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2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Links › UBI

UBI guarantees accelerate inequality and declining electoral leverage – kills democracy

Mary Harrington, 06-05-2023, "Universal basic income will kill democracy," UnHerd, -- MoState JG

Are we on our way to universal basic income? A pilot scheme has been announced in two English locations, in which 30 people will be paid a lump sum of £1600 a month without conditions for two years, and observed for the effect this has on their lives. This follows a slow but steady groundswell of calls for such a measure — calls that have accelerated since “furlough” effectively trialled something similar during lockdown.

But while UBI may serve as a pragmatic response to increasing inequality, we should be alert to what such a measure implies: that the majority of citizens are now passive, consumption-only participants in the economic order. And once this is acknowledged openly, expect it to have knock-on effects in the political sphere as well. One side-effect of industrialisation across the West was the widening of political participation. In England, a key group pushing for change was the 19th-century Chartists, who called for the working-class franchise along with other reforms to rebalance the political order. The threat of unrest, combined with the sheer practical necessity of having a relatively cooperative industrial workforce, ensured that many Chartist demands were eventually attained. In other words: the working class got their voices heard, and formally acknowledged via the vote, because they were needed. Today we are looking at the end of that era. The share of British GDP that comes from industry has shrunk from 30% in 1970 to around 10% today, largely replaced by services. There is no longer enough industry to keep an industrial proletariat employed. And even if manufacturing did get “re-shored”, much of it would likely be automated. So, too, will many of the service roles that replaced industrial work, thanks to rapid developments in AI. As the futurist Yuval Noah Harari argues, new technologies will replace most jobs, producing a new “useless class” of people whose work is simply no longer needed. Others warn that the looming age of automation will accelerate inequality: in effect, a mass of the indigent and unemployable, offset by a small class of fabulously wealthy tech plutocrats. It is not a recipe for political stability. One solution, Harari suggests, might simply be to keep this “useless class” fed with handouts and occupied with drugs and computer games. In more polite progressive terms, this means UBI: a solution to the inequalities now increasingly apparent in post-industrial society, opening the scope for people to pursue individual fulfilment as they see fit. Perhaps echoing the pragmatic willingness of 19th-century British elites to reform institutions in line with the changing political calculus, it’s often the tech super-rich who are UBI’s keenest advocates. Harari notes that this presents a deep challenge to our belief in the dignity of all human life. This is true. It also presents a deep challenge to the political order we have come to think of as settled. Had the industrial working class simply been passive recipients of handouts and consumers of entertainment, it’s difficult to see what leverage the Chartists might have had for demanding the vote — or what reason elites might have had for granting it. By the same token, should the base of net contributors to the Exchequer shrink to a handful of plutocrats, it’s reasonable to expect that in practice, even if not in theory, the political views of those net contributors will weigh considerably more heavily than your average PlayStation-addicted UBI recipient. If your tax base comprises, say, 100 oligarchs, then the departure of even one makes a big dent in the coffers — a threat that can be used to shape policy a long way upstream of official politics. On current inequality trends, then, it’s more than possible that universal basic income will become a reality. If it does, I predict that current electoral rituals will be maintained — but will steadily lose leverage. (This has, in fact, arguably been under way for some decades.) No doubt, over time, other means will be found for the masses to register their views. Or perhaps, like the 59% of American youth who would rather give up the franchise than their access to TikTok, people simply won’t care. Either way, in a UBI state we can expect the industrial-era democratic settlement to persist largely as a toothless ritual, while real political power withdraws into the hands of the new lords and princes.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Links › Social Security

Social security centralizes governance & inevitably produces winners and losers

Chris Edwards, 1-22-2019, Chris Edwards occupies the Kilts Family Chair in Fiscal Studies at Cato and is the editor of Down​siz​ing​Gov​ern​ment​.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. "Winner and Loser States from Centralized Government," Cato Institute, -- MoState JG

Ninety years ago, two‐​thirds of government spending in America was state‐​local and one‐​third was federal. Today, it is the reverse with about two‐​thirds federal and one‐​third state‐​local. American government has become larger and much more centralized. That centralization has made winners and losers among the states as vast flows of taxpayer cash pour into Washington and are then dispersed through more than 2,200 federal spending programs.

