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2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC – Ban Key

Banning LAWs is a key step in preventing the proliferation of patriarchal military violence

Sharkey 20 – Noel Sharkey PhD, DSc FIET, FBCS CITP FRIN FRSA is Professor of AI and Robotics and Professor of Public Engagement at the University of Sheffield and was an EPSRC Senior Media Fellow (2004-2010). He has held a number of research and teaching positions in the UK (Essex, Exeter, Sheffield) and the USA (Yale,and Stanford), 3-8-2020, "A Feminist Future Begins By Banning Killer Robots," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/noelsharkey/2020/03/08/a-feminist-future-begins-by-banning-killer-robots/?sh=7daa61541fd8KK

On International Women’s Day, weapons development won’t be the first thing that springs to mind for achieving global gender equality. But banning autonomous weapons systems AKA “killer robots” is needed to strengthen global peace, advance human security and ensure a feminist future. Technology could be a benevolent force in our increasingly integrated society. The potential benefits of innovative advancements in the fields of artificial intelligence, robotics, and machine learning could secure our future. As United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres said: "…these new capacities can help us to lift millions of people out of poverty, achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and enable developing countries to leap‑frog into a better future." But that assumes that proper safeguards are in place. They are not. Without them technology has the power to harm and disrupt societal values and norms. It is becoming alarmingly clear from a growing body of evidence that automated decision algorithms are propagating gender and race discrimination throughout our global community and perpetrating injustices on the poor, the vulnerable and people with disabilities. But perhaps the greatest concern is the application of algorithmic bias in the control to targeting with autonomous weapons systems. Autonomous weapons systems work entirely without human intervention once they have been launched. They select and engage targets on the basis of sensor inputs. There is no meaningful human control to determine the appropriateness or legitimacy of targets. That means decisions about what to attack and when to fire would be delegated to inanimate machines rather than being made directly by qualified humans. So what does this have to do with gender equality? Quite a lot. For starters, they will carry the same bias baggage as other decision algorithms. And there is much more that I have learned from attending powerful feminist events at the United Nations (like the one shown in the opening picture). Many feminist humanitarian disarmament organisations such as Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) are concerned that killer robots would lack empathy, conscience, emotion and understanding of human rights and human dignity–aspects of human judgment that are crucial for decision-making in war. Delegating life and death decision making to machines would dehumanise warfare and killing and perpetuate patriarchal structures of military violence. Because they would select and fire on the basis of target profiles, fully autonomous weapons raise the risk of gender-based violence. Target profiling based on perceived gender or pattern of behaviour could increase risks to men–who are more likely to be assumed to be potential or active combatants–but could also pose risks to any group whose gender identity has been included in a target profile. Despite claims to the contrary by some men, killer robots would not end sexual violence in armed conflict. Rape and sexual violence are often used as weapons, and are already ordered by states and armed groups as a means of inflicting terror. Autonomous weapons systems would not question an order to round up women to be raped. Unlike human soldiers they entirely lack the conscience and empathy that would make honorable humans disobey. In short, autonomous weapons systems could contribute to or exacerbate notions of militarized masculinity, be used to commit acts of gender-based violence, or increase inequality as a result of algorithmic bias or target profiling. But these weapons are not inevitable, and we have the ability to prevent them from ever being used. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a global coalition of more than 150 non-governmental organizations in over 60 countries, is urging states to immediately launch negotiations on an international treaty to retain meaningful human control over targeting and attack decisions by prohibiting the development, production, and use of autonomous weapons and to have a positive obligation for the meaningful human control of all weapons systems. A treaty banning fully autonomous weapons would support feminist foreign policy goals by focusing on human security and preventing militarisation of emerging technology and technological advancements. This International Women’s Day, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has called for political leadership in the movement to ban autonomous weapons systems. True equality cannot be achieved through the further dehumanisation of conflict. A feminist future starts now, with a ban on killer robots.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC – LAWS -> Racist

LAWS are programmed to be biased – they can’t recognize POC or non-North American accents which guarantees civilian casualties

Acheson 21 Ray Acheson (Ray brings an intersectional feminist approach to disarmament and antiwar activism. Ray represents the organization on the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and working with governments to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Among other things, Ray also works to prevent the development of fully autonomous weapons with the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and to challenge the international arms trade and war profiteering.), September 2021, "Gender and Bias" Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Gender-and-Bias.pdf//mb24

A GENDER ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS Autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the aforementioned norms of gender and power. Scholars of gender and technology have long argued that gender relations are “materialized in technology”. That is, the meaning and character (the norms) of masculinity and femininity are “embedded” in machines. These scholars argue that technological products bear their creators mark. If technology is developed and utilized primarily by men operating within a framework of violent masculinity, their creations will be instilled with that framework of thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation. Erin Hunt of Mines Action Canada has noted that “human biases are baked into the algorithms and the data we use to train a machine learning program often reflects our own patriarchal society with its class and race issues.” She argues, “One thing to keep in mind is that only around 0.0004% of global population has the skills and education needed to create [artificial intelligence] programing and most of those people were born into pretty privileged circumstances. Similarly, a recent estimate done by WIRED with Element AI found that only 12% of leading machine learning researchers were women.” In this context, autonomous weapons, as tools of violence and of war, will likely have specific characteristics that may simultaneously reinforce and undermine hegemonic gender norms. This in turn may have implications for the notion of men as expendable and vulnerable, as predators and protectors, and pose serious challenges for breaking down gender essentialisms or achieving gender equality or gender justice in a broader context. PROJECTING “POWER WITHOUT VULNERABILITY” If we look at how armed drones are used and thought about now, we can see that the development of fully autonomous weapons present similar risks. The argument for these weapons is similar: drones and autonomous weapons are described as weapons that can limit casualties for the deploying force, and that can limit civilian casualties in areas where they are used because they will be more precise. It is a typical argument from the perspective of violent masculinity: those using the weapon can deploy violence without fear of facing physical danger themselves; and in turn argue that it will actually result in less violence. Yet as we have seen with drones, this—at least, the later argument—is far from the case. The tools and procedures used for determining targets for “signature strikes”—attacks based on “producing packages of information that become icons for killable bodies on the basis of behavior analysis and a logic of preemption” 1 —have resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties in drone strikes. The same risks apply to fully autonomous weapons. If weapons without meaningful human control are deployed on the battlefield or a policing situation, programmed to target and engage people on the basis of software and sensors, the risks of mistaken identity or unlawful engagement run high. It is not at all clear to tech workers, scientists, academics, or other experts that weaponized robots will be able to comply with international humanitarian law or other rules of engagement.2 In addition to these concerns, there is also the risk of bias in those software and sensors. If we look at bias in programming algorithms, it’s easy to be concerned. Bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation can be programmed into machines, including “Bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation can be programmed into machines, including autonomous weapons.”. Facial recognition software struggles to recognize people of colour; voice recognition struggles to respond to women’s voices or non-North American accents; photos of anyone standing in a kitchen are labeled as women; people’s bail is denied because a program decided that a woman of colour was more likely to reoffend than a white woman.3 Imagine this kind of bias being programmed into a weapon system designed to target and fire upon targets without any meaningful human control, without any human judgment to counteract that bias. It’s not a pretty picture.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC – LAWS -> Racist

LAWs will increase racial discrimination

Conway 20 – Marissa Conway is the CEO of United Nations Association UK and a Co-Founder of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, 8-2020, "Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots," Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf/KK

As noted throughout this report, the current state of foreign policy, and in particular national security, is rooted in deeply patriarchal values. This can be seen perhaps none more acutely than when we turn an anti-racist lens to conflict, where violence is sanctioned to reinforce specific ideas about imperial power and white supremacy. As killer robots would use technology that carries existing biases, developing these weapons would only further reinforce violence and discrimination against Low Income Countries (LICs) and against people of colour. In Western states, people of colour are traditionally underrepresented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. Technology is a field still dominated by white men, which means that it will also reflect a specific set of biases that privilege white men. Target profiles are an excellent example of how this plays out in practice. In the context of killer robots, developing weapons technology that can select and fire upon targets independent of human involvement guarantees that people of colour will disproportionately suffer violence. In a recent study from the US government, it was demonstrated facial recognition technology does in fact reflect racism in dangerous ways. In the case of one-to-one matching, or when an algorithm matches two photos of the same person, Black and Asian faces were falsely matched between ten to 100 times more than white faces. And in instances of one-to-many matching, where one photo is compared to many others in a database, Black women were more likely to be misidentified (Facial Recognition Fails on Race, Study Says, 2019). In the UK, a report from Big Brother Watch showed that the facial recognition technology the London Metropolitan Police used at the 2017 Notting Hill Carnival, a street parade celebrating Caribbean music and culture, misidentified people at a rate of 98% (Big Brother Watch, 2018). These are only two examples of how racism is inevitably built into and reflected in our technology. For these exact reasons, facial recognition software is being abandoned by developers, like IBM, and banned by users, like the city of San Francisco. In the wake of the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests after the murder of George Floyd by police officers, newfound scrutiny has been given to facial recognition technology, resulting in growing widespread agreement that it is too dangerous to use. Timnit Gebru, for example, who is one of Google’s ethical artificial intelligence team leads, recently went on the record to confirm the risks of facial recognition technology, arguing that it’s too dangerous to be used for law enforcement purposes (Ovide, 2020). It is clear that the algorithms and AI that killer robots would be programmed with are not capable of eliminating the risk of wrongful death without human intervention. Should violence become automated, “power disparities based on racial and other hierarchies” would cause “irreparable harm to targeted communities” (Ramsay-Jones, 2020). And while facial recognition software is an apt example used throughout this report, it is not a standalone example of a poorly programmed algorithm or a piece of problematic technology. The reflection of systemic racism across all current technology makes it clear that self-governing weapons like killer robots would only increase violence against people of colour. Attempts to counter the bias built into technology can only be done through meaningful human intervention in the deployment and use of weapons. The fully autonomous nature of killer robots would render such a process impossible, guaranteeing that communities of colour would suffer increased violence. The imperialist patterns of the global hierarchy must be likewise taken into account. As it currently stands, the technology for killer robots is concentrated in just a handful of powerful, mostly Western states that have ample resources to spend on developing AI (Haner and Garcia, 2019). These countries, which tend to be led by white men, use weapons and the threat of violence to maintain “peace” to keep other states in line with their wishes. Killer robots would reinforce these hierarchies, and would be developed by High Income Countries (HICs) to be used in LICs. It would be a case of HICs using killer robots to maintain their status within the global hierarchy, as well using it against their own people to maintain specific power hierarchies within their own borders (Reaching Critical Will, 2018). As Joy Buolamwini argues, “[w]e have a responsibility to think about how we create equitable and accountable systems, and sometimes what that means is you don’t create the tool” (Wood, 2020). People of colour and people in LICs have been historically excluded from decision making spaces, yet experience the consequences of those decisions regardless. In the case of killer robots, and in parallel with a long history of using people of colour as test subjects for new science developments, it is unlikely that killer robots will do anything but amplify violence (Ramsay-Jones, 2020). Simply put, they should not exist.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC – LAWS = Hegemonic Masculinity

