2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Impact Defense—1NC
Baezner 17 (Marie and Patrice Robin; Feb; Cyber Defense Project (CDP) Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich, “Cyber-Conflict Between the United States of America and Russia” https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/184547/Cyber-Reports-2017-02.pdf?sequence=1)
On the other hand, both states might not desire further escalation, preferring to restrain the conflict to cyberspace. Each would follow the “tit-for-tat” logic and accuse each other while never reaching a tipping point where the conflict spills over to a conventional war. Such a tipping point would be linked to the intensity of the attack or the nature of the targets. Both nations would keep the cyberattacks small enough not to trigger a bigger reaction. The same would be observed on the choice of targets, with both avoiding certain critical or sensitive targets, for instance critical infrastructures. In order to contain the conflict in cyberspace, both states would have to demonstrate their restraint by selecting options with low risk of miscalculation (Lin, 2012, pp. 64–66). In the future, it might also be possible to see a deescalation in the form of the emergence of an international treaty or at least further bilateral treaties between the USA and Russia on cyberattacks. For example, during the last few years, businesses in the USA were often hacked and spied on by the Chinese military. These intrusions were mostly cyber-economic-espionage and were said to have supported the theft of billions of dollars’ worth of intellectual property (Bamford, 2016). In September 2015, the USA and China signed an agreement engaging both countries not to support or conduct cyber-theft of intellectual property. Moreover, the parties have made the commitment not to use cyberattacks against each other’s critical infrastructures in peace-time and to support the establishment of international behavioral norms in cyberspace (Rosenfeld, 2015). Both states also highlighted the fact that they could not control each individual in their country and therefore could not be held responsible for individual acts. Since then it seems that the number of attacks on commercial targets has diminished (Timm, 2016). Former President Obama suggested the creation of a position of cybersecurity ambassador to deal with bilateral or multilateral treaties concerning cyber-norms (Lee, 2016). For this kind of de-escalation to take effect, the termination of the conflict at hand must be the stated aim of both parties. A clear common understanding of the terms of agreement is required and must be based on trust-building efforts, as well as the assurance of mutual adherence. The difficulty of tracking the implementation of such agreements in cyberspace has been an obstacle preventing more states consenting to such solutions (Lin, 2012, pp. 62–64). Nevertheless, a dialogue on cyberspace already exists between the USA and Russia since July 2013. This cooperation includes Confidence Building Measures (CBM) such as the creation of working groups on the issue of ICT security, exchange of information between the two national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and the creation of a direct communication line to directly manage ICT incidents (Segal, 2016; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). In October 2016, former President Obama used the latter to inform Russian President Putin that the USA was accusing Russia of interference in the election process (Ignatius, 2016). Furthermore, Russia and the USA take part in the UN GGE supporting the future establishment of international norms on actions in cyberspace. They stated that international law can be applied in cyberspace and therefore, the rules of proportionality and limited collateral damage should also be respected in cyberattacks (Ignatius, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2015). These examples demonstrate that even though the two states are involved in a “tit-for-tat” logic in their relations on a tactical level, there was still a dialogue on the strategic level, at least until 2015. The recent cyberattacks in USA and the election of Donald Trump as US President, bring new uncertainties.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—2NC
Susan Davis 19—General Rapporteur for this report, Congresswoman. ("NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” October 2019, from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf)
NATO’s ambiguity also extends to the type of punishment it threatens were it to suffer a cyber attack. The Alliance has made clear that it neither limits punishment to similar cyber attacks nor excludes them. Instead, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter cyber attacks. Once again, this introduces useful doubt in an opponent’s mind. A more technical reason for the difficulty of restricting retaliation to cyber attacks is that it is hard to credibly threaten the assets of the attacker in a similar fashion. If an attacker shuts down a power plant, would the Alliance have cyber options to attack an opponent’s power plants or similar infrastructure? Would NATO even want to if it could, as it complies with the principle of proportionality and international law in all its activities? NATO’s ambiguity on the type of retaliation serves a convincing purpose. It produces doubts in the would-be attacker’s mind and presents more options to tailor and scale a response to re-establish deterrence.