In 2019, the federal government will vacuum $3.5 trillion from taxpayer pockets in the 50 states, borrow $1 trillion from global capital markets, and then turn on the leaf blower to scatter $4.5 trillion back out across the 50 states. Many billions of dollars will stay in and around Washington to pay for the leaf‐​blowing operations.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Links › Social Security

Federal intrusion includes expansive grants and funding obligations, overburdening states and shifting power

Diane Katz, 11-30-2021, Former Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, "Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government," Heritage Foundation, -- MoState JG

Federal intrusion in states’ affairs has taken a variety of forms, including mandates, funding obligations, pre-emptions, and regulation.40 Federal Intergovernmental Mandates. The term “federal intergovernmental mandate” refers to a provision in statute or regulation, or federal court ruling that imposes an “enforceable duty” on state, local, or tribal governments (excluding a condition of federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary federal program).41

Growth in the number and scope of federal mandates is largely a modern phenomenon. Researchers have documented one instance of Congress enacting a major mandate in 1931, one in 1940, none in the 1950s, nine in the 1960s, 25 in the 1970s, and 27 in the 1980s.42 Since 2000, Congress and various Presidents have approved more than 190 statutes43 with intergovernmental mandates, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Collectively, the laws have imposed more than 1,000 separate directives.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Links › Generic

Expansion of federal grants collapse federalism – division of powers, waste, dependency

CAGW, 3-1-2022, "Federalism and Federal Grants," Citizens Against Government Waste, -- MoState JG

The expansion of federal grants to the states and the replacement of the Constitution’s system of divided powers with one of coercive federalism has had a detrimental impact on the states. Grant programs not only erode the division of powers between the states and the federal government established by the Constitution, but also fuel wasteful practices and unsustainable spending. The most significant problem with federal grants is their impact on the federalist system. Roosevelt’s New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society led the shift to cooperative and then coercive federalism. Thanks in part to the expansion of federal grants, American intergovernmental relations no longer resemble James Madison’s vision of how powers should be divided between the federal government and the states. The expansion of federal power allows for greater control from a centralized government. Central control, in turn, undercuts the protections provided by a decentralized system and the ability of states and localities to make decisions best suited to their circumstances. Restrictive grants to the states allow the federal government to set and execute policy priorities that are inconsistent and contradictory from one administration to another. In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could attach conditions related “to the federal interests in particular national projects or programs” to federal funds in order to implement preferred policies.32 Congress and federal agencies have increasingly expanded this approach in recent years. For example, the evaluation criteria for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s ReConnect Loan and Grant broadband expansion program gives preference to applicants “who commit to net neutrality” principles, a policy priority of the Biden administration that was in place during the Obama administration and then eliminated by the FCC during the Trump administration.33 Initial guidelines for ARPA spending stipulated that state and local governments could not use any of those funds to reduce taxes. The impact of coercive grants on state sovereignty fuels other issues. Most notably, as grant money moves further away from the issuing agency, spending becomes harder to track. In cases “where the Federal Government compels States to regulate,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in New York v. United States, “the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”34 This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a uniform reporting standard for the states and federal agencies. For example, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program was established in 1993 to provide long-term recovery aid to areas hit hard by natural disasters. Since that time, the program has struggled with funding delays and wasteful spending. A January 2021 Urban Institute report “found that CDBG-DR grants took an average of 4.7 years to complete.”35 A May 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the constant transfer of funds through different entities before it reaches recipients made the program ripe for abuse.36 Despite the risk and concerns that federal oversight becomes more difficult once funds reach the states, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has doled out $40 billion to states and localities in response to disasters since 2017, nearly half of the $90 billion distributed since the inception of CDBG-DR.37 This increased spending has expanded involvement federal control over what were once considered state and local emergencies.

When federal grants dry up, states must find other ways to offset the lost funding either through increasing revenue or eliminating the programs. After the passage of the ARRA in 2009, for example, many states used federal grant funds to support the establishment of new programs or prop up existing programs that would normally be cut. Within a few years, the funds provided by the federal government expired, and the states found themselves unable to continue the programs. A May 11, 2020, Reason Foundation report examined the implementation of state education funds received under the ARRA in light of calls for aid to the states in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The report found that several states spent federal education funding on projects unrelated to the legislation’s intent. Texas placed its education money in a fund that disproportionally benefited higher-income school districts that were less impacted by the Great Recession than schools in low-income areas. North Carolina spent money “via mechanisms that aren’t directly based on overall student counts or needs,” leading to federal relief money being spent on programs “like professional development, driver training for ninth-graders, and gifted and talented education.”38 Strict regulation of federal funds, on the other hand, increases federal control over the states and risks violating state sovereignty. Just as Hoover predicted in 1932, state and local governments have learned to rely on the federal government to provide a bailout during times of economic downturn. When states fail to prepare, it allows them to shift the burden to the federal government and other states. The Mercatus Center’s Veronique de Rugy and Tad DeHaven noted that “it is fair to ask…why taxpayers in states like New Mexico should be responsible for covering for the insufficient planning of states like Pennsylvania.”39 Relief grants allow poorly prepared states to benefit from the stability of other states and their taxpayers. As more states recognize that they do not need to prepare for future downturns or spend money that they set aside for emergencies, they will continue to take steps to maximize federal assistance. After the Great Recession, most states took steps to prepare for an economic downturn. A “stress test” of the states performed by Moody’s Analytics in 2019 found that 28 states held enough cash on hand to weather a moderate recession without turning to tax hikes or spending cuts. 40 Of the remaining 22 states, 12 were “within striking distance” of the goal and the remaining 10 were “significantly underprepared” for even a moderate downturn. In the end, the federal response to the pandemic demonstrated that states did not need to take steps to prepare for downturns because the federal government was standing by to bail them out. To help offset projected budget shortfalls, the federal government pumped trillions of dollars into all the states to offset revenue loss, even if they were running surpluses. In the end, the states were left with far more money than they needed to break even. Federal grants allowed every state, both those that had prepared well and those that hadn’t prepared at all, to expand funding into a wide variety of programs they could not afford to establish before. One year after the declaration of the COVID-19 national emergency, the data showed that only 15 states experienced a decrease in their rainy-day funds. Of the remaining 35 states, all but two “reported higher balances” than before the pandemic.41 The influx of federal funds allowed states to increase spending without tapping into their reserves.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Uniqueness › AT Non-UQ

