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2022 Michigan Kritik
K — Quantum › 1NC – Shell

The observer effect creates erroneous predictions in foreign policy. A quantum approach halts these false alarms.

Favour Obi-Okolie 14, Delta State University, Abraka Delta State, Nigeria, 2014, “Towards A Quantum Mechanical Model of Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, Vol.27, 2014.

Uncertainty, as noted earlier, is one of the key features of quantum mechanics. It holds that no matter how carefully we observe, even with adequate knowledge of initial conditions, we can never objectively understand a physical reality. Applying the concept to politics, Cioffi-Revilla defines uncertainty as the “lack of sureness or absence of strict determination in political life”44 Rathbun furthers that “information is ambiguous because the world is complex and can only be approximated and partially understood due to cognitive limitations.”45 He therefore sought to explain the element of uncertainty within mainstream IR theories. For realists, it is experienced in fear of each other’s intention, while rationalists try to cope with uncertainty through international institutions charged to monitor and signal benign intent. For constructivists, uncertainty stems from an assumption that states are uncertain about action to take when norms as defined by identity are absent. Then cognitivists argue that uncertainty emanates from the confusion caused by the complexity of international politics as well as mental limitations of statesmen. 46 Assessing uncertainty from the quantum mechanical framework, we begin with Heisenberg who is arguably the first to introduce the principle. From his perspective, we cannot completely describe an object since we cannot simultaneously describe its momentum and position with exactitude. The more accurately we understand position, the less accurately we understand the momentum, vice versa. As such, it becomes impossible to predict the destination of a moving object since we cannot accurately determine its position and momentum at the same time. From quantum mechanical thought, this is may be due to hidden variables and/or non-locality. Non-locality describes the possibility of a quantum state to interact with another quantum state of the same pair, even when separated by large distances without an established means of communication. By position we refer to the location of an object relative to a reference point while momentum is taken to mean the measure of the motion of an object relative to its mass and velocity. Position in theoretical physics is synonymous with the condition of a State prior to an action or event being analysed. By condition we mean the geographic and politico-economic structure of a State. In the same vein, the foreign policy action of a State in a given case, accounts for momentum in physics. Therefore, by directly applying Heisenberg’s argument to foreign policy analysis, it is impossible to completely understand foreign policy behaviour of a State by merely understanding its condition prior to the behaviour being analysed. Also, it is impossible to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour. This explains why despite efforts to predict the outcome of a given foreign policy behaviour, mainstream approaches to foreign policy analysis have routinely fallen short in this regard. A good example showing the compatibility of Heisenberg’s uncertainty in foreign policy analysis could be found in the recent Arab Spring. An understanding of the socio-political landscape of the Arab world had led scholars of different schools to conclude that democracy was essentially incompatible with the Arab world. However, at the outbreak of the region-wide uprising, scholars began to foretell democratization. Soon, scholars began to make reversals in their predictions, such that it is no longer fashionable to equate the Arab uprising with democratization. What is deducible from this instance is that, in agreement with Heisenberg’s uncertainty, it is impossible to understand the present and predict the future by simply understanding initial conditions. This position is also understood by recalling that whereas the Cold War engaged IR scholars in a war of paradigms, none of the theories and models predicted the end of the conflict.47 Schrodinger’s wave equation furthers our understanding of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with foreign policy analysis. Inferring from his postulation, it is impossible to understand the totality of a State’s foreign policy behaviour. Rather, every State possesses every possible theoretical element that can be attributed to a State’s foreign policy. For instance, before observation is made, every state is weak and strong at the same time; aggressive and accommodating; cooperative and competitive. However, upon observation, the observer interferes with reality such that the condition of the State aligns with the premonition of the observer/analyst. Thus, we are uncertain of a State’s foreign policy behaviour until we decide to observe and/or analyse. Upon analysis, our uncertainty is substituted by the ‘creation’ of reality. It is at this point therefore that the foreign policy analyst relinquishes every claim to objectivity, having created the reality s/he claims to analyse. Relating the foregoing to Bohr’s contribution to Quantum Mechanics, the foreign policy analyst can no longer be regarded as an impartial observer but as an active participant. The instrument with which s/he assesses a phenomenon directly interacts with the physical object being observed to influence the result obtained. Consequently, we could safely assume that if no one was observing, then nothing would be existing. Then, should we now assume that occurrences in international politics are the creation of analysts? To a large extent, the answer weighs to the affirmative and accounts for why certain state and non-state actors, cognizant of this fact, have immensely invested towards gaining the attention of observers/analysts. Terrorist organizations routinely post videos of violence on the internet for analysts to ‘create’ their existence. States regularly release videos and images of military drills and military hardware. The essence is to gain attention of analysts who would therefore ‘create’ the desired reality. Indeed, terrorism is non-existent until it is so designated by analysts. More so, war is simply what analysts and observers make of it. In addition to the foregoing, quantum mechanics gives us insight in understanding causation. This is chiefly in its notion of interconnectedness which carries potentially far-reaching implications for foreign policy analysis. According to Senge, et al, we are now aware that interconnectivity is the organizing principle of the universe.48 The universe is interconnected in a complex web or relationships such that we cannot adequately understand a physical reality without acknowledging its web of relationships. However, this aspect of the universe was ignored by the Newtonian scientists perhaps as a result of the pervasiveness of relationships which can sometimes fade into the background so that “only the apparently separate ‘things’ of the world are noticed.”49 If objects are interconnected within the universe, do we then assume same for humans and States? Of course, yes. This is largely because humans as well as States share the same feature with all other objects: wave-particle duality. As particles they have form, boundaries, and identity while as wave, they possess an unstructured potential which, according to Zohar, spreads out across the boundaries of space, time, choice and identity.50 Therefore, State and non-State actors, as applicable to other objects, are interconnected or better still entangled in a complex manner that makes it particularly tasking if not impossible to accurately assess foreign policy behaviour. From the foregoing, it could be assumed that quantum mechanics emphasizes what we cannot do over what we can do. How does it then help our understanding of foreign policy? The answer is not far-fetched. By identifying what we cannot do, quantum mechanics saves us from raising false alarms and making erroneous claims. It rather makes case for intellectual diligence by encouraging cross-paradigmatic approach to foreign policy analysis. It underscores that no single theory or approach to foreign policy analysis is on its own adequate for foreign policy analysis. Thus, by engaging all possible approaches, the analyst increases the proportion of objectivity in his/her analysis.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K — Quantum › 1NC – Shell

The alternative is quantum holography. That challenges the tautological ontology of the Newtonian narrative.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

Despite its name, International Relations (IR) has long been predicated on a Newtonian substantialist ontology of things, rather than an ontology of relations, which are “the important missing dimension in most theories of IR” (Wight, 2006: 296). In recent years, IR’s “deep Newtonian slumber” (Ruggie, 1998: 194) has been disturbed by a “relational turn” (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Kavalski, 2018; McClurg and Young, 2011; Neumann, 2013; Nexon, 2010; Nordin et al., 2019; Nordin and Smith, 2018; Qin, 2018; Shih, 2016; Trownsell et al., 2019). Challenging two versions of Newtonian substantialism: atomism (individualism) and structuralism (structuralistsubstantialism) (Zanotti, 2017; see also Wendt, 1999: 26), the gist of this turn is that the fundamental reality is not independent things, but relations. Focusing on “a relation between entities” (Jackson and Nexon, 2019: 584–585, emphases in original), the relational scholarship also departs from the agent-structure and level-of-analysis debates. Yet, despite this significant and welcome development, IR’s relational turn suffers several drawbacks. First, it lacks a clear conception of relations/relationality beyond often tautological definitions. Second, insisting on the temporal priority of relations over entities, much of the literature sidesteps an implicit “chicken-egg” dilemma between entities and relations. Further and more importantly, the relational turn has not yet seriously engaged with another important development in the social sciences in general and IR in particular, namely, the “quantum turn” (Keeley, 2007; Wendt, 2015), or according to Der Derian and Wendt (2020), a permanent quantum revolution. This neglect is both surprising and lamentable. Both turns share an anti-Newtonian stand, and as a “momentous shift in metaphysical outlook” (Seager, 2018: 5), quantum mechanics espouses a doctrine of relational holism “in an all pervasive way” (Teller, 1986: 71), which would make quantum theory a valuable source in IR’s relational quest. To be fair, at least in the IR context the neglect seems mutual. With few exceptions and some general references to relational ontology (e.g. Wendt, 2015; Fierke, 2017; Zanotti, 2017), the burgeoning quantum turn literature in IR has not focused extensively on relations either. Wendt’s pioneering work on quantum theory, for example, is driven primarily by the need to “reconcile consciousness and meaning with the material world” (Wendt, 2006: 218), though he acknowledges that quantum mechanics’ holistic and relational contribution is “a thematic that needs to be developed down the road” (Wendt, 2015: 35). Therefore, the gap between these two turns in IR calls for an explicit quantum relational perspective. This is what this article sets out to do, by offering, more specifically, a quantum holographic approach. The basic notion of holography is that an “object” is “part of the whole while it simultaneously contains the whole” (Van Daele, 2018: 651, emphases added).1 In quantum theory, the holographic principle promises a solution to the well-known tensions between atomic-level quantum physics and Albert Einstein’s planet-level theory of gravity by suggesting that the universe is a holographic projection: what appears on the surface (event horizon) of a black hole is encoded information about what is inside, “just as a two-dimensional hologram encodes a three-dimensional image” (Merali, 2013: 517). So far still largely alien to this field (few exceptions include Pan, 2018; Wendt, 2015), quantum holography adds value to IR in several important ways. First, as a specific form of relationality, quantum holography helps mitigate the existing definitional vagueness about relations. Second, instead of asserting relations’ priority over entities, quantum holography accentuates the ontological duality of relations and things. Avoiding the ontological chickenegg dilemma over which comes first, the duality proposition suggests that relations do not exist either before or after things; rather, relations are from the outset implicated or embodied in things. Relations-in-things are implicate relations that can be better understood through quantum mechanics, whereas things-in-relations (and relations-between-things) represent more classical understandings of relations as something external, compositional, and derivative. Third, quantum holography provides a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of relations, including whole-part relations and internal relations, which have not been adequately theorized in IR. Furthermore, its differentiation between explicate and implicate relations enables us to incorporate mainstream IR’s Newtonian ontology as a limiting case in a broader quantum relational ontology, rather than simply brush it aside.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K — Quantum › 1NC – Shell

