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2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage

Disinformation causes truth decay----system wide approach by NATO is key to prevent it.

Kathleen J. McInnis 21, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative; Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare,” , cy

Beyond these US, UK, and Finnish examples, comprehensive approaches to political warfare among NATO members and partners are less prominent. Perhaps in part owing to bureaucratic stovepiping and policymaking preferences, many capitals of NATO member states that are targets of these campaigns tend to view each of Moscow and Beijing’s actions discretely rather than as constituent parts of a holistic strategy. Failure to consider these activities and their implications holistically—and, therefore, failing to address their respective behaviors in a likewise holistic manner— risks the United States and its allies taking actions that achieve short-term successes at the expense of longer-term gains. Progress on areas like the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), for example, which seeks to replace bilateral trade agreements between EU members and China with a common EU-wide investment framework, can present longer-term strategic risks to European states, including increased vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion and influence campaigns—not to mention heightened tensions in the transatlantic relationship due to increasingly divergent strategic approaches to China.47 In other words, a strategic-level approach between NATO, its member states and partners, the private sector, and like-minded multilateral organizations like the EU is needed, as is a framework to turn strategic consensus into concrete action. Fortunately, both by treaty and by recent operational practice, NATO is well positioned to serve as a bedrock for both. The Alliance can, therefore, usefully serve as a catalyst for developing a Comprehensive Approach to combat coercion and political warfare.

Article 2 and the Art of the Political: NATO’s Strategic Role in Countering Political Warfare

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage

Warming causes extinction

David Spratt 19, Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Ian Dunlop, member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, May 2019, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf

An existential risk to civilisation is one posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity which may never be undone, either annihilating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential.

With the commitments by nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the current path of warming is 3°C or more by 2100. But this figure does not include “long-term” carbon-cycle feedbacks, which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the unprecedented rate at which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage

Info warfare makes it impossible to effectively respond to climate change

Joseph Marks 20, Washington Post reporter, 1/24/20, “The Cybersecurity 202: Disinformation threat pushes Doomsday Clock closer to midnight,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2020/01/24/the-cybersecurity-202-disinformation-threat-pushes-doomsday-clock-closer-to-midnight/5e29d32d88e0fa6ea99d3426/

Online disinformation campaigns are not just a threat to the 2020 election. They may be a harbinger of the end of the world.

Metaphorically speaking, at least.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Information Ecosystem Advantage

Accelerating info operations from authoritarian powers are corrupting institutions worldwide---but the plan solves

Andrea Kendall-Taylor 20, senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; and David Shullman, the senior advisor at the International Republican Institute and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5/26/2020, "Converging Chinese and Russian Disinformation Compounds Threat to Democracy," Power 3.0: Understanding Modern Authoritarian Influence, , RMax

In recent weeks the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda and disinformation blitz around COVID-19 has drawn increasing attention, and with good reason. In addition to promoting a narrative about Beijing’s global leadership around the pandemic, the Chinese government has adopted Russian disinformation tactics in promoting conspiracy theories purporting that COVID-19 originated in Europe, the United States, and beyond to distract from its failed initial response to contain the outbreak from spreading beyond Wuhan.

Several accounts of China’s information operations have noted the incorporation of Russian disinformation tactics. Yet the full significance of this development cannot be understood without appreciating the broader alignment between Russia and China. In other words, China’s adoption of Russian information operation techniques is about more than “authoritarian learning,” or the passive diffusion of such practices from one authoritarian regime to the next. Instead, Russia and China are deepening ties and increasing coordination on a range of economic, defense, technological, and political issues. These repeated interactions facilitate an intentional sharing of best practices and are building a foundation for sustained cooperation moving forward.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

BUT building on existing NATO counter-disinformation ensures a stable presence in the Baltics that deters invasion.

Marta Kepe 17, Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation, M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service June 2017, "NATO: Prepared for Countering Disinformation Operations in the Baltic States?," , RMax

NATO plans to have around 3,000 troops in the Baltic states by the end of May as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) — the largest reinforcement of NATO troops in the region for a generation. This represents a geopolitical shift of focus for NATO, from its earlier Central European theatre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, further eastwards to the Baltic region vis-à-vis Russia. The aim is to demonstrate the “strength of the transatlantic bond,” reiterating to Russia the message that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on the whole NATO alliance, an alliance which now includes the three ex-Soviet members of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These NATO troops will be joining the US troops deployed there as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve that the Pentagon claimed demonstrates continued “US commitment to collective security” in Europe.

