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2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – K Turns Case – Root Cause

Monopoly capitalism and state capitulation to big business makes entrepreneurship and new innovation an impossible dream.

Derek Thompson 16. Staff writer at The Atlantic, October 2016. “America’s Monopoly Problem: How big business jammed the wheels of innovation”, The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/

In the past few decades, however, the economy has come to resemble something more like a stagnant pool. Entrepreneurship, as measured by the rate of new-business formation, has declined in each decade since the 1970s, and adults under 35 (a k a Millennials) are on track to be the least entrepreneurial generation on record. This decline in dynamism has coincided with the rise of extraordinarily large and profitable firms that look discomfortingly like the monopolies and oligopolies of the 19th century. American strip malls and yellow pages used to brim with new small businesses. But today, in a lot where several mom-and-pop shops might once have opened, Walmart spawns another superstore. In almost every sector of the economy—including manufacturing, construction, retail, and the entire service sector—the big companies are getting bigger. The share of all businesses that are new firms, meanwhile, has fallen by 50 percent since 1978. According to the Roosevelt Institute, a liberal think tank dedicated to advancing the ideals of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, “markets are now more concentrated and less competitive than at any point since the Gilded Age.” To comprehend the scope of corporate consolidation, imagine a day in the life of a typical American and ask: How long does it take for her to interact with a market that isn’t nearly monopolized? She wakes up to browse the internet, access to which is sold through a local monopoly. She stocks up on food at a superstore such as Walmart, which owns a quarter of the grocery market. If she gets indigestion, she might go to a pharmacy, likely owned by one of three companies controlling 99 percent of that market. If she’s stressed and wants to relax outside the shadow of an oligopoly, she’ll have to stay away from ebooks, music, and beer; two companies control more than half of all sales in each of these markets. There is no escape—literally. She can try boarding an airplane, but four corporations control 80 percent of the seats on domestic flights. Politicians from both parties publicly worship the solemn dignity of entrepreneurship and small businesses. But by the numbers, America has become the land of the big and the home of the consolidated. This is a problem. But it is not an accident. The bigness of business is a result of federal policy, which, in the past three decades, has deliberately made it easier for large companies to dominate their markets, provided that they keep prices down. After years of sluggish wage growth and low levels of entrepreneurship, some people are starting to worry that America’s biggest companies are growing at the expense of the economy, even if they offer consumers good deals. In the late 19th century, when the U.S. was beginning to develop into an industrial powerhouse, it was America’s first small-business owners—farmers—who initially pushed the government to intervene against trusts. They protested discriminatory shipping rates along rail lines, which were dominated by a handful of railroad magnates. Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 to break up the trusts and protect competitive markets, but it took decades for the law to serve this purpose. (In fact, in the 1890s, the railroads used the act’s language against their own workers, arguing that a labor-union strike amounted to an illegal “conspiracy to restrict trade.”) Several Supreme Court decisions ultimately stiffened U.S. antitrust law. Perhaps the most important decision came in 1911, when the Court ruled that Standard Oil Company of New Jersey’s ownership of nearly 90 percent of U.S. oil production violated the law. The early antitrust reformers warned that even beyond its effect on prices, economic power could buy influence in Congress. Monopolies don’t just dominate their own industries, Justice Louis Brandeis said in 1933; they monopolize political power as well, which allows them to protect their incumbency and stifle competition in myriad ways. The trust-busting ethos gathered momentum; President Roosevelt transformed the antitrust division of the Justice Department from a tiny office of just over a dozen lawyers to a muscular force of nearly 500.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – K Turns Case – Root Cause

Economic struggle and inequality under capitalism perpetuates populism.

Seren Selvin Korkmaz & Alphan Telek 17. Korkmaz is co-founder and executive director of the IstanPol Institute, an İstanbul-based independent think-tank, doctoral researcher at Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies, and former Fox Fellow at Yale University and Telek is a doctoral researcher in Sciences Po Paris, continues his doctoral studies in Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, and academy director of İstanbul Political Research Institute (İstanpol), 12-21-2017. “The origins of populism: bogus-democracy and capitalism”, OpenDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/origins-of-populism-bogus-democracy-and-capital/

However; the reason for populism is not confined to identity politics and the politicians who exploit it. Another important cause is the capitalism which creates severe inequalities and insecurities which are reflected in everyday life. Rent-seeking barons who dominate the economic and political areas benefit from profits; but the burden of the loss is carried by ordinary people. Each person carries this burden of financial and political crisis in their everyday lives. Although there is some amelioration after crises, the continuity of systemic crises, the never-ending passion for rent-seeking and the remorseless commodification of basic resources have created and deepened poverty, resentment, frustration and exasperation in society – feelings that soon turn to anger. The commodification of basic needs and the expansionist notion of a rent-seeking capitalism as well as political inequalities within and across countries create both domestic and regional wars. Politicians and international institutions who are expected to prevent those wars either support the wars, or become incapable of preventing them. As a result of this, people have to leave their home countries and become refugees.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – K Turns Case – Root Cause

Capitalist exploitation, not automation, is the root cause of job insecurity.

Aaron Benanav 2/10. Assistant professor of sociology at Syracuse University, 2-10-2023. “Automation Isn’t the Cause of Unemployment — Capitalism Just Can’t Generate Enough Jobs”, Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/automation-unemployment-capitalism-jobs-post-scarcity-stagnation

Daniel Finn A number of left-wing theorists have put forward an action program based on the challenge of automation as they understand it to be. They rely in particular on the idea of a universal basic income, as you’ve alluded to before. What are your disagreements with that school of thought?

