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2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Overlap---AT: Same Function---2NC

NSA and CYBERCOM seek fundamentally distinct missions.

Fabio Vanorio 18, Executive Officer of the Italian Government at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the Presidency of the Council of the Ministers, May 2018, “Breaking Up The Dual-Hat Leadership Of National Security Agency And United States Cyber Command The Central Debate In The United States Cyber Community,” , cc

The debate about mixing-up military and civilian systems in the cyber security has pro and cons. According to Gen. Nakasone remarks,21 the dualhat arrangement has enabled an operationally close, mutually beneficial partnership, for instance, in mapping networks prior to operations.22 Similarly, the experience has also brought some issues23, such as for example a growing dependence of Military CYBERCOM Information Assurance (IA)24 on the civilian NSA IA25. About the cyber issue, NSA and USCYBERCOM have fundamentally different missions. From an NSA perspective, cyber is about gaining access to networks; from a USCYBERCOM point of view, it’s about every piece of software on the battlefield the adversary is using and preventing that software from working the way it was intended to work.26 In cyberspace, while the military wants to attack networks, intelligence objectives prioritizes gathering information from them.27 This keeps both agencies in potential disagreement about how to use intel and tools that they share.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Overlap---AT: Same Function---2NC

They’re different. CYBERCOM is offense.

Matthew Tyson 22, Software Architect, CSO, 5/16/2022, “The US federal cybersecurity bureaucracy: A guide,” , cc

What is the difference between the two organizations? Given that the organizations are so steeped in secrecy, the difference is hard to determine exactly. The NSA and Cyber Command operate (largely) with different legal authority, the former under Title 50 intelligence and the latter under Title 10 military authority. This difference seems to be reflected in a more offensive-leaning posture to CYBERCOM.

Although the mission statements for the NSA and CYBERCOM both read as similar—bland, yet encompassing descriptions of almost any kind of virtual activity—there is a subtle difference.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Overlap---2NC

There’s a clear separation between NSA and CYBERCOM jurisdiction---the plan intrudes on NSA territory.

Andrew Schoka 19, active duty Army cyber operations officer assigned to U.S. Cyber Command at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Distinguished Military Graduate of Virginia Tech with a bachelor’s degree in systems engineering, 4/03/2019, “CYBER COMMAND, THE NSA, AND OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE: TIME TO END THE DUAL HAT,” , cc

For every operation Cyber Command executes, joint leaders and operations planners must meticulously calculate and evaluate the risk associated with that particular operation. This is an exceedingly complicated task that requires detailed knowledge of the operations planning and approval process, in addition to technical familiarity with the underlying technologies associated with the operation. In developing this process, Cyber Command has relied heavily on the experience of NSA, using similar processes to ensure that risk is minimized. In so doing, Cyber Command has inadvertently patterned its own appetite for risk after NSA’s. But while NSA’s operations are conducted with scrupulous operational security, intelligence collection is not the primary mission of Cyber Command. In the words of Gen. Paul Nakasone, Cyber Command’s primary mission is to impose costs on adversaries who have acted in the cyberspace domain without fear of retaliation. Imposing cost implies inflicting noticeable damage to a target in a manner that would typically be considered too noisy, risky, or noticeable in signals intelligence operations.

When conducting offensive cyberspace operations, there are essentially two ways to acquire access to a target system: using credentials to masquerade as a legitimate user, and using a vulnerability to exploit a system. In a masquerade, an attacker uses valid credentials, such as a username and password, to log in to the target system as an authorized user. Masquerade attacks are usually difficult to detect because they rely on the system behaving the way it’s supposed to. Conversely, an exploit relies on the existence of a technical vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system. Exploitation relies on a system functioning incorrectly, and is significantly more likely to produce alerts that can expose an attack.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Overlap---2NC

New cyber initiatives infringe on NSA authority, causing jurisdictional confusion and undermining their primacy.

