Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Multipolarity › Multipolarity is Peaceful

Multipolar cooperation promotes democracy and solves foreign aggression.

Patriota, 17

(Antonio de Aguiar, Brazilian ambassador to Italy, Malta and San Marino and permanent representative of Brazil to the United Nations from, Cooperative Multipolarity: Is the World Ready? https://risingpowersproject.com/world-ready-cooperative-multipolarity/)

Cooperative Multipolarity is Achievable Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has spoken of the current geopolitical configuration as one without historic precedent, with none of the three top military powers in a position to assume a hegemonic role. In this respect Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow (2014, 183) correctly point out that “ultimately, hegemony is difficult to reconcile with democracy”. It is undeniable that in the emerging multipolar configuration of power divergent agendas and world views will continue to collide and could well lead to open hostility and destructive competition. But it is also true that cooperative, and increasingly inclusive forms of interaction are happening every day on important, unifying issues, through multilateral arrangements which – although described as “American led” by some – in reality reflect an evolutionary path paved with the engaged participation of many nations large and small. Cooperative multipolarity is therefore achievable and can be seen as the next, more democratic and just stage in the evolutionary path of the international system. Important achievements, brought about through the active leadership of the victors of World War II, provide a firm foundation for our future efforts. These include the ruling out of the use of military force, except in situations of self-defense or in accordance with specific multilateral authorization, respect for the universality of human rights, as well as compliance with a vast body of international law establishing rights and obligations in a wide range of topics – from trade, finance and social justice, to health, education and culture. Of the three “pillars” that compose the triad of the UN’s field of activity – namely, development, human rights, peace and security – it is possible to affirm that a process of modernization and adaptation to new contemporary realities has been successfully advancing with respect to the first two. Such is the meaning of the universally applicable 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015; such is the sense of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council created ten years ago. In the peace and security realm, however, there is considerable room for improvement. But the situation is not hopeless. The militarism of the first years of the 21st century has come to illustrate the limitations of the use of force to confront new challenges posed by violent extremism conducive to terrorism, opening opportunities for cooperation on prevention. An effective combination of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy has produced constructive outcomes in dealing with thorny issues such as the Iranian nuclear file.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Offshore Balancing › 2NC---China---Offshore Balancing Good

Offshore balancing checks Chinese revisionism – it helps redirect resources to enable effective US containment

Walt ’20 – Professor of International Affairs [Stephen; STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School; 5-5-20; " The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars?”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/05/offshore-balancing-cold-war-china-us-grand-strategy/; Foreign Affairs; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

The situation in Asia is dramatically different. China is a potential hegemon in Asia, and it will remain one long after the COVID-19 pandemic is behind us. Although Asia contains a number of capable medium-sized powers, such as Japan, South Korea, and India, it will not be easy for them to form an effective balancing coalition. In this case, the United States needs to coordinate this effort and commit its own forces. Buck-passing will not work. Although U.S. military forces will have to be onshore in a number of places in Asia, this policy is still fully consistent with the grand strategy of offshore balancing. To be sure, preventing China from establishing regional hegemony in Asia cannot stop Beijing from trying to build influence through its Belt and Road Initiative or stop it from engaging in other efforts to expand its diplomatic reach. But it would help limit Chinese influence by maintaining an active U.S. presence in Asia and forcing China to focus most of its attention closer to home. By reducing the U.S. commitment to Europe and ending its costly military involvements in the Middle East, offshore balancing would also free up resources that will be needed to meet a future Chinese challenge, a problem that may be increasingly acute in the post-coronavirus fiscal environment. Why is it a problem when people misrepresent offshore balancing? Because we are finally having a serious and long overdue debate about the proper grand strategy for the United States. The stakes are high, as the many failures that flowed from liberal hegemony—the flawed grand strategy that U.S. leaders pursued during the unipolar moment—make clear. Protagonists often try to win policy debates by distorting their opponents’ views, by falsely associating their own recommendations with past successes, and by denying any responsibility for repeated failures. Deciding which strategic options should guide U.S. policy in the future depends first and foremost on a proper understanding of the different alternatives. An accurate understanding of offshore balancing will reveal that it provided the foundation most of America’s foreign-policy successes, while departures from that strategy lie at the root of some of the country’s biggest missteps.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Offshore Balancing › 2NC---Generic---Ext: Offshore Balancing Good

