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2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › I/L Disease

Authoritarian Regimes lead the world in tech development

Chandran and Nicolaci da Costa 19’, (Kavita Chandran and Ana Nicolaci da Costa, “China’s drive to be a world leader in technology could accelerate as its economy slows”, CNBC, NOV 22 2019, , ME)

China is on track to becoming the biggest 5G market in the world. Earlier this month, China turned on its 5G mobile networks ahead of schedule. It announced days later that it was rolling out research and development for 6G networks — even though 5G is still at its infancy. China’s 5G commercial services are available in 50 Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, according to state-backed media Xinhua. In comparison, 5G services in the U.S. are offered only in certain cities. Wendy Liu, head of China strategy for UBS told CNBC there was greater willingness in China than elsewhere to back 5G and blockchain technologies. That’s because they are key to facilitating and managing commerce in the world’s most populous country, she said. “Due to its own needs, (China) is going to push in that direction and you see this willingness to back these technologies more so than anywhere else,” said Liu. Blockchain, a technology that underpins cryptocurrency Bitcoin, is now being used by various industries from finance to food. “Blockchain has the potential to fundamentally change the way businesses conduct business,” said Lucy Gazmararian, senior manager at PwC Hong Kong. “So, a number of areas of financial services are really able to improve significantly because of blockchain infrastructure.” China recently threw its weight behind blockchain. President Xi Jinping reportedly urged China to “seize the opportunity” offered by blockchain, and called on the country to advance development in the field. Edith Yeung, a partner at blockchain-focused venture capital fund Proof of Capital, said the Chinese government has been researching and studying the possibility of launching its own digital currency in recent years. China’s virtual currency may be rolled out within a year: Proof of Capital. She said Beijing has also identified entities for a potential rollout. A virtual yuan could become a reality “quite soon,” Yeung said, adding that it could even challenge the U.S. dollar’s global dominance. From self-driving cars to cancer detection, artificial intelligence (AI) promises to improve and speed up every business in the world. AI can be broadly defined as technology that replicates human intelligence and behavior, in areas such as problem-solving, learning and reasoning. The leadership in Beijing announced in 2017 that it wants to become the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. “China is absolutely leading the world in AI,” according to Frank Hester, founder of TPP, a UK-based healthtech company that has been doing business in China since 2013. “I’ve seen a change over the past 5 years (in China) … it’s almost the policy now to do business with foreigners, which is great.” According to Alain Bénichou, CEO of IBM’s Greater China business, 14% of firms in China have embraced AI technology. He said the rate of adoption in China is higher than the global average, but there is room to grow.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › I/L Disease

China’s A.I and technology advances aid in fight against COVID

Hessey 2020, (Hessey Elliot, “China and AI: what the world can learn and what it should be wary of”, July 1, 2020, )

China announced in 2017 its ambition to become the world leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. While the US still leads in absolute terms, China appears to be making more rapid progress than either the US or the EU, and central and local government spending on AI in China is estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars. The move has led – at least in the West – to warnings of a global AI arms race and concerns about the growing reach of China’s authoritarian surveillance state. But treating China as a “villain” in this way is both overly simplistic and potentially costly. While there are undoubtedly aspects of the Chinese government’s approach to AI that are highly concerning and rightly should be condemned, it’s important that this does not cloud all analysis of China’s AI innovation. The world needs to engage seriously with China’s AI development and take a closer look at what’s really going on. The story is complex and it’s important to highlight where China is making promising advances in useful AI applications and to challenge common misconceptions, as well as to caution against problematic uses. Nesta has explored the broad spectrum of AI activity in China – the good, the bad and the unexpected. China’s approach to AI development and implementation is fast-paced and pragmatic, oriented towards finding applications which can help solve real-world problems. Rapid progress is being made in the field of healthcare, for example, as China grapples with providing easy access to affordable and high-quality services for its ageing population. Applications include “AI doctor” chatbots, which help to connect communities in remote areas with experienced consultants via telemedicine; machine learning to speed up pharmaceutical research; and the use of deep learning for medical image processing, which can help with the early detection of cancer and other diseases. Chinese AI tools are being used in the fight against COVID-19. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, medical AI applications have surged as Chinese researchers and tech companies have rushed to try and combat the virus by speeding up screening, diagnosis and new drug development. AI tools used in Wuhan, China, to tackle COVID-19 – by helping accelerate CT scan diagnosis – are now being used in Italy and have been also offered to the NHS in the UK.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › I/L Disease

Authoritarian measures are essential to combat the spread of disease

Trofimov 20 – (Yaroslav Trofimov, Chief Foreign-Affairs Consultant at the Wall Street Journal, “Democracy, Dictatorship, Disease: The West Takes Its Turn With Coronavirus,” 3-8-2020, Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/democracy-dictatorship-disease-the-west-takes-its-turn-with-coronavirus-11583701472)

Western democracies confronting the spread of the novel coronavirus are facing a test with profound implications for their future: Will they fail where authoritarian China, which is touting itself as an alternative model for the world, is succeeding? Covid-19, the respiratory illness caused by the virus, has already become the most consequential public-health crisis in generations, forcing lockdowns of entire regions, disrupting international travel and damaging the global economy —all of this just weeks since the disease has begun to spread outside China. In December and early January, when the epidemic first erupted in China's metropolis of Wuhan and the surrounding Hubei province, official secrecy and the punishment of whistleblowers contributed to the virus's proliferation. Since then, however, China has adopted draconian measures to control social interactions—a lockdown that seems to have halted the epidemic there, at least for now. China's National Health Commission Sunday reported only 44 new Covid-19 cases, far fewer than the daily toll in the new hot spots of Italy, South Korea, France —and now the United States. The Communist Party of China, or CPC, is already advertising this achievement as proof of the superiority of its model that prioritizes government control over individual freedoms. "The advantages of the Chinese system have once again been demonstrated," went one of many such commentaries in recent days, by academic Dong Yuzhen in People's Daily, the CPC's official mouthpiece. "China's battle against the epidemic showed that the CPC, as China's ruling party, is by far the political party with the strongest governance capability in human history." Europe's experience in tackling Covid-19 offers little encouragement so far, with politicians acting too little and too late, and largely failing to stem the tide. In the U.S., too, nearly 500 cases have already been diagnosed, according to data compiled by Johns Hopkins University as of Sunday afternoon, even as testing capacity lags far behind Europe or South Korea. Many epidemiologists and experts warn that drastic measures of the kind deployed by China and imposed in large parts of northern Italy on Sunday morning—measures that are so far opposed by President Trump—are now overdue. "There is a large perception gap between confirmed cases and unknown infections of Covid-19. This requires school closures, large event cancellations, and other aggressive steps," Mr. Trump's former homeland-security adviser Tom Bossert tweeted Saturday, pointing to Italy's crisis as an example of how hesitation caused by fears of hurting the economy ends up exacting an even higher economic loss, without preventing the disease spread. Back when the epidemic was mostly limited to China, many Western politicians focused on the initial failings in Wuhan, asserting that the free flow of information in democracies would give them a natural advantage during a massive public-health crisis. What is becoming evident now, however, is that such knowledge doesn't necessarily translate into meaningful action. "For a month, we thought that Chinese political values were the cause of the problem, and that our values would protect us from the virus," said Bruno Maçães, Portugal's former minister of European affairs and a scholar of China's global rise. "It was an ideological approach. You need to use technology and political power, not just trust that things will be all right because we have the right values." Italy, the first European nation where the coronavirus spread rapidly, reaching 7,375 cases and 366 deaths by Sunday, acted faster than others, barring direct flights from China in early February and rolling out tens of thousands of tests. On Feb. 21, it was the first to quarantine several towns where the virus had taken root. Yet, Italy's leaders, too, have exhibited a spectacular failure to grasp the scope of the crisis. On Feb. 27, Nicola Zingaretti, leader of one of the two main parties in Italy's government coalition and head of the Lazio region, which includes Rome, posted on Instagram a photo of himself clinking glasses with other people in a Milan pub. "Let's not lose our habits, we can't shut down Milan and Italy. Our economy is stronger than fear: Let's go out for an aperitif, a coffee or a pizza," he urged. On Saturday, Mr. Zingaretti said he had become infected with Covid-19. The next day, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte signed an unprecedented decree that placed Milan, Venice, Parma and several other northern Italian provinces on lockdown, and banned public gatherings, concerts, sports matches and nightclubs in the entire country. Though the new rules are strict, it isn't clear to what extent Italians will comply given lax enforcement: The penalty for disobeying Mr. Conte's decree is a fine of 206 euros ($234) or imprisonment of up to three months, a trifle compared with the punishment exacted by China for breaking the quarantine. The Latest on the Coronavirus * Deaths have been reported in Florida and Washington state, bringing the number of U.S. fatalities to 19; the total number of infections is now 376 * Japan, Singapore and Malaysia all reported their highest single-day increases in cases * South Korea added 483 cases for a total of 6,797 and Italy added 620 new cases and 49 fatalities in the 24 hours preceding its report Friday evening "We have a very strong sense of individual freedom, but all European citizens—and not just Italians—should understand that we are facing a great danger, and that it can be overcome only with responsible behavior by every single citizen," said Roberto Burioni, professor of microbiology and virology at the San Raffaele hospital in Milan. "I have found an extremely grave undervaluation of the risk. Until yesterday, people continued to crowd the ski resorts, the sports events. The individual citizens unfortunately have not realized how important their personal behavior is in order to stop the virus." As Italy shut down, in nearby France—which has reached 1,126 diagnosed Covid-19 cases, the same level as Italy just nine days earlier—several tens of thousands flocked to the streets on Sunday to celebrate the International Women's Day. In Germany, where cases have topped 1,000, authorities Saturday allowed a major soccer match to take place near the center of the country's main outbreak in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. And in the U.S., public life goes on almost as normal, with few restrictions on schools, sports events, concerts or other public gatherings. Mr. Trump and his two main Democratic challengers—all men over 70, the demographic with the highest mortality from Covid-19—continue to hold mass campaign rallies across the country. "China's top-down approach seems to have done a pretty good job in terms of mobilizing the resources and capabilities needed to reign in the virus. You see the contrast with how Western countries, including the U.S., have failed to take decisive action," said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "Many of the Chinese experience measures probably won't be replicable in this country, or actually any democracy. But our policy makers will face some tough decisions."

