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2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Middle Passage

The structure of racial politics is inherently unstable and contradictory especially at key historical moments like the War on Terror—the aff’s targeting of specific leverage points in the political imaginary is the best strategy for overcoming the sedimentation anti-blackness

Winant 15 Winant, Howard. "The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century." Critical Sociology 41.2 (2015): 313-24. rishi

Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome.We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap, people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: •• Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet •• The destruction of the old European empires •• The coming and going of the Cold War •• The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Middle Passage

Feminization of the Atlantic helped justify the middle passage – proves that codes of masculinity are relevant to the K and that we can access their impact thru the aff and perm

Tinsley assistant professor in the departments of English and African American studies at the University of Minnesota 2008 Omise'eke Natasha “Black Atlantic, Queer Atlantic Queer Imaginings of the Middle Passage” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies project muse

If Gilroy’s Atlantic is frigid, Benítez-Rojo’s Caribbean overflows with hyperfeeling female sexuality. Recentering the resistantly nonphallic Peoples of the Sea, Benítez-Rojo foregrounds a vaginalized Caribbean as he proclaims: The Atlantic is today the Atlantic (the navel of capitalism) because Europe, in its mercantilist laboratory, conceived of the project of inseminating the Caribbean womb with the blood of Africa; the Atlantic is today the Atlantic . . . because it is the painfully delivered child of the Caribbean, whose vagina was stretched between continental clamps. . . . After the blood and salt water spurts, quickly sew up torn flesh and apply the antiseptic tinctures, the gauze and surgical plaster; then the febrile wait through the forming of a scar: suppurating, always suppurating.13 Here sexual violence and painful reproduction are simultaneously abstracted and reinscribed in regional imaginations; projected onto the water by which Caribbean women arrived in the archipelago, they conceive a disturbing image that spreads women’s metaphoric legs in unsettling ways. Yet the suppurating wound can heal, almost magically. A few pages later, the vaginal sea opens into a metaphor for liberatory pleasure and pleasurable liberation as Benítez-Rojo imagines the region’s femininity as “its flux, its diffuse sensuality, its generative force, its capacity to nourish and conserve (juices, spring, pollen, rain, seed, shoot, ritual sacrifice).”14 Bleeding, orgasming, or both, Benítez-Rojo’s cunnic Caribbean overexposes the sexualized bodies that Gilroy denies. Like the sea, the space between women’s legs is at once insistently present and insistently ethereal; like the sea, the space between women’s legs becomes a metaphor to mine. These tropes of the black Atlantic, of Peoples of the Sea, do call to me as powerful enunciations of crosscurrents of African diaspora identity, and I evoke them in respect and solidarity. And yet as Gilroy, Benítez-Rojo, Edouard Glissant, and others call on maritime metaphors without maritime histories and evoke sexualized bodies as figures rather than experiences, their writing out of materiality stops short of the most radical potential of such oceanic imaginations.15 There are other Atlantic and Caribbean histories that these scholars could have evoked to make sense of the present, other material details of maritime crossings they could have drawn on to make their metaphors richer conceptual tools. As Africans became diasporic, Atlantic and Caribbean, sex and sexuality did not only impact imaginations; they impacted bodies. Not at all an opening to infinite possibilities, the sea was initially a site of painful fluidities for many Africans. The first sight of the ocean was often a vision of fear, as Equiano remembers when slave traders marched him to the coast: I was beyond measure astonished at this, as I had never before seen any water larger than a pond or a rivulet, and my surprise was mingled with no small fear. . . . The first object which saluted my eyes when I arrived on the coast was the sea, and a slave ship, which was then riding at anchor, and waiting for its cargo. These filled me with astonishment, which was soon converted to terror.16 Once loaded onto the slave ships, Africans became fluid bodies under the force of brutality. Tightly or loosely packed in sex-segregated holds — men chained together at the ankles while women were sometimes left unchained — surrounded by churning, unseen waters, these brutalized bodies themselves became liquid, oozing. Ship’s surgeon Alexander Falconbridge records days when “wet and blowing weather having occasioned the portholes to be shut and the grating to be covered, fluxes and fevers among the negroes ensued. . . . The deck was so covered with the blood and mucus which had proceeded from them in consequence of the flux, that it resembled a slaughterhouse.”17 Lara adds to this imagination in a character’s vision of a slave ship: “Women’s menstrual blood stained the floor¶ around her, pus crusting at the edges of the chattel wounds. . . . She could feel her body rise in a wave of urine and blood, the stench so wretched as to make her choke on her own breath.”18 On this Atlantic, then, black body waters, corporeal effluvia, and the stains of gendered and reproductive bodies were among the first sites of colonization. But this bloody Atlantic was also the site of collaboration and resistance. In the early eighteenth century, ship captains like John Newton and James Barbot repeatedly record with horror how despite such conditions slaves conspired to rebel against captors. At the same time, unnamed rebellions took place not in violent but in erotic resistance, in interpersonal relationships enslaved Africans formed with those imprisoned and oozing beside them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Anti-Blackness

Their desire for purity and authenticity limits the possibility for the creation of complex communication communities that limits the praxis for engagement and normalizes dehumanization of victims of heterosexism

Hoagland 7 (Sarah, Professor of Philosphy and Women Studies at Northeastern Illinois University in Chicago, Collective Member of the Institute of LEsbian Studies and of the Escuela Popular Norteña, "Heterosexualism and White Supremacy," Hypatia 22.1, 166-185, Muse)

We Are Everywhere . . . Or Not at All Communities, of course, can become oppressive in critical ways, particularly when their practitioners think of them as institutions rather than contexts (looser and more ambiguous), for example, when those assuming "leadership" act in terms of purity and authenticity (note Lugones 2003, chap. 7). What brings lesbians together in community? Not fear, which is the current basis of U.S. solidarity, nor is it common oppression. To begin with, there is our desire. Desire and creativity are a central part of our possibilities, ingenious lesbian creativity, making so much—bookstores, coffee houses, poetry, publishing houses, music, bars, sports teams, record companies, theory, music festivals, jewelry, methods of healing. And what are possibilities of lesbian communities? In addition to loving women, because we are everywhere, there is enacting a praxis of engaging through difference rather than similarity, at first brought as a structural challenge by Audre Lorde. And that, it seems to me, grounds our possibilities, our work—not working for state-constructed "rights" but developing complex communication (Lugones 2006). I despair at the multilevels of heterosexualism and white supremacy by which our actions and imaginations are framed. It undermines possibilities of lesbian community and all the work in community building we have to do. In taking up el pasar discontinuo de la cachapera/tortillera del barrio a la barra al moviemiento (the discontinuous passing of the cachapera/tortillera from the barrio to the bar to the movement),9 María Lugones notes "la tortillera exists en la comunidad only as a pervert. Perversion constitutes her and marks her as outside of countenanced relationality. . . . En la comunidad, under the reigns of nationalism, la cachapera is silent, her meaning is made by others" (Lugones 2003, 174). Within African-American communities, out lesbians can be seen not as black, but as a white perversion (Carruthers 1979). [End Page 180] Yet "instead of cultivating her company toward impure shatterings of colonized communions, la cachapera becomes the Latina/Lesbian," moving into the territoriality of the Lesbian Movement—white locales, movement that does not move into Latino communities. So "Latina/Lesbian is an oxymoron, an absence of relation. Latina/Lesbian lacks a hyphen" and so hybridization. "The movement of the tortillera into the Lesbian Movement is a fantastic flight because she comes out to a forced speaking in a bifid tongue; because the eyes that see her coming out, remake her in their own imagination" (Lugones 2003, 174–76). And so the Latina/Lesbian who was working to make a place for herself in the campus Feminist Majority, not to mention the campus GLBTA, finds herself alone once again. At the "Heterosexism and Empire" workshop, one Vietnamese lesbian questioned, given the history of gendering in her country, what it would mean for her to talk about being masculine or feminine. A Korean transperson talked about the effects of Christian missionaries in her immigrant community. And a Palestinian woman noted there was an assumption that if people are queer, they are not going to be Muslim. Communities are the places of our possibilities, the places from which we grow. Moreover, my capacity to be a lesbian involves a relationality proscribed by dominant fragmentation, by heterosexualism. It animates through praxis of engagement.10 If tortilleras, bulldaggers, marimachas, swing girls, desi dykes, among many others, can only act out in lesbian community and are forced into the closet among family and local community; if la tortillera is cut off from a critical community, from a central source that nourishes her, if she can only be lesbian outside a critical place of her possibilities, and once outside only as someone acting out, if her possibilities of utcatha are negated, then as María Lugones suggests, she is a phantasm. And if she is a phantasm, then so am I. What, finally, concerns me is community, lesbian communities. That's what heterosexualism and white supremacy destroy. Lesbian activism has shifted from community building where we developed resources and came together to create, to make something happen, shifted from coming together in collective work to develop communities that undermine oppression, shifted from all that to asking and depending on the state to frame what is significant in our lives. I don't doubt the sincerity of those who are fighting hard for rights; I despair the appropriation of lesbian imagination, the loss of Sinister Wisdom. [End Page 181]

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Anti-Blackness

The neg defines oppression through the binary of whiteness in opposition to blackness – this essentialized view of oppression leads to the prioritization of race over all other forms of oppression and perpetuates gendered violence

DWP 13 (Dearest White People, internet blog cultural poltics, "The Black Mythical Norm: Intersectionality and the Nationalist Construction of “Blackness”," April 16, dearestwhitepeople.wordpress.com/2012/04/16/black-mythical-norm/)

