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2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 2 – Inequality

The current US healthcare system is one of the key drivers of income inequality – it forces wage stagnation and expansive medical debt.

Newkirk II 18’-  is a senior editor at The Atlantic and the host of the podcasts  and  “The American Health- Care System Increases Income Inequality”, The Atlantic, 1/15/18 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/health-care-income-inequality-premiums-deductibles-costs/550997/

For most people, a single doctor’s visit can be a financial obstacle course. Many patients throughout the year pay hundreds or thousands of dollars in premiums, most often through workplace contributions. Then, at the doctor’s office, they are faced with a deductible, and they may need to pay coinsurance or make a copayment. If they have prescriptions, they’ll likely fork over cash for those, too. And that’s just for basic primary care for one person. Repeat that process for an entire family; add in any labs, referrals, specialists, emergency-room visits, and surgeries; and the result for even healthy families is dozens and dozens of payments, and often thousands of dollars. This series of expenditures before, during, and after care is euphemistically called having “skin in the game.” But the reality is, the American insurance system is designed to make health care financially unpleasant, often to the point where patients forego necessary care. A new study in the forthcoming of the American Journal of Public Health sheds light on just how all that “skin in the game” affects the material conditions of patients. The research—by Andrea Christopher at the Boise Veterans Affairs Medical Center, David Himmelstein and Steffie Woolhandler at the City University of New York at Hunter College, and Danny McCormick at Harvard Medical School—indicates that household spending on health care is a significant contributor to income inequality in the United States. It also indicates that medical expenses push millions of Americans below the federal poverty line, including 7 million people who make more than 150 percent of the poverty level. Four million of those Americans are pushed into the ranks of extreme poverty. That health-care costs in the country are expensive—often, prohibitively so—is well known. As Vox’s Sarah Kliff notes, the first reason why is , which doesn’t always correspond with measurable increases in quality or demand. Even for routine procedures or precautionary visits, hospital bills can run over $400, an expense that almost half of American households without dipping into credit. Additionally, billing is famously opaque, incoherent, and fragmented, creating major barriers to informed care decisions and often resulting in bills going into collections. Health insurance is supposed to mitigate those cost and information barriers. A 2016 Kaiser Family Foundation analysis  while significant numbers of Americans have trouble paying medical bills, only 20 percent of insured people had difficulty versus half of all uninsured people. Most of that difficulty for both groups comes from sudden medical events or accidents, or sudden life events like the loss of a job. Medical debt is also a  to bankruptcy in the United States. One of the major arguments for the Affordable Care Act was in its name: a promise to help shield people from the worst financial effects of medical catastrophe or chronic illness. New avenues of subsidized or free health insurance that sprang from Obamacare—including private insurance offered on the exchanges and expanded Medicaid rolls in many states—have been able to do some shielding. The ACA helped  by as many as 1.5 million between 2010 and 2017. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  that, between 2011 and 2016, the percentage of Americans with trouble paying medical bills dropped precipitously. And a by the Urban Institute’s Kyle Caswell and Timothy Waidmann found “improved credit scores, reduced balances past due as a percent of total debt, reduced probability of a medical collection balance of $1,000 or more, … and a reduction in the probability of a new bankruptcy filing” for people in Medicaid-expansion states. But the new AJPH study complicates some of that rosy analysis. The researchers didn’t split the survey population up based on insurance status; they instead measured income inequality across the population, both before medical expenses were taken into account and after. They found that income inequality in 2014 actually increased by 1.5 points after medical expenses were subtracted from income. Put another way, poor people spent much more of their income on health care than the richest people did, and as a result around 1.5 percent of all relative income shifted toward the higher earners. The researchers also found that medical spending sent millions of people effectively into poverty or into deeper rungs of poverty. Seven million Americans making more than 150 percent of the federal poverty line—$31,000 for a family of three—dropped below that line if medical expenses were subtracted from their income. That meant that these families spent something like a third or more of all their income on health care. Of the 7 million, 4 million found their post-health-care income reduced below 50 percent of the poverty line, meaning they spent about two-thirds of their total income on health care. The study also found that the ACA decreased the amount of inequality caused by health-care expenses, but only slightly. There are some limitations to how far these results can be interpreted. It’s possible that, since 2014, continued gains in insurance coverage—at least until the in 2017—combined with additional states expanding Medicaid, decreased coverage costs; a more recent study would be needed to say for sure. Also, without insurance-enrollment breakdowns, it’s impossible to see where and why the biggest gaps in income inequality emerge, and the exact role the ACA may have played in fixing them. Still, the study adds to the body of evidence on the dramatic impact of health-care costs. Even with Medicaid as a safety net, health care is a major burden for low-income people—so much so that it deeply exacerbates differences in income and wealth. One major reason for this burden, perhaps even especially under the ACA, is deductibles. While almost the whole of the national health-care debate has centered on how to lower premiums, the ACA and other health policies have in many cases purposefully driven deductibles upward.  they have trouble affording their deductibles than they do affording their premiums. Between 2006 and 2017, the Kaiser Family Foundation found that deductibles for people with employer-sponsored insurance . The out-of-pocket maximums on many of these plans also increased sharply. Many of these hikes came from an across-the-board embrace of so-called high-deductible plans, which have been theorized to limit both utilization of health care and the burden of premiums. The tradeoff for those lower premiums is that those who use their insurance have to pay a lot more to do so. As a 2017 Atlantic investigation , this theory can often create two kinds of adverse outcomes when put into practice. Many people simply spend what they need to to cover health-care costs, draining their savings and income as they go. And many who don’t turn to crowdfunding to pay their bills, or go without care in the first place. Technically, these outcomes reduce the number of medical bankruptcies—a victory for policymakers—because even high-deductible plans place a hard cap on medical expenditures. Yet even as Americans are better protected from the worst consequences of catastrophic illness, routine care continues to hurt low-income people’s finances.The ACA isn’t really designed to combat that particular paradox. In fact, the law at times embraces it. It juiced up the comprehensiveness of most plans, and it shields people from the true cost of premiums through a number of mechanisms. But , the structure of the high-deductible plan was accepted as a basic mechanism for both rationing and budgeting. While cost-sharing reductions  to put a cap on the burden that deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance place on low-income Americans, 90 percent of all people on the exchanges still pay deductibles of $1,300 individually or $2,600 per family, amounts that are often difficult to afford even for middle-class families.Republican plans to create a new health-care regime would, for the most part, only increase that difficulty, because both the Senate and House bills to repeal Obamacare . President Trump, meanwhile, has cost-sharing reduction payments and signed a tax law that  to purchase insurance. Both of these actions could increase premiums, thus giving some patients yet another financial burden to worry about.The new study functions as a reminder that policymakers seeking to address income and wealth inequality cannot do so without continuing to address health care, still one of the most constant sources of financial woe in American life. That includes both the absolute cost of health care and the myriad ways the cost is passed onto people with insurance. Until those problems are mitigated, having “skin in the game” for the poorest Americans translates to losing financial ground.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 2 – Inequality

The plan is key to redistribute wealth, eliminate income inequality, and guarantee health access for everyone.

Rudiger 16 – Anja Rudiger, Ph.D. in Political Theory from the University of Kiel, former Director of Programs at the National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (“Human Rights and the Political Economy of Universal Health Care,” Health and Human Rights, Vol. 18, No. 2, pgs. 67-78, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2016/12/human-rights-and-the-political-economy-of-universal-health-care-designing-equitable-financing/)

Health system financing is a critical factor in securing universal health care and achieving equity in access and payment. The human rights framework offers valuable guidance for designing a financing strategy that meets these goals. This article presents a rights-based approach to health care financing developed by the human right to health care movement in the United States. Grounded in a human rights analysis of private, market-based health insurance, advocates make the case for public financing through progressive taxation. Financing mechanisms are measured against the twin goals of guaranteeing access to care and advancing economic equity. The added focus on the redistributive potential of health care financing recasts health reform as an economic policy intervention that can help fulfill broader economic and social rights obligations. Based on a review of recent universal health care reform efforts in the state of Vermont, this article reports on a rights-based public financing plan and model, which includes a new business tax directed against wage disparities. The modeling results suggest that a health system financed through equitable taxation could produce significant redistributive effects, thus increasing economic equity while generating sufficient funds to provide comprehensive health care as a universal public good. Introduction Universal health care is about more than our health—it is also a prescription for economic transformation, budget and tax reform, and public sector strengthening. It can catalyze economic redistribution in countries with fragmented market-based health systems, and resist austerity and privatization policies where universal systems already exist. If the human rights framework is to have a role in shaping this high-stakes political project, the right to health care has to be turned into a conceptual tool to guide systems change. Health systems goals put forward at the international, national, or sub-national level are not usually measured against human rights standards, and the policy instruments that implement reforms are not assessed for their consistency with the right to health care. In policy terms, universal health care is decidedly under-defined, which opens up space for periodic re-framing efforts based on evolving political contexts and interests, as the transition from the Alma-Ata Declaration’s Health For All to universal health coverage (UHC) illustrates.1 There is a lack of rights-based policy guidance to assess this shift from “care” to “coverage” and its apparent preference for an insurance business model over public service provision. To guide debates about the political economy of universal health care and inform the design of universal systems, it is incumbent on human rights advocates to establish the right to health care as a workable policy tool and engage with policymaking beyond general statements of values or legal defenses of individual rights. Right to health advocates must be able to define both the goals of a health system and the instruments and mechanisms conducive to achieving those goals. A rights-based framework of policy-relevant principles and standards for health system design, and particularly for financing, is needed to set parameters for modeling, implementing, and improving universal health care systems. This article presents a human rights approach to financing health care, along with the design of a financing mechanism for a sub-national universal system in the United States, including a predictive model simulating equitable revenue generation. This work, developed—with the author’s involvement—by the Vermont Workers’ Center’s (VWC) Healthcare Is a Human Right campaign (HCHR) between 2008 and 2015, includes a system assessment tool that evolved from a rights-based analytical framework designed to evaluate the most recent round of federal health care reform in the United States.2 Although grounded in international legal human rights norms, the example presented here does not make a legal case but offers a normative policy framework, informed by economic analysis and empirical data. All tools were developed collaboratively, with community participation, to advance grassroots human rights campaigns and foster the broad movement building—the coordinated developmental process that creates, strengthens, and sustains social movement infrastructure, membership and strategy—that is required to amass the political power necessary to effect systemic transformation. Human Rights and the US health care market Over the last decade, rights-based advocacy for universal, publicly financed health care has been gaining traction in the United States, notwithstanding the century-old resistance of industry interests and the failure of the recent federal reform, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to challenge those interests.3 Although the ACA expanded access to the public Medicaid program, its mandate on individuals to purchase private insurance policies served to channel customers—and public subsidies—to the insurance industry, thus consolidating the private insurance market. While many health advocates responded with plans for improving the ACA, human rights campaigners pointed to the structural inequity of market-based health insurance and redoubled their organizing for a public health care system. The growing movement for the right to health care is best reflected in the Healthcare Is a Human Right Campaign Collaborative, a national movement building initiative inspired by the success of the eponymous campaign in Vermont, which became the first US state to enact a universal health care law and attempt a transition to a publicly financed universal system.4 The focus on health care financing by both policy makers and campaigners has its roots in the particular nature of the US health care crisis. In the only affluent country without a universal health system, the abundance of resources invalidates any argument for a progressive realization of human rights. Health care funding is plentiful (17% GDP in 2013), yet the mechanisms for raising and allocating those funds are deeply inequitable.5 While total health expenditure is twice as high as in most European countries, health disparities abound and outcomes are poor, with up to 100,000 deaths annually considered amenable to health care.6 Financial barriers are a key predictor of poor access to and quality of health care (oftentimes correlated with structural racism) and a leading cause of debt and impoverishment. The private, market-based insurance system does not function as an effective pre-payment mechanism, even with the public subsidies introduced by the ACA. Because of substantial user fees at the point of service, insurance coverage fails to correlate sufficiently with either improved access to care or ability to pay.7 Low-income people with private insurance rather than public (Medicaid, Medicare, or military) not only spend more of their income on health care than the wealthy, they are also more likely to have lower value insurance plans and delay or avoid getting needed care.8 It follows that universal health care advocacy is centered on promoting redistributive health care financing that facilitates both universal, equitable access to care and equity in the payment for care. Advocates have turned to human rights principles to inform the analysis and development of health-related economic and fiscal policies. The right to health care has been configured as a tool for shaping decisions about equity and resource redistribution.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

Universal healthcare is uniquely key – it allows for rapid and efficient detection programs that minimize the harm of disease in the United States.

