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2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Neg vs. Fem IR Aff › Turn – Disciplinary Power

Disciplinary power is coercive and violent – causes people to internalize their self-worth soley in terms of their productive capacities

Foucault, 75 (1975. Michel, Discipline and Punish – Second Vintage Books Edition, 1995, p. 152-153; spp)

4. The body-object articulation. Discipline defines each of the relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates. Between them, it outlines a meticulous meshing. ‘Bring the weapon forward. In three stages. Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing it close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right knee, the end of the barrel at the eye level, grasping it by striking it with the right hand, the arm held close to the body at waist height. At the second stage, bring the rifle in front of you with the left hand, the barrel in the middle between the two eyes, vertical, the right hand grasping it at the small of the butt, the arm outstretched, the trigger-guard resting on the first finger, the left hand at the height of the notch, the thumb lying along the barrel against the moulding. At the third stage, let go of the rifle with the left hand, which falls along the thigh, raising the rifle with the right hand, the lock outwards and opposite the chest, the right arm half flexed, the elbow close to the body, the thumb lying against the lock, resting against the first screw, the hammer resting on the first finger, the barrel perpendicular’ (‘Ordonnance du janvier 1766…, titre XI, article 2’). This is an example of what might be called the instrumental coding of the body. It consists in the breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the parts of the body, to be used (right hand, left hand, different fingers of the hand, knee, eye, elbow, etc.) and that of the parts of the object manipulated (barrel, notch, hammer, screw, etc.); then the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a number of simple gestures (rest, bend); lastly, it fixes the canonical succession in which each of these correlations occupies a particular place. This obligatory syntax is what the military theoreticians of the eighteenth century called 'manoeuvre'. The traditional recipe gives place to explicit and obligatory prescriptions. Over the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex. One is as far as possible from those forms of subjection that demanded of the body only signs or products, forms of expression or the result of labour. The regulation imposed by power is at the same time the law of construction of the operation. Thus disciplinary power appears to have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the apparatus of production.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Neg vs. Fem IR Aff › Turn – Disciplinary Power

The politicization of identity requires categorization – generates disciplinary regimes which neutralize differences within identity categories and reinscribes relations of domination

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, published by Princeton UP, p. 65-66; spp)

Contemporary politicized identity is also potentially reiterative of regulatory, disciplinary society in its configuration of a disciplinary subject. It is both produced by and potentially accelerates the production of that aspect of disciplinary society which "ceaselessly characterizes, classifies, and specializes," which works through "surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment, and classification," through a social machinery "that is both immense and minute. "19 An example from the¶ world of local politics makes clear politicized identity's imbrication in¶ disciplinary power, as well as the way in which, as Foucault reminds us,¶ disciplinary power "infiltrates" rather than replaces liberal juridical¶ modalities. 20¶ Recently, the city council of my town reviewed an ordinance, devised¶ and promulgated by a broad coalition of identity-based political groups,¶ which aimed to ban discrimination in employment, housing, and public¶ accommodations on the basis of "sexual orientation, transsexuality, age,¶ height, weight, personal appearance, physical characteristics, race, color,¶ creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, or¶ gender. "21 Here is a perfect instance of the universal juridical ideal of¶ liberalism and the normalizing principle of disciplinary regimes conjoined¶ and taken up within the discourse of politicized identity. This¶ ordinance-variously called the "purple hair ordinance" or the "ugly ordinance" by state and national news media-aims to count every difference¶ as no difference, as part of the seamless whole, but also to count¶ every potentially subversive rejection of culturally enforced norms as¶ themselves normal, as normalizable, and as normativizable through law.¶ Indeed, through the definitional, procedural, and remedies sections of¶ this ordinance (e.g., "sexual orientation shall mean known or assumedhomosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality") persons are reduced to observable social attributes and practices defined empirically, positivistically, as if their existence were intrinsic and factual, rather than effects of discursive and institutional power; and these positivist definitions of persons as their attributes and practices are written into law, ensuring that persons describable according to them will now become regulated through them. Bentham couldn't have done it better. Indeed,¶ here is a perfect instance of how the language of recognition becomes the¶ language of unfreedom, how articulation in language, in the context of liberal and disciplinary discourse, becomes a vehicle of subordination through individualization, normalization, and regulation, even as it strives to produce visibility and acceptance. Here, also, is a perfect instance¶ of the way in which "differences" that are the effects of social power are neutralized through their articulation as attributes and their circulation through liberal administrative discourse: what do we make of¶ a document that renders as juridical equivalents the denial of employment¶ to an African American, an obese woman, and a white middleclass¶ youth festooned with tattoos, a pierced tongue, and fuchsia hair?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Neg vs. Fem IR Aff › Turn – Academy

The AFF operates within the academy, destroying the emancipatory potential on two fronts: the authors of their lit are removed from the actual problems and information produced in the academy will only serve to hold up the structural issues they critique—anything else won’t be published

Lynch 1999 (Kathleen, University of Dublin, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January, 1999, pp. 41-69)