In “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” Audre Lorde defines what she calls a “mythical norm” in the United States, which is usually “white, thin, male, young, heterosexual… and financially secure” (Lorde, 2009, p. 517). With regards to this default American, Black Nationalism strives to build racial solidarity around the black community’s common deviation from the norm: Black people are not white. However, this essentialized view of black people often leads to prioritization of race over all other “deviations” by those black individuals whose identities are most closely aligned with the norm. In this nationalist construction of blackness, the black, thin, male, young, heterosexual, financially secure person becomes the “default” black person. According to Mark Anthony Neal, this nationalist construction of “blackness” led to the creation of the “Strong Black Man” figure, which Neal posits “can be faulted for championing a stunted, conservative, one dimensional, and stridently heterosexual vision of black masculinity” (Neal, 2005, p. 24), often to the detriment of those persons within the black community whose experiences with racial oppression intersect with other oppressive forces based on gender, sexuality, class, age, or any other deviation from the nationalist-constructed notion of “blackness.” This paper will explore the ways in which the nationalist-propagated image of the “Strong Black Man” interfaces with intersectionality of racial, gender, and sexual oppression, and attempt to grapple with the question: “who is Black enough?” The notion of not being “black enough” reverberates throughout black feminist and masculinist writings. In “Where We Live,” Essex Helphill states, “I’m as black as anyone, but not by the criteria the nationalists construct” (Belton, 1995, p. 214). In the same piece, in reference to the Million Man March, Isaac Julian laments, “It’s about another spectacle of middle-class black straight men claiming ownership of blackness” (Belton, 1995, p. 214). Audre Lorde echoes this sentiment, proclaiming, “Black women who once insisted that lesbianism was a white woman’s problem now insist that black lesbians are a threat to black nationhood, are consorting with the enemy, are basically unblack” (Lorde, 2009, p. 521). In “Having Their Say,” Rudolph Byrd speaks to the connections between the oppression of women and homosexuals in the black community, stating, “I decided not to waste any more time with those folks because I understood that I could never be Black enough for them… And so it was my experience with homophobia and the rejection of my blackness that caused me to empathize with women” (Cole & Guy-Sheftall, 2003, p. 51). Alongside attacks on queer individuals for not living up to nationalist constructions of “blackness” come accusations of betrayal and treachery toward black feminists and womanists who dare speak out against black male sexism. As Lorde asserts, “Black women’s literature is full of the pain of frequent assault, not only by a racist patriarchy, but also by black men. Yet the necessity for and history of shared battle have made us, black women, particularly vulnerable to the false accusation that anti-sexist is anti-black” (Lorde, 2009, p. 520). Despite feeling marginalized from within their own black communities, women and men who don’t fit into essentialized notions of “blackness” often don’t wish to separate themselves from those black males who propagate sexist, heterosexist, and misogynistic attitudes. Unlike self-identified white marginalized individuals who advocate fractionalization from their white heterosexual male oppressors, black people faced with intersecting systems of oppression are still able to feel united with black nationalists in their struggle against racial oppression. This may be because the white “community” in the United States is no community at all, but rather merely a built-in privilege that has been so long characterized as “default” that it allows white women, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered individuals to define their identities in terms of their own experience, without ever needing to contemplate race. In contrast to this, women, lesbians, gay men, and transgendered individuals in the black community must view their condition through the lens of their experiences with multiple layers of oppression, which means that a separationist attitude within their racial category is not so simple. As stated by the Combahee River Collective, “Our situation as black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race… We struggle together with black men against racism, while we also struggle with black men about sexism” (The Combahee River Collective, 2009, p. 504). The collective struggle against racism, although ripe with complexity, is not one that many Black people seek to abandon, regardless of potentially harmful nationalist sentiments. Because the intersectionality of oppressions facing black people who deviate from the essentialized, or default, image of “blackness” occur simultaneously, it is often difficult for individuals who must cope with many intersecting systems of oppression to separate their basis of oppression into categories and prioritize them in the same way that a black heterosexual male may be able to. The ability and willingness to prioritize identities has much to do with power relationships both among black people and relative to white people. As black nationalists rally together to combat forces of racism, they often strategically seek to do so in ways that run parallel to the white patriarchal power structure. As Isaac Julien argues, “It’s a question of power. Black men have been rendered powerless by the dominant society, and it’s that drive to have power at any cost, no matter what is silenced or dismissed” (Belton, 1995, p. 213). Upon deeper analysis of this quote, it becomes apparent that although much of the black community has been “rendered powerless,” the heterosexual black man in particular has been marginalized by the white supremacy system alone. Because the system of patriarchy allows heterosexual black men to focus on only one of their identities as the object of oppression, these individuals are elevated to a place of power within the black community where they are able to feel anger toward those black people whom they see as raising “other” identity issues that complicate what Angela Davis aptly called “narrow nationalism” (Davis, 1992, p. 320). According to Audre Lourde, “Within black communities, where racism is a living reality, differences among us often seem dangerous and suspect. The need for unity is often misnamed as a need for homogeneity, and a black feminist vision mistaken for betrayal of our common interests as people” (Lorde, 2009, p. 519). One of the greatest pitfalls of Black Nationalism and essentialism is that as a strategy for white acceptance and assimilation into white American culture it is premised on the black community’s acceptance of other power constructs such as patriarchy and heteronormativity. Norm R. Allen, Jr. calls this strategy “Reactionary Black Nationalism.” Allen, Jr. posits, “‘On the one hand, Reactionary Black Nationalists advocate self-love, self-respect, self-acceptance, self-help, pride unity’—all valuable and needed attributes for members of black communities and institutions—but also promote ‘bigotry, intolerance, hatred, sexism [and] homophobia’ among other things” (Neal, 2005, p. 23). This hypothesis is furthered by evidence of acceptance in the nationalist community of what Louis Farrakhan called “defects of character.” Just as Farrakhan was forgiven for his self-described “heart… dark with hatred” (Farrakhan, 1996, p. 11), as apparently shown in his blatant sexism and heterosexism, and Eldridge Cleaver is still held in high regard despite his misogyny and homophobia, Reactionary Black Nationalists’ chauvinist sentiments are “largely ignored or seen as excusable in a world where ‘race’ often trumps ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ as meaningful issues within the black community” (Neal, 2005, pp. 23-24). By prioritizing race in the context of oppression, black heterosexual males silence voices within the black community that they see as obstacles to their strategy of gaining acceptance and power for “black people” as defined by their own construct.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Anti-Blackness

Violence against the black body occurs through a process of socialization that goes beyond race – must examine the role gender plays

Martinot 7 (Steve, Adjunct Instructor at San Francisco State University,He has been a human rights, union, and community activist for most of his life." Motherhood and the Invention of Race," Hypatia 22.2, 79-97, Project Muse))

An article in The Nation from December 3, 2003, entitled "Criminalizing Motherhood," tells an old story. It is the story of a prosecution, now considered by the state as a precedent; yet it reveals a social logic that has long inhabited U.S. jurisprudence and which the state continues to rehearse and perform. In the cold clang of its historically practiced procedure, that logic is at once recalled and forgotten as a principle governing the United States since its inception. Regina McKnight is doing twelve years in prison for a stillbirth, carving out a dangerous intersection between the drug war and the anti-choice movement. In the eyes of the South Carolina Attorney General's office, McKnight committed murder. Her crime? Giving birth to a five-pound, stillborn baby. As McKnight grieved and held her third daughter Mercedes' lifeless body, she could never have imagined that she was about to become the first woman in America convicted of murder by using cocaine while pregnant. [End Page 79] The absence of any scientific research linking cocaine use to stillbirth didn't matter. Nor did it matter that the state couldn't conclusively prove that McKnight's cocaine use actually caused Mercedes' stillbirth. What mattered was that South Carolina prosecutors were hell-bent on using McKnight as an example. Thanks largely to the efforts of the former Republican Attorney General, Charlie Condon, now running for U.S. Senate, South Carolina is the only state in the nation with a child-abuse law that can be applied to "viable fetuses." . . . McKnight, now 26, was the first to be imprisoned on a murder conviction under the "viable fetuses" law. In October McKnight lost her best shot at release when the Supreme Court decided not to review the case, allowing the conviction to stand by default. (Talvi 2003, 4) The article only allusively suggests that McKnight is black, but it does mention that she is a seasonal tobacco worker, homeless, and at the time of her pregnancy, grieving the death of her own mother, who was run over by a truck. For white jurisprudence, it is neither her homeless exposure to the elements, nor the malnutrition attendant upon underpaid agricultural labor, nor the exhaustion of long work hours, that took her baby's life, but a toke in an unguarded moment. It is not the health of the mother that the state is concerned with; the provision of better labor protections and conditions would have directly enhanced the baby's biological well being. And neither is it McKnight's misery, since that is precisely what the state uses against her by prosecuting her for drug use rather than providing her with prenatal medical care. Whatever defense she might have wished to offer concerning her homelessness, her bereavement, or the duress of her daily toil, were discounted in advance. McKnight's health is an extraneous concern and her humanity irrelevant. Yet insofar as the state has shown no interest in the health or viability of either mother or child, its juridical concept of 'viable fetus' becomes simply a rhetorical device to deliver women into the thrall of its control, to render them functions of the state. In prosecuting McKnight, the state's agenda is to use motherhood to control women and to mark the difference of race. The state's control of women's pregnant bodies has a strong racial component—black women's bodies are, and have always been, used in the United States as a mechanism to reconstitute the state as white. In Killing the Black Body, Dorothy Roberts offers a meticulous history of the control of black childbearing imposed by various forms of white power throughout the history of the United States (slavery, Jim Crow, sterilization campaigns, the war on drugs, and so on). Roberts lists a number of cases where the state's discovery of a pregnant black woman's drug use becomes an excuse to demand abortion by threatening [End Page 80] the mother with a jail sentence.1 She argues that, with a few exceptions, black pregnant women were drug tested and reported to the district attorney by hospitals, while white pregnant women were not (1997, 158). And these cases serve as a precedent for all women: what the state does to black women it can do to all women. For Roberts, reproductive rights are a question of social justice, not simply of individual rights (1997, 6). Reproductive rights are double edged: people have the right to bear children as equally as they have the right not to. Social justice locates these rights in a woman's relation to herself: in her body and her social and economic well being. Where and when the law seeks to control motherhood, it doubly derogates those rights. In McKnight's case, social justice is withheld twice, in the state's abrogation of responsibility for her health as a person and a pregnant woman, and in her prosecution as a black woman with a lost pregnancy in the face of the state's failure to protect her. At the end of the trial, a black woman sits in prison, a white prosecutor self-righteously proclaims an important precedent to have been set, and a committee in New York loses an attempt to rectify this miscarriage of justice. Yet for the state to consider McKnight's prosecution as a precedent, it has to commit an act of historical amnesia. Far from a precedent, it reenacts a scene that for three hundred years has seen the sacrifice of thousands of men and women who remain unnamed, the "strange fruit" of a "manifest destiny," to that same state sanctity. McKnight's conviction is entirely in keeping with the legacy of the history of black agricultural labor—from plantation bond labor to the debt servitude enforced by Jim Crow chain gangs to a contemporary migratory labor force facing a highly racialized prison industry. An entire history of segregation and wanton racialized violence is retold in this small legal act. Black people are criminalized through their blackness for the purposes of decriminalizing and valorizing not only the state's abrogation of responsibility to them as citizens but also its imposition of dehumanizing conditions upon them. In McKnight's case, the statements of a white state embodied in the prosecution's arguments are given value and intelligibility by that same history and the history of black agricultural labor. What I refer to as historical amnesia does not erase the history it forgets; it transforms that history into a cultural logic, a means of valorizing its actions and truth claims as natural. As amnesia, it disguises its historical antecedents in order to obviate recognition of former injustices, such as social structures called slavery or segregation, in order to open space to set legal precedents. Thus, it reduces history to a background template by which to establish a sense of familiarity for its injustices, to make them appear acceptable. But at the same time, it reveals the historical sources of its own structure of thought, its sense of the permissible, and the internal cultural logic of the white mind that understands these injustices [End Page 81] as acceptable. In discounting McKnight's arguments, her condition, her very being beyond the scope of argument, data, or morality, the state renders her an instrument for itself. The cultural logic of its operations takes on a proprietary value. No amount of data or argumentation for the rights of black mothers and other women of color will challenge this structure or prevent its reenactment. Indeed, it is only by erasing or dismissing data that might challenge the state's claims that the state bestows validity on its indictment, and its unobstructed call to an unspoken historical logic. Here, I want to investigate the nature and meaning of the structures that make the injustices against McKnight both recognizable and permissible to the white state. McKnight must be criminalized in order to decriminalize the state's maintenance of brutal labor conditions. What I wish to investigate is the relation of the hegemonic white male mind to history, in order to reveal what lies behind its self-valorization, its ability to dispense with argument, and to reside in the emptiest of statements while discounting (through criminalization) any defense against itself. The state is not white by fiat; it is white as a cultural condition given by events that reconstitute its history in the present. To fully understand the structure of the relation between the state's actions and the devaluation and criminalization of black bodies, we must revisit not only the historical legacy these contemporary actions repeat but also the cultural logic that historical legacy created and maintained. We are not speaking of the historical repetition of racism here, but of something more profound. The fact that the state picks out black people to victimize is a pragmatic use of racism. However, for the state to decriminalize itself through the criminalization of its victims becomes a question of social identity, and of a certain social sanctity acquired through that identity. It is the construction of a sanctity for whiteness, and for white racialized consciousness that goes beyond racism, and empowers it. In the eyes of that consciousness, a sense of justice or humanity toward McKnight as a black woman would be an unrecognizable act. What gives the state's injustice familiarity is a structure of racialization, whereby the state renders itself white by its acts against black people, in general, and black women, in particular. This structure of racialization threads its way through U.S. history against people of color as a cultural norm. The modes of impunity and the form of criminalization of the victims may change, but the underlying structure remains the same. To grasp the inner construction of this specific structure of racialization, we must return to the seventeenth-century English colony in Virginia, to the evolution of the slave system, and, as I will argue, to the invention of race, whiteness, and white supremacy. Of particular import will be a law passed in 1662 establishing matrilineal servitude status. In a strange reversal of English law, where the status of the children followed the status of the father, this new law declared that the children's social status followed the servitude status of the [End Page 82] mother. This law constituted an important step in the evolution of a structure of racialization in the colony, as it groped its way toward a system of slavery and an identification with whiteness. The victimization of McKnight reveals the re-racializing project of the state; but to see this, we must understand the history that first discloses the raw evolution of racialization.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Anti-Blackness