Switching to offshore balancing is the best way to remedy current foreign policy issues and prevent war

Ashford ‘21 [Emma; EMMA ASHFORD is a Senior Fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.; 8-24-21; " Strategies of Restraint”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint; Foreign Affairs; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

Both approaches to the world are still problematic. A rebooted liberal internationalism may succeed at rehabilitating the United States’ image, but it is unlikely to advance democracy or build a unified liberal order through nonmilitary means when military ones have failed. And as the global balance of power shifts, liberal internationalism simultaneously overestimates the contributions that U.S. allies can make to collective defense and underestimates the differences they have with Washington. The “America first” approach, for its part, may yield short-term dividends—Trump, after all, was able to force U.S. allies to abide by sanctions on Iran and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement—but it has diminishing returns. The more the United States uses coercive tools against other countries, the more they will look for ways to blunt those tools. And both approaches lean heavily on a forward U.S. military presence in ways that could all too easily trigger an unplanned conflict, particularly in Asia. The remaining alternative, restraint, comes from outside the Washington policymaking world and is largely focused on these flaws. It is far more ideologically diverse than the other two, but most restrainers agree on several core principles. They share a conviction that the United States is a remarkably secure nation, that unlike many great powers in history, it faces no real threat of invasion, thanks to geography and nuclear weapons. They argue that U.S. foreign policy has been characterized in recent years by overreach and hubris, with predictably abysmal results. And they think U.S. foreign policy is overmilitarized, with policymakers spending too much on defense and too quickly resorting to force. Most important, advocates of restraint strike directly at the notion of the United States as the indispensable nation, considering it instead as but one among many global powers. RESTRAINT’S MOMENT The most common slap at restrainers is that they focus too much on criticism without offering plausible policy alternatives. That is not an entirely accurate evaluation; individual proponents of restraint have offered detailed prescriptions for everything from the war in Afghanistan to U.S.-Russian relations. But it is true that restrainers have often focused on what draws them together—namely, their shared criticisms of the status quo—rather than what would pull them apart: the question of which specific policies to implement instead. As restraint enters the mainstream conversation, the distinctions within this group are coming to the surface. Restraint contains several different overlapping ideas. The first (and best defined) of these is an academic theory of grand strategy formulated by the political scientist Barry Posen in his 2014 book, Restraint. His version of restraint envisages a much smaller military based primarily within the United States. Other restrainers—such as the international relations theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt—advocate a grand strategy of offshore balancing, a distinct but related approach that also calls for downsizing the United States’ global military role. (The distinction between the two is one of degree: Posen backs an entirely offshore military presence, whereas Mearsheimer and Walt admit that the United States may occasionally need to intervene to keep a hostile state from dominating a key region.) As grand strategies, both leave many granular policy details unstated, but they present internally coherent and fully formulated approaches to the world. There is also a looser definition of “restraint.” Increasingly, the term is Washington shorthand for any proposal for a less militarized and activist foreign policy. That includes those put forth not just by academic realists but also by progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress, as well as various antiwar groups (such as Code Pink and the Friends Committee on National Legislation) and newer entrants into the antiwar space (such as the veterans’ group Common Defense). Thus, the term “restraint” is now used as often to signify this broader political movement as it is to describe a grand strategy. Any movement that includes Mearsheimer and Code Pink is by necessity a big tent, and indeed, there are many motivations for restraint. For some, it might be a moral consideration: many libertarians believe that war grows the state, and anti-imperialists want to rein in what they see as an overbearing military-industrial complex. For others, the motivation is financial: although conservative deficit hawks are far less vocal on defense than on other issues, they exist, and many progressives and even some mainstream Democrats view cuts to military spending as an easy way to free up resources for infrastructure or social programs. For others in the restraint community, it is personal: some of the recent activism around ending the war on terrorism has been driven by veterans who are concerned about what the conflict has done to their fellow soldiers and to American society writ large. Then there are the strategists, for whom the pursuit of restraint is largely about avoiding the failures and risks of the current approach. There are even those who might be called “restraint-curious,” people who are open to a more restrained foreign policy on specific issues but reject the broader notion.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Offshore Balancing › 2NC---Generic---Ext: Offshore Balancing Good