Strategic communications planning is part of preparing any military deployment; however, this deployment could face the Kremlin's sophisticated disinformation operations and propaganda in NATO territory. This represents the “geopolitics of disinformation,” currently being tracked by the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), who argue that such Russian “disinformation has specific geopolitical objectives;” namely to try to decrease public support for the NATO deployments in both the troop-sending states and the host nation countries.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Baltic invasion goes nuclear.

Hal Brands 19, Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, November 2019, "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/ //AShah

Would the US fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004.

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Specifically, it’ll trigger invasion of the Baltics---escalates quickly

Brent Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah

We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics: It was a shot heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight the Russians to a standstill.

But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Info warfare is the linchpin of Russia’s hybrid proxy conflict strategy---the Donbas model will be replicated

Tomáš Čižik 17, is a director of Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), a Bratislava based international relations and security policy think-tank. Tomáš holds a PhD in Theory of Politics from Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the Matej Bel University, May 2017, " Information Warfare - New Security Challenge for Europe.," Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, //AShah

Armed insurgency, Russia's main kinetic HW tool against Ukraine, was instigated and backed by massive information warfare since it's inception. The rebels, who are mostly mobilized, trained, and armed by the Russian special services, and further supported by the Russian armed forces, have been destabilizing Donetsk and Luhansk regions since February 2014. The crisis started to unfold after the pro-Russian former president Yanukovich was forced to flee to Russia as a result of the revolutionary rally in Kiev over his decision to hinder Ukraine's association with the EU. The mass protests in Kiev's Maidan Square, which brought the new pro-European government to power, demonstrated the unequivocal support of the vast majority - 90% according to some polls - of the Western Ukrainians for European integration (IRI, 2014). In response to the undesired change of the government in Ukraine (GoU), Russia launched an aggressive information campaign blaming the government for alleged violations of the rights of the Russian speaking minorities in the country. Using this narrative, predominantly Russian-speaking Crimea was officially annexed by Russia, and Russian special services started to organize separatist outbreaks in Donbas. For these purposes, Russia used the dissatisfaction of the Russian speaking Ukrainians with the new government's attempt to drop the law making Russian the official second language of Ukraine.

Notably, the linguistic divide between the population of the western and eastern regions of Ukraine is reflected in political preferences on the part of the population. According to the opinion polls conducted by the Kiev's International Institute of Sociology, 72.5% of the population of Donetsk region are in favor of integration of Ukraine into the Russian-led Customs Union as opposed to the 9.4% supporting EU integration (Zn. ua, 2014). The regional differences with regard to foreign policy orientation, also stimulated and well exploited by Russian propaganda, can be seen as the main source of the political disagreement between eastern and western Ukraine. As a result of effective information warfare conducted by Russia and the pro-Russian separatists on the ground, they were able to manipulate with the divides among the population against Ukraine's integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures by provoking violent conflict in Donbas without even having mass support.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Populism’s an independent existential risk and magnifies all others

Andrew Leigh 21, Australian member of Parliament, former professor of economics at the Australian National University, 2021, What's the Worst That Could Happen?: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics, unpaginated ebook version

How likely is it that humanity could end? Experts working on catastrophic risk have estimated the chances of disaster for a wide range of the hazards that our species faces. Adding up the threats, philosopher Toby Ord estimates the odds that humanity could become extinct over the next century at one in six, with an out-of-control superintelligence, bioterrorism, and totalitarianism among the largest risks. He argues that most of the risks have arisen because technology has advanced more rapidly than safeguards to keep it in check. To encapsulate the situation facing humanity, Ord titled his book The Precipice.