2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—2NC
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
In light of the recent developments of NATO, it would seem to be in NATO’s best interest to remain ambiguous and allow the organization to approach its response to a cyber-attack on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the attacks on Estonia might require intervention on behalf of the Estonian people due to the fact they are a smaller, lesser defensible state. Estonia would not be successful standing up against Russia, and as Russia becomes more aggressive in the former-Soviet bloc region, small states like Estonia are at risk. If another attack were to occur against Estonia, the attacks would have to be more severe to invoke an Article 5 response. Such a response would enable NATO states to act as if they too have been attacked as per the mutual defense announcement against cyber-attacks at the Wales Summit. Yet, if the United States is attacked in a similar manner, there likely does not need to be the same scale of defense taken, because the United States has more resources and capabilities to respond on its own. Remaining ambiguous allows NATO to choose the best opportunities for supporting and defending member states.
Before it could decide on a response, NATO would first need to consider the severity of the attack to determine the appropriate level of response, whether it be sanctions, cutting off financial aid to the offending country, or a boots on the ground campaign. However, even while retaining flexibility in its response to a cyber-attack, NATO understands the importance of cyber defense. It aims to deter cyber-attacks against its networks and member country’s networks through strong cyber defenses, although NATO has yet to fully seek what Cold War theorists have called “deterrence by denial,” and which could be an effective mechanism.161 With such a posture, the enemy need not be convinced that a cyber-attack will be followed by retaliation or punishment; instead, it is only necessary to convince the enemy that the initial attack will have no effect.16
2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—2NC
Z’hra M. Ghavam 16—Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, B.S., United States Naval Academy. ("NATO’s Preparedness for Cyberwar," September 2016, )
NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments.
Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines:
2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Working Now—1NC/2NC
Alexander Lanoszka 20, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, “Thank goodness for NATO enlargement”, Int Polit (2020) 57:451-470
The defensibility of NATO’s northeastern flank NATO enlargement has provided a key source of insurance by raising the costs of direct Russian aggression against alliance members. This is true even in arguably the weakest part of the alliance, the Baltic littoral region. Conventional wisdom holds that the defense of this region against Russian aggression is especially costly for the USA and NATO to undertake. The countries located there are exceptionally vulnerable. Whereas most benefciaries of NATO enlargement are at least largely separated from Russia thanks to Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic countries are directly contiguous and have only a short land connection to continental NATO by way of the Polish–Lithuanian border. According to this perspective, a rebalancing of alliance commitments in Europe is necessary because the local military balance favors Russia too much and the political will to defend the Baltic states is too low. The USA will never ‘trade Toledo for Tallinn’ (Shifrinson 2017, 111). Note the contradiction: According to critics, enlarging NATO simultaneously provokes Russia and weakens the alliance. But what rational cause would Russia have to be dismayed when a potentially adversarial military alliance willingly takes on major liabilities? The alliance security dilemma—whereby the strengthening of one coalition may inadvertently create insecurity for another—suggests that Russia would be justifiably concerned if NATO either incorporated states that meaningfully aggregate capabilities or increased military ties with such powerful states (Snyder 1984, 477). By NATO enlargement critics’ own admission, the Baltic countries subtract from, rather than add to, what the alliance can do. Russian might have reasons to protest enlargement, but these reasons likely concern the perceived slight to its honor when former Soviet states became formal defense partners of the USA (Götz 2017, 236–239).4 NATO enlargement has not been responsible for Russian authoritarianism or international revisionism because it never threatened Russia. Pessimism regarding the defensibility of NATO’s so-called northeastern flank is also unwarranted. To begin with, much of the policy literature on this region concentrates on Russia’s strengths while ignoring its key weaknesses. The Baltic countries would almost surely lose set piece battles against Russia, but deterrence ultimately hinges less on being victorious in a potential war than on imposing unacceptable costs on the adversary. The Baltic states have already begun embracing unconventional strategies intended to boost national resiliency and make occupation difficult (Collins and Beehner 2019). Guerrilla tactics and territorial defense serve to augment their denial capabilities that in turn would complicate Russian efforts to hold territory and pacify the local population. Moreover, Russia may have local escalation dominance, but it does not have global escalation dominance, given the forces that NATO members possess. A large-scale land grab made at the expense of any of the Baltic countries might precipitate escalatory dynamics that it could not control. Nuclear war may be a remote possibility, but it cannot be discounted altogether. One reason why Russia has resorted to so-called hybrid tactics against the Baltic countries—such as political subversion and eforts to foment unrest—is that it does not wish to provoke a reaction that it cannot handle (Lanoszka 2016). Put simply, Russia may believe in NATO’s Article Five collective defense commitment more than NATO members themselves do.