Autonomous weapons reaffirm the idea that men are more desirable than women – they represent masculinity in its most ideal form

Daniel M. Sutko 19(Department of Human Communication Studies, California State University, Fullerton, Fullerton, CA, USA), 9-26-2019, "Theorizing femininity in artificial intelligence: a framework for undoing technology’s gender troubles," Taylor & Francis,

Finally, we could frame a cyborg narrative to theorize about long-term gender effects as a result of the introduction of the Human Universal Load Carriage (or HULC), a type of prosthetic armor in development for use by able-bodied soldiers (Chavez 2011). Thompson describes the exoskeleton as ‘a robotic device the soldier wears like a full body suit. It would enhance Soldier performance, increasing strength without losing agility’ (Hames 2008). Both implants and the exoskeleton thus create a situation where technology is not merely something used by the warrior, but rather part of who he or she is. The cyborg narrative suggests that an exoskeleton could level the playing field through increasing the ability of women warriors to lift heavy loads through augmenting their upper body strength. In an article on the official Army.mil website, a developer notes that ‘this is absolutely focused on the American Warfighter and all of the jobs he or she will have to do’ (emphasis added)7. A woman interviewed in the same article notes as well that ‘this will magnify human strength while on the battlefield’ (Chavez 2011). Harnessing of robotic technology thus holds the promise that women soldiers may more successfully enter combat, since physical requirements are replaced by requirements for mental acuity and reflexes. Indeed, increased use of new technologies of this type might affect the gender makeup of the military in the long term as many different types of people might be drawn to the military as a career, including more women. In addition, many new autonomous technologies are focused on the areas of tracking and communications, again invoking the language of the cyborg, as planners explain how in the future the military unit will be linked together through two-way blue force tracking capabilities which provide GPS coordinates for individual soldiers to be shared among a unit, thus providing info on where the friendly unit is located and who the friendly unit is, as well as info on status and intent (Sweeney 2008). Using these technologies, each member can be aware of the physical position, physical health and intent of all members of the unit. In this way, the unit could in the future behave more like a hive or a swarm (or the Borg of the Star Trek canon). Leadership would thus rest not on a traditional, hierarchical unit but rather on a network in which members interact not only with the leadership but also laterally with each other. Such a development could go far towards destabilizing traditional hierarchical leadership forms in the military, which are often coded as male instead of creating a more cooperative mode of war fighting. Once again, these technologies might thus represent a step towards the destabilization of the traditional gendered regime of women's jobs and men's jobs. While new developments thus appear to give feminists much reason for optimism, in reality a new narrative has arisen which describes how robotic technologies will create not a cyborg but a ‘super soldier’. In this narrative, the human operator is not seen or described as dependent upon or merged with technology. Rather he (or she) is seen as controlling the technology, subduing it in the ways in which man has traditionally utilized and subdued nature and thus, in this way reinforcing a binary distinction between that which dominates and that which is dominated (Kaplan 1994). This narrative appears in guidelines developed by military planners and passed to organizations of defense contractors who create new technologies. Designers are encouraged to expropriate features of the animal kingdom in creating weaponized bugs and animals, thus replicating the way in which scientists previously expropriated women's bodies through taking technological control of the reproductive process (Wajcman 1991). Designers expropriate nature to create new weapons, or they harvest and harness features from the animal kingdom to create a new type of supersoldier or superwarrior; one with better eyesight, better hearing and other technologically enhanced features as he either wears the technology or has it surgically implanted in his own body. Both developers and those who hire them often refer to Darwin, suggesting both that the new soldier represents a higher stage of evolution, as well as the fact that (in Hobbesian or Realist terms) survival of the fittest is still the rule when it comes to warfare. Robotic technology, thus, becomes an adjunct of the warfighter, who is coded as male and, instead of eliminating gender differences, technological advances create a new soldier who is a more virile and a more deadly male. In this narrative, technology does not protect the soldier but instead enhances the soldier. The new ‘super soldier’ is described in the 2009 report Future Soldier 2030 Initiative (US Army Natick Soldier RD and E Center 2009). In addition, when a drone or robot acts to protect a warfighter or carries out an act of combat, the narrative is often adjusted to suggest that the activities which occur are not the achievement of the robot, but are instead achievements of the (usually male) designers of the technology. Thus, Major Ray Maher, Assistant Product Manager for the Air Warrior Product Office, notes that ‘the formula is soldiers helping soldiers helping soldiers’ – referring to the way that soldiers act as weapons testers assisting engineers who create technology for defending soldiers (Siniard 2011). In this way, soldiers are seen not as being aided by technology, but rather by engineers. In both of these situations, the US military's reading of the ways in which technology enhances gender contradicts Haraway's narrative. Reliance on new technologies becomes not a weakening or a form of dependence but rather the ultimate male enhancement. Here, we can consider the naming of the exoskeleton as the ‘HULC’ and the intertextual reference to the masculine comic book hero The Incredible Hulk who represents a sort of supermale. New technologies are thus described as creating a ‘super soldier’ who is more male, more lethal and more dominant than previous human alone soldier, thus reinforcing what Peterson (2010: 26) calls the valorization of hypermasculinity. In addition, Haraway's cyborg narrative rests on the assumption that robotics will be available to all individuals or all soldiers and, thus, a blurring of the lines between human and machine, female and male as well as disabled and able will occur. However, strict, hierarchical access regimes for new body-enhancing technologies currently exist. Within the Marine Corps, Blue Force Tracking systems are only available to Special Operations Forces and Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel, as are Personnel Recovery (PR) BFT systems. And within the Army, Blue Force Tracking Technology is available only to combat units (Schwerin 2011) from which women are still excluded. Thus, women have been systematically excluded from using these two technologies, just as Berg and Lie suggest that women have been denied access to other technological capabilities and equipment in the past (Berg and Lie 1995: 340). In this way, new body-enhancing and communications technologies access regimes threaten to create a new type of digital divide – not between the poor and the wealthy based on who can afford technology, but between male and female, as technology is presented as being created for men to enjoy and use and often in ways that demean women.8 Thus, rather than flattening gender differences through the use of new technology, instead a new hierarchy will emerge between enhanced and non-enhanced soldiers. Indeed, one can imagine a new hierarchy in which ‘supermales’ – with superior hearing, eyesight (including the ability to see in the dark), the ability to heal themselves when injured, and to go without sleep and food – dominate over both ‘regular men’ and women.9 Again, robotic technology would thus reinforce hegemonic masculinity rather than eliminating it. AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY AND THE GENDER CONSTRUCT OF WARFARE Thus far, we have illustrated how social constructs of the technology of autonomous warfare have successfully contained and limited its revolutionary or emancipatory effects – showing how the military has successfully created a narrative which reframes technological activity as masculine, as well as the one which reframes technological dependence as technological enhancement. However, we still need to consider the question of distance from the battlefield. In what ways does the fact that men and women now fight virtually from the comfort of home change our understanding of combat as a gendered phenomenon? Clearly, the ability to fight virtually has allowed for more women soldiers to participate in ‘combat’. Data indicates that 17 per cent of those assigned to drone activities at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada are female (Singer 2012). But does the participation in war activity from a remote location where one is not actually at risk of death change how we think about war as an activity? Presently, the US military's answer to these questions is simply that there is no distinction between remote combat and close-range combat. In the words of Colonel Chris Chambliss of Creech Air Base: ‘I don't think we're 7500 miles away at all. I think if you walk out the hangar and you go into one of the ground control stations, you're in the fight’ (Sixty Minutes 2009). The military also reinforces a distinction between home activity and combat activity through mandating that drone operators not take phone calls from home while on duty, and that they wear the same uniforms as those engaged in air combat. Studies on the prevalence of PTSD in drone operators indicate that adopting a ‘combat mindset’ can be just as wearing emotionally regardless of the location where one is while engaged in combat. Thus far, the military strategy of equating virtual and real tasks, regarding virtual assistance as enhancement rather than weakness, and simply ignoring the distances from the battlefield, has been quite effective. The debate about the changed meaning of combat simply is not present in the military community. Thus, developments in the field of autonomous warfare provide fodder for the constructivist position that technological developments do not necessarily lead to social progress or change. In the SCOT school, analysts argue that technology's meaning is largely dictated by the environment and by the usage regimes imposed by those who control the technology. According to this view, technological inventions alone can never force a change in social structures, though, in certain instances, technological developments might help to support social changes being carried out by the users (Pinch and Bijker 1984; LaTour 2005; Oldenziel and Zachmann 2009). As Grint and Woolgar suggest: The gender of a technology does not lie encased in the fabric of the material. It is instead a temporary contingent upshot of ongoing interpretation by designers, sellers and users. The politics and values of technology result from the gaze of the human; they do not lie in the gauze of the machine. (Grint and Woolgar 1995: 305) Thus, so far it appears that the military has been able to ‘hold the line’, introducing new technologies while simultaneously dictating to their designers and their end-users what they will mean and how they will be used. In this instance, it, thus, appears possible to introduce revolutionary technologies without necessarily leading to a significant change in the activity of a warfighter, the role of a warfighter or the overall meaning of warfare. The emancipatory potential of autonomous technology, thus, might exist but has not so far been realized.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

The aff is an act of feminist foreign policy that reshapes how nations operate through an ethics of care. Rather than adopt traditional methods of decision-making, you should employ empathetic understandings of human security.