Galvania et al 20 – Professor of Epidemiology at the Yale School of Public Health and the Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Modeling and Analysis.

Alison Galvania, Alyssa Parpia, Abhishek Padney, Charlotte Zimmer, James Kahn, and Meagam Fitzpatrick, June 2020, “The imperative for universal healthcare to curtail the COVID-19 outbreak in the USA,” The Lancet, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/eclinm/article/PIIS2589-5370(20)30124-3/fulltext

The COVID-19 outbreak in the United States is growing steeply and spreading widely. As of March 26, national incidence surpassed every other country, and as of April 28 has reported over a million cases. The COVID-19 crisis is exposing the systemic frailties in our healthcare system. More than 78 million people in America do not have access to adequate health insurance [[1]]. Given that health insurance in the US is typically provided by employers, millions more are at risk of losing their healthcare coverage as unemployment surges. Here we discuss how the pervasive healthcare insecurity in the US hampers control of COVID-19. Further, we argue that universal healthcare would alleviate the cost barriers that are impeding control of this pandemic.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

A strong national health system prepares us against bioterrorism.

Houser 22 [Ryan Scott Houser has a Master of Science in Biohazardous Threat Agents and Emerging Infectious Diseases and an Executive Master of Professional Studies in Emergency and Disaster Management from Georgetown University among other graduate and professional degrees. His research critically examines health security, biological threats, emergency preparedness, law, and medicine, “The Role of Public Health Emergency Management in Biodefense: A COVID-19 Case Study,” Cambridge University Press, 05/02/2022, ] WC

Promote strong, effective leadership and coordination: The United States must commit to a collaborative framework that integrated public health and its preparedness domains into the biodefense infrastructure that is currently heavily focused in law enforcement entities focused on preventing terrorism. Public health emergencies that are a result of an infectious disease outbreak or even a bioweapon, require national coordination since biological agents are not easily isolated. Effective coordination of response by state, local, tribal and territorial authorities are crucial to a successful response and mitigation of devastating impacts. Clear and effective leadership can assist with promoting all-hazard preparedness and operation response coordination during public health emergencies. This coordination must also focus on federal efforts an infectious disease outbreaks and bioweapons have the potential to span the nation. ASPR must integrate with FEMA to ensure coordination through the emergency management cycle, including the pre-incident phases. ASPR has a crucial role in coordinating the important resources of the Department of Health and Human Services along with other federal medical and public health expertise that will be necessary to support local and state departments. Coordination will allow for the adequate distribution of the right care to those in need, a major gap of the COVID-19 pandemic. Strengthen public-private-government partnerships: Biothreats require a lot of government response in order to be successful. Expanding, strengthening, and sustaining partnerships between government agencies, the private sector, and academia will be critical for preparing and responding to the next threat. Operation Warp Speed and partnerships through the National Emerging Special Pathogen Training and Education Center and Regional Disaster Health Response System were vital to the expansion and mobilization of medical capacities and capabilities needed to address the gaps during the pandemic. Steady state agreements and cooperation can better improve our capabilities, capacities, and resources to prevent, mitigate, and respond to any biothreat no matter the source. These partnerships will help ensure a collaborative approach to response that does not place the federal government, state governments, and private entities in competition for the resources necessary to save lives.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

Bioterrorism limits U.S. military response options and forces nuclear war

Pifer et al. ’10, Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2010, , @BC

It is such a prospect that led University of Maryland scholar John Steinbruner to note “One can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than with the current nuclear weapons arsenals.” The state developing this BW agent might simultaneously develop a vaccine against the new disease and use that vaccine to inoculate its own people. It might then use the biological pathogen as a weapon, or a threat, against another country. That could be a country it was interested in conquering; it could also threaten use against the United States and broader international community, to deter other countries from coming to the rescue of another state being attacked directly by the aggressor (analogous to how Saddam Hussein would have liked to deter the U.S.-led coalition from coming to Kuwait’s aid in 1990-1991). If the United States faced the prospect of millions of its own citizens, or hundreds of thousands of its own troops, becoming sick as it considered a response to aggression, and its only recourse was conventional retaliation, its range of options could be limited. Indeed, the very troops called on to carry out the retaliation might become vulnerable to the disease, jeopardizing their physical capacity to execute the conventional operation. Perhaps they could be well protected on the battlefield, once suited up, but they could be vulnerable before deployment, along with the rest of the American population. A potential adversary, seeing these possibilities, might find the concept of such an advanced pathogen very appealing. Would there be a clear and definitive policy or moral argument against the use of a nuclear weapon in retaliation for a BW attack that killed hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of Americans? If the origin of the attack could be identified, as it might well be under numerous scenarios like the one sketched above, and if huge numbers of American civilians had been targeted, the case for restraint would be hard to make. At the least, it might be no stronger than the case for absorbing a nuclear weapons strike and choosing not to retaliate. What if the United States thought a biological attack by an aggressor imminent? Or what if it had already suffered one attack and others seemed possible? In such circumstances, there could be potential value in a nuclear retaliatory threat against the belligerent state, warning that any future use of biological attacks against the American people or U.S. allies might produce a nuclear response.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

Advances in biotechnology over the past couple years have created capabilities for a major bioterror attack soon.

Hummel and Burpo et al ‘22

[Stephen and F. John, Combatting Terrorism Center, “A New Age of Bioterror: Anticipating Exploitation of Tunable Viral Agents”, ] @SL

Advances in technology, particularly biotechnology, over the past decade have dramatically changed the world. Scientists are employing gene editing tools to cure genetic diseases, reduce the effects of climate change, and generate sustainable food sources. These same tools, however, can be used to modify pathogens to develop and deploy novel biological weapons. The nature of these tools and our understanding of specific viral genomes makes this process tunable. Components of a disease such as transmissibility, lethality, and the infectious window can potentially be modified for desired tactical, operational, or strategic effects. While this capability is currently beyond the skills and knowledge of the biology enthusiast, a trained individual would possess such skills and knowledge, though they may lack the necessary material and infrastructure support. Hence, it is necessary to develop and maintain capabilities that can respond to a variety of pathogens and possible effects. The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Wuhan, China, in November 2019 and its subsequent worldwide spread has had tremendously destabilizing effects, which are still being felt more than two years later. Lessons from COVID variants include immediate impacts at the local level (initial variant), global pandemic effects from the Delta variant to include significant and protracted economic impact, and the more sub-lethal, sustained economic, political, and healthcare impacts of the Omicron strain. The global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has also highlighted the ongoing biological revolution that has resulted in the rapid development and employment of new diagnostic tests, vaccines, and other targeted treatments including monoclonal antibodies and antiviral drugs. Over the past decade, the intersection of technology (e.g., computer science, automation, DNA sequencing) and biology has expanded exponentially, becoming embedded in economies and society. This intersection, along with the demonstrated impacts of SARS-CoV-2, is fraught with opportunities and risks. The tools for curing genetic diseases, reducing the effects of climate change, and generating sustainable food sources are now being developed and tested. Yet, these same gene editing tools could be employed to generate and modify biological weapons, making it important for both the counterterrorism community and scientific community to anticipate how the scientific advances may change the bioterrorism threat landscape.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

The lack of universal insurance makes a bioterror attack increasingly likely.

Kahn 17 – Laura H Kahn, physician and research scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, M.D. from Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, a Master of Public Health from Columbia University and a Master of Public Policy from Princeton University, formerly managing physician for the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, a medical officer for the Food and Drug Administration in Rockville, Maryland, an attending physician/educator at Prince George’s Hospital in Cheverly, Maryland and a staff physician at Gouverneur Hospital (“Why access to health care is a national security issue,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 5th, http://thebulletin.org/why-access-health-care-national-security-issue10819)