Systems of power are interlocking and forcing competition links to white masculine rationality

Collins, 1990. (Patricia Hill Collins, Associate Professor of African American Studies, University of Cincinnati, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment, 1990, p. 225)

Additive models of oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Eurocentric, masculinist thought. One must be either Black or white in such thought systems – persons of ambiguous racial and ethnic identity constantly battle with questions such as “what are you, anyway?” This emphasis on quantification and categorization occurs in conjunction with the belief that either/or categories must be ranked. The search for certainty of this sort requires that one side of a dichotomy be privileged while its other is denigrated. Privilege becomes defined in relation to its other. Replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking ones creates possibilities for new paradigms. The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems of oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity. Race, class and gender represent the three systems of oppression that most heavily affect African-American women. But these systems and the economic, political, and ideological conditions that support them may not be the most fundamental oppressions, and they certainly affect many more groups than Black women. Other people of color, Jews, the poor, white women, and gays and lesbians have all had similar ideological justifications offered for their subordination. All categories of humans labeled Others have been equated to one another, to animals, and to nature (Halpin 1989). Placing African-American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both/and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending upon the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Academy › individualized action good/spills up

Their understanding of individual resistance/our speech act is reductive – affective dissonance galvanizes resistance beyond specific identity or ideology but towards ending violence

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

My analysis has shown that whatever form neoliberalism is taken to be in schools and universities, the neoliberal present has important affective implications. The affective economies of neoliberalism that are produced in schools and universities create particular ‘capacities to affect and be affected’ for teachers and students alike. It is thus extremely important to develop methodological and theoretical tools that critically trace the capacities of teachers and students for affecting and being affected in their engagements and negotiations with neoliberal education, and specifically how these capacities are normalized, embodied or enable alternative counter-practices (Zembylas, 2018b). Hence, what is required is a continued critical engagement with neoliberalism’s educational impact in ways that take into consideration the affective potentialities of resistance. Considering the affective potentialities of resistance in critical pedagogy can be the starting point for alternatives visions of educational policies and practices that challenge forms of neoliberal education. I would argue, then, that what is needed in the study of resistance in critical pedagogy is what Thrift (2008) calls a micro-biopolitical approach (Thrift, 2008) which understands the complexities and ambivalences of neoliberal affects and norms that operate at the mundane, ordinary, and everyday level in schools and universities and the consequences that are produced (Zembylas, 2018b). This micro-biopolitical approach on conceptualizing resistance in critical pedagogy is valuable not only because it pays attention to the affective consequences of mechanisms and techniques of neoliberal education in schools and universities, but also because it invokes what Braidotti (2013) terms ‘affirmative critique’ (see also Staunæs, 2016). An affirmative critique in critical pedagogy, for example, is the sort of critical engagement with ideas 10 M. ZEMBYLAS and things that creates affective spaces for alternative counter-conduct practices against neoliberal education. In other words, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy creates openings for an affirmative critique that has the potential to transform teachers’ and students’ capacities to affect and be affected. In considering the approach I am suggesting here to affect and resistance in critical pedagogy, one can indeed raise several questions and concerns such as: How may critical pedagogy itself function as an ‘apparatus of power’ (Anderson, 2014) which uses affect to mobilize resistance towards certain ideologies or structures such as neoliberalism? How are these mobilizations of resistance connected to broader collective conditions and processes of resisting certain ideologies or structures at the macro-political level? How do teachers’ and students’ practices and bodily capacities reproduce or enrich certain mobilizations of resistance through their encounters? How can those practices and bodily capacities be reproductive, adaptive or resistant, whether intentionally or not? (e.g. see McKenzie, 2017). There are no definitive answers to these questions, but they must be posed to show the complexities and ambivalences emerging from attempts to link affect and resistance in critical pedagogy. Hence, I would argue that any viable theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy must not be limited to ‘conventional’ understandings of resistance but must emphasize how affects condition the ways neoliberalism emerges, circulate and are transformed by forms of resistance waged by teachers and students. Greater acknowledgment of the ways in which schools and universities play a fundamental role in the affective conduct of individuals, encouraging and directing the self-perceptions, economic behavior and socio-political actions of students, citizens, and workers (Odysseos & Pal, 2018) will renew theorization of resistance in critical pedagogy in two ways. First, by gesturing toward the particular ways in which affects come to have force and socio-political significance, critical pedagogy disconnects resistance from a psychologized perspective or a perspective that defines resistance in dualistic terms as a matter of either human agency or social structure. This would mean, for instance, recognizing that resistance is not a set of individualized actions but rather it is very much embedded in the affective infrastructures of neoliberal education. To create renewed affective relations and assemblages as counter-conduct in schools and universities, then, would essentially mean to invent new affective practices that instigate empowerment and resistance against the various manifestations of neoliberal education. As Alldred and Fox (2017) conclude: It is therefore more accurate to see power and resistance as dual fluxes that permeate all assemblages, a shifting balance that is never finally settled. Defining a certain affect as an assertion of power or an effort at resistance is less important than assessing the capacities that these affects produce. (p. 1171) For example, it is argued that ‘affective solidarity’ is necessary for a sustainable politics of transformation (Hemmings, 2012). Hemmings proposes an approach that moves away from rooting transformation in politics of identity and towards modes of engagement that start from the affective dissonance experience can produce. Although affective dissonance with the experience of neoliberalism’s educational impact, for instance, cannot guarantee a resistant mode, ‘that sense of dissonance might become a sense of injustice and then a desire to rectify that’ (Hemmings, 2012, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 11 p. 157). The recognition of affective dissonance as the point of departure for a possible affective solidarity among teachers and student highlights that affective dissonance with neoliberalism’s educational impact may be a productive basis from which to seek solidarity with others – not based on a shared identity or ideology, but on feeling the desire for transforming the injustices inflicted by neoliberal policies and practices. Second, the recognition of the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy helps us understand the affective present in and beyond schools and universities as a series of processes and practices in ‘the everyday’ in which the focus is on the actions that are mobilized to produce something rather than on their representations or what they supposedly mean. By examining the consequences of affects at the micropolitical level, resistance can be understood in terms of the ways actions produce capacities to affect and be affected, that is, ‘in terms of the forces circulating in assemblage and the consequent capacities that are produced in assembled relations, including human bodies and subjectivities’ (Alldred & Fox, 2017, p. 1171). Calling upon theoretical insights in critical pedagogy that recognize and examine the affective dimension of everyday resistance is likely to challenge the ‘invisible’ infrastructures of neoliberal education in schools and universities. All in all, the call for a critical pedagogy to acknowledge the affective dimension of resistance marks an important and necessary moment that allows critical pedagogy to be further enriched in attempts to address the challenges faced by teachers and students in neoliberal education. Schools and universities are at a critical juncture whether and how they will be able to develop pedagogies and ideas that neither return to an idealized, pre-neoliberal past, nor expect a sudden revolution but instead resist against the self-formations involved by neoliberalism (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). What I have offered here is an attempt to illuminate the affective dimension of resistance and its implications for critical pedagogy through theoretical insights that enhance individual and collective capacity for counter-conduct in neoliberal contexts. Being attentive to the complexities and potential ambivalences in teachers’ and students’ forms of resistance enhances our analysis of how critical pedagogy more broadly, and schools and universities more specifically, are themselves implicated in transformations of neoliberal education (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Academy › affect inevitable/necessary/RC