Aaron Benanav I think that the debate over basic income has been very important on the Left. It’s good for people to come up with new, big ideas about how to get to a world without poverty. The basic income idea is appealing because it represents such a new and interesting way to think about the question of how we get to a world where people are not going experience economic insecurity and poverty anymore. One of the main criticisms of basic income is that it’s very much a market-based, individual solution. The problems of insecurity that people experience are only partially to do with their inability to get money as individuals. They’re often connected instead to larger infrastructural questions such as access to public transportation or clean water and sanitation. There’s a whole range of problems that people face where the solutions they need are big and collective in nature. Those problems are difficult to solve just by giving people money and telling them to figure it out themselves. But that’s not exactly where the debate goes when it comes to automation, technological boosterism, and the role that UBI plays in that story, with the idea that basic income can be a highway toward a radically different, socialist future. That idea depends on the automation discourse being true. That discourse is telling us that we live in an era of incredible productivity growth due to technology. According to automation theorists, the problem we face is that we can produce more goods and services than ever before, but people don’t have jobs so they can’t earn money to buy all those goods and services. From that perspective, the problem that we face as a society is really a distributional one. Silicon Valley entrepreneurs have lots of money because they’ve invented a lot of cool products and technologies, and there’s no way as of yet to get that money into the hands of the masses of people who would buy the things that are being produced. In that regard, the left-wing current of the automation theorists come in and say: “We can get to socialism and do all of the things that the Left wants by rolling out a basic income and using that to respond to automation.” However, what the automation theorists say is just not true. The problems that we face are not merely distributional. They have to do with the organization of our production system and the way that the engine of economic growth has been breaking down. That engine was tied to industrialization and a continuous, incremental, and (over time) exponential growth of productivity. What we see in that context are massive struggles over distribution. There is a major effort on the part of business owners and governments to implement austerity programs, push down wages, and reduce the amount of income being distributed to workers as a way to keep the system going as it’s losing steam. That’s why I think that the UBI idea, particularly on the left wing of the automation discourse, just doesn’t represent a viable strategy for us. The facts about the world that it would have to be based on just aren’t an accurate depiction of what’s going on in the world economy today.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – Framework

Counterinterpretation—evaluate the 1AC as a discursive project, including its justifications, which matter for policy implementation and effects. Making the 1AC the focus of the debate instead of the plan is key to policymaking.

Markus Kornprobst 12. Professor, Chair of Political Science and International Relations at Vienna School of International Studies, 7-18-2012. “From Political Judgements to Public Justifications (and Vice Versa): How Communities Generate Reasons upon Which to Act,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 20(1) p. 1-2.

Agents travel down many different roads in establishing legitimacy for policies, politics and polities. A road they very often frequent is paved with explicit communicative exchanges about good reasons upon which to act. In this study, the name used for this road is public justification. In the literature, other names such as collective legitimization (Claude, 1966; Lewis, 2005), deliberative legitimacy (Bjola, 2005) or simply legitimization (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Hochstetler et al., 2000; Hurd, 2005; Steffek, 2003) are also frequently found.1 Public justifications are omnipresent in world politics. To give just a few examples taken from, respectively, realist, liberal, English School, constructivist and poststructuralist scholarship on the phenomenon: in order for international organizations to leave an impact, they have to give good reasons why they ought to be important in world politics (Claude, 1966; Niebuhr, 1950); civil society can leave a mark on global politics by making good reasons for change resonate with a broader state and non-state audience (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Price, 1995); international order gets reproduced through the justifications actors provide (Bull, 1995; Jaeger, 2008); economic policies are deeply shaped by the justifications that actors provide for their stances (Naylor, 2011; Zangl, 2008); and whether states go to war or not has a lot to do with how domestic contestations about justifying and dejustifying the resort to war play out (Levy, 2008; McDonald, 2010). Recent literature has firmly established that justifications matter for world politics. They make it possible for a community, such as a nation, to act (Jackson, 2006; Krebs and Jackson, 2007). Addressing the question of how communities generate these justifications, this article builds on this literature. Engaging with social and political theorists dealing with this phenomenon, it seeks to make three contributions. First, I elaborate on the concept of public justification. I define the concept broadly in terms of a community’s converging on compelling reasons upon which to act. Similarly to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), I caution that this is not to be equated with consensus ‘all the way down’.2 I contend that agreements in communities tend to be patchworks of different intensities and extents. Second, following leads provided by a heterogeneous group of scholars (Beiner, 1983; Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Elster, 1983: 88), I argue that it is political judgements — subsuming particulars under universals — that generate public justifications, and, vice versa, that these justifications shape judgements. In order to facilitate research on this link between judgements and justifications, I develop a three circuit map. The map elaborates on the linkages through which judgements generate justifications (perimeter and resonance circuits) and justifications affect judgements (resonance and structuration circuits). Third, borrowing from methodological writings in our discipline (Crawford, 2002: 119–130; George and Bennett, 2004: 67–72) and beyond (de Volo and Schatz, 2004; Marcus, 1998; Sacks, 1995), I tailor what I label a structured, focused communication analysis to inquiries into the makings of public justifications.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 1NC › 1NC – Capitalism Kritik

Vote negative to endorse socialist revolution. Only total overthrow and replacement of capitalism can solve.

Kieran Allen 17. Associate Professor of Sociology at University Dublin College, 2017. Marx: The Alternative to Capitalism, 2nd edition, Pluto Press, p. 157-158.