Mainstream IR’s state-centric paradigm fails to recognize developments beyond Westphalian abstractions. That guarantees extinction.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

According to the holographic worldview, the universe is “an undivided and unbroken whole” which is enfolded into parts. Thus, the division within as well as between society and nature is “a crude abstraction and approximation” (Bohm, 1980: 158, emphasis in original; see also Barad, 2007: 24–25). In his book Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Bohm expressed a pressing concern with the tendency to divide and subdivide the world into essentially different units or groupings: IR scholars are no stranger to the tendency described by Bohm. The world, apparently organized into sovereign states, appears to be as fragmented as ever, further compounded today by the rise of nationalism, populism, and identity politics, as well as by the socalled return to geopolitics or even the Cold War. All these fragmentations and conflicts in IR seem to conform with the Newtonian ontology of things. However, what is revealed in this orthodox ontology is merely the explicate order of IR, whose implicate order and implicate relations have yet to be adequately understood and theorized. Bohm’s insights into holographic relationality lay an important foundation for such theorizing in IR. As will be illustrated below, the Bohmian holographic theory can give IR, among other things, a stronger ontological commitment to whole and wholeness, a more holographic relational conception of parts such as states, and a novel account of differences as contingent and spatio-temporally situated unfoldments of holographic parts. Wholeness and the study of IR The concept of wholeness is central to Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory (Bohm, 1980; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Zinkin, 1987: 6). Despite a growing effort to include a wider array of issues and factors, IR still has a rather “weak sense of a social whole” (Albert and Buzan, 2013: 121). Even as IR scholars focus on “macrolevel” factors such as international political systems, international structures, international societies, world systems, and global networks, these systemic factors are at best particular structural abstractions of world politics, such as anarchy, the distribution of capabilities, and international norms and rules. While these systemic or structural features are part and parcel of the whole, ontologically they are often seen as either mere external and causal determinants of state behavior, or ultimately reducible to parts (e.g. states, material resources, or ideas),15 rather than as the whole in the holographic sense of the word. By whole we mean the entirety of space, time, and the information, relations, structures, processes, movements, and parts/agents contained within that all-encompassing space-time. In the IR context, the whole goes well beyond states and the totality of their interactions. It embodies the whole social and ecological systems as well as their explicate and implicate relations both between and embedded within their constituent “parts.” Such “parts” may include regions, states, societies, cultures, religions, peoples, economies, markets, goods, histories, ideas, emotions, materials, creatures, and natural phenomena. Of course, what exactly makes up the whole for IR cannot be exhaustively tallied a priori, because by definition such a task is impossible in any given space-time. But the point is that wholeness should be given a higher ontological priority in IR. Just as trees do not grow as assemblages of previously separate branches, leaves, and roots, the world does not start off with merely fragmented parts and preexisting sovereign states which then come together to form a global system; it is the other way round: the whole permeates through the parts and forms the essential relational conditions under which parts emerge and exist. This approach makes it imperative for IR to look for relations in much broader contexts which otherwise have been invisible, understudied, or artificially carved up by mainstream IR. To advocate for wholeness does not mean always privileging “macro-level” issues at the global level. In any case, whole-part or macro-micro issues are always already entangled and co-emergent (Wendt, 2015: 257). Micro parts and issues, precisely because they are microscopic, may be particularly prone to be diffusely spread and enfolded into various parts of the whole. As a result, micro parts simultaneously develop an emergent, holographic property of the whole. The fact that the tiny coronavirus can be quickly enfolded into almost every corner of the whole world and turn global life upside down illustrates the part-whole entanglement, and we dismiss its holographically holistic nature and impact at our own peril. To further illustrate, often traditionally considered outside the purview of IR, micro issues or events such as music (Gienow-Hecht, 2015), sports (e.g. ping-pong diplomacy), the Chernobyl disaster (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union, van der Veen, 2013), a flight school in Florida (e.g. 9/11), US subprime mortgage crisis, Fukushima, Wikileaks, melting polar ice caps, a Tunisian street vendor (e.g. the Arab Spring and the Syria conflict) and now even COVID-19 may be all in various ways “localized” holographic instantiations of the wholes. As such, they can and do play an important part in both reflecting and shaping the whole, especially in the form of some unexpected events and surprising turns, such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the global financial crisis, the rise of Donald Trump, and the current global pandemic. True, some of those “micropolitical” issues have begun to attract IR’s attention (Kertzer, 2017; Solomon and Steele, 2017), but overall the discipline lacks an explicit and holographic ontological and conceptual foundation for a more systematic engagement with the duality of whole-part. Of course, we cannot deal with “the whole of reality all at once” (Bohm, 1980: 2; see also Wendt, 1999: 14). Often it is necessary to take things “apart” and analyze them as if they were separable units. But it is important to always remember the “as if” caveat, lest we reify them as something objectively autonomous. It is also worth remembering that ontologically international relations are always a holographic part of bigger wholes, not closed or autonomous systems or units in and of themselves. In this context, a quantum holographic perspective becomes imperative especially in the face, for example, of the increasingly apparent human-nature holographic entanglement as evidenced by mounting “local” environmental crises and their implications for economic development, international conflict, and planetary survival. Contrary to the prevailing IR approaches that continue to subordinate environmental issues to a state-centric framework and a “national economic” imperative (Saurin, 1996), a quantum holographic approach has the potential to bridge the ontological and conceptual division between the parts and the wholes.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Random Bataille Junk › at: bataille

Voting for them is a double turn

Paul Mann 99, Literature prof @ Pomona, 1999, Masocriticism, p. 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.’4 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a ‘Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his ‘Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or dépensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is the nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Random Bataille Junk › at: bataille

Bataille doesn’t apply to modern capitalism, which is already based on excessive consumption and desire.

