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2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › --Extend - Insufficient

A UBI will not challenge gender roles – too many other social institutions and stereotypes exist to challenge the division of labor in the household.

Robeyns, 2001 – Chair Ethics of Institutions at the Utrecht University, Netherlands [Ingrid. “Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?: A Contribution to the Symposium on P. Van Parijs ’s “Real Freedom for All” Analyse & Kritik, vol. 23, no. 1  AC]

4.1 What's Wrong with Gender Roles and the Gender Division of Labour? In all countries, studies show that women do more unpaid household and care labour and less paid work compared to their male partners (de Hart 1995; Okin 1989; Steil 1997; Strober/Chan 1998; Wunderink/Niehoff 1997). In contradiction to the claim that this division would be an individual free choice, part of the lit-erature gives another interpretation (Okin 1989; Ferber/Young 1997; Folbre 1994, 1995; Neumark/McLennan 1995; Phipps/Burton 1995; Steil 1997; Strober/Chan 1998). Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women? 97 Many feminists, including liberal philosophers (e.g. Kymlicka 1990; Okin 1989) have argued that the gender division of labour is unjust. Not all liberal philoso-phers are convinced by this claim. For liberals, individual free choice is crucial, and most of them see no problem of injustice if women choose to stay at home. If feminists believe that this gender division of labour is not a natural thing, or not a simple uncomplicated matching of preferences of two partners, how can this division then be explained? The combination of (at least) seven elements, and especially their interaction and mutual intensification can explain why so many women perform so much household-and care work. Unfortunately, this attempt to explain the current gender division of labour will remain rather tentative and loose, as it would require a huge study analysing all its details. Firstly, children are from a very young age in a different way confronted with images and ideas on the desirable roles of their own gender. Small children see their mothers taking more care of household work, whereas their father is the absent person, whose position and status in society is determined by activities in the public sphere. If children are raised with these examples of their own gender, and identify themselves with it, then small boys grow up with the idea that their realisation as adults will take place outside the home, whereas girls see that for them this will (partly) take place through care labour. A second element are the role patterns following from socialisation, and the confirmation of these role patterns through the media, movies, television and so on. These representations of gender roles and gender stereotypes are weaker than some decades back, but recent research still shows their existence (Van Zoonen 1994). Thirdly, due to the different expectations boys and girls have regarding the importance of care labour in their life, they will take this into account when choosing a course of study or profession. Girls will easier choose for subjects related to the care sector, or for professions that are easier combined with care labour. This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical fact that girls do not study fewer years than boys, but they choose other subjects and professions, which are considered more 'soft' and have a lower income generating capacity. Fourth, there is a group of labour market conditions leading to the fact that ceteris paribus women earn less than their husbands. Major elements here are labour market segregation and discrimination. Although there is a general tendency to believe that gender discrimination has almost virtually disappeared, recent evi-dence shows its persistence (Darity /Mason 1998; Neumark, Bank/van Nort 1996; Neumark/McLennan 1995; Wenneras/Wold 1997). Furthermore, Neumark and McLennan (1995) showed for the US that women who report gender discrimina-tion in their workplace, will subsequently have a higher incidence of marriage and childbirth. This undermines the commonly assumed causality that marriage and children lead to a lower labour market attachment and are hence the cause of discrimination. Fifth, a husband is on average about 3 years older than his wife, which implies, through the seniority rule in the wage formation, that wives earn less than their 98 Ingrid Robeyns husbands. Phipps and Burton (1995) find a significant negative effect of this age difference on the labour market participation of wives. They argue that age differences are likely to affect attitudes and hence the bargaining position of wife and husband. Sixth, empirical studies (Steil 1997, 48-50) show that the majority of men and women, including double-career couples, continue to view the husband as primary responsible for the financial security of the family. Women's wages are seen as secondary wages, even when she earns the same or more than her husband. As a consequence, a wife is not entitled to see her career as primary, and to exempt herself from household work. Finally, many men and women find it convenient and attractive to stick to the existing gender division of labour. It is a habit and it is easier, as past generations give examples how a household balance between labour and care can be found and as many elements in the organisation of society encourage such a division of labour. Looking for more egalitarian household organisations requires much more thoughts and negotiations by the couple and is therefore a more difficult route to go.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › --Extend - Insufficient

A UBI alone isn’t sufficient to empower women or fix their situations

Kangas and Ylikanno 2023 - Research Director, Department of Social Research, University of Turku and senior specialist at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment [Olli and Minna, January 23, 2023, “Basic Income and the Status of Women in an Established Gender-Equal Welfare State: Results from the Finnish Basic Income Experiment” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9914593/ UP]

However, we, too, end up with a few universalizing comments or, if you like, lessons from the Finnish UBI experiment. In all societies, minimum income protection, either UBI or Finnish residence-based universal basic security, is a necessary condition for fulfilling the grand goals advocated by the protagonists of the basic income concept. However, this is not a sufficient condition to achieve these goals. In addition, we need an amplitude of family policy measures, such as available and affordable childcare, and we need well-functioning healthcare, education, and employment services to support people and societies in their path towards gender equality. Hence, gender equality cannot be achieved by a single social policy measure. The achievement of more equal societies requires several measures that consistently seek to promote that value. A decent level of money is a necessary but insufficient condition for empowering people.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › --Extend - Insufficient

Increased income is insufficient to overcome gendered social structures – Sweden proves.

Koslowski and Duvander, 2018 - prof of Social and Political Science, Univ of Edinburgh and prof of Sociology, Stockholm University [Alison and Ann-Zofie, Working Paper 2018:05 “Basic Income: The Potential for Gendered Empowerment?” Acc 1/28/23 TA]

Basic income is likely to gain momentum as the next social welfare trend to sweep over the world with ideas of how to improve the fairness and efficiency of distributing money. Other earlier movements with similar ambitions to transform societies, ranging across the political spectrum from socialism to neo-liberalism, have led to very different consequences for strata of citizens, but have in common that they have de-prioritised gender equality in favour of other interests. Advocates of basic income suggest that in addition to pragmatic gains, such as a more efficient state administration, primarily a basic income will empower citizens, leading to the potential for greater human flourishing. Our question is whether this empowerment will be gendered and if so, how? So far, the basic income debate addresses gender only in so far as it would raise the income of the poorest, of whom a larger proportion are women. However, it is less clear how it might contribute to a transformation of gendered behaviour, making possible divergent shapes of life where binary and set notions of gender are not a restriction. We discuss the idea of basic income from a perspective of gender equality in the Swedish context. 1. Introduction Basic Income is a social welfare movement currently gaining momentum across the world. It has ambitions to transform societies, with a particular emphasis on the empowerment of citizens, and greater human flourishing among its central goals. History shows us that a common characteristic of political movements this ambitious is that they have tended to de-prioritise gender equality in favour of other interests. Our question then is whether this empowerment would be gendered, and in that case how. Our discussion is hypothetical as basic income is suggested and debated, but not yet implemented. The basic income debate addresses gender in so far that it would raise the economic situation of the poorest, of whom a larger proportion are women. Thus, gendered economic inequality may be decreased. Less clear, is how it might contribute to a transformation of gendered behaviour, supporting possible divergent ways of being where binary and set notions of gender are not a restriction. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect a basic income to be a panacea for all social ills and advocates are not making such a claim. We discuss the idea of basic income from a feminist perspective in the Swedish context (as outcomes may vary substantially across countries, depending not least on progress already made towards gender equality). We consider that a basic income alone is unlikely to deliver on gender equality, as whilst it could be a necessary ‘instrument of freedom’, money alone is not a sufficient instrument with which to realise gender equality: other structures are also needed.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

11. Turn – Rising expectations - even if a UBI increases the perception of new employment options for women, those never occur, and the effects were the same for men and women.