A one in six chance of going the way of dodos and dinosaurs effectively means we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future. Six chambers. One bullet. Even the most foolhardy soldier usually finds an excuse not to play Russian roulette. And that’s when just their own life is at stake. In considering extinction risk, we’re contemplating not one fatality but the death of billions or possibly trillions of people—not to mention countless animals.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

EU populism spills over globally

David Cadier 19, researcher in EU foreign policy at CERI-Sciences Po, Associate at LSE IDEAS (London School of Economics) and a Future World Fellow at the Centre for the Governance of Change (IE University), January 2019, "How Populism Spills Over Into Foreign Policy," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78102 //AShah

Even more than mainstream parties, populist leaders in office seem to regard foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics by other means. Because they consider themselves as the only true representatives of the people, populist actors discard any political opposition as necessarily illegitimate, with repercussions on foreign policy.

Taking the opposite course of their predecessors seems, for instance, a key reference point in setting the coordinates of their foreign policy. This is perhaps best exemplified by Donald Trump’s apparent obsession with unbundling Barack Obama’s diplomatic initiatives.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

European polarization cements populism---it’s robustly correlated

Victor Ginsburgh 21, Victor Ginsburgh has a PHD in economics from the Free University of Brussels. He has been an Economics professor at Université Libre de Bruxelles since 1975, Sergio Perelman obtained his first degree in Economics at the University of Buenos Aires and a PhD. in Economics at the University of Liège, Belgium, where he is Professor of Economics since 1991, Pierre Pestieau is a Belgian economist. He received his B.A and M.A degrees in economics from the University of Louvain and then his PhD from Yale University, August 2021, "Populism and Social Polarization in European Democracies," CESifo Economic Studies, https://academic.oup.com/cesifo/article/67/4/371/6346855?login=true //AShah

Our aim was to explain populist attitudes (that may eventually lead to populist votes) by a number of factors, the most important being the degree of social polarization, which measures the extent of social divides that plague our societies. Polarization is significantly positively correlated with all four populist attitudes, particularly when immigration inflows are treated as an endogenous variable and the model is estimated using IV-2SLS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to correlate populism using such indicators of polarization that reflect the socioeconomic divides better than standard measures of inequality or poverty.

To compute our measure of social polarization, in each country we fractionalize population into three groups, low, middle and high income. The distances between the income groups are the ratios of people experiencing either difficulties ‘to make ends meet,’ or ‘material deprivation’.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Ukraine creates a tipping point in the broader information war---now’s key

Serge Schmemman 22, Times correspondent and bureau chief in Moscow, Pulitzer Prize recipient, 5/5/2022, "The Information War in Ukraine Is Far From Over: Serge Schmemann," , RMax

If the first casualty of war is truth, then the corollary in Ukraine is that information is the first battlefield.

That was where the war began, in early 2022, weeks before Vladimir Putin sent the first rockets, armored vehicles and troops into Ukraine, when he claimed that the massive buildup of troops along Ukraine’s borders was but another military exercise. And that was where the United States and its allies scored their first victories, when they made public intelligence anticipating the invasion and the pretext Mr. Putin would use for it.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
1AC › 1AC---Information Warfare › 1AC---Russia Advantage

Russia’s dramatically increasing its information operations---they’re key to its broader geopolitical goals

Mark Scott 22, Chief Technology Correspondent at POLITICO, writing about the global collision of technology and politics “As Ukraine conflict heats up, so too does disinformation,” POLITICO, 1/27-/22, //chico

Ukrainian special forces planning so-called "false flag" operations. The United States considering chemical weapons attacks in the Eastern European country. NATO preparing to attack Russia during the upcoming Winter Olympics.

The Kremlin is ratcheting up its disinformation game with claims like these amid rising geopolitical tensions between Moscow and Western capitals, according to a review of state-backed media content over the last 10 days by POLITICO.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Cybersecurity › Cybersecurity Definitions

Cybersecurity requires opinio juris and governmental processes

Shackelford et al 16 [Scott J. Shackelford is the Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Senior Fellow, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution. Scott Russell is a Post-Graduate Fellow, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University. Andreas Kuehn is the Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; PhD Candidate School of Information Studies, Syracuse University. An earlier form of this article was published as Defining Cybersecurity Due Diligence Under International Law: Lessons from the Private Sector, in ETHICS AND POLICIES FOR CYBER WARFARE (Maria Rosaria Taddeo ed., 2016). We would like to thank Springer Nature for allowing the republication and expansion of this chapter as an article for the present volume. https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=e47f4f66-6c70-48c4-9602-c14f3a18937d&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5KG5-HR00-00SW-413V-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=237721&pdteaserkey=sr4&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr4&prid=94d3703c-3bc6-4a1c-8516-5ccfa8a69fd6]//LP

