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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Consult AI CP

NATO says no

Sonia Lucarelli et al 21. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

The AI Adoption in the Defense Domain and NATO’s Role. In discussing what AI will mean for allied militaries and the Alliance as such, a basic question should be addressed: is AI a technological revolution or is it an instance of technological evolution? Different pieces of evidence can support both interpretations. It would probably be hard for Allies, from a political perspective, to adapt swiftly to a rapid technological revolution. NATO approach, because of the consensus characterising its procedures, will have to be more evolutionary, granular and nuanced. In any case, it is unlikely to see in the next future AI making decisions for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). There are psychological, cultural, organizational, political as well as technical reasons for this. The journey to AI is likely to be rather troublesome. Agile software development, for instance, enables the development of superior software but, at the same time, also calls for different procedures, organizational structures and processes, touching upon organizations’ identities, missions and culture.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Civilian Tech CP

Civilian AI tech can’t solve---military specific cooperation is key

J.A.P. (Antoine) Smallegange et al, 18. Dr. H.J.M. (Harrie) Bastiaansen, A.P. (Auke) Venema MS, & Prof. Dr. A.W. (Adelbert) Bronkhorst. NATO Sience and Technology Board. "Big Data and Artificial Intelligence for Decision Making: Dutch Position Paper" //pipk

One of the main tasks of NATO is to facilitate military collaboration between member states. Traditionally, NC3O has focused on interoperability and on ways to support headquarters with C2-systemens to facilitate cooperation. The international trend of hyper connectivity and globalization in combination with the requirement of collaboration at tactical levels, make a shift towards interoperable support of tactical commanders paramount. STO can provide nations and NC3O with insights in new possibilities of emerging technologies to support the commanders.

Furthermore, technology for big data and AI is currently developing at a fast pace, with major potential impact on both the strategic, operational and tactical military decision making processes. As such, the military operational benefits may be huge and diverse. However, the full potential cannot (yet) be overseen and will have to be established over time. Moreover, these new technologies not only have potential benefits, but also short-comings and risks that need to be assessed, and for which possible mitigating countermeasures have to be identified.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Civilian Tech CP

Market forces can’t solve the aff---corporate r&d can’t meet NATOs needs on their own