Goux et al 90 (Jean-Joseph, the Lawrence Favrot professor of French and chair of French studies at Rice University, Kathryn Ascheim, PhD and editor of Nature Biotech, Rhonda Garelick, taught at Yale, University of Colorado at Boulder, and Columbia, critic of literature and politics, PhD in comparative literature, “General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism,” Yale French Studies No. 78 On Bataille, pp. 206-224)

Where do we situate Bataille’s claim? What happens to the demand of the sacred in capitalist society? How do we reconcile the affirmation that capitalism represents an unprecedented break with all archaic [precapitalist] forms of expenditure and the postulate of the necessary universality of spending as pure loss? This is the difficulty Bataille wants to maintain as a general anthropological principle the necessity of unproductive expenditure while simultaneously upholding the historic singularity of capitalism with regard to this expenditure. Bourgeois society corresponds to a “general atrophy of former sumptuary processes” (41). An anomaly whereby loss is not absent (which would contradict the general principle) but virtually unreadable: “Today, the great and free social forms of unproductive expenditure have disappeared. Nevertheless, we should not conclude from this that the very principle of expenditure is no longer situated at the end of economic activity” (37). So what happens to ostentatious expenditure in capitalism? And can we really believe, furthermore, that the even more radical desacralization effected by communism could become a libertarian affirmation of sovereignty – the feast of self-consciousness, without divinities and myths? Everything suggests that Bataille was unable to articulate the mystical tension toward sovereign self-consciousness “without form and mode,” “pure expenditure” (224) with a utopia of social life that would make it possible, nor to explain in a developed capitalist society the consumption of the surplus beyond its reinvestment in production. Now it is quite clear that today’s capitalism has come a long way from the Calvinist ethic that presided at its beginning. The values of thrift, sobriety, and asceticism no longer have the place that they held when Balzac could caricature the dominant bourgeois mentality with the characters of pére Grandet or the usurer Gobseck. It is doubtful that the spirit of capitalism, which according to Weber is expressed with an almost classical purity in Benjamin Franklin’s principles [“he who kills a five shilling coin assassinates all that it could have produced: entire stacks of sterling pounds”] [cited by Bataille, 163], could today be considered the spirit of the times. Undoubtedly, the pace at which all residual sacred elements inherited from feudalism are eliminated has quickened. but hasn’t contemporary society undergone a transformation of the ethic of consumption, desire, and pleasure that renders the classical [Weberian] analyses of the spirit of capitalism [to which Bataille subscribes] inadequate? If the great opposition between the sacred and the profane no longer structures social life, if communal, sacrificial, and glorious expenditure has been replaced by private expenditure, it is no less true that advanced capitalism seems to exceed the principle of restricted economy and utility that presided at its beginning. No society has “wasted” as much as contemporary capitalism. What is the form of this waste, of this excess?

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Random Bataille Junk › at: bataille

Bataille’s aesthetics of violence culminates in fascism

Wolin 06 (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology”Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

It seems that the admiration of fascist methods - primarily with respect to the ethos of unbridled transgression that was so prominent in the fascist regimes’ embrace of an aesthetics of violence - evinced in Bataille’s essays of the 1930s had come to the fore in a way that proved profoundly embarrassing to Breton and those allied with him. In Bataille’s view, the fascist revolutions in Italy and Germany were alone successful in challenging the existence of the democratic spirit. They alone had replaced the decrepit value-system of bourgeois society with a new collective mythology - a restoration of myth that was so avidly desired by the belief-starved masses. This telltale flirtation with a “left fascism” - an avowed endorsement of fascist methods for left-wing political ends -was apparent from the group’s inaugural manifesto of October 1935, “Contre-Attaque: Union de lutte des intellectuals rkvolutionnaire.” Here, Bataille’s views played the major formative role. To wit, a sanguinary fascination with revolutionary violence occupied a distinct position of prominence: one of the group’s resolutions emphasized that in order to insure public safety (“le salut publique”) an “uncompromising dictatorship of the armed people” was required. Europe’s political destiny would be determined by “the creation of a vast network of disciplined and fanatical forces capable of exercising one day a merciless dictatorship.” And in conclusion, the admiration for fascist ‘methods was explicitly invoked: “The time has come for all of us to behave like masters and to physically destroy the slaves of capitalism . . . we intend to make use of the weapons created by fascism, which has known how to make use of the Fundamental human aspiration for affective exaltation and fanaticism. ”75 The stress on revolutionary violence, on emulating an ethos of mastership, The celebration of “affective exaltation and fanaticism,” of the emotional side of mass politics that contemporary fascism had been able to exploit so well - all represent key aspects of the ideology of left fascism as propagated by Bataille at this time. As Allan Stoekl has remarked: “Effervescence, the subversive violence of the masses, the baseness of their refusal to enter into boring discussions - all these things, then, without a clear and correct (even of boring) theory behind them, could easily be reversed into fascism, as Bataille quickly became aware.”76 In the context at hand it is of more than passing interest to note that the notion of a “revolt of the masters” (“Herren-Aufstand”) was one of the key ideas of Ernst Jiinger’s prophetic, conservative revolutionary classic, Der Arbeiter (1932) .77

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Set Col Links

Neo-primitivism ends up reinscribing the impacts of traditional primitivism as a grab bag of everything opposed to the modern west.

Li 06 (Victor, an award-winning multimedia journalist based in Chicago, “The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity,” Preface, (2006), 6/27/22 - FI)

Knowing as we do today that there have never existed peoples untouched by history, why do we continue to believe that such groups of people, by-passed by modern history, still exist? Why do we still believe in the idea of the primitive when the term ‘primitive’ itself has been increasingly withdrawn from circulation? Why still harp on the primitive when we have been made aware that primitive society was an invention of the modern West? These questions insistently frame the example that follows. In the summer of 2003, the Canadian newspaper the Globe and Mail featured in its book review section a photograph of ‘an Aboriginal group in Australia ... doing a traditional dance. Leaves are attached to their ankles and emu plumes adorn their headdresses.’ Exoticism visually established, a brief entry under the photograph summarized the contents of the book under review: ‘As the world becomes increasingly globalized and as McDonald’s [ sic ] sprouts on seemingly every corner, there are still small pockets where individual cultures and ethnic groups survive. In Living Tribes , Colin Prior gives a spectacular photographic record of fifteen such peoples, from the Inuit to the Padaung of Thailand to the Turkana of the Kenyan desert.’ 1 We will no doubt notice, especially in these politically enlightened times, that the word ‘primitive’ does not appear in the description. Instead, acceptable terms like ‘individual cultures,’ ‘ethnic groups,’ or ‘living tribes’ are used. But even though the denigration implied by evolutionary ranking is lifted when the word ‘primitive’ is studiously avoided, it is less easy to avoid the suspicion that ‘individual cultures’ or ‘ethnic groups’ may just be euphemisms inasmuch as they are still employed as concepts opposed, as ‘primitive’ once was, to a globalizing modernity. In other words, terminological replacements for ‘primitive’ remain mere euphemisms if they continue to function conceptually and rhetorically as endangered antitheses to the modern West. To be sure, unlike ‘primitive,’ which is burdened by a history of derogation, the new terms are greeted positively as expressions of cultural resistance against the threat of a homogenizing modernity, the coming of a monocultural McWorld. But the avoidance of the word ‘primitive,’ far from signifying a complete rejection of primitivism, represents instead primitivism’s transmutation into the liberal creed of multiculturalism, the preservation of cultural diversity in the age of globalization. Politically acceptable terms like ‘individual culture’ and ‘ethnic group’ may appear to oppose evolutionary narratives of primitive inferiority, but they still fall into the ‘savage slot’ that primitivism has always reserved for the Other of Euro-American modernity. 2 We should also note that the ‘primitive,’ as a chronopolitical concept, is related to terms such as the ‘premodern,’ the ‘archaic,’ and ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ societies. These terms may have different temporal inflections than ‘primitive,’ but they are often used as equivalents of the latter, especially in their perceived common opposition to the concept of modernity. Like Orientalism, primitivism functions as a grab-bag concept into which everything that is seen as opposed to the modern West is gathered. As such, any study of primitivism (and mine is no different) must acknowledge that the term ‘primitive’ lacks singular definition and possesses protean, multiple identities. The ‘primitive’ is not an ontological entity; it is a relational concept that expresses various ‘modern’ needs. The story of the ‘savage slot’ and its related manifestations is well known and has been critically analysed in such notable works as Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other , Adam Kuper’s The Invention of Primitive Society , Bernard McGrane’s Beyond Anthropology , Marianna Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive , Micaela di Leonardo’s Exotics at Home , Shelly Errington’s The Death of Authentic Primitive Art and Other Tales of Progress , Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush’s collection Prehistories of the Future , Helen Carr’s Inventing the American Primitive , Sieglinde Lemke’s Primitivist Modernism , Peter Fitzpatrick’s The Mythology of Modern Law , and Nicholas Thomas’s Colonialism’s Culture . 3 A new perspective can, nonetheless, be introduced to complicate this familiar story. Our awareness of the chronopolitics and geopolitics of primitivism, an awareness we owe in large part to the studies mentioned above, has not led to the disappearance of primitivism but to its deeper imbrication in contemporary theoretical discourses that appear to be anti-primitivist and politically progressive. 4 This book seeks to understand why primitivism keeps reappearing even after it has been uncovered as a myth, a projection, or a construction necessary for establishing the modernity of the West. It examines the ways in which a deconstructed primitivism is replaced by ‘neo-primitivism.’ By ‘neo-primitivism’ I mean the conceptual move through which the rejection of primitivism allows it to reappear in new, more acceptable forms. Neo-primitivism is a contemporary version of primitivism in which the critical repudiation of earlier primitivist discourses paradoxically enables their re-introduction, under different names and configurations to be sure, as cultural, political, ethical, and aesthetic alternatives to Western modernity. Neo-primitivist discourses, as we will see, ignore or forget their own repeated warnings against the pitfalls of earlier forms of primitivism, thereby reproducing the very same problems they have warned us against. Neo-primitivism can thus be characterized as an antiprimitivist primitivism that simultaneously disavows and reinscribes the primitive. Neo-primitivism has become an attractive theoretical option precisely at a time when ‘primitives,’ defined as belonging to authentic, primordial cultures yet untouched or uncontaminated by modernity, can no longer be called upon to act as pure forms of otherness. Nevertheless, the ‘primitive,’ as the ultimate sign of alterity, still seems to serve a useful theoretical function, though it is now conceptualized as a regulative ideal rather than as an actuality. Neo-primitivism can thus be seen as a primitivism without primitives insofar as it forwards a concept of the primitive so pure that no empirical referent or actual primitive can contradict or refute it. Though neo-primitivism questions the use of terms like ‘primitive’ and ‘primitivism,’ it continues to exhibit a deep primitivist logic that lurks in displaced but related concepts like ‘alterity,’ ‘culture,’ and, surprisingly, ‘modernity.’