A. An Introduction to Customary International Cybersecurity Law One precedent informing customary international cybersecurity law was articulated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States case (Nicaragua), which involved a dispute over the United States' involvement with the Contra rebellion in Nicaragua. 11Link to the text of the note In Nicaragua, the ICJ held that customary international obligations would arise from the consistent, widespread practice of States engaging in specific acts or omissions, performed out of a sense of obligation that such acts or omissions were required by international law (opinio juris). The combination of opinio juris and State practice performed by a significant number of States and without the express disavowal of a significant number of other States, gives rise to international obligations under customary international law. The underlying rationale is that this combination reflects a consensus in the international community that the actions taken represent an international obligation. Despite Nicaragua's clear articulation of the rule, in practice, the development of customary international law presents a temporal dilemma. For a State to engage in actions out of a sense of legal duty, this decision presupposes the existence of such a duty, and therefore the prior existence of customary international law on a certain issue. 14Link to the text of the note To help resolve this dilemma, Professor Frederic Kirgis argued for what he calls a "sliding scale" approach. 15Link to the text of the note Professor Kirgis argues State practice and opinio juris need to be understood on a spectrum, wherein the requirement for opinio juris increases as the evidence of State practice decreases. Rather than [*6] impose strict requirements for both State practice and opinio juris, the sliding scale approach argues that a strong history of State practice can give rise to international obligations absent opinio juris. 16Link to the text of the note Likewise, compelling opinio juris could give rise to international obligations with little evidence of State practice. 17Link to the text of the note The sliding scale approach may prove particularly important in the cybersecurity realm as these novel technologies have developed too rapidly for evidence of widespread State practice to emerge, yet compelling opinio juris may still form the basis for international obligations. Proving opinio juris, however, is a difficult task, especially in the cyber context. The temporal dilemma makes pointing to existing rules challenging, so the preferred method is to identify broad principles that enjoy widespread international agreement, which the ICJ suggests may be evidenced by treaties. 18Link to the text of the note Indeed, most courts rely on treaties to identify opinio juris, often exclusively so. 19Link to the text of the note Yet in the cyber realm, treaties have largely focused on implementing domestic cybercrime laws and have done relatively little to address cybersecurity standards, leaving such decisions to the private sector and standards bodies such as the NIST Framework, discussed below. 20Link to the text of the note So using cybercrime as an example, international agreements like the Budapest Convention, the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection, and the various Association of Southeast Asian Nations working groups on cybercrime all could serve as opinio juris that States have an obligation to enact and enforce cybercrime laws within their territories and to cooperate to prosecute and extradite cybercriminals. Even though these agreements often lack binding language, they nonetheless suggest a growing international consensus that the establishment of domestic cybercrime laws is an international obligation. 21Link to the text of the note Similarly, the Organization of American States has also encouraged Member States to join the Budapest Convention and to increase regional cooperation to mitigate cybercrime, whereas a nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolution calls on States to "eliminate safe havens" for cybercriminals. 22Link to the text of the note Declarations like [*7] these, although non-binding, serve as further evidence of international consensus regarding cybercrime. While it is unlikely that a non-signatory State would be bound to the specific terms of a treaty to which it did not sign--particularly in the short term--that treaty may still serve to identify broad principles that form opinio juris and thereby can build a foundation for international obligations. The search for cybersecurity opinio juris is further complicated by the multifaceted cyber threat comprising cybercrime, espionage, terrorism, and war. While the classification of State cyber-activities is a well-known problem, 23Link to the text of the note the fact that these activities are so widespread suggests a lack of opinio juris against aggressive State cyber-activity below the armed-attack threshold. The ambiguity surrounding State cyber-activities is further reinforced by discussions of the international law relating to espionage, which is largely unregulated outside the law of war context. 24Link to the text of the note Similarly, domestic cybersecurity practices are highly variable and can involve the surreptitious installation of malware--as alleged of Chinese telecommunications providers and the National Security Agency (NSA) alike--discussed further below. 25Link to the text of the note Given the relative lack of multilateral progress, claiming a widespread consensus for an underlying cybersecurity norm is challenging: a situation that can only be marginally mitigated by investigating related ICJ jurisprudence on the subject. B. ICJ Jurisprudence as It Relates to Cybersecurity Due Diligence Although the ICJ has never directly addressed cybersecurity due diligence requirements, its cases discussing due diligence generally can serve as broad guideposts to infer cyber-specific applications. It is worth noting that these cases all arose prior to the proliferation of cyber attacks, but some of the principles that underlay the cases, including Corfu Channel, Trail Smelter, and Nicaragua, may still have some applicability. 26Link to the text of the note Before reviewing these cases though, it is first important to define "cybersecurity due diligence." In the transactional context, this term has [*8] been defined as '"the review of the governance, processes and controls that are used to secure information assets."' 27Link to the text of the note The concept as it is used in this Article builds from this definition and may be understood as the customary national and international obligations of both State and non-State actors to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices and effective governance mechanisms so as to promote cyber peace through enhancing the security of computers, networks, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructure. Cybersecurity due diligence obligations may exist between States, between non-State actors (for example, private corporations, end-users), and between State and non-State actors. Applicable instruments include technical standards, legal requirements born from treaty or custom, as well as national policies and private-sector industry norms, discussed below. 28Link to the text of the note We will proceed by highlighting three international obligations identified by the ICJ: the duty to warn, the "no harm" principle, and non-intervention, which we will use to infer cyber-specific applications and identify potential problems. We will then go on to address the law governing countermeasures for when an international obligation is violated, address its applicability to cyber-operations, and consider the implications for cyber due diligence.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Cybersecurity › Cybersecurity Definitions