As the Congressional Budget Office report suggests, the American Health Care Act would make healthcare essentially unaffordable for people with pre-existing conditions, because it would allow insurance companies to dramatically increase their premiums. Ten years ago, I wrote about the security impact of the uninsured during the George W. Bush presidency. In 2005, almost 47 million people (about 16 percent of the total US population) were uninsured. Thanks to the Affordable Care Act passed under the Obama administration, that number dropped to a low of 11 percent, according to a Gallup poll taken during the first quarter of 2016. The Affordable Care Act was a big step in the right direction, but it didn’t close the gap, and the national security and public health challenges of having a large fraction of the population uninsured remain as relevant today as they were a decade ago. Uninsured people delay seeking health care. Once they seek it, often in a busy emergency room, they are typically given less attention than people with insurance. This failure to get care becomes a danger not only for the individual but for the public at large when the problem is a deadly infectious disease. We saw this scenario play out in Dallas during the Ebola crisis of 2014 and 2015. A poor Liberian man, infected with the virus, presented himself to Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital with severe abdominal pain and a high fever. He was examined and sent home with a bottle of antibiotics. Amazingly, he did not set off an Ebola outbreak in his community, though the risk that he could have was significant and the wider public shouldn’t count on being so lucky next time. Before dying, he infected two nurses who had received inadequate training and equipment to protect themselves. During the anthrax crisis of 2001, in which spores of the deadly disease were sent through the US mail, many people infected were federal employees with health insurance. If these postal workers hadn’t had easy access to health care, the death toll might have been higher than only five; 17 more were infected but survived thanks to timely medical attention. Anthrax spores do not spread from person to person, but it’s no stretch to imagine a different scenario: Suppose a future attack involves smallpox, a highly communicable virus, and that the initial victims are uninsured childcare workers or food handlers. The initial signs of smallpox include fever, chills, and headache. Uninsured victims would likely delay trying to get care, hoping for the symptoms to pass. By waiting they would certainly expose others to the virus, potentially setting of a pandemic. Countries like Canada, which has universal health coverage and a well-funded public health infrastructure, are much better prepared to handle deadly epidemics. In 2003, Canada confronted Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which originated in China. A physician from Guangdong province inadvertently infected a number of tourists with the SARS virus, setting off a global pandemic after everyone returned to their home countries. Among the infected travelers was an elderly Canadian woman who returned to Toronto after a 10-day vacation in Hong Kong. Over the course of about four months, the Canadian health system worked hard to contain the virus, treating 400 people who became ill and quarantining 25,000 Toronto residents who may have been exposed. Ultimately, 44 people died from the disease in Canada, but the result would have been much worse without a quick and well-organized response. The Canadian government’s response had its glitches—primarily in the form of poor political leadership. Mel Lastman, the mayor of Toronto and a former furniture salesman, became angry when the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a travel advisory against his city. He railed against the WHO’s decision on television, revealing his complete lack of knowledge about either the organization or public health in general. As a result of Lastman’s poor leadership, he was ultimately relegated to a secondary role as the deputy mayor took his place. Lastman’s credibility and legitimacy never recovered from the SARS outbreak. Likewise, US leaders will be judged by how they handle a bioterrorist attack or pandemic. Unlike Canada, America’s piecemeal healthcare and public health systems are inherently less able to handle such crises. The Affordable Care Act helped fill in the gaps, but really, the only way to prepare for the eventuality of pandemics or bioterrorist attacks is with a single-payer government-run system that covers everyone. The United States might consider modeling its health care system after the one in Israel, a country that, given longstanding threats, takes every terrorist risk very seriously. In 1994, it established universal health coverage for all citizens. The country’s Ministry of Health monitors and promotes public health, oversees the operations of the nation’s hospitals, and sets healthcare priorities. As a result, Israel’s public health, emergency response, and hospital systems are state-of-the-art, highly efficient, and coordinated—a necessity when responding to terrorist attacks. The preamble to the US Constitution states the goals to “provide for the common defense” and “promote the general Welfare.” The US government won’t fulfill either of these duties if it fails to protect its citizens against pandemics and bioterrorism. The mandate requires a robust public health infrastructure and a universal healthcare system that covers all Americans. The Trump Administration and Congressional Republicans threaten to undermine this essential function of government, unnecessarily jeopardizing American lives.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › Advantage 1 – Health Care

U.S. public health is a patchwork system-lack of consistency between state and local levels.

Wallace and Sharfstein ‘22

Megan Wallace and Joshua M. Sharfstein, 2022, Dr.P.H. and M.D, “The Patchwork U.S. Public Health System,” New England Journal of Medicine, 6 January 2022, , @KK

The response to foodborne illness — a quintessential public health activity — is a microcosm of the uneven patchwork that characterizes all of U.S. public health. In the shadow of a pandemic, understanding this haphazard architecture is a step toward appreciating the U.S. paradox of enormous health expenditures but poor outcomes for population health. To begin with, there is no clear administrative structure that organizes the many federal agencies involved in public health (see table). Twenty-one major federal agencies have a role in pandemic preparedness and response, for example, and more than 100 federal offices have been engaged in work during the Covid-19 pandemic. At the state and local levels, variation is the rule, not the exception. Twenty-nine state health departments stand alone, and the others are part of larger health and human services agencies. About half of states have a board of health to provide guidance for public health activities; in the other half, no such board exists. About two thirds of state health officials are appointed by the governor, and the other third are appointed by the secretary of the larger human services agency, a state public health board, or some other entity. Similarly, there is little consistency in the relationships between state and local health departments. In 7 states, the state health department operates all local health offices; in 30 states, local health departments operate largely without state control; and in the remainder, various amounts of collaboration occur. A 2012 review noted the challenge of classification: “Even in states that are considered centralized, it is not uncommon for local government entities to exhibit some authority; likewise, in some decentralized states, state government has some powers regarding the local health unit.”2 There are about 2800 local health departments in the United States, most of which serve fewer than 50,000 people. About half of local health departments report to a local board of health, which may be an elected body such as a county council or an independently appointed group. Another 20% work with the local board of health in an advisory capacity. The activities undertaken by health departments also vary. In 1994, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services convened the Core Public Health Functions Steering Committee to define the 10 Essential Public Health Services, a list that was recently updated by a coalition of public health groups (see box) to center equity and include addressing structural causes of poor health, including poverty, racism, and gender discrimination. The federal agencies and state health departments have broad responsibilities, but typically, local health departments perform less than half of vital public health activities.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › AT: Hard Landing

A hard landing is inevitable – history proves the Fed cannot engineer a soft landing

Jay Zawatsky, 3/19/2018, The National Interest, “The Federal Reserve Cannot Engineer a ‘Soft Landing’” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-federal-reserve-cannot-engineer-soft-landing-24980, mm

The mainstream financial media is enamored with the idea that the Federal Reserve, after “heroically rescuing us” from the “home mortgage meltdown” can now engineer a “soft landing.” The media believes that a group of economists sitting comfortably in the Eccles Building in Washington, D.C. can “mastermind” the most important economic signals of all: the price and amount of money. In effect, the financial media—e.g., CNBC’s Steve Liesman and his ilk, but not Rick “Tea Party” Santelli—believes that the Federal Reserve can pull and push its economic "levers" and twist its economic dials like the “man behind the curtain” in the Wizard of Oz. They believe that by pulling levers and twisting dials in just the right combination, interest rates will gradually rise, the Fed’s so-called “quantitative easing” program will slowly unwind, and more than $4 trillion in “out of thin air money” created since 2009 will be “retired”—without triggering a recession. Would that it were true. Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve cannot accomplish this feat today. Why is this a certainty? Because never in its 105-year history has the Fed been able to so do, even facing less daunting economic challenges. Indeed, every "tightening" cycle in the Fed’s star-crossed history has been followed by an economic downturn (recession) or even a depression.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Slow Growth Impact

No impact to slow growth- it won’t cause war, countries remain cautious

Acharya 18 - UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service, American University (Amitav Acharya; “The End of American World Order” Second Edition; pgs. 157-161; Accessed: July 8, 2018)/

To sum up, I do not suggest that a multiplex world will be free from conflict and violence. Rather, my argument is that just because American dominance is declining, it does not mean the world is catching fire. The US and other Western countries will remain engaged in conflict control around the world, not due to any liberal altruism, but to protect their own homelands from the spill-over of regional conflicts in an increasingly globalized world. The emerging powers may seek to reform the current order, but most of them, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, are not seeking to destabilize the world. On the contrary, they are increasingly engaged in peace operations under the UN auspices. There has been a marked reversal in the contributions of developed and developing countries to the UN, with all the top ten contributing countries in 2013 coming from the developing world, compared to the situation in 1990 when seven out of the top ten were from the developed world.45 China's contribution to US peacekeeping missions jumped 20-fold between 2000 and 2010, and China is the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping troops among the Permanent 5 members of the UN.46 India's contribution exceeds China's; it is historically the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, having participated in 48 of the 69 UN peacekeeping missions until 2015.47 As the emerging powers and other non-Western countries bring more resources and influence to the table, there is a growing opportunity for shared leadership between them and the West in addressing the world's trouble spots. Yet, instead of recognizing and advancing these opportunities, the West is busy complaining and lamenting about the erosion of the American World Order, and even pining for its restoration. The reluctance of the US and the Western powers to accept the decline of the American World Order and seek out new pathways to cooperation and peace may prove in itself to be a major challenge to global stability. Let me conclude with a few observations that might help the international community, the US included, to manage the transition to a multiplex world. First, stop pining for the return of liberal hegemony, by which I mean the post-World War II international order created and dominated by the US and centered around Western interests, values, and institutions. That order might have delivered much good (and lots of bad) for the world, and some of its institutions (such as the UN system) will continue, but the particular historical circumstances behind the rise of liberal hegemony are gone. The global power shift is for real and here to stay. In a multiplex world liberal internationalism will not disappear. But it has to come to terms with other ideas about and approaches to world order. At the same time, while China and other rising powers may be tempted to push for a "world of their own making," or a "parallel" global order, with their own institutions and linkages, I doubt if this can be substantially delinked from the remnants of the liberal order. These different worlds will have powerful incentives to collude, not just collide. It is this complex dynamic of parallel and intersecting orders that will be a defining feature of the emerging multiplex world. Second, unless and until the Trump administration radically changes course or is replaced, prepare to live without significant US support for multilateralism. Under Trump, US support might come selectively and sparingly, but its absence should not deter international cooperation if other major players participate or offer support. Third, avoid undue pessimism and learn from past mistakes in understanding conflict and conflict management. Despite claims about the world catching fire, some forms of international violence are on a long-term decline. Moreover, many of the signs of "anarchy" today, including death tolls in the Middle East, are the result of failed but avoidable policies pursued by the US and its key Western allies. Fourth, give due credit to the contribution of non-Western actors to the marketplace of ideas for global cooperation. Neither hubris nor cynicism about the role of the emerging powers is warranted. Most of the emerging powers, notably China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, are neither status-quo nor revisionist powers, but reformist ones who are willing to contribute to peaceful change in world order. Fifth, encourage pragmatic globalism, in place of ideologically charged liberal internationalism, a term that is deeply associated with Western hegemony and hypocrisy. History provides many examples: the drafting of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2008 financial crisis, Libya till the Anglo-French regime change, fighting terror, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, of practical, non-ideological, issue-based cooperation

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Slow Growth Impact

“Slow growth” is a myth with no impact

Shaffer 17 – Leslie Shaffer, Senior Writer at CNBC, “Slow Economic Growth? Global Bank Asks, 'Who Cares?'”, CNBC, 8-24,

