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2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Internal Links › No Spillover

No link and turn - cooperative federalism solves environmental problems

Ryan, Florida State University School of Law, Professor of Law, 2015 [Erin, 2015, Environment and Society, Chapter entitled “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within” in the book by Kalyani Robins, ed., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Edward Elgar, 2015), http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/environmental_federalisms_tug_of_war_within_ssrn_2.pdf, /MB]

B. The Tools of Cooperative Environmental Federalism. Interjurisdictional environmental problems cannot be managed exclusively at the local or national level, because they require governance capacity from the full spectrum of governance scale. 212 For that reason, cooperative environmental federalism models strive to partner the needed elements that tend to be superior at the federal level with elements that are usually superior at the state and local level, ideally through processes that empower each level to perform to their strengths.

Federally superior governance capacity often includes, inter alia: scientific, technical, and financial resources; the legal authority to enforce nationally uniform standards; the ability to appropriately scale regulation for large-scale public commons; and the ability to police spillover effects from one autonomously acting state to another. Elements of governance capacity that tend to be superior at the state and local level often include: detailed expertise about local environmental, geographic, economic, demographic, political, and cultural factors that bear on the needs and workability of regulatory proposals; locally situated enforcement personnel; the legal authority to regulate local land use and engage in comprehensive land use planning; and other police power-based legal authority to regulate beyond the more limited set of federally enumerated powers. (Of course, these generalizations bear exceptions.) Governance that skillfully partners complementary capacity across levels enhances the regulatory voice of each, harnessing synergy in a way that belies the old zero-sum federalism game.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Internal Links › No Spillover

No spillover to environmental federalism – there are multiple models of federalism at the same time

Ryan, Florida State University School of Law, Professor of Law, 2015 [Erin, 2015, Environment and Society, Chapter entitled “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within” in the book by Kalyani Robins, ed., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Edward Elgar, 2015), http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/environmental_federalisms_tug_of_war_within_ssrn_2.pdf, /MB]

One important lesson of environmental governance is that there is no one size to fit all regulatory needs, and different federalism values may take priority under different circumstances. For example, the CZMA, a federal statutory framework that enables multiple iterations of open bargaining between state executive actors toward the creation of corresponding state legislation, provides a good example of how to integrate state/federal and legislative/executive capacity where place-based local diversity is the most critical factor.287 A very different model is taken by the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating motor vehicle emissions, which enables states to follow either the federal or California standard—limiting the variability of regulation within the national market of automobile manufacturing while still enabling the benefits of regulatory competition. 288 This model enables effective dynamic interaction within a more centralized regime, in which the constraints of a national market are the most critical factor. 289

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Internal Links › Non-Unique

Federalism fails in today’s polarization

Parmet, Northeastern University's Center for Health Policy and Law, Co-Director, 22

(Wendy E., 11-19-22, Scientific American, “Fights between U.S. States and the National Government Are Endangering Public Health”, , Accessed 7-8-23, ED)

Federalism is not, of course, the only reason why the U.S. fares so poorly as compared to other wealthy nations on a wide range of health measures. But in today’s increasingly polarized political environment, legal doctrines that once supported the states’ ability to protect the health of their residents are diminishing the capacity of both our national and local governments to do so. Unless the courts stop enabling this political weaponization of federalism, our federalism will remain uncooperative. And deadly.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Links › AT: Uncoop Fism Good

Uncooperative federalism fails – creates inefficiencies, race to the bottom, and decreases the government’s ability to respond

Parmet, Northeastern University's Center for Health Policy and Law, Co-Director, 22

(Wendy E., 11-19-22, Scientific American, “Fights between U.S. States and the National Government Are Endangering Public Health”, , Accessed 7-8-23, ED)

Still, many Americans cling to the nostalgic notion that the protection of health belongs primarily to the states, territories and tribal jurisdictions. In the early months of the COVID pandemic, then-President Trump expressed that view, telling governors that they were going to call their “own shots.” That’s a sentiment that the conservative justices of the Supreme Court seemed to share last June when they limited EPA’s ability to address climate change and overturned Roe v. Wade.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Links › Federalism fails

Federalism fails and ripe with tensions now – Covid-19 proves

Kettl 20 LBJ School of Public Affairs @ UT Austin, Sid Richardson Professor [Donald F., 5-22-20 The American Society for Public Administration, “States Divided: The Implications of American Federalism for COVID-19”, , ccm]

The COVID-19 outbreak was, by any measure, one of the most challenging public policy problems in American history—and indeed one of the most complex that modern governments anywhere have faced. But amid the global challenges, the United States stands apart because of the highly devolved nature of its response. Although COVID-19 became a clearly national problem, the country did not meet it with a national response. Indeed, the Washington Post’s editorial board argued that creating a robust national testing system was “a uniquely federal responsibility,” a strategy that should have been “a Manhattan Project for the pandemic age.” Instead, President Trump “left the job to governors, and the nation is staggering under the consequences” (Washington Post 2020). For the success that the governors did have, the president took credit. He tweeted, “Remember this, every Governor who has sky high approval on their handling of the Coronavirus, and I am happy for them all, could in no way have gotten those numbers, or had that success, without me and the Federal Governments help. From Ventilators to Testing, we made it happen!”5