Cybersecurity includes proactive measures

Craig et al 15 [Amanda N. Craig is a Senior Cybersecurity Strategist, Microsoft Corporation Scott J. Shackelford is an Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Stanford University. Janine S. Hiller is a Professor of Business Law, Richard E. Sorensen Professor in Finance, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech. Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis. American Business Law Journal, 52, 721. https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5HRG-66D0-00CW-H0YN-00000-00&context=1516831]//LP

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, despite continued legal uncertainty in the United States and globally, debates about active cyber defense began to shift. More frequent cyber attacks increasing anxiety likely contributed to this change of perception; for instance, by 2010, more than forty percent of companies surveyed by Symantec reported that cybersecurity incidents topped their lists of concerns. As was mentioned above, one watershed moment was Operation Aurora, a sophisticated campaign using spear phishing attacks and at least one zero-day exploit exposed by Google in early 2010 The attacks were noteworthy for at least two reasons: the type of intellectual property that was stolen (including Google's source code--that is, its "crown jewels" 116Link to the text of the note) and the illustration of the extent to which state-sponsored attacks--or other highly organized and well-financed attackers--had begun targeting private firms. 117Link to the text of the note According to Dmitri Alperovitch, then-vice president of threat research at the antivirus firm McAfee, Operation Aurora "totally" changed the threat model, representing the first instance in which private firms (outside defense contractors) experienced "that level of sophisticated attack." 118Link to the text of the note Moreover, in Google's private investigation, the company gained access to a computer, located in Taiwan, "that it suspected of being the source of the [Aurora] attacks." 119Link to the text of the note When it saw evidence of attacks involving other U.S. companies, Google alerted and collaborated with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to trace ultimate responsibility for the [*750] attacks back to mainland China. 120Link to the text of the note As such, Google may have "set a precedent of what is allowable" to defend against APTs--even as "one could imagine similar scenarios that could lead to civil or criminal charges." 121Link to the text of the note Operation Aurora did much to introduce the private sector to the concept of APTs, a term that, like "active defense," was borrowed from the military. 122Link to the text of the note In 2011, McAfee defined APTs as "sophisticated, covert attacks bent on surreptitiously stealing valuable data from targeted and unsuspecting companies" and claimed that such "targeted attacks are on the rise." 123Link to the text of the note Yet defining APTs may be a malleable and circumstantial exercise--and may even represent a politically or economically minded euphemism. In 2011, for example, the CEO of security firm HBGary said that the definition of an APT varies depending on "who you ask," and the terminology really only emerged because the U.S. Department of Defense and Air Force needed a "nice way" to refer to Chinese state-sponsored threats. 124Link to the text of the note Likewise, McAfee has argued that "the motive of the adversary … is the primary differentiator of an APT attack from a cybercriminal or hacktivist one" and agrees that APTs are targeted attacks "carried out under the sponsorship or direction of a nation-state [*751] for something other than a pure financial/criminal reason or political protest." 