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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2AC---AI key to NATO---Burden-Sharing Conflicts

AI gaps in NATO create burden-sharing conflicts

Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk

The existence of “AI haves” and “have-nots” within an alliance can complicate burden-sharing — a central tenet of military alliances. On one hand, states with robust AI capabilities can specialize their contributions to alliance operations and focus on providing AI-related capabilities. If, however, AI applications become a necessity for warfighting in the future, states that lack AI capabilities may be less able to contribute to alliance operations. States better equipped with AI capabilities may subsequently be forced to take on a greater share of work, generating both political and operational challenges. Politically, “AI haves” may complain that “AI have-nots” are not adequately contributing to a mission, straining relations between allies. Operationally, capability gaps can hamper an alliance’s ability to deploy forces or achieve military objectives. During the NATO-led air war over Kosovo in 1999, for instance, many NATO members possessed limited numbers of precision-guided munitions in their arsenals and often lacked the training to employ them, curtailing their ability to contribute to operations.65 As a result, responsibility for carrying out the air campaign fell to a small number of allies. In a larger conflict, burden-sharing might be critical to sustaining operations or securing battlefield victories.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › NATO Advantage › 2AC---AI Coop Key to NATO

AI cooperation key to NATO effectiveness

Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk

Second, incorporating AI-enabled capabilities into alliance planning exercises and wargames will help prepare policymakers and commanders to better employ AI.132 Wargames, for instance, might ask leaders to employ AI-enabled capabilities or respond to a rival’s use of AI-enabled weapons. These events allow leaders to test and refine institutional processes in a low-risk environment, while also socializing practitioners to the potential uses, limitations, and risks of AI-enabled warfare.

Conclusion

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Solvency

US-NATO cooperation is key to AI leadership---the US and Europe each have strengths, they just need a forum to effectively coordinate strategies to maximize return---diffusion and development of AI is inevitable, it’s only a question of maintaining the relative lead---no counterplan can solve all the internal links---process is either normal means, causes delays, or discourages necessary private investment

E.H. Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Arkadiankatu. Former liaison between the NATO Innovation Unit and the Commission’s staff. March 31. "Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe" Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. European View, 1-9. //pipk

This article provides a brief overview of European and transatlantic defence cooperation in the area of artificial intelligence. As states race forward to achieve superiority in artificial intelligence, including its military applications, NATO allies and partner nations on both sides of the Atlantic have a strong incentive to cooperate closely and ensure the collective West can maintain its technological edge. However, large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. To ensure greater European performance and relevance, it is desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Solvency

NATO and logistics are key---it’s uncontroversial and establishes standards necessary for broader cooperation---other organizations fail

Ulrike Esther Franke 21, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare. PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Franke is a policy affiliate at the Governance of AI project at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute. "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI" – ECFR/367 2. January. //pipk

AI can enable applications in fields as diverse as health, robotics, defence, and agriculture. Where should the focus of potential transatlantic cooperation lie?

If Europe and the US agree to focus on AI ethics, then they should seek to develop common rules and guidelines that both sides can enforce in their jurisdictions. However, if they agree that their shared goal is to slow down other actors’ – particularly China’s – AI advances, they will need to engage in more targeted forms of cooperation. US researchers have proposed several specific initiatives for international cooperation, such as coordinating investment screening procedures, and establishing common export controls on supply chain components, to ensure China remains dependent on imports of AI chips. This would be in addition to the long line of measures already introduced by the US Department of Commerce. These include requirements for Chinese company Huawei to apply for licences to purchase semiconductors, a measure that aims to exert economic pressure and disrupt Chinese technology supply chains.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Solvency

Starting with an AI logistics pilot through NATO is key---it’s key to military effectiveness, is technologically and politically feasible, and establishes benchmarks necessary for effective AI testing and standards necessary for innovation and interoperability---allies only say yes to the plan

Margarita Konaev & Husanjot Chahal 21, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April. //pipk

Focusing on AI-enabled Military Logistics and Sustainment In military affairs, logistics is tasked with managing the global supply chain for the armed services, including “the transfer of personnel and materiel from one location to another, as well as the maintenance of that materiel.”27 Sustainment is a broader term, encompassing logistics as well as financial management, personnel services, and health services which together provide the support necessary to maintain operations until the mission is accomplished.28 The two functions are closely intertwined. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, for instance, offers a comprehensive definition of logistics that also entails elements of sustainment, encompassing the aspects of military operations that deal with “design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.”29