Kangas and Ylikanno 2023 - Research Director, Department of Social Research, University of Turku and senior specialist at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment [Olli and Minna, January 23, 2023, , Basic Income and the Status of Women in an Established Gender-Equal Welfare State: Results from the Finnish Basic Income Experiment, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, .] EP 

Regarding employment, we found no significant gender effects, although those respondents who received a basic income had stronger confidence than the respondents in the control group in their ability to find employment. However, this belief did not materialise in higher employment rates. Furthermore, our results indicated that the recipients of UBI were more confident in their futures, abilities to cope with difficult life situations, and possibilities to improve their economic situations. In other words, UBI positively affected recipients’ self-confidence, thereby enhancing their internal and combined capacities [19]. This effect was the same for men and women. Thus, we conclude that UBI may be a tool for empowering its recipients, albeit in an established gender-equal welfare state that concerns women and men alike. While UBI is not a universal silver bullet of any kind in enhancing gender equality in a society such as Finland, it may well be that in developing countries or countries with greater gender inequalities. In a highly egalitarian Nordic country, a single change in the benefit system does not affect gender equality. Achieving equality required and still requires decades of development of the benefit-and-service system based on the overarching principle of equality. In sum, the results are sensitive to the context of where the experiment takes place.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

10. A basic income may increase women’s access to their Preferences, but that is not gender justice, because those preferences are shaped by a gender unjust society

Gheaus, 2008 – political philosopher at the Université Catholique de Lille [Anca, Dec, An International Journal of Basic Income Research Vol. 3, Issue 3 “Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender‐Symmetrical Lifestyles” TA]

2. Entrenching Gendered Preferences Advocating gender‐symmetry as a default position raises the concern that, even under the conditions of increased gender justice, some women have a constant preference for being homemakers (Hakim, 2004, estimates that this is about a fifth of the UKʹs female population). Hakimʹs normative conclusion is that the best policies would give equal support to both categories of women, to those who are home‐centred as well as to those who are career‐centred. Leaving aside the question of whether it is at all possible to have policy packages that are neutral in this respect, there are principled reasons for rejecting Hakimʹs conclusion. Responding to preferences need not be the same as promoting justice. First, many preferences are adaptive, and since womenʹs preferences are historically shaped against a background of injustice we have good reasons not to take them at face value. Second, Hakim treats womenʹs preferences as if they were independent of menʹs preferences. But they are unlikely to be so: men and women work together and raise families together. If men were more homecentred and adaptive, this would have an impact on all three categories of women discussed by Hakim. The career‐centred women would find it easier to find partners willing to participate in raising a family, adaptive women would have more support in their endeavors of combining home and work, and there is evidence that even home‐centred women would be better off as they would be more likely to remain in their marriages (Hochschild, 2003.) Most importantly, the preference‐formation for women growing up in a world where, for both men and women, the default lifestyle is that they shoulder equally the burdens (and reap equally the benefits) of both work and home would be different than it currently is. In consequence, instead of responding to womenʹs current preferences, we should aim to ensure that preferences (of all individuals) are formed under just circumstances3. One of the deeply unjust circumstances of the current world is the devaluation of care.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

9. Turn – Polarization - A basic income would deny gender justice because it divides women and it raises the costs of making the gender lifestyles symmetrical

Gheaus, 2008 – political philosopher at the Université Catholique de Lille [Anca, Dec, An International Journal of Basic Income Research Vol. 3, Issue 3 “Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender‐Symmetrical Lifestyles” TA]

1. Gender‐Symmetrical Lifestyles as a Criterion of Gender Justice To judge the degree to which a policy promotes gender justice,1 I suggest an operational definition of “gender justice” based on an ideal of gendersymmetrical lifestyles: A society is gender just when the costs of engaging in a lifestyle characterized by gender‐symmetry (both in the domestic and in the public sphere) are, for both men and women, less or equal to the costs of engaging in a lifestyle that is gender asymmetrical. A gender‐symmetrical lifestyle is one in which women and men engage equally in paid work and family life, which includes unpaid care work for dependants. I start from the assumption that work and family are the central concerns of most peopleʹs lives, if we understand these as the following: “work” includes market and nonmarket activities that are productive of goods or services, and “family” includes various long‐term living arrangements based on emotional attachments typically involving extended periods of dependency related to child care, old age, illness and sometimes life‐long disabilities. It is reasonable to expect that, in order to lead fulfilling lives, the majority of people will need ample opportunities to thrive in both their working and their family lives. Hence, just social arrangements should make “work and family” the default position and should minimize the costs of choosing this situation, for both men and women, relative to either the work only or family only situation. An additional argument in favour of gender‐symmetrical lifestyles is to be found in the feminist literature, which argues that caregiving should be recognized as a universal duty of citizenship (Bubeck, 1999; Kittay, 1999). Introducing a BI would be compatible with gender justice and possibly beneficial for justice, all things considered, only if it does not raise the costs of engaging in gender‐symmetrical lifestyles. But we have reasons to believe that a BI is likely, in the long run, to raise the costs of gender‐symmetrical lifestyles. I rely on already developed arguments indicating that, should a BI be introduced, it would be reasonable to expect an overall drop in female labour (Kesenne, 1990; Robeyns, 2001; Bergmann, 2004); differing income effects for different groups of women (Robeyns, 2001); and a drop in womenʹs bargaining power within the household, decreased self‐esteem and loss of social capital (Robeyns, 2001). Additionally, work on womenʹs preferences and behaviour with respect to combining home and career in the context of public policies suggests that a BI would increase the polarization between home‐centred and work‐centred women (Hakim, 2000). Research by Catherine Hakim shows that if cash is provided instead of services (for example, home care allowances instead of services such as childcare), female preference patterns become more polarized: more women become either career‐oriented or home‐oriented and fewer try to adapt in order to combine home and career (Hakim, 2000).2 Suppose, based on the similarities between a BI and the open‐ended (cash) benefits discussed by Hakim, that the introduction of a BI would lead to more polarization of womenʹs lifestyle preferences. The group of adaptive women would shrink, and there would be less incentive for adapting policies that make the costs of gender‐symmetrical lifestyles the cheapest option for both men and women.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

8. If a UBI is Too Small, it reinforces gender inequality – it allows longer maternity leaves which reinforces dependency on male breadwinners and blocks women from returning to the labor market. Canada proves.