Aggestam et al 18

(Karin Aggestam, Annika Bergman Rosamond and Annica Kronsell, Lund University, Theorising feminist foreign policy, International Relations 2019, Vol. 33(1) 23–39, JKS)

While feminist IR theory remains alert to and critical of the structural underpinnings of world politics, the ontological relationality of the ethics of care provides a key contribution because it takes stock of the experiences of the people at the receiving end of feminist foreign policy. In contrast with orthodox foreign policy practice and theory, which tends to disregard the lived histories of women and colonial subjects, an ethics of care approach would actively seek to uncover their stories to enable intersectional and situated analyses of foreign policy. This involves investigating whether states and other actors actually employ care and empathy as a normative ideal in their pursuit of foreign, security, defence and development policies. States tend to vary in their commitment to such dialogue, but this does not mean that a global ethics of care should be dismissed in the context of foreign and security policy analysis. Instead a critical analysis of feminist- oriented foreign policy should seek to address the ethical question how our view of security in global politics would change once we recognize and accept ... the ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations of dependence and vulnerability of people in the context of complex webs of relations of responsibility.63 This entails exploring to what extent the makers of feminist foreign policy take note of ‘the everyday’ and whether Robison’s notion of ‘a feminist ethics of security’ which centres on ‘marginalised sites’ has some resonance with actual policy-making.64 Ethics of care as foreign policy conduct is often expressed in notions of gender-just protection of such marginalised groups, in particular, the protection of women and children from gendered violence and discrimination. Here ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto highlights the shift in global relations from what previously was a ‘right to intervene’ and sovereign-based logic to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and an ethics of global care.65 We propose here that protection, though at times requiring military means, should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices – a diplomatic tool that is key to the successful conduct of feminist foreign policy. A foreign policy, which builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as acts of listening across borders and intersectional confines. Virginia Held holds that emotions, such as empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness, are sentiments that need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral decisions.66 Central to the analysis of feminist foreign policy then is the extent to which care, the act of listening and dialogical engagement really are key norms in the implementation of gender-just external relations? Here we find Christine Sylvester’s67 concept of empathetic cooperation particularly useful and closely associ- ated with the ethics of care.68 Empathetic cooperation challenges sovereign rights and national interests as the sole platforms for international interactions in favour of empathy across intersectional and ethical boundaries. Laura Sjoberg also suggests that emphatic cooperation is a fruitful platform for the development of a feminist international security ethic, which pays attention to care and justice as well as the gendered structures that have led to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups across international society.69 It may also lead to ‘a form of knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one’s understanding of another in his or her own right’.70 If empathy is an expressed willingness and ability to appreciate the other then empathetic cooperation is ‘a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to hearing’.71 In short, we argue that empathetic cooperation, as part of the making of a feminist for- eign policy, may be a way of opening up for a global ethic and concrete expressions of politics, which do not privilege statist interests and notions of security. Moreover, it moves the agenda towards human security while respecting cultural difference.72 Thus, to explore the presence of empathetic cooperation in the conduct of feminist and gender- based foreign policy is key to the analysis of feminist foreign policy and to ethical inves- tigations into ethically minded foreign policy more broadly.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

Our impact outweighs on probability and magnitude – risk assessment is epistemologically biased towards white masculine elites who discount the severity of everyday localized violence in destroying marginalized populations.

Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, “IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE” 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk, policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus single-mindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors, who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage. n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral, that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation serves only to "mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [*77] of human experience and judgment to scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information? These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue that questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which affect not only today's generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related political and moral considerations plainly on the table. n284 In addition, policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the "public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285 Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities, argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion, and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [*78] to rational method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception A recent national survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion, chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed [*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that perceptions of risk generally differed on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet the most striking results appeared when the researchers considered differences in gender and race together. They found that "white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings, the researchers later conducted several multiple regression analyses to correct for differences in income, education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [*80] Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many ways women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women, because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in shaping perceptions. [*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even though flying is statistically safer. n315 If white men are more complacent about public risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318 Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy. n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to their disadvantage by design. n320 [*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford, Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in general, individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane hazards. n327 [*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment. First, concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second, because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character. For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [*85] 3. Understanding Through Diversity Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional, static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in addressing a problem. n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values. Cynthia Hamilton illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and convinced that "working-class women's [*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even the "science" of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those typically excluded from its practice.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

The panic over potential threats to the nation is a form of masculine futurity which allows reproductive bodies to be regulated. Claims of utilitarianism justify the endless sacrifice of reproductive freedom in the name of the “greatest good.”

Petersen 15

(Kristin Petersen B.A., University of Southern California 2003 M.A. New York University 2008, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, The Logic of Futurity: Reproduction, Cultural Eugenics, and Contingencies of Women’s Citizenship in the Contemporary United States, Proquest, JKS)

Cultural theorist Ruth McElroy suggests, “Women’s belonging to nations is indissoluble from their reproductive biology” (325). For all that motherhood may be conceived as a private choice occurring in the supposedly private sphere, reproduction and motherhood are nonetheless public and political as well, and thoroughly entangled with women’s status as members of their nation. By virtue of their reproduction (or even lack thereof!), women can be constructed in cultural narratives and political scripts as contributors to society or threats to the national good, caretakers of the future who merit protection and support or wayward parents who must be disciplined back into the national fold, national maternal ideals or outsiders within. The state’s identification of and response to women as reproducers reflects the continuous processes of the politics of belonging, which “involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers...but also by their contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents” (Yuval-Davis 20). We see these politics of belonging manifested not only discursively, but also in the policies and laws that protect or privilege some mothers and not others, some children, but not all. When anthropologists Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp ask, “who defines the body of the nation into which the next generation is recruited? Who is considered to be in that national body, who is out of it?” (3), therefore, there is no one answer; rather, this is the question perpetually being asked and answered by political discourse and practice infused with the logic of futurity. The hopes and fears of the present political moment and the imaginative desires for the future are thus continually projected upon the bodies of women and their procreative capacities. Futurity, I suggest in this project, as a possibly inevitable perspective or worldview, allows for the state to focus on women as reproductive beings in a way that it does not for men. Following from Foucault’s explication of biopower, the modern state takes an interest in the workings and ostensible health of its populations, creating new knowledges and indices for the normal as it counts up the characteristics of its citizenry and sets goals for demographic management. While Foucault tends not to focus on the reproductive elements of the state’s biopolitical interest—for instance, the setting of ideal rates of fertility, health expectations for women and children, creation of access to the medical, economic, and social resources needed for reproduction—these are, I would argue, operations of the state that have potential for tremendous impacts upon women particularly. The other biopolitical interests of the state—appropriate number of workers, manageable immigration rates, proper ratio of elderly to young, and so on—are also all implicated in the procreative behaviors of women, which would seem to intensify the state’s interest in them. Brought into the broader framework of women’s political status and national belonging, reproduction in this context seems poised to function as an axis upon which the dispensation of women’s citizenship can pivot, with particular regard to her racial, economic, and social demographic and the state’s assessment of her (and her children’s) value to the national future. Penelope Deutscher suggests that through the emergence of biopower: Women would later assume a status as a reproductive threshold of the future and health of nations, populations and peoples. But the condition for this role for women and maternal reproductivity was the very possibility of reproduction being associated with a shifting field of possible substances, telos, outcomes and obligations: the overall good, the general happiness, the future of the nation, the health of the nation, the competitiveness of the nation, the future of the people, individual flourishing or freedom, individual rights, domestic happiness, the family unit as building block of the nation, the transmission of the bloodline, the family name, transmission of property or family or genealogical transmission, reproduction of the labour force, etc. That reproduction be plausibly thought of in such terms at all was a precondition of it becoming associated with women’s role as threshold of futurity. (Deutscher 129) The state’s biopolitical management of women’s reproduction may thus allow it to approach women primarily as reproductive beings, an essentalist or even utilitarian collapse that may make it easier to intervene upon their bodies and perhaps reflects a deeply ingrained discomfort with the notion that women have tremendous potential power to impact the composition of the future. In this project, I am proposing a framework of futurity that is in operation, characterized by discursive and eugenic aspects, that uses women as the vehicle for future world-building and nation-making. This futurity aims to enact particular visions of the future via changes in the present, particularly through the management of women’s reproduction in the present such that the future population comports with present desires. When this futurity framework is picked up by the state in its various capacities, I suggest there are significant consequences for women’s citizenship as women because they are so intrinsically linked in the cultural and political imaginary with reproduction. In the process of grappling with these concepts, this project asks how the logic of futurity functions to organize the terms of women’s social or political belonging in reproductive terms. How does the state pick up and extend this logic to women, and how might that impact the meaningfulness of women’s citizenship or national belonging? Does the logic of futurity, the constant pressure of the forward vision combined with the imaginative limitations of the present, insist upon women’s citizenship being or becoming something fundamentally different from men’s by virtue of reproductive capacity and association? Exploring these questions brings this project into several disciplinary contexts, including feminist theory and philosophy, political theory, disability theory (eugenics), and even the sphere of economics. In connecting these concepts to ongoing conversations about women and citizenship in the contemporary United States, this project is ultimately working to tie together disparate fields and illuminate how they interact with respect to a model of futurity that I theorize as containing discursive and eugenic aspects. It may be that state-based discourses and practices related to women’s reproduction and citizenship are not so much causes as they are effects of the logic of futurity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

The drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse the obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, , JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

You should refuse debate’s constant urge to prevent incalculable future threats and recognize the urgency of gendered violence.