2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Working Now—1NC/2NC
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
Since the cyber world is still so new and continues to advance each day with new technologies, NATO is still trying to find the best policies and best course of action to take in response to the new threats to peace and democracy that cyber-attacks pose on the alliance and this new world. NATO welcomes and many experts on cyberspace give it recommendations on how to deal with this new threat. The cyber world is too new for NATO to bind its hands, so to speak, with rigid rules and laws regarding when, how, and why it would invoke Article 5 in the case of a cyber-attack on a member country. In response, at the 2014 summit in Wales, the alliance made it clear that a cyber-attack can and will invoke an Article 5 response. It also made it clear that ambiguity has served the alliance well, and it refused to define the kind of attack that would invoke an Article 5 response.
However, that is not to say that NATO has been irresponsible or lackadaisical in trying to give some understanding on when a cyber-attack becomes an armed attack. With the help of experts in the field of cyberspace, international law, and policymakers, the Tallinn Manual was written and published to provide guidance to NATO and any other international or national alliance or government seeking it. Although the Manual offers guidance on what scale, effects, and attacker motivation would be severe enough to fall into the category of an armed attack, it does not give specific details, only a conceptual idea of what an armed attack might look like in the cyber realm. Then, with the guidance of the Manual, and international law, there could be a better understanding of what would then invoke an Article 5 response. Nevertheless, it is not, and was not intended to be, a complete go-to-guide for how each member country should conduct itself in the cyber world.
2022
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Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Working Now—1NC/2NC
Hal Brands 16, PhD @ Yale, Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/
In many ways, the prevalence of gray zone approaches is actually a testament to the strength of the liberal international order that America has led since World War II. Gray zone approaches reflect the fact that there are strong international norms against outright aggression and territorial conquest, and that even moderately revisionist powers often hesitate to pay the costs—from moral opprobrium, to economic penalties, to the potential for a military response—associated with flagrantly violating those norms. In the same vein, gray zone conflict actually underscores the fact that U.S. military power, alliances, and security guarantees—the structures that have long served as the backbone of the international order—have generally proven quite effective in deterring or punishing such flagrant military aggression. Indeed, these strengths of the international system have fostered the very ambiguity and incrementalism that characterize gray zone approaches, persuading revisionist powers—usually—to take small steps that sow doubt about what is really happening, and that avoid more dramatic provocations that might cross clearly established “red lines.”[11]
2022
HDC
Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—1NC
Susan Davis 19—General Rapporteur for this report, Congresswoman. ("NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” October 2019, from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf)
NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers to tread lightly. A similar deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War.
