2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Impacts › DIB Impact
Marks 19, Michael, former Senior Policy Advisor to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of State., 10-10-2019, "Strengthen Us Industry To Counter National Security Challenges," American Military News, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/10/strengthen-us-industry-to-counter-national-security-challenges/
While U.S. defense budgets have recently been on the rise, it is likely that we will see a spending decline in the coming years as competition for non-defense federal budget dollars increases and deficits grow. The United States, therefore, must take action to ensure that we maintain our technological edge against our adversaries by empowering the private sector to provide cost-effective innovation for America’s defense. Since the end of the Second World War the U.S. has relied on qualitative superiority over its potential adversaries, especially those like the Soviet Union/Russia and China, who enjoyed comparative quantitative advantages. These qualitative advantages were vital to maintaining global stability and helped enable our nation to become the preeminent global economy, but they have been eroded over the last few decades. In 1960, the U.S. share of global research and development (R&D) spending stood at 69%. U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounted for 36% of total global expenditures. Soon thereafter other nations recognized the need to increase their R&D expenditures and build their own defense industrial bases to compete with the United States. From 2000-2016, China’s share of global R&D rose from 4.9% to 25.1% while the U.S. share of global R&D dropped to 28%. U.S. defense-related R&D meanwhile now makes up a mere 4% of global R&D spending. There can be no doubt that Russia and China are determined to challenge America’s qualitative advantage. From the rebirth of Russian military power under Vladimir Putin to the ever-growing Chinese military prowess across the board, their efforts show no sign of slowing down. Russia has been and continues to undergo a major modernization of its armed forces. For example, they are in the midst of a ten-year program to build hundreds of new nuclear missiles and have set a goal of modernizing 70% of the Russian Ground Force’s equipment by 2020. One of the most frightening examples of Russia’s resurgence is its development of a hypersonic missile that could be ready for combat as early as 2020. Worryingly, the US is currently unable to defend against this type of missile. To accompany these developments came the emergence in 2017 of Russia as the world’s second-largest arms producer, ready and able to support nations hostile to US interests. China, on the other hand, used to be a country that only manufactured cheap products and knockoffs, but that is no longer true. Technology development and innovation figure prominently in all of China’s national planning goals, with plans to make the country the global leader in science and innovation and the preeminent technological and manufacturing power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese communist revolution. This, of course, has huge implications for China’s military capability. The country now has the second-largest national defense budget behind the U.S. and wants to be Asia’s preeminent military power. Beijing is developing next-generation fighter jets, ICBMs and shorter-range ballistic missiles, as well as advanced naval vessels. The People’s Liberation Army has reached a critical point of confidence and now feel they can match competitors like the United States in combat. This has implications for the security of Taiwan, Japan, other US allies in the region as well as to America itself. To make matters worse, there are a growing number of experts that see China developing asymmetric technologies, combined with conventional and nuclear systems that could create an existential threat to the U.S. pacific based assets. It is in the wake of these growing threats to our national security American industry will likely be expected to shoulder an even larger responsibility concerning investment in defense-related R&D. One of the ways we can empower companies to make these additional investments and lead next-generation defense innovation is to allow commonsense mergers between important defense and aerospace companies. Horizontal consolidation eliminates the redundancy of enormous fixed costs, leading to savings passed down to customers. Mergers can also create economies of scale and existing synergies that help the combined company realize access to larger numbers of engineers and innovators, while keeping costs low and improving the timeline for taking a product from concept to development. A recent example of how this can work is the proposed Raytheon and United Technologies merger. The two parties project that the new combined company will employ more than 60,000 engineers, hold over 38,000 patents and invest approximately $8 billion per year in research and development. This will allow the development of new, critical technologies more quickly and efficiently than either company could on its own. Such private sector investments in innovation will be critical in the face of the growing challenges to American military dominance. America’s R&D advantage, crucial to maintaining military superiority, is increasingly at risk. As China and Russia continue to challenge America’s military dominance and pressures on the defense budget continue to mount, the federal government will likely turn more and more to contractors and commercial companies to develop next-generation defense capabilities. Strengthening U.S. industry, therefore, will be critical to countering our national security challenges.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Uniqueness › Ukraine Aid High---2NC
Vivienne Machi 22, reporter for Defense News, Defense News, “US, allies to meet monthly on Ukraine defense needs”, 5-2-2022, , bk
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany — Defense leaders from more than 40 nations amassed on a blustery April day in southwestern Germany, recruited by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to better coordinate efforts supporting Ukraine in its defense against the Russian invasion.
Tuesday’s gathering, which was organized with less than a week’s notice, will now be a monthly event. Austin announced the creation of a standing Ukraine-focused “contact group” during a press briefing at the end of the event at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Uniqueness › Ukraine Aid High---2NC
Lolita Baldor 7/8/22, National Security reporter for the Associated Press, Washington Post, “US sending $400 million more in military aid to Ukraine”,https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-sending-400-million-in-military-aid-to-ukraine/2022/07/08/c0acc308-fee3-11ec-b39d-71309168014b_story.html, bk
WASHINGTON — The Biden administration said Friday that it will send another $400 million in military equipment to Ukraine, including four more advanced rocket systems. The weapons, said a senior defense official, will bolster Ukrainian efforts to strike deeper behind Russian frontlines in the eastern Donbas region.