Their understanding of resistance refuses an analysis through affect theory – this dooms their movement to failure as they fall victim to the psychic impacts of neoliberal violence

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

In this section, I briefly illustrate how resistance is an affective movement of becoming, rather than an individual act, with consequences for students’ and educators’ bodies, theory, research and practice in education. While others have acknowledged the role of emotions and affect in making sense of how neoliberal changes in education are experienced by students and educators (e.g. see Bialostok & Aronson, 2016; Hanley, 2015; Moffatt et al., 2018), my illustrations – which come from my own research over the years (e.g. Zembylas, 2010, 2015, 2018b, 2018c; Bozalek & Zembylas, 2018) – intend to demonstrate not only how neoliberal policies in education use affects (e.g. fear, anxiety) to produce certain subjectivities (e.g. see Finn, 2016; McKenzie, 2017; Sellar, 2015; Staunæs, 2011), but also how educators and students engage in micro-political movements of affective resistance. To do so, I am using the idea of policy prolepsis introduced by Webb and Gulson (2012) as a methodological tool to identify the particular ways neoliberal policies in education induce and prompt particular behaviors and desires in educators and students.2 Policy prolepses, according to Webb and Gulson, are a category of becoming-policy that shape policy interpretations and practices within the spaces of desired, yet incomplete, policy initiatives and interpretations. ‘Policy prolepses operate through affective tones’ (ibid., p. 91) and ‘are coded affectively’ (ibid., p. 92), positioning policy interpretations as well as subjects themselves. What follows, then, are two brief illustrations of policy prolepsis that show the complexities of affective resistance produced in neoliberal education and its implications. The first example is concerned with how the becoming-policy of standardized professional standards in schools operates affectively in paradoxical and unexpected ways; the second example is concerned with identifying the ambivalent affective assemblages of educators’ and students’ resistance against neoliberal policies at the university level. In the first example, it is shown how the politics of standardized professional standards in schools instill fear, anxiety, stress and anger in teachers, who generate 8 M. ZEMBYLAS micro-political ways of resisting the affective atmospheres invoking normalization of teachers’ pedagogies (see Zembylas, 2010, 2018b). For example, teachers engage in false compliance, agreeing at a rhetorical level with some aspects of professional standards, while resisting them in practice or denouncing standards in small circles of trusted colleagues. Importantly, teachers acknowledge the emotional ambivalence of engaging in false compliance: the assemblages of fear and anxiety on the one hand, and the affective atmospheres of solidarity with colleagues, on the other. Clearly, resistance is not always progressive or emancipatory, as teachers themselves often recognize that their subjectivities are caught up in the affective conditions created by such policy interventions, producing tensions, paradoxes and ambivalences in their lives. One may, in fact, explore the numerous (anticipated and unanticipated) micro-political ways of resistance by teachers that might change the rhythms of schooling, producing alternative affective spaces that sometimes enable new embodied encounters and relations (e.g. between teachers and students or between teachers and their colleagues), while other times simply reinforce the negative atmosphere of fear or anger. Illuminating the counter-conductive elements of teachers’ resistances can reveal more specifically how counter-conduct is always prone to the entanglement of governing and surveillance practices (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). Hence, teachers’ affective resistance towards standardizing processes in schools finds itself caught between a negative affective atmosphere (e.g. fear or anger) that could be reproduced and, at the same time, the production of new and unexpected ways of resistance against the material and affective forces that impinge on teachers’ bodies. In all of these different possibilities, an analysis of the affective dimension of resistance requires that we focus upon the micro-politics of the (intended and unintended) affective assemblages in which teachers are a part of. My second example pertains to university students’ protests in 2015 and 2016 against neoliberal and colonial education policies in South Africa, calling for decolonizing higher education and greater access to education, which has resulted in disruptions of examinations and academic programs (Zembylas, 2018c; Luescher & Klemenčič, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2016; Pillay, 2016).3 I want to draw attention to students’ collective affects (e.g. anger) which circulated through affective economies that operated across universities in the Western Cape (Bozalek & Zembylas, 2018). Collective affects were invigorated by a growing protest against neoliberal and colonial policies in higher education. The anger instilled in students by such policies was transmitted onto local university communities by circulating images of protests through the media. In particular, protests have become a prominent feature of public and university life in South Africa. The process of students’ occupation of university premises, in some cases, and the visibility it gave, especially through violence and the damages caused to university property, made it a transfiguring moment in the lives of the participants and the local community. Hence, there were voices who acknowledged their concomitant responsibility as a result of performing damage to public property that cost considerable amounts of money at a time of scarcity of resources. In our research, for example, there were students and educators who noted how, and in which ways, their subjectivities were produced within assemblages that included ambivalent affective economies – on the one hand, an assemblage of anger against neoliberal policies; on the other hand, CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION 9 an assemblage of disappointment and skepticism for the use of violence as a form of protest, thus questioning the moral legitimacy of (violent) resistance. Counter-conduct offers a compelling concept to understand the form of students’ protests as refusals of subjectivities and as acts of disobedience against being conducted as ‘consumer-students’ (Odysseos & Pal, 2018). However, the framework of counter-conduct, also allows us to grasp counter-conducts as affective mechanisms that may either forge new ways of resisting neoliberal policies or could become co-opted by the politics of violence. Through this tension, it is shown that there are ambivalent affective atmospheres circulating in counter-conductive practices of students and educators that could neither be ‘simply oppositional nor always fully articulated as part of a clear and long-term strategy of resistance’ (Odysseos & Pal, 2018, p. 17). These observations illuminate the affective ambivalence and paradoxicality of resistance against neoliberal policies; in other words, there are limitations in resistance efforts that signal clearly that such attempts may end in failure, possibly reproducing the risks that neoliberalism preys upon. This brief illustration also shows that any such analysis needs to remain attuned to exploring neoliberal policies in education as complex affective sites of producing and contesting subjectivities of students and educators – sites that are open to evading, resisting and redirecting neoliberal and colonial imperatives (Odysseos & Pal, 2018).

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Academy › affect inevitable/necessary/RC

Neoliberalism is an affective event – in order to challenge it, our resistance must be affective too

Zembylas 19 [Michalinos Zembylas (2019): The affective dimension of everyday resistance: implications for critical pedagogy in engaging with neoliberalism’s educational impact, Critical Studies in Education, DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180]//jz

Resistance is a central concept of the social sciences – a concept that has been widely used in feminist, cultural, poststructural, postcolonial and critical theories (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2016). Despite its extensive use, however, there is considerable disagreement and ambiguity as to what exactly it denotes (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 549). In their frequently cited review of the origin and status of the concept in the social sciences, Hollander and Einwohner point out that resistance has been used in diverse, imprecise and contradictory ways. One can make a similar argument about critical pedagogy, namely, that the use of the concept of resistance in this field has also been diverse and contradictory, depending on the theoretical framework within which resistance has been framed (e.g. see Kirylo, 2013). It is safe to argue, then, that there is no unified way of defining resistance in critical pedagogy besides a general understanding of this concept as individual or collective acts of opposition, yet what constitutes opposition is not always clear. While debates in the social sciences over the meaning and implications of the concept of resistance have proliferated in recent years, one aspect that has not been adequately explored is the notion of affect (Hynes, 2013). As Hynes has pointed out, CONTACT Michalinos Zembylas m.zembylas@ouc.ac.cy Open University of Cyprus, P. O. Box 12794, Latsia 2252, Cyprus CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION https://doi.org/10.1080/17508487.2019.1617180 © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group since Hollander and Einwohner published their review in 2004 there have been significant shifts in social theory, and most notably affect theory, that call for a reconceptualization of what counts as resistance. ‘Affect’ can generally be understood as relational and embodied intensities that circulate as ‘forces of encounter’; in this sense, affect encompasses and exceeds more individualized conceptions of emotion (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010). What has conventionally been termed ‘resistance’, then, may be reconceptualized in terms of a flux of affects that produces political effects which challenge understandings of power or control (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Hence, recognizing the affective dimension of resistance complements earlier understandings of power and resistance on the basis of a simplistic opposition of human agency and social structure. As Alldred and Fox (2017) suggest: ‘power and resistance are differing aspects of the affective flux between relations in particular assemblages; all events are consequently sites in which both “power” and “resistance” may be discerned’ (p. 1170). In other words, it is suggested that there is need to pay attention to resistance as an affective event, rather than merely as an individual or collective acts of opposition. In particular, resistance against neoliberal reforms in education – e.g. high stakes testing, accountability, standards, and audit regimes (Giroux, 2008; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005; Taubman, 2009) – involves significant affective repercussions for teachers and students (Zembylas, 2018b; Bialostok & Aronson, 2016; Hanley, 2015; Moffatt et al., 2018). While there are many definitions of neoliberalism, generally it denotes emphases on productivity, economic liberalization policies, and the significance of the individual (see Springer, Birch, & MacLeavy, 2016). Neoliberalism itself, then, is an affective event, as collective affects emerging from neoliberal policies and practices (e.g. fear, anxiety, anger) are inextricable aspects of the sites, networks and flows of neoliberalism in societies (Anderson, 2014, 2016). Scholars of critical pedagogy have analyzed the pedagogies of the neoliberal project, whose aim is to produce apolitical consumers and future citizens (Odysseos & Pal, 2018), yet the affective dimension of resistance against neoliberalism’s educational impact has not been adequately theorized. The main objective of this article, then, is to discuss the affective dimension of resistance in critical pedagogy in a way that would recognize neoliberalism’s affective repercussions. The point is not merely to show that affect is involved in the emergence of resistance in critical pedagogy, but rather to expand the articulation of resistance in neoliberal education through the lens of affect theory. Specifically, I am interested in theorizing how critical pedagogy can cultivate ‘everyday’ or ‘invisible’ acts of resistance (Scott, 1985, 1989, 1990) that constitute forms of ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault, 2009) in ways that acknowledge, engage with, and further enhance teachers’ and students’ critical engagement with the affective aspects of resistance and neoliberalism.1 In other words, I theoretically bring together critical pedagogy, affect, everyday resistance, and counter-conduct to examine the following questions: How might we understand resistance in critical pedagogy as a form of affective work? What are the pedagogical implications of recognizing the affective dimension of resistance, particularly in relation to cultivating counter-conductive practices towards neoliberalism?