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

Commercial technology and public goods. A common theme in discussions about AI is the role of private industry. The story goes that the commercial sector is leading in innovation on AI, and that the defence establishment, in contrast to the Cold War, thus needs to adapt to the needs and capabilities of the private sector, rather than the other way around.240 While defence establishments would certainly do well to shed some bureaucratic deadweight that constrains them from following the “lean”241 or “agile”242 ways of the commercial sector, it is problematic to import private-sector assumptions and practices as this line of thinking suggests.243 Namely, market forces do not always and necessarily lead to the social optimum: markets sometimes lead to the under-provision of public goods such as national defence, because of the inherent difficulty of charging all potential beneficiaries. Similarly, markets may favour the overproduction of negative externalities like pollution, because producers bear only a tiny fraction of the total cost. We observe these dynamics of market failure when we look at AI-related R&D by private companies. First, corporate R&D generally has a narrow, short-term focus, to the detriment of broader, longerterm issues which are necessary for ensuring that AI yields positive returns in the distant future.244 Second, the computer intensiveness of ML is technically, economically and environmentally unsustainable.245 In particular, nobody has mastered how to properly size ML models and modern deep-learning algorithms are based on over-parametrization. This means their performance is inherently inefficient, in that they need an enormous amount of data and parameters. The cost comes in terms of computing resources. Realistically, existing trends are not sustainable.246 NATO and its Allies have operational and strategic incentives to promote leaner and greener AI. Operationally, there is a limit to the utility of computationally intensive AI systems “at the edge” – i.e., usage by small units in operations where connectivity is not assured.247 Strategically, correcting cases of market failure enhances technological prowess insofar as it means promoting broader, longerterm research on AI and the development of less computationally intensive solutions not only for ML, but also for other technological priorities such as quantum248 and aspects of biotechnology. Moreover, weaning ML models off massive training data is one measure of AI becoming more robust,249 and thus potentially less susceptible to data-driven biases.250 Procurement. R&D will, sooner or later, lead to procurement programmes. Transitioning AI into prevailing procurement paradigms, however, will not be immediate or easy. Defence procurement is particularly complex, given the range of strict requirements and specifications with which contractors have to comply.251 This is why traditional weapons manufacturers generally have an advantage when it comes to approaching defence buyers.252 AI, however, will entail a paradigm shift because the capabilities will continuously evolve. For AI-enabled autonomous systems in particular, as mentioned above, decision-making is “non-deterministic” and depends on the “dynamic environment” in which the system operates.253 This means that “traditional development and procurement approaches, based on full-path regression, are unfit”.254 This means that R&D also continues in the product deployment phase, as data and algorithms keep providing information and feedback that have to be integrated in order to achieve initial operational capabilities. Current “waterfall” procurement paradigms are set up so that engineers test prototypes according to defined specifications, and then subsequently move to production.255 With machine learning, the specifications will keep evolving as algorithms are fed new data.256 By extension, this means that testing cannot be treated as a singular phase prior to production and development. For NATO Allies, a more iterative procurement paradigm that does not depend on the sequential “waterfall” entails unique challenges. The integration of enterprise AI requires specific technical, legal, and organizational capabilities. This is linked to human-capital challenges in requirements, procurement and operations communities, as organizations leveraging AI “need their own people who know how to structure the problem, handle the data, and stay aware of evolving opportunities”.257 The development of AI-centred major weapon systems similarly calls for reform, or at least a remarkable adaptation, of defence procurement.258 Significant political, organizational and human capital will have to be invested. This is an additional reason why a centre such as the proposed A3IC could support the transition, through best practices, lessons learned and similar initiatives. Supply chain. Ben Buchanan has conceptualized AI inputs as a triad: algorithms, data and processors.259 Processors are the material part of the triad and they pose a key supply chain vulnerability.260 NATO as an organization has neither the capabilities nor the authority to strengthen the AI supply chain. Additionally, the supply chain is heavily skewed towards some Allies, like the US and Great Britain in semiconductors or the Netherlands in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and partners, like Israel, South Korea and Japan – plus Taiwan, which is a close ally of several NATO countries.261 A useful exercise for the Alliance could be to make an assessment of the supply chain related to semiconductors. This is important for three main reasons. First, several Allies are conducting their own assessments, but an Alliance-wide picture is so far lacking.262 Second, as several countries consider semiconductors a strategic industry and thus aim at achieving a degree of selfsufficiency and autonomy, there is a real risk that different national strategies may collide, thus leaving the Alliance as a whole worse off. Last, but not least, such an assessment could be helpful in determining potential joint or common solutions, including arms control and export controls, as discussed in the next chapter, as well as coordination in R&D investments.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Export Control CP

Export controls are bad---undermine innovation, can’t solve the case

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

Arms control. There have been various calls to adapt different types of arms control regime to AI. Reciprocity, monitoring and compliance pose key challenges here. How can we trust countries that have not complied with existing arms control regimes to respect new ones? How can we convince countries that do not want to enter existing arms control regimes to join new ones? Cooperation, political scientists note, is a matter of interest and trust: any control regime not built on these two pillars is doomed to fail.269 At this stage, it is difficult to find the political conditions conducive to either. There is, however, an additional problem.