While several feminist theorists have engaged with the contradictions of their class position in relation to emancipatory research, critical theorists often tend to ignore the logic of the sets of cultural relations within which academic knowledge is produced. Critical theorists, no more than other intellectuals “tend to leave out of play their own game and their own stakes”...Yet, “the production of representations of the social world, which is a fundamental dimension of political struggles, is the virtual monopoly of intellectuals...” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 37). Even academics who are themselves critical of the failure of critical theory to problematise its own fundamental assumptions, do not address themselves to the problem of the academically embedded context in which theory is constructed (Sayer’s, 1995 critique of critical theory is a case in point). Academics create virtual realities, textual realities, ethnographic and statistical realities. These overhang and frame the lived existence of those who cannot name their own world; it is frequently in the context of these detached and remoter realities that public policy is often enacted. The frame becomes the picture in the public eye. Yet theoretical knowledge has serious limitations imposed upon it by the conditions of its own performance. The relations of cultural production within which critical theory, feminist theory, and egalitarian theory are produced are generally no different to those that operate for the study of nuclear physics, corporate law or business and finance. Although some academics may view themselves as radical, reforming, feminist or emancipatory, they occupy a particular location within the class system (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 36-48). They are part of the cultural elite of society. It is the designation of cultural elitism which provides them with the structural conditions to write; it gives them credibility over other voices and reinforces the perception of superiority which maintains the salary differentials between themselves and other workers. Being granted the freedom from necessity to write and discuss is a privilege which academics (be they liberal, radical or conservative) in well-funded universities are rarely asked to reflect upon, however. Yet, academics are also subordinate to powerful corporate interest groups in the business and industrial sector. In a sense, therefore, they occupy a contradictory class location (Davies, 1995), being at once an elite in the cultural sphere and relatively subordinate in the industrial or financial sphere. Thus, while the concept of the “free-floating, disinterested intellectual” may be part of the ideology of academia it is not grounded in any sociological reality; even radical intellectuals are culturally, and relatively financially, privileged. Operating within a contradictory state, of being personally radical and publicly privileged, makes it difficult for many politically left-wing academics to be progressive in cultural or university politics. It is much simpler to be progressive in general politics that do not touch the core values of one’s own work. Bourdieu (1993, p. 45) suggests that there is no easy resolution to this dilemma for radical intellectuals. He proposes a radical, ongoing reflexivity wherein one prepares “the conditions for a critical knowledge of the limits of knowledge which is the precondition for true knowledge” as the principal protection available. In this way, researchers know where they themselves stand in the classification system. Even if academics do engage in ongoing reflexivity, this does not alter the structural conditions under which they work. The dilemma posed by unequal power between researcher and research subject is not readily resolved, even when the researcher works with emancipatory intent (Lentin 1993, p. 128; Martin, 1996). It is generally the researchers who produce the final text, the written record of the research event. This gives them a power of definition which cannot be abrogated at will. Moreover, the very efforts of those interested in transforming the relations of research production (from those of dominance to those of partnership or emancipation) are deeply implicated in the exercise of power. One cannot escape the reality of power relations even within the language of emancipation. In addition, intellectuals work in institutions which lay down working conditions based on the dominant meritocratic principles of our time — ostensibly at least, promotion is based on merit. The way in which merit is measured is in terms of conformity to the dominant norms of intellectual and academic discourse. This includes not only writing with the dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1961) but writing about what is currently intellectually fashionable. Without at least a nodding recognition of the importance of the dominant discourses, then one’s work is not likely to be published.6 And it is through their publications that intellectuals in universities are generally assessed. While “there is something desperate in the docility with which “free intellectuals” rush to hand in their essays on the required subject of the moment” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 43) the fact remains that academics jobs and incomes are often dependent on such conformity. Not only does the academy generally only recognise those who conform to the intellectual norms of the day, it penalises those who attempt to redefine the purpose of the academy. Lectures, consultations and involvements with nonacademic bodies do not count in terms of the enumerations of one’s work or achievements.7 This acts as a very effective control on academic work limiting and containing interests within the safe confines of the university. It also works effectively to preclude intellectuals from involving themselves, and the university, in radicalising initiatives. While “established or tenured” academics can afford to indulge in such developments, sanctioning via limited promotional opportunities continues to exercise control even over these. Yet, public lectures and involvements with voluntary, statutory, community and other organisations is essential if research findings are to be circulated outside the narrow confines of the academy. Given that the production of scientific knowledge generally is often legitimated on the grounds that it will contribute to progress, and to the ultimate general good of humanity, it is difficult to see how this can happen without the dissemination of the findings outside the academy in accessible contexts and language. What is interesting about the boundary maintenance which goes on in universities is that it is not confined to any one field (Bernstein, 1971). It occurs within and between disciplines, and between the university itself and the “outside community”. Academic knowledge is defined as “superior” knowledge. The fact that the academic perspective is only one viewpoint, and that it may need to be complemented by other forms of understanding by non-academic research subjects is largely ignored (Lather, 1986). The parameters within which academic dialogue takes place, therefore, are narrowly defined thereby inhibiting criticism of academic discourse itself, and prohibiting academics from understanding the world from the perspectives of the “other” outside the academy

2022 Michigan Kritik
Case Neg vs. Fem IR Aff › Poetry Bad

Poems lock the reader into ideology rather than allowing one to identify freely – reifies the structures they critique - turns the case

Altieri, ‘96 (Charles “Some Problems about Agency in the Theories of Radical Poetics” Contemporary Literature, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 207-236)

All three cases offer important correctives to an academic culture that has been obsessed with interpretation as the fundamental model of readerly participation. But even this struggle against the academy requires some further considerations that I think have not been sufficiently taken up by the prevailing radical theories. Were we to grant that the fundamental problem of contemporary Western culture was a blindness inflicted by the imposition of false universals, we would still have to ask if it can suffice to base our notion of what the text offers readers on the project of resisting all hermeneutic idealization. For fact process texts, do we not condemn them to those forces that shape them as such subjects? We ignore the possibilities that the text as structure, as willed object rather than as object of free play, can actually modify beliefs and provide alternative modes of sensibility. So it seems that if poetry is to offer effective resistance to aspects of the dominant culture, we will have to grant it the power to construct hypothetical countermodels, or, at the very least, to provide modes of second-order reading by which an audience is invited to take some distance from its own direct first-order habits. Poems must foster readerly identities that simultaneously align imaginations with specific processes confronting dominant ideological structures and reflect on what is at stake in the choices made as one reads.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › AT: SSD

Their conception of switch side normalizes opposition as a narrative of completeness that shuts out feminist considerations of IR

Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).

The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › AT: Deliberation

Their disembodied model of public deliberation is based on a utopian and masculine Cartesian subject – turns the aff

Pajnik, Mojca, 2006 ("Feminist reflections on Habermas’s communicative action the need for an inclusive political theory." European journal of social theory 9.3; p. 389-390)

Although Habermas broke with the monologic tradition, a frequent criticism among feminist authors is that his theory is too ‘Kantian’. According to this criticism, Habermas persisted in the conception of a moral individual who is disembodied and self-centred – in contrast to a relational and embodied female or male individual. Criticisms of the monologic stance of communicative action are frequent, although a closer reading of Habermas’s theory shows that Habermas’s individual is not tied to a deeper inner contemplation. Habermas’s individual is not liberated from communication with others, but is realized through interaction with others (Baynes, 1994: 319). Jane Braaten (1995) notes that Habermas, with his theory of communicative action, distances himself, on the one hand, from the Cartesian philosophy of the subject, but, on the other, reproduces it with the concept of communicative rationality. In explaining communicative rationality, Habermas becomes overly trapped in the patriarchy of traditional epistemology, which tries to defend the possibility of action in the period of the new historicism of late modernity. Braaten tries to understand Habermas’s theory through the perspective of feminist reasoning and feminist epistemology, on which she bases her alternative to communicative rationality. She calls it communicative thinking, which is based on two principles: the principle of solidarity and the principle of intersubjectivity. As an alternative to the technical image of rationality, grounded in Western, Anglo-American theoretical traditions, according to which rational action, to use Plato’s terminology, is reserved for the ‘enlightened’, Braaten advocates a rational feminist discourse which is based on the principle of solidarity and linked to the issues of discrimination against women. By defending different forms of rational action, she attempts to transcend the bounds of a technical explanation of the success and effectiveness of action, which Habermas also problematized, particularly with the critique of strategic, instrumental action (see Habermas, [1963] 1972, 1968). The difference between communicative rationality and communicative thinking is also explained by the author by drawing on the principle of intersubjectivity: in Habermas’s communicative rationality, this is too narrowly tied to the linguistic process of accepting and rejecting arguments, or is at least, as pointed out by Dallmayr (1984: 236), not clearly formulated. Communicative thinking is a concept which reflects the complexity of everyday life, and the multiple means of action and which takes into account the diversity of contexts of action. Braaten understands it as wider than communicative rationality – this she understands in a somewhat narrow sense as (merely) spoken agreement, achieved by the domination of the superior argument. Consensus, which in Habermas arises from a commonly defined objectivity, assumes ideal, abstract individuals, while communicative thinking considers life contexts and memories. Communicative thinking includes ‘imagination and flexibility’ (Braaten, 1995: 156) and relies on forms of action which try to aerate the stability of social structures. From the standpoint of the organization of society, communicative thinking does not mean a rejection or abandonment of communicative rationality, but rather an extension of rationality in the direction of conceptualization, which Darij Zadnikar recognizes in Habermas and calls ‘a multi-dimensional (“soft”) theory of rationality’ (Zadnikar, 1995: 9). Braaten, whose explanation of communicative thinking explicitly draws on a personal, even physical, feminist perspective, identifies several meanings for this concept. Communicative thinking foremost means respecting differences in everyday life with the inclusion of possibilities for the transformation of conventional politics, with the aim of meeting specific needs, for instance, those of women. It advocates the rethinking of the position of different groups of citizens to respect the specificities of life contexts and opportunities. By providing an alternative to one-dimensionality and the systematic, unified arrangement of structures, it stimulates the multi-dimensionality of expression (Braaten, 1995: 156, 157). Communicative thinking is a response to a technically defined rationality which, in the view of some critics, is still present in Habermas’s theory; it assumes the Kantian action of autonomous, rational subjects: we can speak of the success of speech acts, according to Habermas, when rational subjects act in order to achieve a rational consensus. In this, they are acting according to communicative norms, the rules of universal pragmatics, which assume a communicative competence for grammatical expression. This rigidly defined communicative rationality implies, as expressed in Benjamin Barber’s categories, too thin an understanding of communicative action and in this framework communicative thinking as an alternative is of interest.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › AT: Deliberation