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › I/L Disease

Autocracies are necessary to combat pandemics – decisions are made faster and more effectively

Cepaluni et. al. 20 – (Gabriel Cepaluni, assistant professor at São Paulo State University (UNESP), PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of São Paulo and was a visiting researcher in the Department of Government at Georgetown University (2008-2009), Michael Dorsch, applied economist whose research and teaching interests are mainly in political economics and public economics, Ph.D., Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, M.A., Economics, Miami University, B.A., Economics, International Studies, French, Miami University, Réka Branyiczki, BA in International Business, Corvinus University of Budapest, BA in Psychology, Eotvos Lorand University, MA in Economic Policy in Global Markets, CEU, “Political Regimes and Deaths in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Comparative Politics, 4-27-2020, https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/apsa/article-details/5ea7229e5d762d001217da9a)

6 Discussion and conclusions Our analysis demonstrates that in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, more democratic countries experienced deaths sooner and on a larger scale. For advocates of democratic governance, these results are unsettling. We have several lines of rationalizing the findings, which we believe open up some crucial debates in political science. There may be systematic under-reporting of COVID-19 deaths in less democratic countries. In some cases, under-reporting could be a political decision. In other cases, it may reflect a lack of state capacity to perform the testing necessary to determine the real cause of death (Economist, 2020).24 We have tried to deal with this through our instrumental variable strategy and by including controls for governmental transparency, testing rates and sub-sample analyses, but it remains a concern. Centralized decision-making may be advantageous when it comes to responding to pandemics (Schwartz, 2012). Table 5 shows that more democratic countries had imposed less stringent restrictions during the first 100 days of the crisis. With fewer checks built into the policy-making process, public health policy responses can be made more quickly and perhaps more incisively in autocratic governments. Especially for policies that impinge on civil liberties and privacy, autocratic governments have a far freer hand in imposing restrictions on their citizens. The trade-off between the capacity to protect the public health and personal liberties is a central debate during, and probably well after, the COVID-19 crisis (Harari, 2020). Autocratic governments may have had an extra advantage to the extent that their citizens are more obedient to governmental decrees, especially those that may disrupt the social and business lives of citizens. Figure 3 demonstrates that more stringent policies decreased deaths in less democratic countries, but not necessarily in fully democratic ones. Whether it comes from higher public support for government initiatives (possibly, through the threat of force) or from the government’s ability to stifle debate around their decrees in the media, the greater obedience of citizens in autocracies may have had a role in the lower scale of deaths. Protests against social distancing restrictions in democracies with different institutional performances, such as Brazil and the United States, seem to reinforce this point. Finally, this paper contributes to a substantive topic that will have broad and lasting implications. It may well be many years until we have a clear understanding how the COVID-19 crisis will impact our societies. As the pandemic started in East Asia, the location of some of the best-managed autocracies, it may be that our sample disproportionately includes the autocratic governments with high state capacity. Therefore, it is an area for future research to see if our results hold when autocracies with lower state capacity are eventually included in the sample.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › 1nc – Disease

That causes extinction – a pandemic is imminent –newest data proves disruptions to the environmental mean it’s existential

Diamandis 2022

Eleftherios P., Professor @ University of Toronto Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, “The mother of all battles: Viruses vs humans. Can humans avoid extinction in 50–100 years?” January 29, 2022, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8802343/dmr