Weapons or technology control? Lethal autonomous weapons are a type of military equipment which is hence subjected to clear and existing rules and regulations – both domestic and international – related to the sale, export and transfer of military technology. The key argument for banning lethal autonomous weapons, however, builds on a different logic: the dual-use nature of the constituent technologies favors its swift, and to some extent subtle, diffusion. In terms of inputs, the AI Inputs Triad is based on algorithms, data and microprocessors – although human capital should not be underestimated.270 Banning the weapons without underlying controlling the technology risks being ineffective, at best, and counterproductive, at worst, as it may increase the incentives to countries or actors to source key component technologies and undertake research on their integration so as to neutralize the effects of a ban.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Non-Mil CP

Perm do the CP---State department is topical

Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. //pipk

Congress authorizes DoD and the U.S. Department of State to work with foreign nations to conduct multiple types of activities that fall under the auspices of security cooperation. These activities range from arms sales and military exercises to educational courses and personnel exchanges. Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars and partners with thousands of foreign students and trainees on U.S. security cooperation efforts, which involve large numbers of active-duty and reserve military members, U.S. government civilians, and contractors who plan, execute, monitor, and evaluate these efforts. In some cases, partner nations fund the activities, and in other cases, the United States funds them in the form of loans and grants.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Non-Mil CP

Can’t solve the aff---defense cooperation is key to the alliance

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey 20, concurrent Master of Public Policy and Juris Doctorate 2024 candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School and recipient of Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Fellowship. She previously worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman where she focused on regulatory risk and global data protection for financial institutions. She also worked at the Department of State. Her research with the Belfer Cyber Project includes AI policy, cybersecurity, US-Russian cyber relations, and US foreign policy in the digital age. a dual Master degree in International Affairs candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the University of St. Gallen and was a Belfer Cyber Security Project research assistant. He previously worked for the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs in Washington D.C. and currently works as a researcher for the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The Cyber Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School. "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" August. //pipk

Our assessment of existing transatlantic S&T cooperation and potential future applications of AI technologies has highlighted three sectors where US-EU collaboration on AI could be easily expanded. AI innovation and applications in the areas of healthcare, environmental sciences, and defense will be critical for the advancement of the “global good.”

Enhanced collaboration on AI in healthcare and environmental sciences will capitalize on existing S&T coordination and established research relationships.321 The benefits from pooling resources on health-related and environmental sciences will outweigh apprehensions from private sector competition or government. AI-related cooperation in the defense sector is key for the continuation of historical security alliances.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Non-Mil CP

Defense data sharing key

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey 20, concurrent Master of Public Policy and Juris Doctorate 2024 candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School and recipient of Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Fellowship. She previously worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman where she focused on regulatory risk and global data protection for financial institutions. She also worked at the Department of State. Her research with the Belfer Cyber Project includes AI policy, cybersecurity, US-Russian cyber relations, and US foreign policy in the digital age. a dual Master degree in International Affairs candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the University of St. Gallen and was a Belfer Cyber Security Project research assistant. He previously worked for the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs in Washington D.C. and currently works as a researcher for the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The Cyber Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School. "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" August. //pipk

Rationale: High-quality, diverse data, as Acting Director of the JAIC Nand Mulchandani explains, enables better training and development of algorithms and reliable AI. The defense-sector (NATO) would benefit from diverse data collected by many countries. It is difficult to reduce the timeline to properly collect, organize, store, and develop governance mechanisms around data. Therefore, Acting Director Mulchandani explains, it is important for the US, the EU, and NATO to begin data-sharing efforts as soon as possible to prevent future obstacles.423 However, defense data-sharing efforts, as Ulrike Esther Franke explains, are difficult to initiate because of sensitivities around data, particularly around military operations. It may therefore be easier to establish data-sharing efforts centralized around solving a discrete question or achieving a specific goal.424

The US and the EU should remove obstacles to sharing defense and intelligence-related data where appropriate. They should also fund and prioritize addressing challenges to data sharing through NATO. Efforts should begin immediately as data sharing and governance projects are often lengthy undertakings. Projects focused on achieving a specific, concrete goal should lay the groundwork for larger-scale, general efforts.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: Non-Mil CP