Offshore balancing is empirically proven to be successful – past instances of onshoring have only ended in failure

Walt ’20 – Professor of International Affairs [Stephen; STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School; 5-5-20; " The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars?”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/05/offshore-balancing-cold-war-china-us-grand-strategy/; Foreign Affairs; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

Gady’s article is an interesting historical narrative, and it reminds us that U.S. strategy in the early Cold War was not preordained. But like other contemporary critics of offshore balancing, Gady does not fully grasp the underlying logic behind this strategy. As a result, he mistakenly believes that Cold War containment was at odds with offshore balancing. This is wrong: Containment during the Cold War was a clear application of offshore balancing’s central principles. Gady’s account portrays offshore balancing as something of a halfway house between true isolationism—the position long identified with Taft that he had abandoned by the early 1950s—and the policy of containment that the United States pursued throughout the Cold War. This view is clearly reflected in his claim that “[a]t the core, an offshore balancing strategy for the United States means maintaining regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere while maintaining a balance of power in Asia and Europe, chiefly through allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid, thus preventing any other great power from dominating these geo-strategically important regions” (my emphasis). This description might sound correct at first glance, but Gady misses an essential feature of the strategy: Whether the United States can safely remain offshore depends on the configuration of power in the “geo-strategically important region” in question. Although the United States may be able to rely on “allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid” in some circumstances, this policy is not possible if the states in the relevant region are too weak to balance a potential hegemon on their own. Under these conditions, an offshore balancer must commit its own power—including its own military forces—in that key region to ensure that no single power is able to dominate and control it. This principle explains why Britain—the original offshore balancer—sent its own troops onto the European continent against Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany and its allies, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States acted similarly in the two world wars and in the Cold War too. This prescription follows directly from offshore balancing’s core logic. It is a realist strategy, which views a favorable distribution of hard power (economic capacity, scientific prowess, military strength, etc.) as the primary source of U.S. national security. Spreading democracy, building institutions, expanding trade, etc., may be worthy goals in their own right and can sometimes help at the margin, but at the end of the day U.S. security is determined largely by the balance of power in areas of critical strategic importance. This belief was the basis for Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine, policies that eventually established the United States as the only great power in the Western Hemisphere. By expanding across North America and driving the European powers out, the United States was able to keep dangerous adversaries at a distance, thereby maximizing its own security and freedom of action. Every other major power has either been invaded or suffered sustained attacks at home on one or more occasions during the past 200 years—but not the United States. Being the world’s only regional hegemon has not only made Americans safer. It eventually made it possible for them to intervene abroad without having to worry much about defending their own soil. Since becoming a great power, the United States has also sought to prevent any other great power from singlehandedly dominating Europe, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf. These regions are important because Europe and East Asia are the key centers of industrial power, while the Gulf is the source of much of the oil and gas that fuels the world economy. Were any single country able to dominate Europe or East Asia, it might eventually control greater economic resources than the United States and be able to outpace it in an arms race. That superpower might form alliances with other countries in the Western Hemisphere and bring its own power to bear close to the U.S. homeland. Similarly, a hostile hegemon in the Persian Gulf (or an outside great power that moved into and dominated that region) might be able to manipulate oil supplies in ways that could damage the U.S. economy. Preventing a hegemon from emerging in these key regions provides an additional benefit: It ensures that the major powers in Eurasia will tend to worry more about each other than about the United States. As a result, some of these states are usually eager for U.S. support and thus more willing to do Washington’s bidding. For all of these reasons, it makes good sense for the United States to maintain a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere and help prevent another great power from establishing a similar position in its own neighborhood. Several implications follow directly from this logic. First, the proper role and size of the U.S. national security establishment depend on the distribution of power in the key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight, there is little reason to deploy U.S. ground or air forces in distant areas and less need for a military establishment that far outstrips those of the other great powers. The United States should still maintain a first-class military and keep a watchful eye on developments around the world, but it does not need to garrison much of the planet or use force to spread liberal principles far and wide If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States should rely on local forces in the threatened region as the first line of defense, calibrating its support for these local actors with the level of the challenge and their own capabilities. If these regional states cannot contain a potential hegemon on their own, then the United States must commit its own military power to the region to make sure the potential hegemon cannot overawe and dominate its neighbors while at the same time making sure that its local partners bear a fair share of the costs of containment. During the Cold War, the essential features of containment followed this basic logic perfectly. U.S. leaders did not believe that the local powers in Europe or East Asia could stand up to the Soviet challenge on their own, which is why Washington deployed substantial U.S. forces to these critical regions in peacetime. Of course, it might have been preferable in the abstract for the United States to pass the buck to others, but the distribution of power in Europe and Asia at the time made buck-passing infeasible. There was no potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf, however, and the Soviet Union did not seriously threaten to invade that region during the Cold War. Nevertheless, to maintain the local balance of power and limit Soviet influence, the United States relied on Britain (until the mid-1960s) and on local clients such as Iran. After the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 and Iran became an adversary, Washington created the Rapid Deployment Force. But it kept this force offshore and over the horizon and did not send significant forces into the region until Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990. This clear and obvious threat to the regional balance of power led the United States to organize a large coalition—in which its own forces played the predominant role—to expel Iraq from Kuwait. This operation was fully consistent with offshore balancing: The first Gulf War was an occasion when it made sense for the United States to go “onshore.” Most importantly, whenever the United States has abandoned offshore balancing and pursued a different strategy, the results have invariably been disastrous. The Vietnam War was not consistent with offshore balancing, for example, because, as realist critics such as Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz emphasized, Indochina was not a vital strategic region and its fate could not alter the global balance of power in any meaningful way. The Clinton administration’s adoption of “dual containment” in the Gulf and the recent U.S. wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya were also misguided departures from offshore balancing, as they had little to do with maintaining a favorable balance of power. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, it shattered the local balance in the Persian Gulf to the benefit of Iran.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: LIO › AT: LIO Solves War