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID-19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about the dangers of human suffering through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID-19 pandemic is now being partially controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics, and vaccines, it became clear that our current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term. We now have to start thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race? The answer is unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses found in bats, pangolins, and other exotic animals that live in remote forests to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that the human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses that are capable of affecting the function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, or heart. It is remotely possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to contagious viruses, which can cause pandemics, leading to the destruction of vital organs, causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart, and kidney failures. These diseases could result in the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably the gradual extinction of the human race. This essay will comment on a few independent pieces of scientific facts, and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all) hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction, in the hope that these hypothetical scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes. 1. Introduction Le Chatelier’s Principle: Named after the French chemist, Le Chatelier’s principle posits that “When an external stress (change in pressure, temperature or concentration) is applied to a system in chemical equilibrium, the equilibrium will change in such a way as to reduce the effect of the stress.” In other words, a change in a system will evoke a counter-change, which will bring the equilibrium to a new point. This principle operates with almost every human or other activity. For example, it is known that when fruit production in the Serengeti ecosystem is reduced, the number of elephants, which feed on these fruits, is reduced proportionally. In the context of this essay, I hypothesize that human-made changes in climate, the atmosphere, water, soil, and all other planet-living organisms, will likely evoke counter-changes that may be highly consequential to human life. Due to the complexity of our ecosystem, humans do not know exactly how these changes will affect them in the end. Consequently, they choose to disregard them because lifestyle adjustments may cost money and convenience or loss of well-established pleasures. 1.1. The earth is changing rapidly What is changing on the earth that could induce a potentially catastrophic counter-change? The answer is everything is changing , from the living inhabitants (humans, other species, and plants) to the atmosphere, water, soil, climate, among else. The changes caused by human activity are sometimes dramatic. For example, it has been estimated that about 1 million out of 8.5 million species of plants, animals, and other organisms are in imminent danger of extinction [1]. Other estimates show that 50% of the organisms that existed 50 years ago have already gone extinct, not to consider additional species that are gone before we even identify them. Soon, we will likely be losing more than 80% of the world’s species due to human overdevelopment and its associated consequences. The major reasons for species extinction are habitat destruction, pesticide poisoning, and illegal hunting [1]. 2. Global warming Some may choose to believe what the politicians are debating about: that climate change is a fact or fiction, but the data say that the last 6 years were the warmest on record [2]. Overall, the planet was 1.25°C warmer than in preindustrial times (in the 1950s). Warmer oceans are melting ice sheets and rising sea levels by almost 5 mm per year. In Australia, record-setting heat and drought were responsible for the bushfires that destroyed almost 25% of southeastern Australia’s forests and their living inhabitants, such as koalas. If we cannot slow down earth’s heating by reducing emissions, the current increase of about 0.2°C per decade will likely be rapidly surpassed. How will the planet react? Likely with more catastrophic fires, tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods. The human homeostatic changes to increased temperatures are very complex and include many vital organs [3]. Global warming may also cause changes in the biology of our candidate foes, the viruses, bacteria, and parasites that live in our gut and skin (see Section 2.2). 2.1. How much human-made environmental damage has been done already? Humans are now the undisputed masters of the planet and cannot be easily stopped from actively destroying it, consciously or unconsciously. An interesting question is how much damage has been claimed to be done already, and do we have the data to support these claims? Elhacham et al. have recently compared the natural biomass that exists on the earth with the human-made (anthropogenic) mass [4]. They found that each person on the globe produces a mass that is about equal to their body weight every week! Is that too little or too much? Let us first define biomass and anthropogenic mass. The majority of the earth’s biomass is represented by trees and bushes. The majority of the man-made mass is represented by buildings and infrastructure such as roads and consists of concrete, bricks, asphalt, metals, and plastic. Just consider that the total global mass of produced plastic so far is greater than the overall mass of all terrestrial and marine animals combined! So, how do we fare when comparing biomass to anthropogenic mass production? In the 1900s, the latter represented only 3% of global biomass; but now, in the 2020s, the two masses are about equal. The projection is that if we go on with more deforestation, buildings, streets, plastics, cars, and so on, by 2040, it is likely that anthropogenic mass will almost triple the earth’s biomass. Will there be enough resources and clean air and water to sustain the life of the projected 9 billion inhabitants? Anthropogenic mass production is difficult to slow down since this activity is considered part of our evolving civilization and way of living. 2.2. Human microbiome The human body consists of approximately 30 trillion cells, but the microbiota population in the human gut is estimated to be 300 trillion [5]! In addition, there is another microbiota in the skin and other organs. It was initially thought that these microbiota act locally (e.g., only in the gut or skin), but new evidence suggest that the effects of microbiota may be global, reaching every cell in the body. This can be achieved with various mechanisms, one being the transmission of signals mediated by proteins that can travel through anatomically distinct structures such as the vagus nerve. For example, a protein called curli can travel through the vagus nerve and reach the brain, where it can promote abnormal aggregation of proteins such as a-synuclein, one major pathogenetic player in Parkinson’s disease [5,6]. Another and even more likely mechanism includes the diffusion of bacterial or viral proteins (some could be toxins to various organs) or pathogenic viruses into the bloodstream. From there, they can travel around the body. This is reminiscent of cancer cell metastasis by the hematogenous route. One piece of evidence for that happening is that about half of the human metabolome (the collection of all metabolites in the blood) is derived by host bacteria [5]. Bacteria or virus-derived metabolites could also pass through the placenta and reach the fetus, including the fetal brain, possibly causing diseases such as autism. Despite skin not being as hospitable to microorganisms as the gut, a typical person may have about 1,000 species of bacteria on their skin [7]. These microbial communities continue to grow and diversify until puberty when hormonal and developmental changes reach a plateau. The balance between host and bacteria in the skin is determined by the production of skin-derived microbial nutrients, microbiome-derived skin nutrients, skin, and microbiome-derived antimicrobial peptides, and by the interaction of the microbiome with the host’s immune system. Similar as in the gut, there is a delicate balance between beneficial and potentially harmful bacteria and the host immune system. It is remotely possible that our future enemies may derive from the gut, skin, or other organs harboring microorganisms. In addition, the skin is more sensitive to environmental changes such as climate change as it is directly exposed to the environment. In conclusion, bacterial, viral, and parasite-derived proteins or pathogenic viruses thrive locally (e.g., in the gut or skin) but are capable of acting globally. 2.3. Human viruses and how they could cause disease Many strains of gut bacteria are harmless, but they can become dangerous pathogens under certain conditions, such as antibiotic use [8]. It is well known that gut bacteria can harbor many viruses (bacterial phages) [9]. If they do not immediately kill the infected bacteria, these viruses incorporate into the bacterial genome and stay latent for extended periods (they are known “prophages”). These prophages can be reactivated under certain environmental or other factors and act like pathogenic viruses. It is rather surprising that, in general, viruses are so many that they qualify as the most abundant biological entities on the planet. Sometimes, gut bacteria use their activated prophages as weapons to gain an advantage and kill other competing bacteria. Phages could also assist in bacterial evolution as the latter become more virulent [10]. The gut bacteria also seem to interact with the host immune system and can influence the efficacy of cancer immunotherapy [11,12,13]. The microbiome has been blamed for playing direct or indirect roles in many human diseases, including cancer, metabolic syndrome, diabetes, dementia, and others [14]. The outcomes regarding health and disease depend on the balance of powers among the gut/skin/other organ viruses, the gut/skin/other organ microbiomes, and the host immune system. If this balance is disturbed, a biological war between these players will be initiated, and the outcome will be unpredictable. In conclusion, scientific evidence supports the idea that phages in the mammalian intestine, skin, or elsewhere, not only can be engulfed by certain eukaryotic cells but also might escape from the gut or skin, enter the bloodstream, and make their way into other parts of the body, with as yet undiscovered consequences. 2.4. Viral variants Viruses evolve continuously, eventually leading to more transmissible variants, which sometimes can be more lethal than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is an excellent contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-2 are rapidly spreading and are becoming dominant in certain geographic areas [15,16]. For example, the B.1.1.7 variant (United Kingdom) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; variant 501Y.V2 (South Africa) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; and P.1 variant (Brazil) has approximately 35 mutations with 17 amino acid changes. In April 2021, when this document was first written, I speculated verbatim that “new variants with additional mutations could become able to evade our currently available vaccines by weakening the ability of vaccine-induced antibodies to neutralize/block viral entry, and by strengthening the ability of the virus to enter the cells via surface receptors.” The so-called “omicron variant,” isolated in November 2021, already fulfilled this prediction. 2.5. How COVID-19 and possibly other viruses affect the brain In general, viral invasion of the central nervous system may be achieved by several routes, including transsynaptic transfer across infected neurons, entry via the olfactory nerve, infection of vascular endothelium, or leukocyte migration across the blood–brain barrier. SARS-CoV-2 invades endothelial cells via transmembrane angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor binding and a subsequent proteolytic event, facilitated by transmembrane protease serine 2 [17]. Is there evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can enter the brain? The answer is yes [18]. As already mentioned, one route is by migrating from the cribriform plate along the olfactory tract [19] or through vagal pathways. Another route may include viral entry into brain capillary endothelial cells via the ACE2 pathway. Viral RNA was detected in the medulla and cerebellum by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. However, viral proteins seem to be absent from neurons and glial cells. Consequently, the adverse events of the virus on the brain, including altered neurotransmission and neuronal damage, are likely mediated by neuroinflammation and hypoxic injury through cytokines and other proinflammatory mediators. 2.6. SARS-CoV-2 and possibly other viruses can affect the senses Viruses can affect our senses. For example, SARS-CoV-2 causes anosmia (loss of smell) and ageusia (loss of taste) in 40–70% of COVID-19 patients [20]. These effects persist, but it is unknown for how long. Other neurological symptoms include headache, stroke, impairment of consciousness, seizure, anxiety, and encephalopathy. Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2-related anosmia may be a new viral syndrome specific to COVID-19. This syndrome is likely mediated by intranasal inoculation of SARS-CoV-2 into the olfactory neural circuitry. Since the olfactory sensory neurons do not express ACE2 receptor, the likely explanation for the loss of smell is the damage of accessory cells supporting these neurons. Although anosmia is not a lethal or severe disease, other neurological damage such as blindness could be devastating [21,22]. 3. Adverse scenarios Fifty years ago, one adverse scenario regarding a pandemic was presented in the film “The Andromeda strain,” which describes a pandemic caused by a pathogen of extraterrestrial origin [23]. Here, I present an alternative hypothetical scenario that involves an endogenous virus. Obviously, there is a myriad of similar scenarios, and the one given below can be currently classified as fictional but not impossible. A prophage, which was residing dormant for years in the genome of the commensal gut bacterium Bifidobacterium infantis suddenly, and without an apparent reason, has undergone induction and started to produce viral proteins, which were subsequently assembled into whole phages. After cell lysis, these phages infected other neighboring cells. This cycle was repeated many times, and millions of free virions were released, some entering the systemic circulation (viremia). Some virions reached the lung endothelium and entered the endothelial cells through an, as yet, unknown receptor and started replicating and lysing these cells. The resulting mucous caused the host to cough, thus facilitating the transfer of the virus to other humans through aerosol droplets. Soon, the virus was able to infect, first a few hundred, then thousands, then millions of other unsuspected people through coughing and sneezing. The virus was able to travel all over the world as the pulmonary manifestations were mild, and most infected individuals thought it was a common flu or a similar ailment. Scientists isolated the virus that caused this flu-like disease and determined from its genomic sequence that it was a novel member of influenza virus B, which usually causes seasonal flu. Despite the pandemic nature of the infection, nobody died, and governmental bodies were not highly concerned. Six months later, one individual reported a weakening of his vision, which, within 3 months, progressed to total blindness. This unusual form of blindness quickly spread to other people until scientists performed epidemiological studies, which linked the blindness to the previously mentioned mild flu. Soon afterward, scientists isolated and identified the virus from the brains of blind and subsequently succumbed individuals and confirmed that the sequence matched the virus that caused the unusual flu. More elaborate studies had shown that there was unusual and very severe neuroinflammation around the occipital lobe of the brain (Brodmann area 17), an area responsible for the interpretation of visual signals arriving from the optic nerve. Several therapeutics were tried, but none was proven to be effective. Twelve months into the pandemic, 10 million people lost their vision, and within 18 months, without any success in developing therapies or a vaccine, the blindness had spread to whole nations. 3.1. Blindness The selection of blindness as a chronic consequence of an acute pandemic was deliberate. In 1995, Portuguese author Jose Saramago published a fictional novel entitled “Blindness” (ISBN: 9780151002511), which contributed to him winning the Nobel Prize in literature in 1998. Blindness, as portrayed in the book, is a highly detailed story of a mysterious mass epidemic that caused blindness of a whole nation and the social breakdown that followed. The blindness pandemic, in many respects, is reminiscent of the current COVID-19 pandemic. Blindness caused widespread panic, anarchy, and government lockdowns. The life of the blind people was characterized by filthiness, aggressive manners, disrespect of others, and a struggle to survive by any possible means. The breakdown of society was near total. Law and order, social services, government, schools could no longer function. Families have been separated and could not find one another. People squat in abandoned buildings and scrounge for food. Violence, disease, and despair threaten to overwhelm human coping. One of Saramago’s quotes, describing life after blindness, is reproduced here “Perhaps humanity will manage to live without eyes, but then it will cease to be humanity, the result is obvious…” 3.2. Other ailments Acute pandemics could cause many other chronic diseases that can threaten the sustainability of our present society. Although COVID-19 causes loss of smell and taste, these are considered nonlife-threatening ailments. However, in the long run, the permanent absence of smell and taste will mean the loss of innumerable current pleasures associated with the consumption of food and drinks. Clearly, loss of hearing will not be compatible with current societal functions or human achievements. Acute viral diseases are also associated with innumerable organ-specific diseases such as heart, kidney, and reproductive failures and disturbance of other vital functions that can paralyze our current society, economy, and culture. Even a minor weakening of our memory (mild cognitive impairment) could result in chaotic situations that authors of fiction, such as Saramago, attempt to describe in detail in future books. 3.3. Epilog Humans have learned to take for granted what they currently have and enjoy. Perhaps, we did not realize that the human race’s spectacular advances are dependent on several potentially volatile abilities (senses, brain function) and that even one loss, or diminution of such abilities, could be detrimental, causing a collapse of our civilization. The COVID-19 pandemic helped us realize that we may be sitting on a time bomb, which might explode if we continue disturbing the current equilibrium between humans and other planetary partners. In addition to viruses of a rather exotic origin, such as SARS-CoV-2, billions of other viruses and other infectious agents in our gut, skin, and elsewhere are waiting for the right time to attack us. The lessons learned from COVID-19 should be a wake-up call for humans to stop disturbing the equilibrium with actions that favor the well-being of humans but put in danger the existence of other inhabitants of planet earth. Human migration, also known as “travel,” has facilitated the travel of our foes, along with us, in every conceivable corner of the world.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › DISEASE › 1nc – Disease