Defense cooperation key

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey 20, concurrent Master of Public Policy and Juris Doctorate 2024 candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and Stanford Law School and recipient of Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Fellowship. She previously worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman where she focused on regulatory risk and global data protection for financial institutions. She also worked at the Department of State. Her research with the Belfer Cyber Project includes AI policy, cybersecurity, US-Russian cyber relations, and US foreign policy in the digital age. a dual Master degree in International Affairs candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the University of St. Gallen and was a Belfer Cyber Security Project research assistant. He previously worked for the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs in Washington D.C. and currently works as a researcher for the Cyber Defense Project at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The Cyber Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School. "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" August. //pipk

The US defense sector and the EU340 have separately recognized the importance of AI innovation and adoption. The Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes the need for the Department to modernize its programs and address changing threats posed by new technologies like AI.341 The accompanying DOD Artificial Intelligence Strategy stressed that AI will change “the character of the future battlefield and the pace of threats” the US will face. Therefore, the AI Strategy outlined the need to develop and adopt AI to strengthen the DOD’s capabilities, enhance and streamline businesses processes through AI and ML applications, cultivate its AI workforce, engage with industry and allies to enhance capabilities and security, and lead in military ethics around AI.342 To lead defense-related AI efforts, the DOD created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018 to: 1) accelerate the operationalization and adoption of AI across the DOD, 2) establish a “common foundation” to enable the DOD to scale AI’s impact, 3) coordinate the DOD’s AI priorities, and 4) attract and foster leading AI talent.343 The US has undertaken extensive AI and ML-related R&D and, as mentioned in the United States Government Funding section, defense-related AI R&D appears344 to be larger than non-defense AI R&D. For example, DARPA’s AI Next Campaign—launched in 2018—focuses on improving the security, robustness, and reliability of AI and ML while decreasing the required computing resources, while its Artificial Intelligence Exploration (AIE) funds academia and small industry for high-risk, high-reward projects.345

The EU is less advanced in developing an AI strategy for the defense sector. This broadly stems from its comparatively more nascent defense industry and differing opinions between EU Member States on AI’s defense applications. In 2017, the EU established the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to bolster its security, defense industry, and strategic autonomy.346 EDF and PESCO, as Ulrike Franke, Policy Fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations explains, are vehicles to establish greater European defense collaboration, but these vehicles are not as developed or unified as other defense cooperative mechanisms or alliances like NATO.347 Furthermore, European Member States disagree about the role AI should play in the defense sector, with some countries extremely averse to the idea of developing lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) given the trope of the “killer robot.”348

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Topicality › 2AC---Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is one of these 11 things---we’re testing and evaluation

Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. //pipk

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT Kritiks › 1AR---AT: Securitization

Securitization framework---evaluate securitization debates using three criteria----1. Is the threat real, 2. Do we solve the threat and 3. Is the strategy we endorse non-escalatory

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

While securitization studies have paid considerable attention to the moral value of desecuritization, they have paid almost no attention to the morality of securitization. In this article, I attempt to rectify that situation by proposing a revision of securitization theory that specifies three criteria that – if fulfilled at the same time – would render a securitization morally right. The criteria are: (1) that there is an objective existential threat; (2) that the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and (3) that the security response is appropriate to the threat in question. Although what is suggested here is considerably removed from the Copenhagen School’s original securitization theory, it is akin to that framework insofar as it retains the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitizing actor. Indeed, the development of criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization is analogous to the Copenhagen School’s devising criteria that determine both the existence and the success of securitization.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT Kritiks › 1AR---AT: Securitization

Solves runaway securitization by the state

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

Just war theory has attracted both endorsement and criticism. One of the most pertinent criticisms is that it moralizes war, making it easier to fight. In the light of the ‘war on terror’, Anthony Burke (2004: 330), for example, has argued that ‘moral discourses [including just war theory] are part of the warrior’s political armoury; they are part of war’s machinery, not a rod in its wheels’. A similar objection could conceivably be advanced against a just securitization theory. It might be argued that such a theory moralizes securitization, making it easier to exclude and marginalize minorities and control populations. Some scholars already hold that securitization is a process of deliberate ‘insecuritization’. Didier Bigo (2001: 111), for example, has argued that security is in no sense a reflection of an increase of threats in the contemporary epoch – it is a lowering of the level of acceptability of the other; it is an attempt at insecuritization of daily life by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police potential for action.