Koslowski and Duvander, 2018 - prof of Social and Political Science, Univ of Edinburgh and prof of Sociology, Stockholm University [Alison and Ann-Zofie, Working Paper 2018:05 “Basic Income: The Potential for Gendered Empowerment?” Acc 1/28/23 TA]

The central question asked by those sceptical of the viability of a basic income is how the costs incurred would be borne by a society, initially and over time. In terms of the level of payment, Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017) suggest a quarter of GDP per capita might be appropriate. For Sweden in 2017, this would amount to 114 450 SEK yearly (approximately €950 monthly).The recent Swiss Referendum in 2016 suggested 2,500 Swiss francs (approximately €2,155) per month. The Finnish experiment lands at €560 monthly, which is not sufficiently high to be considered a basic income in the sense suggested by its advocates. It is likely that a basic income payment would indeed be quite low due to the demands even a guaranteed minimum income would make on any tax base (Tobin, 1970). As such, other possibilities for funding might include changes to the tax treatment of capital or banking on public ownership of natural resources (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). In the case that the payment was relatively low, such as is typically the case for ‘cash for care’ policies, this has been associated with women becoming more rather than less financially dependent on their male partners (e.g. Mandel, 2009). Similarly, evidence from the Canadian guaranteed annual income experiment suggests mothers took longer maternity leaves, leading to increased economic dependency on their male partners (Forget, 2011). Policies can be multi-dimensional in the way that they support citizens, going beyond financial support and services. Taking parental leave as an example, this is a policy—in the Swedish context at least—that aims to tackle gendered patterns of behaviour, by promoting fathers’ involvement with small children to a greater extent than might occur in the absence of the policy instrument (e.g. the daddy quota) (Castro-García & Pazos-Moran, 2016; Duvander & Johansson, 2012; Haas & Rostgaard, 2011). Parental leave is also a form of employment protection, and originally was a key determinant for women being able to keep an attachment to the labour force after becoming parents (Cedstrand, 2011). It is also credited with changing norms and behaviours. In Sweden, the reserved part for each parent in the parental leave was intensively debated when first introduced in the 1990s, but then extended without almost any debate in the 2000s (Cedstrand, 2011). So basic income poses a risk in its simplicity if there is the possibility that it might replace more complex policy instruments with financial benefit alone.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

7. Turn – Privatization - A basic income increases systemic gender discrimination by causing a shift to privatization of caregiving, which reinforces domestic violence

Gheaus, 2008 – political philosopher at the Université Catholique de Lille [Anca, Dec, An International Journal of Basic Income Research Vol. 3, Issue 3 “Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender‐Symmetrical Lifestyles” TA]

3. The Increased Privatization of Care If a BI will lead, as some critics fear, to a serious shortage of labour supply in the caring professions, care might become increasingly (re)privatized. Given current cultural norms, it is likely that women will be expected to shoulder the burden of private care, especially if they will indeed gradually be more excluded from the market. The privatization of care and the confinement of more women to domesticity fare badly for gender justice for a number of reasons. Economically, women will lose skills and social capital, making their re‐entry in the market increasingly difficult – ultimately, many will have no substantive exit right from domesticity. Socially and culturally, the privatization of care may lead to the perpetuation of domestic violence and gender stereotypes. Psychologically, all blame for bad care will (continue to) go to women and this, in turn, will perpetuate the misrecognition of women. A general consequence of the privatization of care will be that the economic, social and psychological costs of individuals engaging in gender‐symmetrical lifestyles will become increasingly higher. It is important to emphasize that the costs of leading a particular lifestyle are economical but also psychological. Social expectations, together with oneʹs own internalized expectations, as well as even more elusive factors such as peopleʹs ability to respect women and whatever is associated with the “feminine,” carry the imprints of and perpetuate gender injustice. A discussion of BI’s effects on gender justice will benefit from feminist psychology theories that locate the origins of women’s misrecognition in the traditional social arrangements – in particular the feminisation of child care – and their valuation and representation, which structure our earliest human interaction, our moral emotions and our ability to value women and the feminine (Benjamin, 1988). Feminist theorists have shown how the feminisation of childrearing combined with the generally low status and social powerlessness of women is at the root of womenʹs misrecognition (Ruddick, 1989). Far from being a merely individual choice devoid of any social implication, womenʹs domesticity, particularly when work and family conflict structurally, is a significant symptom and future cause of gender injustice (Williams, 2000). If many women drop out of the labour market and care becomes more privatised, this will generate self‐perpetuating spirals of gender discrimination. A BI would eliminate the economic dependence that spouses with precarious careers would have on their working partner. Such dependence is one of the main incentives women currently have against centering their lives on marriage and (domestic) caregiving. If some women would continue to be expected to marry and center their lives around care‐giving, and this choice would be perceived as less risky than it is now, some parents would have incentive to invest more resources in furthering the careers of boys.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

6. Turn – Work Home Binary - A UBI won’t emancipate women because it reproduces the social relations arranged around a work/home dichotomy, which reinforces the patriarchy

Lombardozzi, 2020 - Senior Lecturer in Economics at The Open University, UK [Lorena. “Gender Inequality, Social Reproduction and the Universal Basic Income.” Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 2, Apr. EBSCOhost, . AC]

Social reproduction is 'the domain where lives are sustained and reproduced', in other words how workers and households—but also capitalists, as well as all kinds of institutions of religion, state and culture—subsist and survive through the relations of production of which they are part.[11] The social reproduction framework underscores that much of the work responsible for reproducing these forms and relations relies on the exploitation of women in the home and elsewhere—in the care home, the school, the hospital and the crèche. As Tithi Bhattacharya writes, '[t]he most historically enduring site for the reproduction of labour power is of course the kin‐based unit we call the family'. But, she continues, labour power 'is not simply replenished at home, nor is it always reproduced generationally.' '[O]ther social relationships and institutions are comprised by the circuit of social reproduction' including care, health services, education, leisure, pensions, benefits.[12] Contemporary conditions in many rich advanced economies have led some to identify a 'crisis of care' synonymous with a crisis in the aforementioned forms of social reproduction.[13] This depends, as mentioned above, on the changing relations between women and labour and on the shift in state support in society. By focussing on the sphere of reproductive work and the gendered division of labour that circumscribes it, a social reproduction approach creates a challenge for the prescription of the UBI, highlighting how the latter situates work exclusively within the dynamic of buying and selling labour power, rather than the specific social conditions that make it both possible and necessary to begin with.[14] Yet, whilst Marxist feminists taking a social reproduction standpoint have been central in popularising the call for a UBI—for example, around the 'Wages for Housework' campaigns—others have been more circumspect. Weeks notes that the 'demand for a UBI does not directly address either the unequal gendered division of household‐based reproductive labour or its privatization', even 'serv[ing] simply to offer more support for the traditional hetero‐patriarchal family's gender division of productive and reproductive labour, with more men participating in waged work and more women working in the home'.[15]

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

5. Turn – False Gender Neutrality - A UBI will not challenge gender norms because it is only gender neutral on its face – when it is implemented, it reinforces existing patriarchal institutional norms

Lombardozzi, 2020 - Senior Lecturer in Economics at The Open University, UK [Lorena. “Gender Inequality, Social Reproduction and the Universal Basic Income.” Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 2, Apr. EBSCOhost, . AC]