The LIO can’t prevent Russia and China from acting like rogue states – the rise of authoritarianism makes “liberal activism” non-responsive

Ignatieff, PhD, ’21 ( Michael, he received his doctorate in history from Harvard University, was the Edward R. Murrow Chair of Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and is currently a professor of history at Central European university Vienna, leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Leader of the Official Opposition from 2008 until 2011, published 12/6/21, access 7/5/22, “The Collapse of Liberal Internationalism”, https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-collapse-of-liberal-internationalism)//lexmw

Though Afghanistan sounded the death knell of liberal internationalism, the bells had been tolling for some time. The rise of authoritarianism, the failure of concerted action on climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic presented challenges that liberal internationalism lacked the tools to deal with. Liberal activism’s characteristic response—human rights “naming and shaming”—became irrelevant as authoritarians grew shameless, consolidating their grip within global powers like Russia and China, as well as smaller players like Turkey and Venezuela. The prime objective of a liberal internationalist foreign policy—the strengthening of a “rules-based international order”—foundered against this new reality. Great powers began acting like rogue states. China to force the release of one of its nationals; it lied about the pandemic, stole intellectual property from its competitors, extinguished freedom in Hong Kong and threatened Taiwan with invasion. In Russia, Putin’s regime poisoned adversaries in foreign countries, used cyberwarfare to spread disinformation in American domestic elections and gave rebels in Ukraine the weaponry to a commercial airliner, sending hundreds of people to their deaths. Nor was “our” side immune to the temptations of rogue behavior. The U.S. and its Israeli ally used targeted assassination against scientists and military commanders in Iraq and Iran. If we add all these pieces together, they tell us the world long ago left “the rules based international order” behind.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: LIO › AT: LIO =/= Heg

The LIO maintains the hegemon

Glaser, PhD, ’19 (Charles L., is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. Professor Glaser holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received a BS in Physics from MIT, and an MA in Physics and an MPP from Harvard. He directs the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, published 4/1/2019, accessed 7/5/2022, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided”