I hold against this first objection that my criteria are robust enough to protect against the abuse of securitization. Note that the insecuritization argument has largely been advanced with a view to migrants in the European Union (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Huysmans, 2006); yet, crucially, under my framework even high levels of migration do not qualify as objective existential threats because the element of intentionality is missing. In the case of migration, we are not even dealing with a collective actor, but with lots of different people and their individual decisions. Intentionality would come into consideration only in the highly unlikely event that one state, perhaps after failing to provide for its own people, would urge or perhaps even pay its own people to emigrate en masse to another state. Under such circumstances, immigration might then become an objective existential threat to the receiving state.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Securitization

Only our framework determines the ballot---their kritik without our criteria is just an FYI---securitization analysis solves better than desecuritization

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

Another more general critique that could be advanced against what is proposed here is that a normative extension of securitization theory confuses the aim of original securitization theory, which is to enable analysts to examine how securitization plays out in practice. While the latter is indeed quite different from what I am trying to achieve here, it is also the case that my argument sits neatly within a wider ‘securitization studies’, the realm wherein the securitization theorist can move from merely observing what is going on to making normative recommendations (Taureck, 2006: 59–60). The latter is desirable because it may not always be satisfying to end one’s analysis without a word regarding the moral rightness of the securitization one has spent (often considerable) time researching. In any case, having an informed opinion on the rightness of a political decision is better than silence, which could be mistaken for approval.

There are reasons to believe that the Copenhagen School would concur with such a view. This is most clearly evinced by the fact that they do not feel obliged to agree with all or any securitization. Indeed, ‘one of the purposes of [the securitization] approach should be that it becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This suggests that although the School’s view of security politics is considered ‘neutral’ (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 38), normative evaluation is considered desirable, even necessary, and indeed a normative preference can be found in most of its members’ writings.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Securitization

No internal link from our securitizing move to securitization by the state---we’re policy analysts, we can’t securitize---our framework for links solves political efficacy of securitization---no discourse links, our speech act is a normative argument as part of policy analysis and doesn’t actually cause securitization

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

Postulating what we should be worried about is certainly one way of conducting normative security theory. Yet, there are other forms of normative analysis, and in this article I am offering a set of criteria that permit the analyst to evaluate whether a particular securitization is or was morally right/justifiable. Inspired by just war theory, where it is argued that, among other criteria, a just cause and the right intention determine the morality of war, I argue that there are three criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization: (1) there must be an objective existential threat, which is to say a threat that endangers the survival of a an actor or an order regardless of whether anyone has realized this; (2) the referent object of security must be morally legitimate, which is the case only when the referent object is conducive to human well-being defined as the satisfaction of human needs; and (3) the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question, which is to say that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions. I argue that a securitization is morally right only if all three of the above criteria are fulfilled at the same time. I also argue that a securitization theory complemented by a normative extension of this type would enable analysts to hold securitizing actors accountable, which would render the theory more policy relevant than is currently the case.

It is, however, not possible to extend the Copenhagen School’s original version of securitization theory by the aforementioned three criteria, as that theory precludes objective threat assessment and the School rejects the theorization of securitizing actors’ intentions. In short, original securitization theory cannot be used in normative analysis in the exact way suggested in this article; rather, my three criteria represent a further development of the revised securitization theory that I have developed elsewhere (Floyd, 2010). Given that it will feature as part of the argument set forth in this article, it will be useful to briefly recite my revision here.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Securitization

Evaluate securitization by weighing the truth claims of our advantages and the ability of our plan to solve---our framework solves the impacts to securitization better than theirs---securitizing objective threats to democracy is good

Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory” Security Dialogue 42(4-5) 427–439 //pipk

The project of establishing a list of criteria that can be used to determine the moral rightness of securitization should be seen as related to work in just war theory, where a list of criteria is used to determine the morality of war. Indeed, some of my criteria are very similar to those proposed by just war theorists. My appropriateness-of-response criterion, broken down into measured response and sincerity, for example, can be found in many writings on just war, while my requirement for the existence of an objective existential threat is comparable to the criterion of just cause. This suggests that certain things that hold true for just war theory could also apply to a just securitization theory. At the very least, they can be used to argue the case in favour of such a theory, while they also suggest what kind of criticisms might be levelled against what is attempted here.