Women are increasingly integrated within the waged labour market, but they remain at the same time the primary caregivers of society, at a time where state support for care is being withdrawn. Thus, the double burden many women juggle with—namely between productive and reproductive work—is not only reinforced within the market, but also legitimised by patriarchal norms that become institutionalised through state policies. The UBI alone will not be able to resolve this situation. UBI, because it would still be embedded in pre‐existing patriarchal and institutional norms, is gender neutral ex‐ante but not ex‐post. It is not gender neutral, because it implies undesired consequences for women if it is unable to challenge and readdress their pre‐existing position of disadvantage in society. The response of some Marxist feminists has been to see the basic income and the recognition of women's paid and unpaid work as intrinsically interdependent. Paid and unpaid work is subject to shaped by public and private institutions regulated by the state which, if reformed, can generate transformative change in the way we deal with care, work and welfare as a whole. Workers' organisations, the welfare system and labour legislation need to work to overcome the structural shortfalls of single‐wage households and develop more heterogeneous and fluid mechanisms of social protection and public goods that can dissolve existing patriarchal social norms, redistribute unpaid work duties to men (through, for example, shared parental leave), and tackle the regulatory obstacles faced within non‐heteronormative households. Governments have the tools to regulate and deconstruct social relations with targeted policies and create the necessary institutions to reflect the social heterogeneity we live in. Hence, policy makers should develop policy solutions that have the potential to be transformative for women's material and social disparities in the short and long term. Inequality in reproductive work does not always explain the inequalities occurring in the formal labour market or in the political sphere. Those separate dimensions reinforce the need to redefine what work is and transform the welfare state built around it. Unfortunately, neither UBI nor any form of cash transfer would help this difficult process.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

4. Alternative Causality - Over-policing hurts women of color, driving them into debt

Bhattacharya 2019 - director of programs and strategy at the Insight Center for Community Economic Development [Jhumpa “Exploring Guaranteed Income through a Racial and Gendered Justice Lens” . . Accessed 23 June 2023 EO]

Ferguson was representative of the systemic racism prevalent in many other municipalities: Over-policing of communities of color has led to disproportionate rates of stops and arrests of people of color, forcing these communities to pay exorbitant fines and fees and extracting their wealth—and in many cases driving them into debt (Bingham et al. 2016). Additionally, even if women are not the ones being arrested and/or fined, they are the ones primarily paying the fine, fee, or bail money for their sons, grandsons, brothers, partners, uncles, and other family members (deVuono-powell et al. 2015). 63 percent of court-related costs were paid for by family members outside of the system, and 80 percent of these family members were women. Further, close to 90 percent of costs for phone calls and visits to an CREATIVE COMMONS COPYRIGHT 2019 | ROOSEVELTINSTITUTE.ORG 8 incarcerated person are incurred by women (deVuono-powell et al. 2015). This creates an additional financial burden to the layers of economic insecurity women of color already experience from race and gender discrimination in the labor market. These practices and the crusade towards mass incarceration and criminalization of nonviolent crimes effectively strip wealth from Black and brown women and communities. In many cases, these realities prevent people of color from building wealth at all. It is clear that any policy discussion about a guaranteed income must both address the historic barriers placed on women and people of color to build wealth and eliminate current wealthextraction policies that are reinforced by current governmental policies. Putting money into people’s pockets through government interventions won’t mean anything if that money is taken by the government with the other hand.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

3. Turn - Statistical discrimination – if even Some women leave the labor market, employers will respond by reducing women’s wages because Statistically, it is more likely for all women.

Robeyns, 2001 – Chair Ethics of Institutions at the Utrecht University, Netherlands [Ingrid. “Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?: A Contribution to the Symposium on P. Van Parijs ’s “Real Freedom for All” Analyse & Kritik, vol. 23, no. 1  AC]

2.9 Spill-Over Effects on All Women Due to Statistical Discrimination A last second order effect is an expected increase of statistical discrimination against women. Statistical discrimination is a form of indirect discrimination based on the fact that a person belongs to a group that has certain characteristics. These characteristics are used as proxies for the average productivity of that group. Women on average get one or two children and take maternity leave. They also work less hours on the labour market than men, and bear more responsibility for the household and the care of the children and the elderly. They have more career interruptions and are more absent from the workplace. For all these reasons, it is assumed by many employers that women are on average less productive than men. Furthermore, it is rational for an employer to think of an individual woman that she will share these characteristics of her group, as he has no information on her future commitments. Hence, an employer discriminates a woman (by not hiring her or giving her a lower wage) because the employer has no exact information on her productivity and therefore his perception of the average productivity of all women will count. A woman who does not want children, or wants to make a career or has a husband who takes half of the household responsibilities, will still bear the consequences of the fact that other women are more 'child and household oriented'-which is perceived as a good indicator for lower productivity. This implies that if a basic income is introduced, and a group of women decreases her labour supply, it will also be expected from other women that they will be less labour market attached. Hence, a basic income will probably worsen the statistical discrimination against women.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

2. Turn – Labor Withdrawal undermines emancipation – empirically proven – in a well established welfare state, it would decrease women’s employment

Kangas et al, 2023- a Research Director at the Department of Social Research at the University of Turku in Finland [Olli, with Minna Ylikännö "Basic Income and the Status of Women in an Established Gender-Equal Welfare State: Results from the Finnish Basic Income Experiment." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol. 20, no. 3, ProQuest, https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/basic-income-status-women-established-gender/docview/2774904198/se-2, doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20031733. EO]

In the alternate strand of the literature, UBI is seen more negatively (for example, [13,14,15]). For this position, it is feared that UBI forms a strong incentive for women to stay at home, locked in their traditional caring positions. Empirical results from the negative income tax experiments conducted in the U.S. and Canada (Mincome) in the 1970s and the 1980s displayed diminishing female labour market participation: wives and single mothers reduced their labour supply, corresponding to three weeks of full-time employment [29,30,31,32]. When given the possibility, women, especially those in lower socioeconomic groups, opted out of unpleasant jobs and chose to spend more time with their children. Thus, the income transfer introduced in the experiments decreased the female labour supply. This finding is, to some extent, corroborated by a Swedish study on the labour market behaviour of lottery winners who reduced their working time as well as those of their spouses [33]. More detailed analyses from the U.S. experiment suggested that the reduction in labour supply was strongest among mothers with small children who were a part of the experiment, given that the opportunity to stay at home with their babies was not possible under the existing social security schemes [29,30]. The Canadian Mincome experiment displayed fewer substitutional effects [29], which is explained by the fact that the family leave systems in Canada are better than those in the U.S. Thus, the context of social policy matters. There have been attempts to bridge the gap between the two opposing lines of argument. While UBI, when generous enough, provides women with the opportunity to choose between family and work, it simultaneously reshapes patriarchal gender norms around paid work and unpaid care, especially as no person is relegated to being a masculinised ‘breadwinner’ or feminised ‘caretaker’ to attain income security. Combined with the provision of affordable quality care services, UBI could potentially facilitate a more equitable distribution of care between genders [5,6,10,34,35,36]. In most cases, the motivation to introduce UBI is related to perceived problems and shortcomings in existing welfare systems: holes in the safety net, poverty, overly low take-up rates, and stigma attached to means-tested programs. Furthermore, it is argued that social insurance-based transfer schemes typical for most welfare states disproportionally benefit males with longer working careers and higher incomes compared to women with care duties at home and longer absences from the labour market. While social insurance-based social security schemes provide inferior benefits to those who do not participate in full-time formal employment, UBI would treat everyone equally, regardless of participation in the labour market or length of working career [34,35,36,37]. However, there is an obvious weakness in this argumentation. The further the equality of women and men has progressed in the labour market, the weaker this motivation for basic income. This applies first of all to gender-equal welfare states. Thus, our main hypothesis is that in a well-established welfare state, UBI would not be a strong policy measure for female emancipation.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gendered UBI Neg › 1NC - Gender Advantage Resps