The persistent belief that global economic growth is "dangerously slow" and fragile is just a myth, DBS said in a note on Thursday. "If you're worried about slow growth today, get used to it. It's probably going to be slower five years from now and slower yet five years after that," David Carbon, chief economist at DBS, said in the note. In the July update of its World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund forecast global economic growth of 3.5 percent for 2017 and 3.6 percent for 2018, unchanged from its April outlook. The IMF report urged countries to pursue structural reforms, such as commodity exporters diversifying their economies, amid concerns about "shocks" upsetting the apple cart. But Carbon said economic growth wasn't in the danger zone when it's "looked at the way it should be: in per-capita terms," with slower gross domestic product growth due mainly to slower working-age population growth. "Per person of working age, growth doesn't appear to have slowed at all since 1980," he said. "To the extent that slower growth results from slower population growth, the response should be: who cares? It's growth per person that matters — your income, my wage — not growth in the aggregate." Carbon noted that the working-age population growth was falling much more rapidly than population growth overall. He pointed to Japan, where the population as a whole fell by 0.2 percent in 2016, while the working age population fell five times more rapidly, by 1 percent each year. Europe and the U.S. changes weren't quite as stark, but still showed the same pattern, Carbon said, noting a 0.1 to 0.2 percent decline in Europe's working-age population, while in the U.S. that group was growing at 0.4 percent a year, down from 1.2 percent a year a decade ago. That translated into simple math suggesting much slower economic growth, he said. "Since GDP growth is the sum of labor force growth (in simple terms, WAPG) and growth in output per-person (i.e., productivity growth), a one percent drop in working-age population growth brings an equivalent one percent drop in potential GDP growth," he said. That meant the potential GDP growth in the U.S. was now less than 2 percent a year, down from 3 percent more than a decade ago, he said. It also indicated that global economic growth was running at or above potential, Carbon said. "Where's the crisis? Where's the danger? Why should governments pull out all the stops to raise it further? And would it do any good," he asked. "Odds are, it wouldn't." Indeed, Carbon noted that while Japan's economy was widely considered a laggard, on a per-capita basis, it would become the world's best performer, alongside Germany, with growth twice that of the U.S. and France. "Whether judged over eight years or 16 years, Japan and Germany are the global growth leaders. The U.S. is a distant third. And France has performed every bit as well as the U.S.," he said.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Slow Growth Impact

Slow growth is inevitable and there’s no impact — trying to constantly accelerate growth is worse

Sharma, CFA, 17 - Chief Global Strategist and Head of Emerging Markets at Morgan Stanley Investment Management (Ruchir, “The Boom Was a Blip: Getting Used to Slow Growth”, 96 Foreign Aff. 104 2017, Hein Online)

The global recovery from the Great Recession of 2009 has just entered its eighth year and shows few signs of fading. That should be cause for celebration. But this recovery has been an underwhelming one. Throughout this period, the global economy has grown at an average annual pace of just 2.5 percent-a record low when compared with economic rebounds that took place in the decades after World War II. Rather than rejoicing, then, many experts are now anxiously searching for a way to push the world economy out of its low-growth trap. Some economists and investors have placed their hopes on populists such as U.S. President Donald Trump, figuring that if they can make their countries' economies grow quickly again, the rest of the world might follow along. Given how long the global economy has been in the doldrums, however, it's worth asking whether the forces slowing growth are merely temporary. Although economists and business leaders complain that a 2.5 percent global growth rate is painfully slow, prior to the 1800s, the world's economy never grew that fast for long; in fact, it never topped one percent for a sustained period. Even after the Industrial Revolution began in the late eighteenth century, the average global growth rate rarely exceeded 2.5 percent. It was only with the massive baby boom following World War II that the global economy grew at an average pace close to four percent for several decades. That period was an anomaly, however-and should be recognized as such. The causes of the current slowdown can be summed up as the Three Ds: depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization. Between the end of World War II and the financial crisis of 2008, the global economy was supercharged by explosive population growth, a debt boom that fueled investment and boosted productivity, and an astonishing increase in cross-border flows of goods, money, and people. Today, all three trends have begun to sharply decelerate: families are having fewer children than they did in the early postwar years, banks are not expanding their lending as they did before the global financial crisis, and countries are engaging in less cross-border trade. In an ideal world, political leaders would recognize this new reality and dial back their ambitions accordingly. Instead, many governments are still trying to push their economies to reach unrealistic growth targets. Their desperation is understandable, for few voters have accepted the new reality either. Indeed, many recent elections have punished establishment politicians for failing to do more, and some have brought to the fore populists who promise to bring back the good times. This growing disconnect between the political mood and the economic reality could prove dangerous. Anxious to please angry publics, a number of governments have launched radical policy experiments designed to revive economic growth and increase wages, or to at least spread the wealth more equitably-even though such plans are likely to fail, since they often rely on heavy spending that is liable to drive up deficits and spark inflation, leading to boom-and-bust swings. Even worse, some leaders are trying to use nationalism-by scapegoating foreigners or launching military adventures-to divert the public's attention from the economy altogether. Depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization need not hurt everyone; in fact, they will benefit certain classes of countries, companies, and people. To respond properly to these trends, governments need to plan for them and to manage public expectations. So far, however, few leaders have shown the ability-or even the inclination-to recognize the new economic reality. MORE OR LESS The emergence of the Three Ds represents an epochal reversal in the story of global development, which for decades prior to the Great Recession was a tale of more: more people, more borrowing, and more goods crossing borders. To understand why the plot took such an unexpected turn, it's helpful to consider the roots of each trend. Depopulation was already under way prior to the economic meltdown. During the postwar baby boom, the annual rate of growth in the global population of working-age people nearly doubled, from one percent in the mid-1950s to over two percent by 1980. This directly boosted economic growth, which is a simple function of how many people are joining the work force and how rapidly their productivity is increasing. By the 1980s, however, signs that the boom would fade had begun to appear, as women in many countries began to bear fewer children, in part because of the spread of contraception. As a result, the annual growth rate of the global working-age population started to fall in stages, with a sharp drop after 2005. By 2016, it had dropped all the way back to just one percent. In the United States, growth in the working-age population declined from 1.2 percent in the early years of this century to just 0.3 percent in 2016-the lowest rate since the UN began recording this statistic in 1951. The UN now predicts that worldwide, population growth rates will continue to decline through 2025 and beyond. Such long-term forecasts, which are based on a relatively simple combination of birth and death rates, have an excellent track record. And the economic implications of that trend are clear: every percentage point decline in working age population growth shaves an equally large chunk off the GDP growth rate. In the 1950s and 1960s, the baby boom provided a massive boost to the global economy, as did increases in productivity rooted in large measure in technological advances. As productivity growth slowed in the subsequent decades, however, easy money started to take its place as an economic spur. Beginning in the early 1980s, central banks began to win the war on inflation, which allowed them to lower interest rates dramatically. Until that point, borrowing and economic growth had moved in tandem, as is the norm in a capitalist system; for decades, global debt had grown in line with global GDP. But as falling interest rates lowered the cost of borrowing to near zero, debt surged from 100 percent of global GDP in the late 1980s to 300 percent by 2008. Although some of this borrowed money was wasted on speculation, much of it went to fuel business activity and economic growth. Then came the global financial crisis. Regulations issued in its wake limited the risks that U.S. and European banks could take both in their domestic markets and overseas. In 2008, global capital flows which are dominated by bank loans stood at 16 percent of global GDP. Today, those flows hover at around two percent of global GDP-back to where they were in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, many private borrowers and lenders have been paralyzed by "debt phobia," which has prevented new lending despite the fact that interest rates are at record lows. The only country where borrowing has continued to grow rapidly is China, which did not develop a fear of debt because it remained insulated from the financial crisis in 2008. But globally, since interest rates can hardly drop any further, a new debt boom is extremely unlikely. Globalization is not likely to revive quickly, either. The last time that cross-border flows of money and people slowed down was in 1914, at the onset of World War I. It took three decades for that decline to hit bottom, and then another three decades for flows to recover their prewar peaks. Then, in the early 1980s, many countries began to open their borders, and for the next three decades, the volume of cross border trade doubled, from the equivalent of 30 percent of global GDP in 1980 to 60 percent in 2008. For many countries, export industries were by far the fastest-growing sector, lifting the overall growth rate of the economy. In the wake of the recession, however, consumers have cut back on spending, and governments have started erecting barriers to goods and services from overseas. Since 2008, according to the Centre for Economic Policy Research's Global Trade Alert, the world's major economies have imposed more than 6,000 barriers to protect themselves from foreign competition, including "stealth" measures designed to dodge trade agreements. Partly as a result of such policies, international trade has fallen back to the equivalent of 55 percent of global GDP. This trend is likely to continue as populists opposed to globalization move to further restrict the movement of goods and people. Witness, for example, one of Trump's first moves in office: killing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-nation deal that was designed by Trump's predecessor to assure that American-style free-market rules would govern trade in Asia. WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL Depopulation, deleveraging, and deglobalization have become potent obstacles to growth and should prompt policymakers in countries at all levels of development to redefine economic success, lowering the threshold for what counts as strong annual GDP growth by a full percentage point or two. Poorer countries tend to grow faster, because they start from a lower base. In countries with average annual incomes of less than $5,000, such as Indonesia, a GDP growth rate of more than seven percent has historically been considered strong, but that number should come down to five percent. For countries with average annual incomes of between $5,000 and $15,000, such as China, four percent GDP growth should be considered relatively robust. For developed nations such as the United States, with average annual incomes above $25,000, anything over 1.5 percent should be seen as healthy. This is the new reality of economic success. Yet few, if any, leaders understand or accept it. Given the constraints imposed by the Three Ds, the economies of China, India, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and the United States are all growing at what should be considered healthy rates. Yet few citizens or policymakers in those countries seem satisfied with the status quo. In India, where the economy is now growing at a pace between five and six percent, according to independent estimates, elites still fantasize about hitting eight or nine percent and becoming the next China. The actual China, meanwhile, is still taking on ever more debt in an effort to keep its growth rate above six percent. And in the United States, Trump has talked of somehow getting the already fully developed U.S. economy to grow at four, five, or even six percent a year. Such rhetoric is creating an expectations gap. No region of the world is growing as fast as it was before 2008, and none should expect to. In 2007, at the peak of the pre-crisis boom, the economies of 65 countries including a number of large ones, such as Argentina, China, India, Nigeria, Russia, and Vietnam-grew at annual rates of seven percent or more. Today, just six economies are growing at that rate, and most of those are in small countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Laos. Yet the leaders of many emerging-market countries still see seven percent annual GDP growth as the benchmark for success. THE POPULIST MOMENT "What's wrong with ambition?" some might object. The answer is that pushing an economy to sustain speeds beyond its potential is like persistently gunning a car's engine: it may sound cool, but eventually the motor will burn out. And if buyers are promised a muscle car but find themselves stuck in a broken-down family sedan, they will turn on the dealer. In the last year, numerous leaders once considered rising stars, such as Mexico's Enrique Pefia Nieto and Italy's Matteo Renzi, have seen their approval ratings tumble and, in Renzi's case, have been forced out of office after their reform plans failed to deliver as promised. Normally, incumbent politicians enjoy an advantage on election day, but not during antiestablishment revolts, such as the one occurring now. In 2009, in the 50 most populous democracies, the governing party won 90 percent of elections at the national level. Since then, the success rate of ruling parties has fallen steadily, to just 40 percent last year. The beneficiaries of this shift have often been populist and nationalist leaders who have cast doubt on the central tenets of the liberal postwar order. Figures such as Trump, Prime Minister Theresa May in the United Kingdom, and the right-wing leader Marine Le Pen in France have encouraged people to question the so-called Washington consensus-that is, the belief that there is an intrinsic link between global free markets and rising prosperity-which was an article of faith in the United States and other Western countries for decades. Many of these same politicians promise more muscular leadership in the name of promoting their countries' interests, and publics have shown themselves to be increasingly open to such appeals. The World Values Survey polled citizens of 30 large countries in the late 1990s and then again in the first five years of the current decade, asking, among other things, whether "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" would be good for their country. In 25 of the surveyed countries, the share of people who said they would prefer authoritarian rule to democracy rose. The figure increased by 11 percentage points in the United States, 24 percentage points in Russia, and 26 points in India, where the number now stands at a stunning 70 percent. Even more striking, the decline in support for democracy was sharper among young people than among the old. Many leaders are responding to this shift by embracing protectionist policies and by intervening more aggressively in markets. One of the main reasons for British voters' surprising 2016 decision to leave the EU was a popular desire, whipped up by populists, to "retake control" of national borders and trade policy. Now the Washington consensus is under attack even in Washington. In the name enemies within is a trick as of his "America first" agenda, Trump begun publicly demanding that companies build with U.S.- sourced materials and threatening to change the tax code to explicitly favor exports over imports. This willingness to scrap postwar economic orthodoxy has extended into emerging markets as well. Although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was once a darling of the free-market crowd, he has recently begun to defy its preferences, most recently by deciding to withdraw 86 percent of the paper currency in circulation in India, virtually overnight, as a way to punish wealthy tax dodgers. Such policies stand little chance of accomplishing the larger goal: bringing back a period of broad prosperity. Indeed, populist experiments will likely do more harm than good, in part by threatening the victory in the war on inflation that governments won in the 1980s and have sustained ever since, as tighter central bank policies have combined with intensifying international competition to put a lid on prices. If countries pursue insular, protectionist policies, decreased foreign competition will likely remove that lid. Populist proposals to boost growth by increasing government spending could also push prices up, especially if the economy is already running close to full capacity, as it is in the United States right now. That is why expectations for U.S. inflation have risen markedly since Trump took office. Populist spending might indeed drive up growth for a year or so, but it would come at the expense of higher deficits and rising inflation. That would force central banks to raise interest rates faster than expected, triggering a downturn. Trumps call for significant new spending on roads and bridges has proved broadly popular, but the timing is all wrong. The U.S. economy is already in the eighth year of a recovery, which means the need for stimulus spending has passed. And the Trump plan would push the U.S. budget deficit, which is already at unprecedented levels, even higher. At this stage, Washington should be building a surplus-money it will need when the next recession inevitably hits. But the idea of saving for a rainy day seems quaint at a time when disgruntled voters are demanding an economic revival. The U.S. economy is already growing in line with its potential rate of 1.5 to two percent, yet most politicians seem to share the public's disappointment and eagerness for more. WINNERS AND LOSERS The slowdown in global flows of goods, money, and people has affected more than just national politics and policymaking: it has also rearranged the international balance of economic power. Before 2008, emerging economies sought to export their way to prosperity. But that model has become less effective as the competitive edge once enjoyed by major exporters, such as South Korea and Taiwan, has begun to shift to countries that can grow by selling to their own large domestic markets, such as Indonesia or Poland. At the same time, countries that got ahead by specializing in outsourced labor will probably see their advantage dwindle. India has seen cities such as Bangalore emerge as incubators of the country's rising middle class, spurred by opportunities at global outsourcing firms. The same goes for the Philippines, where call centers did not exist at the turn of the millennium but have exploded into a $22 billion industry employing more than one million people. As globalization retreats, however, outsourcing is likely to decline, and Trump's tax plans, designed to bring companies and jobs back to the United States, will accelerate this shift. Economic advantages are also moving away from big multinationals and toward smaller, domestically focused companies that rely less on exporting goods and importing or outsourcing labor. As borders tighten and it becomes harder to fill positions with foreign employees, workers in developed economies such as the United States will gain more bargaining power. For much of the postwar era, the share of U.S. national income that went to workers declined, in large part because many companies cut labor costs by shifting jobs abroad. Meanwhile, the share of national income going to corporate profits rose steadily, to a peak of ten percent in 2012. Since then, however, the corporate share has started to drop and the workers' share has begun inching up. Border restrictions and aggressive government intervention in markets are nonetheless likely to slow the global economy. Reduced competition tends to undermine productivity, one of the key drivers of growth. As leaders attempt to grab a greater share of the global pie for their countries, their combined efforts will wind up shrinking the pie itself.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Emerging Market Risk