125Link to the text of the note Yet this statement fails to appreciate that determining which motive dominates can be an even more daunting challenge than establishing attribution. Even though some industry experts have suggested that "APT hysteria" was overblown, and "some who [thought] that they [were] victims of APTs [were] really the victims of organized criminals, hacktivists, glorified script kiddies, and their own mistakes," evidence clearly demonstrates that malware has become more "customized," meaning anything from a simple repackaging of existing malware to "code written from the ground up for a specific attack." 126Link to the text of the note By 2013, more security experts claimed that sophisticated, targeted attacks posed the greatest information security "danger" for businesses that traditional defense technologies were "slowly losing relevance" because they were ineffective, 128Link to the text of the note and that companies were increasingly frustrated by attempting to protect themselves "with a purely defensive posture." 129]APTs are built to circumvent passive cyber defenses like firewalls and antivirus software. Private sector actors' self-reporting suggests that most advanced attacks go unnoticed for more than one year (and are often ultimately noticed by a third party); a reasonable conclusion is that APTs often circumvent purely defensive postures. In the early 2010s, continuing "massive cases of cyber exploitation," including GhostNet, Night Dragon, and Shady RAT, significantly harmed companies and advanced both media exposure and private [*752] sector cybersecurity concerns, 131Link to the text of the note reinforcing the perception that APTs were the new norm. 132Link to the text of the note Moreover, APTs tipped cyber offense-and-defense asymmetry even further in the attackers' favor. Attackers already benefitted from the comparatively small risk of being caught and prosecuted; conversely, defenders already were forced to make significant investments and accept greater risks when deciding how to defend their networks. The rise of APTs enabled attackers to access greater resources and more advanced technologies (such as from a state sponsor or criminal organization) while private sector defenders continued to struggle to increase IT security budgets and employ less sophisticated technologies. According to security expert Keren Elazari in a report prepared for CrowdStrike, Simply put, the bad guys are gaining the upper hand. Cybercrime and corporate espionage attackers are persistent--and they only need to get in once… Advanced attackers are using previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities and self-mutating, evasive, and polymorphic malware while detection rates of existing protection mechanisms are falling. Defenders are facing more malware and more sophistication. Attacks are as lucrative as ever for advanced and commonplace adversaries. Clearly, the time has come for a strategic shift of focus for cybersecurity. Active defense has emerged as the new security paradigm that can help defenders resolve the gap between detection and response and make life more difficult for attackers. In the face of escalating numbers and sophistication of cyber threats, and the imbalance between attackers and defenders, active defense emerged post-2010 as a practice that allows companies to increase the costs to adversaries attacking them---just as, in the physical world, allowing individuals to engage in self-defense increases the potential costs for would-be attackers, therefore possibly dissuading some attackers. However, even though active cyber defense is increasingly emerging as a [*753] sensible or "logical" approach by which the private sector can shift a greater burden to attackers, what has been less clear is how the broader cybersecurity industry is evolving to support more proactive measures. The cybersecurity industry is an essential part of the evolution, as expertise and cybersecurity best practices reside in this space. Part II picks up this debate by couching it in the experience of dozens of cybersecurity companies and then focusing on four case studies before pivoting to consider some of the implications for businesses and policy makers in Part III.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Cybersecurity › Cybersecurity Definitions