Logistics and sustainment are essential to military effectiveness, readiness, survivability, and endurance, and in many ways, constitute the lifeblood of military power.30 The Department of Defense, in turn, sees great promise in leveraging AI/machine learning (ML) technologies for military logistics and sustainment to better maintain equipment, reduce operational costs, and improve readiness. The Department of Defense’s AI strategy, for example, includes efforts related to AI-enabled logistics and sustainment, such as “implementing predictive maintenance and supply, and streamlining business processes,” as part of its strategic approach to “delivering AI-enabled capabilities that address key missions.”31 Joint Logistics, in turn, is one of the JAIC’s key mission initiatives, dedicated to “improving fleet readiness through AI-driven diagnostics, training, process improvements, demand forecasting, and supply chain optimization.”32

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage Two---Cooperation

Global cooperation on AI generates governance capacity necessary to prevent worst-case scenarios

Yves Tiberghien et al 22, professor of political science and director emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia. Danielle Luo, senior analyst, international public affairs at CPP Investments. Panthea Pourmalek is a master of public policy and global affairs student at the University of British Columbia. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity" February 14. //pipk

We are facing an ever-growing gap between the phenomenal acceleration of technology and of connectivity, and the human capacity to manage these trends. The gap is well-documented in the fields of finance, climate change, pandemics and nuclear risks. But the contrast between the exponential growth of disruptive technology and the lacklustre supply of governance mechanisms is starkest in the fields of digital governance and artificial intelligence (AI).

That gap becomes existential when we consider the likely future development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) (Ord 2020) or superintelligence (Bostrom 2015) that can be misaligned with human values or even the goal of ensuring the continuity of human existence. This question of the governance of life with AI may be the most essential question of our time (Tegmark 2017), but you would not know it from the current output of global governance in this field. Summarizing the judgement of many scientists in the field, Toby Ord argues that unaligned AGI is actually the number-one global existential risk for humanity, with a 10 percent chance of human extinction within 100 years. The prophesized existential threats posed by extreme and accelerated technological advancement and expansion have never been as close to reality as they are now. As noted by Yuval Noah Harari and Daniel Kahneman (2021) in a recent conversation, the task of taming and governing the digital/AI revolution is daunting. Humanity may have no slack for a mistake this time around, given the existential consequences of such a mistake.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage Two---Cooperation

Democracy solves extinction

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour.

We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage Two---Cooperation

International cooperation key to prevent authoritarian AI from crushing democracy worldwide

Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk

How can the United States collaborate with allies and partners to shape the trajectory of artificial intelligence in ways that will promote liberal democratic values and protect against efforts to wield AI for authoritarian ends?

This question is both important and urgent. It is important because America’s broad network of alliances and security partnerships is a singular asset in defending liberal values. It is urgent because China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI and the export of censorship and surveillance technologies to countries across the globe.1 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion and stifle dissent.2

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage Two---Cooperation

The aff spills over to broader international democratic cooperation on AI

Ulrike Esther Franke 21, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare. PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Franke is a policy affiliate at the Governance of AI project at Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute. "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI" – ECFR/367 2. January. //pipk

A glance at the history of artificial intelligence (AI) shows that the field periodically goes through phases of development racing ahead and slowing down – often dubbed “AI springs” and “AI winters”. The world is currently several years into an AI spring, dominated by important advances in machinelearning technologies. In Europe, policymakers’ efforts to grapple with the rapid pace of technological development have gone through several phases over the last five to ten years. The first phase was marked by uncertainty among policymakers over what to make of the rapid and seemingly groundbreaking developments in AI. This phase lasted until around 2018 – though, in some European states, and on some issues, uncertainty remains. The second phase consisted of efforts to frame and AI challenges politically, and to address them, on a domestic level: between 2018 and 2020, no fewer than 21 EU member states published national AI strategies designed to delineate their views and aims, and, in some cases, to outline investment plans.