The aid comes as Moscow this week claimed full control of Ukraine's Luhansk province in the Donbas, but Ukrainian officials say their troops still control a small part of the province and fierce fighting continues in several villages.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Uniqueness › DSCA Key---2NC
David Vergun 22, reporter for DOD news, US Department of Defense, “DOD Official Describes How Security Assistance Gets to Ukraine”, 4-19-2022, , bk
Since the beginning of the invasion, DSCA has executed $2.3 billion in presidential drawdown of security assistance to Ukraine and $300 million under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative as of April 1, the official said.
The term presidential drawdown is used when the president authorizes military hardware to be pulled from existing U.S. military stock.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Uniqueness › Int’l SC High---2NC
Jim Garamone 21, reporter, U.S. Department of Defense, “Biden Approves Global Posture Review Recommendations, 11-29-2021, recommendations/#:~:text=The%20Global%20Posture%20Review%20has,with%20his%20national%20security%20guidance, bk
"That guidance asserts that the United States will lead with diplomacy first, revitalize our unmatched network of allies and partners and make smart and disciplined choices regarding our national defense and responsible use of our military," Karlin said. "Nested within this guidance, the global posture review assesses DOD overseas forces and footprint along with the framework and processes that govern our posture decision making."
The main outcome of the review is the return to normal of determining military posture around the world and tying that to America's strategic alignment, an official speaking on background earlier in the day said. "The GPR has strengthened our decision making processes by deliberately connecting strategic priorities, global trade-offs, force readiness and modernization, interagency coordination and allied and partner coordination to global posture planning and decisions," the official said.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DA – DSCA Wave 2 – FMPS › Links › Cybersecurity---2NC
ISG 22 [The Institute for Security Governance (The Institute for Security Governance — situated within the Defense Security Cooperation University’s (DSCU) International School of Education and Advising (ISEA) — is the Department of Defense’s Center of Excellence for Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). ISG is charged with building partner institutional capacity and capability through tailored advising, education, and professional development programs grounded in American values and approaches.), 1-2022, "BUILDING CAPABLE CYBERSECURITY INSTITUTIONS," ] // st
Building the capacity of defense cyber institutions can help partner nations identify, assess, and better understand risks, capacities, and threats within their defense cyber ecosystem. The cyberspace institutional capacity building community can act as a convener and integrator, bringing together partner nation civilian and military officials to: ¶ Identify critical partner nation cybersecurity needs and agree on areas of mutual interest for engagement with the U.S.¶ Devise risk mitigation strategies and codify applicable policies and procedures¶ Build new capabilities or institutions that are resourced, trained, and equipped to effectively manage cybersecurity systems¶ Align interoperability requirements between U.S. security cooperation assistance and partner nation systems¶ Enhance the integrity and security of local cyber defense institutions¶ Develop human capital strategies for building and sustaining a cyber workforce¶ CCB supports the development of cyberspace governance, national frameworks, policy, strategy, and workforce development planning, which can become a force multiplier for many other programs. Building new cyber capabilities together with a partner nation is not enough. These must be effectively integrated into their force structure, sustained and maintained, and well-coordinated with other capabilities. Therefore, ISG enables close partnership with diverse implementers, within DoD’s security cooperation ecosystem as well as across industry and academia. Working together with the cybersecurity capacity building community, ISG is developing shared tools and approaches to enhance the outcome of its work alongside partner nations. In addition, the Institute is working to integrate cybersecurity into the mainstream of ICB planning, and to support the integration of country-level projects among the various implementers. The Institute’s CCB activities encompasses several initiatives:¶ Support the integration of partner nation cyberrelated requirements into ICB planning and design and support the integration of capacity building projects at the country-level ¶ Support the development of a common assessment methodology and lend support to GCCs to conduct assessments of partner nation cyber capabilities as needed¶ Deliver a range of capacity building and educational engagements on cyber governance, policy, and strategy in support of GCCs and partners¶ Create tools and aides for the broader community of interest/practice. Most recently, the Institute conducted a study, initiated by ODASD Cyber Policy, and developed 1) a cyber-focused capacity building playbook; and, 2) a workforce development framework and compendium of relevant U.S. training/education in support of the broad cyber capacity building community. These products, developed through a collaborative process, aim to further harmonize and improve the cyber community’s development of partners’ cybersecurity capabilities.¶ WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING? Institutional Capacity Building programs, overseen by DSCA, encompass Security Cooperation activities that directly support U.S. ally and partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies necessary to effectively and responsibly achieve shared security objectives.¶ ILLUSTRATIVE PARTNER INSTITUTIONS FOR ICB¶ Partner nations’ civilian and military organizations focused at the strategic and operational levels such as Ministries of Defense and Interior, intelligence services, law enforcement organizations, military services, and legislatures.¶ ILLUSTRATIVE ICB DOMAINS¶ Strategy & Policy¶ Resource Management¶ Human Resource Management¶ Acquisition & Logistics¶ Force Management¶ Law & Human Rights
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – leaks – russia impact
Yuval Noah Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9/26/18, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist,
For several generations, the world has been governed by what today we call “the global liberal order”. Behind these lofty words is the idea that all humans share some core experiences, values and interests, and that no human group is inherently superior to all others. Cooperation is therefore more sensible than conflict. All humans should work together to protect their common values and advance their common interests. And the best way to foster such cooperation is to ease the movement of ideas, goods, money and people across the globe.