1. No solvency – a UBI is Insufficient to overcome societal gender roles and structures. Belgium empirically proves.

Koslowski and Duvander, 2018 - prof of Social and Political Science, Univ of Edinburgh and prof of Sociology, Stockholm University [Alison and Ann-Zofie, Working Paper 2018:05 “Basic Income: The Potential for Gendered Empowerment?” Acc 1/28/23 TA]

Basic income seeks to support our ambitions, without dictating what these should be. It makes the assumption that the power differential would be sufficiently shifted by the individualised payment to women for them to negotiate different domestic arrangements, and that norms would be flexible enough to accommodate a greater—and less gendered—range of ‘life options’. The experience of the Belgium time credit scheme does not bode well in this regard. The time credit scheme allowed people a limited amount of paid time away from work, for any purpose. It was a seemingly gender-neutral scheme. However, it has seen extremely gendered use in practice. Mothers (but not fathers) in Belgium have overwhelmingly used their time credit account to care for children, in effect as an extension of parenting leave (Deven & Merla, 2019). Perhaps another example is the completely gender-neutral parental leave in Sweden: despite there being individual parallel rights for two parents, gendered practice endures, with women using the lion’s share of leave. These experiences suggest that for a basic income to have an impact on the gendered practices of parenting, further thought would have to be given to how to achieve that specific goal. Gender equality is not a primary aim of a basic income, but it is a hoped for secondary consequence. Parental leave scholarship suggests that gender equality is most efficiently a consequence when it is an explicit policy aim, but that, as described above, even then it might fail to materialise. Perhaps considering the distinction between gender equality and gender equity is helpful here. Gender equity is the value-laden concept that stems from the socially constructed expectations of female and male behaviour, which is based both on gender stratification and gender roles (Fraser, 1994). Gender equity is thus based on the experience of fairness and whose values are valuable, whereas gender equality would be easier defined by quantitative measures of gendered division of time and rewards of paid and unpaid work. Fraser (1994) would say that gender equality depends on female behaviour becoming the norm. Basic income has the potential to change the meaning of gender equity, either reversing back towards traditional gendered expectations, or alternatively liberating us from such stratifications and norms that limit our behaviour. There are many factors in hypothesising is such outcomes, but it seems clear that a basic income set at too low a payment rate would reverse development by necessity. Firestone (1970, p. 1) observed that: Sex class is so deep as to be invisible…the reaction of the common man, woman, and child—That? Why you can’t change that!....This gut reaction, the assumption about changing a fundamental biological condition, is an honest one….That so profound a change cannot be easily fit into traditional categories of thought, e.g., “political,” is not because these categories do not apply but because they are not big enough: radical feminism bursts through them. 8 As with other big political movements, the basic income project does not appear to be ‘big enough’, remaining relatively conservative and essentialist with regard to its understanding of gender equalities. Perhaps it is precisely because a basic income would be such a revolutionary expansion of freedom, that this core unchallenged gender binary worldview is all the more disappointing. An independent source of income is a good start on the road to freedom, but, it is not a sufficient condition to challenge the persistent norms and prevailing gendered structures. To the extent that gender is based on norms and structures, which have to be challenged, basic income, as a gender-neutral idea that hides gender, could be argued to be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition to see female behaviour becoming the norm, thus leading us towards gender equality (Fraser, 1994).

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Turns Warming

Higher interest rates will derail the clean tech transition

Hielke Van Doorslaer, January 2023, Ghent University, “Why raising interest rates to fight off energy inflation is counterproductive,” https://www.ugent.be/ps/politiekewetenschappen/gies/en/research/publications/gies_papers/2023-global-energy-crisis/why-raising-interest-rates-to-fight-off-energy-inflation-is-counterproductive, mm

Monetary tightening raises the cost of capital, and this hits renewable technologies excessively hard.[10] Sustainable technologies are more capital-intensive than fossil-based technologies, requiring larger upfront investments, and, as such, become comparatively more expensive when central banks use monetary policy to raise the cost of financing. The higher capital-intensity of renewables makes them more vulnerable to interest rate hikes. Raising interest rates across the board therefore risks derailing the transition by inflicting a form of ‘green collateral damage’ on the economy.[11] By making credit more costly, central banks risk delaying the necessary investments in energy efficiency by both households, businesses and governments. Because of central bank actions, private actors are now faced with a higher cost of credit for renovation loans and a higher cost of materials and services (due to supply-induced inflation).[12] Higher interest rates also raise the borrowing costs for governments, constraining the state’s fiscal capacity for long-term investments in improved mobility, green technologies and sustainable infrastructure. Hiking rates in a macroeconomic environment of rising energy prices therefore risks aggravating the economy’s carbon lock-in and prolonging its dependence on outdated and polluting carbon technologies.[13] Interest rate hikes are not only counterproductive in the long run - as they exacerbate both the climate change challenge and undermine central banks’ primary objective of securing long-term price stability -, they are also in direct conflict with the ‘REPowerEU’ plan tabled by the Commission in which it seeks to ‘fast forward the green transition’ by means of ‘an increase in energy savings, a diversification of energy supplies, and an accelerated roll-out of renewable energy’.[14] Moreover, the ECB riskshiking rates at a time when inflationary pressures are seen to be easing.[15] Inflationary tailwinds may then quickly turn into deflationary headwinds. Martin Sandbu has likened this effect to a ‘ketchup bottle’, where shortages can quickly turn into gluts.[16] This risk is especially real when a sudden ease in price pressures coincides with a zealously overtightening central bank, possibly pushing the Eurozone into a recession. In that case demand will falter just when supply capacity is picking up, driving prices down instead of up.

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Turns Warming

Rate hikes crush the clean tech transition

Howard Davis, 5/6/23, The Guardian, “Central banks raising interest rates makes it harder to fight the climate crisis,” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/06/central-banks-interest-rate-hike-climate-crisis, mm

But relying on central bank rate rises in the current situation is folly for another reason: the reality of the climate crisis, which now greatly complicates the task of central banks and policymakers. One reason is obvious: higher interest rates considerably slow down the renewable energy transition. This happens in two ways. First, newly applied renewable energy technologies, which have relatively large front-loaded costs, are more competitive (relative to the already installed fossil fuel technologies) only when interest rates are low. Engineering studies show that the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind onshore will increase by 11% and 25%, respectively, if interest rates are 4-4.5% (rather than around zero). Investments in new renewable energy capacity are thus only viable if market prices allow them to earn their full LCOE [levelized cost of electricity]. Estimates by the International Energy Agency suggest that the LCOE of a gas-fired power plant would increase by about 4% if interest rates were to increase from 3% to 7%, whereas that of offshore wind and solar PV (utility scale) could rise by more than 30%. Second, high interest rates shield legacy oil and gas producers from the competition of up-and-coming low-carbon energy producers. They will enable oil and gas giants to continue to maximize revenues from their decaying, sun-setting assets; oil in particular can keep charging more and more for less and less for a long time. The year 2022 already gave us a flavor of the shape of things to come: Exxon posted $56bn in net profits for the year, while all oil majors combined made close to net $200bn. These windfall profits are very good news for shareholders, as Exxon is planning to spend $30bn on share repurchases in 2023 and another $50bn in 2024. But they are bad news for the rest of us – as high interest rates de-incentivize investments in renewables, lock our economies more deeply into fossil-fuel dependence, slow down decarbonization and put us even more strongly on the road to hothouse Earth.

