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2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Burden Sharing

NATO will not survive unless European states and Canada pay their fair share – history indicates that they won’t

Richter ‘16 – Associate professor of political science at the University of Windsor, in Windsor, Ontario, Canada (Andrew, Comparative Strategy, 35:4, 298-314, “Sharing the burden? U.S. allies, defense spending, and the future of NATO”, November 2, 2016, )//RG

And yet, regardless of the precise amount the United States will spend on defense in 2017 (and the years to follow), it is a certainty that it will remain the world’s largest spender for the foreseeable future, while the goal of more equitable burden sharing in the Western alliance will remain elusive. Sixty-five years of history has revealed that most European countries (and Canada) are simply not prepared to spend what is required to field and maintain highly advanced defense forces, and it does not particularly matter what the United States wants. In effect, European governments have never believed that Washington will diminish its commitment to the Western alliance, no matter how little they contribute nor how shameless they are on free riding on the United States.112 As Ted Galen Carpenter noted in a 2014 article, it appears that the only way to fundamentally change this dynamic is if the United States were to make clear by its actions—not its words—that it will no longer tolerate alliance defense free riding. That would likely mean withdrawing most (if not all) American military personnel from Europe and dramatically reducing air and naval assets on the continent.113 It would also mean ending Washington’s domination of collective defense efforts in NATO. Further, the United States would begin campaigning in favor of the establishment of a pan-European defense force.114 In effect, Washington would have to put allied countries on notice that it is no longer prepared to bear the overwhelming burden of Western defense, and there are limits to its willingness to pay for the defense of others (it might be noted that in March 2016 Republican front-runner Donald Trump made precisely this point.)115 Needless to say, the chances of this happening seem slim; for starters, the United States seems pre- pared, even given recent developments, to continue paying a significant cost both for its own and its allies’ security (in this regard, the administration announced in 2016 that it plans to quadruple U.S. military spending in Europe)116 and the constituency favoring defense spending—and the military more generally—is far larger than in Europe or Canada.117 Yet if the alliance is to survive, significant changes must be made. The key question is whether European states and Canada will make the necessary funding decisions that will permit them to field modern and capable forces in the future. Unfortunately, there are plenty of reasons for skepticism, as defense downsizing in Europe and Canada casts doubt over most allies’ ability and willingness to invest in modern capabilities. Indeed, NATO itself seems to have little influence on member states’ security calculations, and a recent proposal to “name and shame” countries that are not meeting the spending target suggests that the alliance has concluded that public embarrassment holds the best chance of encouraging states to spend more, an unmistakable sign of desperation.118 Indeed, rather than increase their defense programs, most European states and Canada are engaged in, as Hallems and Schreer have recently noted, a strategy of “strategic restraint,” which sees a reduced willingness to pay for the major defense investments necessary to protect against possible threats.119 In the author’s opinion, both Canada and Germany have grown so accustomed to low defense spending that they may be incapable of dramatic change at this point (although at least Berlin seems to have recently recognized the seriousness of the problem). As evidence, one just needs to note the array of dated military platforms that both countries operate, apparently oblivious to the risks such equipment poses both to their own crews and to the civilians in the areas they operate in. Perhaps even more importantly, however, is what the continued operation of such equipment effectively tells the United States—i.e., that both states intend to rely on Washington for their security regardless of whether the United States is pre- pared to accept this burden or not. This would appear to be a fundamental abdication of responsibility by both countries, but in the absence of popular opposition to the policies that result in such military weakness, it seems unlikely that either state will be changing its domestic spending priorities anytime soon. In sum, the growing divide in defense expenditures and capabilities between the United States and most other members of NATO has resulted in the very real possibility that the alliance may not survive. To avoid that outcome, European states and Canada need to accept the fact that a more mature and equitable defense relationship is essential; although in fairness it should be noted that this observation does not apply to the UK, which continues to take its defense seriously (as does France). Any move toward a reasonable program of burden sharing will require a change in mind-set on the part of all NATO members, as dependence on the United States is deeply embedded. The onus, though, must be on European states and Canada to demonstrate that they are serious about accepting a greater degree of responsibility for their defense. If after 67 years of American protection most NATO states are still not willing to pay a reasonable amount for their defense, then the alliance deserves to fail, in which case members will quickly realize the extent of the security bargain that they have enjoyed all these years.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc US Commitment