Their model of deliberation relies on a hegemonically masculine model of rationality and stasis point that attempts to push “unproductive” knowledge to the private or domestic sphere –

Tomlinson, 10 (Barbara, “Feminism and Affect at the scene of argument”, Ch 1 – transforming the terms of reading)

Contemporary U.S. political and academic discourse abounds with a recurring set of formulaic claims that feminist scholars (and feminists in general) are angry, unreasoning, shrill, humorless, ugly, man- hating, perverse, and peculiar. This “trope of the angry feminist” is designed to delegitimize feminist argument even before the argument begins, to undermine feminist politics by making its costs personal, and to foreclose feminist futures by making feminism seem repulsive to young women. The trope is a convention, a plot trick, a setup, a narrative structure, a character type. 2 Its incessant repetition constitutes part of a cultural training program that makes antifeminism and misogyny a routine element in everyday speech and written argument. Instigated by expressly po liti calopposition to feminism, deploying affectively charged strategies that float free of evidence, clichés like the angry feminist put animosity— not argument— at the center of politi cal discussions, interpellating readers as always already antifeminist. The repetition and circulation of such tropes produces a cumulative overdetermined quality that makes them seem already true before the moment of argument. One never encounters the feminist’s argument for the first time because it comes already discredited. Because the trope of the angry feminist encourages unacknowledged ways of interpreting feminist affect, its inveterate irruption is consequential in journalism, entertainment, po liti cal, and quasi- intellectual arenas, as I describe in this introductory chapter. It is perhaps even more consequential in its influence on academic discourses, the subject of the remainder of the book: affect in academic discourses on social justice is often policed through “ideologies of style” that purport to be neutral but operate to entrench current conditions of power. In this book I argue that we have failed to theorize adequately the role of such pervasive affective and ideologically encapsulated arguments in academic and political discourses. In consequence, we do not recognize that our conventional reading practices mislead us about ways to comprehend and counter them. I argue that transforming the terms of reading can reframe the problem, and propose for that purpose a critical toolkit that I call “feminist socioforensic discursive analysis.” My argument here constitutes a provocation to transform the terms of reading, to reframe interpretation of affect in both feminist and antifeminist writing. Th e trope of the angry feminist is a familiar conceit, like many similar phrases deployed to delegitimize social criticism, one that draws on a deep well of related clichés, affective rhetorical strategies, and familiar tropes. Th ese discursive moves circulate as instantiations of power. Th e trope of the angry feminist presents itself as fresh each time it is uttered, its repetitious banality framed as mere reflection of the repetitious banality of the feminist’s argument. Th is leads to the absurd but po liti cally effi cacious situation where readers are weary of arguments they have never heard. These argumentative tactics often succeed in part because our normal reading and writing practices lead us to object or counterargue in ways that fail to come to grips with the specific nature of the rhetorical situation that the tropes instantiate. Our conventional reading practices reinscribe ways of thinking that seem “logical” or “fair” because they are so familiar; they lead us to treat the tropes as surface features of discourse that serve to “skew” debate from its direct and proper form. These conventional practices, permeated by unacknowledged power relations, encourage us to respond to the tropes “normatively,” with reproaches about textual etiquette, textual responsibility, or textual appropriateness, to complain about inadequate evidence, to provide counterexamples, or to condemn the person proffering the trope, as though its use violates an agreement about the proper nature of civic discussion, and as if there is a mechanism of accountability. None of this is the case. Responses that might chastise, correct, or even complain about the trope of the angry feminist are inadequate in part because they rest, ultimately, on an imaginary ideal: a discursive arena regulated by impartial principles in which utterances are adjudicated by unbiased observers. Framing political and even academic discussion in this commonsense way treats rhetoric as a neutral technology to be deployed or evaluated in isolation from its conditions of production, the situations of speakers, or the general societal power relations that give utterances friendly to prevailing power relations an overdetermined “reasonableness” while rendering most oppositional arguments automatically suspect. Our reading practices already rest on uninterrogated and deeply gendered and racialized models of textuality, argument, authorship, politeness, and emotion. Under such conditions, affect is a potent tool of dominance, infusing the reading situation to teach us what power is, who has it, how to get it, how to be rewarded, and how to avoid the punishments power can deliver. Louis Althusser (1971) argues that concrete individuals become constituted as “subjects” through ideology, but the most powerful ideological influences do not come to us in the form of ideological pronouncements. Th at would make them visible, controversial, and refutable. Instead, he argues, the most powerful ideologies exist in “apparatuses,” in practices, and these practices are always material. Reading, writing, and argument are social practices sedimented with ideologies of legitimacy, propriety and fairness so powerful and pervasive that we presuppose their value rather than examining their effects.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › FIAT Bad

Interpreting FIAT as simulation of USFG action destroys our agency in relating to the resolution – turns deliberation and advocacy and reifies hegemonic ideologies

Antonio 95 (Robert, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 101, No. 1)

