor to CSR's call for corporate transparency. The Keynesian legacy also laid the groundwork in the United States for such social welfare programs as social security, unemployment insurance, and Medicare that would not have otherwise existed except for the intervention of the government. These social welfare programs represent an economic social responsibility to protect the vulnerable of our society—those who are unable to provide for themselves (Goodin 145). The function of the welfare state is for the government to provide services to those who are not otherwise provided for. In other words "the state should become responsible whenever there is no one with primary responsibility, or whenever those with primary responsibility are unable or unwilling to discharge it" (Goodin 151). The United States has a long history of providing such services. These services extend beyond social security, unemployment compensation, or Medicare and include children and youth services as well as foreign aid. During the period of Keynesian economics, national social welfare programs expanded at a considerable rate. The welfare state is defined by Agnar Sandmo as "the economic and social policies of a country that gives high priorities to equality and individual protection against social hazards" (469). Although taken as a 16 given right, public education—advocated as a government responsibility by Adam Smith—is another example of a social welfare program. Sandmo states that it is not just wealth redistribution programs such as social security or unemployment that make up a welfare state, but also the presence of economic policies that work to reduce the need for welfare, such as federal jobs programs or employee education programs. According to Robert Goodin, the welfare state and welfare economics represent a social responsibility of a government to protect the vulnerable, such as children, the elderly, the infirm, the impoverished, or the disabled. This is a position that was advocated first by Adam Smith and reinvigorated by John Maynard Keynes but, beginning in the 1980s, had come under increasing fire. Richard Clayton and Jonas Pontusson report that during the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush presidencies, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits were cut 31% (86). AFDC benefits were further cut during the Bill Clinton administration by $24 billion. Social welfare programs represent one aspect of economic social responsibility. Neoclassical economic theory would have us believe that those theories are value neutral, and yet there is a broad spectrum of social values to which economics must respond. That there are social responsibilities for which economics must answer is not a new construct but rather originates in the writings of Adam Smith, who himself draws on the virtue ethics of Aristotle. By and large, the welfare state has remained intact during the past decades, although there has been increasing pressure to reform welfare by either reducing obligations or shifting the obligation to the private sector. However, the reason for the existence of social welfare originates in the lack of resources in the private sphere for these specific needs and hence the need for non-market social institutions. 17 Prior to Keynes, the prevailing belief was that there could not be such a thing as long term structural unemployment (Goodin 148). This belief contributed to the view that, by and large, unemployment was a voluntary condition. The Great Depressions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, of course, proved otherwise. Under the mantle of Keynesian economic theory, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began his extensive public works projects, and under the same mantle President Lyndon Johnson implemented his works of the Great Society. Both the New Deal of President Roosevelt and the Great Society projects of President Johnson contributed to the welfare of society through the creation of public works jobs that not only built national infrastructure but also worked to preserve and restore the environment. Neoclassical economic theory would challenge the social welfare position of Keynesian economics.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Fiscal Redistribution

The belief that fiscal tinkering can somehow create an egalitarian society is a logical fallacy that motivates privatizing of the social. The assumption of equality inherent to neoclassical economics is a cop out, that obscures inequality in service of asset acquisition and profit maximization.

Ban 20 [Cornell Ban, Cornel Ban is an associate professor of International Political economy at Copenhagen Business School., Scandinavian Social-Democracy and the Economics of Reformism, , LTEC]