2022
HDC
Affirmative
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—1NC
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
Finally, NATO needs to maintain ambiguity on what justifies an Article 5 response. As mentioned previously, ambiguity has served NATO well. A set threshold for when NATO will invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack on a member country is not necessary. This ambiguity has historically served the alliance well, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. If the alliance had said weapons were only include guns, bullets, tanks, and bombs, it would have set a threshold precluding a NATO response to attacks that turned four planes into improvised missiles. The larger issue of ambiguity is that there is no set definition of what constitutes an armed attack and what circumstances dictate a collective response, as per Article 5. Remaining ambiguous on the severity threshold of a cyber-attack allows the alliance to act in cases of future cyber-attacks that cause severe damage, but also allow NATO to refrain from over-reacting, even if an event is a cyber, or kinetic, attack as per a definition. It would be a mistake to set a threshold for attacks that cannot currently be anticipated.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Solvency
Weed 17 (Maj Scott A. Weed is the commander, 724th Special Tactics Support Squadron, 724th Special Tactics Group, 24th Special Operations Wing, Pope Field, North Carolina, Air Force Strategic Policy Fellow for Cyber Issues, Department of State.US Policy Response to Cyber Attack on SCADA Systems Supporting Critical National Infrastructure USAF CPP–7 )
The 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Wales Summit further affirmed the UNGGE recommendations by maintaining that “international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace.” NATO’s assertion is categorical—cyberspace will not be a lawless space. NATO also determined that cyber attacks could threaten national security and stability, holding that “cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence” meriting case-by-case Article 5 consideration.13 It is worth noting that neither the UN nor NATO yet specifies a specific “red line” response threshold, automatically determining retaliation and strategic options. Without established and recognized norms of cyber behavior to frame the use of national instruments of power, “We could be forced to live in the worst of all possible cyber worlds—routinely vulnerable to attack and self restrained from bringing our own power to bear.”14
There is also significant policy context necessary for any US cyber response. The US International Strategy for Cyberspace holds that existing Internet governance bodies should continue to guide and shape the development of the Internet.15 The US strategy is aimed at continuing the Internet tradition of innovation, rather than a competing vision of state control. The United States desires to ensure appropriate representation from governments, academia, and private and civil sectors.16 US policy makers insist on not conflating control over standards and protocols with a perceived (by some) need for sovereign ability to act unilaterally or multilaterally in cyberspace to preserve vital national interests.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Russian Cyberattacks
Stojkovski 21—freelance journalist covering foreign policy and technology based in Skopje, North Macedonia (Bojan, 1/4/2021, “Flawed Cybersecurity Is a Ticking Time Bomb for the Balkans”, Foreign Policy, )
On the night of July 15, 2020, the Balkan nation of North Macedonia was anxiously awaiting the preliminary results of its parliamentary election. Soon after the polls closed, in what was first believed to be a minor technical glitch, the website of the State Election Commission went down.
The polling results were nowhere to be found on the website in the next several hours, as the commission resorted to manually announcing the latest updates on a makeshift YouTube channel. And things didn’t get any better in the late hours of the night.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Russian Cyberattacks
Aaltola 21—Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland, and Professor of International Relations at Tallinn University, Estonia (Mika Aaltola, 2021, Democratic Vulnerability and Autocratic Meddling, Chapter 4: Russian Cyber-Enabled Diversions in the West, Springer)
The challenge to the existing regional order inevitably blurs the line between normal and unconventional. What is considered legal, established, and conventional becomes an obstacle as the challenger tries to reset the rules and expectations. This logic increases the possibility of unexpected events in the region. The distinction between peacetime and wartime practices can become more blurred. However, there is no evidence of using cyberattacks to cause widespread physical damage in the region; infrastructure has been outside of the targets.
So far, the attacks have been unlikely to attract clear retaliatory actions. Risks have clearly been taken by Russia, but in a calculated way that maximizes the psychological and political effects and minimizes the chances of punishment. On the other hand, the harm scale that focuses on physical damage misses the real significance of politically motivated cyberattacks. For example, the damage caused by rigging an election process far surpasses some of the physical harm scenarios.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Strategic Ambiguity Fails
Schulze 19 (Dr Matthias Schulze is Associate in the International Security Division at SWP; “Cyber Deterrence is Overrated” SWP, August 2019; https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C34/)
Deterrence fails if the threat of punishment is not considered credible. Deterrence failure often leads to the use of capabilities and thus escalation. This raises questions about the proportionality, effectiveness and accuracy of cyber retaliation capabilities. How much objective damage must be inflicted so that A considers the costs of further offensive action to be too high? How does D know whether A considers threats against certain assets to be particularly painful or not? A and D most likely have different perceptions about what assets are considered especially sensitive. These different perceptions make proportional reactions difficult. There is no international consensus on how proportional cyber retaliation might be conceived. Thus there is an increased risk of escalation. The damage caused by cyber retaliation must be appropriate. If the damage threatened by D is too great, the probability of a renewed retaliation by A increases. It is well researched in political science, that escalation spirals are often a consequence if a retaliation is perceived as inappropriate or too painful. In these cases, deterrence fails. If the threat of punishment is considered not costly enough and thus not credible, deterrence does not work either. Determining the correct measure is highly complex and also a function of the attribution problem: the lower the chance of being caught, the greater the threat of punishment by D must be
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Strategic Ambiguity Fails
Limnell 16 (Jarno Limnéll, Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Senior Research Fellow, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. "Challenge for NATO – Cyber Article 5." http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1119569/FULLTEXT01.pdf)
The current ‘cyber warfare playbook’ is still a slim volume - but it is growing by the day. In order to remain a credible defence alliance, NATO must possess a credible cyber policy, including cyber deterrence. Credibility comes from a largely similar set of actions as NATO has engaged in regarding conventional military. Doing it in the cyber domain is, however, harder at the moment. For example, what is the equivalent of standing up in practice permanent battalions in member states? How do you exercise, publicly message determination to defend and counter aggression, in a serious but non-threatening way?