Olson 15

(Elizabeth, professor of geography and global studies at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Framing

The metrics and justifications for feminist policies matter just as much as the ends. Moves to resolve the aff by using masculine forms of risk calculus are antithetical to the radical, ethical demands of the plan.

Verloo 05

(Mieke, Senior Lecturer in Political Sciences and Gender Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen and Research Director of an EU-funded comparative research facility, “Displacement and Empowerment: Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 12.3 (2005) 344-365)

Some studies that focus on assessing the success of gender mainstreaming practices at the level of the European Union point to a similar phenomenon of "adding other goals," as happened in the Message to the Committee of Ministers to Steering Committees of the Council of Europe on Gender Mainstreaming. In Hafner-Burton and Pollack's analysis (2000) of five areas (structural funds, employment and social affairs, development, competition and science, research and development), the accent is on explaining cross-sectional variety within the European Commission in the start and the implementation of gender mainstreaming. They show how important it has been that political opportunities in Europe have widened and increased over the course of the last decade, for instance as a result of the entrance of the Nordic countries. They also show how important lobbying and modernization have been, for instance the lobbying of WISE (the European organization for women's studies) in the case of gender mainstreaming in science, research, and development. In assessing the success of gender mainstreaming, they refer to classical power mechanisms that are at the heart of social movement theory: political opportunities and mobilizing. In the context of this article, the most interesting part of their analysis is their use of the concept of strategical framing, another power mechanism conceptualized in social movement theory. Strategical framing is a dynamic concept that enables us to see how different actors adapt existing policy frames to pursue their prospective goals. Strategical framing is defined as attempting to construct a fit between existing frames, or networks of meaning, and the frames of a change agent. Hafner-Burton and Pollack show that gender mainstreaming is "sold" as an effective means to the ends pursued by the European Commission, rather than as an overt challenge to those ends. They argue that the gender mainstreaming efforts, because of this strategical framing, might turn into an integrationist approach, integrating women and gender issues into specific regular policies rather than rethinking the fundamental aims of the European Union from a gender perspective. Especially since the European Union is one of the most successful implementers of gender mainstreaming so far, this threatens the transformative potential of gender mainstreaming, they say. [End Page 358] Mary Braithwaite's work on gender mainstreaming in the structural funds (1999) corroborates these findings. She finds that because of the absence of precise objectives on reducing gender inequalities, gender is easily located within and has been subjected to other goals, such as employment creation, economic growth, or poverty reduction. This is not to say that these are abject goals, just to stress that they are not synonymous with gender equality. Braithwaite concludes that gender equity suffers from the dominance of efficiency and effectiveness in gender mainstreaming practices in the structural funds. Strategical Framing and Power The studies presented point out that "success," in the sense of starting a process of gender mainstreaming, seems to be connected to the "stretching" of the goal of gender equality, to strategical framing, and they also show that the actual goal of gender mainstreaming is not articulated clearly. In the last section of this article, I will therefore take a closer look at framing processes, at the politics of framing. What happens in processes of strategical framing? Why would it be that integration rather than transformation is the inevitable result of strategical framing processes? Strategical framing refers to a process of linking a feminist goal, such as gender equality, to some major goal of an organization that should engage or is engaging in gender mainstreaming, thereby securing the allegiance of these organizations to gender mainstreaming. In technical terms, this means that until now strategical framing in gender mainstreaming practices has usually involved framing bridging or frame extension6 (Benford and Snow 2000). The strategies chosen do not challenge the other, mainstream goals of policy makers, but provide for a link by "stretching" the gender equality goal. This means that the dual agenda that is mostly present in gender mainstreaming (of the feminist goal and some other goal) is presented as the possibility of a win-win situation. In such conceptualizations, power seems to evaporate; it is put between brackets. Gender mainstreaming is presented as a harmonious process, certainly in the Council of Europe report. The state is also mostly conceptualized as "friendly," probably connected to the fact that Sweden and the Netherlands have been among its pioneers, countries that to some extent have been "friendly" states in the past. Yet, if gender inequality is about power and privileges, then gender mainstreaming should be about abolishing privileges, and if gender mainstreaming is about eliminating gender bias in policy making, then the state should be problematized. Why then is a process of abolishing privileges and gender bias conceptualized as harmony? The answer provided in the studies discussed earlier is that it helps in organizing acceptance of gender mainstreaming, by making it less [End Page 359] threatening. The consequence of this avoidance of struggle is the exclusion of opposing voices, including radical feminist voices. The "Beyond Armchair Feminism" volume of Organization (2000) is one of the few studies analyzing the bad results of such a dual agenda: the disappearance of a gender focus altogether. Coleman and Rippin (2000) conclude, after having tried such a process of harmonious change, that there needs to be more challenge and less agreement in such change processes, even if trust is a crucial component. The presentation of harmony, used to help smooth the process of change, is counterproductive in the end. In Hearn's (2000) reflection on the project, not only organizations are gendered (in the Acker 1990 definition), but also models of organizational or societal change are gendered, as well as embodying other forms of social division and domination. Following this analysis, change processes and hence gender mainstreaming processes and activities should be conceptualized as necessarily riddled with power, subject to mechanisms of power, and best understood in terms of power. Looking at processes of strategical framing as connected to power relations through a Foucauldian lens shows the logic of the dual agenda as a mix of enabling and constraining processes. The main enabling part is the opening generated by the bridging of frames. Yet, in this logic that juxtaposes two sets of goals, some options are repressed. Exposing the "organization" goal as not neutral, but already gendered, or positioning the "feminist" goal as an organization goal in its own right, will be difficult. As organizations tend to have a self-image of gender neutrality, the gender bias in their existing goals will not easily be recognized. And as both goals will hardly ever be backed by equal power resources, the feminist goal will be watered down much more, or much more easily than the organization goal. Moreover, in the process of convincing organizations or people to start a process of gender mainstreaming, there will already be a tendency to select more "acceptable" feminist goals. Also, the feminists or femocrats involved in these efforts will necessarily have some kind of acceptance by the (gender-biased) organization, leading to further selection and exclusion of radical or marginalized voices. The logic of the dual agenda therefore leads first to an opening for a feminist agenda, and then to a narrowing down of the feminist focus and feminist voices, to eventually losing the focus on gender and gender equality altogether. This logic functions through mechanisms of power. Both goals are not equally powerful, as they have unequal support and resources within the regular organizations that are the relevant context of gender mainstreaming. Especially when gender mainstreaming is conceptualized in a technocratic way, less external pressure or mobilization of feminist groups is to be expected. [End Page 360] Moreover, this inequality of support and resources hinders a clear articulation of a feminist goal, or the expression of particular feminist goals that are seen as more radical, while such radical goals would be needed in view of the watering-down mechanisms. Mainstream liberal feminism hence has an advantage, while a goal that is articulated as a need to displace gender will meet resistance. Finally, within feminism there are hegemonic processes as well that are not recognized and that lead to the exclusion of certain feminist voices.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Solvency

NATO has unique authority over AI – legitimacy, legal interoperability, and accountability.

Lockman and Trabucco 22 Zoe Stanley-Lockman (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University) and Lena Trabucco (Political Science, University of Copenhagen), 3-20-2022, "NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs," The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69#oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69-div1-4//mb24