Even fear of declining US engagement wrecks cooperation

Kunz 2021

Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr

As discussed above, at least part of the suspicions against France’s strategic dialogue with Russia, and more broadly European strategic autonomy, arise from fears that Paris may have ambitions to ‘decouple’ European security from that of the United States. In reality, as noted above, ‘decoupling’ is not on European capitals’ agenda, and thus also not on Paris’. Yet, another aspect over which Europeans disagree is their analyses of long-term prospects for US security guarantees. The debate is consequently about whether Europe needs to start thinking about a ‘Plan B’ or whether Joe Biden’s election as US president means that risks of the United States withdrawing from or reducing its engagement for Europe are off the table. In this context, threat perception again matters tremendously. The greater the fear of Russia, the greater the fear of decoupling. Depending on the kinds of threats European capitals consider most pressing, their focus is either on expeditionary operations (terrorism) or collective territorial defense (Russia). This leads not only to considerable differences in defense planning and posture as discussed above, but also to different degrees of dependence on the United States. Unsurprisingly, therefore, how vociferously European countries place themselves in the Atlanticist camp correlates strongly with the intensity with which they perceive a Russian threat. This is not to say that France, which even in this context represents the other end of the European spectrum, does not need the United States. The two countries in fact cooperate closely at the bilateral level. For Paris, US-French cooperation is most valuable and crucial in the Sahel region in the fight against terrorism, where the United States notably provides crucial reconnaissance and surveillance to France’s counter-terrorism operation Barkhane.36 From a French perspective, this is the most important vector of transatlantic defense cooperation, as again became apparent after the 2020 US elections, when French minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly expressed her hopes of continued US engagement in that region.37 Yet, as seen from Paris, the nation’s survival is hardly dependent on the United States, as opposed to perceptions in Central and Eastern European countries where the US is ultimately considered the guarantor of the nations’ existence. Those states that perceive a threat from Russia are at the same time the most convinced Atlanticists who, in view of their situation, rely on the closest possible cooperation with the United States—and are correspondingly skeptical about stronger cooperation in the EU. On the one hand, they are afraid of prompting less US engagement. On the other hand, they want to avoid having to invest scarce resources in the CSDP, which is by definition not about territorial defense. One key question for the continent’s security is: how likely is continued US engagement? Given that US engagement will still be decided in Washington rather than in Paris, Berlin, or Warsaw, how likely is it that US administrations want to maintain US security guarantees for Europe? And how likely is it—provided they have the political will—that they will be able to do so in light of political and budgetary constraints? On this issue, views and assessments again vary across Europe. Once more, France may be considered the outlier. It is fair to argue that the French analysis on future US engagement is the most pessimistic for European security, based on two observations. First, it is often stressed in France that ‘Trumpism’ is not gone with Donald Trump and that US domestic politics will likely remain volatile.38 Second, as most recently reiterated in its 2021 Strategic Update, France expects the United States to refocus its security policies toward Asia and away from Europe, notably in light of China’s emergence as a strategic rival.39 The French take is thus both relatively traditional—after all, de Gaulle decided to acquire nuclear weapons because he deemed US security guarantees unreliable—and based on systemic factors. In most other countries, transatlantic security relations tend to be viewed in a much more ‘personalized’ manner, i.e., with much greater emphasis on the occupant of the White House without explicitly accounting for systemic factors. From such a vantage point, the years of the Trump administration are considered an anomaly. With Joe Biden’s election, and for instance his speech at the 2021 virtual edition of the Munich Security Conference in which he declared that “America is back,”40 transatlantic security relations are seen as returning to normal. Joe Biden’s accession to the US presidency has therefore already changed one key aspect of Europe’s defense debate: the question of whether or not Europe—and the EU in particular—should aspire for more strategic autonomy. With the Biden administration, the French argument that Europe needs to step up its joint defense efforts to compensate for diminished US engagement clearly seems weakened in the eyes of many.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc US Commitment

Trump’s rhetoric shook the alliance – questions regarding US commitment divide members

Robinson ’6-7 — Eric; M.P.P. in public policy, College of William & Mary; B.A. in economics, government, College of William & Mary, senior research programmer and analyst at RAND Corporation. June 7, 2022; "American politics could derail NATO’s momentum — unless leaders prepare now."; Breaking Defense; https://breakingdefense.com/2022/06/american-politics-could-derail- NATOs-momentum-unless-leaders-prepare-now/; //CYang

With an active Russian invasion on its doorstep and Finland and Sweden asking to join, NATO seems more relevant than at any point since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But, former counterterrorism official Eric Robinson warns the following op-ed, alliance leaders need to keep a wary eye on the looming danger that is American politics. It is a moment of triumph for NATO. The alliance’s main threat, the Russian military, suffered decisive defeats in the battles for Kyiv and Kharkiv in Ukraine. Furthermore, as a direct result of Russia’s invasion, both Sweden and Finland have petitioned NATO for membership. Not since the Berlin Wall fell has a component of the United States’ commitment to Europe’s security been so clearly validated. Regrettably, this remarkable state of affairs in Europe obscures the alliance’s true fragility — a vulnerability so pronounced that NATO’s current confidence could soon become a historic footnote. Internal disputes are not new to NATO, of course. Charles de Gaulle withdrew French military forces from NATO’s high command, Greece and Turkey are effectively rivals, and there is a substantial disparity in defense spending among members. These challenges pale in comparison, however, to NATO’s most critical vulnerability: American politics. In 1947, Sen. Arthur Vandenberg established a baseline for American political alignment when he stated that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” that partisan differences should be minimized in matters of national security. Republicans and Democrats alike would certainly vary in their approaches, but challenging the Soviet Union provided a degree of predictability to American foreign policy. This partisan harmony continued beyond the Cold War, extending into bipartisan support for the Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq. Then came Donald Trump, and an open hostility to America’s longstanding international practices. As a candidate, Trump articulated a deep skepticism of America’s international obligations and his arguments resonated with voters who had soured on the foreign policy establishment. His version of “America First” echoed the original America First Committee of the 1930s and 1940s: disdainful of international commitments, comfortable with authoritarian systems, and accepting moral compromises as a cost of doing business in a rough world. During his time in office, Trump did not shift his views on limiting America’s international obligations, but he never truly acted on his intuition, either. NATO remained shaken yet intact, his administration amended NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, and his team helped establish official relationships between Israel and a series of once-hostile countries. However, since Trump’s exit from office, reporting indicates that he expressed interest or actively explored going further, including wanting to withdraw military forces from Europe and end the US military commitment to the Republic of Korea, two pillars of America’s global security commitment. And notably, Trump’s former national security advisor John Bolton has specifically said he believed Trump would seek to leave NATO. The popularity of “America First” politics returns us to NATO’s critical vulnerability. If he decides to run again, Trump seems almost assured to be the GOP’s nominee for president in 2024. Recent primaries and patterns of behavior among Republicans currently in the House and Senate have shown that Trump’s hold on the GOP may not be ironclad, but he remains the leading party figure. Should Trump return to the White House, he would likely do so with a Republican House and Senate far less likely to push back on his foreign policy than during his first term in office — and as a president who will assuredly be inclined to listen to his close supporters encouraging his basest instincts.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