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Set Col Links

In Baudrillard’s work we can trace we can trace a neo-primitivism logic – as a projection of the western fantasy.

Li 06 (Victor, an award-winning multimedia journalist based in Chicago, “The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity,” Primitivism without Primitives, or Towards Alterity, Culture, and Modernity, (2006), 6/27/22 - FI)

Neo-primitivism as a primitivism without primitives will logically seek to dismiss or drop the term ‘primitivism’ altogether. It is, after all, a problematic term that some anthropologists as early as the 1940s sought to eliminate altogether from their vocabulary. 121 But though the term may be dropped, a primitivist deep structure that privileges the Other of modernity – an Other that critically interrogates the modern – is retained. The disappearance of the term ‘primitivism,’ like the vanished or vanishing primitive, is thus not so much a complete effacement as a displacement and transposition onto other terms or concepts that now occupy the oppositional role to modernity that primitivism once did. I will examine in the chapters that follow how primitivism has been displaced into three new terms: alterity, culture, and, paradoxically, modernity. That alterity should be a form of neo-primitivism is perhaps not so surprising. A postmodern ethics of alterity has sensitized us to the dangers of ethnocentric claims to universal sameness. Particular, local forms of otherness have been mobilized in the struggle against the universalizing metanarratives of a Eurocentric modernity. These local others, often non-Western or seen as marginal to modernity, are not directly referenced as primitives or represented as such in order to avoid the evolutionary, hierarchical implications of the term. Nevertheless their alterity, symmetrically opposed to Western modernity, continues to exhibit characteristics present in earlier descriptions of primitive cultures and societies. The concept of alterity thus follows the fetishisitic logic of neo-primitivism in disavowing the primitive only to reinscribe its difference once again. 122 As we will see, in the next chapter on alterity, Jean Baudrillard not only opposes the Eurocentric representation or incorporation of the primitive, he argues that there are no longer any primitives. He remarks that the death or disappearance of primitive others like the South American Indians is not only a sign of their uncompromised alterity but also of their return as ‘viral spectral presence[s] ... [infecting] the synapses of our [Western] brains.’ 123 According to Baudrillard, then, there are no longer any primitives and precisely for that reason they continue to haunt us powerfully. Another philosopher of alterity, Jean-François Lyotard, drawing loosely on the ethnographic work of André-Marcel d’Ans, mobilizes the cultural difference of the Cashinahua, a small South American Indian tribe, to interrogate Western universal or cosmopolitical thought. But, ever alert to the dangers of ethnocentric projection, he also admits that his description of Cashinahua difference may be ‘simplistic’ and part of a tradition of Western exoticism. This autocritique of his own primitivism does not, however, prevent him from regarding the Cashinahua example as being ‘essential’ to any theoretical investigation into processes of mythic or narrative legitimation that occur in modern forms of totalitarianism. 124 Again we see a disavowal of the primitive instance followed by its reinscription as an example of alterity essential to exposing the totalitarian terror present in the metanarratives of legitimation that constitute the modern West. Thus, in Baudrillard’s and Lyotard’s work we can trace a neo-primitivist logic in which the primitive disappears as a presence to serve as an irreducible idea. Alterity is also the name that Marianna Torgovnick uses to question Western primitivism’s ethnocentric projection of its fears and desires onto primitive others. To Torgovnick, primitivism reveals more about the West than about the primitive whose alterity continues to elude and challenge Western views of the self and the world. The primitive of Western primitivism therefore does not exist or, rather, exists only as the projection of Western fantasy. But if the fantasized, projected primitive does not exist, the argument for an authentic primitive alternative to modern Western thought is promoted in Torgovnick’s work. She argues, for example, that in the oceanic experience, which Freud considered to be regressive and ‘pre-Oedipal,’ we have a primitive alternative to the modern Western separation of the self from the world. Our fascination with primitive life is thus an expression of the desire to undergo this oceanic experience in which the autonomous self is voided and merged with the entire sentient universe. 125 But, Torgovnick adds, this desire is to be found not only in primitive societies. It is a desire also present in certain religious forms and practices of the West. But this desire is more often repressed, ‘hounded out of institutionalized religions,’ and ‘projected abroad in a complicated process by which an aspect of the self was displaced onto the Other.’ 126 Even as Torgovnick incisively critiques Western primitivism’s ethnocentric construction of an exotic Other, she also asserts that ‘what has been sought elsewhere may yet be found in the folds and creases of the West’s own neglected traditions.’ 127 In short, the West’s primitive Other disappears to become the Other within the Western self. Primitive alterity is to be sought not outside but inside the West itself. In Torgovnick’s version of a primitivism without primitives, primitive others – geographically, temporally, or culturally separated from us are no longer needed because the so-called primitive quest for oceanic ecstasy is to be found as much in the West as elsewhere. We no longer need to go in search of primitives because they have been generalized or universalized to the point where we can now say, ‘primitives are us.’

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Set Col Links

Baudrillard’s critique of spectacle and images fails to trace the genealogy of such events ultimately reifying the colonization of everyday life.

Jelly-Schapiro 18 (Eli, Associate Professor of English at the University of South Carolina, “Security and Terror: American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity,” This Is Our Threnody”: Writing History as Catastrophe, (2018), 6/27/22 - FI)