The greatest success of just war theory – at least in the West – is that it has come to inform the practice of war, as decisions about war and how to fight it are made with reference to that theory. In Michael Walzer’s (2002: 933) words, ‘Moral theory has been incorporated into war-making as a real constraint on when and how wars are fought.’ A related positive consequence has been that just war theory has helped democratize war-making, insofar as citizens that are well versed in the ideas of a just war can and repeatedly do hold decisionmakers accountable for their actions. The outcry of the British public over the 2003 Iraq war serves as a useful example.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Benchmarks key to Interoperability

Testing is key---establishes standards for interoperability and data-sharing

Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk

Interoperability is a critical lubricant for U.S. alliances. To operate effectively, allies need to plan, train, and exercise together. Joint operational concepts, common doctrine, and compatible military capabilities and systems are required to communicate effectively and achieve shared objectives.66 As countries integrate AI into military systems, the United States and its allies must ensure that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure.

The United States and its allies could start with common standards for interpretability, safety, and security of AI systems, including AI-enabled, safety-critical systems.67 For AI-enabled military systems expected to perform a given function, the United States and its allies should agree on common benchmarks for accuracy and performance based on the same training and testing data. The CSET survey suggests that allies and partners desire such benchmarks, with a majority of surveyed officials expressing the need for international coordination and management of AI military applications, specifically autonomous weapons systems and unmanned vehicles for submarine detection. A German representative stated that collaboration with the United States would be enhanced by an AI strategy that includes a focus on AI-related defense and security threats.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Solves China---NATO key to P3s

NATO is key---experimentation establishes standards that allow for interoperability and private-public partnerships key to winning the race in AI

Sonia Lucarelli et al 21. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Another topical issue is the private-public partnership on AI. This is key in the AI race between the US and China – possibly leading to disadvantages for Allies vis-à-vis China – and in the relations between NATO and major civilian companies working on AI and Big Data. There is also the fundamental need to ensure interoperability in a fragmented scenario in terms of the Allies’ adoption of AI technologies. NATO has historically been an important player in the processes of standardization and could be such also in this case. In this context, some creativity may be needed: for instance, should NATO provide cloud computing services, namely enablers, the same way it provides air-space management or ground surveillance? Could the Alliance envision an integration of nationally-owned AI assets as it does for the integrated air and missile defense? These are important questions which, however, highlight the fact that defense is a sovereign issue and most decisions are taken by national governments, not by NATO as such.

The Alliance could play a prominent role in the AI domain. For instance, NATO could establish an AI champion to help Allies understand, adopt and integrate AI. Such champion could start with small projects aiming at validating the effectiveness of the solution, and then it could help Allies in training. A key, related issue in this regard is education and training. Similarly, the importance of wargames, simulations and experimentations is going to grow, and NATO has a role to play here, as the unique avenue to convene allied military and political bodies.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Logistics Solves Norms

NATO AI key to democracy---solves ethical AI---starting with non combat still solves

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

NATO has an interest, and a moral obligation, to promote the adoption of its values in the realm of AI. Democratic values inform the Alliance’s goals, thus giving meaning to its material capabilities – including its military power. At the same time, the integration of AI into the fields of security and defence poses unique moral, ethical, legal, and safety-related questions.85 It is thus imperative that the Alliance actively considers and operationalizes AI ethics, regardless of the degree and scope of AI integration within NATO and its Allies. The common principles and values pronounced in the Atlantic Treaty represent the foundations on which NATO was built. Such principles and values – democracy, freedom, rule of law, individual rights, free markets – are the bond underlying the transatlantic community, which in fact predates the Atlantic Alliance.86