The nation’s strategy was built on a wobbly foundation, riven by great tensions of federal versus state power, and then with the states pulling in different directions. The state reactions, in turn, matched the different policy strategies of the states in many other policy areas as well. It is one thing to rely on “laboratories of democracy” to experiment with policy initiatives and determine which ones deserve wider adoption. But it is quite another for the nation’s response to a truly national problem to vary so greatly. The American response to COVID-19 underlines a growing truth about American public policy: The United States is a country with states moving in different directions, and these different directions have grave consequences for the well-being of Americans. The nation faced fundamental choices at the start of the pandemic: first, whether the federal government would lead on issues that were truly national in scope, but instead it pushed responsibility to the states; and then whether the states would seize the punctuation of the equilibrium to create a new governance regime, but instead they slid back into long-established and increasingly disparate patterns. At the core, this is the price of American federalism. The virus frames the question of whether that price is simply too high to pay when faced with the biggest policy challenges of the twenty-first century.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Links › Not Zero Sum

There is no trade off – federalism is not zero sum

Ryan, Florida State University School of Law, Professor of Law, 2015 [Erin, 2015, Environment and Society, Chapter entitled “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within” in the book by Kalyani Robins, ed., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Edward Elgar, 2015), http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/environmental_federalisms_tug_of_war_within_ssrn_2.pdf, /MB]

Heeding these lessons, well-crafted multiscalar governance belies the perverse presumption of zero-sum federalism, which assumes that the allocation of decision-making authority among levels and agents of government is always a zero-sum game.297 Defying the presumption that authority exercised by one is categorically removed from others, environmental governance has experimented with different ways of enhance authority among multiple agents simultaneously, through structured programs of consultation and exchange. This empirical assault on the mythos of zero-sum federalism warrants emphasis, drawing attention to what most American federalism actually looks like in practice, and how federalism in practice increasingly departs from the rhetoric of conventional federalism theory. 298

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: Links › Not Zero Sum

No link – federalism is balanced and not zero sum

Ryan, Florida State University School of Law, Professor of Law, 2015 [Erin, 2015, Environment and Society, Chapter entitled “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within” in the book by Kalyani Robins, ed., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Edward Elgar, 2015), http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/environmental_federalisms_tug_of_war_within_ssrn_2.pdf, /MB]

In so doing, Balanced Federalism demonstrates how well-crafted multiscalar governance deflates the pervasive presumption of “zero-sum federalism,” a misunderstanding of state-federal relations with roots in dual federalism that continues to haunt the American discourse. 82 Zero-sum conceptualizations of federalism assume that the state and federal governments are locked in an antagonistic, winner-takes-all competition for power, in which every victory by one side constitutes a loss for the other.83 While this is sometimes true,84 closer examination of federalism-sensitive governance reveals that the line between state and federal power is just as often a project of negotiation, through ongoing processes of consultation and coordination that can accrue to the advantage of both sides.85 Several authors in this book have highlighted the theory of negotiated federalism that is central to Balanced Federalism model as an essential step toward more rational environmental governance.86

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: UQ › Fism Thumper - Missouri

States like Missouri are more worried on other issues like education than tech

GT Editorial Staff, Media and research public-sector innovation for state and local government., ‘22

[GT Editorial Staff , 03/26/2022, Government Techonology, “State of the States 2022: How Much Tech Is on the Table?,” https://www.govtech.com/state-of-the-states-2022-how-much-tech-is-on-the-table, Accessed 07/12/2023, BS]

Missouri State of the State Address, Address date: Jan. 19, 2022, Stars: 0, To sum it up: Missouri Gov. Mike Parson didn’t mention any specific technology initiatives in his State of the State speech, but praised the state’s economy that held steady during the pandemic and the fact that 95 percent of schools continued to offer in-person learning all while Missouri citizens were getting vaccinated against COVID-19. More than 94 percent of Missourians over the age of 65 have been vaccinated and Parson called that one of the state’s great successes. Overall, nearly 75 percent of Missourians over the age of 18 have been vaccinated. Parson credited a tireless effort by agencies, including the Department of Health and Senior Services; the State Emergency Management Agency; the Missouri National Guard; the department of Public Safety; and countless health-care professionals. And even as the economy thrives and students get an in-person education, Parson said it’s not enough. Unemployment is at 3.5 percent, which is below what it was before the pandemic, Parson said. He added that the state must make lasting investments in continuing education programs to ensure that the next generations have jobs, and to that end, the governor is requesting $31 million for colleges and universities.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: UQ › Fism Thumper - Wyoming

States like Wyoming are more invested in other areas like research than tech

GT Editorial Staff, Media and research public-sector innovation for state and local government., ‘22

[GT Editorial Staff , 03/26/2022, Government Techonology, “State of the States 2022: How Much Tech Is on the Table?,” https://www.govtech.com/state-of-the-states-2022-how-much-tech-is-on-the-table, Accessed 07/12/2023, BS]