Though the global liberal order has many faults and problems, it has proved superior to all alternatives. The liberal world of the early 21st century is more prosperous, healthy and peaceful than ever before. For the first time in human history, starvation kills fewer people than obesity; plagues kill fewer people than old age; and violence kills fewer people than accidents. When I was six months old I didn’t die in an epidemic, thanks to medicines discovered by foreign scientists in distant lands. When I was three I didn’t starve to death, thanks to wheat grown by foreign farmers thousands of kilometers away. And when I was eleven I wasn’t obliterated in a nuclear war, thanks to agreements signed by foreign leaders on the other side of the planet. If you think we should go back to some pre-liberal golden age, please name the year in which humankind was in better shape than in the early 21st century. Was it 1918? 1718? 1218?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – leaks – russia impact
Constantine A. Pagedas 17, Executive vice president at International Technology and Trade Associates, Inc, “Returning to Relevance: the Russian Challenge to Geopolitical Stability,” Japan Spotlight, March/April 2017, http://www.itta.com/sites/default/files/files/pagedas_russian_challenge_to_geopolitical_stability.pdf
Today, aggressive Russian behavior on the world stage and a similar neurotic worldview poses serious risks to the geopolitical stability of the United States and Europe. As a former KGB intelligence officer in East Germany who saw firsthand the decline of Soviet influence within the Warsaw Pact, since coming to power in late 1999 Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a strong proponent of restoring Russian power and prestige in the world and diminishing the political, economic, and geostrategic foundations of the transatlantic partnership. Over the past few years, however, the Russian president has shown himself to be increasingly like some of his predecessors as the US and Europe have been preoccupied with costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis it created, the eurozone debt crisis, and the rise of China as a geostrategic competitor. Under Putin’s direction, Russia has engaged in a series of important actions that have not only advanced Russian interests worldwide, but have also threatened to undermine the foundations of the geopolitical order that have existed since the end of World War II.
Putin’s “Strong Man” Politics
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – leaks – prolif impact
James B. Bruce 16, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, retired from the CIA in 2005 as a senior executive officer after nearly 24 years, “Keeping U.S. National Security Secrets: Why Is This So Hard?,” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 2016, https://www.afio.com/publications/BRUCE_James_Keeping_US_National_Security_Secrets_from_AFIO_INTEL_FALL2016_Vol22_no2_FINAL.pdf
• Imagery: Surprise Indian Nuclear Tests. Both authorized and unauthorized disclosures about intelligence techniques can be damaging. In this case, classified imagery had been used to support a diplomatic démarche asking India to stand down from its plans to test nuclear weapons in 1995, and was also the topic of press coverage based on leaked intelligence. The 1995 intelligence and diplomatic success backfired in May 1998 when the Indians employed countermeasures learned from these earlier disclosures. They prevented satellite imagery from detecting the signatures of their nuclear test preparations, which caught the United States by surprise.25
• Imagery—Missile Tests in Pakistan. In the mid1990s, dozens of press articles covered whether Chinese M-11 missiles had been covertly transferred to Pakistan. If such missiles had been acquired, Pakistan could be found in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which it was a signatory. Under the National Defense Authorization Act, US law mandated sanctions against proven MTCR violators. Press reports claimed that US intelligence had found missiles in Pakistan but “spy satellites” were unable to “confirm” such missiles. Readers of both the Washington Times and the Washington Post learned that intelligence had failed to convince the Department of State of the missiles’ presence in Pakistan. The message from the press coverage was, in effect, that any nation could avert US sanctions if they neutralized intelligence by shielding missiles from satellite observation. These articles not only suggested to Pakistan and China that some key denial measures were succeeding, but also spelled out specific countermeasures that other potential violators could take to prevent US intelligence from satisfying the standards needed for sanctions under the MTCR.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › --- extra ev
Peter Huessy 16, Director of Strategic Deterrent Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, President of GeoStrategic Analysis, Graduated from the Columbia University School of International Affairs and School of Law, Degrees in Anthropology, International Relations and National Security Policy from Beloit College, “The Case for a 21st Century Deterrent”, Gatestone Institute, 3-22, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-nuclear-deterrent
In light of recent geostrategic developments, some former U.S. defense experts are calling for the United States dramatically to curtail its nuclear deterrent.
These experts assume that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is waning and that since the it spends far more on overall defense than do other nations, the U.S. can afford to cut back in this area.[2]
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › --- extra ev
Dr. Bruno Tertrais 15, Master’s Degree in Public Law of the University of Paris, Doctorate in Political Science of the Institut d'études Politiques de Paris, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation Pour La Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, Associate Editor of Survival, Recipient of the Vauban Prize, Knight of the Legion of Honor, “How Relevant is Nuclear Deterrence Today?”, Nação e Defesa, p. 11-14
In Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea or Israel, the relevance of nuclear deterrence is hardly questioned. However, in Western countries, nuclear deterrence has been the target of criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds since 1945. In the past decade, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. Efforts led by four US statesmen, or the more radical Global Zero movement, as well as various diplomatic initiatives, have been accompanied by a flurry of new, serious academic studies questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. More than ever, nuclear deterrence is attacked by many, both on the Left and on the Right. To the traditional arguments related to the credibility of nuclear deterrence are now added two other factors. First, nuclear weapons, it is argued, have limited value vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and such risks bolster the case for nuclear disarmament. Second, alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense are said to now be much more effective than they were in the past. This paper refutes these arguments on the grounds that nuclear deterrence has proven to be an effective war prevention instrument, that it is cost-effective, and that today’s challenges confirm its relevance.