NATO problems are systemic – Russian unpreparedness, free-riding, Turkey

Ilan Berman 19 - Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, a non-profit dedicated to supplying expert analysis to those who make or influence U.S. foreign policy and to assisting world leaders with building democracies and market economies. (“The problems plaguing NATO,” the Hill, 12/11/2019, *modified for ableist language ) PJW

When world leaders gathered in London last week to celebrate NATO‘s 70th anniversary, they put an international spotlight on a partnership that is profoundly ailing. Seventy years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, the West’s most powerful and enduring military bloc is suffering from deep systemic dysfunctions. That all is not well in the Alliance was clear from the wrangling between President Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron, who traded recriminations ahead of the summit and pointed barbs at press-conference time. But the problems run far deeper than simple personal politics, and stem from at least two sources. Today, perhaps NATO’s most pressing challenge is the lack of a clearly-defined mission. The alliance was formed following World War II in order, as its first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, put it, to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” In the decades that followed, that formula helped transform Germany into a crucial ally and successfully deter Soviet aggression. But it more or less fell by the wayside with the collapse of the USSR, replaced by the broad objective of establishing — and then broadening — a zone of peace and stability across the European Continent, and eventually beyond. Today, NATO is once again focused on Russia, which in recent years has demonstrated that it is eager to subvert the post-World War II democratic order in Europe. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea, the alliance has significantly stepped up its military deployments around — and assistance to — Eastern Europe and the Baltic States as a means of deterring further military adventurism by Moscow. Yet, politically, the modern-day alliance isn’t necessarily united regarding the importance of that mission, or even what might be needed to accomplish it. Back in 2017, a simulated wargame carried out by the prestigious RAND Corporation think tank found NATO woefully unprepared to effectively counter a Russian land offensive against the Baltics — and warned that its defenses would collapse within 36 to 60 hours of a Russian invasion. Some two-and-a-half years on, little has changed. Earlier this fall, outgoing Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford told Newsweek that “the NATO advantage over a resurgent Russia has eroded,” and that the alliance was losing its edge in strategic competition with an increasingly technologically advanced, militarily capable and politically aggressive Kremlin. NATO leaders, meanwhile, don’t appear uniformly committed to fixing the problem. Just weeks before the London gathering, President Macron made global headlines when he argued forcefully in an interview with The Economist that Europe needed to rethink its approach to Russia — despite the fact that the Kremlin hasn’t done much to warrant the lifting of sanctions that had been leveled by the EU back in 2014 in response to its invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, President Trump’s calls for greater military contributions from member states as a way of shoring up the alliance’s strategic capabilities have been met with much political resistance and, at least so far, too little substantive movement. As of mid-2019, according to official NATO estimates, the median defense expenditures among the alliance’s 28 member states was a paltry 1.63 percent of national GDP, and just eight countries — the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the U.K., Romania, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania — were spending more than the recommended 2 percent of GDP annually on defense. The difficulties don’t end there, however. NATO also suffers from serious internal friction. Alliances, they say, limp [move] along at the pace of their most grudging member, and today NATO’s most recalcitrant participant is unquestionably Turkey. Over the past decade and a half, the country that once served as the bloc’s southeastern flank and its geopolitical outpost in the Middle East has become a less-than-reliable strategic ally. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party, Turkey has trended in a distinctly anti-Western direction. Although officials in Ankara still pay lip service to their country’s longstanding goal of joining Europe, the actions taken by Erdogan’s government in recent years — from the acquisition of advanced Russian air defenses against NATO’s urging to its permissive attitude toward regional extremists — have given decidedly different indications. Indeed, just a week before the NATO summit in London, Turkey effectively held the alliance hostage when it refused to endorse a plan to bolster defense of the Baltics unless it got more backing from Europe for its recent invasion and occupation of Syria. It subsequently moderated its stance as a result of international pressure. In the process, though, it injected still more doubt into the notion that it remains a committed member of the NATO coalition. All of this matters a great deal for the future of the alliance. NATO’s London summit closed with a communique that painted a decidedly rosy picture of the organization’s health, and spent precious little time discussing the real systemic problems now facing the world’s most important military bloc. That’s a real shame, because until NATO can clearly, unequivocally begin to address its own shortcomings, the state of its union cannot truly be strong.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