Treating words as mirrors of reality provides a comforting illusion of "certainty." This tendency obscures the social bases of language, reifies social conventions, and weakens capacities to imagine and create alternative conditions. Linguistic "abbreviations" cement obligatory social ties where "mutual agreement" about "feelings" is absent and the tendency to "let go" must be stemmed. Nietzsche held that language serves social selection of the herd, keeping experiences, desires, impulses, and actions of weak persons within boundaries, inscribing strong individuals as collective enemies, and redirecting ressentiment into regimentation. Accordingly, cultural rationalization makes this process of liquidating particularity more effective and universal (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 100—102, 216—17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380). Since Nietzsche was himself a master writer, his polemics about words per se are hyperbolic.11 The real target is Socratic culture's exceptionally abstract languages, rampant conceptual reifications, and impoverished aesthetic sensibilities. Nietzsche believed that the obsession with rational representation makes the body an inert target of disciplinary control. Adoration of concepts, theory, and reason makes the abstract signifier the ultimate object of knowledge. Purely formal concepts are treated as the "highest," "real," and "true" things, while sense experience is relegated to the degraded status of "appearance." Platonic ideas, Chris- tian soul, Kantian things-in-themselves, and Newtonian atoms and time are all foundational reifications that "dehistoricize" the corporeal world and erect illusions of firm "grounds" for those who cannot face life without God and tradition or bear the weight of its connective choices and its "great dice game" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 287-90; 19686, p. 549; 19686, pp. 35-37). Destroying Socratic culture's "objective" foundations (i.e., God and Truth), the latest phase of cultural rationalization greatly amplifies feel- ings of uncertainty. The consequent desperate searching and clinging produces frenetic reification; fanatical new prejudices, religions, and politics appear alongside the most sterile intellectual formalisms. Mass culture's hastily formulated languages blur all difference and ambiguity (e.g., parties "transform their principles into great at fresco stupidities"). The proliferation of abstract signifiers, arising from diverse locations and detached from any sense of stable referents, contribute to increasingly mechanical, diffuse, and mindless regimentation. In this fashion, Nietzsche severed the links that modern theorists saw between rationalization and enhanced communication, social integration, and legitimate authority (Nietzsche 1983, p. 215; 1986, pp. 161-62; 1966, pp. 216-17; 19686, pp. 357-58, 380-81). According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations over identify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing over concern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Nietzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › Subject Formation NB

Communication inside of this space is valuable because it disrupts colonial subject formation. The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject.

Karlberg ‘05 [Michael Karlberg, a professor at Western Washington University, specializes in Communism Studies “THE POWER OF DISCOURSE NAD THE DISCOURSE OF POWER: PURSUING PEACE THROUGH DISCOURSE INTERVENTION,” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2005] Davis W

Western-liberal discourses of power and the social practices associated with them are proving inadequate to the task of creating a peaceful, just, and sustainable social order. Having recognized this, progressive scholars and social reformers have begun articulating alternative discourses of power, along with alternative models of social practice. Together, these efforts can be interpreted as a project of discourse intervention – an effort to change our social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute it. In order to advance this project, this paper deconstructs the dominant Western-liberal discourse of power, clarifies elements of an alternative discourse of power, and presents a case study of an alternative discourse community and the alternative models of social practice that it is constructing. The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that subject. This is the basic premise of discourse theory (refer, for example, to Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hall, 1997; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). This paper is about the ways we tend to think and talk about power. In Western-liberal societies, our discourses of power are almost exclusively conflictual or adversarial. Power tends to be associated with competition at best, coercion or domination at worst. Given that the ways we think and talk about a subject influence the ways we act in relation to that subject, these adversarial discourses of power can be problematic because they obscure the mutualistic dimensions of power that have played a significant role in human history and that will need to play an even more significant role if we are to learn how to live together peacefully in an increasingly interdependent world. Peace researchers such as Kenneth Boulding (1990), along with feminist writers and theorists such as Hartsock (1974) and Miller (1982), have articulated alternative ways of thinking and talking about power for precisely this reason. These efforts can be understood as a project of discourse intervention – an effort to change our social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute that reality. To date, this project is still in a nascent stage and thus remains an important yet incomplete intervention in the Westernliberal culture of conflict. To further advance this project, an alternative discourse of power needs to be more clearly articulated. It also needs to be more fully reconciled with the conflictual models of power that are necessary for critical social analysis but insufficient as a normative framework for social practice. Toward this end, this paper briefly traces the contours of prevailing discourses of power by examining them in their most explicitly articulated form: academic discourses of power. After identifying the limitations of these existing discourses, the paper outlines an alternative vocabulary, along with a simple analytical schema, for thinking and talking about power in both its mutualistic and adversarial expressions. The paper concludes with an examination of how one alternative discourse community – the international Bahá'í community – is already constructing alternative models of social practice. Power as dominationAs a central concept within Western social theory, the academic study of power has been approached in many ways, yielding diverse and valuable insights. For example, some theorists have focused on the different forms that power takes, as well as the bases or resources that permit the exercise of power (Wartenberg, 1990; Wrong, 1997); some have explored the complex relationship between the quantitative distribution of power and the processes of social consent that legitimate various expressions of power (Hindess, 1996); some have examined the changing ways that power circulates throughout societies, constructing social institutions as well as individual subjectivities, as it imposes order and discipline in historically specific ways (Foucault, 1980); and others have approached the subject of power from other theoretical perspectives. A review of such a rich and complex body of literature is, of course, beyond the scope of this article. What this article will focus on is a dominant current of thought within late-twentieth-century scholarship that reflects popular Western-liberal discourses and assumptions regarding power. In the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists of power began to invoke what has become a widely-used distinction between two broad ways of thinking and talking about power. This distinction is made by contrasting the expression “power to” with the expression “power over” (e.g., Connolly, 1974; Coser, 1976; Dowding, 1996; Hartsock, 1974, 1983; Lukes, 1986; Macpherson, 1973; Pitkin, 1972). As Wartenberg (1990, p.27) explains, the expressions power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction between two fundamentally different ordinary-language locutions within which the term “power” occurs. Depending upon which locution one takes as the basis of one’s theory of power, one will arrive at a very different model of the role of power in the social world. The predominant model of power in Western social theory – what I call the power as domination model – derives from the latter of these expressions. Although “power to” is the basis of models in the physical and natural sciences, “power over” highlights issues of social conflict, control, and coercion, which have been the primary focus of Western social and political scientists. This power as domination paradigm traces back, either implicitly or explicitly, through the writings of diverse social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986) to Bourdieu (1994). It informed Hobbes’ (1968) notion of a “war of all against all” as well as Marx and Engels’ (1967) theory of historical materialism. Indeed, as Giddens (1984, pp. 256-7) points out, this conflictual model of power underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory, from the left and the right. The extent to which Western social and political theory has developed within the boundaries of this paradigm can best be seen in the American “community power debates” of the mid-twentieth century. Within these debates, prominent power theorists from various sides of the political spectrum, including Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, all proposed different operational definitions of the term power. Yet all of these definitions fell squarely within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. In brief, Dahl (1969, p. 80) conceptualized power in simple behavioral terms, explaining that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. In response to this simple behavioral definition, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argued that power over others can also be exercised in more subtle ways that involve “the mobilization of bias” within a social or political system in a manner that prevents some people or groups from advancing their own self-identified interests. As they (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 7) explain: Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that in their resolution might be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences. Lukes (1974), in turn, insists that both of these conceptualizations are too simplistic. According to Lukes, power over others can also be exercised by preventing them from identifying or recognizing their own interests. In other words, power can be exercised over others by cultivating what Marx and Engels (1967) referred to as false consciousness, or by exercising what Gramsci (1971) referred to as cultural hegemony. As Lukes (1974, p. 23) explains: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? Though Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes each advanced different operational definitions of the term power, all of these definitions were contained within the boundaries of the power as domination paradigm. To his credit, Lukes, along with a number of other power as domination theorists since him, have acknowledged the possibility that “power to” could serve as the basis for an alternative model of social power. However, this acknowledgment has typically been made in order to dismiss “power to” models as largely irrelevant to social and political theory. As Lukes (1974, p. 30) originally contended, “power to” models have less conceptual value than “power over” models for two reasons. First, he asserted that these “revisionary persuasive redefinitions [i.e., “power to” definitions]... are out of line with the central meanings of “power” as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power” (Lukes, 1974, pp. 30-31). Second, Lukes (1974, p. 31) asserted that when one focuses on “power to” concepts “the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is exercised over people – disappears altogether from view, and along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place”. In this vein, Lukes (1974, p. 31) argues that “power to” theories end up “concealing from view the central aspects of power which they define out of existence”. Ironically, by dismissing “power to” theories, Lukes did the same thing in reverse. Similar tendencies characterize the work of many other power theorists. For instance, Wartenberg (1990, p. 5), after drawing the distinction between “power to” and “power over” quoted at the beginning of this paper, goes on to argue that a theory of power has, as a first priority, the articulation of the meaning of the concept of power-over because social theory employs this concept as a primary means of conceptualizing the nature of the fundamental inequalities in society. “Power over”, he (Wartenberg, 1990, p. 5) thus asserts, is “the primary meaning of ‘power’”. And, like Lukes, Wartenberg (1990, p. 5) argues that a focus on “power to” relations merely “shifts the theorist’s gaze away from the set of phenomena that a theory of social power must comprehend, namely the illegitimate inequalities that exist in modern societies”. Even Foucault, despite his radical re-thinking of the nature and function of power, was unable to escape the gravitational pull of the “power over” model in his own writing. Foucault (1980) understands power as a relational force that permeates the entire social body, connecting all social groups in a web of mutual influence. As a relational force, power constructs social organization and hierarchy by producing discourses and truths, by imposing discipline and order, and by shaping human desires and subjectivities. In this context, Foucault sees power as simultaneously productive and repressive: a social body cannot function without it, despite its perennially oppressive manifestations. By recognizing the productive function of power, Foucault gives a nod to the “power to” theorists. However, in his actual analyses, Foucault situates himself squarely within the power-as-domination tradition, and his over-arching project is clearly one of resistance to such expressions of power. Furthermore, he explicitly calls for others to do the same: “We should direct our researches on the nature of power”, he (Foucault, 1980, p. 102) writes, “towards domination and material operators of power”, and we should “base our analyses of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination”.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › Metaphorical Analysis Key