According to LIO theorists, the order is characterized by hierarchy, not anarchy—that is, the lack of an international institution or state that can prevent the use of military force and enforce international agreements. In the international relations theory literature, hierarchy has a variety of meanings and logics. The LIO is grounded in a narrow conception of the term: hierarchy is manifest in legitimate political authority between superordinate and subordinate states. John Ikenberry explains that in hierarchical systems, “order is established or imposed by a leading state wielding concentrated power and authority … hierarchical orders can vary widely in terms of the degree to which superordinate and subordinate roles are established and maintained by such factors as coercive power, legitimate authority, institutionalized relations, and a division of labor.” In a liberal hegemonic order, legitimate authority plays a large role, whereas coercion plays a limited role. The legitimacy of the most powerful state reflects its willingness to rely on bargaining to achieve consensus. The LIO is built on negotiated rules that all states, including the most powerful state, accept. Consequently, the weaker states consider the most powerful state's overwhelming influence in establishing the terms of the consensus to be legitimate. Accordingly, the weaker states are less likely to try to overturn the agreement or regime, which increases the most powerful state's prospects for maintaining its position over the long run. Nevertheless, the structural relationship between the states is hierarchical, because the most powerful state disproportionately influences the terms of the agreement. David Lake offers a different understanding of hierarchy, based on a concept of “relational authority.” He states that “in a relational approach, authority is understood to rest on an exchange relationship between dominant and subordinate states, in which the former provides a social order in return for compliance and legitimacy from the latter.” Legitimacy conferred by the subordinate (weaker) power to the superordinate (stronger) power distinguishes the product of relational authority from standard bargained agreements. Central to Lake's understanding of legitimacy is duty: “It is the duty to comply with the ruler's commands—or alternatively the legitimacy of those commands—that renders authority and coercion conceptually distinct.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: Retrenchment Bad › AT: Generic Retrenchment

Only retrenchment can avoid the worst effects of US hegemonic collapse

Paul 20 – has a M.A. in English from Jadavpur University and is the senior editor at Open Magazine, 2/21/20 (Sudeep, “Who’s Afraid of Pax Americana?”, Open Magazine, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

The backdrop to American power is now this re-emerging world island. And in a time when the US is largely seen to be ‘in decline’, even by the American public (a March 2019 Pew Survey said that 60 per cent of Americans think the US’ stature in the world will shrink over the next 30 years), what matters, as much for America as for the world, is the choices Washington makes in the near future. In Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment (2018), Paul K MacDonald and Joseph M Parent, analysing the cases of Britain, France and Russia, contend that ‘declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes’. But their most significant find is that, when in decline, ‘states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do’. This can be explained by understanding the truism that what matters is not a state’s own trajectory but ‘how the trajectory changes its position relative to others’. Retrenchment is the commonest response to decline and it reduces costs. A retrenching great power switches to a foreign policy ‘less active, less ambitious, and less burdensome’. In this line of argument, challenging theories of grand strategy and war, the ‘biggest danger may not be the impending Sino-American transition itself, but the widespread belief that it makes war more likely’. So, how does Donald Trump’s withdrawal from Syria square with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani or the Middle East peace plan? To understand US foreign policy in the Trump era, a medium-term background is necessary. The most significant breakthrough for Cold War US foreign policy was under the arch-realist Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor-cum-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when the détente with China was established. Ronald Reagan, not a realist in the Nixon mould, reacting to Jimmy Carter’s shock at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the bungling of the Iranian hostage crisis, abandoned the Nixon-era caution and got away with it. But two things still took America by surprise: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. That surprise, however, soon led to elation and the brief return to realism evidenced in the George HW Bush presidency (who built a coalition of 39 states to eject Iraq from Kuwait and limited the war’s objectives) was replaced by the pursuit of what has been called ‘liberal hegemony’. Building on the Cold War’s culture war, combining hard and soft power through institutions and individuals, this was American foreign policy at its most ambitious and arrogant and it made the three presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama a continuum, notwithstanding the divergences in detail. Under Clinton, the US sought to remake post-Soviet Russia in America’s image—economically, culturally and politically. The failure was epic. In a March 2018 essay in American Affairs, former State Department Russia advisor James Carden wrote: ‘The failure of this project has contributed to the present animus towards Russia and continues to hinder more reasonable diplomatic relations.’ This was a long way from George F Kennan’s 1947 article in Foreign Affairs with which America’s Cold War foreign policy had begun, an article that had called for a firm containment of the Soviet Union, not motivated ideologically but strategically. Managing the post-Cold War was America’s second failure on the world stage (bigger than the hot war in Vietnam). In 1992, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had stopped a military modernisation plan, the need for which was felt soon after. Nevertheless, America did not retrench after the Soviet collapse. In The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), political scientist John J Mearsheimer battles for a new realism because ‘[l]iberal states have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to maintain’. But while he proposes a policy of restraint, Mearsheimer is an ‘offensive realist’ as opposed to ‘defensive realists’ who want to have nothing to do with hegemony. MacDonald and Parent might counter the assumption of defensive realism that a hegemonic power would sooner or later be reduced by a coalition of its rivals, because what matters is the relative trajectory of the declining state. But to extend the idea, even if it somewhat contradicts their thesis on retrenchment, it could also be argued that a reduction in the defence budget and curtailing alliance engagements would not reduce the risks for America. Mearsheimer’s belief that ‘a foreign policy based on realism is likely to be less warlike than one based on liberalism’ was nearly proved by Nixon but while the offensive realist finds the defensive realist proposal of mere ‘offshore balancing’ inadequate and dangerous, there is agreement that the US needs to abandon the crusading liberal hegemony in place since the Clinton years. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: Retrenchment Bad › AT: Generic Retrenchment