NATO members have radically different perspectives on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that are unlikely to be resolved easily

Fakhurdinova et al. ‘22 - Marianna Fakhurdinova is a research fellow at the New Europe Center, Nadiia Koval is head of information and analytics at the Ukrainian Institute, Volodymyr Kulyk in a head research fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Mykola Riabchuk is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kateryna Zarembo is a senior lecturer at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv, Ukraine (The Washington Post, “Experts from NATO countries disagree on how to approach Ukraine”, January 26, 2022, )//RG

NATO members in Europe have begun deploying ships and fighter planes to Eastern Europe, a move NATO officials say is aimed at “reinforcing Allied deterrence and defense as Russia continues its military buildup in and around Ukraine.” But are NATO allies in agreement on the Russia-Ukraine crisis? Last week, President Biden appeared to signal disagreement between the United States and its European allies on a potential response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. Top U.S. officials have since worked to clean up the president’s remarks and vowed a “united” response. Our research, however, found that scholars and policy analysts in NATO countries have radically different understandings of developments in Ukraine after Russia’s 2014 intervention in Crimea and the Donbas. Some of these differences reflect cultural conventions and perceived national interests. Other key factors include how different authors view the concept of “justice” — whether its source is international law, or history and identity. These differences, in turn, create very different perspectives over what might be the optimal combination of deterrence and appeasement in Western responses to Russian actions. Not one narrative, but many We studied how Western scholars and policy analysts made sense of the conflict in and around Ukraine by closely examining their publications over a six-year period after the invasion of Crimea. How did they attribute responsibility for the ongoing conflict — and how did they propose to resolve it? After reviewing a total of 1,009 publications from the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Greece and Poland, we identified six different narratives about the nature of this conflict and possible solutions. Will deterrence counter Russian aggression? The first narrative — dominant in Poland, prevalent among U.S. and British authors, and popular with some analysts in France and Germany — calls out unprovoked Russian aggression and advocates for deterrent measures. This view holds Moscow responsible for the violation of international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty. Appropriate responses, for those with this view, include intensifying Western efforts to counter the aggression, tougher sanctions on Russia, more aid to Ukraine, and greater support for its democracy and European integration. Or would appeasement be a better option? The second narrative — popular in France and Germany and prominent among U.S. realists who view Ukraine as marginal to American interests — tries to reconcile Russia’s aggression with a preference for dialogue with an essential global power. While the first narrative defends the rules-based order, the second shifts the focus to interests. The proposed dialogue can include different compromises with Moscow at Ukraine’s expense such as ditching Kyiv’s NATO membership agenda and reducing Ukraine’s control of parts of its territory to purely nominal. A third narrative — one popular among academics and policy analysts in France and Italy, as well as Greece — presents Russia’s actions as a legitimate response to a perceived threat from Western encroachment into its traditional sphere of influence — and/or to irresponsible policies pursued by Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan government. In this view, the West and Ukraine — not Russia — are primarily responsible for the conflict, and this justifies significant concessions to Moscow that boil down to the recognition of Ukraine’s “limited sovereignty.” The fourth narrative — prevalent in Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy — blames the Ukrainian government for developments in Crimea and the Donbas, citing irreconcilable identity differences between Kyiv and/or western Ukraine, on the one hand, and the eastern and southern regions, on the other. This view portrays the West as complicit in Ukraine’s wrongdoings, but plays down Russia’s participation. To these analysts, the West can normalize relations with Moscow by pressuring Ukraine to change official policies — for instance, on regional autonomy for the Donbas and an official status for the Russian language. A fifth narrative — also popular primarily in Italy and Greece — holds Russia and the West jointly responsible for the situation in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. To these scholars and analysts, Ukraine’s own preferences are of little importance, as the country is merely the battlefield between Russia and the West. Ending the conflict requires renegotiating the world order, including regional security arrangements. A sixth and final narrative among some analysts in the United States and Europe takes a neutral stance, and proposes no overarching solutions. It focuses instead on narrower policy questions like sanitation or child trafficking that have arisen during the conflict, and how dialogue of all parties is essential to end to the suffering of the affected populations. Different experiences lead to different conclusions Where a country sits historically and geographically says a lot about where its foreign policy establishment and where policy analysts and academics stand on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. For instance, the strong tendency in Poland to blame Russian aggression and urge deterrence reflects both the country’s historical experience with Russia, and its position as a front-line state. This view is also widely held in Britain, in line with its government’s strong deterrence stance against Putin’s Russia. By contrast, French policy analysts and academics are more likely to see cooperation with Russia as an opportunity to weaken U.S. influence and increase France’s political weight in Europe. While recognizing Russian aggression, they thus prefer the West to continue dialogue with Russia and compromise at Ukraine’s expense. Russia’s long cultural presence in France also helps shape another prominent view among French analysts and academics: that Russian actions are a legitimate response to a perceived Western threat. In Italy, a lack of preoccupation with Ukraine in the academic and think tank community mirrors a lack of interest in Ukraine on the part of political elites. The two predominant narratives include justifying the Russian aggression by pointing out the historical ties between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and viewing Ukraine as an object of geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia. What these findings suggest is that Western scholars and analysts, just like Western policymakers, remain divided on how to respond to Moscow’s aggressive behavior. Should the West try to deter Russia, risking some imminent instability but maintaining the established order in the long run; or try to appease Russia and deal with any repercussions as they arise? With the new escalation of conflict, these differences within NATO allies have become particularly acute and are unlikely to be resolved easily — a fact Russia may be counting on.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

