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2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › War Existential › 2AC – Yes Nuclear Winter

Even limited nuclear arsenals cause extinction through chain reactions – multiple risk scenarios

Andrea Germanos 13, senior editor and staff writer at Common Dreams, “Nuclear War Could Mean 'Extinction of the Human Race'” //lenox

A war using even a small percentage of the world's nuclear weapons threatens the lives of two billion people, a new report warns. The findings in the report issued by International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) are based on studies by climate scientists that show how nuclear war would alter the climate and agriculture, thereby threatening one quarter of the world's population with famine. Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk? offers an updated edition to the groups' April of 2012 report, which the groups say "may have seriously underestimated the consequences of a limited nuclear war." "A nuclear war using only a fraction of existing arsenals would produce massive casualties on a global scale—far more than we had previously believed," Dr. Ira Helfand, the report’s author and IPPNW co-president, said in a statement. As their previous report showed, years after even a limited nuclear war, production of corn in the U.S. and China's middle season rice production would severely decline, and fears over dwindling food supplies would lead to hoarding and increases in food prices, creating further food insecurity for those already reliant on food imports. The updated report adds that Chinese winter wheat production would plummet if such a war broke out. Based on information from new studies combining reductions in wheat, corn and rice, this new edition doubles the number of people they expect to be threatened by nuclear-war induced famine to over two billion. "The prospect of a decade of widespread hunger and intense social and economic instability in the world’s largest country has immense implications for the entire global community, as does the possibility that the huge declines in Chinese wheat production will be matched by similar declines in other wheat producing countries," Helfand stated. The crops would be impacted, the report explains, citing previous studies, because of the black carbon particles that would be released, causing widespread changes like cooling temperatures, decreased precipitation and decline in solar radiation. In this scenario of famine, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely, the report states, and could lead to armed conflict. From the report: Within nations where famine is widespread, there would almost certainly be food riots, and competition for limited food resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities. Among nations, armed conflict would be a very real possibility as states dependent on imports attempted to maintain access to food supplies. While a limited nuclear war would bring dire circumstances, the impacts if the world's biggest nuclear arms holders were involved would be even worse. "With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking about the possible —not certain, but possible—extinction of the human race," Helfand told Agence-France Presse.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › War Existential › 2AC – No Limited War

War goes existential – China doesn’t go nuclear immediately, but conventional war sets off spirals that escalate – no chance for a limited war.

Caitlin Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control”, , //lenox

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, u has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › War Existential › 2AC – War = Extinction

US-China war goes immediately existential – even the worst theoretical accounts fall short because nuclear war cannot be controlled.

Andre Damon 21, Writer and editor for the World Socialist Web Site specializing in geopolitics and economics, “What a US nuclear war with China would look like”, //lenox

The tabletop military exercise proceeds as follows. During a freedom of navigation exercise in the South China Sea taking place in the year 2034, a group of US frigates board a Chinese civilian vessel in distress. The Americans learn the vessel houses sensitive technology and seize it. While the operation is underway, the US vessels are attacked by a Chinese fleet, which totally paralyzes them using advanced cyberweapons. When the US dispatches two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Pacific in a show of force, a total of 40 American ships are sunk with negligible Chinese losses. The numbers are not quantified, but some tens of thousands of American sailors, airmen, and marines must have lost their lives. In response, Washington launches a nuclear weapon at a Chinese coastal city, against which Beijing retaliates by launching a nuclear attack on San Diego, California and Galveston, Texas. The US retaliates by obliterating Shanghai, one of the world’s largest and most important cities. Stavridis writes that after an American nuclear attack on Shanghai, “These many months later the city remained a charred, radioactive wasteland. The death toll had exceeded thirty million. After each of the nuclear attacks international markets plummeted. Crops failed. Infectious diseases spread. Radiation poisoning promised to contaminate generations. The devastation exceeded… capacity for comprehension.” The American survivors of a Chinese nuclear attack on San Diego are left to live in “wretched camps,” where “cyclical outbreaks of typhus, measles, and even smallpox often sprouted from the unbilged latrines and rows of plastic tenting.” This appears to be a vision of hell. But it must be stated bluntly that even this depiction falls far, far short of the actual effects of a nuclear world war. By training and temperament, Stavridis is largely incapable of viewing the world through the eyes of anyone besides a military officer or “national security” bureaucrat. “Ordinary” people are not described. The various protagonists take the lives of millions, and it is very hard on them, and the reader is supposed to sympathize. In Stavridis’ account, the decisions governing the conflict are made by largely rational and analytical military technocrats. Elected leaders notionally exist, and they sometimes take actions that impinge upon the narrative, but it is the military officials that largely guide the action. Just as politicians have little impact on the plot, social dynamics and popular opinion are largely ignored. The United States carries out a nuclear attack on a Chinese port city, and it appears to have no domestic social effect, except to lead the public to bray for blood. Millions are killed, tens of millions are displaced domestically in the United States. In one single incident—the nuclear bombing of Shanghai—the United States carries out an act of mass murder surpassing in scale the vernichtungskrieg (war of extermination) waged by Nazi Germany in the Eastern front over four years. Amid all of this, there is no domestic social response. The end of World War I toppled the Russian, Austrian, Ottoman, and German empires in a massive revolutionary upheaval. The end of the Second World War completely redrew the map of Europe. But in Stavridis’ account, the population somehow remains complacent throughout a third world war while millions are slaughtered. This has nothing to do with the real world, dominated by class polarization and conflict. War will be accompanied by massive state repression. The pretext for a domestic crackdown and the need to divert intense internal social conflicts outward are, in fact, among the major unstated reasons why ruling classes are embarking upon military confrontations that can end in the acts of mass murder depicted in 2034. Finally, the military dynamics are themselves totally unrealistic. The central assumption of the book is that there exists such a thing as a “tactical” nuclear war. Military actions are calmly and rationally discussed and deliberated. Even so, it is only through an absurd and unbelievable plot twist that a strategic nuclear exchange is avoided. In a ridiculous deus ex machina, India attacks both Chinese and US vessels, bringing about an end to the war. There is no such thing as a “tactical” nuclear world war. There has never been a full-scale war between two countries armed with nuclear weapons. More importantly, there has never been a full-scale war between “great powers” armed with 21st century technology. The range, cheapness, and speed of offensive weapons, including drones and high-speed missiles, will mean that a third world war will be conducted everywhere at once, at dizzying speed and complexity. The logic of these phenomena—the complexity of global relations and domestic opposition, the expansion of the battlefield to the entire globe, the delegation of warfare to artificial intelligence—makes nuclear war impossible to control and limit to the “tit-for-tat” military exchanges depicted in the book.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – Yes Nuclear Winter