Emerging markets are insulated against Fed rate hikes

The Economist, 7/7/22, “Are central banks in emerging markets now less of a slave to the Fed?” https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/07/07/are-central-banks-in-emerging-markets-now-less-of-a-slave-to-the-fed, mm

In America and Europe, central banks turned only recently from encouraging economic recovery to battling stubborn inflation. In some emerging markets this shift began much earlier. Brazil’s central bank raised interest rates by three-quarters of a percentage point back in March 2021, 15 months before the Federal Reserve did the same. It foresaw that fiscal stimulus in the rich world raised the risk of inflation, which would upset financial markets and complicate life for emerging economies. The governor of Russia’s central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, warned over a year ago that the prospect of sustained inflation was likelier “than perceived at first glance”. The pandemic had changed spending patterns, she pointed out. No one knew if the shift would last. But that very uncertainty was discouraging firms from investing to meet demand. These kinds of comments look prudent and prescient in hindsight. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, central banks in emerging markets have won increased respect in recent years. Their monetary-policy frameworks have improved, according to a new index (based on 225 criteria) developed by the IMF. Their frameworks are more coherent (their targets serve sensible objectives), transparent (they say what they are doing) and consistent (they do what they say). According to calculations by the World Bank, expectations of inflation in emerging markets in 2005-18 were about as well-anchored as they had been in rich countries in 1990-2004. Inflation also became less sensitive to falls in the exchange rate. Your columnist remembers a sign outside a café in the Malaysian state of Penang in 2015. “Don’t worry!” it said. “As our ringgit falls, coffee price remains the same.” More people expected emerging markets to succeed in their fight against inflation, which in turn made success more likely. This enhanced credibility raised enticing possibilities. Perhaps their central banks, like those in the rich world, would not need to worry about each depreciation and every inflation spike. If so, perhaps they could pay less slavish attention to two forces that had bedevilled them in the past: namely, the global price of capital, which is dictated by the Fed, and that of commodities. When the Fed tightens monetary policy, trouble has often followed for emerging markets. In 2013, for example, Ben Bernanke’s talk about reducing (or tapering) the pace of the Fed’s bond-buying sparked the “taper tantrum”, a big sell-off in Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. Things are different in the rich world. When the Fed tightens, central banks in Britain, the euro area and Japan do not feel obliged to raise interest rates. Their currencies may fall. But unless these depreciations look likely to raise inflation persistently above their targets, they are ignored. Likewise, when the price of oil goes up, so does the cost of living. Yet consumer prices need not go on rising, unless people demand higher wages in response, putting further upward pressure on prices in a self-reinforcing spiral. In both cases, central banks can ignore a one-time increase in prices. The more securely inflation expectations are anchored, the more leeway central banks enjoy. The past year has subjected emerging-market anchors to one severe test after another. Global interest rates have risen in anticipation of a faster pace of tightening in America, as the Fed wrestles with a credibility test of its own. And emerging markets have suffered remorseless increases in the prices of food and fuel, which make up more of their consumers’ shopping bills than they do in the rich world. According to the World Bank, food and energy account for over 60% of South Asia’s consumer-price index. Some central banks have been able to “look through” the rise in food and fuel prices. One example is Thailand’s central bank, which has done nothing even as inflation has surged. It insists that “medium-term inflation expectations remain anchored,” and it wants to make sure the economic recovery gains traction. But other emerging markets, including Mexico and Brazil, felt compelled to raise interest rates forcefully long before their economies fully recovered. They were quicker to respond than their counterparts in mature economies, point out Lucila Bonilla and Gabriel Sterne of Oxford Economics. But “that’s partly because they had to be.” Much of their tightening had to keep up with a worrying rise in inflation expectations. They have stayed ahead of the curve. But the curve has been brutally steep. The Fed has been a “somewhat less dominant” force in this emerging-market tightening cycle than in the past, note Andrew Tilton and his colleagues at Goldman Sachs. Fears of a second taper tantrum have not been realised. One reason may be that a lot of footloose foreign capital had already left during the pandemic. Moreover, some of the countries that might otherwise be vulnerable to Fed tightening, especially those in Latin America, are also big commodity exporters that have benefited from higher prices for their wares, point out Ms Bonilla and Mr Sterne.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Emerging Market Risk

Emerging market economies won’t buckle because of rate hikes – Fed analysis proves

J. Scott Davis, Michael Devereux, and Changhua Yu, 7/12/22, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Fed’s 1994 rate aggressiveness led to emerging-market turmoil; is this time different?” https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2022/0712, mm