In one of his early writings, Marx declared that ‘without revolution, socialism cannot be made possible’.23 In the Communist Manifesto, he and Engels were even more forthright, declaring that ‘their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions’.24 A number of reasons were advanced for why revolution was necessary. The machinery of the state could not be used for this purpose because it had been shaped by the dominant class and their economic goals. Marx, therefore, argued that his purpose was not to ‘transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it’.25 While this point was made in relation to Continental powers and Marx held open the possibility of a parliamentary transition in the US and Britain, the ‘bureaucratic- military machine’ has now grown in all countries. Unlike the capitalist class, workers need direct political power to begin the process of liberating themselves. In 1789, the bourgeoisie of France carried out a radical overthrow of the old feudal regime, but after the upheavals of 1848 in Europe they became ever more fearful of the growing class of workers below them. They are aware that in revolutions the rabble gets insolent and lays hands on things. The bourgeois gentlemen therefore seek as far as possible to make the change from absolute to bourgeois monarchy without a revolution, in an amicable fashion.26 They learnt that sometimes aristocrats could be left in political control as long as they, the capitalists, had the freedom to make money. However, a similar separation of political and economic power was not possible for workers because, unlike both the bourgeois and the aristocracy, they are an exploited class. Uprooting a system of exploitation that is embedded in the very nature of commodity exchange, therefore, required direct political force. It was also only in the process of revolution that the mass of people learnt to clarify their own interests and develop a different understanding of their society. In normal times, the majority accept the legitimacy of their rulers and at least some of their ideas. This cannot be changed simply through preaching, teaching or good example. A new consciousness cannot emerge on a mass scale by workers ‘waking up’ and then passively following the teachings of their intellectual masters or clever television presenters. Experience of class struggle is the only way in which people can learn and, as Draper put it, ‘revolution speeded up the curriculum and enriched the course’.27 In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels summed up their views on how traditional ideas were changed: Alteration ... can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.28 Revolutions are neither accidental nor planned. They may start in the most unpredictable way, often with spontaneous mobilisations, but they arise from deeper contradictions in society. As Engels put it, ‘revolutions are not made deliberately and arbitrarily, but ... have been the necessary outcome of circumstances entirely independent of the will and leadership of particular parties and entire classes’.29 They develop from a general tumult in society that affects all social classes. Typically, the lower class does not suddenly embrace a vision of a bright new world, but rather fights for aspirations it considers just in the old world. It is only when society has reached a massive impasse that it adopts revolutionary methods to achieve these ‘moderate’ demands. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was fought, after all, over ‘land, bread and peace’.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 1NC › 1NC – Capitalism Kritik

Capitalism fuels a laundry list of impacts—catastrophic environmental degradation, war, and violent police states are all driven by the system.

William I. Robinson 14 Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 5-27-2014. “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism”, World Financial Review. https://worldfinancialreview.com/global-capitalism-crisis-humanity-specter-21st-century-fascism/

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into astructural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contradictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the structural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corporate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication in paper service and digital media, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction – to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction.

2023 ENDI Kritik
Capitalism Kritik › 1NC › 1NC – Capitalism Kritik

Basic income is the band-aid that legitimizes neoliberal capitalism and allows market priorities to continue unchallenged.

Tom McDowell 21 Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University, 2021. “Basic Income and the Legitimization Crisis of Neoliberalism”, Journal of Social Policy, p. 1-18.

Conclusion Contrary to popular belief, neoliberalism’s foundational thinkers were generally not opposed to helping people in need of income support; indeed, they believed there were both moral and practical imperatives for the state to do so. However, the raison d’etre of their entire theoretical project was to oppose modern forms of liberal democracy, which they claimed had been irreparably corrupted by the diseases of rationalism and collectivism. This theoretical commitment to opposing the welfare state and government coercion limits the practical options available to resolve neoliberalism’s legitimization crisis internal to its logical structure. A guaranteed, or basic income, however, could soften some of the impacts of the market’s contradictions, while at the same time stabilizing the hegemonic order. The fragmenting of the progressive neoliberal hegemonic bloc in the mid-2010s has created a moment of instability and transition that also provides opportunities for new ruling coalitions to form. Although the vacuum in this political crisis has been filled in some countries by the rise of an ‘illiberal’ form of right-wing authoritarianism, the case made in this article is that basic income is uniquely positioned as a policy around which a progressive neoliberal bloc based upon a redistributive, competitive logic could coalesce. As a policy issue that was advanced by seminal neoliberal thinkers, basic income holds the potential to raise living standards and well-being without deviating from most of the essential assumptions of the neoliberal orthodoxy. Although classical liberal arguments for basic income have largely ignored Marxist analytical categories, this article has made the case that Hayek and Friedman’s advocacy for basic income emerged from a recognition that the intensification of certain contradictions of the marketplace render external economic redistribution through the establishment of a wage floor necessary. A critical understanding of the historical contradictions that have brought about neoliberalism’s legitimization crisis, then, can help to explain why basic income, given its ability to address some of these specific issues, while at the same time securing and extending free market relations, has emerged as a popular policy response to rising inequality in recent years. It also holds the potential to bolster classical liberal accounts for a guaranteed income by demonstrating a practical benefit to fending off the forces of illiberalism, while preserving an order devoted to competitive market principles in an increasingly unstable political climate (Preiss, 2015). Since the state’s primary objective, from a Poulantzian perspective, is to re-establish equilibrium to consolidate the authority of the hegemonic system, it is probable that governments will continue to seek solutions to the present crisis by searching for new ruling coalitions to legitimize the neoliberal order. Although there are other policy approaches, such as the trend towards social impact bonds, that could arguably fulfill a redistributive function within a market-based framework, there are few policies that offer the potential to improve income security in a non-coercive manner. This paper claims that basic income may provide the ‘best possible shell’ for a revitalized progressive neoliberalism for the 2020s, offering stability to the existing order, and counterbalancing the consolidation of a right-wing authoritarian governing bloc. As Chrisp and Martinelli (2019) have noted, there are considerable practical challenges for basic income as a consensus issue, given that there exist significant differences between left and right factions about what such a scheme should look like. To satisfy the conditions necessary to stabilize the hegemonic order, any guaranteed income programme would have to meet two minimum conditions. First, it would have to be sufficiently generous, reliable, and accessible to resolve neoliberalism’s distribution problem by raising the income floor and providing additional security. If it is insufficiently funded, or not widely available to those who need it, it is unlikely to provide the income security necessary to meaningfully reduce discontent with material conditions under neoliberalism. Second, its conditions must be designed so that, in keeping with the essential logic advanced by the neoliberals themselves, the guaranteed income programme is non-coercive and does not interfere with market relations (Preiss, 2015). From the neo-Marxist perspective, the reconstitution of the centrist, neoliberal governing bloc (that generated the legitimization crisis of neoliberalism in the first place) paints a bleak outlook for the future. A basic income developed by and for a neoliberal environment, Clarke (2020) argues, is likely to bear the hallmarks of its “strategic imperatives” to promote an agenda that places primary emphasis on market competition and the profit margins of private capital (n.p). This could lead to the development of a ‘neoliberalized’ guaranteed income scheme that seeks to replace, rather than supplement, existing welfare supports. This would raise the possibility of the implementation of a permanent basic income scheme, which could lead to what Jäger and Zamora (2021) have termed “welfare without the welfare state” (n.p). Such concerns are well-founded. In the late 1960s, Friedman (1967) noted that one of the benefits of a guaranteed income scheme is that it weakened the foundations of the welfare state by making individuals less reliant upon it. He suggested that if the left-wing were to embrace such a programme, it “will find that it has bought a Trojan Horse”, since it will provide citizens with “reasoned alternatives to present programs that will permit a gradual withdrawal from them” (Friedman, 1967, 241). It is possible, and perhaps likely, that the establishment of a more redistributive neoliberalism based upon guaranteed income transfers would lead to the continued erosion of welfare state programmes and protections. However, as this article has claimed, in the absence of an organized, counterhegemonic movement on the left, the most likely outcome to neoliberalism’s unravelling hegemony is for it to undergo yet another mutation, transforming itself while remaining dominant. While it may be the case that there can be “no social policy detour” around the economic contradictions at the heart of the neoliberal policy paradigm, neoliberalism has proven adept at reconstituting itself to accommodate variegated and complex environments, making short-term concessions to ensure the consolidation of its hegemony (Clarke, 2020, n.p.). Basic income is uniquely positioned as a policy approach that corresponds sufficiently to both the political demands of the present moment, and to the essential logic of the neoliberal intellectual tradition, to temporarily stabilize the political order, while at the same time addressing the problem of rising inequality.