Yes nuc winter !

Andrew Glikson ‘17, paleo-climate and earth scientist at the Australian National University. “Nuclear Winter”, The Plutocene: Blueprints for a Post-Anthropocene Greenhouse Earth, pp. 85-91 // gbs

The effects of nuclear weapons are not limited to radiation.24 A single nuclear weapon detonated above a city will ignite mass fire over an area of 50–500 km2 from which living things have little chance to escape.25 Vast areas of forests will go up in smoke and fires would burn for weeks in cities and industrial centers and vast stored fossil fuels. The fires will produce a thick smoke layer that will drastically reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface. Darkness would persist for many weeks, rendering agricultural activity in the Northern Hemisphere virtually impossible if the war takes place during the growing season (Crutzen and Birks 1982). The release of dust, ash, particulate black carbon and sulphur dioxide from the fires would plunge large regions of the world into atmospheric conditions described as nuclear winter (Turco et al. 1983), threatening the survival of civilization and many species over large parts of Earth. Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986, the environmental consequences of nuclear war can still end human history as even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal exploded in large urban centers would result in catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and the protective stratospheric ozone layer. A nuclear war fought with several thousand weapons could even leave much of the Earth uninhabitable.26

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 1AR – Taboo Breakdown

A counterforce strike would have less casualties – weakens the justification for the taboo.

Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Keir Lieber ’19. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Maine and formerly a postdoctoral research fellow with the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. Keir A. Lieber is the GOAT. “How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:1, 29-54, gbs

The extent of collateral damage caused by a nuclear weapon would likely play a significant role in determining the durability of a nuclear non-use norm based on moral considerations. If a nuclear detonation resulted in great destruction and many non-combatant causalities, as would likely be the case with an attack that targeted a city or generated substantial lethal nuclear fallout, one might expect that the moral underpinnings of the norm would remain intact – and perhaps even be bolstered. That is, a dramatic demonstration of the abhorrent consequences of nuclear weapons use could serve to reinforce subsequent adherence to the norm. By contrast, a nuclear attack that resulted in very few casualties – for example, as might conceivably occur with a limited counterforce strike using a few precise, low-yield weapons – would appear to weaken the normative constraint against nuclear use.30 That is, if the non-use norm were driven by revulsion at the expected massive and indiscriminate devastation that would occur if nuclear weapons were used, an instance of nuclear use that generated only modest collateral damage would undermine the norm.31

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 1AR – Taboo Breakdown

Social science, leaders convincing the population, fog of war, and the precedent is broken – all proves the taboo is not durable

Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Keir Lieber ’19. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Maine and formerly a postdoctoral research fellow with the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. Keir A. Lieber is the GOAT. “How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:1, 29-54, gbs

There are good reasons for analysts to question the strength and prevalence of an international norm against nuclear use, but here we highlight several reasons why the durability of a moral-based nuclear taboo is dubious. First, the comparable case of strategic bombing does not support hypotheses about how and when norm-violation should strengthen morally-based taboos. Second, recent survey and social science research challenges the durability of a moral taboo. For example, surveys indicate that a majority of Americans, who are supposed to have internalized the nuclear taboo, would be willing to use nuclear weapons against terrorist adversaries or Iran. Furthermore, experiments in psychology tell us that leaders can encourage their population to make tragic trade-offs through their framing of choices. The strategic bombing case illustrates one such trade-off: General Eisenhower siding with strategic bombing proponents to facilitate a quicker end to World War II. Opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the abstract does not guarantee opposition in times of crisis. Finally, precedent logics – not moral logics – appear to more commonly underlie taboos in warfare. Once the bargain against bombing civilians broke down, there was little moral compunction leading countries to stop pursuing this strategy. Furthermore, the survey literature referenced above suggests that respondents’ reluctance to have the United States employ nuclear weapons stems from a concern about precedence, not moral authority. If the nuclear taboo is based upon concern for precedent and not moral opprobrium, then resuscitating the taboo after an incident of nuclear use may be unrealistic. These findings point to a number of policy implications. Most importantly, policy-makers should be aware of the challenges to the norm against nuclear use after a future violation. Both the moral logic and precedent logic cause reason to be skeptical that the norm would remain durable. As a result, preventing nuclear use in the first place is paramount. The United States should continue to seek to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, a major challenge at a time when NPT member states are so divided over nuclear disarmament.86 U.S. leaders should refrain from making casual nuclear threats against adversaries and should encourage other leaders to follow suit. Moreover, in its declaratory policy, the United States should restrict the intended use of its nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks. If the United States or its assets were attacked with a nuclear weapon, leaders would have to strongly consider whether responding in kind would do more harm than good. Fortunately, U.S. conventional superiority means that the U.S. military would have many non-nuclear means to respond. Finally, because we find that the precedent logic to be more compelling in explaining non-use, the United States should consider ways in which it can affect whether future nuclear use is perceived as successful and how it can lead the international community in bringing about a strong sanctioning response against those responsible for such an attack. If nuclear use is perceived as unsuccessful or the attacker is meaningfully punished, the precedent is more likely to be re-established.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – Taboo Breakdown