The conjoined critiques of spectacle, exception, and imperial capital, though, are unevenly revelatory of the colonial essence and history of contemporary culture and politics. This unevenness is an effect of theory’s symptomatic nature—the ways in which theory often echoes the form of its critical object. The works I critically engage in this chapter are exemplary instances of this formal echo. In their critiques of spectacle, Jean Baudrillard and Slavoj Žižek reproduce the ahistoricity of the image, leaving untraced the genealogical routes that connect commodity ascendance in the postcolonial metropole to the pure articulation of commodity rationality in the colony. In their theorizations of bare life and the state of exception, meanwhile, Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler affirm the exceptionalism of the War on Terror’s political technologies. Finally, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s critique of an emergent imperial order adopts two abiding tropes of the “globalization” concept: the assumption of an imminent or achieved planetarity—the disappearance of the “outside” that is essential to colonial rationality—and the assumption that the defining political forms of this globalism originate in the advanced capitalist world. Spectacle, Capital, Terror As theorized by Theodor Adorno and others, the mass violence of the twentieth century redefined the aesthetic and political implications of the sublime. Kant and Burke recognized that performances of political violence could produce the sublime, but they reserved the term “nature” for the non-human world. Writing in the eighteenth century, they did not see, or anticipate, the profound reification of social life under capital—the ways in which historically contingent social relations, and the violence inherent therein, are rendered by the mythos of capital as natural. In the context of this “second nature,” the sublime acquires a different resonance and effect. Spectacular instances of political violence, and indeed the relentless spectacle of commodity culture, do not permit the second moment in Kant’s dynamic sublime, wherein human reason and rationality reasserts its dominance over the irrationality of nature—because the irrationality of “second nature” violence is inextricable from rationality itself, and because there is no longer a position of safe remove, an outside, from which one can regard and redeem the sublime. 4 The naturalization of commodity rationality was a key concern of the thinkers of the Situationist International. Guy Debord published his seminal Society of the Spectacle in 1967. Debord named, in that book’s title and in its interior contents, a new form of capitalism based on the subjection of ever more realms of human social life to the rationality of the market. In so doing he described one of the defining characteristics of neoliberalism before the neoliberal era had properly begun. (Most historians of neoliberalism locate its inception in the early 1970s.) The prescience of Debord’s critique, and the endurance of the state of affairs he highlighted and foretold, has ensured that the Society of the Spectacle remains a relevant text, one with much to say about the culture and techniques of contemporary capital accumulation. The “colonization of everyday life” was enabled by the ascent of the image—as a commodity in itself and as a screen that conceals, like a fetish, the reality of capitalist social relations. Debord’s use of the term “colonization”—and Henri Lefebvre’s echo of it—might be read as proposing an obfuscatory analogy between the radically different modalities of commodity rationality in the colony and metropole. His choice of metaphor, though, evinces the historical articulation of, rather than collapses the distance between, colony and metropole. Invoking “colonization” rather than simply “commoditization” evokes the dialectical relation between the violence of extractive industry in the space of the colony and the saturation by the commodity form of all spheres of human social life in the consumerist societies of the overdeveloped world. It points, in other words, toward the history of colonial violence that conditions—is synchronically and diachronically connected to—cultures of alienation and exploitation in the postcolonial metropole Reflecting the televisual glare of the Twin Towers’ collapse, several widely cited theoretical texts composed in the near aftermath of September 11 summon Debord’s critique—notably Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism (2002), Slavoj Žižek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002), and the Retort group’s Afflicted Powers (2004). The contemporary critique of spectacle confronts the same theoretical aporia negotiated by Debord: How to highlight the primacy of the image without submitting to its power? How to reveal the ubiquity of commodity culture without reinforcing its omnipotence and reproducing it’s a historicity? The Retort group observes that “the colonization of everyday life” is simply “‘globalization’ turned inward.” 5 The contemporary critique of spectacle, I want to argue, mimics rather than resists this inward turning. The violence of spectacle expresses itself in both subjective and objective forms. Subjective violence, as Žižek has outlined this distinction, refers to “violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent”—the violence that shows up on the evening news, the violence that disrupts the peaceful workings of everyday social and political order. 6 Objective violence, by contrast, refers to the often-invisible violence of the system itself—the pervasive and perpetual violence of capital in its globalized form. Spectacular instances of subjective violence serve one of two contradictory purposes. The dramatic car accident viewed by millions on YouTube distracts from rather than directs our attention to the slow ecological violence of automobile culture. But the logic of the terrorist attack—and indeed, as Retort cites, that of “the ruined small farmer from South Korea, slashing his arteries in defiance on the barricades at Cancun” 7 —avows that another form of subjective violence is possible, one that will cut through the thick screens of fetishism and reification. The potentiality of the “image-event” in exposing and resisting the objective violence of commodity culture is one central concern of the contemporary critique of spectacle. “The events in New York,” Baudrillard writes in The Spirit of Terrorism , “have radicalized the relation of the image to reality. Whereas we were dealing before with an uninterrupted profusion of banal images and seamless flow of sham events, the terrorist act in New York has resuscitated both images and events.” 8 The meeting of image and event, though, is not seamless. “At the same time that [images] exalt the event,” Baudrillard contends, “they also take it hostage. They serve to multiply it to infinity and . . . are a diversion and neutralization. . . . The image consumes the event, in the sense that it absorbs it and offers it for consumption.” 9 The force of the real event is correlated to the symbolic power of its proliferation as image. But the reduction of the event to its image denies the experience of the event as reality. Baudrillard elaborates this paradox by suggesting that the destruction of the Twin Towers elucidated the contest between, and entwined nature of, reality and fiction. For many observers, Baudrillard notes, September 11, 2001, represented the “resurgence of the real . . . in an allegedly virtual universe” (a resurgence that corresponded with “the resurrection of history beyond its proclaimed end”). Baudrillard is wary of this reading, however, and insists instead that if reality appears, in the event of the Twin Towers’ collapse, to overtake fiction, “this is because it has absorbed fiction’s energy, and has itself become fiction.” 10 The image precedes and surpasses the real event: “Rather than the violence of the real being there first, and the frisson of the image being added to it, the image is there first, and the frisson of the real is added.” 11 The image delivers the real. In other words, the violence of September 11 does not represent the return of history or the return of the real. It represents, rather, the triumph of the symbolic. In Baudrillard’s reading, the image-event of September 11 was empty of political content. The political aims of its actors, the historical forces from which it emerged and to which it responds—all of this is eclipsed by the image. Every replay of the towers falling serves to further evacuate the event of its historical and political meaning. Yet in making this observation so central to his account, Baudrillard finds himself stuck in something of a critical cul-de-sac. His emphasis on September 11 as spectacle—and his corresponding neglect of the concrete social relations within which the spectacle operates—serves to reinforce rather than resist the fetishism of the image. The question his account ultimately prompts, then, is how to “[preserve] intact the unforgettable incandescence of the image” 12 without being blinded by it. This is not to condemn or dismiss Baudrillard’s essay—a slim and narrow volume that does not aspire to any kind of comprehensive reading of global politics—but to shed light upon the ways in which the dominance of the image is reprised in the moment of critique.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Repo. Futurism Link

Baudrillard’s theory of the Hyper-real is inscribed within notions of Reproductive Futurism-a simulacrum which is self-replicating, repetitive, and meaningless- seeing Queer bodies as functionally “useless” and future negating because they do not possess the natural capacity for sexual reproduction.

Edelman 04(Lee Edelman, Professor of English and Tuft University, Professor Edelman’s research focuses on fields of intersection between sexuality, rhetoric, culture, politics, and film, December 6th 2004, No Future: Quuer Theory and the Death Drive, Sinthomosexuality, pg 60-66) SY