NATO has to find a clear way to deal with a ‘Cyber Article 5’ event. It may be necessary to reinterpret what Article 5 and an armed attack constitute in today´s world. The biggest challenges is to reach a shared understanding of the limits (physical and cyber) which could lead a member state to invoke Article 5 and delineate what proportionality in response means. The decisions are political by their nature and requires strong understanding
2022
HDC
Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Strategic Ambiguity Fails
John R Deni 19, John is a Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, “The Paradox at the Heart of NATO’s Return to Article 5,” RUSI Newsbrief, November/December 2019, Vol.39 No.10, , *ableist language edited
Despite the necessity of exercises like Defender 2020, new purchases of advanced military equipment and the expansion of military manpower (all underway since 2014), these steps together constitute a growing paradox that the Alliance has been slow to recognise and respond to. That is, just as the Alliance is becoming more focused on and more capable of responding to an Article 5 threshold-crossing event, the probability of a conventional manoeuvre warfare scenario is decreasing. Put another way, major improvements in the Alliance’s ability to defend the territory of its member states are necessary, but it is becoming ever more obvious that these steps will not be sufficient for collective defence in NATO’s next decade.
Many European security analysts believe an Article 5 threshold-crossing event is unlikely in the coming years. Russia is a declining state along several measures, especially in economic terms, and over time the acute threat that it represents today should diminish. Certainly, it has made advances recently in limited military capability areas, such as indirect fires and precision munitions. Yet, the Russian playbook evidently continues to eschew frontal attacks on states that are members of a military alliance, at least in the air, sea, land and space domains.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Strategic Ambiguity Fails
Ethan Williamson 19, Current Analyst with Morgan Business Consulting LLC and recently became CompTIA Security+ Certified and hold a Secret clearance, “NATO’s Expanding Role in Cybersecurity,” Charged Affairs, 5/13/19, , language edited change denoted by brackets
Through these organizations and agreements, NATO has improved and strengthened its unified cyber defense capability, seemingly positioning itself to be a standard bearer for cybersecurity. However, these commitments lack specifics and could hamper NATO’s ability to respond to an attack because of bureaucratic and security protocols. Following the inclusion of cyber attacks under Article 5, NATO and its allies could not agree on what kind of attack would trigger the collective defense response. Allies still use their own incident standards to define cyber incidents and in some cases do not make these standards public. This results in an uneven response and makes it difficult for NATO and its allies to provide a unified, Article 5 response to cyber incidents. Stoltenberg has defended this vague definition by stating that, “a clearly defined threshold only invites attacks immediately beneath it.” This clarification does not address the larger issue of which attacks would trigger an Article 5 response, as NATO already defends against low-level cyber attacks daily. Ambiguous guidelines could also cause NATO to misappropriate responses to cyber attacks, leading to potentially embarrassing overreactions to minor incursions or devastating slow responses to crippling [devastating] attacks. Without a clear definition, NATO will struggle to respond to attacks.