Wyoming State of the State Address, Address date: Feb. 14, 2022, Stars: 1, To sum it up: Gov. Mark Gordon touted Wyoming’s energy sector economy in his 2022 State of the State speech. He argued for simultaneously investing in the fossil fuel industry while looking at controlling its carbon emissions, and in renewable energy efforts. He said pursuing both traditional and alternative energy sources would balance climate change concerns with energy consumption demands and local economic needs.“We have a plethora of opportunities coming our way: carbon capture utilization and sequestration; bioenergy CCUs; hydrogen; better, cleaner ways to burn coal and other fossil fuels,” Gordon said. “Wyoming is leading the research on ways to keep our legacy industry viable and take up new ones as well.”Gordon decried federal efforts to cease issuing new permits for oil and gas drilling on public land, something President Biden pledged during his campaign, but has yet to achieve. Instead, the governor said “sensible development” and “innovations” could help achieve climate goals. Gordon also called for investing in transmission lines to deliver energy to other state customers and for budgeting $100 million for large-scale energy projects. Alongside continuing to develop the energy sector, Gordon said the state needs to diversify its economy. He mentioned rising new business activities, including making nods to “advanced nuclear,” “advanced manufacturing” and “digital assets.” He also called for raising salaries for state employees across a variety of job types to curb a trend in which workers are lured away to higher-paying employment by Wyoming’s counties and towns and neighboring states. Gordon did not name IT workers specifically, but salary-boosting could help address such workforce needs; other states often report that noncompetitive salaries lose them cyber and technology talent.

2023 GDI Counterplan
AFF Answers - Fism DA › AT: UQ › NonUnique

Federalism is outdated and unnecessary – Texas, vaccine distribution, climate change, and education all prove

Feldman 21.[Noah Feldman is a Bloomberg View columnist. He is a professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.) "Federalism shows its age." Seattle Times. https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/federalism-shows-its-age/. 2-24-2021. accessed 6-25-2021. ALS]

There wasn’t much President Joe Biden could have done about this month’s Texas energy disaster. Ditto the slow-moving vaccine rollout. The reason is the same: federalism, a system dating back to the 1780s and only seriously overhauled once. Although federalism still has some benefits, its obsolescence is increasingly obvious when the U.S. faces crises that, like climate change and COVID-19, don’t respect state boundaries. Energy and health care are only two of the crucial infrastructure systems that remain state-regulated or state-run. And many of those systems are in need of updating everywhere — not piecemeal, as federalism tends to support. Federalism was, in important ways, an American invention — the brainchild of James Madison. It was a product of political necessity for 13 states that had been separately administered as British colonies and that had already tried and failed to function as a loose confederation between 1776 and 1787. Unifying into a single nation would have been practical for the early United States. At the Philadelphia constitutional convention, big-state representatives, including Madison, favored a heavily national model of government to replace the failing decentralized system created by the Articles of Confederation. But local elites in the small states did not want to give up power. They staged a walkout, returning only once they were assured of permanent protections for their states, including equal representation in the Senate. The core idea of federalism was that states would retain sovereignty over their citizens, while the federal government would in parallel exercise its own sovereignty over the same people. The founders thus “split the atom of sovereignty,” as Justice Anthony Kennedy once grandly put it: Instead of a single sovereign government, the U.S. would have a federal semi-sovereign government operating alongside the semi-sovereign states. The devil was in the details. Which government controlled which powers became a challenge. The Civil War was fought in part over the question of whether states or the federal government would have control over the existence of slavery. Recognizably modern national regulatory legislation began to emerge gradually in the Progressive Era. In 1887, a century after the Philadelphia convention, the Interstate Commerce Commission was created by Congress to regulate railroads, the most important interstate infrastructure of the day. But it took the Great Depression and the resultant New Deal for Congress to pass vast national legislation and to create a raft of federal agencies to perform coordinating tasks that had previously been unthinkable. New Deal federalism was itself continuing the compromise between the federal government and the states. Core issues of national competency were moved to the federal level. Yet states retained a tremendous amount of regulatory capacity, including in areas that overlapped with federal regulatory control. Thus, to take the example of energy, both the federal government and the states regulate different aspects of the power grid. In this respect, today’s federalism isn’t radically different from the federalism of the New Deal. Texas actually made a conscious choice not to connect its power grid to that of other states, partly in order to retain state regulatory control. Under the Constitution as it has been interpreted since the New Deal, Congress would have the power to pass laws that impose regulatory controls even on in-state power grids. If Congress wanted to, it could enact laws empowering federal regulators to require state-based power plants to be capable of functioning even in very cold temperatures, thereby reducing the risk of the kind of temperature-based breakdowns that caused the recent Texas power disaster. Similarly, Congress has the authority to do much more than it does to control or regulate health care at the state level. Even a nationalized health-care system would be within the constitutional reach of Congress. Education is yet another area where states exercise near total authority, even though the issue is of obvious national importance. The problem, therefore, doesn’t lie in the Constitution, at least not primarily. It lies in the deeply established political norms and customs that still confer enormous power on states, even regarding national infrastructure problems that span state boundaries. Those customs and norms continue to shape the distribution of power and responsibility as between the states and the federal government. True, the constitutional design of the Senate, as well as the continued sovereign existence of the states, help shape the ongoing political reality. But as the New Deal federalism overhaul shows, those structural features of our federal system can be overcome when crisis demands it. Will the crises regarding climate change and COVID-19 generate support for overhauling federalism again? If failures continue to pile up over time, the public will demand change, and to meet that need, Congress and the president may see fit to regulate more extensively. As infrastructure in the United States continues to degrade, the need for such federal initiatives is likely to continue to grow. Until it does, the U.S. will remain stuck with the legacy of an 18th-century Constitution that, despite its many virtues, doesn’t always meet the needs of the moment.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Aff Answers – States CP › AT: Solvency › States – Carbon