Autocracies solve emerging pandemics – studies prove democratic failure

Kavanagh & Singh 20 – (Matthew M. Kavanagh, assistant professor of global health and visiting professor of law at Georgetown University, where he directs the Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Renu Singh, fellow at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, “Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response—COVID 19 in Comparative Political Perspective,” 5-28-2020, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, )

Is Democracy Good or Bad for Health in a Pandemic? In general, social scientists have tended to agree, albeit with caveats, that democracy is beneficial for public health. COVID-19 is raising important questions about this contention as high-profile cases show authoritarian countries winning praise for their response while leading democracies have struggled to respond. This complicates, perhaps in helpful ways, the exploration of health and of democracy. A wide literature has long debated the value of democracy for health. Electoral pressures and political freedoms of democratic regimes, it is argued, contribute to improved health and longer lives (Ruger 2005; Sen 1999). These claims have empirical support in political science (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2017), economics (Kudamatsu 2012), and public health (Bollyky et al. 2019)—though not without challenge, as some have shown weak or no connection (Ross 2006). A range of mechanisms have been proposed and tested for how democracy improves health including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and a norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information both flows to the public about health and from the public to government about how to calibrate policy; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail; and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. The narrative of Chinese success and U.S. failure has led to concern that COVID-19 represents bad news about the value, and future, of democratic governance (Diamond 2020). Initial studies have already been conducted showing a correlation between democracy and worse outbreaks as well as less effective policy responses (Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki 2020). Pandemic response is different from much of population health—with effective responses requiring the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance. With the exception of HIV (e.g., Lieberman 2009), disease outbreaks and political institutions have been under-studied in comparative politics—with much of the literature focused on infant mortality or life expectancy, long-running trends that have far different mechanisms from a pandemic. Here, the accountability mechanisms that help democracies perform better may not be as beneficial. Political leaders with short time horizons may have relatively weak incentives to invest in pandemic preparedness and response (Dionne 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009). And some of the benefits of associational networks and civil society can be shut down in the face of an emergency—facing, for example, stay-at-home orders. Democracies also have the added challenge of managing competing political factions and institutions, some of whom may have political incentives to undermine response. Once the outbreak broke into the public and Beijing was moved to act, China was able to quickly shut down the Wuhan market, shut down the movement of tens of millions of people, screen and isolate the sick, and even build two hospitals in a matter of days. Singapore is another autocracy that has gained praise for its quick response. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to respond. The Trump administration focused on travel bans to keep the “foreign” virus out rather than on mobilizing public health capacities to detect and respond—a message that aligns with the Trump administration’s election-year antiimmigrant and anti-China political frame. The President’s incentive structure has been clear, as his administration has tried to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan Virus,” continuing a trade war with China, the largest producer of medical goods needed by the U.S. Perhaps these incentives were clearest in early March when Trump resisted allowing a cruise ship with COVID-19 cases to dock because “I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship” (The White House 2020).

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › CLIMATE › I/L Climate

Even if democratic institutions could generate pro-climate policy making – rampant corruption precludes compliance

Povitkina 18’(Marina Povitkina, Postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo and Center for Collective Action Research at the University of Gothenburg, The Limits of Democracy in tackling climate change, March 2018, , ME)

National-level carbon dioxide emissions depend on a multitude of factors, including countries’ economies, geography, demographics, and, not least, politics. The aim of this study has been to focus specifically on the political 424 M. POVITKINA determinants of CO2 emissions and revisit the findings reported in previous literature indicating that the amount of countries’ CO2 emissions is associated with their level of democracy. Here, I instead argue that while democratic institutions shape preference aggregation within a polity and favor environmental commitments, the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of corrupt institutions, which obstruct coercive capacity, extractive capacity of the state, actors’ compliance, and pro-climate policy-making. To test this claim, I investigate whether the association between democracy and CO2 emissions is conditional on the levels of corruption. In pursuing this aim, I analyze the emitting behavior of countries across the globe over time and estimate a within-between regression, which takes into account the variation between countries and simultaneously accounts for the developments in countries over time. Such investigation brings a number of insights into the political factors behind the differences in CO2 emissions between countries and the political drivers of emission reduction within states. The results of this study show that after taking into account the common economic, geographical, and demographic explanations of CO2 emissions, political factors still make a difference. In accordance with most previous results, my findings show that more democratic countries do tend to emit less. However, this is only true for those democracies where corruption is low. When corruption is high, democracy does not seem to make a difference for the level of emissions, all else equal. It does not matter for the level of emissions whether a country has free elections, freedom of the press, and freedom of association if the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the state do not function well and are drenched in corruption and clientelism. In such a case, democracies do not seem to do any better than authoritarian regimes, where decision-making power is in the hands of a narrow elite. To exemplify, the results imply that it makes no difference for the national levels of CO2 emissions if a country is a democratic and corrupt Jamaica or an authoritarian and corrupt Azerbaijan. The results also show that a political system with a low level of corruption is not a universal cure. Lower corruption seems to matter only for the levels of CO2 emissions in democratic regimes and the level of corruption does not seem to play a role if a country is authoritarian. For example, being democratic and relatively non-corrupt Austria is more beneficial for lower CO2 emissions than being democratic but moderately corrupt Slovakia. However, at the same time, being an authoritarian regime with relatively low-corrupt institutions, such as Saudi Arabia, does not seem to be associated with lower emissions than being an authoritarian and corrupt regime, such as Yemen. While we can only gain insights about the associational relationship between democracy, corruption, and CO2 emissions from the between country estimates, the analysis of changes over time brings us closer to causal claims. The results from the within-part of the analysis show a similar picture to the between-part: positive changes in democracy are associated with the reduction in emission levels only when countries experience relatively low levels of corruption. When corruption levels in countries are low relative to what these countries experienced on average over the time period under investigation, steps toward democracy go together with steps toward climate change mitigation. When corruption is relatively high, more democracy does not seem to make a difference for emission control.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › CLIMATE › I/L Climate