Daniel Wilson 22, senior reporter covering government contract and defense-related legislative, regulatory and litigation issues for Law360, 1/24/2022, “New Biden Cybersecurity Memo May Sow Agency Confusion,” , cc

Law360 (January 24, 2022, 7:01 PM EST) -- A new White House memo aimed at improving cybersecurity coordination and standards across national security agencies may end up having the unintended effect of causing confusion when cybersecurity missions overlap with those of other federal agencies.

The Jan. 19 memorandum requires the U.S. Department of Defense and the 17 agencies and offices within the Intelligence Community to meet or exceed the same cybersecurity standards that "civilian" agencies — all the other executive branch agencies — are required to meet under a May 2021 executive order. The National Security Agency will take the lead in coordinating those efforts as a "national manager," according to the memo.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---AT: Ukraine---2NC

Ukraine ops were small-scale AND shrouded in secrecy---can’t vote for a thumper you know nothing about!

Sean Lyngaas 6/2, CNN’s cybersecurity reporter, 6/02/2022, “US confirms military hackers have conducted cyber operations in support of Ukraine,” , cc

"We've conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum; offensive, defensive, [and] information operations," General Paul Nakasone said in an interview with Sky News. A spokesperson for the command did not dispute the accuracy of the article but declined to elaborate on what the command's operations in Ukraine have entailed.

It's a rare public acknowledgment from US military officials of hacking operations that are often shrouded in mystery.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---AT: Ukraine---2NC

Cyber ops in Ukraine were conducted with civilian oversight---not full CYBERCOM autonomy.

Ines Kagubare 6/1, staff writer at The Hill, 6/01/2022, “Cyber Command chief confirms US took part in offensive cyber operations,” , cc

U.S. Cyber Command Director Gen. Paul Nakasone confirmed for the first time that the U.S. had conducted offensive cyber operations in support of Ukraine.

“We’ve conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum: offensive, defensive, [and] information operations,” Nakasone said in an interview Wednesday with Sky News, a British television news channel.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---AT: CYBERCOM High---2NC

Rescission is imminent.

Herb Lin 5/17, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, 5/17/2022, “President Biden’s Policy Changes for Offensive Cyber Operations,” , cc

On May 13, a Washington Post story indicated that changes to U.S. policy regarding offensive cyber operations are imminent. These changes would refine the Trump administration policy as promulgated under National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NSPM-13) in 2018. To understand the story underlying this change, it is helpful to review the history of presidential guidance and policy regarding offensive cyber operations.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---AT: CYBERCOM High---2NC

Biden is stripping CYBERCOM’s free-ranging authority.

Suzanne Smalley 3/31, reporter covering intelligence and disinformation at CyberScoop and former Mandiant exec tapped to run CTIIC, ODNI's cyber threat intelligence center, 3/31/2022, “Biden administration is studying whether to scale back Trump-era cyber authorities at DOD,” , cc

The Biden administration is reviewing whether and how to change a Trump-era policy that gave unprecedented authority to the Department of Defense and U.S. Cyber Command to authorize cyber-operations without White House approval, two sources briefed on the discussions said.

The administration has launched an “interagency review process” paving the way for revisions to the Trump-era National Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13), one of the sources said. The White House National Security Council is spearheading the effort, according to the sources.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---NSA Primacy---2NC

NSA has renewed control over national security systems

Teri Robinson 22, digital content specialist and award-winning journalist specializing in cybersecurity, 1/21/2022, “Biden Signs Authority for NSS to NSA: Think CISA for Military, Intel Systems,” , cc

But better late(ish) than never. “The NSA has a great deal of expertise in the domain of cybersecurity, and further empowerment of this agency to advise, support and direct the broader mission is likely to mitigate risks to our nation’s information system infrastructure,” said Tim Wade, technical director, CTO team, Vectra. “This order reflects the consensus that technology reflects a critical war front in today’s digital age and one of national importance.”

Biden’s directive, bearing the officious name National Security Memorandum 8, “Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense and Intelligence Community Systems,” represents the implementation of last spring’s EO 14028 that set out cybersecurity requirements for national security systems (NSS) sprawled across the federal government and those that contain classified information or are crucial to military and intelligence activities. The memorandum named General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service as national manager for NSS.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Uniqueness › UQ---No Split---2NC

A split is unlikely, but not locked in.