2023 ENDI Topicality
Topicality – Redistribution › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – AT Reasonability

They’re not reasonable—UBI is minimally redistributive.

Melissa S. Kearney and Magne Mogstad 19. Kearney is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and Director of the Aspen Economic Strategy Group and Mogstad is the Gary Becker Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago, 8-23-2019. “Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a Policy Response to Current Challenges”, Aspen Institute Economic Strategy Group. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/UBI-ESG-Memo-082319.pdf

First, on inequality and redistribution, a UBI is by design not ideal for redistributive purposes. For example, a UBI that paid $10,000 to every U.S. adult would cost about $2.5 trillion per year, well more than half the current federal annual budget. Furthermore, by giving money to everyone, there would be far fewer resources available to redistribute money and/or invest in the human capital of those with the most need. In calculations presented below, we show the practical trade-off between giving more money to a more targeted group of low-income individuals and less money to a more diffuse group including less needy individuals. We cite work by Hoynes and Rothstein ( 2019) documenting the loss of progressivity that would come from replacing our current system of transfer programs with a UBI. We further argue that programs that are universal do not accomplish as much in terms of generating social benefits as those that are targeted, citing evidence from examples such as child care and early childhood education programs.

2023 ENDI Topicality
Topicality – Redistribution › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – Ground

Existing tests of fiscal redistribution programs have focused on targeted transfer programs, not UBI. This kills our ability to find quality evidence against UBI compared to topical basic income affs.

World Bank 20. The World Bank, 2-4-2020. “Exploring Universal Basic Income: A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices”. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotection/publication/exploring-universal-basic-income-a-guide-to-navigating-concepts-evidence-and-practices)

Currently, no country has a UBI in place, although there have been (and still are) several small-scale pilots and a few larger-scale experiences. Only two countries—Mongolia and the Islamic Republic of Iran—had a national UBI in place for a short period of time. The large majority of UBI pilots are variants of targeted schemes. For example, the proposal by Felman et al. (2019) on a “quasi-universal basic rural income” for India is simply a variant of a traditional guaranteed minimum income program. There are systemwide questions—around financing, inflation, linkages to pensions, relationship to minimum wages, and the political economy—that pilots cannot fully answer. A UBI is a program to be delivered in cash, unconditionally, and to everyone. Its design features—all in cash, no conditions, and no targeting—challenge current practices to varying degrees.

2023 ENDI Topicality
Topicality – Redistribution › 2NC/1NR › 2NC/1NR – Case list/TVA

Our interpretation allows for any basic income program as long as eligibility is somehow connected to lower incomes. Basic income plans that target households based on factors correlated with low income and plans that use means-testing for eligibility are topical under our interpretation.

David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le 20. Coady heads the Expenditure Policy division in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Fiscal Affairs Department and Le is an IMF researcher with a Master of Public Policy degree focused on Economic and Data Analysis, 6-26-2020. “Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers”, IMF Working Papers.

The distinction between targeted and universal transfers relates to the former’s use of eligibility conditions (or “targeting” criteria) for receiving benefits. It is useful to distinguish between the following concepts: • Universal transfers. These are transfers that are available to everyone without any eligibility conditions (i.e., no targeting). For example, a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is typically defined as a uniform cash transfer, set at a level that covers basic needs, that every person is entitled to regardless of income or other conditions such as age, gender, or location.5 A transfer program under which every person gets a common (or uniform) transfer, not necessarily set to cover basic needs, is also an unconditional universal transfer. • Quasi-universal transfers. These are “categorical” transfers where eligibility is defined according to criteria that are typically viewed as being highly (although not perfectly) correlated with having low income.6 All households in a given “category” would receive a transfer regardless of income. For instance, households with children or elderly may be deemed more likely to be poor. Therefore, basing (“targeting”) eligibility for transfers on such criteria will result in poor households receiving a relatively high share of total transfers and thus have a bigger poverty impact compared to a universal transfer with the same transfer budget. • Means-tested transfers. These are benefits where eligibility is based on income (or “means”). This requires a capacity to define, measure and verify “means”. For instance, General Minimum Income (GMI) programs will typically base “means” on total household income and assets. The benefit for a household is then based on the gap between “means” and “needs”, where the latter reflects family composition and some concept of basic needs, and the transfer partially or fully closes this gap.