States like California are already failing to capture carbon

Lopez, Graduate of San Francisco State University, Covering environmental policy issues., ‘22

[Nadia, June 3, 2022, Cal Matters, “Climate controversy: California’s plan for handling crisis is flawed, advisors say,” https://calmatters.org/environment/2022/06/california-climate-change-plan-flawed/, Accessed 07/12/2023, BS]

IN SUMMARY: California’s climate change plan fails to provide substantial evidence that capturing carbon will meet ambitious greenhouse gas goals, critics say. The plan “does California a disservice,” one state advisor said. As California races to prevent the irreversible effects of climate change, some experts are questioning key policies that the state is counting on to meet its ambitious goals and accusing state officials of failing to provide substantial details to back up its claims. The California Air Resources Board’s proposal, called a scoping plan, outlines policies that would transition the economy away from fossil fuels. The purpose of the plan is to fulfill state mandates to reduce planet-warming emissions 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2045. In this year’s highly-anticipated climate policy blueprint, some critics say the state agency has not been transparent on how it plans to achieve its goals. The process has left legislators and others at the forefront of the climate discussion confused over the air board staff’s projections.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Aff Answers – States CP › AT: Solvency › States – Food Tax

A state food tax would not benefit or help lower- middle income households

Konish, Personal finance reporter for CNBC, ‘22

[Lorie, 04/15/2022, CNBC, “As food prices soar, some states consider cutting taxes on groceries. But that may not be the best approach, research finds,” Accessed 07/02/2023, BS]

New government inflation data shows prices are surging in one key area – food. Now some states are looking at helping to reduce that burden on consumers by curbing their taxes on groceries.But such moves may not be the most beneficial to those who such policies aim to help – low-income taxpayers, according to a new report from the Tax Foundation. What’s more, the policies would only provide modest tax savings to the middle class, the report found. A better solution may be to provide a one-time credit of $75, for example, which could help the poorest households save 31% on their tax liability, the independent tax policy nonprofit found. “There are far better ways to help lower- and middle-income households, including grocery tax credits, than the grocery tax exemption,” said Jared Walczak, vice president of state projects at the Tax Foundation.Currently, 13 states impose levies on groceries.Seven states tax groceries at the level of the ordinary sales tax rate, including Alabama, Mississippi and South Dakota. The other four states — Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas and Oklahoma — also provide a credit or rebate to low-income households.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Aff Answers – States CP › AT: Solvency › State Taxation Fails

State progressive taxes have no effect on personal income growth

Chernick, Hunter College, Professor of Economics, 10

(Howard, 2010, SAGE, “Redistribution at the State and Local Level: Consequences for Economic Growth”, DOI: 10.1177/1091142110375694, Accessed 7-9-23, ED)

The first row of table 3 indicates that the progressivity of a state’s tax structure does not have a statistically significant effect on the rate of growth in personal income. The first 2 rows of table 4 show that neither high- nor low-income tax burdens separately affect economic growth. A variety of robustness tests are presented below.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Aff Answers – States CP › AT: Solvency › States Fail - Growth

Can’t solve growth – Fiscal Redistribution in states have had no effect on growth

Chernick, Hunter College, Professor of Economics, 10

(Howard, 2010, SAGE, “Redistribution at the State and Local Level: Consequences for Economic Growth”, DOI: 10.1177/1091142110375694, Accessed 7-9-23, ED)

Fiscal redistribution varies substantially across U.S. states, both on the tax and spending side. A compensating differential framework is used to show that greater redistribution will tend to increase the gross wage of skilled workers but that any increase could be offset by stronger preferences for redistribution. An increase in gross wages raises the cost of output in the more redistributive state, leading to a predicted decline in income and output. To test the model, five- and ten-year per capita and aggregate growth rates are estimated as a function of initial measures of tax and expenditure incidence. Data are a four-period panel of U.S. states from 1977 to 1995. Tax progressivity is measured both overall and for the income tax alone. Expenditure progressivity is measured by spending on welfare and higher education, and the state share of elementary and secondary education spending. Tax structure and welfare spending are instru- mented. State tax progressivity shows no effect on growth. Welfare spending has a negative effect on aggregate income growth but not on per capita income. Higher education spending is unrelated to growth. Fiscal spillovers within regions are asymmetric. Progressive taxation and more higher education spending by a state’s geographic neighbors have positive effects on own-state growth. The asymmetry in tax effects explains why interstate tax competition does not lead to geographic convergence in fiscal structures. The results suggest that interstate differences in fiscal redistri- bution are welfare enhancing in the Pareto sense.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Aff Answers – States CP › Perm › Perm Do Both

Perm works – Cooperative federalism works best in the health sector

Parmet, Northeastern University's Center for Health Policy and Law, Co-Director, 22

(Wendy E., 11-19-22, Scientific American, “Fights between U.S. States and the National Government Are Endangering Public Health”, , Accessed 7-8-23, ED)