As stated earlier, NATO’s focus is on deterring attacks—to such an extent that the cost of an attack would outweigh any benefits. However, this focus has resulted in NATO lacking the offensive capabilities to respond in the same capacity as its allies, like the United States. There is some discussion within NATO over taking an “offensive defense” role within cyber in order to respond directly after an attack. This change will have its own repercussions, as it may lead to an attack being wrongly attributed or a response unnecessarily escalated.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff—Case—Extend: Strategic Ambiguity Fails
Patrick 18—James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (Stewart Patrick, 8/8/2018, “NATO's Deterrence Problem: An Analog Strategy for a Digital Age”, Council on Foreign Relations, )
While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on the idea of collective defense, the nature of security threats has changed since its inception. The Cold War-era alliance is struggling to adapt to evolving technology and the altered nature of warfare. Nowhere is this more true than in the cyber realm. NATO policymakers have acknowledged cyberwarfare as a distinct sphere of conflict, but they have not yet tailored nuclear-era concepts of deterrence and response to this new domain. As cyberattacks increase in destructive potential and remain difficult to attribute, the alliance face the dilemma of whether and how to adapt their policy of strategic ambiguity to a new era of cyberwarfare.
At their annual summit last month, the twenty-nine allies reaffirmed the integral role cybersecurity plays in NATO, creating a Cyberspace Operations Center to supplement existing cyber defense facilities and reaffirming the need for an offensive capability “to deter, defend against, and to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Missing from the communique, however, were any rules of engagement for the cyber sphere. This raises the question: How would NATO respond if a member state were to invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty following a cyberattack?
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Aff—Case—Emerging Tech Add-On
Dr. James Johnson 21—Assistant Professor in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University and a Non-Resident Fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point, previously a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, 1/13/2021, ‘Catalytic nuclear war’ in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states, Journal of Strategic Studies, Routledge
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, it contextualizes the concept of ‘catalytic nuclear war’ with emerging security technologies, particularly AI. The article uses this analytical framework to examine how and under what circumstances the nefarious (mis)use of these technologies by non-state actors (i.e., terrorists, criminals, and state-proxy actors) might create or exacerbate escalation pathways leads to an accidental nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed powers. Next, in the articles’ empirical core, it considers four aggravating features in the interaction of emerging technology with nuclear weapons and the pathways to nuclear escalation examined in the article – information complexity and asymmetry; greater automation of NC3; disinformation, misinformation, and information manipulation; and nuclear multipolarity.15 This article posits that AI-enhanced capabilities will likely amplify these underlying conditions (or second-order effects), thus increasing the risk of sparking unintentional escalation between strategic nuclear-armed powers – especially in crisis and conflict conditions. The next section uses four fictional scenarios – cyber false flag operation, cyber-attack on nuclear early-warning systems, drone swarming targeting ISR systems, and deepfake disinformation – to demonstrate how AI-enhanced capabilities in the hands of non-state actors might accidentally or inadvertently drag a competitive nuclear dyad into conflict. The final section considers possible ways of reducing catalytic escalation risk caused by non-state actors, particularly how militaries can maintain effective command and control of their nuclear forces in a rapidly evolving and complex conflict environment.
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Aff—Case—Emerging Tech Add-On
Nicolas Mazzucchi and Alix Desforges 19, Nicolas Mazzucchi is a research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research and Alix Desforges is a postdoctoral fellow at Geopolitics of the Datasphere (GEODE), “Web Wars: Preparing for the Next Cyber Crisism” Carnegie Europe, 11/28/19, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/web-wars-preparing-for-next-cyber-crisis-pub-80420
The acceleration of the military use of cyber capabilities and the simultaneous militarization of cyberspace create new threats and opportunities for NATO. The alliance must respond in a number of ways, including by increasing investment, strengthening technical cooperation with the European Union (EU), and seeking political consensus on the attribution of, and responses to, cyber attacks.
ISSUES AT STAKE
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Affirmative
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
Marios Efthymiopoulos 19, PhD from the University of Crete in Security and Strategic Affairs on NATO issues and NATO-Russia relations, Chairman of the Board of Advisors of Strategy International, 6/24/19, "A cyber-security framework for development, defense and innovation at NATO", Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Volume 8, Article 12, https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13731-019-0105-z
NATOs cyber-resilience experienced in crisis management and communication
Societal security, an emerging phenomenon in the field of strategy and security, requires good crisis management skills but also communication effectiveness in both the real and virtual worlds. Business continuity at NATO requires as foresaid the Alliance, to be resilient and surely for the purposes of this research paper, the Alliance and allies to be or become cyber-resilient.