Divergent threats and priorities undermine cohesion

Wallander ’18 — Celeste; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. July-August 2018; “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance”; Foreign Affairs, Volume 97, Number 4; ; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

As if on cue, border disputes and simmering ethnic conflicts in eastern Europe began to threaten the peace almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. And with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, they ultimately broke it. In the face of these challenges, NATO sought to leverage the desire for membership to encourage political reforms by requiring that new members meet its standards for good governance. This decision was based on the belief that liberal institutions, practices, and values would prevent a return to the nationalist, nativist, extremist, and intolerant dynamics that had driven destructive conflicts in Europe for centuries. To foster security within Europe, NATO required that new members leave autocratic practices behind. Fulfilling these requirements was often politically contentious, and aspiring members did not always succeed. Countries that had spent decades under authoritarian communist rule had to root out the lingering influence of intelligence agencies, overturn politicized control of the military in favor of apolitical professional defense forces, establish legislative oversight for military procurement, and implement personnel policies that would combat corruption. All of that has taken time: Montenegro set the goal of achieving membership in 2007 but had to wait ten more years to earn admission. And mere aspiration is not enough: Bosnia, for example, has yet to fulfill the criteria that the alliance set in 2010 for the country to be granted the Membership Action Plan, a procedural precursor to joining. These requirements may have slowed the process of NATO's expansion, but liberal institutions and practices are central to creating security and trust among Europe's diverse societies. Anything less would have weakened the alliance instead of strengthening it. Beyond its stabilizing effect on the broader continent, there is another reason NATO's liberal democratic character came to matter: in the absence of a shared external threat, the binding force of liberal democratic values and institutions has become essential to the alliance's effectiveness. NATO's ability to conduct security operations depends on its political cohesion as much as its members' military capabilities. Few question NATO's cohesion when Article 5 of its founding treaty is invoked — that is, when an ally is directly attacked. Common external threats generate unified responses. After 9/11, for example, NATO members quickly joined the U.S. campaign against Taliban — ruled Afghanistan. However, when the alliance faces a security issue that does not invoke Article 5, alliance cohesion is less certain because members have different priorities that guide their cost-benefit calculations. In such cases, liberal commitment to the rule of law has played an important role. The alliance has proved cohesive when acting outside Europe and when the stakes are well grounded in international law, as was the case during its 2011 intervention in Libya, which was backed by a un Security Council resolution. In other instances, when the alliance has faced more diffuse and contested security challenges, a common commitment to liberal democratic values has proved even more essential to maintaining cohesion. Consider the Balkans: in 1995, NATO conducted Operation DelibeForce to protect un safe areas in Bosnia that had come under attack from ethnic Serbian armed groups. And in 1999, it conducted another air operation against the armed forces of what remained of Yugoslavia to prevent military attacks on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In both campaigns, Article 5 did not apply because no NATO member had been directly attacked. Nor was the alliance acting under a un Security Council resolution. These interventions tested the alliance's political capacity, but ultimately, members coalesced around their common commitment to human rights, a principle that would be- come enshrined in international law in 2005 as "the responsibility to protect" (or R2P). The alliance's ability to prevent mass atrocities in non-NATO states was thus as much a product of its members' values as it was a product of their military assets By contrast, when democratic values and institutions have cut in the opposite direction, the alliance has been divided. Compare NATO's interventions in the Balkan wars to its disunity over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although the Bush administration contended that Iraq threatened global security by pursuing weapons of mass destruction (an area of international law far better established than R2P), NATO was far from unified on the matter. In fact, France and Germany were among the most vocal critics of the invasion. Although NATO's interventions in the Balkans had been legally problematic, the allies were still united in pursuing them because of their shared commitment to human rights. But when it came to Iraq, without a justification rooted in liberalism, not all of them were willing to support an intervention beyond the purview of Article 5.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