Autocracies are better suited to enact meaningful climate action

Gardels 18’ (Nathan Gardels, editor in chief of The WorldPost, Democracy may fatally slow climate action, The World Post, September 13th, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/09/13/saving-the-planet/, ME)

In his recent book, “How Democracy Ends,” the Cambridge scholar David Runciman doubts that democracies can effectively battle oncoming challenges that have not yet fully arrived. “Climate change,” he writes, “lacks political grip on our imaginations because it is so incremental. The environmental apocalypse is only ever a creeping catastrophe. We experience it as a rumor.”In other words, the future, by definition, has no present political constituency in systems legitimated by consent of the governed. In this sense, democratic politics can disable the requisite will to act until climate calamity is already upon us. That will likely be too late. Ominous signs, such as intense storms like Hurricane Florence or this season’s wildfires, from California to the forests above the Arctic Circle in Sweden, are hopefully bringing forward a concrete awareness of what the future holds. Yet, as Barack Obama reminded Americans last week — referring to President Trump’s rollback on a wide range of policies, including on the environment — progress does not advance in a straight line. Two steps forward often entail one step back, the former president lamented. This is particularly true in democracies where partisan fever is so high that a new election can result in totally overturning a course of action that the public embraced only a few years earlier But there is no time to waste. As the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate recently reported, we are facing “a unique ‘use it or lose it’ moment.” If the world cannot reach the goal of the Paris climate accord to keep the global average temperature below 2 degrees Celsius in the next decade, the planet will heat up past the point of no return. In short, when it comes to climate change, time is an ethical dimension. Whether our species can regain the time lost during this “one step back” is the open question upon which our ability to radically adapt, or even survive, depends. In this respect, China’s one-party, long-term-oriented system presents yet another challenge to the West. Indeed, California Governor Jerry Brown warned this week that by sabotaging America’s electric car industry, Trump was handing the future of auto manufacturing to the modernizing Middle Kingdom, which is vigorously pursuing new battery technologies. China’s leaders believe in science. They have the will and capacity to take decisive and meaningful climate action on a large scale, without a break in the continuity of governance. Whether democracies can similarly rise to this challenge without resorting to authoritarian means will determine if, one dire day, the choice comes down to liberty or survival. In The WorldPost this week, we publish varying perspectives on this challenge in tandem with the Global Climate Action Summit taking place in San Francisco, co-chaired by Governor Brown, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and China’s top climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua. Christiana Figueres, who presided over the successful negotiations that led to the Paris climate accord, focuses on particulate pollutants in the air that are the consequence of our civilization’s carbon exhaust. “Global warming is not just manifesting in devastating fires, floods and heatwaves; its causes are impacting nearly every breath we take,” she writes. “Thick, heavy smog caused by the burning of fossil fuels and crops is choking cities around the world. China has been forced to close tens of thousands of factories to reduce its air pollution. Air pollution in Africa has been ruled responsible for more deaths than unsanitary water or malnutrition. Last November, Arvind Kejriwal, chief minister of India’s capital city, wrote: ‘Delhi has become a gas chamber.' Figueres, however, is optimistic that we are on the cusp of a shift. “Driven in part by the demand for and the undeniable benefits of clean, breathable air, the paradigm in which development and economic growth depend on coal in particular is rapidly being replaced,” she writes. “The truth is that addressing global warming and its causes is now the only real way to secure economic growth. That means powering it with clean, everlasting, abundant alternatives. Governments everywhere can reap enormous benefits, including saving billions of dollars on healthcare, by fostering a shift to electric transport, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and scaling ecosystem restoration including mangroves, peat bogs and forests.” Erik Hoffner agrees on this last point. While carbon sequestration technologies are promising, he says, they are likely prohibitively expensive. The same result can be accomplished by the low-tech and far less capital-intensive alternative of agroforestry, which is “essentially a forest-mimicking agriculture that involves growing trees, shrubs and vegetables in tight assemblages.” James Redford and Adam Browning argue that what unites Americans on climate action is, ultimately, the jobs and an improved economy that clean energy can bring. In a short video, they report from their road trip through Minnesota on local communities that are building a solar-based energy grid in this northern state not known for its sunshine. Ali Hasanbeigi and Daniel Moran ponder an entirely new aspect in the climate change debate. While the Paris accord is based on measuring domestic emissions within a country’s borders, it does not count “emissions associated with the products countries import — which can often constitute significant shares of a nation’s economic activity.” As a result, “more than 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are embodied in trade and flow through this glaring ‘carbon loophole,’ one of the most critical and under-discussed problems in international climate policy circles.” To close the carbon loophole, the authors call on nations and companies to “buy clean” by establishing “rules that favor the purchase of cleaner, low-carbon products and that drive clean innovation through the power of the purse.” One of the essential elements in fighting climate change is putting a worldwide price on carbon. To move toward this goal, I propose in my profile of Jerry Brown that he take on the role of a global elder statesman on the issue when he leaves office next year. He has not only made his state a leader in battling global warming; he has also strung together a global “network of the willing” to implement the Paris accord despite America’s official withdrawal. First and foremost among his tasks would be to integrate California’s sizable carbon trading market created by its “cap-and-trade” programs with similar markets in China and Europe. “The model for Brown’s elder statesman role,” I write, “is Jean Monnet, a former French official and diplomat who devised the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community implemented in the 1950s. The driving notion was that regional integration of heavy industry in the Ruhr Valley along the French-German border in the years following World War II would accelerate economic reconstruction and make war ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’”Similarly, I argue, “the integration of cap-and-trade markets today would not only ultimately establish a global carbon price that would diminish reliance on fossil fuels; it would also create a bridge of common intent across boundaries to save the planet despite national conflicts arising today in trade and security matters. Tying our climate fates together would in effect serve as a kind of preemptive version of the Coal and Steel Community.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › CLIMATE › I/L Climate

Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change---authoritarianism is necessary to ensure rapid state-led transformation

Mann & Wainwright ’18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with Climate Mao, sketching it as an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan.35 We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou’s version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.36 Minqi Li’s is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that Climate Mao offers the only way forward: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.37 Taking inspiration from Mao, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—could transform China and save humanity from doom. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China’s massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.38 But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world’s climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › CLIMATE › 1nc – Climate

Warming causes extinction.

Spratt 18, *David, Research Director, Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, **Ian T. Dunlop, Chairman of Safe Climate Australia, Director of Australia 21, Deputy Convener of the Australian Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, a Fellow of the Centre for Policy Development, and a member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Climate Change Task Force ( “What Lies Beneath: The Understatement of Existential Climate Risk”, Accessible at: )