The first pillar considers NATO’s role in the evolution of ethical and values-driven AI. One ongoing debate regarding AI as a military technology is the ethical implications and baseline values the Allies, and others, want infused in the development and adoption of AI. The Allies themselves lack uniform consensus on numerous, substantial ethical questions on the use of AI, as most clearly seen in the adjacent area of the ethics of autonomy in weapons systems including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In this discussion, we spotlight NATO’s role in facilitating and shaping ethical harmonization as an operational requirement to ensure successful future missions. The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation. Ethics and values One of the vital aspects of AI which has garnered significant global attention is the ethical implications of artificial intelligence as a military technology—an issue that has divided much of the global community, including NATO member states. As a starting point, researchers and analysts have considered the implications of emerging military technology in terms of ethical responsibility and regulation, especially as states and organizations continue to release AI ethical principles, guidelines, and standards.55 We explore how NATO can operationalize the debate around ethics and values of military AI to garner coordination and continue progress of EDT harmonization among partners. Building on the theoretical discussion from STS and military innovation literature above, the adoption of technologies that reinforce values serves the strategic interest of NATO to shape technological innovation against current waves of illiberalism. Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59 The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment. Put simply, shared values are important to both political and operational coherence between Allies. In its 2018 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, the strategic command Allied Command Transformation urged discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of technological advancement to both know how it would impact NATO decision-making and how the Alliance would be prepared to address adversaries who do not share in that vision.62 As such, NATO is contending with the ways that ethical AI impacts its own cohesion internally and how differences between allies may project outward in the face of competitors whose ethical frameworks and commitment to the rule of law differ. Internally, there is a strong national government commitment to responsible AI. Recently, transatlantic cooperation has initiated partnerships of largely NATO states committed to advancing responsible AI with goals towards data sharing and future interoperability.63 AI defense partnerships are not restricted to military innovation but rather aim to facilitate civilian innovation cooperation for defense purposes. Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.”64 Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another.65 These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway.66 While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies.67 Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.68 NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation. Many remaining questions and uncertainty will be addressed in NATO’s forthcoming AI ethical principles guidelines. But the guidelines adopted in 2021 do not address every ethical dilemma. Regarding accountability, especially, likely major questions will continue to affect the Alliance. As Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges David van Weel recently clarified, NATO will offer a framework of responsible use for the Allies—but the question of accountability for member states, as opposed to civilian technology manufacturers for example, is one principle that will not have an easy solution.71 International legal norms In certain respects, the legal debate mirrors much of the ethical debate surrounding AI as the two address many of the same issues. International law is a values-based system embedded in certain principles and practices agreed-upon within the international system. This section certainly identifies the complementarity of the ethical discussion surrounding AI, but it also illustrates where the legal debate can depart from the ethical considerations to address different sorts of legal challenges that face the Alliance. Lawyers, researchers, and civil society grapple with existing legal regimes relevant to military operations and the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding automated decision-making, particularly in lethal decision-making. Thus far, the legal dialogue has been heavily anchored in the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other relevant legal regimes, to lethal autonomous weapons systems.72 IHL, also known as the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, regulate the means and methods of warfare and, as such, is pivotal to the emergence of military technology and how existing legal structures are disrupted. The legal debate often revolves around the prospect of a “treaty ban” of LAWS.73 But the legal debate is much more nuanced than the likelihood of international treaties banning any particular weapon system. Especially because NATO is not a regulatory body, it cannot institute measures to regulate emerging technology for the Allies. Instead, NATO’s function in the legal domain may be more effective outside the traditional legal debates around emerging military technology and more embedded in fostering cooperation and coordination among military partners. Other avenues of legal regulation may fall short of an international convention or prohibition, but nevertheless factor significantly in regulating and/or delineating state policies. Additionally, non-lethal applications of AI, as well as applications of AI that do not figure into autonomous systems, also raise important legal questions under international law. Arguably, norms around non-lethal applications are more urgent as their development is more advanced, harder to define, and less controversial in integration.74 Ultimately, NATO’s facilitative power can help ensure that integration of EDTs like AI into military capabilities and into multinational coalition operations is consistent with member states’ legal obligations. One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations. Safety and security For humans to meet ethical and legal commitments when developing and deploying AI, the systems themselves must be safe, secure, and reliable. More simply put, if humans and institutions interacting with AI do not have confidence that the systems will perform as expected, then they cannot assure that its development and deployment are responsible. This makes safety and security a key pillar of responsible AI governance for any actor.82 As this section explores for NATO in particular, safety and security are indispensable to the Alliance’s stated goals to focus its approach to EDTs in the areas of “deterrence and defense, capability development, legal and ethical norms, and arms control aspects.”83 Politically, democratic militaries using AI cannot be accountable to their citizenries nor their coalition partners if they lack mechanisms to trace and explain how their systems are reliable. Accidents and interference with AI systems could likewise create political risks for the Alliance. For example, if deepfakes and micro-targeted information attacks compromise confidence in the integrity of information used to build a common operating picture, then the operational difficulties could also erode political trust between Allies in a few key ways. In the North Atlantic Council, disagreement about the integrity of information could slow the decision-making body’s ability to react to fast-changing operational realities.84 Further, compromised AI systems may not only make it harder for forces to prevent harm to non-combatants, but also to prevent friendly fire. In this way, coalition forces arguably face even higher obligations to coordinate on the reliability of their systems, relative to adversaries and near-peer competitors that tend to operate alone. As such, responsible AI governance is not purely technical; policy alignment and strategic planning are likewise necessary to draw attention to risk management above the tactical level. Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In addition to governability, NATO and its Allies are assessing the risks that bias, attacks, and lack of interpretability can introduce in relation to the anticipated uses of a given AI system.89 In security and defense, new and heightened risks include poisoning of the information environment, deception systems and techniques, uncertainty about the performance of systems in new and unknown environments, and the possibility that tensions or accidents escalate at a faster tempo than humans and institutions can process, among others. These risks can manifest either in motivated attacks or unintentional failure modes.90 In both cases, assuring and certifying that military assets are safe and secure is important given the inherently high risk in operational environments. These operational environments include the presumption that an adversary is disrupting one’s own systems, be it by directly attacking the AI systems themselves, or disrupting the broader command, control, and communications systems under which the AI systems are operating.91 Mitigating these types of risks is typically done in testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) and in experimentation activities.92 Yet AI cannot be validated and verified the way traditional software systems are because there is no guarantee that an AI system will perform in the real world as it does in a testing environment, and because lifelong-learning systems will perform differently over their lifecycle. Having robust assurance and TEVV processes in place are also important for operators to build trust in the systems they are meant to use, as well as for citizenries and coalition partners at large to see that accountability procedures still apply. As such, building institutional procedures to govern AI safety and security is necessary to build trust in the use of the technology—as well as to develop countermeasures and defensive systems that protect against adversarial threats. NATO thus has an institutional responsibility to prevent and mitigate these intentional and unintentional failures if using AI in operations and mission support.93 As Table 69.1 shows, the Alliance also has a range of relevant entities to coordinate national approaches to AI safety and security, as well as facilitate safety measures as part of responsible use in the Alliance-wide ecosystem. NATO has an important role to play in military standardization and Allied policy planning for safe, secure, and interoperable AI. This includes the coordinating role of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Command, Control and Consultation Board to implement complementary acquisition processes that fuse AI adoption measures with safety responsibilities. Furthermore, entities including STO and NSO have a significant role setting the technical baseline and promulgating materiel standards that provide the technical framework for safety and security. Although their staffs are themselves small, they both convene hundreds, if not thousands, of subject matter experts in working groups. As such they both offer unique technical networks to help shape safety and security in a way that minimize risk in operations. NATO’s resources and leadership are vital to using standards and coalition policy to instill safe and secure technological development, a necessary condition to interoperable and successful future operations.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Solvency

NATO is key to building international momentum against LAWS. Even if NATO hasn’t previously signaled support for the plan, it still can and should.

Rideau Institute, 21 [Rideau Institute, 7-5-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, Rideauinstitute, "Swarming military drones bring new urgency to push for killer robot ban – Rideau Institute", https://rideauinstitute.ca/2021/07/12/swarming-military-drones-bring-new-urgency-to-push-for-killer-robot-ban/]/ISEE

What about NATO? In our 7 June blog we called upon Canada to take a strong position at the then upcoming NATO Summit in support of a ban on the development and use of fully autonomous weapons systems. The NATO Communiqué at paragraph 36 makes only one specific reference to autonomous weapons technologies, stating that: Through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, Allies are committed to working together to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas such as …autonomous systems…. Paragraph 37 contains one positive, albeit passive, reference to regulation of emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs), which would include lethal autonomous systems, with the following statement: This strategy outlines a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora. [emphasis added] In the view of Ian Davis of NATO Watch: Exactly where the alliance falls on the spectrum between permitting AI-powered military technology in some applications and regulating or banning it in others is expected to be part of the Strategic Concept debate. The 2021 NATO Summit formally launched work on the new Strategic Concept, to replace that developed in 2010. It is to be approved at the next summit in 2022. (See Communiqué paragraph 6.) Reminding us of the UN Secretary-General’s support for a total prohibition on “morally repugnant” weapons that could, by themselves, target and attack human beings, Davis outlines the critical role that NATO can and should play to that end: With NATO leadership such weapons could be banned by a treaty similar to the initiatives that successfully prohibited antipersonnel landmines in 1997 and cluster munitions in 2008. Preserving meaningful human control over the use of force is an ethical imperative and a legal necessity. The development of a new NATO Strategic Concept is an opportunity for member states to lead by example in the global effort to ban killer robots and to develop new norms guiding the use of artificial intelligence for defence purposes. In the view of the Rideau Institute: This would be a tangible demonstration by NATO members of their oft-proclaimed declaratory commitment to strengthening the rules-based international order.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Solvency

A complete ban is possible and it solves. Only prohibiting LAWS entirely resolves questions of enforcement and circumvention.

Wareham 17 Mary Wareham, 1-5-2017, "The Growing International Movement Against Killer Robots," Human Rights Watch,