This paradox determines the trajectory of a recent essay by Jean Baudrillard that was published under the deliberately inflammatory title, ‘‘The Final Solution.’’ Baudrillard asserts that the human species is confronting a life-and-death crisis around the question of reproduction, more specifically, around its determination by way of sameness or difference. But a vortex of contradictions engulfs his use of these various terms, occasioning, or rather seeming to occasion, a transvaluation of values in accordance with which they appear to signify against our expectations: ‘‘There is something occulted inside us: our deaths. But something else is hidden there, lying in wait for us within each of our cells: the forgetting of death. In our cells our immortality lies in wait for us. It’s common to speak of the struggle of life against death, but there is an inverse peril. And we must struggle against the possibility that we will not die. At the slightest hesitation in the fight for death—a fight for division, for sex, for alterity, and so for death—living beings become once again indivisible, identical to one another—and immortal.’’49 Far from speaking, with the sinthomosexual, for the death drive and its disarticulation of forms, Baudrillard remains an advocate here of reproductive futurism, explicitly enlisting this notion of death, this resistance to immortality, against the force of the death drive, which he assimilates to, and disavows as, the paradigm of sameness: ‘‘The death drive, according to Freud, is precisely this nostalgia for a state before the appearance of individuality and sexual differentiation, a state in which we lived before we became mortal and distinct from one another’’ (interesting) (). He may trumpet what he calls here the ‘‘fight for death’’ in thus opposing himself to the death drive, disparaged as eternal pursuit of the Same and hence as immortality, but opprobrium, in Baudrillard’s argument, still attaches to the death drive only insofar as it constitutes a mortal threat to the survival of the human—insofar, that is, as its sameness might make human difference different. The immortality for which he reproves it, then, threatens the human precisely with a death he would have us fight against. It names the endless negation of form, and so of what, for Baudrillard, defines the value of ‘‘difference’’: that is, our distinctly human identity. As he sketches an evolutionary movement from ‘‘the absolute continuity found in the subdivision of the same—in bacteria—to the possibility of life and death’’ (), by which latter phrase he indicates the attributes of sexual reproduction, Baudrillard, complicit with tendencies of scientific discourse in general, celebrates the triumph of sexed reproduction over genetic duplication in a teleological narrative that itself reduplicates the Freudian account of genitality’s triumph over the various ‘‘partial’’ drives. Naturalizing this trajectory from the replication he associates with genetic immortality to the procreation made possible by encountering sexual, and therefore genetic, difference, Baudrillard sounds the note of futurism’s persistent love song to itself, its fantasy of a dialectic capable of spinning meaning out of history, and history out of desire: Next [after the evolutionary moment of bacterial replication], the egg becomes fertilized by a sperm and specialized sex cells make their appearance. The resulting entity is no longer a copy of either one of the pair that engendered it; rather, it is a new and singular combination. There is a shift from pure and simple reproduction to procreation: the first two will die for the first time, and the third for the first time will be born. We reach the stage of beings that are sexed, differentiated, and mortal. The earlier order of the virus—of immortal beings—is perpetuated, but henceforward this world of deathless things is contained within the world of the mortals. In evolutionary terms, the victory goes to beings that are mortal and distinct from one another: the victory goes to us. () Or goes to ‘‘us’’ so long as ‘‘we’’ don’t identify—or get identified by others—with the regressive ‘‘order of the virus,’’ of immortal sameness or repetition, that threatens ‘‘us’’ with the sort of death Baudrillard refuses to embrace (a death through viral replication like that associated with what was referred to, twenty years ago, as ‘‘the gay plague’’): ‘‘This is the revenge taken on mortal and sexed beings by immortal and undifferentiated life forms. This is what could be called the final solution’’ (). Thus death, the corollary of difference, can function as a value for Baudrillard in the context of individual identities alone (because this, after all, allows for the Couple’s dialectical survival in the ‘‘third ’’); it retains its negative valence where the species itself is concerned.50 The latter’s impulse to immortality, to perpetuating its self-perpetuation through the mechanics of genetic exchange, must resist the backward appeal of ‘‘involution,’’ which signifies, for Baudrillard, the regressive ‘‘nullification of differences’’ (). It must, that is, remain the same in its difference from the lethal sameness it condemns for its nullification of difference, thus affirming as constant the One of the Couple and the fantasy of the sexual relation as the ‘‘duality that puts an end to perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same’’ (). Unless, of course, such iterations of the same put an end to it instead. And that, according to Baudrillard, is precisely what ‘‘sexual liberation’’ intends: The first phase of sexual liberation involves the dissociation of sexual activity from procreation through the pill and other contraceptive devices—a transformation with enormous consequences. The second phase, which we are beginning to enter now, is the dissociation of reproduction from sex. First, sex was liberated from reproduction; today it is reproduction that is liberated from sex, through asexual, biotechnological modes of reproduction such as artificial insemination or full body cloning. This is also a liberation, though antithetical to the first. We’ve been sexually liberated, and now we find ourselves liberated from sex—that is, virtually relieved of the sexual function. Among the clones (and among human beings soon enough), sex, as a result of this automatic means of reproduction, becomes extraneous, a useless function. ()) The meaning of ‘‘sex,’’ which Baudrillard had identified earlier as a mode of reproduction (‘‘sexed, differentiated, and mortal’’) distinct from that of ‘‘deathless things’’ (such as viruses and bacteria) by virtue of its mingling of genes to create ‘‘new and singular combination[s],’’ undergoes an important mutation here. How else to explain his odd characterization of artificial insemination as ‘‘asexual’’ and (continuous in this with cloning) as reproduction ‘‘liberated from sex’’? For whatever the mechanism by which it’s achieved—and ‘‘artificial’’ seems largely a diacritical term intended to naturalize the procreative function of heterosexual intercourse—insemination, the fertilization of egg by sperm, defines the very principle of sexual reproduction for Baudrillard. But the evolutionary argument for genetic combination (the essay’s original meaning of ‘‘sex’’) has morphed, as it often seems to do, into a panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation (the subsequent meaning of ‘‘sex’’).What can the lament for the putative loss of the sexual function mean, therefore, if not its very opposite: that heterosexuality, stripped of its ancient reproductive alibi, must assume at last the despiritualized burden of its status as sexual function, as sinthomosexuality; that in the face of what Baudrillard calls ‘‘automatic’’ or ‘‘biotechnological’’ modes of reproduction, it must recognize the ‘‘extraneous’’ element in sex that is never extraneous to sex and that marks it as a ‘‘useless function,’’ as a meaningless and unrecuperable expense, or even, as Jacques Derrida has written with regard to différance, ‘‘as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct.’’51 Like Faron, the narrator of The Children of Men, for whom sex in a world without procreation—without ‘‘the hope of posterity, for our race if not for ourselves’’—becomes ‘‘almost meaninglessly acrobatic,’’ Baudrillard recoils in horror before this ‘‘useless’’ sexuality. And a ‘‘useless function’’ for Baudrillard, as his use of the same phrase elsewhere suggests, means one that refuses meaning: ‘‘At the extreme limit of computation and the coding and cloning of human thought (artificial intelligence), language as a medium of symbolic exchange becomes a definitively useless function. For the first time in history we face the possibility of a Perfect Crime against language, an aphanisis of the symbolic function.’’52 Aphanisis, the term Ernest Jones introduced to identify the anxiety-inducing prospect of the disappearance of desire, refers in the passage from Baudrillard to the fading or, more ominously, to what he describes as the ‘‘global extermination of meaning’’, the unraveling of the braid inwhich reproductive futurism twines meaning, desire, and the fantasy of (hetero)sexual rapport. At the same time, though, it also evokes the subsequent use of theword by Lacan, for whom it refers instead to the fading or disappearance of the subject,whose division the signifier effects in such a way that ‘‘there is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject.’’ Lacan will then go on to add, ‘‘There is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which is that of the unconscious.’’53 Meaning, that is, against whose aphanisis Baudrillard’s jeremiad is launched, always already entails, for Lacan, the aphanisis of the unconscious: ‘‘When the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading,’ as disappearance’’ (). Appalled by the imminence of a ‘‘final solution,’’ the liberation from sexual difference intended by the force of ‘‘perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same,’’ Baudrillard holds fast to the meaning whose ‘‘global extermination’’ sinthomosexuality is always imagined to effect and whose Symbolic exchange jouissance would reduce to a ‘‘definitively useless function.’’54 And he does so in the hope of perpetuating the temporal movements of desire, of shielding himself from the unconscious(and the iterations of the drive, and securing, through futurity, through the victory of narrative duration over irony’s explosive negativity, a ground on which to stand: ‘‘The stakes,’’ he warns, ‘‘are no longer only that ‘history’ is slipping into the ‘posthistorical,’ but that the human race is slipping into the void’’ (). And all because (heterosexual) sex has ‘‘become extraneous, a useless function,’’ has become, that is, void of content once the inspiriting meaning it carried—both like, and in the form of, a Child—has vanished into the unregenerate materiality of the signifier.55 For ‘‘the signifier,’’ as Lacan declares in his interpretation of ‘‘The Purloined Letter,’’ ‘‘is not functional’’; it exceeds its use-value in the service of signification and, especially as localized in what the essay punningly engages as ‘‘the letter,’’ it brings us back to the Real, to the fatality of ‘‘what remains of a signifier when it has no more signification.’’56 Apostrophizing just such a signifier, Lacan, in his reading of Poe’s short story, makes clear just what SINTHOMOSEXUALITY 65 Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/615833/9780822385981-002.pdf by UNIV OF PENNSYLVANIA user on 09 March 2021 remains: ‘‘nothing, if not that presence of death which makes a human life a reprieve obtained from morning to morning in the name of the meanings whose sign is your crook’’ (). Baudrillard, like Silas Marner and Scrooge, may walk through the valley of the shadow of death, but with meaning as his shepherd he shall always want, desiring from morning to morning the continuation of the reprieve by which he perpetuates the fantasy space essential to his desire. ‘We see no white winged angels now,’’ George Eliot observes. ‘‘But yet men are led away from threatening destruction: a hand is put in theirs, which leads them forth gently towards a calm and bright land, so that they look no more backward; and that hand may be a little child’s.’’ Or rather, though that Child be as helpless as Eppie, as delicate as Tiny Tim, it must be the hand of a ‘‘little child’’ that lifts us into the future and thereby saves us, in the words of Baudrillard, from ‘‘slipping into the void’’ of all that is ‘‘backward’’ or ‘‘involuted,’’ of all that he condemns as ‘‘successive iterations of the same’’ that are, themselves, precisely what old Mr. Lammeter knows we value in the Eppies and Tiny Tims who embody reproductive futurism. As those faces of Eppie and Tiny Tim turn their eyes to us once more, soliciting the compassion that always compels us to want to keep them safe (in the faith that they will confer on us the future’s saving grace), let me end with a reference to the ‘‘Fourteen Words,’’ attributed to David Lane, by which members of various white separatist organizations throughout the United States affirm their collective commitment to the common cause of racial hatred: ‘‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.’’57 So long as ‘‘white’’ is the only word that makes this credo appalling, so long as figural children continue to ‘‘secure [our] existence’’ through the fantasy that we survive in them, so long as the queer refutes that fantasy, effecting its derealization as surely as an encounter with the Real, for just so long must sinthomosexuality have a future after all. For what keeps it alive, paradoxically, is the futurism desperate to negate it, obedient in that to the force of a drive that is futurism’s sinthome.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Fem K Link

Baudrillard’s theory essentializes and valorizes the feminine and reproduces explicit binaries that subjugates and undermines women

A Keith Goshorn, critical theorist, associate professor of sociology at colgate university, Baudrillard: A Critical Reader, edited by Douglas Kellner, 1994, pg. 258-260