In 2016, the World Economic Forum survey of the most impactful risks for the years ahead elevated the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation to the top of the list, ahead of weapons of mass destruction, ranking second, and water crises, ranking third. By 2018, following a year characterised by high-impact hurricanes and extreme temperatures, extreme-weather events were seen as the single most prominent risk. As the survey noted: “We have been pushing our planet to the brink and the damage is becoming increasingly clear.”29 Climate change is an existential risk to human civilisation: that is, an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. Temperature rises that are now in prospect, after the Paris Agreement, are in the range of 3–5°C. At present, the Paris Agreement voluntary emission reduction commitments, if implemented, would result in planetary warming of 3.4°C by 2100,30 without taking into account “long-term” carbon cycle feedbacks. With a higher climate sensitivity figure of 4.5°C, for example, which would account for such feedbacks, the Paris path would result in around 5°C of warming, according to a MIT study.31 A study by Schroder Investment Management published in June 2017 found – after taking into account indicators across a wide range of the political, financial, energy and regulatory sectors – the average temperature increase implied for the Paris Agreement across all sectors was 4.1°C.32 Yet 3°C of warming already constitutes an existential risk. A 2007 study by two US national security think-tanks concluded that 3°C of warming and a 0.5 metre sea-level rise would likely lead to “outright chaos” and “nuclear war is possible”, emphasising how “massive non-linear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events”.33 The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) explains what could happen: “If climate change was to reach 3°C, most of Bangladesh and Florida would drown, while major coastal cities – Shanghai, Lagos, Mumbai – would be swamped, likely creating large flows of climate refugees. Most regions in the world would see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, whether heat waves, floods or storms. This likely scenario for a 3°C rise does not take into account the considerable risk that self-reinforcing feedback loops set in when a certain threshold is reached, leading to an ever increasing rise in temperature. Potential thresholds include the melting of the Arctic permafrost releasing methane into the atmosphere, forest dieback releasing the carbon currently stored in the Amazon and boreal forests, or the melting of polar ice caps that would no longer reflect away light and heat from the sun.”34 Warming of 4°C or more could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%,35 and the World Bank reports “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible”.36 Prof. Kevin Anderson says a 4°C future “is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable”.37 This is a commonly-held sentiment amongst climate scientists. A recent study by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre found that if the global temperature rose 4°C, then extreme heatwaves with “apparent temperatures” peaking at over 55°C will begin to regularly affect many densely populated parts of the world, forcing much activity in the modern industrial world to stop.38 (“Apparent temperatures” refers to the Heat Index, which quantifies the combined effect of heat and humidity to provide people with a means of avoiding dangerous conditions.) In 2017, one of the first research papers to focus explicitly on existential climate risks proposed that “mitigation goals be set in terms of climate risk category instead of a temperature threshold”, and established a “dangerous” risk category of warming greater than 1.5°C, and a “catastrophic” category for warming of 3°C or more. The authors focussed on the impacts on the world’s poorest three billion people, on health and heat stress, and the impacts of climate extremes on such people with limited adaptation resources. They found that a 2°C warming “would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population (to deadly heat). A 4°C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented.”39 A 2017 survey of global catastrophic risks by the Global Challenges Foundation found that: “In high-end [climate] scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end.”40 84% of 8000 people in eight countries surveyed for the Foundation considered climate change a “global catastrophic risk”.41 Existential risk may arise from a fast rate of system change, since the capacity to adapt, in both the natural and human worlds, is inversely proportional to the pace of change, amongst other factors. In 2004, researchers reported on the rate of warming as a driver of extinction.42 Given we are now on a 3–5°C warming path this century, their findings are instructive: If the rate of change is 0.3°C per decade (3°C per century), 15% of ecosystems will not be able to adapt. If the rate should exceed 0.4°C per decade, all ecosystems will be quickly destroyed, opportunistic species will dominate, and the breakdown of biological material will lead to even greater emissions of CO2 At 4°C of warming “the limits for adaptation for natural systems would largely be exceeded throughout the world”.43 Ecological breakdown of this scale would ensure an existential human crisis. By slow degrees, these existential risks are being recognised. In May 2018, an inquiry by the Australian Senate into national security and global warming recognised “climate change as a current and existential national security risk… defined as ‘one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development’”.44 In April 2018, the Intelligence on European Pensions and Institutional Investment think-tank warned business leaders that “climate change is an existential risk whose elimination must become a corporate objective”.45 However the most recent IPCC Assessment Report did not consider the issue. Whilst the term “risk management” appears in the 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report fourteen times, the terms “existential” and “catastrophic” do not appear.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › CLIMATE › 1nc – Climate

Democracy terminally slows warming mitigation---extinction

Abadi 22 — Cameron Abadi deputy editor at Foreign Policy., “What if Democracy and Climate Mitigation Are Incompatible?,” Foreign Policy, 8-7-2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/climate-change-democracy/, accessed 7-5-2022, WMK

In the past 14 months, the United States and Germany both held national elections that placed climate change policy squarely at the center of national debate. The fact that two of the world’s five largest economies committed to addressing the world’s most pressing crisis through public discourse followed by public voting was an unprecedented democratic experiment.

It did not work out as optimists hoped. On the one hand, the victorious parties in both countries vowed to achieve what was necessary to prevent the worst effects of climate change from occurring, in accordance with the international climate agreement unanimously approved in Paris in 2015. But on the other hand, in neither country can the resulting policies be described as fulfilling that promise.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › AT: DPT

DPT is wrong – longitudinal analysis disproves peaceful dyad thesis

Owsiak and Vasquez 22 — Andrew P Owsiak, John A Vasquez, The Limited Scope of the Democratic Peace: What We Are Missing, International Studies Perspectives, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2022, Pages 169–190, WMK

Cumulatively, our analysis offers three main, interrelated findings. First, the democratic peace potentially accounts for only a minority of peaceful dyads in the interstate system. The exact amount of its explanatory power varies, depending on myriad research design choices; yet that amount most often falls below 10 percent of peaceful dyads. The democratic peace does not, then, account for the majority of peaceful dyads in the interstate system over the past 200 years. It has a limited scope. Second, the democratic peace performs better in more recent, shorter periods, as opposed to longer historical ones. Finally, most peaceful dyads, regardless of time period, require a theory other than the democratic peace to explain why they have never had a war or a MID. We now turn our attention to where scholars might most fruitfully search for the factors capable of accounting for these overlooked, peaceful dyads.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › AT: DPT

DPT is wrong – theorist conflate causation and correlation – demo promo is the greatest cause of modern war

Skidelsky 22 — Robert Skidelsky, a member of the British House of Lords and Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University. Robert Skidelsky, “The False Promise of Democratic Peace,” Project Syndicate, 4-19-2022, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/democratic-peace-theory-is-wrong-by-robert-skidelsky-2022-04, accessed 7-3-2022 WMK

Clinging to the assumption that only dictatorships start military conflicts, proponents of democratization believed that the global success of their project would usher in a world without war. But this theory lacks a sound foundation and has produced one disaster after another when put into practice.

LONDON – Through persuasion, exhortation, legal processes, economic pressure, and sometimes military force, American foreign policy asserts the United States’ view about how the world should be run. Only two countries in recent history have had such world-transforming ambitions: Britain and the US. In the last 150 years, these are the only two countries whose power – hard and soft, formal and informal – has extended to all parts of the world, allowing them plausibly to aspire to the mantle of Rome.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › I/L War – Median Voter

US and Israel prove – citizen preferences for a capital-intensive military doctrine lock in aggressive foreign policy and protracted warfare – legal reforms fail.

Caverley 10 – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This article shows that, contrary to the consensus regarding U.S. military intransigence in the face of unconventional warfare, civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration - and ultimately the American public - played an essential role in the selection of a capital-intensive strategy to fight insurgents in the Vietnam War. President Johnson was convinced that the American public would punish any administration that "lost" South Vietnam to communism, but he was equally certain that public preferences constrained the number of U.S. forces to be deployed and lives to be lost far more than the amount of money to be spent and ordnance to be consumed. In response, he and his sub- ordinates instructed the military to fight what they themselves acknowledged to be an ineffective, capital- and firepower-intensive strategy. The article ex- plains this seemingly nonstrategic behavior using a theory, generalizable be- yond this specific case, of the distribution of the costs of war within the electorate.138 Israel's experience in its 2006 war against Hezbollah suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to the Vietnam War or to U.S. strategic culture.139 Israel expended 170,000 artillery shells, twice the number fired in the conve tional 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in a month.140 The Israel Defense Force's (IDF's) initial campaign plan - a rapid air and small-unit ground assault that relied on firepower to control territory - was designed to minimize the number of ground forces and casualties. The Israeli cabinet rejected it; the transportation minister objected to "exposing 40,000 troops to the Lebanese reality."141 Four days into the conflict, the IDF deputy chief of staff recommended stopping the campaign: "We have exhausted the [aerial] effort; we have reached the peak; from now on we can only descend."142 Nonetheless, despite its intention to avoid a ground war, the Israeli government announced ambitious goals far beyond releasing hostages and deterring further rocket attacks.143 A report written by a subsequent government commission describing the strategic co- nundrum evokes the constraints faced by Johnson in Vietnam: "Declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement." The report acknowledges the government's bind: no "other ef- fective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and pro- longed ground operation" existed, but this "would have a high 'cost' and did not enjoy broad support."144 Cost distribution theory makes such behavior explicable. From four ma- jor assumptions - security is a public good; voters weigh security benefits against taxes, conscription, and casualties; median wealth is less than mean wealth in every state; and the preferences of the median voter are heeded in a democracy - I derive a voter preference for a capitalized military. Like the democratic exceptionalist research program, this article finds evidence that the American public weighs the benefits of limited war against the costs. Although one recent study of American public opinion assigns expectations of success as the most important factor in the public's support for a conflict, it also points out that the public more generally carries out relatively competent cost-benefit analysis.145 This article extends this logic by arguing that when the ability to substitute matériel for personnel is low, as it is against unconventional opponents, democracies may still prosecute wars using an ill-suited military doctrine (and thus a lower chance of success), because the costs remain modest for this pivotal voter. Democratic exceptionalism's cost-internalization mechanism provides an overly optimistic assessment of democracies' discretion in how and even when they fight small wars. Neither an apolitical public, nor a dysfunctional military culture, nor a military doctrine divorced from grand strategy causes a flawed warfighting strategy. Rather, it results from political leaders' assessment of the average voter's preferences. Although claiming that democracies substitute capital for labor to reduce the costs of war for voters is not news, tying the pur- suit of such a strategy to a rational voter has two novel and important implications. First, many observers argue that most wars of the twenty-first century will be hybrid conflicts involving unconventional opponents; finding the root cause of poor counterinsurgency is an essential task. This article argues that fixating on reforming the armed services (or even the civilian tools of foreign policy) in an effort to improve democratic performance in small wars is its own form of myopia. My theory gives reason to be skeptical of how much the U.S. military will be allowed to shift by future administrations and the public to which they are held accountable. Dysfunctional organizations can eventu- ally learn and adapt. If the public suffers from foolish preconceptions, it may be dissuaded through public education and the marketplace of ideas. Even positing a powerful strategic culture underpinning U.S. doctrine suggests that "it is at least possible that by deconstructing the standard American 'way' . . . some pathways to improved performance may be identified."146 But if a rational, fully informed electorate views such a military doctrine as its best option, the prospects for change are less clear.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › I/L War – Security Dilemma