Affirming the principle of meaningful human control via a preemptive ban This matter of whether autonomous weapons are ethically acceptable lies at the core of the debate over them. The fundamental question is not technological, but philosophical: “Will machines be given the power and authority to kill a human being?” History has shown that for some weapons that significantly threaten non-combatants, including poison gas, biological weapons, chemical weapons, blinding lasers, antipersonnel mines, and cluster munitions, responsible governments have found it necessary to supplement the limits already in the international legal framework. Fully autonomous weapons have the potential to raise a comparable level of humanitarian concern. Based on current and foreseeable technology, the ICRC says there are serious doubts about the ability of autonomous weapon systems to comply with IHL “in all but the narrowest of scenarios and the simplest of environments.” Because of this, the ICRC says “it seems evident that overall human control over the selection of, and use of force against, will continue to be required.” The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots fundamentally objects to autonomous weapons because it rejects the notion that a machine should be permitted to take a human life on the battlefield or in policing, border control, or any circumstances. It seeks to affirm the positive principle that weapons systems, military attacks, and the use of violent force in policing should always be kept under meaningful human control. In order to do that, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls on states and others to endorse its call for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons systems. The global coalition of non-governmental organizations does not oppose military use of autonomy and technologies relating to artificial intelligence, but it draws the line at the development of machines that could select and fire on targets without human intervention. Research and development activities should be banned if they are directed at technology that can be used exclusively for fully autonomous weapons or that is explicitly intended for use in such weapons. A preemptive prohibition is both possible and desirable. The Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol IV banning blinding lasers provides precedent for the creation of a protocol on lethal autonomous weapons systems. The campaign has urged that states ban rather than regulate fully autonomous weapons because a complete prohibition is clearer and easier to enforce than partial regulations or restrictions and eliminates room for different interpretations. A complete prohibition creates greater stigma against the weapons and discourages their proliferation. Mere regulation would still allow governments to obtain them, and be tempted to use them illegally. The serious international security and proliferation concerns relating to fully autonomous weapons include the real danger that if even one nation acquires these weapons, others may feel they have to follow suit in order to defend themselves and to avoid falling behind in a robotic arms race. There is also the prospect that fully autonomous weapons could be acquired by repressive regimes or non-state armed groups with little regard for the law. These weapons could be perfect tools of repression and terror for autocrats. Another proliferation concern is that such weapons would increase the likelihood of armed attacks, making resort to war more likely, as decision-makers would not have the same concerns about loss of soldiers’ lives. This could have a destabilizing effect on international security. Since 2013, a broad range of individuals, organizations, and states have come forward to endorse the call for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons systems, including: • Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, The Holy See, Pakistan, State of Palestine, and Zimbabwe. • The European Parliament, which adopted a resolution by a vote of 534–49 calling for a ban on “development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention.” • Twenty-one Nobel Peace Laureates, who expressed concern that “leaving the killing to machines might make going to war easier.” • More than 120 religious leaders and organizations of various denominations, who view the weapons as “an affront to human dignity and to the sacredness of life.” • More than 270 scientists in 37 countries, who warned how interactions by devices controlled by complex algorithms “could create unstable and unpredictable behavior … that could initiate or escalate conflicts, or cause unjustifiable harm to civilian populations.” • More than 3,000 artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics experts, who said they have “no interest in building AI weapons and do not want others to tarnish their field by doing so, potentially creating a major public backlash against AI that curtails its future societal benefits.” • Canadian technology company Clearpath Robotics, which said it had “chosen to value our ethics over potential future revenue” by pledging not to manufacture “weaponized robots that remove humans from the loop.” • The ethics council of the $830 billion Norwegian government pension fund, which is looking at whether investments in companies making lethal autonomous weapons systems would violate the fund’s fundamental humanitarian principles. • The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, who in a report recommended, “Autonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful human control should be prohibited.” Finding the way forward, faster toward an outcome In May 2013, states first deliberated on autonomous weapons in a multilateral forum when a UN special rapporteur presented a report to the Human Rights Council that called for an immediate moratorium on the weapons. At the Convention on Conventional Weapons, also in Geneva, representatives from more than 85 countries met in May 2014 and April 2015 for a total of nine days to discuss lethal autonomous weapons systems, while a third meeting took place in April 2016. Various UN agencies, international organizations, the Red Cross, and civil society groups coordinated by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots are also participating throughout these deliberations and other meetings, which have helped sharpen the focus on lethal autonomous weapons systems and the concerns raised by them. The process is helping to establish a common base of knowledge from which some nascent norms or principles are finding broad agreement, most notably the notion that human control must be retained over the operation of weapons systems. However, the informal talks are being criticized for “treading water” as they lack ambition, demonstrate no sense of urgency, and reflect the CCW’s usual “go slow and aim low” approach. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls on states to agree to a more formal and substantive process, with up to four weeks of work dedicated in 2017, when they decide on the way forward at the end of the year. The CCW Review Conference in December 2016 should agree to begin formal negotiations and aim to complete them within one or two years by producing a preemptive prohibition on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Pakistan—the first and probably most ardent supporter of the call for a ban—will serve as president of the CCW Review Conference, where states must take crucial decisions on the process going forward and desired outcome. Sustained and substantive national campaigning is required to make any headway reining in autonomous weapons, including legislative scrutiny in the form of debate, questions, and inquiries, and new legislation to ban the weapons. As Canada’s new Minister of Defense Harjit Sajjan commented to the Halifax Security Forum, legislative oversight is required as technology advances so that the burden of deciding on ethical dilemmas associated with their use is not placed on service men and women. The US is the only country with a detailed written policy guiding it on fully autonomous weapons, which it says “neither encourages nor prohibits” development of lethal autonomous weapons systems.” The US has described fully autonomous weapons as a potential “force multiplier.” Recent media interviews with top Pentagon officials provide some disturbing signs that the five-year policy may soon be replaced by guidelines allowing acquisition of human-out-of-the-loop weapons systems. However, officials also express support for retaining human control by stating, for example, that “we will not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision.” Israel has also spoken about the desirability and potential benefits of autonomous weapons systems, urging other countries to “keep an open mind” because it is “difficult” to foresee how developments may look in 10-30 years from now.” No other state has publicly expressed interest in pursuing such systems and several have explicitly stated that they are not developing such systems and that have no plans to do so. But there have been extensive discussions about the potential benefits of such weapons, and many states are concerned that potential enemies will acquire fully autonomous weapons, making their continued development inevitable. The trend toward ever-greater autonomy in warfare has been accelerating greatly in recent years, at an ever-faster pace. A strong, inclusive, and unified effort is needed now to prevent the unconstrained development of fully autonomous weapons systems.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Advantage

Maintaining lethal autonomous weapons causes a tradeoff of priorities. Killer robots won’t create peace, but they do sustain a system where military dominance must come at the cost of human security.

---AT: PICs/DA’s war !---Root cause

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

FFP addresses the root causes of violence and insecurity by calling for an institutional overhaul of foreign policy and national security. Our world is structured around the patriarchy and naturally, its systems and power hierarchies will be reflected in the weapons we produce. This report will highlight some of the issues revealed when a feminist lens is turned onto killer robots. In Chapter 1, militarisation and masculinity will be explored, including how ideas about masculinity influence a militarised approach to national security. In Chapter 2, gender-based violence and the question of accountability are discussed. The distinction between combatant and civilian are blurred within a patriarchal and racist context, and the ability for killer robots to commit sexualised violence is highlighted. Lastly, in Chapter 3, racism and imperialism is analysed, with a look at how existing societal biases are built into any new technology we would produce. Finally, the report concludes with a summary of the policy recommendations included throughout each of the three chapters. For decades, feminists have campaigned against the violent patriarchal structures that sustain conflict and keep an elite few in power. By building societal hierarchies so that only a small and specific group of people have access to the top - which often in Western countries means straight white men - particular ideas about who is best suited to lead become intrinsically linked to gender and gendered traits. This means the lens through which foreign policy is often conducted has its roots in stereotypical masculine characteristics that have historically been accepted as best for policymaking. These traits include things like being rational, strong, and assertive, while avoiding more feminine-coded traits like emotion or empathy. These ideas about gender feed directly into how national security is understood as a militarised space (Cohn, 2018). Gender (referring to someone’s identity as a man, woman, or gender non-conforming) and gendered traits (referring to concepts about masculinity and femininity) are overlapping but not entirely synonymous. Reference to masculinity here is done so with the understanding that it is a social construct based upon stereotypes to fuel a patriarchal hierarchy of power. The ability to exercise such traits, however, is not exclusive to men, and this report is not interested in reinforcing dated and static ideas of men as masculine and women as feminine. As bell hooks notes, “Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism” (hooks, 1995). Anyone is capable of expressing a wide variety of characteristics. Furthermore, including other social categories like race or class into this consideration likewise continues to reveal a complicated system of power dynamics based around identity that play out both between individuals as well as states. The power dynamics found in much of today’s foreign and security policy are framed around realism, an ideology that understands state relationships through the lens of power optimisation. Part of this process means developing new weapons technology in order to continually seek military dominance. Killer robots fit in well with this strategy, and sustain a system that values maintaining power and security through military dominance. The means of keeping peace, then, rests upon the ability to threaten or inflict violence (Conway, 2016; Starr, 2020). Military domination becomes an easily justifiable form of peacekeeping, and masculine-coded traits like aggression and dominance are seen not just as fundamental to security policy, but taken as objective truth within security policy. In this sense, masculinity is systematised by associating ideas about manliness with the willingness to exercise violence (Cohn, 1993). By centring masculine traits as preferential in security policy, “human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity - all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse” (Cohn, 1992), get left out. By making it clear that ideas or traits that are coded as feminine are not legitimate, alternative ideas and approaches to security policy are silenced. However, an FFP framework is interested specifically in these silenced ideas, both to explore the fresh perspective they offer and to understand why they were silenced in the first place. A feminist framing of security also takes a step back from the realist and masculine lens through which much of security policy is developed, and instead is interested in what makes the average person secure and safe. Much more immediate needs must be met when security is reframed with the average individual, rather than the state, in mind. Access to safe housing, healthy food, a good education, and affordable healthcare become some of the most prominent indicators of someone’s health and wellness. The ability to lead a life free from discrimination due to gender, race, class, sexuality, or ability are also much better indicators for how sustainability peaceful a society is (Hudson, 2014). A strong military and extravagant weapons arsenal falls low on the lit of priorities in comparison. An FFP would then call for investment not into weapons technology and the military, but instead into the infrastructure of a society and programs to increase equality. As long as militarisation is the lens through which security policy is developed, and gendered traits remain driving factors behind ideas about security, sustainable peace is not possible. By investing in new weapons technology, we are continuing down a path that guarantees violence rather than challenges it. Killer robots will not contribute to peace, but sustain a system where a narrow and patriarchal understanding of security is supported, continuing to leave many vulnerable and at risk of violence.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Advantage

AI reproduces the subjectivity of the people that create it---statistically that is white, male, and wealthy.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