Yet more crucial than the above general considerations should be an examination of Baudrillard’s rather careless employment of a category of “the feminine,” particularly in constructing one of his central theoretical figures, the notion of seduction. this usage of “the feminine” here and elsewhere in his writing surely appears, on the surface, to be risking a narrowly essentialized definition of the term, and one drawn from the social postures of a previous century at that. Worse, he might be said to be participating in a continued “metaphorization” of the feminine,3 which marks the distancing and objectification of women as Other-ness. Seen in this light, his posture would only be typical of a long history of male philosophers trying to “place into discourse” an idealized or imaginary “feminine” while remaining relatively indifferent to or ignorant of the status of the “real” women around them. Furthermore, can he also fairly be charged with employing an outmoded binary and oppositional sense of masculine/feminine polarity — even though he is obviously trying to excavate through the theory of seduction a strategy which, even in the words of his harshest critics, seems to ... . subvert ... fixed dualities between masculine and feminine”4? The charges of his allegedly essentialized usage of femininity (and masculinity) must be weighed not against any possible ameliorations by elder male generational oversight (if it is indeed only that), but against the possibility that his intention has been rather to deconstruct the historical function of the category itself and how it has supposedly been used. From this perspective, his aim is not primarily to create a discourse of female submission, but to develop a counterfactual sub-discourse which set an overt agenda by which masculine prerogatives have only constructed themselves in defensive and insecure postures against a naturally superior female order and its dominant set of “secret” goals. While any, even preliminary, understanding of his precarious position here will require some defining extrapolations of what a deliberately uncipherable and non-representative theory of seduction represents, a fair-minded critique will require some speculation as to what purpose the author intended by such a theory as well as a judgment of its results. One must then determine what advantages and disadvantages Baudrillard has given himself in trying to counter the tyranny of the rationalist productivist ethic with language drawn from a long-passed epoch rife with sexist and “aristocratic overtones. And, finally, we can ask whether he may be wisely obliged to abandon an unworkable theory of seduction in his attempt to formulate a subversive counter-weight to the dominating mode of capitalist productivism. And, regardless of our judgment on any of the above, at this point in time, our attention is merited by any theorist who undertakes to question and challenge, even indirectly, the cultural foundations of the religion of “free market economy” which, along with its semiotic viruses of commercial promotionalism and the commodification of discourse, have so thoroughly naturalized themselves into nearly all aspects of contemporary life, especially its discourse of “sexuality.” Baudrillard deserves further scrutiny from feminists most particularly here for his attention to the exchange value basis of traditional sexuality and its reflection of capitalist objectification, paradoxically reproduced by its emphasis on individualist “subjectivity” or subjective “individualism.” For this sexuality as feminists have known all along, is tainted as a sub-set derivative of what Baudrillard calls “the abjection of free enterprise.” Although it is unavoidably necessary in addressing the issues at stake in this essay to use the conventional distinctions of “male” critics and “female” critics, I do not intend to suggest in any way a grouping of qualities around or inherent to either. Likewise, I do not mean to imply anything necessarily synonymous between “women” and “feminists,” even if these two do occasionally get thrown together here. Furthermore, it should be obvious by now that to be a feminist is not to automatically belong to one gender or the other. Indeed, one of the foremost points I hope to establish is that Baudrillard’s continuance in identifying women only with certain universalized “feminine” qualities is a severely detrimental limitation to the overall more-radical intentions of his theoretical project.6 This becomes evident when we begin to see the contradictions that result from his acceptance of the Freudian axiom of a single, masculine libido theory of sexuality implicit in his early writings on seduction, in contrast to his later theorizations of entering a condition of transsexuality which begin to resonate with the more progressive feminist notions of gender as a culturally learned performativity. His notion of transsexuality is but an aspect of a greater cultural movement of transvestism, which is the term he utilizes to characterize the implosion of previous fixed cultural polarities into what he sees as our current state of indeterminacy.7 Ultimately, more is at stake here than simply deciding whether Baudrillard has made sexist remarks, held onto essentialized notions of women and “the feminine,” or has been a deliberately antagonistic provocateur of feminism and the social movements for women’s “liberation.” What finally matters in the resolution of such questions is whether significantly new currents of thought have arisen which have possibly erased the need or the basis for past antagonisms. The one thing which I would assert with some certainty at the outset is that both the adherents of the multiple strains of today’s feminism as well as the multiple adherents of Baudrillard’s theoretical project will be far better off if they can listen to and learn from each other. For the French theorist is no more a ‘traditional male’ than he is the embodment of his self-described ‘supreme femininity.’ And the most alert of today’s feminists no more see themselves as a group of non-liberated “autonomous feminine subjects” than they are a group of “non-seductive female phallocrats” as seen in the eyes of some of their detractors.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Cap Bad Link

Baudrillard is wrong – class struggle cannot be defined by signs when signs don’t control the world

McWhinney 21 (Andrew McWhinney @ Negation Mag - Editor, writer, podcast producer for Negation Mag, MA from McMaster University, Published: March 2021, <IKS> "A Marxist Mission to Rescue Jean Baudrillard", DOA: 6-23-2022, )

SIGN FETISHISM: ISSUES WITH BAUDRILLARD'S THOUGHT While there are plenty of useful and practical insights to be found in the work of early Baudrillard, there are also many worrisome tendencies that begin to show themselves in said texts. In FCPES, Baudrillard asserts multiple times that modern capitalism has put its core emphasis on sign value and the reproduction of the system through the dogmatic (re)production of the code. For Baudrillard, "sign exchange value is fundamental — use value is often no more than a practical guarantee;" he intends for this to be a critique of a supposed ahistorical view of human needs that Marxists uphold.15 Reacting to this perceived ahistoricism, Baudrillard simply ends up bending the stick too far in the opposite direction. One only needs to look to Marx in Capital, Vol. 1, to combat this over-enthusiastic stick-bending. Marx states that "the commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind. The nature of these needs, whether they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference."16 It is clear that Marx never saw use values as fulfilling static human needs; indeed, in Marx’s conception, human needs are subject to social-historical transformation, and are fulfilled by social use values. There is thus no need, as Baudrillard does, to disregard use values as ahistorical and false, nor is there a need to conceive of use value as a purely discursive guarantor of exchange value. Sign value is simply that part of the commodity, one might say, that fulfills that social-imaginative need of fitting into a particular position in the capitalist social hierarchy, which is explained by the link between sign value and use value (SgEV-UV). Baudrillard’s totalizing view of sign value and the code also poses two other problems; it is vaguely defined yet monolithic. Baudrillard seems to think that the code of capitalist society — that of political economy — is singular, without contradiction. This is just not true. As Valentin Vološinov states in his work Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e., by the class struggle. Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle.17 Signs are not singular in their meaning, but multiaccentual — they are overdetermined by a multiplicity of codes (class, race, gender, sexuality and so on), and the sign value of a commodity may differ according to how it speaks to these codes. Baudrillard’s monolithic formulation of the code is actually what Vološinov points to as the goal of the ruling class: "to extinguish or drive the inward struggle between social value judgements which occurs in [the sign], to make [it] uniaccentual."18 Forgoing the sign as a site of class struggle, Baudrillard wishes to abandon the logic of the sign altogether, substituting it for what he calls "symbolic exchange." Symbolic exchange, while taking on various definitions in Baudrillard’s thought,19 most concretely refers to any social practice that defies the "repressive, reductive, rationalizing metaphysic of utility."20 Pulling from Georges Bataille’s theory of the general economy21 and Marcel Mauss’s analysis of gift economies,22 Baudrillard sees symbolic exchange as that which defies the equalizing, totalizing logic of the sign – it is ambivalent to the logic of value as such, and acts as the radical negation of the value systems of capitalist society, allowing for the destruction of (sign) value logic and the possibility for other ways of being in the world to emerge. Practices of symbolic exchange for Baudrillard include gift-giving, sacrifice, and excessive festivities. As Baudrillard put it, "the symbolic social relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the consumption of the ‘surplus’ and deliberate anti-production."23 As Douglas Kellner has noted, the politics of symbolic exchange are similar to the politics of difference and the micropolitics of desire advocated by many of Baudrillard’s contemporaries. The issue with Baudrillard’s version of this politics, however, is that it comes up against his own monolithic, all-consuming, all-encompassing conception of the code, which can seemingly co-opt and absorb all opposition. Thus, as Kellner notes, Baudrillard can only advocate a vague, unhelpful, ultra-leftist practice of "total refusal, total negativity and the utopia of radical otherness;" a position which forgoes any possibility for a material revolution.24 Baudrillard’s sign fetishism only proceeds to get worse over time. Forgoing even the notion of a critical political economy of the sign, Baudrillard later comes to believe that the reproduction of society no longer centres on reproducing the mode of production, but the code itself: The other production, that of values and commodities, that of the belle epoque of political economy, has for a long time had no specific meaning. What every society looks for in continuing to produce, and to overproduce, is to restore the real that escapes it. That is why today this "material" production is that of the hyperreal itself.25 There is no longer a "real" base where production takes place. There is only a "hyperreal," something that appears more real than the real world itself — we live, according to Baudrillard, in a world smoothed of all its real contradictions, and where apparent contradictions merely exist to perpetuate an illusion of what our society is supposed to look like. Taken to its most nihilistic conclusions in Fatal Strategies (1983), this theory asserts that objects have come to rule subjects, and the social has officially been wiped out. We as subjects must accept this defeat and adopt objecthood ourselves. What is probably most compelling about Baudrillard to many — including post-leftist TikTokers — is what feels like the descriptive power of some of the borderline science-fiction predictions he makes in works like Fatal Strategies. With the development of the internet and its acceleration of communication, it can often feel for middle-class young people that they are living out most of their lives in the hyperreal. The code of corporate social media spaces seems to pull them in, hijack their sense of belonging, and render them passive consumers of content. All media has become seemingly cool — cold, even — and them along with it. For young people who have grown up with the internet as a core part of their social experiences, this can feel all too real. Alienation, for us, is automatically linked to the sensation of simulation, the proliferation of the code, and not immediately identified with material strife. The issue here, however, is that the world has not been reduced to the code. The development and proliferation of hierarchical sign-systems, the building blocks of ideology, quilted through the power of material institutions in the capitalist mode of production, is undeniable. There is certainly a different ideological apparatus to contend with that requires new thinking and modes of analysis to comprehend fully. But there is still a material base co-constituted with this ideological apparatus; there is still material exploitation at the site of capitalist labour, and the extraction of surplus value is still central to reproduction of capitalist society. Exploitation of labour and the labour of consumption under late capitalism are both significant and central experiences of the subject in advanced capitalist societies; consumption on its own is not. In his sign fetishism and monolithic conception of the code, Baudrillard ended up taking the side of capital, erasing any potential for resistance against capitalism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › Links to Counter Ks › Cap Bad Link