The nuclear taboo is not durable. A first strike would let all hell break loose.

Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Keir Lieber ’19. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Maine and formerly a postdoctoral research fellow with the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. Keir A. Lieber is the GOAT. “How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:1, 29-54, gbs

If one of the established nuclear weapons states uses nuclear weapons, the strength of the nuclear taboo would be greatly undermined. As Mark Fitzpatrick concludes, ‘the rupture to the system would be strongest if it were committed by one of the charter members of the nuclear club’. 36 The moral norm is arguably strongest among this grouping. And nuclear use by one of these powerful states makes it less likely that there would be a strong and organized international response to the violation. The established nuclear powers all sit as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, making costly action more complicated. Moreover, use by a nuclear weapons state, in cases other than in the darkest of circumstances when state survival is at stake, could undermine the nonproliferation regime and ultimately the durability of norm against nuclear use.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – Russia Draw In

Russia would get drawn in – growing alliance with China

Andrea Kendall-Taylor ’19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS. She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, authoritarianism and threats to democracy, and the state of the transatlantic alliance. Hearing on "An Emerging China-Russia Axis?: Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition", , jstor //gbs

Ties between Russia and China are deepening. The relationship between Russia and China has improved steadily since the waning years of the Cold War. This trend accelerated in the last decade and especially since 2014 when Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea shut down Russian opportunities in and cooperation with the West. Indicators across virtually every dimension of the bilateral relationship highlight their growing alignment.1 Economically, China is the largest purchaser of Russian crude oil and has surpassed Germany as Russia’s largest trading partner. Militarily, their defense cooperation continues to grow, including through defense dialogues, joint exercises, and regional security cooperation. Russia continues to sell China increasingly sophisticated military technologies, though that aspect of the relationship has diminished in relative importance as China has enhanced its capabilities in this area. Politically, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping enjoy close relations, and exchanges and interactions at lower levels of the Russian and Chinese governments are frequent. 2. Russia-China relations will continue to deepen as the key drivers of their relationship strengthen and constraints erode. Both Putin and Xi view the United States as a significant threat to their power. Their shared perception of the United States as a threat is an important driver of their relationship. U.S. actions such as sanctions against Russia and the administration’s trade war with China are justified approaches to addressing hostile adversaries, but also serve to push the two countries closer together. The strong consensus in Washington around great power competition as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy is likely to continue to provide incentive for greater alignment between Russia and China. The growing similarity between the Putin and Xi regimes is also likely to provide a basis for future cooperation. Xi has consolidated power and dismantled the consensus-based decision making that has dominated China’s post-Mao political system. While meaningful distinctions between the governments remain, China’s political system more closely resembles the Putin-dominated Russian regime.2 Research suggests that shared regime type enhances cooperation between states.3 Not only are the key drivers of bilateral relations strengthening, but many of the factors that observers long assessed would constrain the relationship are eroding. First, analysts have long held that Russian concerns about insecurity in its far east would stymie cooperation. However, the Kremlin’s concerns about this source of insecurity have diminished; today, the Russian and Chinese governments are moving ahead with infrastructure projects in border regions that had long been delayed. Moreover, Putin likely understands that China constitutes a long-term threat to Russia but appears to calculate that a far-off and uncertain threat from China is more acceptable than the immediate and certain threat he perceives from the United States. Cultural factors and historical enmity are likely to be enduring constraints on Russia-China relations. However, Xi and Putin dominate the media environments in their countries and are capable of slowly turning public opinion over time. Such a process would be hard and slow, but Beijing and Moscow have the capacity to re-shape public attitudes, should they decide to. Already, surveys show that 69 percent of Russians hold a positive view of China—the same percentage of Russians that hold negative views of the United States.4 3. Russia and China are united in their discontent with U.S. dominance—a marriage of convenience—but sustained cooperation and repeated interaction raise the likelihood of more meaningful alignment. Putin and Xi prioritize their own survival in office above all else. They both judge that the United States and its efforts to support democracy present a threat to their hold on power, and that the U.S.-dominated international order disadvantages them and fails to accommodate their interests. They are united in their discontent and share an interest in weakening Western cohesion and subverting many of the values and rules that define the post-World War II order. Although they have banded together in discontent, there is potential that their repeated interactions will foster a deeper and more enduring partnership over time. Already, Russian and Chinese values and views of the way the world should be ordered are significantly aligned. Russia and China are likely to continue to work together, and potentially coordinate their efforts to create an environment that is conducive to both of their development goals. 4. Deepening relations between Russia and China will be among the most significant U.S. foreign policy challenges in the coming decade. Russia and China are unlikely to forge a formal military alliance. But even short of such an alliance, their growing alignment and coordination will present a significant challenge for U.S. national security in the coming years. The Director of National Intelligence warned in his 2019 Annual Threat Assessment that strengthening ties between China and Russia will present a “wide variety of economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies.”5 If Russia-China relations continue to grow, it would harm U.S. interests by enhancing their mutual capabilities and stretching U.S. capabilities, complicating U.S. strategic planning by potentially dividing U.S. power, emboldening them to act knowing they will have each other’s support, enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the alternative they provide, and diluting U.S leverage over countries willing to play the United States off Russia and China.6 Russia and China are also poised to challenge U.S. interests through the complementarity of their actions.7 Russia and China take different approaches to pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Russian foreign policy is confrontational and brazen. So far, China has used a subtler and more risk-averse strategy, preferring stability that is conducive to building economic ties and influence. Although their tactics are different, they have the potential to converge in synergistic ways such that the combined effects on U.S. interests is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. This dynamic is most evident in Europe, but there is potential for greater synergies between Russia and China to create new challenges for the United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – Russia Draw In