Nuclear Weapons Have Been Effective War-Prevention Tools
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – deterrence !
Michaela Dodge & Adam Lowther 16, Dodge is a Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy at The Heritage Foundation; Lowther, Ph.D., is a Director of the School for Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, “A No-First-Use Policy Would Make the United States Less Secure,” E-International Relations, 10/4/2016, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/10/04/a-no-first-use-policy-would-make-the-united-states-less-secure/
The very term “no-first-use” is misleading. While a nuclear weapon has not been used in anger for over 70 years, nuclear weapons are used every single day to deter large-scale conventional and nuclear attacks. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch points out that “we have used the nuclear forces every second of every day for 50 years.” Moreover, during those 50 years, humankind has experienced the most peaceful period in its history as measured by the number of conflict-related casualties as a proportion of the world’s population. This is due in large part to the devastating risks that nuclear weapons pose to any society that is attacked with them. For the United States and the Soviet Union, a large-scale nuclear exchange meant the end of society as Americans and Russians had known it. That risk led American and Soviet leaders to exercise a level of caution and restraint that was not exercised by German, Japanese, and other world leaders in the years leading up to World War II.
If the United States were to adopt a no-first-use policy, the perceived threat of nuclear conflict admittedly would decline. While a decline in the perceived threat of nuclear weapons use may seem like a good thing, however, it is actually dangerous because it is that very perceived threat that gives leaders who may be contemplating the use of force the chance for second thoughts that can prevent great-power war. This is an important point. Opening the door to great-power conflict, even if ever so slightly, is obviously a step in the wrong direction.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – deterrence !
Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark 19, Political scientist and assistant professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “5. Should Presidential Command Over Nuclear Launch Have Limitations? In A Word, No.,” Texas National Security Review, 7-2-2019, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-nuclear-first-use-and-presidential-authority/
While passing a law to require congressional or military-legal approval before a nuclear launch could take place may seek to address fears of an unjustified attack, taking such steps would be misguided. Specifically, it would introduce complexity and dangerous time delays that would, as an unintended consequence, undermine deterrence, the quintessential purpose of nuclear weapons in the United States. That said, there are ways to build more oversight of the president’s nuclear authority while still maintaining the critical deterrence mission.
Presidential Authority
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – leaks – democracy !
Dr. Larry Diamond 19, Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, PhD in Sociology from Stanford University, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, p. 199-202
The most obvious response to the ill winds blowing from the world’s autocracies is to help the winds of freedom blowing in the other direction. The democracies of the West cannot save themselves if they do not stand with democrats around the world.
This is truer now than ever, for several reasons. We live in a globalized world, one in which models, trends, and ideas cascade across borders. Any wind of change may gather quickly and blow with gale force. People everywhere form ideas about how to govern—or simply about which forms of government and sources of power may be irresistible—based on what they see happening elsewhere. We are now immersed in a fierce global contest of ideas, information, and norms. In the digital age, that contest is moving at lightning speed, shaping how people think about their political systems and the way the world runs. As doubts about and threats to democracy are mounting in the West, this is not a contest that the democracies can afford to lose.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – leaks – democracy !
Margaret B. Kwoka 14, Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Leaking and Legitimacy,” SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID 2494375, Social Science Research Network, 09/10/2014, papers.ssrn.com, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2494375
The effect of most leaked information, however, is not nearly so clear as these extreme hypotheticals. Pozen recently argued that the government has deliberately chosen not to punish leakers because while individual leaks may be harmful to government interests, leaks as a whole are more beneficial than detrimental.92 A permissive attitude toward leaks allows the government to credibly “plant” information in the press, and promotes the public’s belief in the legitimacy of the government, compensating for an overbroad classification system.93 The focus of Pozen’s analysis, however, is the much more common, everyday leaks of higher-level government officials, and Pozen acknowledges that some leaks can be truly harmful.94 Citing Chelsea Manning’s disclosures to WikiLeaks as a “rare undeniable leak”95 of the unauthorized nature, Pozen concedes that even a permissive approach to leakiness “cannot tolerate the proliferation of internal dissenters who seek to impeach the entire secrecy and national security system.”96 Pozen’s account of the costs and benefits of leaking thus does not fully account for the deluge leak.