COVID reinvigorated federalism in the United States

Andrea Gustafson January 19, 2021, Andrea Gustafson (she/her) is from Coventry, Rhode Island, and is currently a junior at Boston University, majoring in political science and international relations. Covid-19 Could Strengthen Federalism in the United States -- MoState JG

Donald Trump’s presidency has exacerbated the nationalization of politics in the United States. The current state of US democracy raises the question of the place of federalism given the dominance of national issues. Federalism is the type of government in which regional governments and a central government share power, both having their own spheres of responsibility and checks and balances on one another. When discussing the nationalization of politics, summarizes its effect stating, “the nationalization of American politics is kind of the death knell for the governor as the go-to figure in our politics.” However, the Trump administration’s lackluster action on Covid-19 may give federalism a new life. State governors have had to step up and act independently to address the current pandemic, taking measures, such as executive orders, to protect their constituents. Could this incipient revitalization of federalism be key to preventing democratic backsliding in the United States? I argue that the Covid-19 responses by various state governments strengthen US federalism, which will in turn create new opportunities to bolster US democracy. Federalism allows for a local government to tackle issues that may not be suitable for the federal government. The increased action occurring in state governments will allow states to exercise the ability to check federal government policies. Meanwhile, local governments and politicians oversee a jurisdiction that is closer to their constituents, giving citizens easier access to political participation than the federal government. If the strengthening of federalism results in increased participation due to this greater opportunity for access, then it may bolster US democracy.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Uniqueness › AT Non-UQ

federalism on the brink

Diane Katz, 11-30-2021, Former Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, "Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government," Heritage Foundation, -- MoState JG

The federal government’s continuous breach of constitutional constraints is approaching a crisis point. Countless regulatory and statutory mandates are supplanting states’ governance over matters properly under their purview, including education, law enforcement, public health, infrastructure, insurance, land use, and even civil service.2 States have also become inordinately dependent on federal funding,3 which skews local priorities and imposes a multitude of burdensome obligations.4 Imbalance in the federal–state relationship has profound effects on self-government. The U.S. Constitution unequivocally limits federal authority in order to impede the consolidation of power, as well as to maximize political accountability, policy innovation, and civic participation. To the extent that Washington violates constitutional strictures and usurps states’ authority, the functions of federalism are thwarted.

There is abundant evidence of excessive encroachment: The number and cost of federal mandates have increased markedly—an additional 457 enacted between 2006 and 2019 —as have pre-emptions6 of state and local authority. States are also more dependent on federal grants-in-aid, which comprised 32.4 percent of total state spending in fiscal year (FY) 2020.7 Outlays for the federal regulatory bureaucracy have grown by 18 percent in the past decade, to $66.2 billion in FY 20208 —excluding budgets and staffing for tax functions, entitlement programs, and government procurement. Federal dictates have likewise engulfed private enterprise, including 856 new mandates between 2006 and 2019.9

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Uniqueness › AT Non-UQ

Now is the time for state government – Congressional gridlock will halt federal policymaking

Bromley-Trujillo and Nolette 6/23 Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, B.A. in political science from the University of Texas, San Antonio and M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Michigan, Paul Nolette, Associate Professor and Director of the Les Aspin Center for Government. 6-14-2023, "The State of American Federalism 2022–2023: Escalating Culture Wars in the States," OUP Academic, – mostate JG