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Academy › AT: vagueness bad

Their obsession with blueprinted methods and separation of the theoretical from the material crowds out nuance and leaves the judge to default to normative Western modes of adjudicating critical thought – vote aff to subvert the university’s imperative for clarity

Hoofd 17 [Ingrid M. Hoofd (2017) “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration: The Disintegration of University Teaching and Research” Palgrave Macmillan, New York, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7]//jz

Several years ago, the media and communications programme in NUS saw the need for an ethics module, and I was invited to create and teach this module. That this course became mandatory within this particular programme is, in light of the connection I outlined in Chap. 1between communication technologies and academic acceleration, no surprise: the integration of more and more complex media technology into society creates a host of new ethical dilemmas, and students, so the argument goes, should be taught how to manage these dilemmas and technologies in their ‘real’ jobs after university. This argument is of course not unique to this particular university. The shift from an industrial social order towards a society marked by new media technologies has resulted in a proliferation of debates and agendas on the teaching of moral guidelines in academia and other educational institutions, and in many ways follows Ortega y Gasset’s call to teach the students what they need to know by way of imparting only that cultural and moral knowledge that may function as a ‘method’ or roadmap. At Utrecht University, for instance, the Media and Culture Department in the Humanities Faculty at which I currently teach has attempted to heed students’ needs by responding to the advice from an external visiting committee demanding more transparency in teaching. The Department did so by implementing the requirement that end goals and methods are made explicit in module syllabi and student theses, and that courses are to focus on the transmission of clear skills rather than ‘obscure theory.’ But while such attempts at transparency are seemingly well meant and generous to the students, they ultimately divorce methods IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 73and skills from their grounding theoretical (and hence always subjective) perspectives, much like Ortega y Gasset implies that the teaching of mere ‘roadmaps’ is an ultimately neutral or positive affair. Methods, as its etymology indeed suggests, are convenient roadmaps in Ortega y Gasset’s sense, but are always specifi c to a certain theoretical tradition and hence can always be questioned for their limitations. What is more, the emphasis on methods seems to arise from a fear of the confusion and partial subjectivity of student assessment on the basis of the inter-subjective teacher– student relationship within a certain tradition, and hence appears as an attempt to stamp out the ‘noise’ emanating from the Lyotardian ‘demise of great narratives’ in the postmodern European context. This obsession with methods can therefore be interpreted as akin to the onslaught of cybernetics and quantifi cation, which seeks to suppress the complications of thinking as dialectical in the university at large from the larger speedelitist context which this cybernetic machinery serves. Staff and student work in turn increasingly resembles a fi nally immoral—because blind to its reproduction of inequalities—form of automated production and an ever more hastily churning out of research and writing. Student theses, for instance, having to bow to the demands of a standardised assessment form in which supposedly crucial aspects of the thesis are presented as separate entities (for instance, the method employed needs to be rendered explicit and is assessed separately from the theoretical framework in the form), leads to narrow ‘assembly-line’ write-ups that merely seek to ‘tick the boxes’ without any critical or holistic considerations around rhetoric and perspective. More disturbingly, students that attempt a more daring or original piece of writing for their theses tend to get penalised when, for instance, not explicitly stating the method employed, even if management claims that the form is not meant to be prescriptive. This deplorable practice is therefore reminiscent of the ‘drilling’ and disciplining of the student (and the lecturer or supervisor), as the compulsory transparency of goals and methods lead to a situation that becomes completely blind and disrespectful to how the outcome of the pedagogical student–teacher relationship can and should never be fully known in advance in order to remain a scene of insightful transformation for the student and teacher away from the cybernetic compulsion of the neoliberal economy. In other words, if the pedagogical scene wishes to be as hospitable and promissory as possible so that radically new understandings may emerge (and the student can truly grow), it is imperative that module goals remain partly oblique and emergent, and that methods 74 I.M. HOOFDare always also questioned and unpacked for their partial and subjective (often European and masculine) theoretical underpinnings and traditions. After all, the term ‘theory’ is derived from the Greek θεωρειν or ‘being a spectator in a theatre,’ and hence always implies not only a partial or subjective position, but also an element of contextual inter-subjectivity. The formulation of strict methods is therefore one particular instance of a problematic transcendence via an erasure of the non-neutral grounds of theory. The faculty examination board at Utrecht thus attempts to ‘eliminate the noise’ of teacher and student subjectivity and respond to the demands of the market, while failing to understand that not only such inter-subjective ‘noise’ is precisely what makes teaching, learning, and pedagogical communication possible, but also that the main ‘culture’ of the humanities traditionally is one of questioning methods and critiquing all forms of non-neutral automation in order to invite a radically different future. The acceleration of the aporia can therefore be keenly felt around these pedagogical demands from the management (and beyond) as well as in my supervision and teaching at Utrecht University; an increasingly unsure student body demand being taught ever clearer ‘methods’ and ‘skills,’ while at the same time, some of these students get ever more self-doubting and even display a recalcitrance with the university as such, being unsure how to properly understand their own fears and doubts as a logical product of the aporetic demands the university and the lecturer makes on them. What is more, the rendering transparent of methods and goals while eliding the controversies underlying them has in many cases the paradoxical outcome of making the students understand less, as they, for instance, logically cannot comprehend why all the great texts of the humanities tend not to have an explicit methods section, while they have to focus so much on methods in their theses. Eventually therefore, this attempt at complete transparency does the students and the staff a disservice, even if it seems to dutifully cater to their needs and uses. Interestingly also, while the harking back to the teaching of theoretical traditions in media studies may seem an antidote to the obsession with clear methods and roadmaps, the acceleration of the aporia emerges even stronger in such well-meant attempts to rethink the pedagogical scene as one of Bildung via theoretical—yet eventually also largely white and masculine—culture. In order to counter the obsession with methods and end goals, several of my colleagues and I at Utrecht University set up a task force for rethinking student assessment and pedagogical goals. Our line of reasoning largely is that a more appropriate and generous teaching and IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 75assessment should instead focus on the teaching of the main grounds, theories, and traditions in the humanities at large, so that an ethic of critique and questioning can once more be foregrounded in the media and culture curriculum, as it was in the past. While this at least allows the students to address methods and texts in a critical fashion, the question of course remains whether such a revision—while certainly remaining more hospitable to subjective student and staff otherness than the blind quest for objective module transparency and methodological automation—not also remains wedded to a nostalgic and ultimately problematic Enlightenment agenda. Such a nostalgia for the grounds of (critical) theory hence also appears as a complicit product of the acceleration of higher education, insofar it also performs the Janus-faced logic of academic optimism in light of larger social desperation. What is more, the art of critique (which comes from the Greek κρινειν or ‘to separate’) also requires that aspects are split out or distinguished from one another—left from right, East from West, and neo-liberal from liberal—whereas such divisions are nonetheless intimately entangled with and constitutive of one another, so that technological conditions that collapse the semiotic and functionalist spheres, the simulated playing out of such illusory differences lead to their accelerated reproduction. The problem is thus one of conceiving a truly radical form of questioning or critique by looking closer at the ‘theatrical’ aspect of θεωρειν, while admitting that such a questioning itself performs such theatricality just as much. It is for this reason that, for instance, Gary Genosko addresses the problem of radical theory in Baudrillard’s work as similar to the problem of how to conceive of ‘political theatre’ in “The Drama of Theory,” about which more in Chap. 5 . So in short, I suggest that the debates and agendas that see the solution in a rigorous implementation of moral or methodological roadmaps almost always concern the issue of how to teach a form of refl ection fi t to deal with the moral confusion and supposed ‘loss of values and direction’ (in line with Ortega y Gasset’s lament of fragmentation) due to the arrival of the information age; any illusion of grounding university teaching in some superior European cultural and theoretical tradition runs the risk of closing off alterity, so that it must also question its own grounds. This also becomes clear in the ethics course I had to set up for the communications programme in Singapore, to which I will now turn.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Academy › Feminism Specific

We can use educational forums and research to solve for structural issues and the issues in the Academy

Lynch 1999 (Kathleen, University of Dublin, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, January, 1999, pp. 41-69)

Feminist scholars have been especially effective in challenging the core epistemological and methodological assumptions of mainstream social scientific practice. They have challenged patterns of bias in research design, including the absence of research on questions of central importance to women; the focus on elitest research topics; the naive understanding of objectivity; the improper interpretation and overgeneralisation of findings; and inadequate data dissemination (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1995, p. 218). Not only have feminist theorists been to the fore in the critique of positivism, they have also been leaders in developing a theory of emancipatory action through education and research ( Harding, 1987; Humphries and Truman, 1994; Lather, 1991; Lentin, 1993; Mies, 1984; Smith, 1987; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Weiler, 1988). They have encouraged women to engage in action both in and through education, and through research; they have also attempted to document the type of the procedures which must be followed in order to create an emancipatory research approach. Lather claims that: 52 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW ... the development of emancipatory social theory requires an empirical stance which is open-ended, dialogically reciprocal, grounded in respect for human capacity, and yet profoundly sceptical of appearances and “common sense”. Such an empirical stance is, furthermore, rooted in a commitment to the long-term, broad-based ideological struggle to transform structural inequalities (Lather, 1986, p. 269). The challenge posed by critical and feminist theories for research in terms of reflexivity, dialogue and co-operation with marginalised people, are considerable. An even greater challenge is how to establish collaborative practices between theorist/researcher and marginalised peoples which will ensure that the understandings arrived at can work towards a transformative outcome. To confront the latter challenge is to confront the forces of interest within the academy itself.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Set Col

Only the AFF resolves the internal link to imperialism and colonialism. We challenge the Western Savior narrative that presents the US as the savior of “our” and “their” women as an excuse for colonial expansion.