Threat perception debate has toxified the alliance

Kunz 2021

Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr

It would, however, be erroneous to solely limit the analysis of disagreements among NATO members to the actions of Turkey as the current ‘problematic ally.’ Even Western European Allies sometimes hold positions that are incompatible with each other. Key disagreements pertain to threat perception and hence defense priorities as well as to the likelihood of continued US security guarantees. These disagreements run deep—sometimes so deep that they are not always visible at the surface level of every-day policy issues. Yet, they clearly shape positions, as a closer look at the ongoing European defense debate reveals. In past years, many important aspects of this debate revolved around the notion of European strategic autonomy. Long known and used in a French national context,14 the 2016 European Union Global Strategy lifted “strategic autonomy” to the European level. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not provide a concise definition of the notion’s content or implication.15 The ensuing and at times heated debate among Europeans was not particularly enlightening at the conceptual level and is today considered in need of being “detoxified.”16 Yet, the debate has offered many meta-level insights into the various national approaches to European security and defense. Two variables are key in this context: threat perception and assessments of the likely future of US security guarantees for Europe. Threat perception is an absolute classic in European defense debates: the question of against what or whom Europe needs to be defended. Diverging threat perceptions translate into different and even incompatible views on what policies the Alliance should adopt regarding certain key issues, notably in its relationship with Russia as the single most important issue for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century. Moreover, given that threat perception requires translation into defense planning, this is also a debate about allocating capabilities and defining priorities in light of scarce resources. Most important in the context of threat perception is how Europeans should deal with Russia, notably in a wider vision of Euro-Atlantic security. The second variable pertains to the United States and its engagement in European security. Here, the key question is that of the mid- and long-term reliability of US security guarantees and the conclusions Europeans need to draw for their own security cooperation, which, in turn, has ramifications for NATO. In both the EU and NATO contexts, as well as at national levels, Europeans have in recent years acknowledged on numerous occasions that their security environment is deteriorating. The conclusions drawn from this observation, as well as how to explain its causes, however, vary widely across the continent.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

European threat perception differences make compromise impossible

Kunz 2021

Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr

The principal factor explaining divergences among European nations is threat perception. Enumerations of threats and risks in various national strategy documents certainly look very similar at first glance, just as Europeans regularly manage to agree on listings of threats and challenges in joint documents such as the 2016 European Union Global Strategy or NATO Summit Declarations. However, divergences pertain to the prioritization and urgency of these threats. In light of scarce resources, in particular in smaller European countries, it seems almost self-evident that a genuine 360-degree approach taking into account all threats that would backed up by actual defense planning and allocated resources is hardly feasible. The usual enumerations are therefore primarily a rhetorical compromise and mere juxtapositions of threats that say little about actual prioritization. In reality, European states hold very different views on what priorities should be and what both national and multinational defense planning and procurement should focus on. While this categorization obviously lacks sophistication, European states can roughly be divided into two ideal-typical camps. The first one is composed of those countries that consider Russia the main threat to the continent’s security. This first group primarily consists of the northern and eastern European countries, i.e., the so-called Eastern flank. Germany also belongs to this group, at least on paper (as illustrated, for example, by the 2018 Conception of the Bundeswehr which switched the official focus back to territorial defense17), although concerns about Russia are much less pronounced there than, for example, in the Baltic states or in Poland. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are part of it, too. The second camp looks primarily to the south and sees the greatest challenges in (Islamist) terrorism, inter alia resulting in high levels of political instability in regions such as West Africa. The most prominent representative of this camp is undoubtedly France, but Italy and Spain also share many of the French views.18 These two main categories of threats—Russia and terrorism—are the most relevant dividing line in Europe’s defense debate. Transnational threats such as climate change or the risk of pandemics are also part of contemporary discourses but are less controversial. The key explanation for this is the fact that primarily the former two require translation into capability requirements in defense planning (such as the NATO Defense Planning Process, NDPP) and thus the allocation of (considerable) means and prioritizations in acquisition decisions. In comparison, the actual military and defense planning implications of, for example, climate change are negligible. Russia and terrorism as main threats, in turn, clearly shape defense planning, military policies, and procurement decisions. They also shape attitudes and expectations vis-à-vis NATO and the EU’s defense activities within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Europeans themselves are increasingly aware of these divergences in threat perception and the problems they cause. It is for this reason that the European Union’s latest strategy process, the Strategic Compass (launched under the German EU presidency during the second half of 2020 and due to be completed under the French presidency during the first half of 2022)19 started with a first phase on threat assessment. The result is an unpublished report based on input from EU member states’ intelligence agencies (and not governments, in order to ‘depoliticize’ the document) that details the threats and challenges the EU will likely face in the five to ten years to come. Yet, because threat perceptions are at the heart of defense policies and are not suitable for compromise, it seems unlikely that the Strategic Compass—or any other strategy process or document—will truly overcome intra-European divides that are structural in nature.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Threat Perception

Diverging threat perception makes it impossible to create joint policies or allocate resources

Kunz 2021

Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr

US security guarantees for Europe. Threat perception is an absolute classic in European defense debates: the question of against what or whom Europe needs to be defended. Diverging threat perceptions translate into different and even incompatible views on what policies the Alliance should adopt regarding certain key issues, notably in its relationship with Russia as the single most important issue for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century. Moreover, given that threat perception requires translation into defense planning, this is also a debate about allocating capabilities and defining priorities in light of scarce resources. Most important in the context of threat perception is how Europeans should deal with Russia, notably in a wider vision of Euro-Atlantic security.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Democratic Backsliding

Rising populism will only continue to exacerbate divides among member states

Bazin ’18 — Aaron; Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group, U.S. Special Operations Command. January-February 2018; "An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO"; Army University Press; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/; //CYang