Recent congressional actions (or inaction) hold significant implications for federalism along two primary avenues: First, congressional gridlock typically has the byproduct of pushing policy issues onto subnational government agendas (Karch 2020). Second, it is common for federal legislation to include aspects of implementation that are left up to the states. A long line of scholarship shows that policy implementation is heavily influenced by political factors and state capacity levels (e.g., Dahill‐Brown and Lavery 2012). Moreover, implementation can be substantially affected when federal and state policy actors are in conflict over public policy goals. As Goelzhauser and Rose (2017) note, state–federal relationships are heavily influenced by partisan disagreements. The 117th Congress passed several major pieces of legislation in 2022, including the Inflation Reduction Act, legal protections for marriage equality, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, and security assistance to Ukraine, among others. The passage of multiple significant bills through Congress represents somewhat of a departure from the legislative gridlock that largely defined the Trump years (Smith 2021). Bipartisan policy passage provides some evidence of this; fourteen House Republicans along with fifteen Senate Republicans joined Democrats to pass the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, a law that followed a mass shooting that killed nineteen children in an elementary school in Uvalde, Texas. The law’s major provisions include investments in mental health services and federal grant money provided to the states to implement red flag laws. In another show of bipartisanship, Congress also enacted the Respect for Marriage Act, with thirty-nine Republicans in the House and twelve Republicans in the Senate joining Democrats in support of the legislation. In addition, there was overwhelming support from both parties for aid packages to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. By this evidence alone, one might argue that Congress has moved beyond the consistent gridlock of years past. If gridlock were to truly subside, this would take some pressure off of subnational governments to fill policy voids on contentious issues.

Still, there is ample evidence that the parties remain heavily polarized and generally unable or unwilling to compromise on legislation. When measuring congressional productivity Binder (2004) argues that we must account for the denominator and compare legislative successes relative to legislative failures. In 2022, Congress remained deadlocked on a vast array of highly salient policy issues including voting rights, immigration, and reproductive rights. Each of these policy issues garnered significant public attention; however, political polarization, narrow party margins in Congress, and institutional features including the filibuster in the Senate largely prevented action by Congress. Lack of action on each of these key issues creates both opportunities for states to act and also significant challenges. For instance, states that border Mexico are bearing the brunt of a lack of federal immigration policy reform, which has exacerbated conflicts between states as well. In addition, a lack of uniform voting requirements at the federal level means that voting rights vary extensively across the states, resulting in voters experiencing drastically different “costs of voting” depending on the state in which they reside (Schraufnagel et al. 2022).

2023 SDI Disadvantage
2NC › Uniqueness › AT Courts

Sackett v. EPA signals the Supreme Court’s commitment to federalism

Adam Carrington, 5-26-2023, associate professor of politics at Hillsdale College.  "Supreme Court’s opinion in Sackett v. EPA is a victory for the rule of law and federalism," Restoring America, -- MoState JG

All of these results are good for the rule of law, for federalism, and therefore for America. Indeed, the decision in Sackett v. EPA continues a renewed commitment to these principles on the Supreme Court's part. Let us hope as bigger cases come down at this term’s end that it is only a precursor to even better victories. The rule of law presupposes clarity of language. By its own words, law both empowers the government and places limits on that empowerment. Otherwise, we would fall into one of two dystopias: an anarchy from a timid government unsure of its capacities or a tyranny from public officers held to no discernable restraints. The need for clarity in the law underlay Thursday’s Supreme Court decision in Sackett v. EPA . The decision sought to further define the term “the waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act of 1972 and thus roll back the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulatory powers. In the majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito lauded the success achieved by the Clean Water Act. People can now use many bodies of water that were once unusably polluted. But determining the extent of the above phrase has been a subject of debate between and within both courts and federal agencies for 50 years. Do the waters of the United States only include interstate avenues of commerce? Do they involve any body of water, however small and temporary, down to puddles in a person’s backyard? Judges, bureaucrats, and scholars have put forward arguments bordering on both of these extremes and everywhere in between over the decades. Alito sought to limit how judges interpreted and enforced the term toward the narrower definition. “[W]aters of the United States” included only what people commonly understood as “streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes” or some body of water permanently connected to the same, he argued.

While the particular definition of this term will not touch most of our lives, the general principle and practice will. For one, Alito’s opinion placed restraints on governmental power over America's citizens. Bureaucrats have tried to read laws such as the Clean Water Act as broadly as possible. Doing so has expanded their regulatory authority over private citizens, businesses, and groups in all kinds of ways. To the extent they did so through the manipulation of the laws, they infringed on our liberty. Alito affirmed and exercised the principle that bureaucrats cannot define statutory language however they wish, expanding it to meet their goals and preferences. Instead, the government possesses the power to act only so far as the law’s terms dictate. And the laws do possess a clarity of language discernable by judges and others reading them. The laws thereby dictate that government can act only over certain areas in certain ways that other persons can point out and require bureaucrats to obey. For another, Alito’s opinion struck a blow for federalism. Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion focused on this issue more than Alito’s, though the two were consistent on this point. Part of the debate over the Clean Water Act is not the power of the government over individual people but the regulatory authority of the national versus the state governments. Our Founders established a system that divided the exercise of the people’s political power between one national and many state governments. It did so to achieve the same purpose that laws seek. The national government is given control over matters affecting the whole nation, matters it is best suited to address. States receive the rest of legitimate governmental powers, namely those local matters it is most ready to consider. This division also allows the different levels of government to check each other against tyranny, even as each seeks to act more effectively. Over the last century, the national government has eroded these lines, accruing increasing power once exercised by the states, either directly or through other means. Thomas pointed out how the court’s opinion on Thursday reimposed some of the old limits, even though he would go even further than the majority did. States now will have a greater responsibility to enact proper regulations to protect America’s local waters for the health, safety, and convenience of the people.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
Federalism DA – MSDI 2023 › 1NC Shell › Generic