1. Past Harms
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 1ar – xt: leaks undermine intel
Edward Lucas 14, Senior editor at the Economist, former foreign correspondent with 30 years' experience in Russian and east European affairs, is the author of, among other publications, Deception (2011), which deals with east-west espionage, and The New Cold War (2008), which gave warning of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin's Russia, nonresident fellow at CEPA, a think-tank in Washington, DC, “The Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster,” Kindle, 2014, p 37-62
Chapter Three: Damage Control The mere whiff of a breach acts like nerve poison on intelligence agencies. If you lose even a single document, or believe an unauthorised person has had access to it, assumptions must be of worst-case scenarios. Assume that the Russians learn that an outwardly boring Irish insurance broker in the Ukrainian capital Kiev, for example, is actually an undercover officer of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service. What will they be able to do with that information? Will he be in danger? Will they able to find what agents he is running? If so, they must be brought out: they risk arrest. Maybe the agents are safe, but the operation cannot continue: in that case everyone involved must be stood down inconspicuously. What about colleagues? Safe houses? Dead-letter boxes? Another question is when the breach occurred. Can one be sure that this was the first instance? How solid is the 'product' (the intelligence obtained from the compromised network or individual)? Should it be assessed or analysed differently? Is it possible that the adversary used the breach to feed misleading information and then monitor the results? The answers to these questions may be 'no'. But an experienced team of counter-intelligence officers must ask them, find the answers, check and double-check. The taint of even a minor breach must be analysed, contained and cleaned. If a single breach is a serious problem, two make a nightmare— particularly if the missing material comes from different bits of the organisation. Documents which may on their own be quite anodyne can be gravely damaging if they are combined. Revealing an intelligence officer's cover name may be no big deal. But combined with his previous travel, it could be the clue that gives the adversary details of an operation. Multiple breaches increase the problem exponentially. Each bit of compromised information must be assessed not only on its own, but in relation to every other piece of data. As the numbers mount, the maths becomes formidable. Four bits of information have 24 possible combinations. Seven have 5,040. Ten have more than three million. If Snowden has taken a million documents, the permutations that—in theory—need to be examined exceed the number of atoms in the universe.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – judicial oversight bad – leaks
Dr. Bruce G. Blair 20, Research Scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, PhD in Operations Research from Yale University, “Loose Cannons: The President and US Nuclear Posture”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 76, Issue 1 [language modified; abbreviation in brackets]
The fog of nuclear conflict will prove all the thicker because leaders and planners lack adequate knowledge about their adversaries’ mind-set, resolve, wartime aims, and game plans. For instance, de-classified Soviet documents show clearly that the US strategy of “escalation dominance” was completely out of sync with Soviet nuclear strategy and that escalation to full-scale nuclear war was virtually inevitable if the United States struck first.13 After many decades of scholarly research, it is still not known what leaders in Moscow and Beijing were thinking during Cold War crises involving US attempts to threaten nuclear violence to coerce them.14 Today it would be foolhardy in the extreme to presume we would know Putin’s, Xi’s, and Kim’s minds and behavior in wartime. A prudent leader would not only refrain from initiating the actual use of nuclear weapons because of the danger of escalation; that leader would also refrain from brandishing them at all during a confrontation. The fear of an adversary striking first is the leading textbook cause of crisis instability. To stabilize a military crisis situation, what is actually needed is predictability and reassurance that first use is not on the table. For many strategists, however, taking options off the table looks like weakness. Retired Gen. James Mattis (the recent defense secretary) has a favorite military maxim: “Never tell the enemy what you are not going to do.” Strategists weaned on Thomas Schelling’s classic game theory arguments believe threatening, manipulating risk, and blackmailing are the currency of savvy crisis diplomacy. And it is certainly true that past US presidents have regularly played nuclear brinksmanship with the Soviets and Chinese and displayed incautious risk-taking in their crisis maneuvering. This was in fact the playbook of the Nixon advisors who ordered the world-wide nuclear alert that my crewmate and I helped implement in 1973. This alert sent a provocative message to the Soviets: The United States was prepared to play nuclear roulette to gets its way.15 Nuclear roulette begins at the outset of a crisis as the belligerents intensify their [ISR] intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. The aim is to maintain “situation awareness,” but the activities lend themselves to the worst-case interpretation that the adversary is updating its targeting in preparing to strike. Similarly, nuclear forces and command structures are programmed to go to higher readiness to prepare for war if the adversary will not back down. Although the motives may be defensive, these activities may appear to be precursors of a first strike and provoke an action-reaction spiral that spins out of control. Certainly, if even a single nuclear weapon were used, the strategic nuclear forces on both sides would move rapidly to a maximum war footing and project credible mutual threats of large-scale preemptive attack. In sum, a nuclear posture gearing up for a possible enemy first strike risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. From the perspective of presidential decision making, the first-use contingency could easily accelerate escalation to the point of causing mental duress. This contingency is also notable for its absence of guardrails and the ease with which a misguided or rattled president could order it. The launch protocol described earlier for launch on warning applies equally to first use. Although the timeline could be extended greatly, the president could choose at any time to end the discussion and order a strike. During the Cold War, I seldom practiced executing a first strike, and today there are no foreseeable scenarios that would justify transgressing the nuclear taboo of first use. Nevertheless, a first nuclear strike remains the default contingency of the US posture, owing to the huge uncertainties surrounding the alternatives – second-strike retaliation and launch on warning. A crisis that brings the belligerents to the brink of nuclear war would compel consideration of first use. Nuclear warfighters who reject the adage that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought may well brief and tout the purported warfighting advantages of going first. Even though first use runs counter to and undermines the entire framework of the global nuclear order, in which nuclear weapons exist only to deter, leaders may waver if it seems the least fraught choice at the moment of truth. An impulsive president may be drawn to it. Wiser advisors may counsel restraint, but nothing would stand in the way of the president ordering a first strike. The likely if not inevitable consequence of attacking a nuclear adversary with nuclear weapons is nuclear retaliation and uncontrolled escalation that crosses the threshold of acceptable damage to this nation. First use runs an existential risk to the United States and the world. It carries a huge risk of triggering a nuclear exchange of cataclysmic proportions with massive casualties to all the belligerent parties and beyond.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – judicial oversight bad – leaks
Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker & Pate 7, Bryan Pate, 2007, “Rethinking Judicial Oversight of Intelligence,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, , nihara
To function effectively, all democratic governments must subject their actions to open public debate, review, discussion, and response. These are the essential ingredients of oversight and accountability. Yet, to survive in an often hostile world, these same governments must also be able to collect, analyze, and use foreign and domestic intelligence—information of ongoing value only insofar as its methods of collection and secrecy can be maintained. This is the paradox of intelligence oversight: the need to achieve open review of secret materials and activities without destroying their value.