US-China war would draw in Russia – making the conflict even more severe

Gompert et al 16 [David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristinia L. Garafola, 2016, <<David is a an American government official and former diplomat>>, <<Astrid is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation with a MPhil in IR @ University of Oxford and AB in East Asian Studies @ Princeton University>>, <<Cristinia is an associate policy researcher @ the RAND Corporation>>, “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html]\\pairie

Overall, the decline in U.S. warfighting advantages does not mean China can win a war that the United States is willing to fight. By 2025, a war could be a military standoff, with major weapon-platform losses on both sides, in addition to losses in cyberspace and space. Yet neither side would fare so much worse than the other that it would feel compelled to concede, raising the probability that a war would be both severe and long. Such a war could be decided by economic costs, domestic political effects, and international responses. Japan’s

[Table 3.7 Omitted]

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – India Draw In

Sino-India relations are irredeemable – India sides with the West in a conflict which causes escalation

Maria Abi-Habib 9-24 — (Maria Abi-Habib, [Maria Abi-Habib is the bureau chief for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for the New York Times, based in Mexico City.], “Will India Side With the West Against China? A Test Is at Hand (Published 2020)“, New York Times, 09-24-2021, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/world/asia/india-china-border.html, mysoor)

Will India Side With the West Against China? A Test Is at Hand The United States and its allies have long wanted India’s help in confronting China. Now, a deadly border clash seems likely to push India in that direction. For years, the United States and its allies have tried to persuade India to become a closer military and economic partner in confronting China’s ambitions, painting it as a chance for the world’s largest democracy to counterbalance the largest autocracy. Last week, the idea of such a confrontation became more real as Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed in the worst violence on the countries’ border in 45 years, leaving 20 Indian troops dead and causing an unknown number of Chinese casualties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has publicly reveled in the prospect of a more muscular role for India in the region and the world. But analysts say the new tensions with China will be the starkest test yet of whether India is ready — or truly willing — to jostle with a rising power bent on expanding its interests and territory. With China facing new scrutiny and criticism over the coronavirus pandemic, Indian officials have recently seemed emboldened, taking steps that made Western diplomats feel that their goal of an India closer to the West was starting to be realized. And some believe the friction with China will push India even further in that direction. This month, India signed a major defense agreement with Australia that allows both countries to use each other’s military bases. And it is expected to invite Australia to join naval exercises it conducts with Japan and the United States, to strengthen efforts by the so-called Quad — Australia, Japan, the United States and India — to counter China’s projection of sea power in the region. India’s campaign for a larger profile in multinational organizations has also moved quickly. On Wednesday, it was elected unopposed to a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. And in May, it won the chair of the World Health Organization’s executive board, where it promptly supported calls to investigate the origins of the coronavirus — an inquiry China had fought to block. But India is still well behind China when it comes to military and economic power. That may give India’s leaders pause over the prospect of an armed escalation on their disputed Himalayan border, where the bloody clashes broke out last week. “India will have to deploy all three — military, economic and political options,” said Samir Saran, the president of the Observer Research Foundation, an influential think tank in Delhi. “China is a large and powerful country, and a sustained response to their aggression will have to include all of these.” “The defense of liberalism and democracy and an international open system will play out between India and China,” he said. Chinese and Indian generals continue to meet along the border to discuss de-escalation efforts. And Indian officials acknowledged on Friday that the night before, China released 10 Indian soldiers seized during the fighting. (Later, China’s foreign ministry spokesman said he did not know of any prisoners being taken, but did not explicitly deny India’s announcement.) But the troop buildup is continuing, with villagers in the area and satellite imagery indicating that both sides are still sending in reinforcements. On Saturday, the Indian government released a statement blaming China for trying to erect structures across the disputed border, in territory Delhi considers its own. The government added that it would not allow China to make any unilateral changes to the border. Though India denies it, independent military analysts have estimated that Chinese troops have seized control of about 23 square miles of Indian territory in the past two months, But India’s military ability to retaliate may be limited for now. While its military is one of the world’s largest, it has failed to modernize and stay competitive, watching as China rapidly surpassed it over recent decades. This year, India announced a military budget of nearly $74 billion, compared with Beijing’s $178 billion. In India’s case, much of that spending is going to pay pensions. Economically, India has become more willing to use its vast market as a lever to pressure China. In April, it passed legislation requiring government approval for any investments from Chinese entities, a setback for China as its companies look abroad for growth. And Reuters reported on Thursday that India planned to raise tariffs on Chinese goods. Diplomats expect India to prevent the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from entering its market to build a 5G wireless network. The United States accuses Huawei of aiding the Chinese