Democratic collapse is an existential threat --- controls every impact

Kasparov 17 (Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror, war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
Federalism DA – MSDI 2023 › 1NC Shell › Generic

Federalism is key to democracy

Donald F. Kettl, 1-18-2022, columnist for Governing, is a professor emeritus and the former dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. "Can Federalism Save American Democracy? Maybe …," Governing, -- MoState JG

“Canada is like a nice family living over a biker bar,” Dustin Hoffman once quipped. “They keep telling the downstairs neighbors to keep down the noise, people are trying to sleep.” But our Canadian friends are increasingly worried that things downstairs are moving from disorder to danger. In the country’s leading newspaper, Toronto’s Globe and Mail, political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon , “By 2025, American democracy could collapse, causing extreme domestic political instability, including widespread civil violence. By 2030, if not sooner, the country could be governed by a right-wing dictatorship.” The United States “is becoming increasingly ungovernable,” he wrote, and wondered, “How should Canada prepare?” It’s not just the Canadians who are worried. An published in early January found that 64 percent of Americans agreed that “American democracy is in crisis and at risk of failing.” One in four believed that it was sometimes OK to use violence to protect American democracy, although of course it’s their own version of democracy they’d want to take up arms to protect. In a few short years, we’ve moved from the world’s very model of democracy to a government that, in the eyes of other nations, is anything but. A European think tank’s 2021 report classified the U.S. as with “the sustained and deliberate process of subversion of basic democratic tenets by political actors and governments.” Commentary around the anniversary of the Jan. 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection was united in the conclusion that “American democracy is tottering,” as . Even biker bars have rules that aim to keep at least a semblance of order. Critics are pointedly wondering if the same can be said for American democracy. The federal government is a mess. So it’s worth asking: Can state and local governments, closer to the people, provide a lifeline to the nation’s grand traditions of governance? Can federalism save American democracy? There’s a strong case that the answer is yes. After all, the biggest fear of some of the founders was that so much power would accumulate in Washington that liberty would erode. They believed that preserving the power of states, as the new nation’s building blocks, would prevent tyranny.