2023 ENDI Topicality
Topicality – Redistribution › 1NC › 1NC – Topicality – Redistribution

Violation—UBI results in the transfer of wealth from low- to high-income households.

Juan Carlos Conesa et al. 20. Professor in the Department of Economics at Stony Brook University, with Bo Li who is affiliated with Peking University’s School of Economics and Qian Li who works at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics’ Institute for Advanced Research and the Chinese Ministry of Education’s Key Laboratory for Mathematical Economics (SUFE), 1-30-2020. “Universal Basic Income and Progressive Consumption Taxes”, Stony Brook University. https://www.sunysb.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2020/UBI_Ctax_2001.pdf

In all these cases, capital shock falls with the exception of alternative 4, in which the elimination of income taxes encourages capital accumulation. All these policies stimulate labor supply, especially for the non-college group. There are two reasons for that. First, under the targeted transfer system of the benchmark these households receive an annual transfer as high as $4, 838, if they fall into the first quintile. However, UBI only pays them $2, 488 per year. This negative income effect drives low educated households to supply more labor. Second, since UBI is not income tested the distortion on labor supply at the bottom of the distribution is eliminated. In contrast, college educated households adjust their labor supply slightly, and in different directions depending on the different policy scenarios. Essentially, switching from targeted transfers to UBI results in a redistribution of income from low income households to high income ones. Non-college educated households experience substantial welfare losses in all policy alternatives (between 7.7 and 10.9 percent).6 College educated households also experience welfare losses in the first three cases. In contrast, eliminating income taxes while introducing substantially progressive consumption taxes generates the lowest welfare losses for non- college households and even some welfare gains for college households. However, these welfare gains are attributable to the elimination of income taxes rather than UBI per se.7

2023 ENDI Topicality
Topicality – Redistribution › 1NC › 1NC – Topicality – Redistribution

Interpretation—redistribution requires the transfer of wealth from high to low incomes.

André Decoster and Guy Van Camp 98. Decoster has a PhD in economics from KU Leuven. Van Camp works for KU Leuven’s Center for Economic Studies, December 1998. “The Unit of Analysis in Microsimulation Models for Personel Income Taxes: Fiscal Unit or Household?”, Center for Economic Studies Discussion Paper Series DPS 98.33. https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/eteceswps/ces9833.htm

If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: ΠRS = 2∫01 [LX-T(p) – LX(p)]dp (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and LX(p) = ∫0y xf(x)dx/μ 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and p = F(y) (3) LX-T(p) = ∫0y ( x-t(x))f(x)dx/μ(1 – t) 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 = p and p = F(y) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income (x) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income (x – t(x)), with: p: the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f(x): the density function of x F(x): the distribution function of x μ: mean income (pre tax) t(x): the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t: the average tax rate. Defining areas by: GX = 1 − 2∫01 LX(p)dp (5) CX-T = 1 − 2∫01 LX-T(p)dp (6) it is easily seen that the measure of redistribution ΠRS, can be rewritten as: ΠRS = GX – CX-T (7) where GX is of course the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and CX-T is the area between the diagonal and the concentration curve of post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income. The difference between the Lorenz curve of post-tax income, and the concentration curve of post-tax income is important, if there is reranking. Only in the absence of reranking, CX-T equals the Gini coefficient of the post-tax income distribution, and ΠRS can be interpreted as the reduction of the Gini coefficient.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: Bats BioD

Bats spread Ebola—turns the CP

Kupferschmidt, correspondent for Science magazine¸ 17 [Kai, 6-21-2017, “Bats really do harbor more dangerous viruses than other species”, , accessed 7-12-2023, AS]

Is there something special about bats? The question has been hotly debated among researchers studying the origins of deadly viruses. Marburg, Ebola, severe acute respiratory syndrome: They have all been linked to bats, leading some scientists to argue that something about the mysterious mammals makes them especially likely to harbor viruses dangerous to humans. "Bats are special," is their motto. But others argue that the bat order is very well-studied and very big—one in five mammalian species is a bat—biasing results. That debate may finally be over. A broad look at all viruses known to infect mammals suggests that bats are, indeed, more likely to carry unknown pathogens that can wreak havoc on humans. Surprisingly, the study comes from researchers who until now were bat doubters. "As a scientist, you accept the results of your own study—even if they prove you wrong!" says disease ecologist Peter Daszak of the EcoHealth Alliance in New York City, a senior author on the new study. Daszak's group started out trying to answer a broader question: Where should scientists concentrate efforts to find as-yet-unknown viruses threatening humanity? Most emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses, diseases that originate in animals, and some may have the potential to trigger massive epidemics. But there are thousands of species of mammals, potentially carrying hundreds of thousands of viruses—so where do you start? Daszak's colleague, ecologist Kevin Olival, collected information on all viruses known to infect mammals, 586 in total, found in 754 species. (Some viruses are known to infect only one species; others are found across a wide range of animals.) To correct for the fact that some animals have been studied more than others, the researchers counted the number of disease-related publications on each species. The researchers then calculated how many viruses they would expect to find in each species, if it were as well-studied as the animal with the most publications—the red fox. This gave them an estimate for the "viral richness" of every mammal species. They found several patterns in the data: For instance, large animals carry more viruses than small ones. And animals ranging over wide areas carry more viruses than species with confined habitats. In their next step, the scientists looked only at the 188 known zoonotic viruses, agents that have been found in humans and at least one other mammal. Even after accounting for factors that would increase zoonotic virus load—how closely the animal is related to humans or how much its habitat overlaps with cities, for example—bats host a significantly higher proportion of zoonoses than other mammals, the researchers report today in Nature. They estimate that there are about 17 zoonoses yet to be discovered in every bat species versus about 10 for rodent and primate species. Fabian Leendertz, an epidemiologist at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, says the paper offers strong evidence that bats are unique, but cautions that it is difficult to completely correct for the bias that comes from bats having been so widely and systematically studied. "What we need now is more real-world data showing how exactly infectious diseases spill over from animals to humans." The study is "important for anyone interested in zoonotic spillover events," says Linfa Wang, who heads the "bat pack," a research team in the Emerging Infectious Diseases Programme at the Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore. Wang has spent many years arguing whether bats are special with Daszak, and says it's exciting that the new paper comes from his group. Daszak, meanwhile, is gracious in defeat: "Linfa was right all along," he says. But that's no reason to fear or fight them, he adds. Bats have many useful roles, from pollinating flowers to controlling insects. And virus outbreaks are not inevitable as long as humans keep their distance. "These viruses will only emerge in people if we continue encroaching into bat habitat, hunting and eating them, and otherwise making contact with them," Daszak says. Just what makes bats special is still unclear; there are many competing hypotheses, from a primitive immune system to echolocation creating droplet clouds that help spread viruses. The next debate is about to take off.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: Bats BioD