Political deliberation is based more on how metaphors animate policy than rational choices

Heidt 13 Heidt, Stephen J. Department of Communication, Georgia State University. "Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry." Southern Communication Journal 78.3 (2013): 233-255. rishi

Presidential rhetoric always ignores policy details partially because presidents don’t like to speak in specifics, but also partially because metaphoric appeals are easier to extend. Presidents turn to metaphor because they recognize the power of metaphor, the ability of metaphor to connect complicated public policy proposals to broader themes and representations of America, and the difficulty opponents have in countering metaphorical depictions of public policy. In this way, public decision making is premised not on the evaluation of specific policies but instead on the assessment of the archetypal metaphors utilized by advocates and the ability of those metaphors to animate empty, incomplete, or poorly defined policy agendas. The danger reflected by this analysis is that the use of metaphor to extend public policy pushes an ultimately uncritical perspective, one that asks audiences to accept the policy not on its merits but on its relationship to generalized conceptions of the human experience. The danger of uncritical acceptance is such that, over time, advocates and publics come to believe their characterizations of international situations, the necessity and inevitability of democracy, and the U.S. role as benevolent assistant. These rhetorical processes allow for the appropriation and use of policy by those less interested in the ideals that serve as the genesis for the policy and instead desire to redirect the policy toward their own ends. This is precisely what occurred during the George W. Bush administration, leading one expert to fear that ‘‘the close association of democracy promotion both with the war in Iraq . . . and with the War on Terrorism . . . has badly hurt the legitimacy of democracy promotion.’’105 Critical inquiry into the rhetorical forms like metaphor that authorize, extend, or reassert public policy can usefully expose those forms as antidemocratic tools that sanitize public conceptions and convert well-intentioned public policy into something else entirely. These conclusions suggest that more essays explaining metaphor’s role in public policy would be welcome.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Framework › AT: TVA - Trade off DA

Centering debates on specific operational aspects of military policy trades off with analyses of cultural constructs that justify the use of force – their model of debate doesn’t challenge militarism

Levy 15 Levy, Yagil. Prof. Yagil Levy. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at Open University of Israel "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization." Armed Forces & Society (2015): 0095327X14567918. rishi