Worrisome Battles So if the United States is backsliding, can its state and local building blocks stop the skid? There’s certainly hope. Congress is the Hells Angels of biker bars, with Gallup finding public trust in the federal government to handle domestic problems at , near the historic low. (And that may be an optimistic number: The Pew Research Center found that trust Washington “to do what is right just about always or most of the time.”) But while Americans’ confidence in state and local governments has been slipping in recent years, those levels of government still enjoy much higher levels of public trust: 57 percent and 66 percent, respectively, according to Gallup. A Deloitte study : “the more local, the more trusted.” Yet despite the headlines about Washington’s dysfunction, some of the more worrisome battles are raging at the state and local levels. In 2021, at least 34 laws were passed in 19 states that restricted voting, the , with more such legislation teed up for 2022. Brennan called this an “alarming and unprecedented attack on our democracy.” Meanwhile, are cascading into once-sleepy races for state secretaries of state, from groups trying to set up the next round of vote challenges. Just as alarming are the full-blooded battles that have erupted at school board meetings around the country. In many communities, these meetings used to be downright boring affairs, mostly poring over the details of school budgets. But COVID-19 and the culture wars have changed all that. In Rapid City, S.D., and Kalispell, Mont., for example, conservatives who were furious about mask mandates ran to . In a suburban school district near Columbia, S.C., a battle over pandemic restrictions led to who was the state’s reigning Superintendent of the Year. In Texas, a new state law from being forced to discuss “a controversial issue of public policy or social affairs” in the classroom. That spun off into a battle to ban the teaching of critical race theory (CRT) in local schools, even though there’s no evidence that local schools were teaching it. CRT was, until recently, a relatively obscure college-level issue focusing on whether race is woven into legal systems and political practice. But now any issue involving race attracts the CRT label — and an argument to ban it. The battle led a Black principal accused of promoting CRT . And in Virginia, in November Republican Glenn Youngkin surprisingly won the race for governor on the back of attacks on CRT, although the evidence that the issue won the race for him is . Noncontroversial was the problem itself: Virginia teachers don’t teach CRT. It’s not just issues around race. Texas Gov. Greg Abbott called on the Texas Education Agency to into “the availability of pornography” in the state’s public schools. It wasn’t clear where rivers of obscenity were flowing through the schools. In any event, the TEA has no investigators or prosecutors. In Williamson County, near Austin, county commissioners to two local school districts in a battle over what they claimed were offensive books on library shelves. A New Civil War? Americans might trust state and local governments more than the feds because the more local a government is the more trusted it is. But, on the other hand, the more local a government is, the easier it is to create flashpoints on issues, mobilize crowds to overwhelm debates and terrify elected officials into relenting. That’s led some analysts to warn starkly that the U.S. stands on the verge of a new civil war. In The Atlantic’s Jan. 6 issue, Barton Gellman that “January 6 was practice” and that the “next coup has already begun.” Barbara F. Walter, the author of the new book , tells us, “We are closer to civil war than any of us would like to believe.” That’s a tough message to hear but, , “if you were an analyst in a foreign country looking at events in America — the same way you’d look at events in Ukraine or the Ivory Coast or Venezuela — you would go down a checklist, assessing each of the conditions that make civil war likely. And what you would find is that the United States, a democracy founded more than two centuries ago, has entered very dangerous territory.” And, back to the Canadians, journalist Stephen Marche, in , warns of the escalating “tolerance for violence.” He writes, “Eventually somebody acts on it.” In The Globe and Mail, Homer-Dixon worries that “we live in a world where the absurd regularly becomes real and the horrible commonplace.” Our neighbors are worried about what’s going on downstairs in the biker bar of American democracy. A Democracy-Building Strategy There’s a way out, but it won’t be easy. In the Deloitte study, John O’Leary, Angela Welle and Sushumna Agarwal suggest a simple strategy: Go local, since people tend to trust the government that they interact most with; go focused on individual governmental functions, since people tend to trust the programs and agencies that deliver value to them; go digital, since satisfaction with digital services is connected with higher levels of trust; and go transparent, since it’s easier to trust the things we see than the mysteries we don’t. The best bet for saving American democracy lies, as always, with state and local governments. Working to uproot the incivility and polarization that has infected local governments — especially local school boards — would be an important first step. The second step lies in the collection of trust-building strategies that local governments have close at hand. In the raucous politics spreading through local governments, that’s possible, with strong leadership. But it’s a very tall order. Or the disruptive battles wracking local politics could continue, or perhaps even escalate. That would be both sad and dangerous. Sad, because it would eat away at the foundation of American government. Dangerous, because without that foundation, the worries of our Canadian neighbors could come to pass. America is in genuine trouble. Federalism can save it, or sink it. For clues about which way it’s going to go, check in with your local school board. And tell those bikers to cool it.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
Federalism DA – MSDI 2023 › 1NC Shell › Generic

Federal intrusion includes expansive grants and funding obligations, overburdening states and shifting power

Diane Katz, 11-30-2021, Former Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, "Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government," Heritage Foundation, -- MoState JG

Federal intrusion in states’ affairs has taken a variety of forms, including mandates, funding obligations, pre-emptions, and regulation.40 Federal Intergovernmental Mandates. The term “federal intergovernmental mandate” refers to a provision in statute or regulation, or federal court ruling that imposes an “enforceable duty” on state, local, or tribal governments (excluding a condition of federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary federal program).41

Growth in the number and scope of federal mandates is largely a modern phenomenon. Researchers have documented one instance of Congress enacting a major mandate in 1931, one in 1940, none in the 1950s, nine in the 1960s, 25 in the 1970s, and 27 in the 1980s.42 Since 2000, Congress and various Presidents have approved more than 190 statutes43 with intergovernmental mandates, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Collectively, the laws have imposed more than 1,000 separate directives.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
Federalism DA – MSDI 2023 › 1NC Shell › Generic

Federalism high now – Dobbs v. Jackson decision prompted the relevance of state level policymaking, especially in courts

John Dinan, 4-15-2023, "The Constitutional Politics of Abortion Policy After Dobbs: State Courts, Constitutions, and Lawmaking," ScholarWorks at University of Montana, -- MoStateJG

A leading effect of Dobbs is of course to heighten the importance of state governments in determining the level of protection for abortion rights. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, states enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion in regulating abortion. Many states in the pre-Roe era maintained longstanding policies banning nearly all abortions except when necessary to preserve the life of the woman. Some states permitted abortions in additional circumstances, and four states updated their laws in the years just prior to Roe by allowing abortions for any reason during the first several months of pregnancy.3 Even after Roe, states retained a fair amount of discretion in enacting abortion policy. States could decide at what point after fetal viability to ban abortions, with some states choosing to ban abortions as early in a woman’s pregnancy as they were permitted to do so by the Court’s rulings and other states opting to allow abortions through a later point in pregnancy.4 After the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in 1989 in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services5 and in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 6 states were also free to decide whether to enact a wide range of abortion regulations, including parental consent and notification requirements, waiting-period laws, informed consent rules, and restrictions on public funding of abortion.7 However, Dobbs broadened considerably the scope of state policy authority, by holding that the U.S. Constitution provides no barrier against states banning abortion at any point during pregnancy and permitting states to enforce virtually any restrictions they might choose to enact, including a number of restrictions that were unenforceable before Dobbs. 8