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Hyperinflation

Hyperinflation causes global societal collapse and conflict

Laurence Fletcher 22, has been the deputy markets news editor at the Financial Times since 2018, previously worked at the Wall Street Journal, Reuters and Bloomberg,”Hedge fund Elliott warns of more pain to come after 2022 market rout”,[11/2/22],https://www.ft.com/content/f3bb0f96-1816-4481-8318-4f7583326a4a//AOC

The world is on the road to “hyperinflation” and could be heading towards its worst financial crisis since the second world war, according to Elliott Management, one of the world’s biggest and most influential hedge funds. The Florida-based firm, which was founded by billionaire Paul Singer and manages about $56bn in assets, has warned its clients of an “extremely challenging” situation for the global economy and for financial markets where investors will find it difficult to make money. An “extraordinary” set of financial extremes that come as the era of cheap money draws to a close “[has] made possible a set of outcomes that would be at or beyond the boundaries of the entire post-WWII period”, it wrote in the letter, which was seen by the Financial Times. “Investors should not assume they have ‘seen everything’” just because they have experienced financial crises such as the 1970s bear market and oil price shock, the 1987 market crash, the dotcom bust or the 2008 financial crisis, it added. Elliott declined to comment. The group’s warning comes during a dismal year for markets, in which global equities have shed $28tn in value, according to Bloomberg data, and bonds have also tumbled, leaving investors with few places to seek shelter. The fund manager laid much of the blame for the looming crisis on central bank policymakers, which it said had been “dishonest” about the causes of high inflation by blaming it on supply chain bottlenecks in the wake of the pandemic, rather than on ultra-loose monetary policy put in place at the height of the coronavirus crisis in 2020. The world is “on the path to hyperinflation”, it said, which could lead to “global societal collapse and civil or international strife”. While such an outcome is not certain, this is currently the direction that the world was headed, it added. Its warnings come as investors try to assess the economic damage likely to be felt from a rapid series of large interest rate increases in the US and elsewhere, as central bankers race to try to curb soaring inflation. The S&P has dropped 20 per cent since its peak at the start of this year, while the Nasdaq is down by one-third since its high a year ago. However, Elliott said markets had not fallen far enough, given the many risks present, and warned of a further reversal of the so-called “everything rally” seen near the top of the bull market of recent years, as sky-high investor exuberance lifted all manner of risky assets. There are so many “frightening and seriously negative possibilities” that it is hard not to think that “a seriously adverse unwind of the everything bubble” is coming, it said. The hedge fund estimates a 50 per cent fall from peak to trough would be “normal”, suggesting further large falls to come in major equity markets, although it added it was impossible to know whether or when that would happen. Recommended Martin Wolf Geopolitics is the biggest threat to globalisation Elliott, which is up 6.4 per cent in 2022 and which has only lost money in two calendar years since launch in 1977, pointed to a handful of areas of potential stress that could accelerate market falls. It highlighted banks’ losses on bridge financing, potential markdowns of collateralised loan obligations and leveraged private equity as areas of potential risk for markets. The firm was also critical of investors who believed market falls will always prove shortlived and can be “ignored”. The idea that “‘we will not panic because we have seen this before’ does not comport with the current facts”, it said.

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Emerging Markets – AT EM Decline Inevitable

Emerging markets will recover in 2023 as long as rate hikes continue to ease

UBS Insights, 2/9/23, “Stars are aligning for emerging markets in risky environment,” https://www.ubs.com/global/en/wealth-management/insights/chief-investment-office/house-view/daily/2023/latest-09022023.html, mm

Emerging market assets could suffer further headwinds if the end of the Federal Reserve’s rate tightening cycle turns out to be further away than currently forecast. But we now see a much more favorable backdrop for emerging markets. Emerging markets are closely linked to the fortunes of the Chinese economy, which should rebound as the country opens up. China's earlier-than-expected reopening looks set to boost domestic consumption and demand for goods and services from other emerging (and developed) nations. Notably, we expect a revival in demand for energy and other commodities, on which many prominent emerging markets are heavily reliant. Structurally higher commodity prices should also cushion emerging economies and their credit fundamentals. Overall, we expect China’s growth to recover from 3% in 2022 to 4.9% this year. Tactically speaking, China's reopening should both directly and indirectly benefit emerging market assets through brighter growth prospects, higher commodity prices, and improved financial conditions due to stronger currencies and lower interest rates. In addition, we expect the Chinese economy to contribute to an earlier inflection point in the global outlook. It is notable that the performance of emerging market equities has historically led an earnings recovery by almost three months. Easing financial conditions and a weaker US dollar have historically been linked with strong emerging market performance. While the Fed is not yet done tightening and labor market data remains too strong, we still believe we are relatively near the end of the rate-hiking cycle. We also see further weakness ahead for the DXY dollar index, which—even after a recent modest rebound—is still 9.5% down from its peak in September. In addition, we expect global economic growth to bottom this year and start to improve. This combination of easing financial conditions, a weaker dollar, and a turn in growth has been positive for emerging markets in the past. Over the last 20 years, emerging market equities have produced annualized monthly returns of close to 43% in periods of accelerating growth and looser financial conditions, and around 23% even in periods of slowing growth and looser financial conditions. Valuations are appealing on a relative basis and corporate fundamentals are turning the corner. At the time of writing, MSCI Emerging Markets is trading at 12x 12-month forward earnings, a small premium to its 10-year average. But that is still close to a 30% discount to developed markets. Earnings momentum and earnings revisions in emerging markets are still negative in absolute terms, but they are bottoming compared with developed markets. So, we see emerging markets as well-positioned to be early beneficiaries of the inflection points in global markets, earnings, and GDP growth we expect in 2023. We are most preferred on both emerging market stocks and bonds. Among emerging markets, China is our most preferred market.