What is controlled by civilian control of the military? One might think that effective civilian control restrains the use of force. However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, a glance at developments in civil–military relations during the post– Cold War period shows that while civilian control has been tightened in many democracies, militarization also increased. Militarism is defined as an approach that regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.1 Militarization is therefore a process through which militarism increases while demilitarization signifies a decline in this propensity. As an illustration, in the United States, as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, militarization with an increased propensity to use force2 thrived in an era of increased political scrutiny of the military.3 In Israel, civilian control has been enhanced since the 1970s, leading to an overly subordinate military whose professional autonomy has been impaired,4 while the government has enjoyed more legitimacy to launch offensive campaigns in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.5 In Russia, during Putin’s rule, the military’s subversive behavior toward elected politicians has been moderated and its freedom of action restricted,6 however, militarization in terms of patriotic education,7 and the inflation of external threats8 has flourished. Thus, increased civilian control of the military may be coupled with militarization, although not necessarily. This case raises the need for two scholarly investigations. The first, which I will leave unexplored, is the extent to which there is a causal link between civilian control and militarization. The second, and the focus of this article, is the extent to which control of the military should be distinguished from the mechanisms controlling the use of force, an underdeveloped aspect in the study of civil–military relations, as I explain in greater detail subsequently. I argue that a distinction should be made between two modes of civilian control over military affairs: control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military, the main focus of students of civilian control, concerns itself primarily with the military organization, particularly the operational aspects of the military’s performance (doctrine, deployment, resources, etc.) and their expected political implications. In contrast, the control of militarization deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of force, first and foremost military force. It draws on political discourse, seeking to guarantee that the use of force follows a thorough, open, and deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy to use. The encounter between the modes of control yields several possible results. It follows that this article is an analytically motivated study rather an empirically motivated one. My aim is to develop a theory that distinguishes between the control of the military and the control of militarization and propositions regarding the encounter between the two modes of control. These propositions can be viewed as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry.9 The first section presents the gap in the literature, leading, in the second section, to a revised conceptualization of civilian control. In the third section, I analyze the relationship between the modes of control. The Theoretical Gap Scholars disagree whether civilian control of the armed forces is positively correlated with the reduction in the use of force. Lasswell argued for such a positive correlation. In his classic ‘‘garrison state’’ theme, he expressed concern that the empowerment of the military establishment in reaction to an external threat would undermine civil–military relations by letting the officers, as ‘‘specialists in violence,’’ run the state and impose their warlike inclinations on politics.10 Choi and James validated this concern statistically by concluding that as the influence of the military increases, the likelihood that the state will be involved in a military dispute becomes greater.11 Similarly, Snyder echoed the Lasswellian view by claiming that the offensive bias is exacerbated when civilian control is weak, and this bias grows more extreme when the military leverages the operational doctrine to improve its position in civil–military disputes.12 Sechser linked civilian control with the use of force by suggesting that the cautious nature of military officers may be a consequence of strong civilian control.13 Officers are concerned that a strong civilian leadership will punish them for botched military adventures. Mills went even further by arguing that there is no prospect for peace without a monopolistic control of violence, an approach that strongly links control with the restraint of force.14 In a different manner, students of militarism such as Bacevich,15 Mann,16 and Shaw17 implicitly recognized that the restraint of the military may take place within a militaristic mind-set. At the extreme, as Mann asserted with regard to the post– Cold War expansionist trends of the United States, ‘‘the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists’’.18 It follows that civilian control may not reduce the proclivity to use force. Recognizing that militaristic pressures can come from civilian origins, other scholars even assume that officers may be less war-prone than politicians. Huntington famously contended that the military is more conservative than civilians regarding the propensity to use force, largely due to organizational cautiousness.19 Similarly, Betts concluded that military leaders rarely recommend the use of force, and their advice is more influential when counseling against military intervention.20 Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security. 21 Desch acknowledged that, ‘‘the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it’’.22 In other words, civilians may be more warprone than the military.23 It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.24 Therefore, effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force. Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between control of the military and control of militarization. Two Modes of Control Control of the Military A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives.25 To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.26 It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry. Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier. As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is. Control of Militarization While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force. Drawing on Burk’s ‘‘way of war,’’27 Johnston’s ‘‘strategic culture,’’28 Mann’s ‘‘militarism,’’29 and Beetham’s ‘‘political legitimacy,’’30 the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state’s legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force. Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation’s security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,31 an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.32 The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable. Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military’s institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading. The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process: 1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.33 2. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good.34 Thus, the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives. 3. Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation.35 4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.36 Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.37 By extension, challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation. In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.38 This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.39

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Grace

Victoria Grace is transphobic—their link/answer is just another reason to vote for us.

Guignion 21 (David, University of Western Ontario, The Journal of Media Art Study and Theory Volume 2, Issue 1, 2021) 

Grace combines her criticism of these two approaches to question if trans identities are “a transgressive force that destabilizes and challenges the gender binary” (117). Drawing upon the influential work of Sandy Stone, Susan Stryker, and Judith Halberstam (to name just a few), who have made significant contributions to the trans theory, each contributing specifically to the way that trans people are (pre)figured within the dominant matrix of cisgender and hetero-normative social relations that permeate today, Grace employs Baudrillard’s work to downplay these “transgenderist” beliefs that “reflect uncritically precisely what is happening with the simulation of gender, and accord almost perfectly with the contemporary hegemonic structuration” (121). The violence of Grace’s suggestion is striking for three primary reasons. Firstly, it positions trans identities as simply a means to transgress power relations when, for many—if not all—trans people, their identity as trans portends any political affiliation. Trans people are not trans people to make a political statement. Secondly, the disavowal of trans people’s identities as only participating in the hegemonic configuration of gender (as either anatomy as destiny or performative as destiny) ignores the fact that for many trans people their identities are a way by which they may continue to survive in the world. In other words, by framing their existence as a ‘failure’ to ostensibly challenge hyperreality, it extends the familiar oppressive discourses that shroud their daily lives. And thirdly, it is incredibly ironic for her to employ Baudrillard, a cis-gender man, as the authority on what constitutes appropriate, or properly political, identities. 

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Turn – Overdeterminism

There is no all-encompassing system of value that makes everything people do the capitalisms—your impact claims are overdetermined and vague—the affirmative’s creation of new codes is an effective form of politics.

MacCannell and MacCannell 1993 (Dean and Juliet, Sociology and English professors respectively at UC-Irvine, Forget Baudrillard? p. 141-143)

We are suggesting that Baudrillard took his analysis of the simula- crum up to the site of the new forms of capitalist exploitation that have introjected class structure into postmodernity. But he did not name the new sites of exploitation or initiate critical examination of them. His failure in this regard places his work at great risk. Historically it may contribute as much to the new forms of exploita- tion and their cover-up as to their exposure and eventual overthrow. He cannot 'read' or 'see' Mickey Mouse because Mickey stands in precisely the same relation to code creation as Baudrillard's theory taken in its entirety. Ultimately, both Baudrillard and Mickey Mouse insist on a generalized sense of the possible existence not of codes, which would be subversive, but of The Code, a single frame- work, already in existence, for everything. The Code, and correla- tively the pretence of the absence of need for any new code, is the only field for the putative free play of simulacra, or the appearance of a figure of lack which can be universally worshipped. If there were a code, it truly would accommodate human life to the impos- sible, to death, to ultimate pleasure, to the real. I f there were a code it would be equally and freely available to all human beings. Group, class, status, category, would disappear or be rendered insignificant. No wonder it is fervently desired by the prematurely utopian adherents of every political position. It would be stable and open to all for all time until the radical end of time that is supposed to be the Last Judgement.¶ Postmodernity affirms the possibility of The Code in the form of¶ pure repetition, the simulacrum, and the 'random cannibalization of styles of the past', as Jameson put it. But postmodern capitalism is also committed to apparent diversity of consumer goods within the framework of a single Code, a commitment that produces a certain tension if not a contradiction and dialectic. Apparent diversity is achieved by the marketing of diverse codes the source and origin of which are officially unrecognized and repressed.¶ We suggest that what is being exploited by postmodern capital- ism are the codes of those in the starkest of human situations, who have confronted 'the worst' most radically in their 'lifestyles' (=codes) or modes of relating to death and fulfilment. What is most successfully 'marketed' today are simulacra of whole ways of existing, adaptations of 'gang youth', punks, 'primitive' Brazilian Indians (At Play in the Fields of the Lord), homeless people, bag ladies, hookers, war victims, AIDS sufferers (the list is extended daily), their codes, the means they have worked out for dealing with the worst. We further suggest that Lacan was correct in his assertion that the 'panic' of the drive has displaced the Symbolic of¶ desire for the contemporary or postmodern subject. There is no more 'needs fulfilment' in postmodernity. Capitalism, driven beyond its capacity to provide, has seen to that. All that it can promise us now is an endless series of futile attempts to accommo- date that which carmot be accommodated: the satisfied need, ultimate jouissance, death. Its radical failure of symbolization leaves its believers 'eyeball to eyeball' with The Real. Postmodern capitalism is the realm of 'enjoyment', where the human subject is commanded 'to enjoy' but carmot, where pleasure that cannot be experienced spills over into The Thing, where our 'things' obscenely and menacingly enjoy themselves at our expense.¶ But there are those among us who deal directly with the absolute- ness of loss, those who know there is no substitutability, no itera- bility, no supplement. They have carved out an existence on the empty gound between the possibility of the symbolization of desire and the dream of a single Symbolic-Paternal Order. They are the only possible source of a critical viewpoint on postmodern capital- ism and of the creative energy needed to move it. We are disappointed with Baudrillard for not having found the site of post- modern exploitation, for giving us instead nostalgia for the medieval Church in the form of the now commonplace postmodern assertion of its absence. But if Baudrillard spends all his time with¶ commodities-as-simulacra, with God as simulacrum, with things that can have no relation to need, there must be a reason for it. He is avoiding the ground that has been departed by the cause of desire, the ground where new codes are created as a matter of necessity. This is the reason he did not find Mickey Mouse. Mickey is there on the ground of departed desire as a defender of its borders, to block those who have not entered and to cover up the creative adaptations of those who have. Mickey permits us to imagine that there is a universal code of which he is the emanation and emissary, while his owners, if not his animators, know there are as many codes - ripe for the plucking - as there are human groupings. What Mickey does not permit us to imagine is his code: that his head, with the two ears that never change their location or position, that his head is not only the maternal breast and the castrated balls, but a motion picture projector. What this Mickey- projector reproduces is not a universal code for iteration as has been claimed. It is rather a faithful reproduction of the absolute loss human life is based upon; of the theft of its creativity, its reduction, and abject resignation in the face of The Real.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Alt Fails