Invoking simulacra is a capitalist ploy to distract from materialism

Schwabach 3 (Aaron Schwaback @ Jefferson School of Law - Professor of Law and Director of Center for Global Legal Studies, J.D., University of California at Berkeley Published : 2003, <jonah> <IKS> “Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law,” DOA: 7-8-16, pages 1-21)

Although this theme has attained the status of a cliche, one carefullydeveloped depiction is that in Joe Haldeman’s novel Forever Peace.78 The story’s protagonist, Julian Class, is a University of Texas professor and U.S. Army sergeant who spends ten days each month remotely operating a military robot metonymically (and ironically) called a soldierboy. Together Class and the soldierboy form a cyborg – a concept often linked in fiction and criticism with problems of identity. 79 Class, in the person of the soldierboy, fights against third-world guerrillas who, unlike him, are actually present. In one disturbing scene, he and his fellow soldiers discuss having killed two ten-year-old girls who fired upon the soldierboys.80 The girls could not have inflicted serious damage on the robot, and, of course, could not have injured Class or his fellow operators, who were far away and safe at the time. The scene could have been written in response to Baudrillard’s solipsistic view of virtual war as nothing more than non-intersecting simulacra – for Baudrillard, the simulacral war that the “Americans” experienced never mirrored that experienced by Saddam Hussein: “[T]he two adversaries did not even confront each other face to face, the one lost in its virtual war won in advance, the other buried in its traditional war lost in advance.”81 Haldeman’s reader, however, is left with the horrified awareness that, while Class’s war is a simulacrum, the little girl’s death is real. Inhabiting worlds of simulacra is a luxury enjoyed by academics from wealthy countries, like Jean Baudrillard and Julian Class, one of whom may be no more and no less real than the other. Those who actually risk death in war, though, enjoy no such luxury, but must believe in the reality of war and their own existence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: War is Simulation

Troll the Trolls DA

Drinking low NOW

Abrams, Abigail. 5-17-17 “Teen Drinking Reaches Lowest Point in 25 Years, CDC Says.” Time, Time, https://time.com/4776249/teen-drinking-lowest-point-25-years-cdc/. 🐸

Teens are drinking significantly less than they used to. Underage drinking among teens has reached a new low, ABC News reports. The percent of teens who said they have at least one drink per month dropped from 50.8% in 1991 to just 32.8% in 2015 in a new report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Despite the overall decrease, researchers say binge drinking is still a problem. Of those teens who reported drinking, 57.8% said they had five drinks in a row, and 43.8% said they had drunk at least eight drinks in one sitting. Researchers examined data from the national Youth Risk Behavior Survey, which asks students to answer a self-administered questionnaire. The sample size ranged from 10,904 to 16,410 students between 1991 and 2015, according to ABC. The new report found that binge drinking among teens has decreased from a high of 31.5% of teens in 1999 to 17.7% of teens in 2015. Teen drinking has been falling for years, but the CDC and other groups are still concerned about underage drinking.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: War is Simulation

War is not just simulation – they obfuscate the real material determinants of warfare and which guarantees escalating military interventions

Hobbs 06 – Lecturer in Media and Public Relations at the University of Newcastle

(Mitchell, “Reflections on the Reality of the Iraq Wars: The Demise of Baudrillard’s Search for Truth?,” https://www.academia.edu/2569231/Reflections_on_the_reality_of_the_Iraq_Wars_the_demise_of_Baudrillards_search_for_truth)

Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlightingthe relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, asmedia theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”. Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including theGulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use” (Kellner, 1989:73). In thisregard, Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the newsmedia, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism thatundermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner,1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra,and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within criticalsocial theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, workas “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies” In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives, circulating in aseemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solidmight melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or government ‘spin’. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, sociologists can, to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections. 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 REST IN PEACE BAUDRILLARD? In the final analysis, then, Baudrillard’s work on the Gulf War and the September 11terrorist attacks should (respectfully) be laid to rest. For although some, such as RichardKeeble (2004:43), have followed Baudrillard in arguing that “there was no war in the gulf in 2003”, such statements are somewhat antithetical to the truth aims of the social sciences. Baudrillard, being both an icon and iconoclast, pushed his language and arguments to rhetorical extremes in order to force the collapse of representations andarguments he saw as having supplanted truth. His fatal theory was in a sense intellectual ‘hype’, for a capricious world in which only ‘hype’ can be noticed. Yet in shouting his arguments he served to obfuscate their nuance and subtext, the very intellectualessences of his work and, ultimately, his contribution to the body of knowledge. However, although fatal theory is of little practical use for media researchers seeking anempirically derived ‘truth’, Baudrillard’s oeuvre is still (somewhat) instructive, remindingus of the importance of de-mystifying reality. For although the voice of the scholar is that of a pariah in the entertainment driven public sphere, we must force our voices into the public sphere if we are to re-contextualise events such as the Iraq war, by providing audiences with better, more veracious accounts of events. Failing this, we will continue to find our ‘defence’ forces engaged in military operations under spurious casus belli arguments. Accordingly, despite the many faults of his work, Baudrillard should not beforgotten. For although his contribution was more of a slap-of-the-face than a gentlepush in the right direction, his ideas regarding simulacra and reality have helped to further our understanding of media spectacles (and their potential repercussions). In apost-Baudrillard world, as social inquiry (it is to be hoped) returns to a more empiricallyinformed understanding of the media, we should not forget the implications posed by thiscultural field. For if sociology seeks to explain the social world, then it must work to prevent the dislocation of reality from the ‘real’ that Baudrillard so feared.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: Scenario Planning = Simulation

Scenario planning within the context of USFG action is more likely to produce ethical students than unethical ones

Esberg, Sagan 12 – *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND **Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation

(“NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1)

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7∂ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: Scenario Planning = Simulation

Scenario planning is integral to planning the future

Mellor 13, Ewan E. Ph.D. candidate, Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, 2013, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,”

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: Reps Matter

Reps don’t shape reality and there’s no impact

Van Rythoven 19 (Eric, PhD from Carleton, Researcher @ journal of global security studies, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 7-16-2019, )

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: Operational Warfare

Operational warfare is useless as a concept and probably wrong

Chandler 9 (David, prof of IR @ westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics," Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler_18-1.pdf)

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’(p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’(p.84). In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity(p.6). As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’(p.84). It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic(p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human(against humans)are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them. This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’(p.85)Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control. It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war(the asserted purpose of the book). Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…(p.84) Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Baudrillard › AT: Specifics › AT: Operational Warfare

Experts are credible, and don’t do any of that nasty operational warfare business.

Ravenal 9 – Professor Emeritus at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

Earl Ravenal, “Designing Defense for a New World Order,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects--- a.k.a. pork---funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities---at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)---for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups---about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”---not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation---is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points--- empirically---to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.