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Banking Crisis – Ukraine Scenario

Failure in Ukraine spills over – triggers broader European instability and conflict – goes nuclear

Thomas Graham, 3/8/2022, (Distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), CFR, “Preventing a Wider European Conflict,” https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict, mm

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict. The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response. The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security. Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians. As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories. The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine. Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments. Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo. Implications for the United States A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe. At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow. Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent. A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO. In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war. Likewise, a broader conflict in Europe would stress, perhaps to the breaking point, the United Nations and many of its auxiliary organizations. Already stymied by a growing rift between the Western permanent members and Russia and China, the Security Council would have failed in its primary reason for being—to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. It could continue to exist as a forum for the airing of grievances and acrimonious debate, but it would serve little purpose as a platform for addressing major global issues. Finally, the humanitarian costs of a wider conflict in Europe would be staggering, particularly given the destructiveness of modern weapons. Beyond the physical destruction and loss of life, untold numbers of refugees would flow across borders not only into Central East Europe but perhaps further West depending on the scale of the fighting. The strain on the socioeconomic systems—coming on top of the stress of the two-year-old pandemic, economic dislocation, and mounting inflation—could bring some close to collapse. Preventive Options U.S. policy toward Russia has traditionally been a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration deployed both as it tried to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine. Both have a role to play in reducing the risk of a wider European conflict, now that Russia has invaded. Many of the steps that the Biden administration is now taking to counter Russia could be accelerated and expanded to deter it from expanding its military operations beyond that country. They would likely prove more effective due to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee, which does not apply to Ukraine. The Biden administration could: With its NATO allies, accelerate and expand its current augmentation of forces in vulnerable allies along the frontier with Russia to reassure them—and convince Moscow—of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense. Step up its already intensive schedule of consultations with allies to maintain alliance unity in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat. Develop a long-term plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported Russian gas, building on the stopgap measures it is already putting in place to deal with a near-term decision by Moscow to stop flows of gas westward. Consider cutting off energy imports from Russia, and asking the Europeans to do the same, but only after it has prepared the American public for the economic hardship (rising energy costs, inflation) such a step would entail. Accelerate efforts to harden American and allied critical infrastructure against cyber intrusions. The Biden administration could also resume its diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution. To that end, it could: Resist the temptation to cut off channels of communication, as past administrations have done in reaction to Russian aggression. White House−to-Kremlin and military-to-military channels will be critical to reducing misunderstandings that could lead to direct military confrontation between the two countries. In addition, a White House−to-Kremlin link could provide a platform for negotiating an end to the conflict before it spreads beyond Ukraine. Carefully recalibrate its rhetoric to ensure that the confrontation does not turn into an existential one, where victory, whatever that might mean, is the only acceptable outcome. Such a posture would ignore the reality that Russia is unlikely to capitulate in a matter of vital interest—and would escalate rather than surrender. Talk of regime change and possible war crimes charges would probably prove counterproductive and fuel public support for escalation, especially at a moment when polls suggest the war effort enjoys the backing of the vast majority of the Russian population. Avoid appearances that the United States and NATO are waging a conflict against the Russian people. Releasing constructive proposals for resolving the conflict (including provisions for the lifting of sanctions), and urging the Ukrainians to publish reasonable negotiating terms, would be more likely than bellicose warnings to turn the Russian elites and public against the war. Russians need to be persuaded that the United States and Europe are not seeking a punitive peace but are open to a renewal of relations should their country act to end the conflict. Accelerate efforts to get information to the Russian people that would give them a more accurate portrayal of the brutal, unnecessary conflict their leaders are waging allegedly on their behalf. Students and young professionals would be particularly receptive to such information and inclined to protest. The mitigating options identified below, with the exception of invoking Article 5, could also be taken now to induce Russia to de-escalate and withdraw from Ukraine and to prevent it from expanding its military operations beyond Ukraine. Mitigating Options Should the conflict spread beyond Ukraine despite U.S. efforts, the task will be to bring it to an end on terms favorable to the United States as quickly as possible. Washington could consider diplomatic initiatives, defensive steps, and sanctions. Diplomatically, Washington could invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to make clear NATO’s determination to come to the aid of members under Russian attack. It could call for an urgent session of the UN Security Council to focus on the threat posed by Russia to international peace and security. The debate would doubtlessly be acrimonious, but the United States needs to make a concerted effort to shape public opinion and isolate Russia as the aggressor. Washington could also propose a P5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) meeting to discuss steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war. To avoid turning this into a two-bloc standoff between Russia and China and the Western powers, India could be added to the discussion. But New Delhi could resist being drawn into an East-West conflict, as it has in the past. The Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. With regard to defensive measures, Washington could enlarge NATO de facto to coordinate strategy and tactics with Sweden and Finland, with an eye to their de jure membership in the near future. It could also send a small NATO contingent to the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) to warn Serbia and Republika Srpska against aggressive actions against Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning sanctions, Washington could build on the sanctions it had already levied to raise the costs further. However, the Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. Recommendations The Biden administration is already taking steps to prevent the spread of conflict in Europe and harden the resilience of allies and partners in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: further augmentation of NATO forces, including a greater presence of American troops and equipment, along the entire Russia/NATO frontier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea; frequent consultations with allies and partners; steps to handle the large-scale exodus of refugees from Ukraine; organization of fuel shipments to Europe from various sources to cover gaps in the event of a Russian cutoff of gas exports; measures to harden U.S. and allied computer networks against attacks. The task is to turn those expedient measures into strategies to fortify the transatlantic community against a prolonged threat from the East, which Russia will continue to pose even if the current crisis is somehow defused in the near future. In particular, the United States needs to work with its European allies to drastically reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The goal should be to cut that dependence in half by the end of the decade by fully using the regasification facilities in place, building more, and accelerating work on renewables. In addition, even as the United States and European Union are dealing with the war in Ukraine, they need to recommit themselves to sorting out the continuing problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo to reduce the opportunities for destabilizing Russian interference in the Balkans. Finally, to ease the burden on states bordering Ukraine, the United States should be working with the UNHCR and its allies to develop plans for the long-term resettlement of Ukrainian refugees throughout Europe in case of a long period of instability in Ukraine. The United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific. All these steps, however, do not go far enough to deal with the enduring Russia challenge. The Biden administration needs to do more, ideally as part of a larger effort to reposition the United States strategically on the global stage. Critically, the United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific, and to prepare for a major change in the geopolitics of the Eurasian supercontinent. A tall order but not an impossible task. There are three core elements to this task: rethinking NATO, enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, and creating a security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia. Rethinking NATO. The strategic goal should be the achievement of a near perfect overlap in NATO and EU membership among European states. That would provide the foundation for the development of a united European pillar inside NATO, in a sense resolving the tension between NATO and the EU (if not necessarily between the United States and Europe). The European pillar would assume ever greater responsibility for the defense of the continent, backed up by the American strategic deterrent, thus freeing up American forces to deal with the growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted at the Madrid Summit this coming June, provides an opportunity to articulate this goal, as well as to lay out the full breadth and enduring nature of the Russia challenge. The United States should consider pressing for the following steps: Fortify NATO’s eastern border. The alliance should abandon the pledge of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act not to deploy permanent substantial combat forces to new members. It should augment its forces in vulnerable member states, as long as there is no agreement between NATO and Russia to mutually restrict force levels in border zones. Prepare for the eventual membership of Finland and Sweden to reinforce the northern flank. In the face of Russian conduct, the populations of these two countries are reconsidering their long-standing traditions of neutrality. While staying out of the domestic debate, the United States and other allies should indicate that they would welcome the two countries into the alliance and articulate clearly the changing nature of the security environment in the Baltic region brought on by a more aggressive Russia. Repair relations with Turkey. This is a matter primarily for the United States, which has levied sanctions on its ally for its purchase of S-400s, an advanced Russian air defense system. The United States could take a first step by approving the sale to Turkey of the F-16s it has requested. Washington should also look for an opportunity amidst deteriorating relations with Moscow to persuade Ankara to reconsider its purchase of S-400s. Forego expansion into the former Soviet space for an extended period. No one believes that any former Soviet state will be ready for membership for years to come. Without necessarily abandoning the Open Door policy, the alliance should make clear that it will not expand eastward while it focuses on its own consolidation. Enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific. In the face of a prolonged conflict in Europe, the United States will still have to expend considerable resources to preserve and advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific. To reassure its allies and partners of its commitment, it will need to maintain, if not increase, the tempo of its military activities, including freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea; renew its efforts to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan; and preserve its military presence in Japan and South Korea. Australian-British-U.S. military cooperation, symbolized by the submarine deal of last fall, should be expanded in the years ahead. At the same time, Washington should continue to deepen strategic cooperation among the Quad. A special effort should be made to enhance strategic cooperation with India and reduce its reliance on Russia for military hardware and nuclear power. Creating a new security forum. To link its interest in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, Washington should consider forming a small security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia. Those partners could include Canada in North America; France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in Europe; and Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific region—a new G12 of sorts. The United States could use this forum to underscore its commitment to Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, help its allies in the two regions gain a better sense of their mutual security and economic well-being, and, where possible, coordinate strategies. One major topic for this forum would be dealing with the growing Russia-China strategic alignment. Conflict in Europe will only push Russia and China closer together, at least initially. But Russia’s aggressive behavior undermines the stability that China requires to build its commercial and technological ties with Europe. The G12 could explore ways its members could exploit and increase this friction to attenuate the Russia-China ties, thereby improving the security situation in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. As the United States repositions itself in the global arena, it will need to come to an understanding with its allies on how it wants a broader conflict with Russia to end. In a prolonged conflict, Moscow will seek to divide the allies in part through calls for peace negotiations. When to negotiate is a delicate question on which the United States and its allies are sure to have different opinions. Washington will have to work hard to forge a consensus. Both victory and defeat will be hard to define. But given the destructiveness of modern weaponry and the ever-present risk of escalation to the nuclear level, a negotiated settlement, in which neither side wins or loses, is to be preferred to pressing for victory—that is, Russia’s capitulation. It should be possible to find one that leaves the transatlantic community stronger and peace in Europe more secure.