Teresa Heffernan, Professor Saint Mary’s University, Canada. “Feminism Against the East/West Divide: Lady Mary's Turkish Embassy Letters” Eighteenth-Century Studies Volume 33, Number 2, Winter 2000

In an episode of Cervantes's Don Quixote (1604) entitled "The Captive's Tale," a Moorish woman and a Spaniard arrive at an inn where Don Quixote and various guests are lodged. After reassuring the guests, who are disturbed by the presence of the veiled woman, that although his companion is "Moorish...in body and dress," she is "in her soul...a very good Christian," the Spaniard begins to tell of his adventures and she is persuaded to remove her veil. 10 While fighting for "his God and king" against the Turks at the battle of Lepanto (1571), the Spaniard recounts, he was captured and imprisoned in Algeria. Coming to his rescue, a wealthy Moorish woman promised to free and marry him in return for taking her to Christian lands. This woman, his traveling companion, "the most beautiful princess in the whole kingdom," according to the Spaniard, betrayed her father, denounced her people, and changed her name from Zoraida to Maria, warning her Spanish savior "'Do not trust [End Page 203] any Moor; they are all deceitful.'" 11 The Christian victory at the battle of Lepanto, was, according to the Spaniard, the moment "when the insolent pride of the Ottoman's was broken for ever," proving to "all the nations" that the Ottoman empire was penetrable; his story of this veiled woman's unveiling seems to support this claim. As the balance of power shifts and Islam begins to lose ground, the West asserts its dominance by speaking for and producing a silenced Orient, much as the Spaniard speaks for his silent Moorish companion. Moreover, this tale of conquest and domination, which involves the emasculation of the Eastern father and the "rescue" of the daughter, underscores a seminal change in the relations of East and West. No longer is this story just about the Christians against the infidels, as in the Crusades. Rather, Zoraida's father, on discovering his daughter's complicity in the betrayal, accuses her of joining the captive not for reasons of faith, but in order to indulge in the "immorality" of the West and to satiate "her wicked desires": "Do not imagine that she has been moved to change her faith out of a belief that your religion is better than ours. No, it is because she knows that immorality is more freely practised in your country than in ours." 12 Caught between the captive's reading of her in terms of a sexual conquest and her father's reading of her in terms of sexual perversion, Zoraida as the (un)veiled woman is doubly silenced. This tale, ostensibly about religious difference (the daughter wants to convert to Christianity), undergoes an important shift in this scene as the religious tension between West and East is recast into its modern form. In this East/West divide, depending on which side articulates the dispute, the West's moral decay is pitted against the East's spirituality or, alternately, Western freedom and reason are pitted against Eastern fundamentalism. Despite the commercial and diplomatic alliance between Britain and Turkey (which encouraged Queen Elizabeth to solicit the help of the Sultan against the idol-worshipping Spanish), like the captive's tale, many of the earliest travel narratives about the Orient written by the merchants of the Levant Company, established in 1581, stressed the cultural divide between East and West, keeping "intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness." 13 Looking back over the life of the Company in 1893 and paying homage to its "heroic" colonial past, Theodore Bent writes in his introduction to an edition of the diaries of two early merchants (Dallam and Covel), The Levant Company, "besides the amount of wealth it accumulated for this country, did infinite service in the development of art and research, geography and travel, the suppression of slavery, and the spread of civilization in countries which would still have been unapproachable, had not the continued efforts of the 244 years [the life of the Company] been towards civilization and humanity." 14 As a burgeoning publishing industry begins to develop around these tales of the "exotic" east in the late seventeenth century, in these narratives, like in the "Captive's Tale," the construction of the (un)veiled woman is central to the depiction of the East as barbaric. These colonial narratives thus justified the economic domination and exploitation of foreign markets with scandalous stories that testified to the essentially uncivilized behavior of distant neighbors. In his diary that details his travels in the Levant (1599), Thomas Dallam mentions catching a glimpse of the Signor's concubines through a grate in a "very thick wall" surrounded by "very strong iron"; he lingers, on pain of death, over the spectacle of these bejeweled captive women, perversely commenting that the sight "did please me wondrous well." 15 In an entry of his diary dated 23 May 1676, John Covel tells a sordid tale about a slave of great beauty, [End Page 204] who is ravished by an admirer. The Sultan, overcome "with madnesse that he lost one so sweet," beheads the man and takes the girl for his harem. 16 Bon Ottaviano writes of the eleven or twelve hundred virgins that make up the Sultan's harem in his 1625 account of the Ottoman Court. He further gives details of the brutality these women faced at the hands of the Grand Seignior, claiming that in some cases the punishment involved them being bound hand and foot, put into a sack, and thrown into the sea in the dark of night. Furthermore, he tells us that these "young, lusty, lascivious wenches" are allowed radishes, cucumbers, and gourds only in slices to prevent them from engaging in any unnatural or unclean acts. 17 Robert Withers, who claimed Ottaviano's 1625 account as his own, embellished this already exaggerated and inaccurate narrative with more lurid details about life in the harem, rashly claiming to have penetrated it. Finally, Jean Dumont comments in A New Voyage to the Levant (1696) on the Sultan's wives who, he reports, are guarded by white and black eunuchs "who never permit'em to enjoy the least Shadow of liberty." 18 These largely fictitious (given the fact that male travelers had no access to women's quarters) and, at the very least, grossly distorted accounts of the abusive treatment of the veiled woman are standard tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travel narratives to the Levant. At once voyeuristic and indignant, these travel narratives distracted attention from the gender inequities at home, presented the Orient as a place in need of rescue, and secured the idea of Europe as free, fair, and civilized. These narratives also allowed the male reader to experience vicariously the role of hero or savior, in the colonial vein of "white men saving brown women from brown men," while satisfying fantasies of penetration and domination of the East. 19 Furthermore, despite the similarities in the subordinate positions of women in the East and West, the veiled woman, as portrayed in these narratives, becomes one of the most powerful symbols of the "irrationality" and "backwardness" of Islam. Jean Dumont, claiming there is "no slavery equal to that of the Turkish Woman," suggests that these customs are the result of a mind that "is at the bottom nothing else but a pure Insensibility and a Weakness that is altogether inexcusable in any reasonable creature." 20 This seventeenth- and eighteenth-century orientalist literature that foregrounds the trials of the (un)veiled woman is already part of the story of the West's shift to modernity. While the West was preoccupied with the struggle of liberating itself from the tyranny of the father and articulating itself as secular, a story in which paternal rule is replaced by a fraternal order and reason displaces faith, Islam was perceived as arrested, irrational, and backward, still enslaved by despots. The modern understanding of the opposition between a traditional, religious, and conservative Islam that values community, faith, and spirituality and a modern, secular, and progressive society, which is founded on liberty, reason, and materialism, in short, the contemporary East/West divide, is already evident in these tales. Like Zoraida, the (un)veiled woman, captive in this narrative, can only be "saved" from her culture or "submit" to it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Set Col

Imperial violence “here” and “there” represent different intensities of the same ideology

Maira 2008 (Sunaina, Prof. of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, Belly-Dancing: Arab Face, orientalist…” in American Studies)

In contrast to Britain or France, for example, the United States did not have a direct colonial relationship with the Middle East but has had a history of covert interventions and non-territorially based policies to assert its political, economic, and military interests and hegemony in the region, especially since World War II.11 Furthermore, the United States has a long history, since its wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898, of “imperialism with- out colonies” or of “informal empire.”12 This neocolonialist model is rooted in what some call the strategy of “New Empire,” promulgated by Theodore Roosevelt and other early twentieth century figures who wanted to expand U.S. economic and military power without the burden—and stigma—of administering overseas colonies.13 However, Neil Smith argues that 1898 was not a sharp break between “formal” and “informal” modes of empire, but rather a transition in evolving forms of U.S. expansionism that continued to use territorialized forms of domination, globally and also domestically (confining Native Americans; enslaving African Americans; and importing Asian, Latin American, and Arab labor).14 This imperial expansion and conquest of new geographic and cultural frontiers was accompanied by the appropriation and exploration of “other” cultures, which shaped the crafting of a distinctly “American” national identity. Images of the “Orient” and processes of cultural appropriation are key to the everyday cultures of U.S. imperialism and imperial feelings, for they have long provided Americans with “opportunities for creating selves and settings of aesthetic appeal and social charisma” and with a “foil for the ‘progress’ that many Americans so assiduously pursued as their birthright and destiny.”15 Orientalist images of Muslim “infidels” and “barbaric” Arabs have histori- cally permeated U.S. popular culture, providing an antithesis for American national identity and helping to legitimate U.S. imperial expansion and racial domination, including its interventions and support for colonialist projects in the Middle East. American Orientalization of Muslims and Arabs has a long history that can be traced to the foundational Holy Land myths of the Christian settlers and the U.S. Navy’s war with the Barbary states (early “terrorists” in the Mediterranean) in the 1780s.16 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States ventured into trade with the Middle East during what Mark Twain described as the “Gilded Age,” and American missionaries, tourists, and merchants contributed to racist as well as romanticized notions of the “Orient” that was imagined as “exotic” as well as “backward.”17 These stereotypes crystallized in archives of American Orientalism that were shaped by historical events, including U.S. support for the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the creation of the state of Israel in the Middle East in 1948, the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran and installation of the Shah in 1953, the attack on Beirut in 1958, the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, the American hostage crisis of 1979, and the two wars on Iraq.18 Strikingly, the repertoire of American Orientalism has remained relatively stable as U.S. strategic, economic, and political interests in the Middle East have drawn it more deeply into the region.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › AT: Set Col

Perm – do both – enables a recognition that what is shared between the story of Middle Eastern conquest and Native displacement is a vulnerability that props up and defends a paternal American savior

Lubin 2008 (Alex, Professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico, “’We Are All Israelies’” in South Atlantic Quarterly)

The comparative imaginaries that have linked the U.S. West to the Orient reemerge in the George W. Bush administration’s desire to “smoke” Osama Bin Laden “out of his cave.”25 The invocation of the Western drama of settler colonialism has always animated American thinking about and activity in the Middle East, and Bush is merely tapping into a well of affective politics that links the United States to the Middle East as well as provides sup- port for increased surveillance and the suspension of rights domestically. Yet, in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalization, the United States’ comparative rendering of the Middle East through its own settler colonial past has been multiplied and transformed into a “global war on terror.” That is, the United States’ unparalleled superpower status enables it to universalize and globalize its comparative politics into a global “clash of civilizations.”26 Comparisons animate the contemporary conflict against “terrorism” as U.S. war officials battle daily to shape the story of the Iraq war by comparing the contemporary battle against “Islamo-fascism” to the antiracist and anti- Fascist memory of World War II. In 2007, President Bush inadvertently cautioned legislators to continue absurdly high rates of war funding so as not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam, when, according to Bush, the U.S. superpower was undermined domestically by an emasculated Left unable to endure the rigors of war. The comparative turn, hinging on the seem- ing nobility of World War II and the darkness of Vietnam, illustrates an uneasy empire’s attempt to maintain contradictions in the face of messy facts on the ground. Yet these comparisons are always fraught and invite unintended readings. Comparing Israeli and U.S. settler colonialisms seeks to shatter the patina of exceptionalism, as well as the “state of exception,” to use Giorgio Agamben’s term, that currently justifies the military, social, and cultural occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, staking a claim for similarity—not exactness—allows us to see particular sites of state and imperial rule not in isolation but as constitutive of larger global systems and circuits of power.27 Although most settler colonies come to an end through a suc- cessful anticolonial rebellion or through the absorption of the settler colony into the mother country, the legacy of colonial rule in places like the U.S. Southwest continues to haunt the postcolonial society. Comparing occu- pied Palestine to the postcolonial U.S. Southwest reveals each location in a new light: we are able to recognize colonial rule in the Middle East as well as the colonial present in the U.S. Southwest.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Cap

Marxism operates from a starting point that ignores sexual difference and footnotes any feminist struggle

Hartmann, 2006 - Heidi Hartmann is a feminist economist and the founder of the Institute for Women's Policy Research, a scientific research organization formed to meet the need for women-centered, public policy research, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, HEIDI I. HARTMANN, United States 1945- . Economist. Founding Director of the Institute for Women's Policy Research (1987). Capitalism and Women's Work in the Home, 1900-1930 (1976), Women's Work, Aden's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job (1981), Comparable Worth: New Directions for Research (1985), Women, Work, and Poverty: Woman-Centered Research for Policy Change (2006).