As the Federal Reserve embarks on a monetary tightening cycle, only a few spots of vulnerability have appeared among emerging markets. Unlike in 1994, when U.S. policymakers’ aggressiveness roiled these markets—especially Mexico’s—the markets appear in a relatively safer place now. Current Fed monetary tightening is the most forceful in almost three decades. The federal funds target rate has increased by 1.5 percentage points over the past three meetings and is expected to rise a total 3.25 percentage points in 2022, according to the median projection from the Summary of Economic Projections released after the June Federal Open Market Committee meeting. This would be a quarter percentage point greater than the 3 percentage points of tightening between February 1994 and February 1995 (Chart 1). During the 1994 tightening cycle, the penultimate increase was a 75-basis-point (0.75 percentage points) move in November 1994, the Fed’s last 75-basis-point boost until June 15, 2022. The tightening cycle sparked the Mexican currency crisis in December 1994—nicknamed the “Tequila Crisis.” While domestic factors, including excessive debt build-up, political instability and an unsustainable exchange rate peg, made the economy especially vulnerable to external shocks, Fed interest rate increases provided the final jolt. The Mexican real exchange rate (the value of the Mexican peso in terms of dollars, adjusted for the purchasing powers of the two currencies) peaked in January 1994 and gradually depreciated during 1994, losing about 8 percent of its value. The real exchange rate collapsed in December that year, dropping more than 40 percent of its value between November and March 1995 (Chart 2). The interest rate on the three-month Mexican treasury bill rose from around 10 percent in February 1994 to 14 percent in November. It skyrocketed to more than 70 percent by March 1995. This real-exchange-rate collapse and spiking local interest rates were tied to a collapse in foreign borrowing. The Mexican current account deficit—a measure of net capital inflows—had grown during the early 1990s, reaching nearly 6 percent of GDP by 1994. By the second quarter of 1995, Mexico was running a current account surplus, indicating that those foreign capital inflows had come to a halt (Chart 3). What explains this sudden collapse of the Mexican exchange rate and foreign borrowing in late 1994 in response to a Fed tightening cycle? And while the 1994 Fed began tightening in February, why did it only lead to a gradual exchange rate depreciation and a gradual interest rate increase through November, before the December collapse? In a recent article, we model a collapse in foreign borrowing in a small open economy in response to an increase in the foreign interest rate, and we describe policies that a central bank can implement to prevent it. For this, we rely on the model of an underborrowing equilibrium (from Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe 2021). In this underborrowing equilibrium model, a small open economy faces a borrowing constraint—its ability to borrow from abroad depends on the value of collateral. The economy faces a currency mismatch where borrowing is denominated in the foreign currency but at least some collateral is denominated in the domestic currency. Under a range of possible conditions, two equilibria can occur in a country with high external debt. This results from a circularity—high foreign borrowing leads to a strong exchange rate that supports high foreign borrowing (and conversely, a weakening exchange rate produces inadequate backing for such borrowing). In one equilibrium, foreign borrowing is high, leading to strong domestic consumption and a strong exchange rate, raising the value of collateral, loosening borrowing constraints and allowing still more foreign borrowing. In another equilibrium, foreign borrowing is low, leading to low domestic consumption and a weak exchange rate, reducing the value of domestic collateral, tightening borrowing constraints and reducing foreign borrowing. In this framework, even a modest increase in the U.S. interest rate can trigger a collapse in foreign borrowing in an emerging-market economy such as Mexico. As the U.S. interest rate increases, there will be a gradual reduction in Mexican capital inflows and the real exchange rate as investors find U.S. assets more attractive. This resembles the 8 percent depreciation in the Mexican real exchange rate between February and November 1994. There comes a point where the value of the exchange rate no longer supports the high borrowing/high consumption equilibrium. At that point, there is a collapse in foreign borrowing, or a “sudden stop,” as borrowing constraints bind. The economy must revert to the only equilibrium remaining, with low foreign borrowing, low consumption and a weak exchange rate. Of course, the Fed tightening cycle in 1994 didn’t trigger a sudden stop in all emerging-market economies. Two key factors explain why a collapse happened in Mexico and not elsewhere. The first factor is the economy’s level of external debt. Key to the existence of an underborrowing equilibrium is a high level of external debt. When an emerging-market economy’s level of external debt is high, continued foreign borrowing is only supported by a strong exchange rate that raises the value of domestic collateral. In this case, even a small increase in U.S. interest rates could upset that fragile equilibrium. Mexico had run high current account deficits of nearly 6 percent of GDP throughout the early 1990s, so by 1994, the economy had accumulated a sufficient stock of external debt. The second factor is central bank reserves. Central bank reserves are liquid foreign currency assets that a central bank can sell in a time of crisis to support the value of the currency and prevent a collapse. In 1994, Mexico’s central bank reserves were insufficient. If the rise in the U.S. interest rate leads to a fall in foreign inflows and exchange rate depreciation, the central bank can sell foreign assets and use the proceeds to buy domestic assets, offsetting the decline in foreign capital inflows. A sufficient amount of selling by the central bank will support the value of the exchange rate when U.S. interest rates are rising, ensuring that the exchange rate can still support the high borrowing/high consumption equilibrium. However, to sell foreign assets during a crisis, the central bank must own a stock of such assets before the crisis. Emerging markets must decide what reserve level is adequate to protect their currency against swings in foreign monetary policy. Pablo Guidotti, a former deputy finance minister in Argentina, came to a conclusion that was later popularized by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. In a 1999 speech, Greenspan summarized the rule stating “that countries should manage their external assets and liabilities in such a way that they are always able to live without new foreign borrowing for up to one year.” The Guidotti–Greenspan rule leads to a simple measure of a central bank’s reserve adequacy: foreign exchange reserves minus the sum of short-term foreign-currency-denominated external debt and the current account deficit. Banco de México entered 1994 with foreign exchange reserves of about 5 percent of GDP. At the time, the Mexican current account deficit was nearly 6 percent of GDP, meaning that the central bank did not have enough reserves to cover a year’s worth of new borrowing, much less service existing debts. Chart 4 presents reserve adequacy as well as its three components for the major emerging-market economies at the end of 2021. Reserve adequacy is negative only in Turkey and Argentina, with their low stock of reserves and high amounts of short-term foreign currency debt. Colombia and Chile have relatively high current account deficits but, at least for the time being, have a high stock of reserves and a relatively low stock of short-term foreign currency debt. Mexico is in a much different place than it was in 1994. It boasts a relatively high stock of reserves, a small current account deficit and a stock of short-term foreign currency debt that is among the lowest in the major emerging markets. This suggests that as the Fed tightens monetary policy and raises interest rates, many major emerging-market economies—notably including Mexico—are in a much safer place than they were in 1994, the last time the Fed was so aggressive.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Warming Impact

No warming impact.

O’Brien 19---Anthony Patrick O'Brien is a professor of economics at Lehigh University. He received his Ph. D. from the University of California, Berkeley, October 19th ("Your View by Lehigh professor: ‘Climate change is not going to kill us’", Morning Call, Available online at https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-climate-change-existential-threat-20191019-kdluxxt45vfdhkfavdppz2yjaa-story.html, Accessed 4-29-2021)

Do scientists agree with Zach? The federal government’s Fourth National Climate Assessment was released last November. Hundreds of scientists from 13 government agencies compiled the 1,500-page report. It finds no existential threat from climate change. Zach is likely to have a long life. The report concludes that by 2090, under a worst-case scenario, the U.S. economy will suffer $507 billion in annual losses from climate change. Sounds like a big number, but it’s less than 1% of gross domestic product in that year. To make the U.S. economy carbon free, Bernie Sanders has proposed spending $16 trillion, or more than 30 times the annual damage climate change is likely to cause. Some scientists take issue with the National Climate Assessment and argue that the cost of climate change will eventually run into the trillions of dollars. They could be right, but there are three reasons to question any long-range forecast of the climate (or the economy, or anything else): 1) the unavoidable imprecision in the models used; 2) the neglect of market adjustments; and 3) the neglect of technological change. First, if you’ll pardon a little geek speak, the world is nonlinear (straight-line projections don’t work) and stochastic (or uncertain). So assumptions about initial conditions and the estimated parameters of models matter a lot. Years ago, economist Paul Samuelson of MIT showed that in building nonlinear models of the business cycle, small changes in a model’s parameters would result in forecasts that the economy would either grow smoothly with mild recessions (great) or would experience increasingly severe recessions (uh-oh). Edward Lorenz, also of MIT, applied similar reasoning to climate models, concluding: “In view of the inevitable inaccuracy and incompleteness of weather observations, precise very long-range forecasting would seem to be non-existent.” These insights into the nature of nonlinear, stochastic models became the foundation for a branch of math called chaos theory. In short, there are good reasons that economists can’t accurately forecast when the next recession will begin and meteorologists can’t accurately forecast whether the coming winter will be snowy or dry. And the further in the future the forecast, the more skeptical you should be. Forecasts of conditions 70 years in the future? Whether rosy or gloomy, there’s no good reason to believe them. Models of climate change also ignore the role of the market adjustments that are already occurring. Consumers worried about climate change have been eating less beef, buying more products made from recycled materials, and buying more from companies that are operating in an environmentally friendly way. As always in a market system, companies are more than happy to adapt to changing consumer preferences. Finally, the National Climate Assessment and similar forecasts assume essentially no technological progress in energy efficiency, sequestering carbon or other ways of lessening climate change. No technological progress over 70 years in an area attracting as much research attention from business, government and universities as climate change does? Not likely.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › No Warming Impact

No impact to warming

Kerr 19 (Dr. Amber Kerr, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub. Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab. Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1. Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. (Amber, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” series of posts from scientists compiled by editor Scott Johnson, Climate Feedback, )

Scientists who reviewed IFLScience’s story found that it failed to provide sufficient context for this report—differentiating, for example, between speculative claims and descriptions of peer-reviewed research. In particular, the story’s headline (“New Report Warns ‘High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End’ Within 30 Years”) misrepresents the report as a likely projection rather than an exploration of an intrinsically unlikely worst case scenario. See all the scientists’ annotations in context. REVIEWERS’ OVERALL FEEDBACK These comments are the overall assessment of scientists on the article, they are substantiated by their knowledge in the field and by the content of the analysis in the annotations on the article. Amber Kerr, Researcher, Agricultural Sustainability Institute, University of California, Davis: The content of the IFLScience article is mostly an accurate representation of the contents of the Breakthrough report, but the article tends to gloss over important caveats and probabilities that are given in the report. The least accurate part of the IFLScience article is the headline, which is an outright misrepresentation of the report. The article title states that there is, overall, a “high probability” of human civilization coming to an end in 30 years. This is extremely misleading. What the Breakthrough report actually says is that, in the most unlikely, “long-tail” biophysical scenario where climate feedbacks are much more severe than we expect, THEN there is a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end. But the report authors explicitly state that this “high-end scenario” is beyond their capacity to model or to quantitatively estimate. Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research: The article uncritically reproduces claims from a recent report released by an Australian thinktank regarding the purported “end of human civilization” due to climate change over the next 30 years. While there is plenty of scientific evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society and to key global ecosystems, even these dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “annihilation of intelligent life,” as is claimed in the report. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: The report this article is based on describes a scenario which is unlikely, but several aspects of what is included in the report are likely to worsen in coming decades, such as the occurrence of deadly heatwaves. The conclusion of a high likelihood that human civilisation will end is false, although there is a great deal of evidence that there will be many damaging consequences to continued global warming over the coming decades. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: I don’t think it’s so easy to discount the essential warning of this report. However, it would have been stronger if the authors were more careful not to mention the unsupported concept of near-term human extinction, and the unsupported probabilistic claim that there is a “high likelihood” of their 2050 scenario which includes the collapse of civilization. I do not understand why non-scientist writers (neither report author is a scientist) feel a need to exaggerate sound scientific findings, when those findings are already quite alarming enough. I feel that humanity should undertake urgent climate action just as the report authors do, but I feel that misrepresenting the science is unhelpful and unnecessary. Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: This is a classic case of a media article over-stating the conclusions and significance of a non-peer reviewed report that itself had already overstated (and indeed misrepresented) peer-reviewed science – some of which was already somewhat controversial. It appears that there was not a thorough independent check of the credibility of the message. Notes: [1] See the rating guidelines used for article evaluations. [2] Each evaluation is independent. Scientists’ comments are all published at the same time. ANNOTATIONS The statements quoted below are from the article; comments are from the reviewers (and are lightly edited for clarity). New Report Warns “High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End” Within 30 Years Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: The headline overstates the conclusions of the report (which is already overdoing things). The reports says it presents a scenario, and under that scenario and all the assumptions within it, the report claims that there is a “high likelihood of human civilization coming to and end” – but even then, the report itself does not give the end of civilisation within 30 years. The process supposedly leading ultimately to collapse begins around 2050 but takes a long time to take effect. Also the processes themselves are not well-grounded in science, as they over-interpret published work. A new report has warned there’s an existential risk to humanity from the climate crisis within the coming decades, and a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’ over the next three decades unless urgent action is taken. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: This is hyperbole. The scenario constructed in this report does not have a “high likelihood” of occurring in part because it requires a confluence of circumstances coming together. While it’s certainly true that climate change will be damaging to society and the environment and many of the consequences will be severe this does not equate to a high likelihood of civilisation coming to an end. Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: The “report” is not a peer-reviewed scientific paper. It’s from some sort of “think tank” who can basically write what they like. The report itself misunderstands / misrepresents science, and does not provide traceable links to the science it is based on so it cannot easily be checked (although someone familiar with the literature can work it out, and hence see where the report’s conclusions are ramped-up from the original research). This requires us to work towards avoiding catastrophic possibilities rather than looking at probabilities, as learning from mistakes is not an option when it comes to existential risks. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: The report focuses on possible scenarios very much on the extreme end of what could happen but then claims there’s a “high likelihood” of human civilisation ending. These two statements don’t fit together. With that in mind, they propose a plausible and terrifying “2050 scenario” whereby humanity could face irreversible collapse in just three decades. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: Not to downplay the seriousness of what humanity is facing, but the report in fact doesn’t make this claim. While scientists do expect many of the changes to the Earth system due to global heating to be “irreversible,” and while this should be extremely concerning to any reasonable person, it is different than “irreversible human collapse” which, if you think about it, needs unpacking. Their analysis calculates the existential climate-related security risk to Earth through a scenario set 30 years into the future. Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: No, the report’s authors have merely read (or possibly seen without actually reading) a few of the scariest papers they could find, misunderstood (or not read properly) at least one of them, and presented unjustified statements. posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity that may never be undone, either annihilating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential. Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research: As I climate scientist, I am unaware of any scientific research that suggests changes in Earth’s climate capable of “annihilating intelligent life” over the next 30 years. There is plenty of evidence that climate change will pose increasingly existential threats to the most vulnerable individuals in society; to low-lying coastal cities and island nations; to indigenous cultures and ways of life; and to numerous plant and animal species, and perhaps even entire ecosystems. Such consequences are well-supported by the existing evidence, are already starting to emerge in certain regions, and should be of paramount concern. But even these very dire outcomes aren’t equivalent to the “end of human civilization,” as is claimed in the report. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050. However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation! A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive. Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” – they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave. North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models. Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1. It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error. 1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’. Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research: This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim). Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome? While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science. Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research: It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence. Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: So there is only a “high likelihood” in the scenario that the report’s authors have constructed here. They do not say that their scenario itself is “highly likely” (in fact they say it is a “sketch”) – so the headline of this article is not justified. The most recent IPCC report lays out a future if we limit global heating to 1.5°C instead of the Paris Agreement’s 2°C. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: The article doesn’t mention it, but it’s worth pointing out that the underlying report criticizes the IPCC for being too “reticent” and gives an erroneous example: it claims that mean global temperatures will accelerate beyond the IPCC’s projections since human greenhouse gas emissions are themselves accelerating. Emissions ARE accelerating exponentially, leading to exponential CO2 atmospheric fraction increase, but exponential growth in CO2 fraction leads to linearly increasing global mean temperature. By 2050 there’s a scientific consensus that we reached the tipping point for ice sheets in Greenland and the West Antarctic well before 2°C (3.6°F) of warming Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: This is somewhat unclear phrasing from the report. Although studies have shown it is possible that the threshold for the Greenland Ice Sheet tipping point may be lower than 2C global warming (relative to pre-industrial), there is not currently a scientific consensus that this is where the threshold is. It seems to authors’ scenario is that scientists living in 2050 have reached the consensus that the tipping point has been passed by that time, but that’s different – again it’s part of the scenario and does not support the “end of civilisation by 2050” headline.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › Renewables Fail