Bats are key proponents for spreading deadly illnesses which could cause another pandemic that will result in societal collapse

Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, 21

[IACUC, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, 2021, “Zoonoses Bats”, ., accessed 7-12-2023, AS]

Bats (order Chiroptera) are reservoirs for many infectious agents, including parasites, bacteria, viruses, and fungi. The epidemiology of infectious disease in bats is not well understood but it is known that bats can transmit numerous infectious agents and provide a reservoir for emerging pathogens. The primary zoonotic diseases associated with North American bats are rabies, histoplasmosis, salmonellosis, yersiniosis and external parasites. Imported bats can also carry a number of zoonotic viruses including nipah virus, hendra virus, ebola virus, SARS coronavirus and others, which can cause severe & fatal illness in humans and other animals. All live bats entering the U.S. require an import permit from the CDC and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services and must be quarantined under elevated biosafety conditions. Long-term closed captive bat colonies which have passed quarantine require less stringent biosafety conditions. Rabies is a fatal viral infection that can be transmitted by bites, scratches and mucus membrane exposure from an infected animal. Bats, humans and other mammals acquire the rabies virus through direct contact, bites or scratches from other infected animals and rarely via inhalation of infected bat guano (fecal material) in bat roosts or caves. Bats will develop symptoms and die once infected but may shed the rabies virus for a period before any symptoms are apparent. The clinical symptoms are depression, anorexia with possible neurological symptoms and unusual behavior. No vaccine or treatment is available for bats. Persons working with bats require rabies vaccination and routine assessment of their rabies titer. They should wear protective clothing and thick protective gloves when handling bats to prevent exposure. If a person is bitten or scratched by a suspect bat, the animal should be euthanized and tested for rabies. Persons with exposure to rabies must seek post-exposure rabies prophylaxis from a medical professional immediately. Salmonellosis and yersiniosis are bacterial diseases acquired by contact and ingestion of fecal material from infected animals. Salmonellosis symptoms in people include diarrhea, vomiting, and abdominal cramps. Symptoms of yersiniosis in people can include high fever and chills, headache, malaise, and swollen lymph nodes. Histoplasmosis, cryptococcosis and blastomycosis are fungal infections that occasionally infect bats and can be present in bat guano. Animals infected with these bacterial and fungal diseases typically have diarrhea, but some animals may show no symptoms of disease. Symptoms of these fungal diseases in people include fever, cough, etc. and might develop to more serious illness in those with weakened immune systems.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: Birds BioD

Birds are carriers of foodborne illnesses that threaten our food supply

Clark, U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and Rice, Food Laboratory Division, New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, 14 [Larry and Daniel, 2-21-2014, “The Produce Containment Issue”, 139-183, Science Direct, accessed 7-12-2023, AS]

Wild birds are capable of pathogen carriage, acting as reservoirs, and becoming infected with a wide variety of pathogens, some of which are zoonoses. This review focuses on the avian species and pathogens that represent the greatest likelihood to be of concern at the agricultural production and processing level. Risk was assessed using information derived from urban human health, water quality, poultry, livestock production, wildlife health, and the veterinary literature. Despite the lack of direct evidence available relating to birds and the risks to farm-side production and processing of produce, it appears there is ample evidence to support the notion that birds can pose a human health risk by serving as a source of contamination of produce and crops. The most significant factor posed by birds is fecal contamination of water, which is subsequently used for irrigation or processing produce or fruits. Other important risk factors for contamination of field and fruit crops is proximity to landfills and wastewater treatment facilities. Mitigation measures, such as exclusion or hazing, can be reasonably applied if the resource attractive to birds is spatially localized. However, mitigation becomes more problematic from a cost and logistical perspective across large landscapes. The list of zoonotic pathogens that have the potential to infect humans through a fresh produce vehicle is extensive. The following zoonotic pathogens have been reported to be carried by one or more species of wildlife and have the potential to be transmitted to humans through fresh produce: Viruses – Hepatitis E; Bacteria – Campylobacter spp., Salmonella enterica, pathogenic E. coli, Listeria monocytogenes, Yersinia enterocolitica, and Arcobacter spp.; Protozoa – Cryptosporidium parvum, Giardia spp., and Toxoplasma gondii; and Helminthes – the nematodes Ascaris suum, Toxocara canis and cati, Tosascaris leonine, Lagochilascaris minor, and both Angiostrongylus catonensis and costaricensis, and the trematodes Fasciola hepatica and gigantica and Fasciolopsis buski. Many of these organisms are rarely associated with human illness; however, several are among those currently listed as the most significant emerging foodborne pathogens. Establishing the role that wildlife and feral domestic animals play in produce-borne human illness is very difficult, as evidenced by the number of outbreak investigations that imply involvement of wildlife in spite of a lack of conclusive evidence that this has indeed occurred. Almost certainly, some human illnesses with zoonotic pathogens are directly linked to wild animals; however, the frequency with which this occurs is unknown.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › Generic Bio-D Defense

No extinction from biodiversity loss, and intervening actors solve.