In the United States, there are many established mechanisms of oversight and accountability, both inside and outside the government. Under the U.S. Constitution, the three separate branches of the federal government—executive, legislative, and judiciary—share power through a system of checks and balances. Each has the obligation and authority to ensure that the other two branches perform their assigned functions appropriately. This tripartite division naturally encourages oversight and accountability between the branches. In addition, each arm of the government provides its own unique internal oversight. Within the executive branch, management reviews are conducted by numerous offices, each of which typically includes an inspector general and a general counsel to ensure that it is complying with the law.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – judicial oversight bad – top level
Martin 15 (David A; Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law Emeritus at the University of Virginia, former principal deputy general counsel of the Department of Homeland Security, member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, J.D. from Yale Law School; 2015; “Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures”; ; Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1; accessed 6/26/18; TV)
Justice Field, of course, does wind up treating the political branch’s conclusions, in this particular setting, as conclusive on the judiciary — but he does not rest that outcome on the idea that immigration control is a sovereign power outside the reach of the Constitution. Instead, he offers a statement about institutional roles seen as appropriate for the respective branches of government in this specific domain. In the foreign arena, he writes, as a matter of “self-preservation,”34 the government has the “highest duty” to “preserve . . . independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment.”35 To achieve these ends, the government is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. . . . The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.36 In other words, in 1888, the political branches judged necessary the application of a new absolute rule excluding Chinese laborers, in order to achieve security against what Congress deemed a type of foreign encroachment.37 Even with misgivings about the justice or fairness of the action, the courts will not second-guess that judgment of necessity. In realms touching upon foreign relations and potential national self-preservation, Field indicates, the nation must speak with one voice, and it is not for the courts to introduce a discordant sound. B. Complexity, Prophecy, and Experimentation in Foreign Affairs Decisionmaking Some critics of the plenary power doctrine question this asserted linkage between immigration and foreign affairs. Chinese exclusion was not a foreign affairs decision, they assert, but one driven by domestic political considerations — and in fact it worsened our relations with China.38 The invocation of foreign affairs is seen as a pretext covering up uglier motives, and the plenary power doctrine prevents courts from looking behind the mask.39 Therefore, some assert that courts should simply provide the ordinary measure of constitutional scrutiny — to smoke out invidious motives or at least to provide an appropriate evaluation of the weight of the governmental interest in light of the individual stake.40 This kind of pre-textual invocation certainly can occur. But here is the difficulty: We should not assume that pretexts in the foreign affairs arena are readily identifiable. As Justice Breyer observed in a recent political question case: Decisionmaking in [the foreign affairs] area typically is highly political. It is “delicate” and “complex.” It often rests upon information readily available to the Executive Branch and to the intelligence committees of Congress, but not readily available to the courts. It frequently is highly dependent upon what Justice Jackson called “prophecy.” And the creation of wise foreign policy typically lies well beyond the experience or professional capacity of a judge. At the same time, where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak “with one voice and ac[t] as one,” is particularly important.41 Many of the nation’s policy tools in the foreign arena are crude and imprecise, with uncertain impact. This very uncertainty may require trial-and-error application, with a need for quick policy changes, especially in times of crisis. Therefore, deference to the political branches is called for, not because we can always be sure that their motives are pure and nondiscriminatory — we cannot — but because subjecting these measures to detailed litigation would interfere with the flexibility often necessary to act beyond our borders. A too-ready judicial interference would also impair our ability to deploy uncertain tools — deriving from immigration control, trade regulation, or other components of our international relations — according to a single unified strategy.42 C. An Example: The Contrast to Domestic Measures Consider the seizure of U.S. diplomats by militants in Tehran in 1978. After the embassy invasion was ratified and defended by the new Iranian government, the U.S. government turned to a disparate variety of countermeasures to try to win release of the American hostages, including the seizure of billions of dollars in assets of Iran and of its companies and nationals, litigation in the International Court of Justice, an ill-fated military rescue attempt after Iran defied the International Court, diplomatic overtures through Algeria, and certain immigration-law-based restrictions imposed on Iranian nationals in the United States.43 There were even proposals at the time to use immigration or other powers to intern large numbers of Iranian nationals so they could perhaps be part of an exchange that would bring the diplomats home.44 Thankfully, such internment was never put into motion. Contrast the trial-and-error use of these generally crude and scattershot measures with how the government would respond to a domestic kidnapping and potential hostage situation. The police could deploy quickly to investigate who seized the victims and where they were currently located. In that process the authorities could use judicial search warrants to facilitate the inquiry, plus arrest warrants and compulsory grand jury subpoenas as appropriate. They could call on a wide range of assistance and technical support from a host of fully empowered domestic agencies, state and federal. Once