The "marriage" of marxism and feminism has been like the marriage husband and wife depicted in English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism. Recent attempts to integrate marxism and feminism are unsatisfactory to us as feminists because they subsume the feminist struggle into the "larger" struggle against capital. To continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce. The inequalities in this marriage, like most social phenomena, are no accident. Many marxists typically argue that feminism is at best less important than class conflict and at worst divisive of the working class. This political stance produces an analysis that absorbs feminism into the class struggle. Moreover, the analytic power of marxism with respect to capital has obscured its limitations with respect to sexism. We will argue here that while marxist analysis provides essential insight into the laws of historical development, and those of capital in particular, the categories of marxism are sex-blind. Only a specifically feminist analysis reveals the systemic character of relations between men and women. Yet feminist analysis by itself is inadequate because it has been blind to history and insufficiency materialist. Both Marxist analysis, particularly its historical and materialist method, and feminist analysis, especially the identification of patriarchy as a social and historical structure, must be drawn upon if we are to understand the development of western capitalist societies and the predicament of women within them. In this essay we suggest a new direction for marxist feminist analysis. I MARXISM AND THE WOMAN QUESTION The woman question has never been the "feminist question." The feminist question is directed at the causes of sexual inequality between women and men, of male dominance over women. Most marxist analyses of women's position take as their question the relationship of women to the economic system, rather than that of women to men, apparently assuming the latter will be explained in their discussion of the former. Marxist analysis of the woman question has taken three main forms. All see women's oppression .in our connection (or lack of it) to production, Defining women as part of the working class, these analyses consistently subsume women's relation to men under worker's relation to capital. First, early marxists, including Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin, saw capitalism drawing, all women into the wage labor force, and saw this process destroying the sexual division, of labor. Second, contemporary marxists have incorporated, women into an analysis of evervdav life in capitalism. In this view, all aspects of our lives are seen to reproduce the capitalist system and we are all workers in the system. And third,, marxist feminists have focused on housework and its relation to capital, some arguing that housework produces surplus value and that houseworkers work directly for capitalists. . . . While the approach of the early marxists ignored housework and stressed women's labor force participation, the two more recent approaches emphasize housework to such an extent they ignore women's current role in the labor market. Nevertheless, all three attempt to include women in the category working class and to understand women's oppression as another aspect of class oppression. In doing so all give short shrift to the object of feminist analysis, the relations between women and men. While our "problems" have been elegantly analyzed, they have been misunderstood. The focus of Marxist analysis has been class relations; the object of marxist analysis has been understanding the laws of motion of capitalist society. While we believe marxist methodology can be used to formulate feminist strategy, these marxist feminist approaches discussed above clearly do not do so; their marxism clearly dominates their feminism. Marxism enables us to understand many aspects of capitalist societies: the structure of production, the generation of a particular occupational structure, and the nature of the dominant ideology. Marx's theory of the development of capitalism is a theory of the development of "empty places." Marx predicted, for example, the growth of the proletariat and the demise of the petit bourgeoisie. More precisely and in more detail, Braverman among others has explained the creation of the "places" clerical worker and service worker in advanced capitalist societies.2 Just as capital creates these places indifferent to the individuals who fill them, the categories of marxist analysis, class, reserve army of labor, wage laborer, do not explain why particular people, fill particular places. They give no clues about why women are subordinate to men inside and outside the family and why it is not the other way around. Marxist categories, like capital itself, are sex-blind. The categories of Marxism cannot tell us who will fill the empty places. Marxist analysis of the woman question has suffered from this basic problem.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Cap

Breaking the fantasy of mastery with an affirmation of vulnerability is critical to overcoming neoliberal subjectivity

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

As noted earlier, , , , ) and other non-psychoanalytic thinkers focus on neoliberal subjective practices that demand a shift from comfort with dependence to repudiation of dependence. In a psychoanalytic frame, however, which recognizes no possibility of overcoming dependence, the task is to comprehend the psychic effects of a cultural lack of attunement to dependency needs and a cultural encouragement to split off and project dependency needs and vulnerability. Such effects, as we have seen, include intense shame about dependence (see ), omnipotent versions of autonomy, and narcissistic processes that include oscillations between grandiosity and self-deprecation with regard to the self, and idealization and devaluation with regard to the relation with others. These narcissistic states and oscillations are motored by the fantasies subtending the fetish structure of a perverse society that disavows a reality marked by gross failures of accountability and proper caretaking by those in authority (). The fantasies endemic to narcissistic neoliberal subject formation are produced in part by the radical split between autonomy and connection described earlier (and enacted differently by different groups): in the autonomy fantasy, we imagine ourselves self-sufficient and omnipotent, needing no one (the entrepreneurial self); in the fantasy marked by neoliberalism’s degraded state of dependency, we fantasize that we will be loved and taken care of without having to make any effort.  and , ) have well elaborated the ways that overinvestment in these fantasy logics operates in contemporary UK political culture, issuing in oscillations between policies that reproduce dependency and policies that punish dependency.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Cap

Vulnerability DA--Neoliberalism depends on the narcissistic fantasy of mastery that disavows vulnerability as dependence—alt reproduces neoliberalism without the aff

Layton 14 Lynne Layton, Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis and Editor, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 253 Mason Terrace, Brookline, MA, 02446, USA. E-mail:“Some psychic effects of neoliberalism: Narcissism, disavowal, perversion” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 161–178. doi:10.1057/pcs.2014.5; published online 15 May 2014 rishi

It is a hallmark of US neoliberal political life that the more people are rendered vulnerable and dispensable, the more the state of vulnerability becomes figured as shameful. As many have noted (see, for example, ), increased income inequality has led the privileged to rationalize their privilege, which in turn has led to decreasing empathy for the poor. , who interviewed white and black working-class men in New York in the 90s, found that neoliberal economic realities and the decline of traditional collective sources of solidarity had rendered white working-class men quite vulnerable. One way they dealt with their heightened feelings of vulnerability was to draw boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor, the latter of whom they associated with blackness (see also ). Indeed, by the 90s in the US, the white imaginary offered two predominant socially reviled subject positions to poor African Americans: the omnipotent male criminal, who terrorizes vulnerable whites with his nefarious entrepreneurial skills, and his split-off other side, the female welfare dependent, who, since Reagan, has held all of the country’s disavowed need and has been used as a signifier of the failures of big government. As I shall argue, a typical form of splitting endemic to neoliberal practices and ideologies pits omnipotent narcissistic versions of autonomy against degraded narcissistic versions of dependence. This instance of a racist white imaginary well exemplifies how a radical split between autonomy and dependence can be projected seamlessly onto a racialized and gendered divide.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC › Cap

Perm do both—Ideals of subjectivity and precarity define modern neoliberalism—historical materialist accounts fail—aff’s rearticulation of the subject is key

Oksala 15 Johanna Oksala is currently Academy of Finland Research Fellow (2012-2017) in the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki, and a Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, USA (2013-2015). Her books include Foucault on Freedom (2005), How to Read Foucault (2007) and Foucault, Politics & Violence(2012). “Johanna Oksala on Foucault, Marx and Neoliberal Subjects”, Theory Culture and Society, February 16th 2015 rishi

It is my contention that Foucault’s “post-Marxist” insights about the intrinsic link between productive practices of power and forms of the subject must remain central in our critical analyses of the neoliberal turn. While in many Marxist accounts neoliberalism is understood simply as an intensification of capitalist exploitation, which is heightening the fundamental class antagonism between capitalists and laborers, from a Foucauldian perspective it must be understood as a new configuration of power relations that produces new forms of the subject. We have to recognize the historically specific ways that the instability and the persistent crises of capitalism have been negotiated in recent decades through neoliberal forms of governmentality – new political technologies of power and social regulation. Many socialist writers have lamented that the retreat from class analysis in the academy in the eighties and nineties was one of neoliberalism’s most effective weapons because it prevented class-consciousness from developing as the appropriate response to the rise of neoliberalism. While the spread of neoliberalism is clearly inseparable from the structural logic of capitalist accumulation, to view the subjects it produces simply as class subjects who lack the appropriate consciousness of their situation is nevertheless problematic in my view. While it is important to acknowledge that in his lectures on neoliberalism, The Birth of Biopolitics(2008), Foucault describes technologies and rationalities rather than their actual empirical outcomes, empirical and experiential evidence gives weight to the theoretical claim that the neoliberal reorganization of Western societies has resulted in new forms of the subject – a new understanding of ourselves. Social volatility and economic risks have become increasingly central for profit making and the financialization of everyday life requires new kinds of subjects and social networks (Floyd 2009, 196). Neoliberal governmentality has dramatically extended the reach of the markets and market rationality and thereby produced the corresponding subjects who are compelled to behave as market actors – consumers, individual investors and entrepreneurs – across several dimensions of their lives. As Foucault shows, neoliberal techniques scramble the traditional opposition between capitalists and workers in the sense that subjects are increasingly conceived and conceive themselves as entrepreneurs of the self, who attempt to maximize their “human capital”. Whether we focus on the reforms of pension plans and healthcare, revisions of copyright laws or the restructuring of universities, we are increasingly required to view ourselves as market-actors and to behave accordingly. These new forms of governmentality and social regulation are misrecognized insofar as they are identified as “merely” cultural or superstructural. The historically specific practices of power in which we must engage daily in order to go about our lives are not just symbolic, cultural or discursive practices as Foucault’s Marxist critics sometimes claim. They are essentially material, social and economic practices that are organized through neoliberal rationality and embedded in law and political institutions, but also in everyday social relationships. Hence, we are not confronted merely with ideological fiction that could be dispelled through the development of appropriate class-consciousness; we are confronted with a new kind of social reality. What the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism downplays in my view, however, is the necessary “failures” of neoliberal governmentality to constitute entrepreneurial subjects – the neoliberal constitution of “others”. The obstacles in the way of developing class consciousness are also “objective” in the second sense that we are witnessing other, radically new forms of subjectivation that are brought about by the global, neoliberal turn: the unemployed and the undocumented subjects, as well as the neocolonial, disposable subjects of the global South. It is widely acknowledged by numerous socialist writers that the composition of the workforce has dramatically changed in the last decades due to the globalization and neoliberalization of our economies. The industrial working class has been shrinking in all Western countries at a rapid rate, and has been largely replaced by post-industrial, service-sector workers, who are largely female and in part-time or precarious employment. Instead of social relations based on relatively stable forms of wage-labor, the growth of insecurity and negative flexibilization have come to increasingly characterize all work. Moreover, the majority of the poorest and the most oppressed people in the world today are not wage-laborers. They are people who have to eke out a precarious existence in the informal economy because capitalism appears to have no use for them at all. In other words, the forms of exploitation have not only assumed radically new forms, but it has become increasingly unclear what the class relations are and how we are situated in their intersections. It is imperative to also theorize these new forms of the subject and the political potential they hold for radical social transformation. That requires acknowledging the limits of both Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism, as well as traditional Marxist class analysis, and moving beyond them.