government in cyberespionage, and it has urged its allies to block the company’s 5G development. Although India’s potential buying power gives it one way to slap at China, it has nowhere near the spending and lending capacity that China has used to increase its global influence. Still, Indian officials have embraced the idea of being a democratic counterbalance to China, and the coronavirus has offered a chance to push that narrative as countries fume over Beijing’s handling of the pandemic. Indian political figures went on the offensive after the pandemic began, criticizing China’s authoritarian system and its lack of transparency as the coronavirus spread beyond the city of Wuhan, where it is widely thought to have begun. Vijay Gokhale, who recently retired as India’s foreign secretary and is still close to the government, wrote a lengthy opinion piece this month in which he blasted China’s handling of the pandemic. “The shortcomings of the regime,” he wrote, “will further fuel a debate on the superiority of the Chinese model as an alternative to democracy. Will this form the ideological underpinning for the birth of a new Cold War?” The pandemic also gave Mr. Modi a chance to tap his country’s giant pharmaceutical industry to strengthen diplomatic ties. Diplomats stationed in India say that in the early days of the crisis, he and his foreign minister were “constantly working the phones” to offer countries help with medicines. One Western diplomat felt that the coronavirus crisis had made India more eager to build stronger relationships to help it deal with China, and that diplomacy with India was going more smoothly than ever before. “Everyone is more willing, privately, to talk about what to do with China in a post-Covid world,” the diplomat said speaking on condition of anonymity. “The ways that China has influenced that world order can now more easily be discussed as we are all trying to figure out what the new world order is. “India represents one path,” the diplomat added, “and China represents another.” More immediately, India faces the prospect of an escalation at the border, where China had been building up its forces before the violence last week. “India wants peace,” Mr. Modi said Wednesday, “but if provoked, India is capable of giving a befitting reply.” China’s push at the border is not an isolated show of strength. Since the pandemic’s start, China has flexed harder on many different fronts: It sank a Vietnamese shipping boat, harassed Malaysian oil rig operations and tightened its control over Hong Kong in hopes of stamping out the pro-democracy movement there. But India has several reasons to feel particularly hemmed in by China. Over the past decade, China has heavily courted India’s neighbors, unraveling New Delhi’s influence on its own doorstep. As Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Himalayas, Nepal’s government simultaneously claimed a sliver of territory on its border that India considers its own. India’s defense minister recently suggested that Nepal’s border actions were taken at the behest of China. In Pakistan, India’s archrival, China is building huge infrastructure projects, some in territory that the Indian government disputes. With every project built, China is making it harder for India to hold on to its territorial claims. And right off India’s southern coast, China took possession of a port in Sri Lanka after that country could not pay its debt to Beijing. Some Indian officials fear that China could militarize the port, which Sri Lanka denies. “India went from having a monopoly of political and military power in the region to dealing with a marketplace of competition where China is increasingly predominant,” said Constantino Xavier, a fellow at the Brookings Institution. He predicted that the new wave of border violence would prompt India to push back harder. Some see China’s buildup on the border as a calculated effort to keep India’s aspirations in check. “China doesn’t particularly want India to succeed,” said Tanvi Madan, the director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution. “A weaker India will do less strategically in its own neighborhood, allowing China to step in more; and it will engage less in places like East Africa or in regional institutions, posing little challenge to China.” China has also been sensitive about the prospects of closer ties between India and the West. On Wednesday, Global Times, a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party, published an editorial claiming that the United States had given Mr. Modi’s government false confidence, and that it would ultimately abandon India. “The resources that the U.S. would invest in China-India relations are limited,” the editorial read. “What the U.S. would do is just extend a lever to India, which Washington can exploit to worsen India’s ties with China.” Despite warm meetings between Mr. Modi and President Trump, their countries’ relationship has at times been rocky. But given China’s increasingly hard line in territorial disputes, some Indian officials fear there may be little choice but to look West. In an opinion piece last week, Mr. Gokhale, the former Indian foreign secretary, said that countries could no longer ignore Beijing’s transgressions and must choose between the United States and China. “In the post-Covid age,” he wrote, “enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Limited War › 2AC – Generic Draw In

Avoidable US-China wa causes extinction and draws in other countries

Kevin Rudd 22, global president of the Asia Society and former prime minister of Australia, “A U.S.-China War Would Dwarf the Destruction in Ukraine. Both Sides Must Act Now to Avoid It,” , cy

A U.S.-China War Would Dwarf the Destruction in Ukraine. Both Sides Must Act Now to Avoid It

he world’s attention is rightly focused on the unfolding horror in Ukraine. Images of destruction and death wrought across that nation, and the harrowing experiences of refugees fleeing in their millions, testify to the tragic reality of war. And in the capitals of Europe, something once thought an impossibility—a large-scale 21st century war on the continent—has now become all too real, awakening once idealistic nations to the hard truth that such senselessness violence has not been eliminated from our modern, globalized world.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Modernization

China already has the nuclear triad.