The next phase could be a period of international, and specifically transatlantic, cooperation on AI. After several years of European states working at full capacity to understand how to support domestic AI research, including by assembling expert teams to deliberate new laws and regulations, there is growing interest among policymakers and experts in looking beyond Europe. On the EU level, AI policy and governance have already received significant attention, with the European Commission playing an important role in incentivising member states to develop AI strategies, such as by starting to tackle issues around how to make sure AI is “ethical” and “trustworthy”. But recent months have seen a rise in the number of calls for international cooperation on AI driven by liberal democracies across the world. Western countries and their allies have set up new forums for cooperation on how to take AI forward, and are activating existing forums. More such organisations and platforms for cooperation are planned.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

Unrestrained great power competition causes extinction---China and Russia aren’t revisionist but the misperception of their own strength fueled by technological advances undermines climate negotiations and risks crises escalating to nuclear conflict---competition is inevitable but mitigating the risks of conflict through effective management and credible deterrence solves

Robert S. Litwak 21, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center. Dr. Litwak is also a consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He served on the National Security Council staff as director for nonproliferation in the first Clinton administration. He was an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and has held visiting fellowships at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Oxford University. "Geostrategic Competition and Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable" September 15. //pipk

Humanity faces two catastrophic, indeed existential, threats—climate change and nuclear war. These risks play out before us as if on split screen. On one side are the here-and-now impacts of climate change: wildfires from Siberia to California to southern Europe, scorching “heat domes” over the Pacific Northwest, and “once in a thousand years” flooding in China. On the other, heightened geostrategic competition carrying the greatest risk of war between nuclear powers since the depths of the Cold War: in the month of April 2021 alone, a Russian troop surge on the Ukraine border triggered an “imminent crisis” alert in NATO while Chinese naval vessels and bombers conducted a largescale war-game encircling Taiwan. Though ostensibly discrete, the events playing out on the split screen are linked. This new nexus between geostrategic competition and climate change must be understood and integrated in policy if the twin threats are to be averted.

In his landmark book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman stated that the central challenge of climate change to humanity is now “to manage what is already unavoidable and avoid what will truly be unmanageable.” To that compelling formulation can be added a corollary reflecting the new nexus: avoiding unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for managing the climate threat.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

Maintaining the lead in military AI strategy is key to preserving the balance of power, preventing runaway great power competition, and deterring Russian and Chinese attacks that escalate to nuclear Armageddon---creates space for political bargaining and diplomatic negotiations

Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy 18, Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Bharath Gopalaswamy is the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin. “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” November 12. //pipk

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response.

For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

Hybrid threats fueled by AI undermine decision-making and risk escalatory responses---effective NATO response is key

Sonia Lucarelli et al 21. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Hybrid Threats to Allies’ Decision-Making. Hybrid threats is a broad category encompassing a variety of actors, actions and targets. As for actors, due to their actual capabilities, intentions and recent track records, China and Russia can be identified as the most gathering threats.

Concerning actions, information is key under several respects. It refers to Big Data and AI taken together, as the latter entails the use of algorithms to learn from the former with a view to exploit the target’s vulnerabilities. Digital connections are the underlying infrastructure used to perpetrate hybrid threats in the information domain. Western societies rely on virtual world platforms that can be targeted by potential attackers. Since global networks defy borders and limit state jurisdiction, they are harder to defend and allow potential attackers to act below the threshold of detection and attribution. Hybrid threats also benefit from the unprecedent speed and scope of information. This is not new in principle, but it has reached game-changing levels. On the one hand, managing this massive flow of information is just prohibitive for NATO and its member states; on the other hand, high speed of circulation translates into increased operational tempo.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

NATO is uniquely vulnerable to hybrid threats---training builds cooperation and understanding to effectively counter impacts on decision-making

Hanna Smith 21, Director of Research and Analysis at the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and visiting professor for the academic year 2020–2021 at the College of Europe, Bruges. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Putting together the five characteristics of hybrid threats (use of multiple synchronized tools, ability to create ambiguity and to hide true intentions, deliberate threshold manipulation, exploitation of the seams of democratic societies, and use of decoys); the SEES model (situational awareness, explaining, estimating, and strategic notice); and the new challenges of today’s information environment (speed, volume, AI, and degrading expertise), they result in a mix that can influence decision-making algorithms and, in Omand’s words, “it is our own demons that are most likely to mislead us” (2020).