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Economic competition is based in hegemonic masculinity—the aff controls the internal link to their impacts

Elias and Beasley 09 [Elias, Juanita associate professor in international political economy and Beasley, Christine professor of politics at University of Adelaide. “Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization: “Transnational Business Masculinities” and Beyond”. Globalizations, 6(2). 2009.]

For key critical masculinity scholars it is globalization—specifically a multinational-led neoliberal globalization—that is recognised as ‘the most obviously important’ issue in the future of the field researching masculinity. Specifically, this is understood in terms of ‘the relation of masculinities to those emerging dominant powers in the global capitalist economy, the transnational corporations’ (Connell et al., 2005, p. 9). Connell’s particular contribution to this field is that globalization, in creating what has been termed a ‘world’ or ‘global gender order’, involves the re-articulation of national hegemonic masculinities into the global arena. Specifically he refers here to ‘transnational business masculinity’, which he describes as definitively taking the leading role as the emergent gendered world order, an order associated with the dominant institutions of the world economy and the globalization of the neo-liberal market agenda. The leading role of transnational business masculinity re-articulates older and more locally based bourgeois managerial hegemonic masculinities (Connell, 2005b, pp. 84, 76-7; Connell, 2005a, p. 263; Connell and Wood, 2005). In this account transnational business masculinity is seen to occupy the position of hegemonic masculinity on a world scale—that is to say, a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimates men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole (Connell, 2000, p. 46). This notion of hegemonic masculinity is, however, understood as embodying more that just a Gramscian-style mechanism for gaining consent. Rather, the political legitimating meaning of hegemonic masculinity quickly slides towards its meaning as the ‘dominant’ masculinity and how an actual group of men ‘embodies’ this dominant positioning, including how this group exhibits particular personality traits. Connell asserts that ‘world politics is now more and more organized around the needs of transnational capital’, placing ‘strategic power in the hands of particular groups of men—managers and entrepreneurs’—who self-consciously manage their bodies and emotions as well as money, and are increasingly detached from older loyalties to nation, business organisation, family and marital partners (Connell, 2005a, p. xxiii; Connell and Wood, 2005, p. 359). Drawing upon Connell’s work the sociologist Joan Acker endorses this view that hegemonic masculinities are embodied in the specific characteristics of multinational business-men suggesting that we think of ‘Rupert Murdoch, Phil Knight or Bill Gates’. Adding ‘[t]his masculinity is supported and reinforced by the ethos of the free-market, competition and a “win or die” environment. This is the masculine image of those who organize and lead the drive to global control and the opening of markets to international competition’ (Acker 2004, p. 29). These men are, in Connell’s account, dispositionally highly atomistic—competitive and largely distanced from social or personal commitments. They embody a neo-liberal version of an emphasized traditional masculinity, without any requirement to direct bodily strength (Connell, 2005a, pp. xxiii, 255-6; Connell, 2005b, p. 77).

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC - Fem IR

Our method is to embrace vulnerability. Only a recognition and embodiment of vulnerability can reshape foreign policy in a manner that does not replicate the hierarchical logic of the protection racket. Whyte says that “vulnerability is not a choice” and he is right.

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, SPP)

As outlined above, early feminist peace and conflict researchers, such as Elise Boulding and Sara Ruddick, insisted on the importance of the relational body when studying peace. I also argued above that local turn scholarship is limited in its understanding of the everyday and mundane practices of peace. In my view, both the relational body and mundane practices require a more nuanced reading of power, governance and the vulnerabilities that practices of power produce, since the body is always both ‘active and acted upon’.35 In short, practices of governance that are targeted at the body also produce the body.36 Yet the fleshy living body also has agency, which makes it an ‘engaged body-subject’.37 In other words, the body is never a passive target of practices of governance: it also has a capacity to escape these practices.38 Eighty-year-old Kaisu told her story in a Finnish documentary film in 2010.39 She was among the Finnish women accused of having fraternised with German soldiers during the Second World War. She moved to Germany with the withdrawing German troops and was repatriated to Finland after the war. The following is my description of Kaisu’s narrative: VIGNETTE 2 Kaisu was among the women whose bodies were securitised and transferred to the camp immediately on their arrival on the Finnish soil. She calls it the ‘quarantine camp’ as if there had been something contagious in her body that needed purification. Hence medicalisation also takes hold of her body even in her most intimate memories. Her young body had been securitised and medicalised as it was seen to constitute the contagious risk of knowing too much. In the documentary, her body is stiff, but strong when she sits on the porch of the barracks, in which she thinks she was incarcerated sixty years ago. She is smoking a cigarette with a firm hand. Her body and her solemn voice convey her strength. Kaisu recalls how the Security Police had suspected her of being a German mole. She is very proud of the fact that she did not cry during the interrogations: ‘In front of Hautojärvi [the interrogation officer] I did not cry’. In the narrative, her resistance is not just geared towards the interrogation officer, but also towards the Finnish state, whose security apparatus suspected and humiliated her. In her upright body, she resists the forces that sought to silence her.40 When considering mundane peace, Judith Butler’s observation that one way of managing populations is to distribute vulnerability among people unequally is crucial.41 Biopower – power that is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population and which is ultimately utilised by the state ostensibly in the protection of life – establishes a norm that allows for measurement, evaluation and hierarchical ranking. As such, it constitutes a mechanism of control and distributes vulnerability and invulnerability among the population.42 In Kaisu’s case, her body was rendered vulnerable – shaped as that of an outcast – through the mechanisms of governance in the post-war Finnish national order. The vignette demonstrates that power is multiple and relational, as it establishes socio-historical relationships that render some bodies more vulnerable than others. Biopower increases efficiency and capacity at the level of individual bodies and whole populations, yet it also distributes vulnerability and invulnerability. This is particularly acute during times of economic, social and political transformation, such as peacebuilding and reconstruction, when social relations must be re-imagined and re-structured. Butler theorises peace and argues that peace is a way of indicating one’s dependency on others and being acknowledged. She not only theorises peace as individual vulnerability but says that it needs to be institutionalised: I think that peace is the active and difficult resistance to the temptation of war; it is the prerogative and the obligation of the injured. Peace is something that has to be vigilantly maintained; it is a vigilance, and it involves temptation, and it does not mean we as human beings are not aggressive. It does not mean that we do not have murderous impulses. This is a mistaken way of understanding non-violence. . . . Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. . . I think it needs to be institutionalised. It needs to be part of a community ethos. I think in fact it needs to be part of an entire foreign policy.43 For Butler, therefore, the recognition of vulnerability can lead to more adequate, peaceful responses to different forms of violence and can counter the tendency to react to violence with more violence.44 Alyson Cole has noted that Butler’s view on vulnerability paves the way to ‘nonviolent interaffectivity’.45 Vulnerability does not, in this view, imply weakness or inferiority; rather, it is a human condition, ‘a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways, which can take diverse forms in different social situations (for example, bodily, psychological, economic, emotional, and legal vulnerabilities)’, as Erin Gilson summarises Butler’s views.46 Understanding oneself as vulnerable involves an understanding of the self as shaped by its relationships to others, the world, power and its environs. This has, in my view, implications for the everyday, as our embodiment and vulnerability are embedded in the everyday – in its historicity, forms of power, materiality and concreteness. Vulnerability is not just a way of referring to the capacity to be wounded, however. It is also a ‘way of indicating one’s dependency on another, a set of institutions, or a circumambient world to be well, to be safe, to be acknowledged’, argues Butler, in the spirit of early feminist peace and conflict researchers’ work.47 While the vulnerable body is often thought to be private and non-political, when in contact with other bodies, the politics of vulnerability comes to the fore – firstly, in the form of the unequal distribution of vulnerabilities, and secondly, in the form of accountability, recognition and acknowledgement. In other words, the way in which vulnerability is recognised, accounted for, acknowledged and responded to is at the core of the political. ‘The political’ is hence an existential relation that we all live out, on a daily basis, in ways that create, re-produce, transcend and challenge differences, hierarchies, discriminations and vulnerabilities between subjectivities and political positions. Furthermore, vulnerable bodies are agentic, as receptivity, accountability and vulnerability are actually the presuppositions of agency, not its opposites.48 In short, vulnerability is enabling for our being in the world; that is, vulnerability is a ‘condition of potential that makes possible other conditions’, including peace. It can be argued that Kaisu’s bold appearance in the documentary film was a political event of claiming back her silenced body and evoking recognition of the existence of the bodies of her kind. Her vulnerable body thereby carried an agentic capacity capable of challenging the existing hierarchies, discriminations and differences. Although vulnerability can be seen as a shared human condition, it is lived and experienced in different ways, as well as distributed unequally, as argued above. The ways in which we live and are affected can be understood only in light of the particularity of embodied, social and mundane experiences. It is in this way that feminist and critical theorising of the body, the everyday and vulnerability open up new pathways to re-theorise peace. Peace is something that becomes expressed and takes place through acts and points of everyday contact between variously situated and variously vulnerable bodies – namely, in corporeal events where accountability, response-ability, recognition and acknowledgement emerge. The pluralistic and critical approaches indicated in my agenda are more sensitive to the changing patterns and dynamics of peace than many abstract, ontologically solid or violence-dependent approaches.