2023 MNDI Disadvantage
Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Impact – Banking Crisis – Ukraine Scenario

A widespread banking crisis would crush Western support for Ukraine

Katherine Fung, 3/16/23, Newsweek, “Banking Crisis Gives Putin Something to Smile About,” https://www.newsweek.com/banking-crisis-gives-putin-smile-1788370, mm

The recent banking crisis in the U.S. and Europe gives Russian President Vladimir Putin a means of bolstering his messaging about the Ukraine war while Russian banks remain relatively insulated from potential fallout. Confidence in the American banking system deteriorated rapidly over the last week following the second- and third-largest banking failures in U.S. history and the Swiss National Bank had to rescue the Swiss-bank Credit Suisse from default. Economists warned a bank of Credit Suisse's size failing could spark an economic meltdown, including having an impact on Russian oil, but as people in Western countries panicked, Putin gained an opportunity. "What Putin wants is a narrative of disarray in the U.S. and in Europe, whether that disarray is January 6-style protests, political polarization or economic crisis," Michael Kimmage, who previously held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio on the State Department's policy planning staff, told Newsweek. "He just wants to show there's a Western decline and that the West won't be able to support Ukraine long term." "None of that has to be true, but that's a narrative that he wants to put together and these kinds of events are definitely useful for the Russian public," Kimmage said. Since he ordered the invasion of Ukraine last year, Putin has denounced the West as a fading power and worked to strengthen ties with nations in the East, like China and Iran. It's a message that he's used to calm Russian fears over the growing number of sanctions that have been imposed by the West, and one that will likely be assisted by the West's efforts to financially isolate Russia. The Swiss central bank offered Credit Suisse a lifeline on Thursday, fighting off a bank collapse, as the risk of the bank defaulting grew. However, even if Credit Suisse failed, and led to a subsequent economic crisis across Europe, it "would have little impact on Russian banks or the Russian financial system," Gary Hufbauer, a nonresident fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told Newsweek. After a year of sanctions and economic isolation, Russia's banks are now "well insulated from the West." In June, the Russian president lambasted the U.S. and its allies for living in the past "under their own delusions" that everyone else is "second-class," calling the sanctions "crazy" and "reckless." Last month, in an address marking the first anniversary of the war, Putin accused the West of trying to "distract" the public from domestic corruption by rallying behind the sovereignty Ukraine and placed the blame for the conflict squarely on "the West and the Ukrainian elite and government." Although Russia may have some advantages to being cordoned off from the European banks, Nouriel Roubini, chairman and CEO of Roubini Macro Associates, told Newsweek that it's important to remember the country has already suffered a massive economic decline due to the war and the early impact of the sanctions. As one of the world's top three crude oil producers, Russia historically dominated oil imports. When the U.S. and the European Union sanctioned Russian oil, global prices soared more than $120 a barrel amid concerns of a shortfall of supplies. Should a full-blown, catastrophic economic crisis break out, both Roubini and Hufbauer agreed that it would lead to another sharp drop in prices of oil and gas, further hurting Russia's economy. With Russia's economy already in so much turmoil, "the rest is noise," Roubini said. Putin has claimed that Russia's GDP only contracted by two percent in 2022, but analysts have warned that the Kremlin has used statistics as part of its "information war." "The Kremlin communicates heavily using cherry-picked forecasts, presenting them as facts and forgetting to mention that they are massively outside expert consensus," Agathe Demarais, the global forecasting director at the Economic Intelligence Unit, wrote in a Foreign Policy analysis on Monday. "Moscow also delays the release of statistics that don't fit its narrative." Demarais said it's most likely that Russia's GDP decline will be revised closer to three or four percent. Ideal GDP growth is between two and three percent. Putin's maintained support within Russia for the war on Ukraine but the Russian people are feeling the economic toll of the war. A February poll from the Moscow-based research group Chronicles found those who were economically impacted by the war were less likely to be supportive of it. Aleksei Miniailo, a Russian opposition politician who launched Chronicles previously told Newsweek the economic fallout of the war was starting to take a toll on Putin's propaganda machine. Despite promises of a quick and easy victory, Moscow has struggled to make substantial gains in Ukraine, including a failure to capture Kyiv, and been forced to mobilize 300,000 Russian men to join the war effort. Currently, Ukraine is deploying all its resources to defend Bakhmut in hopes that it will be successful in retaking the key territory by spring. But those ambitions have stressed Western officials, who say the bombardment could be unsustainable. Kimmage noted that the optics of civilian suffering in Ukraine has had damaging impacts to Russia, and so, international attention on a global financial crisis could act as a distraction from those images. "It's not that Putin will get out of that problem with this particular crisis, but attention will focus elsewhere," Kimmage said. "It's not on Russia's subpar military performance and it's not the civilian suffering that Russia is causing, so it's absolutely useful to Russia." With fears that ammunition could be depleted, it's clear Ukraine will continue to require aide from its allies. But if Europeans become increasingly more concerned about their own finances, there could be a shift in public opinion on sending aid to Ukraine when constituents are struggling at home, opening up an opportunity for Putin to advance on the battlefield. "The financial turmoil will weaken Europe economically, and that will make continuing to shoulder the war effort cost harder," Alessandro Rebucci, an associate professor of international finance and applied macroeconomics at Johns Hopkins University, told Newsweek.