the kidnappers were located, the police would establish perimeter control around the hostage site. No hostile militias would stand in the way (or if such appeared, other governmental power, including the National Guard, could be deployed). In a protracted standoff, judicially issued search warrants might help legitimate a forcible rescue operation. And the full weight of criminal punishment, imposed through efficiently functioning courts, could be expected for the kidnappers or hostage takers. This comparison helps reveal why courts are positioned to apply close constitutional scrutiny of official domestic action, whenever it is credibly challenged, but properly feel more constrained in the international arena. In the international arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory process or other reliable coercive means under their own government’s control. Moreover, the stakes are typically higher, as is the number of people potentially affected — not only by the immediate outcome but also by downstream effects, as the resolution either deters similar adverse actions in the future or instead stimulates them because the U.S. effort failed. With a domestic operation, judges can be confident that the government will still have plenty of capacity to deal with public safety threats, even in the presence of robust judicial review. One cannot have such confidence about the efficacy of alternative policy tools in the global arena if domestic judicial action begins to prevent or second-guess or slow down the use of those initially chosen by the political branches. Another difference between the two settings is relevant. In the domestic arena, we do not tolerate individuals using tit-for-tat responses to remedy wrongful behavior. I cannot justify seizing and carrying away my neighbor’s television on the ground that he borrowed my riding mower months ago and never returned it. But this prohibition on messy self-help obtains precisely because efficient hierarchical legal mechanisms, involving professional police and a developed court system, stand available to redress my neighbor’s wrongful act. In recent decades, the world has taken limited but hopeful steps toward investing transnational institutions with comparable powers, but progress remains quite uneven across different policy domains. The plenary power doctrine manifests the Supreme Court’s judgment that the kind of detailed constitutional scrutiny appropriate for the mature and developed domestic public order is not workable in the more primitive international legal system, marked primarily by horizontal action-and-response to try to rectify breaches. D. The Nongovernmental Component of Foreign Affairs Decisionmaking Foreign affairs are involved in immigration decisionmaking for another, more entangling reason, even when there is no clear effort to retaliate against or to influence a foreign government. Most high-level immigration decisions — by Congress or by the executive branch — are designed, at least in part, to influence or shape behavior overseas by individuals and nonstate actors, including both prospective immigrants (contemplating either legal or illegal channels) and smuggling organizations. For example, the decision (part of Operation Streamline45) to prosecute a high percentage of simple entrants without inspection caught along the southern border, causing them to spend some time in jail or prison before being repatriated, has been criticized as disproportionate to the inherent nature of this misdemeanor offense.46 But this critique misunderstands the policy decision. Operation Streamline is primarily meant to send a deterrent message to others contemplating a future clandestine crossing.47 The same is true of decisions to repatriate violators to a distant part of the land border rather than back to the border town from which they entered and where their coyote may be waiting to help them try again to enter.48 To take another example, in 1994, the Clinton administration decided to decouple the grant of work authorization from the simple act of filing for asylum, as had been provided under earlier regulations, though this change would mean that many applicants would be without a means of support, other than private or family charity, for as long as 180 days. This austere step was taken, in significant part, to discourage people planning to come to the United States to file an ill-founded claim that previously would have secured several years of residence and lawful work while they awaited a hearing.49 Changes to the treatment or opportunities of noncitizens in the United States, whether in the direction of restriction or liberalization, almost inevitably affect the decisions of people and organizations abroad who are thinking about organizing or participating in migration to the United States. Smuggling organizations, in fact, often build their business plans around finding and exploiting weak spots in immigration laws or processes.50 As a result, some U.S. government measures take on a more severe or restrictive aspect than might initially seem to be warranted by the acts of the individuals most immediately affected. This is because the policymakers mean the action not just for those who are the direct object of enforcement on U.S. soil but also for the message sent to others they want to deter. This dynamic appears to explain, in significant part, the Obama administration’s decisions to respond to the southwest border migration surge in summer of 2014 with a surprisingly severe set of measures, including sustained detention, even though the subjects were mainly children traveling with a mother or other relative. The executive branch also implemented accelerated removal processing where the law permitted such action, and assured substantial publicity for the flight whenever recent migrants were deported by airplane to their home country.51 Despite sharp criticism, these practices persisted, and they seem to have had much of the desired deterrent impact in the foreign nations at issue. In fact, monthly arrivals of unaccompanied minors from these countries declined from 10,631 in June 2014 to 2,432 in September.52 This kind of deterrence-based action, focused on overseas individuals and nongovernmental players, is also an aspect of foreign affairs, even though it falls below the plane of high-level geopolitics. It likewise may need to take the form of rough-hewn trial-and-error, like the more traditional foreign-relations actions directed at governments. The Supreme Court’s case law over the years appears to consider such policy