Since hybrid threats are designed to interrupt effectiveness of the SEES model at some point, by trying to create cognitive errors such as those arising from group thinking, 2 mirror imaging or applying unconscious confirmation bias, they can challenge organizations like the European Union (EU) and NATO even more than a state. The multilateral setting – with several, connected national interests – can be more vulnerable to hybrid threat activities. The things that can go wrong in the SEES model are especially vulnerable in a multilateral setting, unless there is a comprehensive approach, willingness to exchange information, joint understanding on resilience, and mechanisms to counter and respond in place.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

NATO AI governance solves hybrid tactics, run-away offensive cyber weapons, great power conflict, and internet functionality---diffusion of tech is inevitable but cooperation through NATO is key to standardization that leads to effective management

Sonia Lucarelli et al 21. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Digital revolution has substantially transformed the world we live in, providing great opportunities but also making societies more vulnerable and transforming the meaning of state borders. Technology makes external interferences cheaper, faster and all-encompassing: citizens can potentially become direct targets of information warfare, all members of a society can be part of conflicts one way or another. From advanced weaponry to command and control, most security-related domains are undergoing deep transformations as data availability and transmission increase exponentially. This is especially true as the emergence of so-called hybrid tactics contributes to universalize the battlefield. Also, attackers may lose control of their offensive cyber weapons, and ‘collateral damages’ across the private sector and the public worldwide might be more and more difficult to contain. Less visible, yet important challenges connected with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) also exist. For instance, data overload can create problems for decisionmakers that are unable to detect important signals. Losing sight of how machines make their calculations – a somewhat inherent feature of Artificial Intelligence (AI) – can hinder deeper understanding of phenomena as well as learning, besides having dense ethical implications.

A crucial question for Western societies and governments is how to deal with technological changes by exploiting their many benefits while managing to limit their risks. Broadly speaking, observers have long noticed the potentialities of technologies in the security domain: better situational awareness, early warning against threats and risks, the ability to prevent and/or stop attacks to happen, the use of technology against the adversaries’ own technologies, and eventually deterrence of high-end hybrid warfare or, at least, the increase of resilience against it. In particular, in order to harness the potential of new technologies, higher levels of security are needed. While internet is unfortunately not secure by design, it has to be somehow retrofit to guarantee a certain level of protection – for instance by avoiding a single point of failure, developing better firewalls, etc. Ultimately, the digital revolution poses challenges to decision makers both as potential users of new technologies and as leaders of targeted societies. Learning to achieve political aims through the support of technological innovations and at the same time acquiring the ability to prevent and manage interferences, if not attacks, have become paramount.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › 1AC › Advantage One---NATO

Artificial Intelligence is on the brink of transforming warfare---NATO is developing a governance strategy now but testing is key to effective implementation---it demonstrates value in real-time to ensure buy-in, evolves models to optimize decision-making, and resolves the skills gap

George Christou 21, Professor of European Politics and Security, University of Warwick. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

Just like with the commercial and public sector, then, technological progress has allowed militaries and security sector professionals to gather large amounts of data, and a number of countries (governments and armed forces) are in the process of constructing and implementing governance models to ensure the benefits of Big Data in terms of real time intelligence, enhanced decision-making, situational awareness and overall competitive edge against increasingly capable opponents. The synergy between Big Data, ML and AI is particularly important in this context when it comes to all aspects of combat readiness, with experts agreeing that AI and its application in the armed forces is “present in all domains…and all levels of warfare” (Svenmarck et al., 2018) with the potential to have a transformative impact on national security technology (Allen and Chan, 2017; see also Tonin, 2019). Many, however, are at an early stage in the development of any BDA strategy. Thus, the lessons from other sectors – and indeed leading governments and security organizations – can provide guidance on best practice as they move from their ‘data’ governance models to ‘Big Data’ governance frameworks that will give them the ability to ensure maximum value and advantage is extrapolated from the BDA life-cycle.