Although one effect of Dobbs is therefore to shift more of the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, the ruling has other consequences for the ways that abortion policy is made. In this article, I focus on three main consequences of shifting the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, stemming from distinctive features of state courts, constitutions, and lawmaking. In highlighting these distinctive aspects of constitutional politics in the states, I am building on and contributing to recent analyses demonstrating that the approach to protecting rights at the state level differs significantly from that at the federal level.9 Although abortion rights are my focus in this article, the arguments that I advance are also applicable to other rights and cases. One consequence of Dobbs is to redirect from federal to state courts nearly all litigation challenging restrictive abortion policies.10 State supreme courts are just as capable as the U.S. Supreme Court of issuing rulings protecting abortion rights and have in recent decades drawn on state constitutional privacy, liberty, due process, and equality guarantees to strike down restrictive abortion policies.11 However, state courts are structured differently from federal courts in that judges face the electorate on a regular basis in three-quarters of the states and lack life tenure in all but one state. In part, as a result, state supreme court judges are less inclined than their federal counterparts to invalidate policies backed by the public and public officials, whether abortion policies or other policies.12 The relatively quick turnover in the membership of state courts as a result of these selection and retention processes also leads to more rapid change in the ideological composition of state courts compared with the U.S. Supreme Court and creates a greater risk that rights-protective state court rulings will be reversed by a future state court.13

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › Extinction Deprioritizes Structural Violence

Dominant moral calculus always prioritizes future suffering in the face of ongoing structural violence.

Olson 2015 – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill (Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526) //Phops

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006) In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city. In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency. In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123). Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle. In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › A2 Extinction First – Can’t Solve

Humans can’t do everything necessary to cause extinction.

Friedemann 5/7/13 (Alice Fridemann-freelance journalist who specializes in energy, “Why we might not go Extinct.” Culture Change. Web. 13 May 2013, ( //Phops

I don’t want to diminish the suffering and tragedy of between 3 and 7 billion people dying, of climate change wreaking harm for thousands of years, and the loss of much of the amazing scientific understanding we have of the world since so much of it is being preserved digitally instead of on a more permanent physical substance (i.e. imprinted on thin metal sheets, etc.). All of the 9 planetary boundaries [(climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen cycle, phosphorous cycle, global freshwater use, land system change, rate of biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, chemical pollution)] will diminish as human population declines from lack of fossil fuels. Peak phosphorous will come even sooner without fossil-fuel driven vehicles and equipment to harvest and transport it. This is too big a topic to list every factor and how it might turn out as you can see from the menu items in Decline and Collapse at energyskeptic.com [:Air Pollution, Biodiversity, BioInvasion, Climate Change, Countries collapsing now, Extinction, Floods, Food, Humpty Dumpty, Middle East, Nuclear Power, Oceans, Optimism & Critical Thinking, Overpopulation, Ozone Loss, Peak Minerals, Planetary Boundaries, Predictions, Stages of, Supply Chains]. Yes, extinction is a possibility if too many of these happen at once over just a few centuries. But since both human population and energy resources are likely to decline exponentially rather quickly, we won’t be able to do the harm we are now, to the planet or ourselves, and that has a good chance of saving us from extinction.

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › Low Probability Impacts bad/Can’t Be Predicted

War is fundamentally uncertain and non-linear

John F. Schmitt 1997. (John F. Schmitt. "Chapter 9. Of Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security" National Defense University. Web. 1997. accessed 6-29-2023. < http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/bibliography/comch09.html >. Phops)