Norms and values can strongly shape the international system.87 Given the intense international competition in the technological, military, economic, and normative domains, embedding democratic values into AI is as much a strategic imperative for the Alliance as it is a functional one.88 In addition to signalling to domestic populations that NATO and its Allies follow through on their commitments to uphold values as the basis of the political and military Alliance, incorporating AI ethics into the “NATO-mation” agenda also serves as a bulwark against the incursion of unwelcome illiberal values in the course of future technological development.89

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Logistics Solves Norms

Momentum for democratic cooperation in AI building now---NATO logistic exercises key to preventing the US from leaving allies behind

Margarita Konaev & Husanjot Chahal 21, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April. //pipk

Conclusion The idea of an international technology alliance grounded in a shared set of democratic ideals and ethical standards for the development and use of emerging technologies is gaining ground in the United States and among its allies and partners.75 Yet as the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, the United States may charge ahead in integrating AI into its military systems while allies trail behind. The growing gap in military and technological capabilities, in turn, could undermine interoperability and threaten the long-term viability of multinational coalitions like NATO and other key U.S. alliances.

While there are notable technical, bureaucratic, and political barriers to multinational cooperation in AI, especially for military purposes, AI applications for logistics and sustainment represent both a promising and critical area for collaboration between the United States and its allies. There are many ways allies can work together in this space, including by developing joint standards for data sharing, investing in collaborative R&D programs, advancing multinational public-private partnerships, and integrating AIenabled logistics and sustainment technologies into joint military exercises.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Logistics Key---Say Yes

Allies will only say yes to the plan---logistics is non-controversial and leads to broader cooperation

Margarita Konaev & Husanjot Chahal 21, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April. //pipk

The United States' global network of alliances and partnerships is a force multiplier in the strategic competition against China and Russia. With artificial intelligence as the focal point of this competition, fostering AI defense and security cooperation is becoming increasingly important. In fact, in its final report, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has recommended strengthening AI interoperability with U.S. allies and partners as a key element of building an AI-ready force by 2025.1 The AI future of the United States is then inherently intertwined with that of our allies and partners.

Although there are powerful incentives for multinational collaboration on AI, there are also nonnegligible technical, bureaucratic, and political barriers that could prevent like-minded nations from realizing a shared vision for the responsible use of military AI. This issue brief summarizes these challenges and then makes the argument that multinational collaboration on AI applications for military logistics and sustainment offers the path of least resistance. Our key takeaways are: • Multinational collaboration efforts on military applications of AI face an uphill battle. Public misgivings about the militarization of AI, tensions with Europe on questions of regulations and data privacy, lack of clarity regarding the best forum for collaboration, and technical challenges to ensuring that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure could impede efforts to work together. While no easy task, collaboration on AI-enabled technologies and applications related to military logistics and sustainment is technologically attainable, politically feasible, and strategically imperative. There are multiple pathways for collaboration on this set of technologies and applications, including joint standards for secure data sharing; collaborative research and development programs; multinational public-private partnerships; and joint military exercises that include AI-enabled logistics and sustainment technologies and capabilities.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Solvency › 2AC---Unilat Fails

Alliances key to AI versus Russia and China---the US can’t do it alone

Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk

America’s broad network of allies and partners is a source of enduring strength. In an era of economic and technological competition with China and Russia, the United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce troves of strategic resources, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant and trend-setting; data on which to train AI algorithms; advanced microprocessors and data storage units; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices to the rest of the world.

Alliances matter in the AI context because they provide a framework for cooperation, data sharing, dissemination of best practices, joint planning, and procurement. The market adequately incentivizes some forms of cooperation, such as data labelling and exchanges. But alliances can help formalize and expand these relationships, correct for market failures in such areas as AI safety and security, coordinate development of use cases and risk assessments, enhance the legitimacy of international action, and validate the deployment of safe and reliable AI.