Despite that sordid background, for most of U.S. history, federalism also ensured that the units of government that were most capable of solving health problems—the states—had the legal authority to do so. When few people traveled and most goods were locally produced, the states (and their cities and towns) were in the best position to respond to disease outbreaks. States and localities could and did impose quarantines, license physicians and institute a range of other measures designed to protect the public’s health. All of these actions were grounded in the states’ so-called police powers, the sovereign powers that the states retained when they joined the federal union. For the most part, courts deferred to such powers, leaving states with broad authority over public health. Indeed, courts have repeatedly emphasized the centrality of public health to the states’ police powers.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Fism DA › ! › 2NC Enviro Fism Good

Environmental federalism solves climate change through maximizing regulatory effectiveness, spurring innovation, and catalyzing concrete action

Buzbee Georgetown Law’s Environmental Law & Policy Program, Faculty Director 17 (William W., 2017, Wisconsin Law Review, “Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge”, , ccm)

As with other regulatory challenges characterized by rapid change, innovation, and turbulent politics, retaining state and local climate authority both intertwined with and possibly independent from federal climate regulation would create a more sturdy and resilient web of regulation, stabilize linked markets, and discourage efforts to derail a federal climate law. The mere possibility of more state regulation would create heightened incentives for successful federal regulation that would, in turn, reduce potentially disparate state measures. With more regulatory stability, market rewards for innovation would also be enhanced.

Federal climate preemption and unitary regulatory scheme arguments may make sense in an idealized world of perfect, stable legal commitments, but in a real world pervaded by regulatory failure, reversal risks, and political instability, such unitary preemptive regimes would undercut climate progress. The more federal climate regulation or future legislation uses preemptive strategies, the more all hopes for climate progress would rest on one imperfect and vulnerable federal vessel. Retaining room for state and local climate regulation and linked clean energy efforts hedges regulatory risks. Such overlapping and potentially intertwined federal and state regulation may, somewhat paradoxically, be the most effective way to ensure that a future federal climate law or regulation under existing law will actually be implemented and endure despite ongoing political and legal contestation.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Fism DA › IL › Yes Spill Over

Incursions on federalism spillover.

Roberts ’15 – Patrick S. Roberts Patrick S. Roberts is an Associate Professor at the Center for Public Administration and Policy (CPAP) in the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. "The Centralization Paradox," American Interest, 6-10-2015, ableism-edited