Cybersecurity involves market-based approaches

Ebrahim 20 [Tabrez Y. Ebrahim is an Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor, University of California, San Diego; Ostrom Visiting Scholar (Program on Data Management and Information Governance) & Affiliate (Program on Cybersecurity and Internet Governance), Indiana University (Bloomington); Visiting Fellow, University of Nebraska (Lincoln): Nebraska Governance & Technology Center; Thomas Edison Innovation Fellow & Leonardo da Vinci Fellow, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School;ARTICLE: NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INNOVATION. West Virginia Law Review, 123, 483. https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:61X5-YX61-JX8W-M4YS-00000-00&context=1516831.]//LP

National cybersecurity involves tradeoffs with government intervention and market-based incentives for technological innovation, and theoretical reformulation of innovation mechanisms towards this lens is the subject of this Article. The patent system has been considered as supporting the establishment of a market of new technologies by providing incentives for invention, promoting the financing of innovation, and stimulating competition through exclusion. As such, while the patent system is a government-driven mechanism, the market foundation role of patents supports the market development of new technologies. [*488] The parsing out of the government's need to provide national cybersecurity versus the private market in being able to provide national cybersecurity raises the question as to whether the patent system provides sufficient incentives for national cybersecurity innovation. A variety of innovation mechanisms could promote national cybersecurity innovation, and a comparison of the role of government and the market presents innovation policy considerations for society. Implicit in this analysis is that the patent system has some role in technological advancement for national cybersecurity. However, inventors and patent holders lack inadequate incentives from the patent system for national cybersecurity inventions, for which the guarantee of the reward is too small, the possibility of the reward is uncertain, or the transaction cost is too high. As a result, the patent system is inadequate to promote national cybersecurity innovation. Such limitations may push some national cybersecurity innovators towards trade secrecy, which presents a different set of problems, including whether and how they can help foster technological advancement to protect the critical infrastructure. The purpose of this Article is to assess how important the patent system is to national cybersecurity. If one unequivocal conclusion follows from this Article in addressing this tradeoff for achieving national cybersecurity, it is that patents may not be a good match when their disclosure is kept secret or when their interests can be taken by government, and technological innovation for critical infrastructure protection can be better oriented through prize funding or a better way to encourage public-private research and development ("R&D"). Innovation mechanisms for technological advancement present unique challenges for national cybersecurity, including market failure, government failure, and co-mingled public-private infrastructure elements. At a theoretical economic level, inventors and innovators will not make investments in national cybersecurity R&D and individuals hope to reap its benefits without contribution to its technology development - a conundrum that warrants government intervention. 17Link to the text of the note

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Artificial Intelligence › AI v Autonomous

AI has to problem solve not complete a task

Ball 20 [Inertial Sense has released the following article explaining the difference between autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) as the two concepts relate to robotic systems. Inertial Sense is the developer of LUNA, an automated navigation software platform designed for robotics companies who want to make their existing fleet unmanned and automated. https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2020/11/artificial-intelligence-vs-autonomy-for-mobile-robotics/]//LP

Artificial Intelligence vs. Autonomy Artificial intelligence applications and autonomy are both valuable tools in the industrial environment. These technologies can be used independently or can work together to achieve the desired results. Here’s an easy way to breakdown the differences between the two: autonomous robotics = task completion and AI = problem-solving. Autonomous robotics systems are designed for use in predictable environments to complete tasks within a specific, usually pre-planned, environment. Sensors are of critical importance in providing robots with detailed and accurate information about their location within the domain. Autonomous robotics systems rely on these sensors to navigate their environments and to perform their tasks quickly and effectively. Autonomous devices and systems can be powered by conventional software or by AI systems that allow them to learn and adapt as they operate. Artificial intelligence is defined by Yale University as “building systems that can solve complex tasks in ways that would traditionally need human intelligence.” This typically involves machine learning technologies and the use of highly advanced sensors to collect information about the environment and to allow the system to react appropriately to external stimuli.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Artificial Intelligence › AI v Autonomous

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous systems are distinct

Sagramsingh 19 [Raine Sagramsingh is a recent graduate of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. She graduated summa cum laude with a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering. She was an active member of the Florida State University Center for Leadership and Social Change’s Service Scholar Program. Raine completed internships with the Air Force Research Lab and Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems.https://wise-intern.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Raine_S_-FinalPaper.pdf]//LP