Implications What does all this mean? We know what the command and control implications of Newtonian war are: we have been operating with them for more than a century. But if we treat war as a nonlinear dynamical system, the implications are dramatically different. These implications stem from two fundamental conclusions: War is fundamentally uncertain. War is fundamentally uncontrollable (at least given our current understanding of control). Uncertainty A Sure Thing Nonlinear dynamics suggests that war is uncertain in a deeply fundamental way. Uncertainty is not merely an initial environmental condition which can be reduced by gathering information. It is not that we currently lack the technology to gather enough information but will someday have the capability. Rather, uncertainty is a natural and unavoidable product of the dynamic war: action in war generates uncertainty. The only type of war about which we could achieve certainty would be a system at equilibrium, which would not be war at all. Nonlinear dynamical systems sensitive to initial conditions are intrinsically unpredictable at the microscopic level, but the inability to accurately predict system behavior is not due to insufficient information about the system as was often assumed. Rather, unpredictability is a direct and irreducible consequence of the system’s sensitivity to initial conditions and the nonlinear rules that govern its dynamics. The best we can hope for is to work out probabilities—or, as Hayek suggests, to focus on "prediction of the principle"—and even then the system will surprise us. Promises of a "God’s-eye view" of the battlefield or Admiral Owens’ dream of 95-percent certainty within a 200x200x200-mile battlespace are thoroughly Newtonian concepts that simply do not jibe with the nature of war as a complex phenomenon. The widespread belief that information technology will allow us to blow away the fog of war is a dangerous delusion which fails to understand the complex nature of war. Control in War? Complex systems like war simply cannot be controlled the way machines can. We should not think of command and control as a coercive form of mechanistic control__the way an operator operates a machine. The object of mechanistic command and control is for the top of the organization to be "in control" of the bottom and for the bottom to be "under" the control of the top. The worst thing that can happen is for a commander to "lose" control of the situation. But are the terrain and weather under the commander's control? Are commanders even remotely in control of what the enemy does? Good commanders may sometimes anticipate the enemy's actions and may even influence the enemy's actions by seizing the initiative and forcing the enemy to react to them. But it is a delusion to believe that a commander can really be in control of the enemy or the situation. Is a kayaker paddling down a raging river really in control of the situation? Does he control the river? Does he really even control his own course? Or does he try to steer his way between and around the rock formations which spell disaster as the rapids carry him along. For the kayaker, success__safely navigating the river__is not a matter of push-button precision. For the kayaker__as for the commander__it is a matter of coping with a changing, turbulent situation. Command in war is less the business of control than it is the business of coping. Complexity suggests it is a delusion to think that we can be in control in war with any sort of certitude or precision. Complexity further suggests the radical idea that the object of command and control is not to achieve control but to keep the entire organization surfing on the edge of being "out of control" because that is where the system is most adaptive, creative, flexible and energized. Macroscopic Command and Control The turbulence of modern war suggests a need for a looser form of influence__something more akin to the willing cooperation of a soccer team than to the omnipotent direction of the chess player__that provides the necessary parameters in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without stifling the initiative of subordinates. Complexity suggests the need for macroscopic command and control. Command and control should not try to impose precise domination over details because the details are inherently uncontrollable. Rather, it should try to provide a broad, meaningful structure to the roiling complexity. Newtonian command and control is microscopic: it attempts to control the system by controlling each particle in the system. Complex war defies microscopic command and control and instead requires macroscopic command and control which "controls" the system by influencing the system parameters and boundary conditions.

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › Low Probability Impacts bad/Can’t Be Predicted

Extremely low probabilities should count as zero—even if there’s some risk, policy decisions can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities

Rescher 2003 (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 49-50)//Phops

On this issue there is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decision-oriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well forget about it as a worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x = 0. We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote possibility can—for all sensible purposes—be viewed as being of probability zero. Accordingly, such remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities as no long[er] representing real possibilities. Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it: [P]eople…refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect.

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › Prefer Structural Violence

You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge

Nixon ‘11 (Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3, https://southwarknotes.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/slow-violence-and-the-environmentalism-of-the-poor.pdf)//Phops

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded. Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations. In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?

2023 SDI Affirmative
Impact Framing › Prefer Structural Violence

Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension – culminates in Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) (http://www.philippebourgois.net/articles/Scheper-Hughes%20et%20al%202004%20Introduction.pdf)//Phops

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

2023 SDI Affirmative
Off Case Answers › Other Solvency Mechs

UBI funded through progressive taxes

Hanna, Rema, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2018. "Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32 (4): 201-26. DOI: 10.1257/jep.32.4.201

Given that a universal basic income would need to be financed through taxation, one can recast universal basic transfers as a particular feature of a tax schedule, as described by Saez (2002) and illustrated by Figure 1. We assume that a universal basic income program is fully financed by a progressive income tax schedule. Pre-tax income y for an individual appears on the horizontal axis, and after-tax income α(y) for that individual is on the vertical axis. The tax paid by a household is therefore given by y – α(y)). The universal basic income—the transfer given to everyone, regardless of their income—is thus equal α(0) to on the vertical axis. This perspective suggests that any tax-and-transfer system that has the feature that α(0) > 0 can be thought of as including a universal basic income.

2023 SDI Affirmative
Off Case Answers › Other Solvency Mechs

Fund via value added taxes

E. Napoletano (former registered financial advisor and award-winning author and journalist) “An Unexpected Outcome Of The Covid-19 Pandemic: A Slew Of Universal Income Programs” May 12, 2022 https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/universal-basic-income-programs/

In Alaska, Watson said research on the state’s UBI program counters the work incentive and shrinking labor force arguments. While the annual dividend payment does spark spending among Alaskans, employers tend to staff up to support increased business from cash-flush residents. There’s concern about where funds for these programs come from. While taxpayers are loath to pay more, some experts propose value-added taxes (VAT) to bridge the divide, where the wealthy would bear most of the burden for funding UBI programs. Yet the swath of cash transfer programs being introduced will provide data that will inform both those for and opposed to supplemental payment and income programs. This could help improve future programs—or be used as an argument against their creation.