Kareiva & Carranza 18, * Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability and Chair, Doctorate, in the Environmental Science and Engineering program; **PhD Student at University of California, Riverside. (Peter, Valerie, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back”, Futures, 102, pg. 39-50, doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2018.01.001)

While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species number declines locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al 2017; Vellend et al., 2013). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

What about the remaining eight planetary boundaries? Stratospheric ozone depletion is one—but thanks to the Montreal Protocol ozone depletion is being reversed (Hand, 2016). Disruptions of the nitrogen cycle and of the phosphorous cycle have also been proposed as representing potential planetary boundaries (one boundary for nitrogen and one boundary for phosphorous). There are compelling data linking excesses in these nutrients to environmental damage. For example, over-application of fertilizer in Midwestern USA has led to dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, excessive nitrogen has polluted groundwater in California to such an extent that it is unsuitable for drinking and some rural communities are forced to drink bottled water. However, these impacts are local. At the same time that there is too much N loading in the US, there is a need for more N in Africa as a way of increasing agricultural yields (Mueller et al., 2012). While the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles clearly perturb local ecosystems, end-of-the-world scenarios seem a bit far-fetched.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › Generic Bio-D Defense

No impact to bio-diversity loss—their ev is bad science

Jeremy HANCE 13, senior writer for Mongabay.com, one of the leading sites on the Web covering tropical forests and biodiversity, Citing research by Barry Brook, Professor at the University of Adelaide, Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute [March 5, 2013, “Warnings of global ecological tipping points may be overstated,” http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0305-hance-tipping-points.html#r2IbUBDMyux2eU7i.99]

There's little evidence that the Earth is nearing a global ecological tipping point, according to a new Trends in Ecology and Evolution paper that is bound to be controversial. The authors argue that despite numerous warnings that the Earth is headed toward an ecological tipping point due to environmental stressors, such as habitat loss or climate change, it's unlikely this will occur anytime soon—at least not on land. The paper comes with a number of caveats, including that a global tipping point could occur in marine ecosystems due to ocean acidification from burning fossil fuels. In addition, regional tipping points, such as the Arctic ice melt or the Amazon rainforest drying out, are still of great concern. "When others have said that a planetary critical transition is possible/likely, they've done so without any underlying model (or past/present examples, apart from catastrophic drivers like asteroid strikes)," lead author Barry Brook and Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide told mongabay.com. "It’s just speculation and we’ve argued [...] that this conjecture is not logically grounded. No one has found the opposite of what we suggested—they’ve just proposed it." According to Brook and his team, a truly global tipping point must include an impact large enough to spread across the entire world, hitting various continents, in addition to causing some uniform response. "These criteria, however, are very unlikely to be met in the real world," says Brook. The idea of such a tipping point comes from ecological research, which has shown that some ecosystems will flip to a new state after becoming heavily degraded. But Brook and his team say that tipping points in individual ecosystems should not be conflated with impacts across the Earth as a whole. Even climate change, which some scientists might consider the ultimate tipping point, does not fit the bill, according to the paper. Impacts from climate change, while global, will not be uniform and hence not a "tipping point" as such. "Local and regional ecosystems vary considerably in their responses to climate change, and their regime shifts are therefore likely to vary considerably across the terrestrial biosphere," the authors write. Barry adds that, "from a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points." The paper further argues that biodiversity loss on land may not have the large-scale impacts that some ecologists argue, since invasive species could potentially take the role of vanishing ones. "So we can lose the unique evolutionary history (bad, from an intrinsic viewpoint) but not necessarily the role they impart in terms of ecosystem stability or provision of services," explains Brook. The controversial argument goes against many scientists' view that decreased biodiversity will ultimately lessen ecological services, such as pollination, water purification, and carbon sequestration.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: Econ DA Net Benefit

Nuclear reactor operating cost and construction cost is highly expensive

Office of Nuclear Energy 2021

[3-29-2021, Office of Nuclear Energy, “Advantages and Challenges of Nuclear Energy”, , accessed 7-9-2023, AS]

USED FUEL TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL Many people view used fuel as a growing problem and are apprehensive about its transportation, storage, and disposal. DOE is responsible for the eventual disposal and associated transport of all commercial used fuel, which is currently securely stored at 76 reactor or storage sites in 34 states. For the foreseeable future, this fuel can safely remain at these facilities until a permanent disposal solution is determined by Congress. DOE is currently evaluating nuclear power plant sites and nearby transportation infrastructure to support the eventual transport of used fuel away from these sites. It is also developing new, specially designed railcars to support large-scale transport of used fuel in the future. CONSTRUCTING NEW POWER PLANTS Building a nuclear power plant can be discouraging for stakeholders. Conventional reactor designs are considered multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects. High capital costs, licensing and regulation approvals, coupled with long lead times and construction delays, have also deterred public interest. DOE is rebuilding its nuclear workforce by supporting the construction of two new reactors at Plant Vogtle in Waynesboro, Georgia. The units are the first new reactors to begin construction in the United States in more than 30 years. The expansion project will support up to 9,000 workers at peak construction and create 800 permanent jobs at the facility when the new units begin operation in 2023. DOE is also supporting the development of smaller reactor designs, such as microreactors and small modular reactors, that will offer even more flexibility in size and power capacity to the customer. These factory-built systems are expected to dramatically reduce construction timelines and will make nuclear more affordable to build and operate. HIGH OPERATING COSTS Challenging market conditions have left the nuclear industry struggling to compete. DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is working to overcome these economic challenges by modernizing plant systems to reduce operation and maintenance costs, while improving performance. In addition to its materials research that supports the long-term operation of the nation’s fleet of reactors, the program is also looking to diversify plant products through non-electric applications such as water desalination and hydrogen production. To further improve operating costs. DOE is also working with industry to develop new fuels and cladding known as accident tolerant fuels. These new fuels could increase plant performance, allowing for longer response times and will produce less waste. Accident tolerant fuels could gain widespread use by 2025.

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: Set Col !

Reject settler colonialism as a structural analytic---forecloses an analysis of dynamic and contingent relations that elide the binary.