Martin Matishak 3/18, senior cybersecurity reporter for The Record, 3/18/2022, “DoD official: Keeping Cyber Command, NSA leadership together will be ‘looked at’,” , cc

A senior Pentagon official on Thursday said the Biden administration will review the joint leadership structure that has long governed U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.

“I believe that the ‘dual-hat’ will be looked at again, just by this administration, just to ensure that we understand what the value added is, but also what the impacts are. And so that discussion is still ongoing within the department today,” Ronald Moultrie, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security testified during a House Armed Services Committee subpanel hearing.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Elections---2NC

Collaboration between CYBERCOM and the NSA secures elections.

David Vergun 21, writer-editor for the DOD at the Pentagon, 3/25/2021, “Cybercom's Partnership With NSA Helped Secure U.S. Elections, General Says,” , cc

[Title: Cybercom's Partnership With NSA Helped Secure U.S. Elections, General Says]

Being both the commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency improves the ability to provide the nation with speed, agility and flexible responses to adversaries who are increasingly modernizing, getting quicker and getting more sophisticated, the agencys' director said.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NSA Good---Prolif---2NC

Proliferation causes extinction.

Dr. Andrew Futter 21. Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester; Samuel I. Watson, Associate Professor at the University of Warwick; Peter J. Chilton, Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham. "Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Ages.” In The Politics of Nuclear Weapons: New, updated and completely revised. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. pp. 71-78. 2021. Springer. //EM edited for errors.

In the Second Nuclear Age, the greatest risk no longer appears to be from a large-scale conflict between major powers (although this possibility always remains) but instead from regional instability in the Middle East, South or Northeast Asia, or even a non-state actor armed with a nuclear weapon (see Chap. 9).18 This threat has been exacerbated by the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction technology, and particularly the combination of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities to new actors across the globe. Ultimately, the central theme of the Second Nuclear Age is that the spread of the bomb, along with the means to build and deliver nuclear weapons, to new actors has changed the central dynamics of the global nuclear order, and consequently we may no longer be able to rely on the nuclear thinking and toolkit that helped us to survive the First Nuclear Age. In the words of Fred Ikle, writing in 1996:

Half a century after it began, the nuclear drama has reached the conclusion of its first act—a rather happy ending in spite of the gloomy prospects for civilization that darkened the stage at the outset. Tis respite, though, is not a lasting redemption from the dangers of nuclear warfare.19

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NSA Good---Prolif---2NC

SIGINT’s key to counterproliferation.

Phil Gurski 21, President and CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting Ltd. Phil is a 32-year veteran of CSE and CSIS and the author of six books on terrorism, 3/01/2021, “Do we need intelligence to stop nuclear weapons proliferation?,” , cc

One of the reporting series I recall was that which had to do with states which were pursuing nuclear weapons programs. There were quite a few of them in the 1980s and 1990s: Libya, South Africa, Taiwan, North Korea, India and Pakistan. As we all know, only the last three have attained that capability (we’ll leave aside Israel for now: also, the so-called Permanent 5 UNSC members – the US, USSR/Russia/, the UK, France and the PRC – already had ‘the bomb’). Then there is Iran….more on that in a bit.

Back then, there was no Internet. There was no easy way to keep tabs openly on who was doing what. Thankfully, we had SIGINT to help us gain insight. Through the targeting, collection, processing and analysis of communications (verbal, written, imagery, telemetry, etc.) we could see which countries were making progress and suss out who were the key officials (scientists, civil servants) with the keys to this breakthrough. We learned a lot and were able to keep our political masters informed in ways which would have been impossible without intelligence.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---NSA Good---Prolif---2NC

Clogs pipelines for signals intelligence.

Jane Edwards 21, staff writer at Executive Mosaic and covers stories about federal cybersecurity, citing Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3/09/2021, “Gen. Mark Milley: NSA-Cybercom Split Could Impact Flow of Signals Intelligence,” , cc

Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-time Wash100 Award, said the organizational criteria for separating the National Security Agency from Cyber Command have not yet been met and that the split will impact the military’s access to signals intelligence, Defense One reported Monday.