Only retrenchment can solve inter-state conflict in the Middle East – proven by partial withdrawal under Trump

Parsi 20 –  has a Ph.D. in foreign policy from John Hopkins University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Uppsala University and a Master’s Degree in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics. He has served as an adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, New York University, and George Washington University, as well as an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and as a Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC and currently teaches at Georgetown University in Washington DC, 1/13/20. (Trita, “Perhaps the Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away?”, Quincy Institute, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

As the scholars Hal Brands, Steven Cook, and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation, “the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region: the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force; uphold freedom of navigation; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or face grave consequences; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” This account is accurate enough (although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel), but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own. That’s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article, too, where he points to Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful. It will be even nastier and more turbulent than it is today.” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018, “If it weren’t for the United States, they’d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.” All this without a nod to the fact that, if anything, the United States’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region, which have, in turn, prompted further Iranian response. Assertions about the United States’ pivotal role in the Middle East, no matter how often repeated, have not been proved true. Iran, ravaged by sanctions, corruption, and economic mismanagement, is nowhere near establishing hegemony in the region. Saudi Arabia spends more than five times as much on its military than does Iran; the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE—outspends Iran by a factor of eight. Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether. Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times. Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression. An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy. Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments. In the wake of the U.S. assassination of Suleimani—which some former U.S. officials have called an act of war—the calculations may change once more. According to Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Suleimani was in Iraq to bring him Tehran’s response to a message from Riyadh on how to defuse regional tensions, presumably as part of the House of Saud’s renewed interest in diplomacy. The Iraqis, according to him, were mediating between the two rivals, an initiative that has now been thrown into question. Iran may very well conclude, rightly or wrongly, that Saudi Arabia and the UAE conspired with Washington to assassinate Suleimani and as a result not only end the recent diplomacy but also target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as part of the revenge for Suleimani’s death. This is yet one more instance, it seems, in which U.S. activities in the region have brought more turmoil than stability. To be sure, there is no guarantee that recent diplomatic efforts would have been successful. A more responsible Riyadh might not have begotten a more responsible Tehran. But it is noteworthy that diplomacy did not even begin in earnest until Washington clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to entangle itself in a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And by returning to the region in a show of military force, Trump may once again disincentivize the United States’ allies from taking diplomacy seriously. They may even interpret Suleimani’s killing as a license to resume their recklessness—activities like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s purported kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister and ordering of the dismemberment of Khashoggi; Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s imposition of a blockade on Qatar; and the two countries’ further destabilization of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen. As in the past, in other words, it seems as if the Middle East’s descent into chaos is more likely with the United States than without it. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: Retrenchment Bad › AT: Europe Rentrenchment

Europe can handle Russia without the US – their ev doesn’t account for Europe’s vast types of units.

Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of numerous articles and three books, 12-2-2020, (Barry, "Europe Can Defend Itself," Global Politics and Strategy, 62(6), p. 7-34, , kav)  

If the IISS front-wide 1.5–2:1 force-ratio heuristic is valid, NATO European forces seem competitive. NATO’s publicly announced rapid-reinforcement objective for ground forces is 30 mechanised battalions in 30 days.38 In Western militaries, this would typically imply ten brigades. If ten brigades is NATO’s official solution to the Russia problem, and if the IISS heuristic roughly captures the thinking of NATO planners, then NATO is unlikely to have assessed the plausible Russian force in theatre as larger than 15 brigades. 

Changing the mission from offence to defence, however, also permits NATO Europe to take advantage of the large number of ‘light’ infantry units in Western armies (see Table 3). These units typically have no tanks, and though they can have light armoured vehicles, these are not well suited to offensive operations. Some are airborne units, which in most Western armies are considered elite troops. While these units are often among the readiest in any army, ‘Defending Europe’ rightly does not count them as useful for the counter-attack scenario. Most NATO European armies maintain one or more additional infantry brigades. Some of these specialise in mountainous terrain and are considered elite. There are also many infantry brigades that travel by truck or light armoured vehicle, and fight on foot. For defensive operations, especially where urban or forested areas are available for cover and concealment, these units can be effective, even against mechanised forces. Indeed, they are sometime preferable.39 Such brigades are not the equal of armoured brigades in open country, but assigning them half the combat power of their heavier brethren when fighting defensively on ground of their choosing seems fair. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK collectively have at least another dozen of these types of brigades.40 If half are assumed ready, then six more brigades are available to fight, and even if their combat power is discounted by another 50%, three brigade equivalents can be added to the NATO total, bringing the Russia–NATO force ratio down to 14:14, or one to one. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: Retrenchment Bad › AT: Europe Rentrenchment

Europe’s NATO military can handle Russia alone – it’s more efficient and money-wise than the US.

Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of numerous articles and three books, 12-2-2020, (Barry, "Europe Can Defend Itself," Global Politics and Strategy, 62(6), p. 7-34, , kav)  

The main security problem for Europe is Russia. We should be curious as to how Europe’s situation could be so bad, given that Europe’s main military inputs – people and money – exceed Russia’s. Including Turkey and Canada, and excluding the US, NATO has nearly 1.9 million military personnel. Excluding Turkey and Canada, NATO has nearly 1.4m military personnel.7 Russia has about 900,000 troops in the active forces, and another 500,000 in paramilitary units, the main purpose of which is internal security, for a total of 1.4m.8 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute assesses that Russia spent perhaps $65 billion on defence in 2019, measured at market exchange rates.9 The non-US NATO members spent roughly $300bn on defence that year, about $280bn without Turkey and Canada. Indeed, combined German and French defence spending alone is $100bn, which exceeds that of Russia. In crude terms, then, the Europeans out-resource Russia in military inputs. Furthermore, Europe draws its inputs from a much larger and more diverse base. The pre-Brexit GDP of the EU (which excludes NATO members Canada, Norway and Turkey, and includes neutrals such as Finland and Sweden) was about $16 trillion, compared with Russia’s $1.7trn. The pre-Brexit population of the EU was 513m, while Russia’s is about 145m. Overall, then, any inability on the part of European members of NATO to muster the military wherewithal to oppose Russian aggression involves more than a mere incapacity to allocate sufficient national resources to the challenge. It would be a defence-management failure of truly heroic proportions. 

Two reasons are generally offered to explain why Europe would logically get less for its total defence spending than would a single country. Firstly, whether counting NATO members or EU members, every European state has its own defence ministry and its own array of military headquarters, schools, depots and bases. Given that some of these countries are quite small, considerable duplication of effort is plausible. The superficial evidence does not support the argument that superfluous European civilian employees are the problem, however. The ratio of civilians employed by EU ministries of defence to the number of troops under arms is considerably lower than that of the United States. The US has 758,000 direct-hire civilians, 1,363,000 active troops and 804,000 reservists. Even if all reservists are included, the ratio of civilians to military personnel is 0.35. Europe employs 372,000 civilians to manage 1,400,000 troops, for a ratio of 0.25. Thus, by the numbers, Europe appears to be more efficient at management and support than the US.10 This may seem off base intuitively, but the similarity in the ratio of civilians to uniformed personnel is suggestive. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: China War › AT: Thucydides Trap