The fact that Derthick was not famous outside her professional circle probably says something about broader trends in American society and politics. Derthick was for many years one the ablest expositors of the Anti-Federalist tradition in American political thought, a tradition that lives on in the form of resistance to the overweening power of the presidency and the creeping centralization of government authority in Washington. Her work shows why federalism remains part of the core of American identity and the bedrock of the Constitution’s commitment to self-government. It also shows why the distortion of the balance within American federalism lies at the root of the political distemper we have experienced in recent times. The matter so far sounds simpler than it is. Derthick, who was a protégé of Edward Banfield and a colleague and friend of James Q. Wilson, was no simple thinker. Many observers have argued that what’s wrong with the U.S. political system is that it has too weak an Executive Branch relative to the Legislative and Judicial Branches. From Samuel Huntington to Francis Fukuyama, the argument has been that we are a “Tudor” polity heavy with “parties and courts”, that Federal and state bureaucracies are hidebound and slow because, unlike most European and other democracies, they are encumbered by mounds of pointillist but often pointless and inconsistent directives from lawmakers and judges. The more nuanced question, then, is this: Can the American political system be simultaneously overbalanced toward the central, Federal government and yet still suffer from a relatively weak Executive? Martha Derthick understood perhaps better than anyone that it could. Anti-Federalists such as Patrick Henry and George Mason were formally those who opposed the ratification of the Constitution and a strong central government. They were dismayed at how much power some framers of the Constitution wanted to take away from the states. More broadly, they worried that the complexity of the new government, and particularly the separation of powers, would obscure the responsibilities of politicians to their constituents and their lines of accountability to the public at large.1 In other words, in the original tension, as understood by the Founders, between a republican form of government and a democratic form, the Anti-Federalists leaned somewhat optimistically toward the latter. Martha Derthick never referred to herself as an Anti-Federalist. Like most people today, she quoted the famous Federalists such as James Madison far more often than she cited the Anti-Federalists.2 In some sense, Americans are all Federalists now, at least in so far as we are all members of one nation governed under the Constitution (a post-Civil War amended Constitution at that). If Anti-Federalism is merely a collection of historically specific and partisan ideas then it is a museum piece, an artifact in the history of ideas. If, however, Anti-Federalism represents an orientation toward power that favors the local and is suspicious when authority is concentrated and concealed, then it is part of a debate in which we are still engaged. Elvin Lim has aptly described the ongoing debate between the inheritors of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist traditions as a “Lover’s Quarrel” that traverses political parties and ideologies throughout American history.3 Derthick did not want to return to the Articles of Confederation, but she did favor the parts of the Constitution that protected the sovereignty of the states—the foundational crucibles of self-government in a large, extended republic. She used her knowledge of the founding period to shed light on how far America had drifted from its original constitutional design, particularly through the erosion of local deliberation by commandeering profiteers masquerading as advocates of rational design and the public interest. Her position should not be confused with states’ rights arguments. Like Madison, she was critical of state legislatures as fonts of political demagogy, but like the Anti-Federalists she worried that the same forces could infect national politics. Her work highlights one of America’s central contributions to the world: how decentralized federalism can preserve liberty in a large republic, and how each citizen can maintain the delicate balance of being a member both of a state and of a larger nation. American federalism offers hope to nations [devastated] crippled by regional differences and overbearing central governments: the benefits of a small republic through membership in states and the benefits of a large republic through membership in one nation. In recent decades, however, federalism’s benefits—civic deliberation and laboratories of democracy—have been themselves [devastated] crippled by an increasingly national, centralized, and presidentialized political culture. The principal lesson from Derthick’s work is that policy interventions invariably have unintended consequences. At their best, policymakers anticipate consequences and plan for contingencies. At their worst, they ignore or even conceal the self-serving consequences of their proposals. For example, the end of smoking in airplanes, bars, and restaurants in the United States is considered a triumph for public health. Derthick’s Up in Smoke reminds us of the knavish tricks that led to this triumph. Crusading state Attorneys General and trial lawyers joined forces to extract riches from the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that sharply increased taxes on cigarette sales and created a powerful constituency that benefits from the tobacco industry.4 State governments now have a substantial interest in seeing revenue from smoking continue. The tobacco settlement shows the prescience of the Anti-Federalist concern that judicial decrees replace democratic deliberation when politicians opt for expedient solutions. (Here is a stellar example from Derthick’s analysis of how a fear of excessive centralization and an appreciation of a weak executive can coexist happily.) Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, one Anti-Federalist, writing under the name of Brutus, warned that judges would not limit themselves to the plain meaning of laws and the Constitution, but would reconstruct words according to their “spirit.” Interpreting laws according their spirit and applying them to new contexts may seem perfectly reasonable. The Founders never envisioned the internet, or drone spy cameras, for instance, and judges must apply law to changing contexts. But Brutus and the Anti-Federalists worried that judges and politicians—the Tudor “courts and parties”, again—would take advantage of laws and rules to satisfy their own narrow interests in ways not intended by the public mandate behind the original law or the Constitution. They were indeed prescient. At the founding, states and the national government each had separate spheres. The national government pursued foreign policy, and the states formulated education, health, and welfare policies, among others. In modern federalism, the spheres overlap. States and the national government share responsibilities for a range of activities. Politicians at all levels of government propose policies to meet public concerns, and they attempt to shift costs to other levels of government or other institutions. In the case of the tobacco settlement, state Attorneys General shifted the cost of public services to addicted smokers, who paid increased taxes on tobacco products. Like the Anti-Federalists, Derthick’s sympathies lie with local communities and, through them, with the principle of subsidiarity. But to principle she joined the practical: Local governments, being at the bottom of the political food chain, have less opportunity to outsource the financing and implementation of their goals than do states or the Federal government. Alas, over time, local governments have lost significant control over setting their own priorities.5 With the capillaries of the body politic thus impaired, the entire body has suffered. To show this ill health, Derthick’s first book unpacked the development of the usually uninspiring topic of federal grants-in-aid with her characteristic verve and humor.6 She described early public assistance grants to states as entreaties to change their behavior. As befits her Anti-Federalist sympathies for subnational governments, she characterized intergovernmental relations as a diplomatic rather than a hierarchical process: Federal enforcement is a diplomatic process. It is as if the terms of a treaty, an agreement of mutual interest to the two governmental parties, were more