Manu Vimalassery 16, Assistant Professor of American Studies at Barnard College, Juliana Pegues, Alyosha Goldstein, “On Colonial Unknowing”, Theory & Event, 19(4), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633283

The theorization of “settler colonialism” is indicative of these tensions. Activists and academics have increasingly taken up settler colonialism as an analytic to address the particular ways in which colonialism operates and persists in places such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as well as Israel/Palestine. To a considerable extent, much of the work that has recently become associated with settler colonial studies has already been underway in Native American and Indigenous studies, as well as other fields including ethnic studies and colonial discourse studies. Our contention is that the particular ways in which settler colonialism has assumed predominance as an analytic risks obscuring or eliding as much as it does to distinguish significant features of the present conjuncture.22 Indeed, we suggest that when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely the effects and enactments of colonial unknowing that we are theorizing in this introduction. Approaches to the analysis of settler colonialism, as isolated from imperialism and differential modes of racialization, are consequences of the institutionalization of this work as a distinct subfield, which is claimed and consolidated through analytic tendencies that foreclose or bracket out interconnections and relational possibilities. Settler colonial histories, conditions, practices, and logics of dispossession and power must necessarily be understood as relationally constituted to other modes of imperialism, racial capitalism, and historical formations of social difference. The key insights of settler colonial studies into the particularity of settlement as a manner of colonial power have also led to a tendency to focus on this distinction as constituting a discrete and modular form or ensemble of practices— such as Patrick Wolfe’s often cited contention that “settler colonialism destroys to replace”23—that can be applied across differences of geography or time. As such, settler colonialism appears as a self-contained type rather than a situatedly specific formation that is co-constituted with other forms and histories of colonialism, counter-claims, and relations of power. For instance, in the U.S. context, settler colonialism as a singular manner of colonialism entirely misses the ways in which the abduction and enslavement of Africans and their descendants was a colonial practice that, while changing in its intensities and modes of organization over time, was co-constitutive of colonialism as a project of settlement rather than a supplement that demonstrates the taking of land and labor as distinct endeavors. Wolfe’s description of settler colonialism as a structure, and not an event, has by now achieved the status of a truism in analyses of settler colonialism.24 Wolfe’s work has been crucial in bringing further attention to the fact that colonialism is an ongoing fact of life for indigenous peoples more than fifty years after the advent of the so-called era of decolonization. His scholarship insightfully underscored historical continuities in the shifting regimes and policies of settler states in relation to indigenous peoples, and challenged a certain produced ignorance about the “post” colonial character of societies like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.25 Yet drawing an absolute distinction between structure and event, and as a result, discarding a focus on the historicity of settler colonialism, neglects some of the ways Wolfe distinguishes between the binary terms structure/event in the service of further analysis. For example, Wolfe emphasizes how settler colonialism is a “complex social formation” with “structural complexity” that emerges through process.26 When taken up as a modular analytic that travels without regard to the specificities of location or social and material relations, a categorical event/structure binary banishes deeply engaged historical knowledge from the landscape, turning away from historical materialism, devolving into a scholastic debate over identities and standpoints that are reduced to structural essences and divorced from politics or contingency. Emphasizing structure over event also limits the analysis of settler colonialism itself into a descriptive typology, orienting our vision narrowly within the technical perspective of colonial power (in the white Commonwealth countries), away from geographies from below, such as a hemispheric perspective of the Americas, with their multiple and distinct modes of colonialism, thus replicating the conditions of unknowing.27 Foregrounding structure against event might also divert attention away from imperialism. This binary perpetuates taking what Lisa Lowe calls the “colonial divisions of humanity” as given. Situating this compartmentalization as a consequence of imperial formations calls attention to how, as Lowe writes, “The operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity—settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds—are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct now as yet concluded.”28 If the analytic project is reduced to naming and delimiting settler colonialism as a distinct structure of power that exists in specific places, primarily the settler peripheries of Anglo imperium, we lose focus on the Caribbean and the Americas as the grounds of modern imperialism, abdicating the hard-won horizon of anti-imperialism. An emphasis on structure over event is symptomatic of the stabilization of colonial unknowing through binaries and schematic modes of thought. As Wolfe writes, “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”29 However, Wolfe’s cartographic model is that of the frontier, in which “the primary social division was encompassed in the relation between natives and invaders.”30 The frontier is a linear model, a binary opposition between civilization and savagery, reflecting both a colonizing subjectivity and its state form. What socio-spatial imaginaries, and concomitant critical models, might become visible if we thought from other spatial forms, such as circles or spirals, spatial forms that are often more relevant to indigenous epistemologies than straight lines? If we remapped the colonial condition through circular or spiraling forms, what new insights might we gain on the decolonial imperative? For one, we might be able to better grasp colonial, racial, and imperial simultaneities, as well as positions that do not easily fit into a settler/native binary. As Wolfe writes, “Settler-colonists came to stay. In the main, they did not send their children back to British schools or retire ‘home’ before old age could spoil the illusion of their superhumanity. National independence did not entail their departure.”31 Moreover, to inflect these insights through the lens of negritude produces a considerably more complex set of possibilities, where the verbs come and stay do not carry any simple or easily recoverable trace of agency or consent.32 As Iyko Day writes, “the logic of antiblackness complicates a settler colonial binary framed around a central Indigenous/settler opposition.”33

2023 GDI Counterplan
2AC › AT: China REM Module

No risk of conflict – the US has shifted to domestic rare earth mining

Subin, reporter for CNBC, 2019 (Samantha, The new U.S. plan to rival China and end cornering of market in rare earth metals, 04-19-21, accessed 07-13-23, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/17/the-new-us-plan-to-rival-chinas-dominance-in-rare-earth-metals.html)-TL

The United States has made previous attempts to reemerge as a dominant player in a rare earths supply chain that is responsible for some of the most important materials involved in electric vehicle production, battery making, renewable energy systems and technology manufacturing. Under the Biden administration, the effort is receiving renewed focus, with massive investments planned in climate change technology and a hard line being taken on geopolitical rivalries and the national security threat posed by China.

In 2019, China was responsible for 80% of rare earths imports, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although exports fell last year in part due to Covid-19.