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This paradox determines the trajectory of a recent essay by Jean Baudrillard that was published under the deliberately inflammatory title, ‘‘The Final Solution.’’ Baudrillard asserts that the human species is confronting a life-and-death crisis around the question of reproduction, more specifically, around its determination by way of sameness or difference. But a vortex of contradictions engulfs his use of these various terms, occasioning, or rather seeming to occasion, a transvaluation of values in accordance with which they appear to signify against our expectations: ‘‘There is something occulted inside us: our deaths. But something else is hidden there, lying in wait for us within each of our cells: the forgetting of death. In our cells our immortality lies in wait for us. It’s common to speak of the struggle of life against death, but there is an inverse peril. And we must struggle against the possibility that we will not die. At the slightest hesitation in the fight for death—a fight for division, for sex, for alterity, and so for death—living beings become once again indivisible, identical to one another—and immortal.’’49 Far from speaking, with the sinthomosexual, for the death drive and its disarticulation of forms, Baudrillard remains an advocate here of reproductive futurism, explicitly enlisting this notion of death, this resistance to immortality, against the force of the death drive, which he assimilates to, and disavows as, the paradigm of sameness: ‘‘The death drive, according to Freud, is precisely this nostalgia for a state before the appearance of individuality and sexual differentiation, a state in which we lived before we became mortal and distinct from one another’’ (interesting) (). He may trumpet what he calls here the ‘‘fight for death’’ in thus opposing himself to the death drive, disparaged as eternal pursuit of the Same and hence as immortality, but opprobrium, in Baudrillard’s argument, still attaches to the death drive only insofar as it constitutes a mortal threat to the survival of the human—insofar, that is, as its sameness might make human difference different. The immortality for which he reproves it, then, threatens the human precisely with a death he would have us fight against. It names the endless negation of form, and so of what, for Baudrillard, defines the value of ‘‘difference’’: that is, our distinctly human identity. As he sketches an evolutionary movement from ‘‘the absolute continuity found in the subdivision of the same—in bacteria—to the possibility of life and death’’ (), by which latter phrase he indicates the attributes of sexual reproduction, Baudrillard, complicit with tendencies of scientific discourse in general, celebrates the triumph of sexed reproduction over genetic duplication in a teleological narrative that itself reduplicates the Freudian account of genitality’s triumph over the various ‘‘partial’’ drives. Naturalizing this trajectory from the replication he associates with genetic immortality to the procreation made possible by encountering sexual, and therefore genetic, difference, Baudrillard sounds the note of futurism’s persistent love song to itself, its fantasy of a dialectic capable of spinning meaning out of history, and history out of desire: Next [after the evolutionary moment of bacterial replication], the egg becomes fertilized by a sperm and specialized sex cells make their appearance. The resulting entity is no longer a copy of either one of the pair that engendered it; rather, it is a new and singular combination. There is a shift from pure and simple reproduction to procreation: the first two will die for the first time, and the third for the first time will be born. We reach the stage of beings that are sexed, differentiated, and mortal. The earlier order of the virus—of immortal beings—is perpetuated, but henceforward this world of deathless things is contained within the world of the mortals. In evolutionary terms, the victory goes to beings that are mortal and distinct from one another: the victory goes to us. () Or goes to ‘‘us’’ so long as ‘‘we’’ don’t identify—or get identified by others—with the regressive ‘‘order of the virus,’’ of immortal sameness or repetition, that threatens ‘‘us’’ with the sort of death Baudrillard refuses to embrace (a death through viral replication like that associated with what was referred to, twenty years ago, as ‘‘the gay plague’’): ‘‘This is the revenge taken on mortal and sexed beings by immortal and undifferentiated life forms. This is what could be called the final solution’’ (). Thus death, the