Political and economic factors. The group of political and economic factors points to the risks of severe disagreements among the allies, which could lead to the weakening of the transatlantic bond, disintegration tendencies within the European Union, or even withdrawal of a NATO nation from the Alliance. At the level of political elites, the participants identified the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations among the most probable causes of weakening alliance cohesion in the future. Particularly, populist leaders who prefer narrow, short-term political gains at home and who are prepared to “undermine an international institution to gain consensus internally” represent a serious threat to multilateralism, on which the Alliance has depended. Oftentimes, national leaders “use NATO as a scapegoat for their domestic political games,” while “NATO does not [and cannot] fight its own nations.” At the level of domestic population, the support for the Alliance in member states can decline due to NATO’s unclear purpose. This could become an acute problem, especially if national leaders continue to frame security problems exclusively in domestic terms instead of treating them as NATO-wide. Particularly, concerns over sovereignty could override the relative value of the Alliance’s collective good and make governments pull limited funds away from NATO. In a similar vein, demographic shifts changing the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of nations, such as an aging population and migration, will drive differences in fiscal priorities, which could result in decreasing national defense spending. Furthermore, if the free-riding behavior reaches critical proportions within NATO burden sharing, it can create, out of those who bear their fair share, a group of allies disinterested in defending free-riding nations, as they could cease to see “return on their investment.”

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Democratic Backsliding

No cohesion — the alliance is more fractured than it’s ever been.

van Dijk & Sloan ’20 — Ruud van Dijk is the coordi NATOr of the BA and MA programs in the history of international relations at the University of Amsterdam. Stanley R. Sloan is Visiting Scholar in Political Science at Middlebury College, Vermont and a Non-resident Senior Fellow in the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States. September 28, 2020; "NATO’s inherent dilemma: strategic imperatives vs. value foundations"; Journal of Strategic Studies; Volume 43, Issue 6-7; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

It has been clear since NATO’s founding that what the alliance purports to stand for and what certain member states practice, do not always fully align. It has certainly not been lost on those skeptical of or hostile to the alliance — within or without — that authoritarian regimes have come to power in several member states and that they have begun to erode, if not outright contradict, many of the core principles NATO was designed to defend and promote. At the same time, some of the member states in question remain of crucial importance to the alliance’s security interests. From the beginning in 1949, when treaty values and strategic imperatives have been conflicted, the strategic imperatives have almost always, albeit temporarily on an ‘exceptional’ basis, taken precedence over the values. In the beginning, the dominance of strategic considerations over values was demonstrated when Portugal, under its autocratic regime, was invited to sign the treaty. Its Azores airfields would have been critical to American reinforcement of NATO forces in wartime. However, value-based opposition from European founding members blocked dictator Francisco Franco’s Spain, despite strongly-held views of U.S. Se NATOrs, including leading NATO skeptic Robert Taft, who thought military resources of Spain and Germany would add importantly to NATO’s defenses against the Soviet Union. The point was recorded in Senate Resolution 99 when it passed the Senate in 1951.4 While not new, these tensions today are greater than at few other times in NATO’s history. In our view, they could become an existential threat. This essay focuses particularly on Turkey’s drift away from secular democracy as a contemporary threat. But it is not the only worrying development observed in the politics of NATO states over the past decade. The growth of European radical right populist parties was stimulated in part by the tragic flood of refugees from the south and the fear that not only terrorism, but different racial, linguistic, and ideological challenges would come with the immigrants. Moreover, even the United States and the United Kingdom got caught up in radical right temptations, with Brexit resulting in Britain and Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States. NATO’s military-strategic mission and its role as a stabilising force in international politics ultimately depend on the political cohesion of the alliance and on the credibility of its fundamental principles. An alliance that lacks a common political purpose will also differ on the threats faced by member states, and as a result fail to organise an effective defense. Drifting too far from core principles will render hollow the language in Article 2, where member states pledge to ‘contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded … ’.5 Those of us who believe the alliance can perform a useful role in the world of the twenty-first century and who take the fundamental principles from the preamble and the treaty seriously, need to think hard about the consequences of NATO, through the actions of important member states, not practicing what it preaches.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 1nc Laundry List

NATO is falling apart – political divides, US military dependence, disorganized command structure, and ineffective war planning mean it won’t be fixed

Lucas ‘22 – Nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist, and the author, most recently, of Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet (Edward, Foreign Policy, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date”, June 7, 2022, )//RG

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making? Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.” Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.” The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia. Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint. Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork. The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarters split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy. A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat. To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin. Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now. NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died. But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms. The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 2nc AT Fiat Solves

Fiat is a neg warrant — the process will make the outcome fail.

Hill ’20 — Steven; Director of Research at Research England and formerly Head of Research Policy at the Higher Education Funding Council. April 27, 2020; “AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO?”; AJIL Unbound, Volume 114; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

While the use of AI in both these contexts could potentially increase the speed and quality of multinational military cooperation, it clearly also can pose difficulties. For example, increasing speed could be perceived as fueling pressure for inappropriately accelerated action. This kind of acceleration of usual processes might be perceived as going against “normal” NATO decision-making in a number of ways: it might be seen as evading the political control exercised by the North Atlantic Council, overriding the consensus decision-making that applied within the Alliance, being susceptible to misinterpretation or being seen as escalatory in nature, or otherwise leading to unpredictable results. In an extreme case, Allies might see these situations as inconsistent with NATO’s collective defense mandate. This might result in a backlash against the use of AI-enabled military applications, precisely at a time when the Alliance needs to maintain an edge with them. In other words, as with many issues involved in multinational military cooperation, the problem may ultimately boil down to one of trust.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 2nc AT US Solves

US pressure is a neg warrant — it makes consensus LESS likely.