“For us in the military, the signals intelligence we get from the NSA is … unbelievably good. It’s among the most valuable pieces of intelligence we get on a daily basis,” Milley told reporters.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Cyberterror---2NC

Cyberterror imperils nuclear stability.

Keren Snider et al. 21, postdoctoral scholar in the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa, Israel; Ryan Shandler, postdoctoral research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, and a research fellow at Nuffield College; Shay Zandani; and Daphna Canetti, 10/07/2021, “Cyberattacks, cyber threats, and attitudes toward cybersecurity policies,” Journal of Cybersecurity, 7(1), , edited for ableist language, cc

Despite the sizeable literature dealing with the effects of exposure to violence, few studies directly investigate the effects of exposure to destructive cyberattacks. This is despite the growing recognition that these threats have become a very tangible part of modern life. In a complex scenario described in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, the authors contemplated how new forms of cyberattacks could be used to “acquire the credentials necessary to access the industrial control system of a nuclear power plant… with the intent of threatening to conduct cyber operations against the system in a manner that will cause significant damage or death…” [30]. Even more recently, reports have acknowledged how cyberterror attacks could immobilize [destroy] a country's or region's electrical infrastructure [31], disable [decimate] military defense systems [32], and even imperil nuclear stability [33]. While there is a difference between capability and intent, and we acknowledge that physically destructive cyber threats have remained scarce until now, understanding how civilians respond to such digital cyberattacks will become particularly important as the threat matures.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Cyberterror---2NC

Cross-agency cooperation checks back cyberterror.

David Vergun 21, writer-editor for the DOD at the Pentagon, 6/29/2021, “NSA, Cybercom Leader Says Efforts Have Expanded,” , cc

Another challenge with weapons systems is ensuring that cybersecurity considerations are implemented in the earliest phases of the acquisition cycle, he said.

Protecting DOD's data is also a major challenge, he said.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Turf Wars---2NC

Extinction

Dr. Michael Miklaucic 13, Adjunct Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy at American University, and of Conflict and Development at George Mason University, Director of Research, Information and Publications at the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at National Defense University, Jacqueline Brewer, 07/05/2013, “Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization,” Government Printing Office, Google Books

Public-Private Partnerships to Combat Illicit Trade and Illegal Economy The illegal economy poses an existential threat when it begins to create criminalized markets and captured states, which launches a downward, entropic spiral toward greater insecurity and instability. In countries that have been corrupted by criminal networks, market- and state-building become less attainable, economic growth is stunted, efforts toward development and poverty eradication are stifled, and foreign direct investment is deterred.

The United States is supporting the OECD, the World Economic Forum (WEF), and other international partners to provide knowledge-based platforms for international public and private stakeholders to raise awareness of the threat posed by illicit trade and illegal economy to economic growth, development, and global security, and to share experience on practical approaches to the control of illicit activities as well as of the negative externalities of the illicit economy. Engaging the public and private sectors through innovative public-private partner-ships will be particularly important for securing the integrity of the global supply chains and for ensuring long-term sustainable licit commerce and productive markets.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Turf Wars---2NC

Those deck law enforcement of financial cybercrime.

Susan W. Brenner 13, NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and Technology at the University of Dayton School of Law, “Cyber-threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control”, Minnesota Law Journal of Science & Technology, Winter 2013, 14 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 137, Lexis

If these statutes parsed investigative authority out among the five agencies listed above in a fashion analogous to how [*193] combat jurisdiction is parsed out among the five military branches, this would go a long way toward reducing the turf wars that currently plague federal law enforcement. Unfortunately, the statutes rarely do this, which means agencies often have overlapping investigative jurisdiction, which "can open the doors" to turf battles. In a 2011 investigation of jurisdictional overlap among federal agencies, many agents reported that they had encountered uncertainty and disagreements about the appropriate allocation of investigative authority and said these disagreements often negatively affected investigations. Criminals' increasing use of cyberspace is only exacerbating the difficulties federal agents already face.