This brings us full circle to the problem of which objects and concepts get represented in the dataset. If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves (AAUW 2015). A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all (Adam 1998, 23). In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.” Sub-symbolic systems fare no better. In these “bottom–up” systems, the AIs are left to figure things out on their own. The AI is a blank slate, where programmers envision creating an intelligence on par with a child’s brain.20 By emulating the learning processes of a child, from adolescence through adulthood, one is able to create a generally intelligent AI (Storrs Hall 2007, 137). Aside from the ethical considerations about an AI-baby, there are other technological limitations and hazards about bottom–up systems. In particular, because there are no preprogrammed constraints (e.g. do not kill noncombatants) and it is a learning system, it has the potential to learn the “wrong thing” (Wallach and Allen 2009, 110). Programmers acknowledge the potential for such “bad behavior” and have taken seriously the AI-baby approach where a programmer oversees the “education” of the AI. Yet this does not assuage fears of a gendered AI. In fact, it would almost guarantee not only a masculinist AI, but would also pervert the very nature of learning. The AI would have very limited social interaction: it lives in a lab, does not go to school, interacts with one type of person and is limited to whatever interaction its “caregiver” decides to give it (Weber 2014). This is not to say that there are no women in robotics or AI labs, but that the culture permeating computer science and robotics is predominantly masculine, and that the women have consistently remained a mere quarter of the population of computer scientists since 1960 (Burleigh 2015; AAUW 2015). Finally, the statistical approach will also produce gendered AI. It works off of basic probabilistic mathematical models of how the world operates. The statistical approaches will utilize certain kinds of modeling, such as Bayesian inference or networks. In a Bayesian inference, the model will predict with x probability that a statement is true, whereas a Bayesian network is a graph “whose nodes represent statements or measurements,” and the “links between the statements or measurements correspond to the Bayesian-inference steps with the appropriate probabilistic models” (Storrs Hall 2007, 156). Of course much depends on the model, the available data and the scope of the problem to solve. For the machine to solve a problem requires “taking enough statistics from enough evaluations” to first form the model, and thus requires either interacting many times in a particular situation or a large enough data set from which it could draw to be prepared to act with any reliability in a new context.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
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These weapons cannot be disentangled from inherent biases in artificial intelligence. They’ll inevitably kill the wrong person.

Sharkey 18 Noel Sharkey Emeritus, 8-28-2018, "The impact of gender and race bias in AI," Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog,

Automated decision algorithms are currently propagating gender and race discrimination throughout our global community. The major culprits are machine learning with big data. Drawing on the lessons learned, the question asked here is, can we take away meaningful human control and put our trust in artificial intelligence (AI) to select targets and attack them with violent force? To answer this, we take a journey into less deadly application domains where the biases of such systems are clear to see. En route we’ll examine the causes of bias inherent in the use of machine learning with big data and why a lack of transparency makes the bias problem difficult to fix. Finally, similar problems of bias in the use of automated face recognition are discussed in relation to target acquisition. Much of the recent discussions about autonomous weapons systems (AWS) have focused on careful military planning, on maintaining wider loops for human control and on human oversight. While conventional military planning is important, we must consider the stark reality of other ways that the technology may be used. Modern armed conflict is rarely about high densities of military personnel meeting on a battlefield with the aim of killing as many of their opponents as they can. It is replete with un-uniformed combatants moving through and hiding among civilian populations. Some believe that AWS will be able to pick out specific people or classes of people who may be legitimate targets of attack (setting aside the plethora of international human rights issues). But is this a humanitarian disaster waiting in the wings? Bias in decision algorithms The acceleration in the commercialisation of AI has largely been the product of two main factors (i) an increase in power, memory and speed of computers and (ii) the availability of large quantities of data about so many aspects of our lives. These factors have enabled the use of machine learning tools in an unprecedented way for innovative commercial applications. These include algorithms being delegated with decisions that impact on people’s lives in the belief that algorithms will make more objective and hence fairer and less biased decisions than error prone and biased humans Unfortunately, it is becoming alarmingly clear from a growing body of evidence that decision algorithms are perpetuating injustice for many. Many cases are emerging that postcode, ethnicity, gender, associations and poverty negatively bias the decisions being delegated to machines. Tech giants such as Google and Microsoft openly admit that there are bias problems and they have been doing their best, unsuccessfully so far, to find solutions. Areas of injustice coming to light include: Insurance risk, mortgage loan decisions, shortlisting, hiring and interviewing for jobs, job advertising, bail and recidivism risk, assessment, custodial sentencing, airport security and predictive policing. One of the common causes of decision biases arises from ethnicity or gender biases, often unconscious, of the programmer or of those classifying the data samples. Another major cause is the application of machine learning algorithms, such as deep learning, and the way in which they are trained. I will cover two of the inherent causes below and then explain why lack of transparency makes them difficult to fix. How machine learning can ignore minorities One of the benefits of using machine learning systems in an engineering context is that they reduce or remove the impact of outliers (examples outside of the norms in the data) in the training data. For example, shaky arm movements of a robot can be turned into smooth movements by training with machine learning. However, in the context of a decision algorithm, the ‘outliers’ can be the minority groups in the data. These may be people from different ethnic groups or a low represented gender. Google illustrates this problem by training a system with drawings of shoes. Most of the sample are the plain shoes or trainers drawn by the majority of people. But some people drew high-heels. Because this was a minority, the post training tests misclassified high heels as ‘not shoes’. This is a simple example where the misclassification can be clearly seen. In a targeting context there would be no way of knowing which minorities could mistakenly fall into the category of legitimate targets. And in conflict it is rarely possible to get clear information about casualties and whether or not they were legitimate targets or collateral damage. Bias problems in the data Our societal values and norms are constantly evolving with massive changes over the last 50 years in what is acceptable to say in the media or in the workplace and also as to what are discriminatory practices. However, it appears that most of the old values are locked into the internet where much of the training data for machine learning algorithms are derived. Studies have demonstrated that, for example, ‘man’ is associated with boss, president, leader and director, whereas ‘woman’ is associated with helper, assistant, employee and aide. Google searches for black names like Leroy and Keisha yield ads associated with crime, whereas white names like Brad and Katie yield sites with contact details. Searches for professional hair yield images of white women whereas for unprofessional hair we get images of well-groomed black women. Then there are latent biases in data created by frequency of occurrence—e.g., searching on Google images for pictures of great physicists yields mostly pictures of men. The societal push towards greater fairness and justice is being held back by historical values about poverty, gender and ethnicity that are ossified in big data. There is no reason to believe that bias in targeting data would be any different or any easier to find. Lack of transparency and explanation In the Google shoe classification example described above—amplification through filtering—the data may contain flat soles, small heels, high heels, laces, no laces, strips, shiny material etc. When the algorithm has completed learning, it would be difficult or perhaps impossible to work out which features of the drawing had been selected to trigger the shoe/non-shoe decision. This lack of transparency is because the end result of learning is large matrices of numbers that are used to generate the decisions. No one has, as yet, found a general means to probe the matrices to find out what features of the data it has assigned to the decision. This means that no explanation can be given for why a particular decision has been made. Imagine the dangers that this poses for targeting decisions where we cannot tell what features are responsible for classifying a person or object as a legitimate target. This is the dark recess where bias lives. The consequences of bias in armed conflict All of this injustice is happening in the civilian domain where there has been plenty of time to test, scrutinize and construct these systems. It emphasises the problems of accountability and responsibility in the automation of weaponry that we have been discussing for years. When it comes to armed conflict, data management will be considerably more difficult. If there is bias in civil society, just imagine the kinds of bias that will be built into algorithms being delegated with life and death decisions in conflict zones where we have little or no proper understanding of the cultures involved. Given the enormous challenges we are already facing in trying to develop fair and just AI systems, the chances of justice in civilian laden conflict zones is vanishingly small. There is even bias in automated face recognition Proponents of autonomous weapons systems might still argue that automated face recognition could form an objective and unbiased basis for automating kill decisions in urban warfare. They may even suggest that it is the ideal tool to track down and kill ‘high value targets’. After all, it has been shown to be accurate in laboratories and it has been developed and sold by the major tech companies like Amazon, Google and Microsoft. But there are problems. First, the NGO, Big Brother Watch used freedom of information requests to obtain accuracy data on the UK police force’s use of NEC’s NeoFace Watch to find criminal faces among crowds. The results of their ensuing report were shocking. The average false face recognition was 95%. Yes, that means that only 5% of those identified were that person. The worst results were the metropolitan police force’s use of the technology at the big Afro-Caribbean Notting Hill Carnival with only 2% correct recognition accuracy over a weekend. Just imagine the humanitarian consequences if that had been an AWS selecting targets Second, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conducted a range of tests with Amazon’s Rekognition system that is becoming popular among U.S. police departments. One of their tests matched photographs of members of the U.S. Congress against a database of 25,000 publicly available ‘mug shots’ of criminals. The system incorrectly matched 28 members of Congress with people who had been arrested. This has led U.S. lawmakers to raise questions about the police use of the technology and both Amazon and Microsoft (who make their own facial recognition software) have called for new regulations. From the perspective of bias, it is important to note that the ACLU test showed that a disproportionate number of African-American and Latino members of Congress were misidentified as criminals. The best results reported for face recognition are for white males and that has been the conclusion of a number of academic studies. Gender, age and shade of skin really do matter to automated face recognition. Joy Buolamwini from MIT, tells the story of how her research on using a computer avatar was hampered because the face recognition software could not even find her face, never mind recognise it—the missing face problem. She had to wear a white mask to be seen. Buolamwini then conducted a comprehensive research study on three major commercial face recognition systems for gender classification: IBM Watson Visual Recognition, Microsoft Face Detect and Face++. The face pictures were of parliamentarians from three northern European countries and three African countries. A range of skin shades were represented. The result was that all systems perform better on males versus females and the lighter the skin the more accurate the result. All performed worst on darker female faces with error rates from 20.8% to 34.7%.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Advantage

Lethal autonomous weapons are profoundly gendered. They reinforce patriarchal structures by identifying men as potential combatants while running the risk of unchecked sexual violence against women and nonbinary people.