DPT is empirically denied – democracies demonize non-democracies – ensures hair trigger security dilemma

Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › I/L War – Interventionism

Liberalism is inherently destabilizing—democratic pursuit inevitably leads to expansionism

Humpal 20 – Active Duty Air Force Officer and Ph.D. Candidate at Northwestern University studying insurgent behavior, civil wars, and global norms (Jesse, 6-23-2020, “Liberal Internationalism, an Ideology of Violence”, Global Security Review, https://globalsecurityreview.com/liberal-internationalism-ideology-of-violence/, accessed 7-2-2020) //DYang

During the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration’s cabinet and top advisors were an eclectic mix of liberal internationalists and neoconservatives. The thing these two ideologies have in common is their lust for foreign interference. At the surface their objectives were different, but at their core, they believed the United States should have a grand strategy of dominant manipulation on the world stage. In invading Afghanistan and then Iraq, liberal hegemonic rhetoric was shouted as not only justification for war but as a divine duty of the United States as the world’s sole hegemon. It was common to hear Bush and his team promote ideas such as the democratic peace theory, and the duty to liberate the veiled Afghani women under Taliban control. Although one can easily get behind democratic peace or the liberation of women, these were little more than post hoc justifications for invading sovereign nation-states. This is the unfortunate reality; liberalism is an expansionist ideology that inevitably does more harm than good. The Core Assumptions of Liberalism At its base level, liberalism emphasizes inalienable rights and individuality. From this baseline, thinkers have developed theories and ideas about how these rights should be manifested. The conclusion is at the crux of whether liberalism acts as an expansionist ideology or not. Although one could trace liberalism quite far back in historical political thought, John Locke acts as a cornerstone of the philosophy. Importantly, Locke lays the groundwork in Two Treaties of Government that all men are in “a state of perfect freedom,” that is to say, that humans have natural or inalienable rights.1 Although different thinkers have come to different conclusions of the type of liberalism that is dominant. In the American case, which will be the primary subject for the remainder of this piece, progressive liberalism and its emphasis on positive rights is the only dominant strand. According to John Mearsheimer in The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, this is true for three reasons: The Industrial Revolution, nationalism, and modern peacetime militaries.2 Since the United States is the sole world superpower and also subscribes to modern liberalism, the next section will explore how those two characteristics make liberalism incredibly expansionist in its aims. Liberalism is Inherently Expansionist To first explain why liberalism is inherently expansionist, one must understand how important the concept of inalienable rights is too liberal thinkers. It is through this understanding that the other layers form. If one believes, as liberals do, in inalienable rights, it means that everyone in the world has the same inherent set of rights. This is so important to internalize as a concept because of what this belief drives a country to do. For instance, if the fundamental principle is that each human has the same rights, then there is inevitably a duty to ensure that these rights are protected. It is from this duty that humans feel a calling, and eventually, a nation-state can be provoked to meddle. The American view of liberalism and its focus on positive rights results in social engineering. Social engineering manifests itself through policies aimed at leveling the playing field. On the domestic side, an example of this would be affirmative action. This policy manipulates the playing field in order to give a group who is historically disadvantaged a fairer opportunity. This is done at the expense of negative rights. Since people within a nation have more in common with each other than they do with people of other nations, it is possible to agree on foundational rights within the confines of one’s borders. For example, in the United States, the Bill of Rights is mostly noncontroversial. However, since each nation-state has its own identity, agreeing on foundational rights between states, or worse, globally is all but impossible. However, many liberals feel confident that they can project positive rights aboard. It is from this confidence that nation-states begin to feel obligated to intervene in places that rights are threatened. Even though a desire to meddle and optimism of success is in the DNA of liberal internationalists, they frequently lack the number one characteristic needed for liberal hegemonic pursuit, unipolarity. For most of the modern world, the globe existed with multiple superpowers. In a world with more than one superpower, countries’ foreign policies were preoccupied with survival. Since there is not a global state, the nation-state is the highest level of authority. In a multipolar world, nation-states are required to operate using a realist strategy. This strategy forces countries to balance, position, and align themselves in a rational way. However, in 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself without a rival. This unipolar world gave the liberal United States the rare opportunity to pursue any foreign policy strategy they wanted without fear of attack or significant pushback. Thus far, it has been established that liberal internationalists believe in global inalienable rights and that these rights are positive in nature thus requiring social engineering. Further, they have profound confidence in their own ability to execute global social engineering. Now, as the lone global power, the United States is unencumbered in its choice of foreign policy strategy. With all of this in place, according to liberal logic, one has the duty to protect and enforce the rights of others. From this duty, the next question is how is this accomplished? Despite the liberal internationalist fascination with international organizations, it is interesting that the policies of those institutions mirror that of the dominant state. With the United States being that state, the United Nations and NATO have taken their lead in liberal projection and have acted as a puppet organization. By the logic presented, it is unreasonable not to promote rights abroad if able. Now that the United States is able, that is exactly what they have done. Also, as established above, international organizations are part of the bedrock of liberal internationalism. It is through the ruse of these organizations that the United States can act under the veil of legitimacy. With these two pillars, the United States the state, and the United States the United Nations, numerous interventions have been waged, and there is no logical conclusion, with the exception of the emergence of another superpower. As the unipolar power, the United States not only has tried to liberalize several countries as the dominant front but has also led non-U.S. participant resolutions in the U.N. which started violent interventions. An example of this is the AMISOM run intervention in Somalia. While the United States is not a direct participant, they fronted and legitimized this effort using the international community.3 It’s illogical for liberalism as a foreign policy to be non-expansionist and has proven itself to be very expansionist. If inalienable rights are real, then how can a liberal internationalist not protect those rights abroad, even if it is through violence. It is from this paradox that one should understand that despite the peaceful façade, liberalism as a foreign policy is not only inherently expansionist but innately violent.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › I/L War – Interventionism

Democracy promotion locks-in permanent instability and inevitably fails due to US hypocrisy

Walt 16, (John Walt, Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, August 2016, , ME)

Other critics reject offshore balancing because they believe the United States has a moral and strategic imperative to promote freedom and protect human rights. As they see it, spreading democracy will largely rid the world of war and atrocities, keeping the United States secure and alleviating suffering. No one knows if a world composed solely of liberal democracies would in fact prove peaceful, but spreading democracy at the point of a gun rarely works, and fledgling democracies are especially prone to conflict. Instead of promoting peace, the United States just ends up fighting endless wars. Even worse, force-feeding liberal values abroad can compromise them at home. The global war on terrorism and the related effort to implant democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to tortured prisoners, targeted killings, and vast electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some defenders of liberal hegemony hold that a subtler version of the strategy could avoid the sorts of disasters that occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. They are deluding themselves. Democracy promotion requires large-scale social engineering in foreign societies that Americans understand poorly, which helps explain why Washington's efforts usually fail. Dismantling and replacing existing political institutions inevitably creates winners and losers, and the latter often take up arms in opposition. When that happens, U.S. officials, believing their country's credibility is now at stake, are tempted to use the United States' awesome military might to fix the problem, thus drawing the country into more conflicts.