or less continuously being negotiated. In these negotiations, numerous diplomatic forms and maneuvers are observed, especially by the federal negotiators. Her vision of intergovernmental relations was one of polite discussion, continuous negotiation and accommodation, and threats held in reserve. The Federal ability to withhold funds “is in fact one of the major resources of federal influence—but it is of use mainly as a potential resource. It lies at the foundation, as a weapon in reserve, of all federal enforcement activity, and the nature of that activity is such as to make the best possible use of it.” In Derthick’s view, what began as a reasonable adaptation of federalism to a new era of national government expansion has become, in its worst iterations, a club that the Federal government can use to beat the states into submission without opportunity for public involvement. For example, Congress and the President went too far in demanding state compliance with education reforms in the initial get-tough period of No Child Left Behind. At the same time, she observed, the Federal government’s authority to selectively enforce laws by granting waivers poses problems for the rule of law. Executive waivers have an uncontroversial origin as a tool to adapt Federal government involvement to differences among states.7 If waivers are used often and selectively, however, they raise questions about why a law is not applicable to all citizens, or why it is a law rather than just a good idea. President Obama has issued more than a thousand temporary waivers exempting businesses and labor unions from various provisions of the Affordable Care Act. The constitutional source of the President’s right to issue waivers to laws is murky at best. At worst, the President’s unilateral suspension of the law threatens the rule of law itself. Government works best, in Derthick’s view, when it operates through deliberation at the lowest possible level. Citizens can more easily observe government operations at the smaller scale, look their chosen representatives in the eye, and together decide what their communities should do through discussion and debate. Where local action is not possible or desirable, national level programs should be given clear goals, and, above all, Executive Branch agencies should hit the sweet spot between too much autonomy and too little. Thus, in Agency Under Stress, Derthick shows how the Social Security Administration suffered from a lack of innovation when it was the domain of experts alone.8 So yes, bureaucrats can be henpecked by “courts and parties”, to be sure, but left alone they can be highly inertial, too. This led Derthick to the conclusion that experts should be on tap, not on top. In other cases, politicians, judges, and advocacy lobbies henpeck relentlessly, hobbling administrative agencies so severely that they cannot see straight or work effectively. For example, Derthick pointed out the absurdity of bureaucracy-ensconced school reformers who purport to improve student achievement by punishing the teacher workforce.9 Honest observers can differ on whether the generic problem with bureaucracy is too much autonomy or too little, but the problem isn’t really amenable to generic determination. Each situation is different and things change; Derthick understood that. Nevertheless, she believed that the lack of transparency in state and national policy should be cause for concern for anyone who holds democracy to be the best form of government because it offers citizens informed consent. If democratic decision-making processes are transparent, the rules of the game are clear, and citizens have an opportunity to debate and discuss the wisest course of action, then, rational apathy given its due, democracy can provide for informed consent. If the authors of policy hide behind the scenes, or bury their designs in obscure “tax credit” amendments, the authority for government action becomes unclear, special interests have a field day, and citizens are pushed away from meaningful participation. Then the political process fails at offering the meaningful informed consent that gives the political system legitimacy. The Anti-Federalists worried that the Constitution would oppress people from two directions. They suspected that the legislature would be unable to stand up to the unchecked power of the Supreme Court, and they feared that the populist presidency would grow in power until it overwhelmed popular rule and sober self-government. Such concerns have risen to high collective consciousness many times in American history. The trope of the “imperial presidency” rings out from Lincoln to FDR to Richard Nixon. Several contemporary observers of the American political scene have predicted that, if the United States government were ever to fall, a despotic presidency would be to blame. Derthick did not frame her criticism of American politics in such apocalyptic terms, but she did worry that the rise of a populist presidency could obscure how policy is actually made and put too great a distance between citizens and the policy process. A populist American President appears on television and video daily as a sponsor of grandiose policy proposals: free community college education; a mission to Mars. The populist-style President himself is a product of the cauldron of election contests that demand ambitious proposals but offer hazy details on implementation or any reasonable metric as to how such proposals might be evaluated. This sort of President nowadays invariably gets absorbed into an electronic celebrity culture saturated by advertising language. Nowhere is this form of political theater more evident than in recent education policy, where proposals for reform—first charter schools, then school choice and vouchers, then smaller class sizes—appear as “flavors of the month” without enough time having passed to evaluate their effects. Meanwhile, laws emerge behind the scenes from issue networks rather than the minds of lawmakers. The presidentialization of everything has spread beyond health, welfare, and education to other domains, including disaster management.10 At the founding, disaster management was a responsibility for states and localities, if for the government at all. Today, the President is the responder-in-chief to any major disaster, from floods to hurricanes to oil spills.11 Disasters make for good news stories, and responding to them is one way in which the President and the Federal government can palpably affect citizens’ lives and deliver benefits. The President cannot issue “waivers” in disaster management, but he does have sufficient discretion to issue “declarations” that trigger Federal resources to flow and pre-planned protocols to spring into action.12 The number of disaster declarations has increased over time. While “no dough for snow” was once a rallying cry at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, it is now routine for the President to declare snow disasters. In emergency management, as in the tobacco settlement, politicians sometimes derive benefits from a social ill. Disaster losses offer politicians an opportunity to come to the rescue. It is too perverse to say that politicians hope for disaster losses, but they do have more incentives to respond ably than to take steps to prevent disaster losses in the first place by, for example, limiting development in flood plains and other risky locations. Questions about how to manage sustainable development, however, depend on context and buy-in rather than on rational planning.13 These decisions are best left to communities, which can draw on expert guidance to come to their own decisions about implementation. Making the presidency the locus of policymaking in areas previously reserved for the states, such as education or welfare, risks closing off avenues for participation and for creative implementation in different regions. Critics of the contemporary Anti-Federalist approach might point out that state legislatures, elected judges, and city councils are even more likely to be captured by special interests than Presidents.14 In reply, a defender of local and state prerogatives would point out that centralization is at best a temporary fix to special-interest control, and often no fix at all. Derthick’s study of the Federal and federalized tobacco settlement shows how mercenary state officials engaged in a “race to the trough” of tobacco settlements. Today’s term “special interests” conveys just what the Anti-Federalists were worried about. The best way to defeat narrow, particularistic interests is to reinvigorate participatory processes, electoral contests, and