Green assets can’t solve warming.

Pistor ’21 (Katharina, Professor of Comparative Law at Columbia Law School. “The Myth of Green Capitalism.” Project Syndicate. 9/21/2021.

NEW YORK – Heat waves, floods, droughts, and wildfires are devastating communities around the world, and they will only grow more severe. While climate-change deniers remain powerful, the need for urgent action is now recognized well beyond activist circles. Governments, international organizations, and even business and finance are bowing to the inevitable – or so it seems. In fact, the world has wasted decades tinkering with carbon trading and “green” financial labeling schemes, and the current vogue is merely to devise fancy hedging strategies (“carbon offsets”) in defiance of the simple fact that humanity is sitting in the same boat. “Offsetting” may serve individual asset holders, but it will do little to avert the climate disaster that awaits us all. The private sector’s embrace of “green capitalism” appears to be yet another gimmick to avoid a real reckoning. If business and finance leaders were serious, they would recognize the need to change course drastically to ensure that this planet remains hospitable for all of humanity now and in the future. This is not about substituting brown assets for green ones, but about sharing the losses that brown capitalism has imposed on millions and ensuring a future even for the most vulnerable. The notion of green capitalism implies that the costs of addressing climate change are too high for governments to shoulder on their own, and that the private sector always has better answers. So, for advocates of green capitalism, public-private partnership will ensure that the transition from brown to green capitalism will be cost-neutral. Efficiently priced investments in new technologies supposedly will prevent humanity from stepping over into the abyss. But this sounds too good to be true, because it is. Capitalism’s DNA makes it unfit to cope with the fallout from climate change, which in no small part is the product of capitalism itself. The entire capitalist system is premised on the privatization of gains and the socialization of losses – not in any nefarious fashion, but with the blessing of the law. The law offers licenses to externalize the costs of despoiling the planet to anybody who is smart enough to establish a trust or corporate entity before generating pollution. It encourages the off-loading of accrued environmental liabilities through restructuring in bankruptcy. And it holds entire countries hostage to international rules that privilege the protection of foreign investors’ returns over their own people’s welfare. Several countries have already been sued by foreign companies under the Energy Charter Treaty for trying to curb their carbon dioxide emissions. Two-thirds of total emissions since the Industrial Revolution have come from just 90 corporations. Yet even if the managers of the world’s worst polluters were willing to pursue rapid decarbonization, their shareholders would resist. For decades, the gospel of shareholder value maximization has reigned supreme, and managers have known that if they deviate from the orthodoxy, they will be sued for violating their fiduciary duties. No wonder Big Business and Big Finance now advocate climate disclosures as a way out. The message is that shareholders, not managers, must spur the necessary behavioral change; solutions must be found through the price mechanism, not through science-based policies. Left unanswered is the question of why investors with an easy exit option and plenty of hedging opportunities should care about the disclosure of future harm to some companies in their portfolio. There is obviously a need for more drastic changes, such as carbon taxes, permanent moratoria on extracting natural resources, and so forth. These policies are often dismissed as mechanisms that would distort markets, and yet they idealize markets that don’t exist in the real world. After all, governments have lavishly subsidized fossil-fuel industries for decades, spending $5.5 trillion (both pre- and post-tax), or 6.8% of global GDP, in 2017. And should fossil-fuel companies ever run out of profits to offset these tax breaks, they can simply sell themselves to a more profitable company, thereby rewarding their shareholders for their loyalty. The script for these strategies has long been written in the law of mergers and acquisitions. 1 But the mother of all subsidies is the centuries-old process of legally encoding capital through property, corporate, trust, and bankruptcy law. It is law, not markets or firms, that protects the owners of capital assets even as they saddle others with enormous liabilities. Advocates of green capitalism are hoping to continue this game. That is why they are now lobbying governments to subsidize asset substitution, so that as the price of brown assets declines, the price of green ones will rise to compensate the asset holders. Again, this is what capitalism is all about. Whether it represents the best strategy for ensuring the planet’s habitability is an entirely different question. Instead of tackling such questions, governments and regulators have once again succumbed to the siren song of market-friendly mechanisms. The new consensus focuses on financial disclosure because that path promises change without having to deliver it. (It also happens to generate employment for entire industries of accountants, lawyers, and business consultants with powerful lobbying arms of their own.) Not surprisingly, the result has been a wave of greenwashing. The financial industry has happily poured trillions of dollars into green-labeled assets that turned out not to be green at all. According to a recent study, 71% of ESG-themed funds (supposedly reflecting environmental, social, or governance criteria) are negatively aligned with the goals of the Paris climate agreement. We are running out of time for such experiments. If greening the economy was really the goal, the first step would be to eliminate all direct subsidies and tax subsidies for brown capitalism and mandate a halt to carbon “proliferation.” Governments should also place a moratorium on shielding polluters, their owners, and investors from liability for environmental damages. Incidentally, these moves would also remove some of the worst market distortions around.

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Aff Answers › IMPACT ANSWERS › Renewables Fail

Renewables don’t solve warming.

Jeff Sparrow 11/4/21. Writer, editor, and broadcaster who works at the Centre for Advancing Journalism at the University of Melbourne. "Elites Won’t Save the Planet — We Need a Mass Movement". 11-4-2021. https://jacobinmag.com/2021/11/elites-fossil-fuel-delegates-cop26-conference-climate-crisis-mass-movement