The first lesson or best practice relates to having a clear rationale, goals and guiding principles in place to ensure effective governance of Big Data in the organization. This includes strategically assessing the type of model required, based on current capabilities, resources and future needs, i.e. decentralized/centralized/hybrid. More importantly, governments and security organizations need a clear understanding of the value of Big Data across different domains (land, sea, air) and landscapes (human, physical, information) so that high quality, usable, real-time information can be delivered through AI and ML at strategic, tactical and operational levels. This is certainly recognized in the NATO context, with a Dutch Position Paper highlighting that, in terms of Big Data and AI, “the focus should be on assessing and…demonstrating the added value that innovations can provide to NATO military theatres” (Smallgange et al., 2018). This is critical, so that the full possibilities of influencing the three landscapes – through situational awareness and effective command and control – can be developed in a broader way than that offered by traditional military means. This way, there is also a recognition that in order to take full advantage of the data-centric technologies (BDA and AI), a data-centric methodology is required, so that effective support can be offered at different levels (Blunt et al., 2018).

2022 Michigan Evidence

No Escalation—No Interest

No great power entrapment – conflicts stay local

Elizabeth Calos 12 — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY

This argument has been supported by the data gathered from the Correlates of War Project. The data showed that for both weak and medium powered states, alliance membership with a conflict originator had a significant impact on the decision of the state to enter into a conflict that it did not initiate. However, the same level of significance was not found for high-powered states. Thus, the first hypothesis, that a great power or strong state will not necessarily feel compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners because the state is stable enough that changes in the strength of alliance member do not impact the security of the state, has been supported by this study. The second hypothesis, that a weak or medium power state will be compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners, even when the conflict may go against the state's desires or the mandate of the alliance has also been supported by the data. This indicates that the explanation of alliance behavior backed by the logic of rational deterrence is more accurate than the explanations provided by the grievance model, which predicts that this joining behavior would not occur across all three groups, or the Rubicon model, which predicts that it would occur uniformly across the groups.

2022 Michigan Evidence

No Escalation—Diplomacy

Even if entrapment’s true, it’s never driven escalation – nuclear umbrella encourages peaceful resolution

Narang and Mehta 19 [Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State", 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717729025?casa_token=fjphBVEC1bcAAAAA:s1NRigLIcYYxZXkDz9eLxekB42NjmCbbcbFMw_HyiWfIAQl2rkicA4CWZa6pN7ACXfmR6slngz2Jlg]

In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero, assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.

2022 Michigan Evidence

No Escalation—Moral Hazard

No impact to moral hazard---the higher the hazard, the less likely conflict occurs

Benson 14, Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University (Brett, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58.2)

Do military alliances cause allies to act so aggressively that their behavior undermines the security goal of the alliance? If so, then leaders may be cautious about joining an alliance, doing so only if they can select safe alliance partners or design the terms of the treaty in a way that captures the deterrence benefits while managing the dangers of overaggression. We show that while alliance commitments may cause alliance partners to behave aggressively, under some conditions the added aggressiveness actually enhances deterrence. From this perspective, the effectiveness of an alliance is related both to the structure and to the content of the treaty.

2022 Michigan Evidence

No Norway Entrapment

Norway isn’t interested in conflict, but US support causes deterrence—solves wider scale conflicts

Frank Bakke-Jensen, 1-11-2021,(writing when he was the Norwegian minister of defense; "Norway’s defense minister: We must ensure strategic stability in the High North," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/norways-defense-minister-we-must-ensure-strategic-stability-in-the-high-north//EZAY

The United States and Norway have a strong and longstanding bilateral relationship based on mutual interests and common values. The trans-Atlantic link remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security, and our two countries cooperate closely on almost every aspect of military operations. Looking ahead, the two key dimensions for Norwegian security policy are the Arctic and Russia.

2022 Michigan Evidence

No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V

Wars of aggression are unpopular – allies won’t follow and credibility isn’t sacrificed

Constantine Atlamazoglou, 9-23-2021, (master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "NATO is still living with the consequences of a historic decision it made hours after 9/11," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-still-living-with-consequences-article-5-invocation-after-911-2021-9)//EZAY

The day after the September 11 attacks, most NATO countries called for the invocation of Article 5. This did not immediately happen since the origin of the attacks had yet to be determined to the satisfaction of some members.