The terms in which the international community discusses lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) can at times be ambiguous as there is an absence of a common vocabulary and common understanding of the terms autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI). LAWS are weapons systems that apply lethal force independently, with freedom from human control. AI has many subfields including machine learning, data mining, speech recognition, and image processing. Policymakers frequently refer to any of the subfields of AI as AI. By grouping these various terms together under the umbrella of AI, the term is frequently misused by technical experts, policymakers, and the general public. As advances in technology lead to increased autonomy in systems, the terms AI and autonomy are frequently used together. Despite their relationship to each other, it is a mistake to use these terms interchangeably. Currently, the international discussion does not define the technical characteristics of LAWS, hindering the development of public policies, laws, and practices related to the use of autonomy and AI in weapons systems. To improve understanding of the technical characteristics of autonomy and AI in LAWS, this paper aims provides the following recommendations. Recommendation 1: Classify the level of autonomy and intelligence in current weapon systems. Members of the international discussion on LAWS should evaluate where current weapon systems fall on the spectrum of intelligence and autonomy and should consider which of those should or should not be a part of the continuing discussion. Recommendation 2: Limit the use of the term Artificial Intelligence. While potential exists for fully-autonomous intelligent weapon systems, they are not a current reality. Using the term AI to refer to machine learning, computer vision, natural language processing, and many other fields of study limits the development of public policy because there is no individual evaluation for their potential positive or negative impact on LAWS. Recommendation 4: Distinguish autonomous systems from autonomous intelligent agents. An autonomous system does not imply the use of AI, whereas autonomous intelligent agent does. These terms represent significantly different technologies that warrant separate discussion. Recommendation 5: Distinguish between semi- and fully-autonomous systems. To make progress developing public policies regarding LAWS, the discussion must distinguish semi-autonomous systems from fully-autonomous systems. Regulating the two technologies with the same set of policies ultimately will be unsuccessful.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Security Cooperation › Public Good

Security Cooperation must work towards overall public good

Van Ness 08 [Peter Van Ness is a Visiting Fellow, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/anu/0002776/f_0002776_1944.pdf]//LP

The future material gains from cooperation for all parties are potentially immense, especially with respect to investment, trade and technology transfer for the collaborative development and marketing of Russian energy resources. Meanwhile, the US and China would maintain their institutional ties in the region (for China, most importantly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN+3; and for the US, its bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Australia), but in Northeast Asia, the most potentially volatile region in Asia, they would work together. Other countries in the Asia–Pacific may wonder about how such a new institution in which they do not directly participate will affect them. Seen in realist terms, those governments might worry that the security arrangement had been designed as a conspiracy against them. But cooperative security provides a different understanding. Multilateral security cooperation by a group of states in one region not only enhances their own security but also produces a public good of strategic stability for the larger community of nations. ASEAN has shown the way. The cooperative-security design in ASEAN has been built on a network of economic and political ties and strategic dialogue. If the Six Party Talks on Korea can now achieve as much as ASEAN already has achieved for its member-states (i.e., to make inter-state war among any of its members unthinkable), all countries in the region would benefit. Other countries in the region like Australia would not directly participate in the new institution, but they would benefit from the strategic stability and shared security achieved by the new, multilateral cooperative-security consortium—a public good.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Security Cooperation › Actor

Any department can do Security Cooperation as long as they can justify it and the DoD agrees

US Code 18 [United States Code Annotated; last amended Aug. 13, 2018; Title 10: Armed Forces, Subtitle A: General Military Law, Part I: Organization and General Military Powers, “Security Cooperation,” Chapter 16 https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=36d1e120-61e0-4d13-85f2-d432af69ca97&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fstatutes-legislation%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A8T8B-MS12-D6RV-H0B2-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=6362&pdteaserkey=sr20&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr20&prid=298b0942-ad47-415b-a269-8b26a8cf67ae]//LP

§ 385. Department of Defense support for other departments and agencies of the United States Government that advance Department of Defense security cooperation objectives

(a) Support authorized. Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense is authorized to support other departments and agencies of the United States Government for the purpose of implementing or supporting foreign assistance programs and activities described in subsection (b) that advance security cooperation objectives of the Department of Defense.