Increasingly, mainstream commentators enthuse about the prospect of Big Business adopting new technologies to pull the planet back from a climate disaster. But Big Business isn’t going to save the world. A Question of Consumption The problem isn’t simply that corporations often lie, using environmental rhetoric to “greenwash” their images. It goes much deeper than that. Capitalism must grow. Its blind search for profit might bring disaster, but it will still sniff out opportunities for expansion, indifferent to experience or consequences. As a result, even measures that might alleviate the environmental crisis become immediately weaponized against the planet. For instance, the panels that produce solar electricity have improved at a remarkable rate, offering a tantalizing glimpse of a future powered by the sun’s limitless power. The advances made in renewables and associated technologies (such as battery storage) will play a huge role in any serious response to the environmental crisis. Yet researchers Richard York and Shannon Elizabeth Bell caution that capitalism has already undergone many previous energy transitions: from biofuels (such as wood) to coal, from coal to oil, from oil to natural gas, and now, potentially, from fossil fuels to renewables. They warn that no established energy source has undergone a sustained decline merely because a new one became available. More typically, rather than replacing the older source, the new source is immediately used to intensify growth and thus more overall energy use. In many cases, the addition of new sources has actually increased consumption of previous types of energy. The embrace of fossil fuels led, in relative terms, to a decline in biofuels. Yet, in absolute terms, the use of petroleum in logging trucks and mills greatly intensified deforestation and thus produced a net increase in the use of wood. Similarly, the rise of petroleum did not curtail trade in whale oil, but instead fostered a dramatic intensification of whaling — partly because whale ships became much more efficient, and partly because the industry developed new uses (such as in margarine) for its products. It remains to be seen whether renewables will have the same effect. The available figures show a significant shift to renewable energy in terms of new capacity, with investment in renewables outpacing fossil fuels. Yet, internationally, the percentage of renewable energy as a proportion of electricity and other energy has been very slow to change. Renewable energy consumption has increased — but overall energy consumption has increased far, far more. There’s no mystery as to why. In 1865, William Stanley Jevons published a book entitled The Coal Question. The titular query centered on Britain’s response to the rapid depletion of its coal stocks, with the book most remembered today because of Jevons’s rejection of claims that technologically driven energy efficiency would alleviate the shortage. “It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose,” he said, “that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth.” What he meant was that efficiency decreases price and thus encourages use, leading to a rebound that wipes out the supposed savings. The so-called Jevons Paradox has been demonstrated over and over again in the years since. A prosaic example involves refrigerators, with the improvements of new models corresponding not to a decline in the overall environmental impact of white goods, but rather fostering a huge boom in the industry, and so a massive total rise in both energy consumption and carbon dioxide output. Because capital must expand, technologies that, in the abstract, should reduce resource use become the basis for a reorganization that enables fresh accumulation. The first generation of computer users will remember the claim that screen use would make paper redundant — something that palpably failed to occur, as computerization provided fresh markets supplying home and office printers. Likewise, the invention of synthetic alternatives did not mean that natural fibers were no longer used — instead, their production massively expanded in parallel with the new options. Enthusiasts for “green capitalism” insist that, as economies mature, their “material footprint” — the measure of their environmental impact — declines. In the digital era, they say, technological progress decouples capitalist growth from ecological damage, allowing the system to expand safely into infinity. Yet while some individual economies have reduced their dependence on nonrenewable resources, they’ve generally done so by outsourcing dirty industries. As a meta-analysis of 179 studies between 1990 and 2019 put it, “no evidence for the needed kind of decoupling currently exists.” On the contrary, the materials used by the global economy passed 100 billion tonnes per year — a disturbing new record, and the exact opposite of “dematerialization.” “Not only is there no empirical evidence supporting the existence of a decoupling of economic growth from environmental pressures on anywhere near the scale needed to deal with environmental breakdown,” explained a major 2019 report for the European Environmental Bureau, “but also, and perhaps more importantly, such decoupling appears unlikely to happen in the future.” Think of electric vehicles (EVs) — a mode of transport far less destructive than internal-combustion engines. Like solar power, EVs will surely play an important role in a sustainable future. Under capitalism, however, they’ve been seized upon by the automotive industry to preserve and extend car culture. Rather than reducing waste and decoupling transportation from material inputs, the automotive companies see opportunities to renew old markets in Europe and North America, and to open fresh ones in places such as China. Their success in selling high-tech private vehicles will, accordingly, forestall sustainable options such as bicycles and public transport, push cities to maintain the wasteful infrastructure designed around cars, and foster a new and ruinous race for lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and other rare materials needed for batteries. Against Corporate Environmentalism If the tendency of capitalism to respond to a crisis with more capitalism gives the system its disastrous momentum, it also provides the capitalists themselves with insulation from the consequences of their actions. The intensified commodification resulting from each fresh calamity creates opportunities for those with disposable wealth to ensure that they and their loved ones remain more or less unaffected. The planet might be growing unbearably hot, but if you have the money, you can still live in air-conditioned comfort in a pleasant location. In the midst of mass extinctions, luxury eco-resorts and private zoos allow the well-to-do to gaze on tigers, orangutans, and elephants. That’s why, even a looming apocalypse will not, in and of itself, motivate them to change course. The technology to prevent climate change exists — and it’s getting better all the time. What we don’t have is a social system that allows us to use it. The failure of world leaders to deliver meaningful political outcomes at COP26 will give “green” entrepreneurs more room to posture as a meaningful alternative. In that context, it’s crucial for activists not to fall in behind corporate environmentalism, but rather to build an independent movement, one that prioritizes human need over capitalist logic.

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Aff Answers › LINK ANSWERS › Inflation Good Turn

Inflation won’t collapse the economy – even double-digit inflation can be absorbed

Gene Marks, 3/9/22, The Hill, “Why I’m not worried about inflation - and why you shouldn’t be either,” https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/597525-why-im-not-worried-about-inflation-and-why-you-shouldnt-be-either/, mm

Russia’s war with Ukraine. A 40-year high in both the consumer and producer price indexes. A spike in the price of critical raw materials, including nickel, aluminum, copper and lumber. A skyrocketing jump in the price of oil. Supply chain problems. Labor shortages. Excessive government spending. Exploding government debt. A $4 trillion increase in the nation’s money supply. All these factors (and others) are contributing to increased inflation. But am I worried? Not really. And you shouldn’t be either. Change happens. This has happened countless times before. We’ll adjust. Let me explain. I can adjust because, as a small business owner, I can and have increased my prices, as 68 percent of small businesses reportedly have, according to a recent report from the National Federation of Independent Businesses. My customers aren’t thrilled. But it’s not as if they’re not expecting it. That’s because they’re doing the same with their customers. My competitors are doing the same. Big brands are doing the same. It’s a market economy. And the market is shifting. So we shift with it. The economy doesn’t go away when prices go up. Things adjust. People spend differently. But they still spend. “When this happens, I get more rides,” my Uber driver said to me recently. “People would rather take an Uber than spend on gas for their car.” Another option for me, as a business owner, is cutting costs. And I’ll do that too. I’ll get an energy audit from my local utility company and more diligently monitor power usage in my office. I’ll cut back on travel where I can. I’ll buy products in bulk, comb through my overhead, limit discretionary spending and negotiate harder on contracts. And as countless other businesses are doing around the country, I’ll invest in more technologies that will get work done with fewer people. Like a Fortune 1,000 company, I’ll make these adjustments to maintain my profits. This is not hyperinflation, thank goodness. It’s just a good old-fashioned double-digit across the board price increase. The same kind of inflation Americans saw in the 1970s and 1920s and throughout the 19th century, and it’s the same inflation that millions of business owners from ancient Egypt to medieval Florence saw before that. But we’re not Venezuela. We’re the U.S., and the good news is that the U.S. economy is the largest in the world, and with that comes lots of buyers and sellers. People don’t go into caves when prices rise. They still buy and sell. That’s all fine for business owners like me. You may ask: But what if you’re not a business owner? What if you’re an employee or on a fixed income? Should you be worried about inflation? Not really. If you have a job – and I certainly hope you do – you’ll get cost of living increases. Why? Because employers like me don’t want to lose you in these times of tight labor. It’s not that we’re altruistic. It’s just that we understand that if we don’t pay you enough to keep up with inflation, you’ll look elsewhere. So, we will. Even so, you may decide to make a few extra bucks doing a side gig like my Uber driver. If so, then good for you. If you’re unable to work for health or other reasons or if you’re retired or on a fixed income, the government is mandated to pay your social security and Medicare at higher rates as the cost-of-living increases. Assuming you have a good financial adviser, your savings will also grow along with interest rates, which will rise this year. Will this be enough? Probably not. But when is it ever? Hopefully, you’ll do the same as me when it comes to expenses. Maybe you’ll spend less on frivolous things than before. Maybe you’ll wonder why you subscribe to so many streaming services (Is “Inventing Anna” really worth it?) or if it’s necessary to drive a gas-guzzling vehicle in lieu of a hybrid or electric one — or a bike. You’ll pay closer attention to your household expenses, your extracurricular expenditures (Really? A onesie for your Great Dane?) and your taxes. You’ll take more reasonable vacations and cook at home more often. (It’s still much cheaper than eating out, even with rising food prices.) You’ll be fine. You may even be happier. If you’re smart, you’ll also make sure your savings are keeping up with inflation. As I said earlier, as prices rise so will interest rates. That’s good news. You’ll make sure any excess cash is now in a savings account earning interest. You may also decide to (finally) meet with a financial planner and better invest your money like all those rich people always do. You may even invest in mutual funds that carry stock of those Fortune 1,000 companies that will do all of the above in order to keep their shareholders happy. (And they will, trust me, they will.) The media loves to report bad news, so you’ll inevitably read about the losers during this inflationary era. But there will be winners too. There will be people who profited and suffered thanks to the great and terrible decisions they made. There will be people who took unnecessary risks that paid off or didn’t. There will be people who were smart and people who were lazy and dumb. But those will be the exceptions, not the norm. Most of us will be paying more for the things we want, but we’ll be receiving more income too. It’s all relative. It’s just an adjustment. The price of a gallon of gas in 1950 was $0.27. So, whether you’re a business owner like me or not, please don’t worry so much about inflation. I’m not. It’s happened before, and it will happen again. Let’s just make sure that we’re smart about how we’re managing our money, that we’re paying attention to the economy and we’re watching our pennies. But then again, shouldn’t we always be doing that?

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Aff Answers › LINK ANSWERS › Inflation Good Turn

Inflation solves debt crisis and allows future economic recovery

Karl Smith 21 Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was formerly vice president for federal policy at the Tax Foundation and assistant professor of economics at the University of North Carolina, America Needs Higher, Longer-Lasting Inflation, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/america-needs-higher-longer-lasting-inflation/2021/10/11/af2728e4-2a86-11ec-b17d-985c186de338_story.html

Analysts are concerned that the rise in inflation may be persistent because they see hints of a broader, gentler rise in prices across a range of goods — and, crucially, in the wages of the workers who produce those products. This increase in both wages and prices can lead to the dreaded wage-price spiral. Yet because it is shared by both households and businesses, the pain is muted. Indeed, a higher rate of inflation, and correspondingly higher wage growth, could be a net positive for the economy. There are two main reasons. The first is debt dynamics. Higher rates of inflation make debt more expensive, but easier to manage. A permanent increase in inflation from 2% (its average over the last decade) to 4% would cause interest rates to rise by roughly 2% as well, as lenders sought to protect themselves from rising prices. Economists describe this as a rise in nominal rates, because the net return from lending — the real interest rate after accounting for inflation — remains the same. One way to see how this would play out is to consider the mortgage market. Higher nominal interest rates would mean a higher monthly payment for any given loan. That might seem to make houses even less affordable. But what’s been clear over the last two decades — and what economic theory predicts — is that housing prices in the most desirable urban areas are determined by the maximum mortgage an affluent urban family can afford. Buyers in those markets bid against each other for a relatively fixed stock of housing. Over the last decade, as nominal interest rates fell, families could afford to take out larger mortgages, and so maximum bids rose. Overall, buyers ended up with roughly the same monthly payment. Yet wage growth was also slow over the last decade. So those same families haven’t seen their mortgage payments decline as a fraction of their income at the same rates as previous generations did. They have less room to manage unforeseen expenses, making their financial future more uncertain. Modest increases in inflation and wages would reverse this whole process — that is, they would decrease mortgage sizes and maximum bids, thereby slowing the rise in home prices. Meanwhile rising wages would make those mortgages more affordable over time. The second reason to support higher inflation, and the resulting higher nominal interest rates, has less to do with homeowners than with Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell. Higher interest rates would give the Fed more room to cut interest rates in case of a downturn. When covid struck, the nominal interest rate the Fed controls was only 2%. That gave it very little room to stimulate the economy. Fortunately, in part because of the unusual nature of the recession, Congress did. The next recession, hopefully, will not be the result of a global pandemic. That means Congress is unlikely to provide the same level of support, and the Fed will have to do more to stimulate the economy. To do that, it needs higher nominal interest rates. Inflation — particularly when caused by sharp increases in a few products — is politically unpopular. A modest sustained increase in prices and wages, however, would create a more stable U.S. economy by improving debt dynamics and giving the Fed more flexibility. In an uncertain world, those two advantages make higher inflation more than worth it