corollary of difference, can function as a value for Baudrillard in the context of individual identities alone (because this, after all, allows for the Couple’s dialectical survival in the ‘‘third ’’); it retains its negative valence where the species itself is concerned.50 The latter’s impulse to immortality, to perpetuating its self-perpetuation through the mechanics of genetic exchange, must resist the backward appeal of ‘‘involution,’’ which signifies, for Baudrillard, the regressive ‘‘nullification of differences’’ (). It must, that is, remain the same in its difference from the lethal sameness it condemns for its nullification of difference, thus affirming as constant the One of the Couple and the fantasy of the sexual relation as the ‘‘duality that puts an end to perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same’’ (). Unless, of course, such iterations of the same put an end to it instead. And that, according to Baudrillard, is precisely what ‘‘sexual liberation’’ intends: The first phase of sexual liberation involves the dissociation of sexual activity from procreation through the pill and other contraceptive devices—a transformation with enormous consequences. The second phase, which we are beginning to enter now, is the dissociation of reproduction from sex. First, sex was liberated from reproduction; today it is reproduction that is liberated from sex, through asexual, biotechnological modes of reproduction such as artificial insemination or full body cloning. This is also a liberation, though antithetical to the first. We’ve been sexually liberated, and now we find ourselves liberated from sex—that is, virtually relieved of the sexual function. Among the clones (and among human beings soon enough), sex, as a result of this automatic means of reproduction, becomes extraneous, a useless function. ()) The meaning of ‘‘sex,’’ which Baudrillard had identified earlier as a mode of reproduction (‘‘sexed, differentiated, and mortal’’) distinct from that of ‘‘deathless things’’ (such as viruses and bacteria) by virtue of its mingling of genes to create ‘‘new and singular combination[s],’’ undergoes an important mutation here. How else to explain his odd characterization of artificial insemination as ‘‘asexual’’ and (continuous in this with cloning) as reproduction ‘‘liberated from sex’’? For whatever the mechanism by which it’s achieved—and ‘‘artificial’’ seems largely a diacritical term intended to naturalize the procreative function of heterosexual intercourse—insemination, the fertilization of egg by sperm, defines the very principle of sexual reproduction for Baudrillard. But the evolutionary argument for genetic combination (the essay’s original meaning of ‘‘sex’’) has morphed, as it often seems to do, into a panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation (the subsequent meaning of ‘‘sex’’).What can the lament for the putative loss of the sexual function mean, therefore, if not its very opposite: that heterosexuality, stripped of its ancient reproductive alibi, must assume at last the despiritualized burden of its status as sexual function, as sinthomosexuality; that in the face of what Baudrillard calls ‘‘automatic’’ or ‘‘biotechnological’’ modes of reproduction, it must recognize the ‘‘extraneous’’ element in sex that is never extraneous to sex and that marks it as a ‘‘useless function,’’ as a meaningless and unrecuperable expense, or even, as Jacques Derrida has written with regard to différance, ‘‘as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct.’’51 Like Faron, the narrator of The Children of Men, for whom sex in a world without procreation—without ‘‘the hope of posterity, for our race if not for ourselves’’—becomes ‘‘almost meaninglessly acrobatic,’’ Baudrillard recoils in horror before this ‘‘useless’’ sexuality. And a ‘‘useless function’’ for Baudrillard, as his use of the same phrase elsewhere suggests, means one that refuses meaning: ‘‘At the extreme limit of computation and the coding and cloning of human thought (artificial intelligence), language as a medium of symbolic exchange becomes a definitively useless function. For the first time in history we face the possibility of a Perfect Crime against language, an aphanisis of the symbolic function.’’52 Aphanisis, the term Ernest Jones introduced to identify the anxiety-inducing prospect of the disappearance of desire, refers in the passage from Baudrillard to the fading or, more ominously, to what he describes as the ‘‘global extermination of meaning’’, the unraveling of the braid inwhich reproductive futurism twines meaning, desire, and the fantasy of (hetero)sexual rapport. At the same time, though, it also evokes the subsequent use of theword by Lacan, for whom it refers instead to the fading or disappearance of the subject,whose division the signifier effects in such a way that ‘‘there is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject.’’ Lacan will then go on to add, ‘‘There is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which is that of the unconscious.’’53 Meaning, that is, against whose aphanisis Baudrillard’s jeremiad is launched, always already entails, for Lacan, the aphanisis of the unconscious: ‘‘When the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading,’ as disappearance’’ (). Appalled by the imminence of a ‘‘final solution,’’ the liberation from sexual difference intended by the force of ‘‘perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same,’’ Baudrillard holds fast to the meaning whose ‘‘global extermination’’ sinthomosexuality is always imagined to effect and whose Symbolic exchange jouissance would reduce to a ‘‘definitively useless function.’’54 And he does so in the hope of perpetuating the temporal movements of desire, of shielding himself from the unconscious(and the iterations of the drive, and securing, through futurity, through the victory of narrative duration over irony’s explosive negativity, a ground on which to stand: ‘‘The stakes,’’ he warns, ‘‘are no longer only that ‘history’ is slipping into the ‘posthistorical,’ but that the human race is slipping into the void’’ (). And all because (heterosexual) sex has ‘‘become extraneous, a useless function,’’ has become, that is, void of content once the inspiriting meaning it carried—both like, and in the form of, a Child—has vanished into the unregenerate materiality of the signifier.55 For ‘‘the signifier,’’ as Lacan declares in his interpretation of ‘‘The Purloined Letter,’’ ‘‘is not functional’’; it exceeds its use-value in the service of signification and, especially as localized in what the essay punningly engages as ‘‘the letter,’’ it brings us back to the Real, to the fatality of ‘‘what remains of a signifier when it has no more signification.’’56 Apostrophizing just such a signifier, Lacan, in his reading of Poe’s short story, makes clear just what SINTHOMOSEXUALITY 65 Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/615833/9780822385981-002.pdf by UNIV OF PENNSYLVANIA user on 09 March 2021 remains: ‘‘nothing, if not that presence of death which makes a human life a reprieve obtained from morning to morning in the name of the meanings whose sign is your crook’’ (). Baudrillard, like Silas Marner and Scrooge, may walk through the valley of the shadow of death, but with meaning as his shepherd he shall always want, desiring from morning to morning the continuation of the reprieve by which he perpetuates the fantasy space essential to his desire. ‘We see no white winged angels now,’’ George Eliot observes. ‘‘But yet men are led away from threatening destruction: a hand is put in theirs, which leads them forth gently towards a calm and bright land, so that they look no more backward; and that hand may be a little child’s.’’ Or rather, though that Child be as helpless as Eppie, as delicate as Tiny Tim, it must be the hand of a ‘‘little child’’ that lifts us into the future and thereby saves us, in the words of Baudrillard, from ‘‘slipping into the void’’ of all that is ‘‘backward’’ or ‘‘involuted,’’ of all that he condemns as ‘‘successive iterations of the same’’ that are, themselves, precisely what old Mr. Lammeter knows we value in the Eppies and Tiny Tims who embody reproductive futurism. As those faces of Eppie and Tiny Tim turn their eyes to us once more, soliciting the compassion that always compels us to want to keep them safe (in the faith that they will confer on us the future’s saving grace), let me end with a reference to the ‘‘Fourteen Words,’’ attributed to David Lane, by which members of various white separatist organizations throughout the United States affirm their collective commitment to the common cause of racial hatred: ‘‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.’’57 So long as ‘‘white’’ is the only word that makes this credo appalling, so long as figural children continue to ‘‘secure [our] existence’’ through the fantasy that we survive in them, so long as the queer refutes that fantasy, effecting its derealization as surely as an encounter with the Real, for just so long must sinthomosexuality have a future after all. For what keeps it alive, paradoxically, is the futurism desperate to negate it, obedient in that to the force of a drive that is futurism’s sinthome.