Kris Osborn 21, President & Editor-In-Chief of Warrior Maven, “China Solidifies "Air Leg" of Nuclear Triad Weapons Systems,” , cy

China is now taking substantial and decided steps forward to solidify the air-leg of a “nuclear triad” with the addition of a nuclear-capable H-6N bomber, according to the Pentagon’s recently released 2021 report on China’s military capability.

China is known to operate road-mobile ICBMs and of course arm its Jin-class submarines with JL-2 and emerging JL-3 nuclear capable missiles, yet it is only in recent years, if not months, that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force has resurrected its airborne leg. This quite simply means that China will operate with an ability to hold targets around the world at risk of nuclear attack from the air as well as from the ground and sea.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Lasers

Vacuum decay won’t cause universal collapse – it’s science fiction. Worry about the nukes.

Ryan F. Mandelbaum 21, Senior technical writer for Gizmodo, “The Universe Is Not in Danger of Ending From a Higgs Boson Vacuum Bubble,” , cy

Title: The Universe Is Not in Danger of Ending From a Higgs Boson Vacuum Bubble

There are few easier ways to get people to read your website than to scare them. That’s how we ended up with the media frenzy surrounding Tiangong-1, and it’s why InfoWars continues to exist. It’s also how we’ve ended up with folks telling you the universe is due to end. Heck, we’re guilty ourselves.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Hypersonics

China is already equipped with advanced hypersonics.

Sakshi Tiwari 21, Defense and IR Journalist for EurAsian Times, “China’s Missile Program Far Exceeds The Capability Demonstrated By US, Russia So Far – US Intelligence Report,” , cy

Title: China’s Missile Program Far Exceeds The Capability Demonstrated By US, Russia So Far – US Intelligence Report

Russia and China have been increasing their joint military training at sea, in the air, and on land over this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said on Tuesday. Earlier in the day, he spoke with his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, via video conference.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Bioweapons

No impact to Chinese bioweapons.

Corey Pfluke 20, arms control and proliferation specialist for the American Foreign Policy Council, , cy

However, an advanced biological weapons program is not enough to classify as a threat; there also needs to be a real intent to use those weapons. When it comes to China’s intention, it is possible that China would not choose to use biological weapons in any capacity because of the suffering the country saw due to Japan’s use of Shigella and plague against the nation. During the 1991 BTWC Review Conference, the Chinese delegation stated, “Of bacteriological weapons, China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not developing, producing, or stockpiling this type of weapon.”20 More recently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated in 2011 that China continues to support the “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons.”21 At the same time, China was not involved in the BTWC negotiations and, before signing the treaty, ensured the inclusion of a clause that meant the treaty was only binding if all other countries in the treaty were also following the guidelines, essentially giving the state an out to not only pursue biological weapons but to use them if necessary.22 This action indicates that the Chinese wish to leave the possibility of using biological weapons open as a policy option, which in turns means a certain amount of willingness to utilize the weapons if the need arose. Overall, China may have the capability, but Beijing may not have the will to put its own people at risk, which is what makes the new subfield of genetic weapons both fascinating and frightening.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Biotech

No super soldiers – insufficient knowledge and it takes at least a century to develop.

Popy Pandey 21, Fanatic about science, history, and religion. Top writer in Science, “Is China Using Genetic Engineering to Develop Genetically-Modified Super- Soldiers?” //lenox