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

Killer robots reinforce violence patriarchal structures, which have sustained a long and terrible legacy of targeting violence in gendered ways. The usage of killer robots raises a host of concerns as to how they might target innocent men as potential combatants, as well as increase sexualised violence against women, girls, and non-binary people. Many international regulations have been developed to protect people from gender-based violence, and yet, there is no accountability structure for weapons that operate completely autonomously, meaning these killer robots could commit unchecked violence. Combatants or Civilians? Under the administration of President Obama, during which drone strikes became a critical act of US military intervention and targeted killing, the criteria for distinguishing between a civilian and a militant or terrorist was blurred to the point of non-distinction. The CIA counted all military-age males who were in a strike zone as combatants “unless there [was] explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” (Becker and Shane, 2012). The reasoning behind this (il)logic was that if people are spending time around known terrorist hotspots, then they would likely be up to “no good”. This resulted in incredibly low reported rates of civilian Gender-Based Violence and Accountability casualties, as almost all men killed were considered to be combatants. This is but one example of how profiling based on gender, or any social category for that matter, can be twisted in a way that creates a tangible threat for people who simply share the gender of the target profile. Given the lack of clarity as to how combatants are defined, there is a high risk of false positives and targeting of innocent civilians. Developing sound regulations and processes that would guarantee the safety of civilians is an incredibly challenging, and probably impossible, task (Moyes, 2019). Attempts to do so would also place the burden of navigating legal obligations onto AI, a technology which does not have the capacity to make the kind of judgement calls humans are capable of. Killer robots would not be able to identify nuances within a target profile, and without meaningful human intervention, would always result in the use of force, therefore risking the death of innocent people (Moyes, 2019). Sexualised Violence Gender-based violence also manifests in sexualised violence, including the rape, forced pregnancy, slavery, and torture of women, girls, and non-binary people. While proponents for killer robots have argued that such machinery would reduce sexualised violence, the uncomfortable truth is that the opposite is likely (Sandvik and Lohne, 2015). Acts of this nature are often used purposefully in conflict scenarios as a mechanism to instill fear, humiliation, and shame, or for purposes of ethnic cleansing. A killer robot, with no conscience or ability to reject unethical instructions, would execute orders based upon whatever programming it received, including orders to commit sexualised violence (Sharkey, 2020). The assumption that new technology would function precisely as it “should” without consideration of the context in which it’s developed, as well as the motives of the user, is a reckless presumption (Sandvik and Lohne, 2015). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) takes a specific focus on the use of sexualised violence as a weapon of war and war crime, unilaterally condemning it in alignment with the Rome Statute of the International Court and the Geneva Convention (UN General Assembly, 1998; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949). However, should these weapons commit such atrocities, their distance from human intervention begs the question of legal accountability. Killer robots themselves cannot be tried for crimes. So who, then, should bear that responsibility (Acheson, 2020)? Ultimately, human intent and system performance can never be fully consistent when it comes to killer robots. This misalignment is of grave concern to a FFP framework. As gender equality and protecting vulnerable populations is of central concern to FFP, the potential for gender-based violence should killer robots be developed is simply too great a risk to take. The margin of error of these weapons results in the death of innocent people, a risk that should be considered too great to consider this technology usable.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Advantage

LAWS are the ultimate form of dehumanization. Algorithmic biases ensure discriminatory targeting along gendered and racial lines, which guarantees the deaths of marginalized communities.

Acheson, 20 [Ray Acheson has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research, and is currently completing a book about the nuclear ban treaty and antinuclear activism to be published by Rowman and Littlefield in 2020,Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, January 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022,“A User Guide to Killer Robots,” https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/WILPF_Killer-Robots-Guide_EN-Web.pdf]/ISEE

Autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the established norms of gender and power. These norms can and do affect how we think about weapons, war, and violence. Throughout history, we have seen that weapons symbolise power. The association of weapons with power comes from a dominant understanding of masculinity, in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. This is not to say that all men agree with or perpetuate this idea, but that this is widely considered the norm or standard for masculinity. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. Turning men (and women) into warfighters has tended to require breaking down their sense of ethics and morals and building up a violent masculinity that is lacking in empathy and glorifies strength as violence and physical domination over others portrayed as weaker. Autonomous weapons would be the pinnacle of a fighting force stripped of the empathy, conscience, or emotion that might hold a human soldier back. While armed drones are on this trajectory towards mechanised violence, autonomous weapons would complete the separation of the body and mind from the battlefield and the process of dehumanisation of warfare. This process of dehumanisation also often includes sexual – or other kinds of gender-based violence. Some people who support the development of killer robots have argued that these weapons will be better than human soldiers because they will not rape. This is a myth. An autonomous weapon could be programmed to inflict terror on a population through sexual violence, which is already ordered by states and armed groups using human soldiers. An autonomous weapon, if programmed to rape, would not hesitate to do so. It is also important to consider the broader culture of rape in relation to weapons and war. Rape and sexual violence are used as weapons in conflict, and is also heightened during and after conflict. War destabilises communities and exacerbates already existing gender inequalities and oppression of women, LGBTQ+ people, and others who do not conform to societies’ standards of gender norms. 8 of 14 A WILPF GUIDE TO: KILLER ROBOTS WILPF is also concerned about the development of autonomous weapons programmed with "target profiles" and algorithmic bias in terms of gender, race, socioeconomic status, ability, and sexual orientation. Facial recognition software struggles to recognise people of colour; voice recognition struggles to respond to women’s voices or non-North American accents; photos of anyone standing in a kitchen are labelled as women; people’s bail is denied because a program decided that a woman of colour was more likely to reoffend than a white woman; trans people are surveilled on the basis of the clothing they wear. Imagine this kind of bias being programmed into a weapon system designed to target and fire upon targets without any meaningful human control, without any human judgment to counteract that bias. Or, imagine that bias being deliberately programmed into the killer robot, to kill all people of a certain ethnicity, religion, or sex. In this way, an autonomous weapon contributes to further dehumanising people by turning them into target profiles and expendable targets. A good example of this is how already in conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age. While men are not necessarily targeted only because they are men, taking sex as a key signifier as identity and exacting harm on that basis constitutes gender-based violence. This erodes the protection that civilians should be afforded in conflict and violates many human rights, including the right to life and due process. It also has broader implications in the reinforcement of gender norms, including violent masculinity. Assuming all military-age men to be potential or actual militants or combatants entrenches the idea that men are violent and thus targetable. This devalues male life—it suggests men are relatively more expendable than women. It increases the vulnerability of men, exacerbating other risks adult civilian men face such as forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and summary execution. The gendered culture of violent masculinities that surrounds the development of autonomous weapons, likely to be embedded within the technology and its use, will create new challenges for preventing violence, protecting civilians, and breaking down gender essentialisms or discrimination. Understanding how autonomous weapons are likely to be perceived in a gendered way by their developers, operators, and their victims is crucial to developing policies that can help break the cycle of violence. This could include an understanding that the operation of weapons without meaningful human control, weapons programmed to target and kill based on pre-programmed algorithms of who is considered to pose a threat, used without consent in foreign lands or in the streets of local cities, will result in civilian casualties, psychological harm, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. That this in turn will result in a violent masculine response from affected communities, reinforcing gender inequalities and oppressions. Such understandings should have significant implications for our thinking about and approach to the development of autonomous weapons. We can think about how this kind of analysis and argumentation could help tech workers and policy experts see the need for meaningful human control over weapon systems. We can also see how autonomous weapon systems could facilitate the profiling, targeting, dehumanisation, and death of various marginalised communities and as well as activists or others confronting power. In a context where weapons are treated as tools of power, violence, and subordination of others, increasing the remoteness and abstraction of violence is not the answer. Dealing with violence and conflict as a social institution, rather than a technical challenge to be “solved” with new weapons technology, is imperative. Understanding these dimensions of both violence and technology could help contextualise our work against weapons in a broader context of social justice.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **1AC Toolbox** › 1AC – Inherency

Lethal autonomous weapons are here now- a multilateral response is necessary to prevent runaway proliferation.

Trager and Luca, 22 [Robert F. Trager and Laura M. Luca, 5-11-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Foreign Policy, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them",

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Orientalism supplements › Ballot key/ballot good

Marxism is blatantly orientalist – proves the alt fails and serves as an impact turn to the alt

Lindner 21(Kolja Lindner, KOLJA LINDNER is a lecturer (maître de conférences) in German political theory at the Université Paris 8. His research interests lie broadly in political theory and social inequality, postcolonialism, secularism, and Marx. His major publications include Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism (forthcoming), Le dernier Marx (edited, 2019), and Die Hegemoniekämpfe in Frankreich: Laizismus, politische Repräsentation und Sarkozysmus (2017).,12-1-2021, "Hegemonic Orientalism and Historical Materialism," No Publication, https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article/4/3/517/294165)//BRownRice

Said makes two criticisms of Marx. (1) According to Said, Marx advances “the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 analyses of British rule in India”2 as well as the idea of a “fundamentally lifeless Asia” (O, 154). Both notions are by this account “perfectly fitted . . . to a standard Orientalist undertaking” (O, 154)—that is, to an effort “to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (O, 3). This view was based on “Romantic and even messianic” (O, 154) sources of the kind that Said locates in Goethe's West-östlicher Diwan. (2) For Said, a contradiction arises as “Marx's moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West” (O, 154). Against the backdrop of an essentialist homogenization, Marx severely downplayed the suffering of colonized people: “They are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways” (O, 155). He reconciled condemnation and affirmation of “the human depredation introduced into [the Asiatic] system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and outright cruelty” (O, 155) through the notion of the “historical necessity” (O, 153) of a social transformation in Asia.