Baudrillard’s theory cannot distinguish between the productive politics of the aff and the mass snooze of commodification—the affirmative disproves the simulation thesis by producing content that ruptures and interrupts the droning message of the war on terror.

Rojek 1993 (Chris, Senior Editor in Sociology at Routledge Forget Baudrillard? P. 120

Yet to imply that poetry excludes politics is surely eccentric Observing and communicating cannot be satisfactorily understood as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them, as unchanging constants. There is an historical dimension to them. Baudrillard’s sociology is fatally immune to this because it is bluntly ahistorical. So it ignores how observing and communicating have changed and minimizes the stratified difference sbetween communicators and observers. Baudrillard correctly stresses that the distraction factories of the gflobal communications industry confuyse our sense of change and our awareness of difference. But the minimalist picture of humans as ‘monitroing screens’ or ‘terminals in mass communication networks’ which his sociloygy supplies is an unsuitable answer to this confusion. It does not even take seriously the circulation processes which his work identifies. For circulation involves not only repetition but also reaction. Benjamin’s sociology allows for reaction. His discussion of mass reproduction and the global circulation of images, bodies and commodities does not negate a political response; on the contrary it demands one. The decline of aura, the homogenization of culture and the manipulation of the masses are all things which Benjamin opposes. There may be a note of melancholy in his assessment of the prospects for successfully opposing these historical tendencies but he does not waver in his commitment to struggle and resistance. In contrast, Bduarillard discusses mass reproduction , homogenization, and manipulation as immoveable facts of life. One relates ot them through irony, play, seduyction and movement. Commitment in Baudrillard’s aleatory, reversible universe is always a sign of stuborrness. It closes down one’s range of response to the isness of hyperreality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Vulnerability DA

Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

As noted earlier, , , , ) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability. Such effects, as we have seen, include intense shame about dependence (see ), omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others. These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority (). The fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort.  and Glynos (2014a, ) have well elaborated the ways that overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Vulnerability DA

Vulnerability DA--Neoliberalism depends on the narcissistic fantasy of mastery that disavows vulnerability as dependence—alt reproduces neoliberalism without the aff

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

It is a hallmark of US neoliberal political life that the more people are rendered vulnerable and dispensable, the more the state of vulnerability becomes figured as shameful. As many have noted (see, for example, ), increased income inequality has led the privileged to rationalize their privilege, which in turn has led to decreasing empathy for the poor. , who interviewed white and black working-class men in New York in the 90s, found that neoliberal economic realities and the decline of traditional collective sources of solidarity had rendered white working-class men quite vulnerable. One way they dealt with their heightened feelings of vulnerability was to draw boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor, the latter of whom they associated with blackness (see also ). Indeed, by the 90s in the US, the white imaginary offered two predominant socially reviled subject positions to poor African Americans: the omnipotent male criminal, who terrorizes vulnerable whites with his nefarious entrepreneurial skills, and his split-off other side, the female welfare dependent, who, since Reagan, has held all of the country’s disavowed need and has been used as a signifier of the failures of big government. As I shall argue, a typical form of splitting endemic to neoliberal practices and ideologies pits omnipotent narcissistic versions of autonomy against degraded narcissistic versions of dependence. This instance of a racist white imaginary well exemplifies how a radical split between autonomy and dependence can be projected seamlessly onto a racialized and gendered divide.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Feminism DA

Baudrillard destroys feminist projects

Ebert 5 (Teresa, Professor of Humanities at the College of Arts and Sciences at the University at Albany who specializes in Critical and Cultural Theory, Feminist Critique, Marxist Theory and Globalization Theory, “Rematerializing Feminism” ) //Don Markos