John Ratcliffe is particularly concerned about China’s rapid advancements in ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ genetic engineering technology. CRISPR-Cas9 is a revolutionary technology that enables geneticists and medical researchers to edit specific regions of the genome by deleting, inserting, or modifying DNA sequences. This is a very strong tool for a genetic alteration that was initially designed with the goal of curing hereditary illnesses. In 2020, two biologists were given the Noble Prize for this technology: Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer Doudna. In 2018, He Jian Kui, a researcher working in China, claimed to have used this procedure to create two genetically modified human infants, named ‘Lulu’ and ‘Nina’. Initially, this achievement was lauded throughout the world, but subsequently, as experts dug deeper into He Jian Kui’s method, they harshly criticized it for ethical reasons. Without any methodical approach and without investigating the consequences of these experiments can result in fatal diseases in humans. In response to the global outrage, He Jian Kui was sentenced to three years imprisonment by a Chinese court. Later in the year, the Chinese government committed to enacting legislation governing human gene editing. However, Ratcliffe’s accusation that China conducts biological tests on its soldiers has dragged back China into the argument. Ratcliffe is not the only one to make such claims. Earlier this year, two researchers, Elsa Kania, and Wilson Vorndick expressed concern about China’s possible use of ‘CRISPR-Cas9’ technology to weaponize its soldiers. Additionally, they asserted that China is attempting to connect biotechnology, supercomputing, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, both researchers asserted that ‘Biotechnology’ was a primary priority area for China’s strategic and defence development. One point worth noting is that neither Elsa Kania nor Wilson Vorndick claimed that China has achieved any success with these methods of genetically engineering their army. They only stated that the Chinese army is actively engaged in genetic engineering. Ambition Vs Reality Wilson Vorndick, a former navy officer, seemed more concerned with the future consequences of gene editing than with China’s ability to build super-soldiers. In 2019, the science journal ‘Nature’ expressed concern, that gene-editing techniques could have negative consequences for humans. These approaches have the potential to cause major mutations, posing harm to the entire humanity. Additionally, the mutation created by the technique will be very difficult to be detected. Although China has denied all of these allegations and described the US as a malicious propagandist. However, due to China’s lack of transparency, verifying the veracity of claims is exceedingly difficult. However some experts suggest, it is exceedingly unlikely that China will succeed in such endeavours in the near future. Let's understand why? Possibility of Super-Soldier In a report published in BBC, Elsa Kania disagrees with Ratcliff’s assertions, believing that China is only conducting field trials for exploratory purposes and developing a super-soldier is not easy for any nation across the world. Because our resources are insufficient to develop a super-soldier via genetic engineering at the moment. Additionally, she cites the ineffectiveness of gene editing techniques in mature adults when compared to embryonic gene editing. Dr. Helen O’Neill, a molecular geneticist at University College London, also disagrees with Ratcliff’s claim she is more worried about the possibilities of such technology than with the production of super-soldiers. Pointing out the limitation of gene-editing technology, scientists Christophe Galichet underscores the lack of precision of these technologies. He continued, ‘Although gene editing is conceivable, we are still unknown about the complete function of genes; if we change a sequence of DNA, it is possible that it may confer additional strength on the subject, but it is also possible that it will have unintended consequences. Additionally, some experts believe that China is being inspired by the west in these initiatives. According to a 2017 report from ‘The Guardian,’ US military agencies are investing millions of dollars in gene extinction technologies that can be used to eradicate malarial mosquitoes, invasive rodents, and other species.’ This has raised concerns because, while they intend to use the technology to eradicate invasive species, but it has the potential to be misused. France and the United Kingdom both issued guidelines in 2020, directing researchers to conduct research on enhanced soldiers within critical boundaries. Although numerous western countries conducted genetic engineering research, none aroused as many ethical concerns as China. Impact on Geopolitics BGI (Beijing Genomics Institute), a Chinese genome sequencing company, had marketed millions of COVID-19 test kits outside of China. Apart from this, BGI’s parental test kits are quite well-known worldwide. However, Reuters uncovered in an independent study that ‘this Chinese corporation is selling prenatal tests globally, manufacturing these kits in partnership with the country’s military, and utilizing them to harvest genetic data from millions of women for large-scale population studies. US security officials warned American labs against using such China-made testing kits as these can be leveraged for the collection of genetic data in order to push genome research in China. Even though BGI rejects these charges, Reuter stated that the evidence in hand is insufficient to prove anything, but the connections between BGI and the Chinese PLA are deeper. China has strengthened the linkages between its commercial firms and military-related research activities in recent years. Previously, BGI collaborated with the PLA on the development of technology to prevent altitude sickness among Chinese soldiers. The majority of China’s population lives in Western China, whereas their most significant borders with India are in the south and west; these borders are characterized by high altitude topography. According to ‘The New Indian Express,’ China is currently constructing multiple permanent military structures around the India-China border, named the LAC(Line of Actual Control). China attempted to intrude on the Indian side of the border on numerous occasions, resulting in numerous clashes, the most notable one was the ‘Galwan Clashes.’ Both sides suffered huge losses in the ‘Galwan clashes’ due to the high altitude and rough terrain. The higher altitude on the Chinese side across LAC gives China an operational advantage during times of conflict. However, the Chinese army suffers a lot to defend these posts along LAC because of high altitude sickness and related health problems. PLA has performed a variety of scientific studies in the past to address concerns about China’s west and south-west border’s higher altitude. Even if this doesn't conclude the possibility of a super-soldier, experts say this is alarming because it is the first step toward a military-genetic engineering link. Conclusion Although Ratcliff’s assertions appear a little far-fetched, China’s suspicious practices refocus analysts’ attention on them. Even if they succeed in generating mutant super-soilers, it will take them a minimum of a century of time, because our existing scientific understanding is insufficient to accomplish such a feat. However, due to China’s lack of transparency, we would never know what is truly going on inside the country.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Biotech

No Chinese innovation – party constraints and economic realities of Chinese markets make it impossible.

Regina Abrami 14, Director of the Lauder Institute's Global Program and Head of its International Studies faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, “Why China Can’t Innovate”, //lenox