opportunities for interaction with the bureaucracy that implements laws and policy. This doesn’t mean that more democracy can always solve the problems of democracy; sometimes opening the policy decision process just makes it easier for well-organized groups to employ the logic of collective action to accrue even more political leverage.15 But it does mean that shutting the citizenry out of the process will ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the government as a whole. Derthick’s The Politics of Deregulation offered a salutary example of how the public policy process can serve the public interest rather than narrow, particularistic interests. She explains in that book why the time was ripe for a consensus among economists to lead to deregulation of the trucking, banking, and airline industries in the late 1970s.16 Economists agree about many topics, but only occasionally do their ideas lead to policy change in the general interest.17 The rise of expertise in government, new communication technologies, and, most importantly, arguments that served both the Left and the Right propelled deregulation from the realm of expert ideas to policy action. Though often associated with conservatives, deregulation proceeded apace during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Derthick’s portrayal of how deregulation came about defied the stereotype of government agencies as slow to change. She showed how ideas can persuade bureaucrats to join coalitions for reform. Here, as in other cases, she was at pains to demonstrate how settled truths about political behavior are often not true at all. Reading through Derthick’s oeuvre shows the virtues of an orientation toward political power that leans more Anti-Federalist than Federalist. She recognized the advantages of nationhood but observed that democracy is best practiced when power is local, transparent, and, as much as is possible, open to all. Nevertheless, she understood well the dark side of political subsidiarity. She drew attention to the fact that the “tenacity and violence of southern resistance to changes in race relations gave federalism a very bad name. . . . When a system of decentralized power was seen to produce flagrant violations of fairness (now literally seen on national television), the system itself was discredited.”18 Derthick came of age during the civil rights struggle, when claims for states’ rights fell under suspicion of being covers for racism and the preservation of what was a de facto single-party system. She completed her Ph.D. under the direction of V.O. Key, a scholar of American elections at Harvard, but Edward Banfield employed her to assist in compiling reports on the politics of cities.19 Banfield soon became embroiled in the racial politics of the 1960s by writing a book about why the tall and foreboding, racially segregated Chicago housing projects were doomed to make the problems they intended to solve worse. This view is now conventional wisdom, thanks in no small part to the pioneering anti-social engineering work of The Public Interest, which twice hosted Derthick essays. But at the time it brought down a virulent, early form of political correctness on Banfield’s head that followed him from Harvard to Penn. Perhaps this perspective on university life is what helped Derthick decide to spend much of her career at the Brookings Institution, where she served as director of its Governance Studies Program from 1978 to 1983. She ultimately returned to university life as a chaired professor at the University of Virginia and continued to write articles and books and take an interest in students even after her formal retirement in 1999. Derthick described herself as a journalist by temperament and method, a disposition perhaps inherited from her father, who was a reporter and editor for the Cleveland Plain Dealer. She had a deep respect for the facts, an early instinct she never lost. Her modesty, however, understates the depth of understanding found in her method. To begin with, she read everything, from scholarship to government reports. Then she spoke to people involved in whatever she was studying. She folded all that she learned into beautiful prose. She was not afraid to master the quotidian—what policymakers do and how they define their tasks—and not only the ideas that presumably motivate them. Derthick was concerned with what mattered most: meaningful participation in government; citizenship in the fullest sense of the term; effective public services; and structuring government so that markets and regulation each have their place.20 She respected the careful work of economists and policy analysts who evaluated the actual effects of policy interventions. But she also knew, along with sociologist Peter Rossi, that the better the test, the closer the effects get to zero.21 Because of her relentless pragmatism, diligence in pursuing detail without regard to the procrustean influence of theory, and her lucid writing style, the American Political Science Association gave her name to its award for the “best book that made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism.” In 2006, the proud recipient of the Martha Derthick Award was none other than Derthick herself—though, as she reminded people, she was not on the nominating committee.22 While her intellectual identity formed during the social upheavals of the 1960s, unlike many of her contemporaries she did not believe the solution to social problems lay in a unitary form of government, which she saw as a nod toward social authoritarianism. Instead, she believed, solutions could only be found in the push and pull of mutual accommodation among the Federal government, states, and localities, and in opportunities for meaningful participation at all levels. Local communities are where people decide what they want to do and who they want to be. They are the only avenue most Americans have for deliberation—for meeting with one another to discuss their collective goals and plans. Pushing more policymaking down from the Federal heights to states and localities will not satisfy everyone, nor should it. It does not allay concerns about states that enshrine discrimination in law, or states that give short shift to their most vulnerable citizens, or states so weak that they fail without Federal government intervention, as appeared to happen during Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. The modern-day Anti-Federalist looks much better, however, when considering how open a system of state sovereignty and local control is to many different kinds of interests. State sovereignty leads to a greater number of genuinely empowered elected and appointed officeholders, and to a wider variety of policy experiments. In the nation as a whole, state sovereignty can allow the parts of the United States that want to be “red” to be “red” and the parts that want to be “blue” to be “blue” simultaneously. If government’s ultimate purpose is to serve a diverse and ever-changing society, there is a strong case for preserving Derthick’s modern Anti-Federalist legacy. If more of us understood that, perhaps we would not have had to wait for an obituary to recognize a leading light in that vanguard.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Fism DA › IL › Yes Spill Over

State action serves as a bulwark against Federal preemption – the plan reverse that

Kaufman 04/2020

Emma, Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. “THE PRISONER TRADE”, https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/1815-1883_Online.pdf

The 1920s was also a decade of increasing optimism about regional administration of American laws. Across domains from transportation and waste disposal to education and criminal justice, government officials touted the benefits of regional governance, specifically interstate compacts.54 Compacts, these officials argued, could address the policy concerns wrought by increased mobility without sacrificing cultural variation and local control.55 For opponents of federal law enforcement and skeptics of the fledgling administrative state, regional agreements served as a means to “stave off federal intervention.”

2023 GDI Counterplan
Fism DA › Links › AT: Perm Shields Net Benefit Link

Bargaining power - Inter-gov bargaining yields to improvement

Inman, Professor, Finance, Economic and Public Policy, Wharton School, Univerwity of Pennsylvania, Rubinfeld, Professor of Law, NYU, ‘14

[[Robert P., Daniel L., 2014, Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, forthcoming, “ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM,” , Accessed 06/09/2023, BS]

II. Economic Federalism