“First, fiscal policy was to be restrictive rather than countercyclical, because a policy of general reflation would simply produce inflated profits and wage drift. Correspondingly, profits were deliberately squeezed to push employers to resist inflationary wage claims. Second, despite profit capping, wages still had to be controlled, so Rehn and Meidner proposed the solidarity wage; that is, unions would operate a centralized wage policy that stressed the principle of equal pay for equal work across sectors. This policy effectively raised the reservation wage of low productivity sectors, which in turn forced inefficient firms either to increase productivity or to go bankrupt, while at the same time furthering redistributive policy goals.44 The third element of the model, an active labor-market policy, was designed to make profit capping and the solidarity wage more effective by promoting labor mobility through supplyside training, relocation, and investment programs. The point was to encourage further industrial adjustment and employment growth as two sides of the same coin.”45 This inclusive growth regime forged by SAP at Saltsjöbaden was attractive to labor because it brought public pay-as-you go pensions, paid vacations, public works to prop up working class wages and mop up unemployment. It was also attractive to a capitalist class who was shocked by the effects that the deflation and strike activity had on their assets and profits and who was promised that private property and business 9 concentration would be left untouched and that labor would be pacified via union-employer negotiations that would deliver not just social peace but also predictable labor costs while serving the imperative of stable domestic demand and efficient use of all available resources. Even the introduction of progressive taxation was designed so as to serve both the demands for downward income redistribution as well as business interest in increasing investment. Thus, high marginal income, wealth and inheritance taxes pushed capital owners’ resources into investment rather than consumption while the SAP gave up on its longstanding progressive corporate income tax policy and devised a tax regime that favored large firms (via deductions for reinvested profits) in the name of rationalizing the private economy, a move that made Saltsjobaden stick with big capital.46 Overall, in recognition of the fact that social democratic reformism depended on private investment, the tax system gave Swedish capitalists one of the lowest corporate income tax rates in Europe while having the highest taxes on was not central to growth: luxury consumption and wealth holdings. As Mark Blyth put it: “What enabled these new ideas to be accepted by both business and labor, which at that time had some of the most fractious industrial relations in the world, was the ability of the state to use these new ideas to recast the problem of deflation in terms of the interdependency of business, labor, and the state, rather than as the fault of any one of them.”4 Like in Sweden and Denmark, the political moderation of Norwegian social-democrats enabled an alliance with a small farmers’ party and proto-Keynesian economics gave the left a toolbox to rule the capitalist economy with. Norwegian economists such as Ole Colbjørnsen and Ragnar Frisch agreed with the Swedish and Danish economics of reflation but went further, advocating for state planning, albeit without the multi-layered policy architecture of that their Swedish counterparts had devised. The result was an employment-based stimulus and a Saltsjobaden-style class compromise. Unlike the economic irrelevance of the SPD’s ideas about how to counter the Great Recession, the Norwegian Labor Party’s homegrown para-Keynesianism locked in transformations that would deeply transform statemarket relations in Norway from the 1930s onwards.48 In other words, the Scandinavian model of social democracy had a lot of “class collaborationism” in it. At the same time, although the welfare state proper did not arrive until the end of the war, in the 1930s this political angle convinced capital owners to share with workers the benefits of growth through limits to personal wealth accumulation, while making the labor market work as in the idealized neoclassical economics model. Liberal economics, it seems, needed big government and big unions to work as promised. It is important to stress that this Nordic tightrope walk between the imperatives of capitalism and the imperatives of delivering extensive social goods for a broad social block had benefitted from an extraordinarily favorable condition: bourgeois parties with relatively progressive ideas about market-society relations and who in fact laid the foundations of the welfare state and labor-capital coordination via democratic corporatism. Indeed, the early history of the Nordic welfare (1890- 1920) was largely the work of these parties, with the Social Democrats having a more scattered influence. This should not be confused with the oft claimed Bismarckian social reforms. Scandinavia developed differently, with a universalist welfare model funded by way of general taxes, which uncoupled access to benefits from their financing. Or, the evidence indicates that the bourgeois parties, and in particular those representing agrarian interests, also played a significant role in this regard during this period and, occasionally later on as well. The battle for universalism and tax funding in early Swedish welfare policy was fought primarily by the peasantry and in Denmark liberals and conservatives supported critical elements of the budding welfare state and social policy the SD governments wanted. Indeed, even the fundamental bases of corporatism had been laid with the support and often the initiative of these parties.49 The contrast with the known reactionary positions of the bourgeois parties in France, Germany, Austria or Britain is manifest. Conclusions During the first half of the twentieth century, Nordic social-democracy was an ideologically unambitious and ruthlessly pragmatic reformist movement that ended up being only loosely steeped into revisionist Marxism. This political movement may have lacked the theoretical spark of their continental and especially of their German comrades. But in retrospect, it seems that this conceptual aloofness in the realm of ideology proved to be an asset in terms of practical political gains once nationalization ceased to be focus of economic policy. Indeed, the German-Nordic contrast as well as the internal variations in the Norwegian case leads one to realize that the most ambitious and long-lasting transformations of capitalism in the direction of decommodification and the highest quality of life available for “the many” were engineered by these philosophically inconsistent but economically astute “class collaborators.” Through achieving political hegemony for more than half a century and pushing through their agenda without morphing into mere progressive liberals, these parties and their labor union allies managed to change for the better the fate of ordinary people more than the scintillating and occasionally tragic minds of the SPD could ever change theirs. Of course, it would be ludicrous to attribute the German political disaster to the disastrous economics of the SPD during the Weimar Republic. Material factors, context, culture, location and other factors played a critical role in the buildup of this hegemony. But letting the Nazis be the party of unemployment-mopping public works, rejecting the stimulus program proposed by the bread-and-butter economists of the unions and shunning the alliance with the farmers (so essential in Scandinavia) certainly did not help. Marxist-Leninists have been sarcastic with the blandness of the melioristic and utilitarian ambitions of the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian descendants of Bernstein. They have also piled mordant criticism on Nordic social-democrats’ anti-communism. The MarxistLeninists’ ire is understandable. To paraphrase Sven Steinmo, what remains is that by making capitalism a lot more humane and compatible (at least for a while) with the interests of wage earners, women, the unemployed, farmers and the precariously self-employed, Nordic Social-Democrats also made capitalism harder to topple by the Marxist-Leninist left, a political current that in Scandinavia was reduced to irrelevance not by state repression but by the social-democrats’ success as decommodifying labor to an extent that was unimaginable under liberal democratic conditions elsewhere.50 Bernstein would certainly have deplored the abandonment of their ambition to surpass capitalism.