Michel ’14 — Leo; Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and M.A. Degree from The Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. “NATO Decision-Making: The ‘Consensus Rule’ Endures Despite Challenges”; NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The Secretary General aids consensus-building through informal discussions at NATO headquarters with individual allies or groups of allies. He also can influence alliance deliberations through his public statements, private meetings, and correspondence with senior officials, legislators, or opinion leaders of allied governments (see Mayer and Theiler and Hendrickson, this volume).3 However, the Secretary General and other NATO officials cannot overrule an ally’s position. Indeed, any perceived effort by the Secretary General or other NATO officials to run roughshod over any ally’s objections is apt to provoke sympathetic objections from other allied representatives, since the latter are wary of any precedent that could diminish their future prerogatives.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 2nc AT Countries Abstain

No, they won’t.

Binnendijk & Kugler ’03 — Hans Binnedijk; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Richard Kugler; Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. October 2003; “Dual-Track Transformation for NATO”; Defense Horizons, Number 35; ; //CYang

NATO has finessing mechanisms that can help circumvent the unanimity rule on occasion, but all of them are thin reeds to rely upon in today’s world. One such mechanism is the “silence procedure,” whereby a member who disagrees with a widespread consensus chooses to abstain from voting, thereby allowing the consensus to carry the day. Another mechanism is to shift decisionmaking from the NAC to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). This allows NATO to make decisions without France, which belongs to the NAC but not the DPC. A third mechanism is for the Secretary General to claim to speak for a unanimous consensus without taking a formal vote. This mechanism was employed in the Kosovo war and helped enable NATO to conduct military operations even though some members had misgivings. A fourth mechanism is that SACEUR and other commanders can prepare informal defense plans.

The problem with these finessing mechanisms is that they only work sometimes and can easily be overturned by a small number of members intent on having their way. Such members can refuse to stay silent, can insist the NAC be used, can deny the Secretary General the authority to speak for NATO, and can block military commanders from planning informally.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 2nc Consensus Fails

Allies will bring up unrelated disputes.

Burns & Lute ’19 — Nicholas Burns; Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Douglas Lute; Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. February 2019; “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; ; //CYang

A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with a NATO partner who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 This practice erodes Alliance cohesion and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 2nc Consensus Fails

Consensus-based decision-making fails — it’s outdated.

Kupchan ’10 — Charles; Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. May 1, 2010; “NATO’s Final Frontier”; Foreign Affairs; [edited for ableist language] ; //CYang

In this respect, NATO needs to address its outmoded reliance on decision-making by consensus, which could become a recipe for paralysis [inaction]. Precisely because its member states have such a wide array of interests, fears, and capabilities, the alliance is more likely to take effective and timely action through coalitions of the willing, not by unanimous consent. For the same reason, provisions may be necessary to isolate or suspend the privileges of recalcitrant members. Accordingly, NATO should move toward a more flexible system of decision-making. Russian membership would help drive home the importance of updating NATO's institutions and decision-making procedures.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Consensus/Say “No” › 1nc Consensus Fails

Consensus requirement wrecks solvency — waters down the aff’s mandate — consensus directly trades off with effectiveness!

Bazin ’18 — Aaron; Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group, U.S. Special Operations Command. January-February 2018; "An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO"; Army University Press; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/; //CYang

Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align. Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up. Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Hungary Spoils

Hungary will not change course, even with NATO pressure.

Deni ’20 — John; Ph.D., is a research professor of JIIM security studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College and the author of “NATO and Article 5.” April 30, 2020; "NATO punishment won’t make Hungary’s dictator change course"; TheHill; [edited for ableist language] https://thehill.com/opinion/international/494433- NATO-punishment-wont-make-hungarys-dictator-change-course/; //CYang

More tangibly, recently improved ties between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Orban’s government present other serious problems. At best, they weaken NATO’s united front toward Russia over its actions in Ukraine; at worst, they represent a potentially grave security risk.

The alliance’s reluctance to do much over Hungary stems from several factors. First, the NATO treaty has no provisions for sanctioning, punishing or expelling a member state. Individual member states may decide to withdraw from the alliance, but neither NATO nor any other country can force them to do so.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Hungary Spoils

Here’s comparative evidence — NATO’s biggest threat is internal backsliding & Orban.

Bergmann & Cicarelli ’20 — Max Bergmann is Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is Research and Program Associate at the Center for American Progress. August 17, 2020; "Why Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding Should Prompt NATO To Act"; Center for American Progress; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/hungarys-democratic-backsliding-prompt- NATO-act/; //CYang

Hungary’s democratic backsliding and increasingly nationalist rhetoric threatens the stability of the alliance. NATO needs to respond.

On June 6, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Órban visited a small town on the Hungarian-Slovak border to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The agreement, signed in the wake of World War I, dramatically shrunk Hungary’s territory from its Austro-Hungarian empire borders, resulting in Hungary ceding two-thirds of its territory and leaving sizable populations of ethnic Hungarians outside of the new boundaries. In his speech, which was imbued with nationalist resentment, Órban described every Hungarian child inside and outside of the country’s borders as a “guard post” to protect national identity. Additionally, he boasted about the speed at which Hungary has increased defense spending and built “a new army,” proclaiming, “We haven’t been this strong in a hundred years.”