Beyond the "End of Ideology " In postmodern social theory, especially in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, ideology is seen as undergoing a "break." In their writings, Laclau and Mouffe, through a heavy reliance on Lacan and Althusser, have erased the materialist theory of ideology articulated in Marx and Engels' The German Ideology and more em- phatically reiterated in Marx's own Capital In order to dramatize the break, they have reduced the classical Marxist theory of ideology to a simple "false consciousness" and with great fanfare have represented Althusserian and post-Althusserian views as groundbreaking concep- tual feats. Ideology after this "break" has become a generalized rep resentation from which no one can escape and in which everyone is condemned to live their social being. One of the consequences of this notion of ideology, of course, has been its erasure of the rigid clarity of class antagonisms and any other binaries (such as true/false, powerful/powerless, exploitative/emancipatory) . This paradox - that in a world in which ideology is one of the fundamental axes of identity and social processes, intellectuals have declared it ended - is caused by the fact that the regime of social relations of production, which the Marxist tradition has explained by the concept of ideology, has not only not ended but instead has intensified its hold on the subject. The most effective way to disentangle the contemporary impasse on ideology is to re-understand the materialist theory of ideology. Ideology has a very specific and materialist meaning in the Marxist tradition, especially in Marx's Capital (in which, curiously, it has be- come common to say that the notion of ideology was abandoned by Marx). In various chapters of Capital (especially chapters 1, 6, 9, 10, 1 1 and 12), Marx explains the process by which the worker exchanges his/her labor-power for wages. In chapter ten he explains the pre- cise mechanism of the working day, during which the worker pro- duces the equivalent of his wages and also surplus labor. In chapter six he theorizes the difference between labor and labor-power and concludes that labor-power is that particular "commodity whose use- value possess the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification of labor, hence a creation of value" (1977, 270). The exchange, he concludes, between the capitalist and the worker is an exchange of labor-power for wages. This exchange is represented in bourgeois theory as a free, unfettered and equal exchange. In fact, at the end of chapter six, Marx makes a point of dwelling on this "free-trader vulgaris" view of the exchange of wages for labor-power; he concludes that it is anything but an equal exchange - it leaves the worker, Marx notes, "like some- one who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but - a tanning" (1977, 280). The historical materialist concept of ideology seeks to account for the representations of this exchange as an equal and fair ex- change. This, I want to emphasize, is the core of the materialist theory of ideology: how the relation between wage-labor and capital is rep- resented as free and equal when it is anything but (it is "a tanning") . False consciousness (the bête noir of postmodern theories of ideology) is a "struggle concept" (to adopt Maria Mies' term) by which a mate- rialist understanding marks the consciousness that regards this ex- change to be an exchange among equals and conducted in freedom. It is a false consciousness, because it is seen as unfettered and un- coerced when, in fact, as Marx himself argues, this exchange takes place under "the silent compulsion of economic relations" - a com- pulsion that "sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker" (Marx, 1977, 899). False consciousness is the conscious- ness that misrecognizes the compulsion of economic relations as free and therefore accepts the exchange of wages for labor-power as equal. Even a quick look at the post-Althusserian theories of ideology will make clear that, far from being groundbreaking theories, the postmodern notion of ideology is simply an erasure of the material- ist theory of ideology and a marginalization of the role of labor. It ends up essentially legitimizing the relation between wage-labor and capital. To say, as postmodern theories of ideology say over and over again, that there is no space outside ideology is to say that it is impos- sible to mark any relation as a relation of inequality. Because to say that the exchange of wages for labor-power is unequal, according to postmodern theory, is to set up a "true" {i.e., "equal") relation. This is "wrong," according to postmodern theory, because it establishes a binary in which a truthful relation masters a false relation. But this is exactly what happens under capitalism. The relation between wage- labor and capital is an unequal relation, and to simply say that draw- ing attention to its inequality is to fall into binaries is to substitute bourgeois epistemology for social justice. Ideology is not epistemol- ogy: to try to make ideology part of epistemology and then decon- struct it through a maneuver in which right and wrong, correct and incorrect, truthful and untruthful are pitted against each other is to simply relegitimate capitalist relations. The crisis we are witnessing now in the theory of ideology is the crisis of this legitimization of an unjust relation in the discourses of intellectuals who, in their formal theories, declare themselves to be anti-capitalist and friends of the people.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Afro-Pessimism › Perm – Intersectionality

Perm – we must join struggles together against the patriarchy in an intersectional lens in order to advocate for women who are often excluded from feminist conversations

Lorde 80 (Audre Lorde, American writer, feminist, radical feminist, womanist, librarian, and civil rights activist. Black lesbian writer who addressed injustices such as racism, sexism, classism and homophobia through her works. “Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference”)

But our future survival is predicated upon our ability to relate within equality. As women, we must root out internalized patterns of oppression within ourselves if we are to move beyond the most supercial aspects of social change. Now we must recognize dierences among women who are our equals, neither inferior nor superior, and devise ways to use each others’ dierence to enrich our visions and our joint struggles.

The future of our earth may depend upon the ability of all women to identify and develop new denitions of power and new patterns of relating across dierence. The old denitions have not served us, nor the earth that supports us. The old patterns, no matter how cleverly rearranged to imitate progress, still condemn us to cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old exchanges, the same old guilt, hatred, recrimination, lamentation, and suspicion.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Afro-Pessimism › Perm

Prefer the perm: Systems of power are interlocking… and forcing competition between the aff and the alt links to white masculine rationality

Collins, 1990. (Patricia Hill Collins, Associate Professor of African American Studies, University of Cincinnati, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment, 1990, p. 225)

Additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric, masculinist thought. One must be either Black or white in such thought systems – persons of ambiguous racial and ethnic identity constantly battle with questions such as “what are you, anyway?” This emphasis on quantification and categorization occurs in conjunction with the belief that either/or categories must be ranked. The search for certainty of this sort requires that one side of a dichotomy be privileged while its other is denigrated. Privilege becomes defined in relation to its other. Replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking ones creates possibilities for new paradigms. The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity. Race, class and gender represent the three systems of oppression that most heavily affect African-American women. But these systems and the economic, political, and ideological conditions that support them may not be the most fundamental oppressions, and they certainly affect many more groups than Black women. Other people of color, Jews, the poor, white women, and gays and lesbians have all had similar ideological justifications offered for their subordination. All categories of humans labeled Others have been equated to one another, to animals, and to nature (Halpin 1989). Placing African-American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both/and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending upon the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Afro-Pessimism › Turn – Intersectionality

Afro-pessimism as a totalizing theory cedes potential for radical surrender to intersectionality which is key for black feminist praxis

Nash 19, (Jennifer C. Nash, Black Feminism Reimagined: After Intersectionality, 2019, Jennifer C. Nash is Associate Professor of African American Studies and Gender and Sexuality Studies at Northwestern University)GP

In this chapter, I imagine a black feminist theoretical and political project that could surrender its territorial hold to intersectionality and permit the analytic to move untethered from the imagined specificity of black woman. My understanding of surrender is indebted to Kevin Quashie’s work on black interiority, which complicates the prevailing notion that surrender is “a passive term, the counterpart to being conquered, dominated, or defeated.”8 Instead, Quashie argues that surrender can be “expressive and active,” “a deliberate giving up to another, the simultaneous practice of yielding and falling toward what is deeply and largely unknowable.”9 Drawing on Quashie, I treat a black feminist surrender of intersectionality not as a form of “defeat” but as the beginning of reimagining black feminist theoretical and political life, as a deep act of generosity that unleashes connections between black feminism and women of color feminism, enabling black feminism to imagine itself otherwise. Indeed, this chapter endeavors to energize a black feminist politics of surrender by asking what if we surrendered the notion that black woman is intersectionality’s key sign? What if we insistently despecified intersectionality? What if we embraced a vision of intersectionality that was capacious enough to center women of color generally and that insisted on the intimacies between transnationalism and intersectionality in terms of both their construction and use by women’s studies and their creative world-making possibilities? What if intersectionality could be mobilized to theorize arrangements of power beyond US black woman, and thus as a generative space of intimacy among women of color? In other words, I treat a despecified intersectionality, one that does not necessarily reference black woman, as a critical response to how women’s studies has imagined both intersectionality and transnationalism, and as an opportunity for black feminists to imagine a kind of intimacy with both transnationalism and the broader category “women of color.” This form of letting go, effectively ceding a proprietary relationship with intersectionality, allows for new forms of intimacy, allegiance, and alliance and promotes a form of black feminist agency that is far from the defensive posture I trace in the first half of the book.