choices equally worthy of foreign-affairs deference.53 This analysis is not meant as advocacy for the quick or expansive use of immigration restrictions to respond to objectionable or unwelcome actions of foreign governments or nonstate actors. For reasons of both policy and proportion, immigration sanctions of this type should be sparingly deployed. But the Court’s doctrine of deference in Chae Chan Ping and later cases is based on the recognition that even for relatively liberal foreign-affairs decisionmakers, rough-hewn actions that initially seem outsized or individually unfair might need to be in the mix to respond to, or to help shape, actions that others are taking abroad.54 III. Why the Court Resists Even Moderate Proposals for a More Active Judicial Role A more nuanced branch of the Chae Chan Ping criticism accepts that foreign affairs considerations may well be at stake in some immigration decisions, but would modify the doctrine to allow for a carefully structured closer judicial look.55 The courts, such observers contend, should not take political branch assertions as controlling, but instead should perform an initial judicial probe of the asserted reasons, to decide whether the challenged immigration restriction rests on a significant foreign affairs foundation. If the answer is yes, then the reviewing court should treat the political branches’ decision as dispositive — essentially, as a political question not subject to judicial review. But if not, then the court should apply ordinary modes of constitutional review, which might well bring a form of heightened scrutiny. At first glance, this kind of proposal would seem to offer an attractive middle ground to the Supreme Court. Yet the Court in practice has manifested great resistance to these scholarly invitations. Why? In my view, a majority of the Justices harbor a deep skepticism that lower courts can be trusted to give sufficient weight to foreign policy concerns in making any such threshold assessment. The very nature of immigration litigation in the courts of appeals, with an actual and often sympathetic human being front and center, makes a reviewing judge far more likely to overvalue the individual interests at stake and undervalue the more subtle and complex reasons why a particular measure may be needed for system stability or to influence behavior beyond our borders — connections that often would not become fully apparent until broader damage is manifested months or years after an interventionist judicial decision.56 Anna Law’s book, The Immigration Battle in American Courts, documents this disparity in outlook between the Supreme Court and the lower courts quite revealingly. She describes “how [lower court] judges can disregard congressional edicts limiting their scope of review in order to reach a desired result,”57 and can usually get away with it because the Supreme Court can review only a tiny fraction of their decisions.58 Professor Law regards this stance by the courts of appeals as a virtue, but the Supreme Court doubtless views it otherwise. Keeping the plenary power doctrine categorical gives the Supreme Court greater assurance that lower courts will preserve the space needed for government actions to meet real foreign affairs imperatives (even if this stance inevitably also leaves room for some ill-motivated actions adopted by the political branches). If this symposium were being held at the time of Chae Chan Ping’s centennial, in 1989, we might have had greater reason to expect some softening by the Supreme Court regarding the deference doctrine in the foreign affairs arena. Exactly twenty-five years before the week when this symposium convened in Norman, Oklahoma, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling that the Soviet bloc was coming apart, about to be replaced, in many instances, by democratic governments. Lengthy wars were ending in Latin America, and dictators were being forced from office. It appeared we were on the cusp of a far more benign world order — one that might permit the rapid flowering of more protective international legal institutions and thereby reduce reliance on crude action-and-response in the international arena. Today’s global scene is far more grim. Not only has the United States experienced the trauma of al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks, which revealed a genuine need for more vigilant immigration screening, but democratic nations are also facing new global threats from other nongovernmental actors who actually glorify the use of beheadings, crucifixion, and slavery, in addition to other players using more old-fashioned forms of terrorism directed at civilians. Failed states are more common, and well-armed insurgencies have proliferated. The march of democracy has slowed and, in several countries, reversed. Climate change and even plague-like diseases presage more complicated foreign policy challenges, many of which will have a migration dimension. The risks to the United States, if our government’s foreign-policy-linked initiatives are unsuccessful, now seem far higher than in 1989. Thus, I do not foresee the Supreme Court retreating significantly from the strong deference doctrines derived from Chae Chan Ping. 59
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Turkey DA › 1NC – ! – Syrian Invasion
Will Todman 19, fellow at the Middle East Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 7, 2019, “The Implications of a Turkish Intervention in Northeastern Syria”, https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-turkish-intervention-northeastern-syria \\SYang
A3: A Turkish invasion of northeastern Syria is likely to result in a high number of casualties in the near term and significant instability in the longer term. For years, the SDF was the principal U.S. partner in the campaign against the ISG, and it has grown into a formidable fighting force.
Perhaps the greatest fear is the resurgence of the ISG in Syria. With the SDF focused on the north to repel a Turkish attack, it will redeploy forces from southeastern Syria. These areas have already witnessed sporadic attacks from ISG cells and a spike in tensions between the local Arab tribes and the SDF in recent months. The attack may also mean the release of up some 12,000 jihadi prisoners and tens of thousands of dependents who are in areas controlled by the SDF. The ISG has called on its members to free the detainees. The White House claims that Turkey will assume responsibility for these detainees, but the chances of a smooth handover from Kurdish to Turkish authorities is slim.