Innovation from the Bottom Up There are limits, though, to what even so muscular and motivated a government as China’s can mandate when it comes to innovation. Against the government’s intentions and national resources run powerful currents that originate in China’s Communist system and ancient culture. Consider how those forces can constrain the entrepreneurial creativity bubbling up in China. In the early 1990s Edward Tian (Tian Suning), a U.S.-educated entrepreneur, founded the telecom start-up AsiaInfo (now AsiaInfo-Linkage), which within three years grew into a thriving company of 320 people with revenue of $45 million. In 1996, frustrated with the slow pace of technological change in China’s telecommunications industry, then–vice premier Zhu Rongji convinced Tian that it was his duty to leave AsiaInfo in order to lead a new company, China Netcom, as it set out to build a fiber-optic network linking some 300 cities. When one of us (McFarlan) visited the company, in 2001, it was an innovative firm with an open, creative culture, despite the fact that it was jointly owned by four government agencies. In 2002, when the telecommunications giant China Telecom was broken apart by the government, its 10 northern provincial markets were integrated into China Netcom. Overnight, Tian became responsible for an organization of 230,000. The culture clash between the two organizations was extraordinary. Tian was seen by many China Telecom employees as an American outsider trying to reform a state-owned enterprise in unacceptable ways. Six months after the merger, McFarlan presented our case study on China Netcom to 70 senior Chinese executives, including 20 from the telecom industry. Rather than draw lessons from the case about the relationship between organizational change and business success, the group attacked Tian for his “un-Chinese” ways of managing—and then charged McFarlan with incompetence for presenting Silicon Valley culture in China in such a positive light. Tian soon stepped down from his CEO role and later from the China Netcom board. To outsiders, China Netcom eventually looked like a modern telecom firm, with the governance structures needed to be listed on international stock exchanges. But it remained at heart a state-owned enterprise. When we teach our current case on China Netcom, we ask MBA students to scour the company’s board for the real boss. Where, we ask, is the party secretary? The Communist Party requires a representative to be present in every company with more than 50 employees. Every firm with more than 100 employees must have a party cell, whose leader reports directly to the party in the municipality or province. These requirements compromise the proprietary nature of a firm’s strategic direction, operations, and competitive advantage, thus constraining normal competitive behavior, not to mention the incentives that drive founders to grow their own businesses. But even if the government were to disband party cells and instead redouble its efforts to encourage breakthrough innovation, there remains an even stronger disincentive: the economic realities of the markets in which Chinese companies operate. Why go to the trouble to pioneer innovative offerings when the rewards and growth prospects for incremental improvements are so vast, both at home and abroad? Consider the B2B portal Alibaba, which in 2001 was so shaky that we feared it would go bankrupt. But by creatively adapting foreign technologies to the needs of developing markets, Alibaba now serves 80 million customers in nearly 250 countries. The success of its auction website, Taobao, eventually forced eBay out of China. Or take Baidu, the Chinese search engine leader, which has grown massively in its home market with an offering that breaks no technological ground and does not challenge political orthodoxy. Having tailored its product, organization, and processes to the needs of China’s patchwork of regional markets, Baidu now has an 80% share of what has become the world’s largest search market. Just as Japan caught up with the United States technologically in many industries during the three decades after World War II, China is now doing the same through incremental innovations. Adapting technology has become a standard and highly lucrative practice. Getting that technology through acquisitions, though, is an important new trend.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – Biotech

No CRISPR impact – China regulating in squo

David Cyranoski 19; cites He Jiankui who speaks during an interview at a laboratory in Shenzhen. (“China set to introduce gene-editing regulation following CRISPR-baby furore” Nature. May 20, 2019.

China is poised to introduce a new regulation on gene editing in humans. A draft of the country’s new civil code lists human genes and embryos in a section on personality rights to be protected. Experiments on genes in adults or embryos that endanger human health or violate ethical norms can accordingly be seen as a violation of a person’s fundamental rights. Lawyers say the regulation would mean that anyone who manipulates genes in humans is responsible for what happens to a person. “The law makes clear that those who do research with human genes and embryos cannot endanger human health or violate ethics,” says Zhang Peng, a criminal-law scholar at Beijing Wuzi University. China has been revising its civil code — the overarching legal framework that governs non-criminal disputes in areas such as marriage, inheritance and personal rights — since 2002. The latest draft was submitted last month to the country’s chief legislative body, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and is likely to be adopted next March. The inclusion of gene editing in the latest draft of the new civil code was a last-minute addition, however — prompted by uproar over gene-editing experiments carried out last November by Chinese biophysicist He Jiankui. He claimed to have done experiments on human embryos that resulted in twin girls whose DNA had been engineered to make them less susceptible to contracting HIV. The controversial experiments drew condemnation in China and internationally, and led to He’s sacking from the Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen in January. He was also censured by Chinese authorities, but it was not clear whether he had broken any of the country’s laws. The revised civil code places experiments using human genes or embryos under the section of the code that ensures a person’s right to physical well-being, freedom, privacy and dignity. It is the first time that regulations relating to genomes have been included in the civil code, says Zhang. If the new code had been in effect when He was considering his experiments, it might have dissuaded him, says Zhang. Even if He’s work did make the twin girls less likely to get HIV, it’s possible that he inadvertently increased their susceptibility to other infectious diseases. But there’s also a danger that his experiments made unintended modifications in their genomes, as often happens in gene-editing experiments in the laboratory, leaving the twins vulnerable to genetic diseases. Under these regulations, such gene-editing experiments would be illegal, says Zhang. In March, the health ministry also drafted regulations that would require scientists to get approval before editing human embryos, and would impose penalties for those who broke the rules.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – AI

China lags behind the US despite President Xi’s plans

Rayome, 19 (Alison DeNisco Rayome, 4-5-19, senior editor at CNET,”How China tired and failed to win the AI race: The inside story,” //MS)

In July 2017, the Chinese government under President Xi Jinping released a  for the nation to become the world leader in AI by 2030, including investing billions of dollars in  and .

Meanwhile, in the US, President Donald Trump released a long-awaited  executive order in February 2019. The order  heads of implementing federal agencies that perform or fund AI R&D to prioritize this research when developing budget proposals for FY 2020 on. However, it does not provide new funding to support these measures, or many details on how the plans will be implemented.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – AI

Even if China is ahead in some places, there’s no impact – the US is ahead in places it counts.

Lopez, 20 (Todd Lopez, 7-9-20, contributor for DOD News, “Where it Counts, U.S. Leads in Artificial Intelligence,” )

When it comes to advancements in artificial intelligence technology, China does have a lead in some places — like spying on its own people and using facial recognition technology to identify political dissenters. But those are areas where the U.S. simply isn't pointing its investments in artificial intelligence, said director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Where it counts, the U.S. leads, he said.

"While it is true that the United States faces formidable technological competitors and challenging strategic environments, the reality is that the United States continues to lead in AI and its most important military applications," said Nand Mulchandani, during a briefing at the Pentagon.