While turf wars and overlapping or uncertain investigative jurisdiction continue to impede U.S. law enforcement's ability to respond to crimes, they are not the only factors that are eroding its ability to respond to cyber-threats. The problem law enforcement must confront is the civilian correlate of the problem General Alexander faces: we can no longer assume that attacks which appear to constitute "mere" cybercrime are just that, i.e., are carried out by civilians who are "in" the United States and whose motives are purely personal. An attack on a financial institution might be a cybercrime committed by a greedy United States citizen "in" the United States, but it might, instead, be (i) a cybercrime committed by a non-United States citizen operating from abroad or (ii) a cyber-sortie carried out by a hostile nation-state's own cyber command.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Militarization---2NC

Military culture and cybersecurity are incompatible---meshing them risks war AND public-private incongruity.

Jon R. Lindsay 20, assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 10/30/2020, “Cyber conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden dangers in the American military solution to a large-scale intelligence problem,” Intelligence and National Security 36(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1840746, cc

At the same time, the institutional characteristics that make military organizations so effective at scaling up operations also raise serious concerns when the operations in question are intelligence and covert action. These can be considered alongside the same three characteristics that define intelligence itself.

First, intelligence is deception. The essence of intelligence tradecraft is the abuse of trust to infiltrate the same institutions and infrastructures that enable cooperation in the target society. Whether secret vulnerabilities and accesses are leveraged to collect or inject information is a secondary distinction. Defenders can employ deception as well as attackers, which complicates and limits the strategic effectiveness of intelligence by any means. This is all second nature to intelligence professionals, but the subversion of trust stands in stark tension with martial ideals of open and heroic combat, even as stratagem has a long history in war. Feints and ambushes are one thing, but subversion and treachery are quite another. It is understandable why a military organization might resist thinking of itself as an intelligence organization, even setting aside the subordinate or supporting connotation that intelligence usually has in a military setting. CYBERCOM is an honorable military organization, but intelligence is at its core a duplicitous business. The mismatch between military culture and intelligence practice is also likely to complicate CYBERCOM’s efforts to recruit, retain, and manage the unconventional hackers it needs to subvert the most sophisticated trust networks humanity has ever constructed. This all raises an important ethical question: should the same militaries that openly man the ramparts also be digging through firewalls?

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Impact › Impact---Militarization---1NC

Breakdown of civil-military cooperation prevents effective response to a host of existential challenges

Jim Golby 21, senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin; and Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy and director of the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University, 1/1/21, “BIDEN INHERITS A CHALLENGING CIVIL-MILITARY LEGACY,” /jpb

Civil-military relationships are not an end in themselves. These relationships exist only to provide effective national security policies in a given geopolitical environment in the context of democratic accountability. Unfortunately, the environment is not benign. As they sort through the civil-military and institutional baggage — the items they bring with them and the items they inherit — Biden’s team must also navigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on all of the other stubborn problems that have bedeviled leaders in the post-Cold War era, including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational networks of terrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And, of course, Biden must still lead the country out of the worst pandemic in a century while recovering from all of the associated economic upheaval. There will be no strategic holiday during which the Biden team can painstakingly sort through its civil-military affairs.

The new commander-in-chief starts with the enormous advantage of being “not Trump.” He will need all of that advantage — and will need to have learned from Obama-era missteps — in order to navigate through the tricky civil-military waters we have described above. Members of the Biden team come in as seasoned professionals, but we hope that leads them to caution and humility rather than unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If Lloyd Austin wins over the critics and proves himself to be both fully sensitive to these civil-military realities and savvy in how he seeks to overcome them, he may yet emerge as the successful and strong secretary of defense the Department of Defense so desperately needs. The early slate of civilian nominees named for key roles is a welcome sign. The initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone, especially after the tumultuous and stressful transition. Even so, the norm of civilian management of the Defense Department will be more difficult to reestablish, like so many other civil-military norms that have weakened in recent years, if Congress does grant another recently-retired general legal permission to serve as secretary of defense. Biden, and Austin, will need all the top civilian defense talent they can get.