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › I/L War – Interventionism

Democracy promotion ensures endless interventionist wars – efforts at regime change suppress minority rights, and increase states’ reliance on terrorism and prolif

Mearsheimer ’18 (John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, Yale University Press, , ME)

Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal state seeks to spread its own values far and wide. My goal in this book is to describe what happens when a power­ful state pursues this strategy at the expense of balance­-of­-power politics. Many in the West, especially among foreign policy elites, consider liberal hegemony a wise policy that states should axiomatically adopt. Spreading liberal democracy around the world is said to make eminently good sense from both a moral and a strategic perspective. For starters, it is thought to be an excellent way to protect human rights, which are sometimes seri­ously violated by authoritarian states. And because the policy holds that liberal democracies do not want to go to war with each other, it ultimately provides a formula for transcending realism and fostering international peace. Finally, proponents claim it helps protect liberalism at home by eliminating authoritarian states that otherwise might aid the illiberal forces that are constantly present inside the liberal state. This conventional wisdom is wrong. Great powers are rarely in a position to pursue a full­-scale liberal foreign policy. As long as two or more of them exist on the planet, they have little choice but to pay close attention to their position in the global balance of power and act according to the dictates of realism. Great powers of all persuasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in a bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great power. In these circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard­-nosed behavior with liberal rhe­toric. They talk like liberals and act like realists. Should they adopt liberal policies that are at odds with realist logic, they invariably come to regret it. But occasionally a liberal democracy encounters such a favorable balance of power that it is able to embrace liberal hegemony. That situation is most likely to arise in a unipolar world, where the single great power does not have to worry about being attacked by another great power since there is none. Then the liberal sole pole will almost always abandon realism and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Liberal states have a crusader mentality hard­-wired into them that is hard to restrain. Because liberalism prizes the concept of inalienable or natural rights, committed liberals are deeply concerned about the rights of virtually every individual on the planet. This universalist logic creates a powerful incen­tive for liberal states to get involved in the affairs of countries that seriously violate their citizens’ rights. To take this a step further, the best way to ensure that the rights of foreigners are not trampled is for them to live in a liberal democracy. This logic leads straight to an active policy of regime change, where the goal is to topple autocrats and put liberal democracies in their place. Liberals do not shy from this task, mainly because they often have great faith in their state’s ability to do social engineering both at home and abroad. Creating a world populated by liberal democracies is also thought to be a formula for international peace, which would not just eliminate war but greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the twin scourges of nuclear prolifera­tion and terrorism. And lastly, it is an ideal way of protecting liberalism at home. This enthusiasm notwithstanding, liberal hegemony will not achieve its goals, and its failure will inevitably come with huge costs. The liberal state is likely to end up in endless wars, which will increase rather than reduce the level of conflict in international politics and thus aggravate the problems of proliferation and terrorism. Moreover, the state’s militaristic behavior is almost certain to end up threatening its own liberal values. Liber­alism abroad leads to illiberalism at home. Finally, even if the liberal state were to achieve its aims—spreading democracy near and far, fostering eco­nomic intercourse, and creating international institutions—they would not produce peace. The key to understanding liberalism’s limits is to recognize its relation­ship with nationalism and realism. This book is ultimately all about these three isms and how they interact to affect international politics

2022 Michigan Evidence
DEMOCRACY BAD › WAR › 1nc – War

b. Median voter theory – democracies fight capital intensive wars more frequently.

Caverley 10 – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.

This section offers a theory of how a rational actor, the average voter in a democracy, can favor what appears to be a nonstrategic policy. To do so, it uses the core logic of a research program claiming that this sort of behavior should rarely happen in democracies. The theory presented here shares three impor- tant assumptions with the cost-internalization logic of democratic exception- alism: the distribution of costs within the state affects its pursuit of security; a democratic government's provision of security is a public good; and voters "take a reasonably level-headed cost-benefit approach in forming attitudes to- wards military missions."28 I relax the claim that costs are always internalized within democracies, however, arguing that the average voter's share may be much lower than the state's per capita costs. Even in democracies, wealth is not distributed equally within any given state; the person with median income is less well off than someone possessing the mean. A political-economic approach, the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, suggests that if the median voter can set a tax rate and spend the revenue on a service available to all citizens, she will take advantage of the potential for re- distribution.29 Even with a flat tax on income, the wealthy will pay a larger portion of the costs for a public good enjoyed by all. For example, in 2005 the fifth of the population with the highest incomes paid 69 percent of all U.S. fed- eral tax revenue, and the middle fifth paid only 9 percent.30 Similarly, the median voter will prefer to tax capital more heavily than labor, because labor income is distributed more equally than capital income.31 How these taxes are spent plays a most important role in establishing the redistributive nature of the public good of defense. Military doctrine, the means by which military power is developed and exercised, can be stylized as a production function consisting of two factors - capital (e.g., tanks, planes, ammunition, and even training) and labor (soldiers, sailors, etc.) - as well as the technology that allows one factor of production to serve as a substitute for another.32 Capital and labor are imperfect replacements and show diminishing returns; given a hundred tanks and ten soldiers, adding another tank will not produce as much capability as adding another soldier. The type of conflict af- fects substitutions as well; it is much harder to substitute capital for labor when fighting an unconventional opponent. Tax revenue can pay for both the capital and labor inputs. Personnel also can be supplied through conscription, a tax on a citizen's labor rather than income. Even if the odds of being conscripted are equally distributed, the median voter will demand that a larger amount of the military budget go toward the purchase of capital to reduce the risk of conscription. In cases where existing threats do not currently justify resorting to conscription, military capitalization will still to a large degree determine a draft's future likelihood. The median voter normally will be happy with an expensive, all-volunteer military; but once the level of threat creates a demand for labor that reaches into the middle class, the voter will support a conscripted military where draftees are protected by large amounts of capital.33 Casualties are also a public bad: no one wants to see their fellow citizens die. The less wealthy are more likely to be drafted and to join an all-volunteer force; they may gain jobs from domestic weapons manufacturing; and they of- ten regard military service as a means of acquiring human capital. Conscription is therefore an important, but not the only, reason why militaries with large amounts of labor can be a public bad. The median voter will accept a higher tax, what the British socialist Sidney Webb called the "conscription of riches," to build highly capitalized militaries both in peace and in war, because such militaries redistribute money and skills through jobs and training as well as reduce the risk of conscription and casualties. The median voter theory outlined above does not claim to perfectly capture how policy is made in a democracy, nor does it argue that one's relative in- come determines one's position on foreign policy. Rather, this simple theory suggests an equally simple insight: a military doctrine that privileges capital over labor will reduce the costs of conflict for an important swath of voters. A capitalized military not only results in many voters doing less of the fighting themselves, but also allows someone else's resources to fund the costs of war. Politicians should respond accordingly. This distribution of costs explains how a state's seemingly nonstrategic behavior may be in the interests of important rational actors within a democracy. Because of its redistributive nature, a capitalized military doctrine can lead to moral hazard, which arises when perverse incentives encourage actors to pursue risky behavior. For example, drivers with auto theft coverage are more likely to park on the street than pay for secure parking. Many domestic gov- ernment programs merge moral hazard with the Meltzer-Richard effect dis- cussed above. Deposit insurance uses government backing to insure bank deposits up to a certain limit, a redistributive public good. Because the insur- ance applies regardless of the bank (subject to government regulations), an individual has little motivation to consider the bank's solvency. Indeed, she is likely to choose the higher interest provided by a bank making risky investments. Regarding defense provision, a lack of cost internalization creates an incentive for the median voter to support risky behavior: that is, using a capital- intensive military in conflicts where substitutability is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting in such a manner. If the median voter's risky behavior is in effect being subsidized by the wealthy, democratic leaders sensitive to this voter's costs will pursue strategies that make success less likely. I argue that this is what happened in Vietnam.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: DSCA DA › 1AR – No Tradeoff – Aid Inevitable

Opposition to bills is all political – congress doesn’t care about spending, so it won’t care if the plan and Ukraine funding explode budgets.

Gleckman ’22 (Howard Gleckman, senior fellow at The Urban Institute, reporter at Forbes. “Why Congress Will Borrow To Help Ukraine But May Offset New COVID-19 Medical Costs With Spending Cuts” 05/17/22 )

Why is Congress prepared to spend billions of dollars for new aid to Ukraine without requiring offsetting tax increases or spending cuts at the same time lawmakers are demanding that more COVID-19-related therapeutics and testing be fully paid for?

It can’t be about the money. The next round of Ukraine aid will cost about $40 billion, even more than President Biden requested. By contrast, it looks like Congress is considering only about $10 billion, or one-quarter as much, for the COVID-19 health bill. If you are worried about the budget deficit, why fret about a $10 billion bill and ignore $40 billion in new spending?