The U.S. and China won’t fall into the Thucydides trap and will find a way to peacefully coexist

Jayathilaka 4/11/22 [11 Apr 2022, Jayathilaka, Aruna, Department of Social Sciences, Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka, Lecturer in Political Science, “Are China and the USA Heading for a War ? (Can they Avoid the ''Thucydides Trap''?)”, SSRN, , AA]

Thucydides (460- 404 BC), finest of historical Greek historians and writer of the History of the Peloponnesian War, which recounts the war among Athens and Sparta within side the fifth century B.C. He was also named as the father of the school of political realism', which views the political behavior of people and the resulting effects of relations between states as ultimately mediated and based on "fear and self-interests'. As he explained, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." (Allison, 2015). Thucydides recognized key drivers of this dynamic: the growing power's developing entitlement, experience of its importance, and call for more say and sway, on the only hand, and the fear, insecurity, and resolution to protect the popularity quo this engenders within side the mounted power, at the other (Allison, 2017). 3.1 Graham Allison on the Thucydides’ Trap Graham Tillett Allison, an American political scientist and the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, recognized Thucydides Trap as the best framework to understand why there is potential for conflict between the United States and China. (Allison, The Thucydides Trap, 2017) The Harvard Thucydides' Trap Project has identified sixteen cases over the last 500 years in which a major rising power threatened to dethrone a major ruling power.( Figure 01) Figure 01 : Thucydides’ Trap in the history Power struggle between China and USA Source : (Allison, 2015) Source: ( Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2021) Twelve of these sixteen contenders resulted in warfare. Allison uses the cases to demonstrate how the tension between rising and ruling powers frequently leads to war and how the war was avoided in the four rivalries that did not result in violence. Allison views that China's attempt to challenge the US hegemony will create an avenue for a war. According to Allison, the Chinese government's action plan for achieving this goal includes: revitalizing the Party, restoring its sense of mission, and reestablishing its authority in the eyes of the Chinese people; reviving Chinese nationalism and patriotism to inculcate pride in being Chinese; engineering a third economic revolution, and reorganizing and rebuilding China's military so that it can 'fight and win.' (Allison, Avoiding the Thucydides Trap, 2018) In addition, Allison revives Samuel Huntington's classic thesis about the clash of civilizations. He argues that China's pursuit of its goals resulted from 'deep cultural' differences. (Table:01) Table 01 : 'Deep Cultural' differences between USA and China Source: (Allison, The Thucydides Trap, 2017) 04. Reponses on the ‘Thucydides Trap’ The concept of the "Thucydides Trap" and the debates around it have influenced academics, international media, including Chinese official media, and American and Chinese politicians. 4.1 Scholars views on ‘Thucydides Trap’ In comparison, international scholars are more diversified in the concept. There are generally three views; Pessimistic Views, optimistic, and Realistic Views. 4.1.1 Pessimistic Views The first view, mainly from Western and American scholars, is quite pessimistic. They believe that U.S.-China relations have fallen into or are about to enter the “Thucydides’ Trap.” For instance, in May 2015, American scholar David Lampton, who used to express much hope for a sound and lasting U.S.-China relationship, delivered a speech at the World Forum on China Studies, stating that “tipping point in U.S.-China relations is upon us. and that we are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties” (Lampton, 2015). Analysts and officials in Washington are fretting over “worsening tensions between the United States and China and the risks to the world of two superpowers once again clashing rather than cooperating”. (Michael Beckley and Hal Brands 2021). According to these analysis, a cold war with Beijing is already under way. Hence, it is not surprising that the Chinese continue to see the USA’s ‘hegemony,’ military presence, and alliances with others as major stumbling blocks for China’s attempts to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity (To, 2003) 4.1.2 Optimistic Views However, most Chinese analysts believe that the "Thucydides' Trap" cannot adequately characterize Sino-US ties. They have explored strategies for both countries to escape the trap by deconstructing the notion's flaws. Professor Qin Yaqing, for example, discovers that the Chinese philosophical paradigm of "Yin and Yang Dialectics" differs markedly from Western concepts of "conflict and confrontation." As a result, rather than viewing China's ascent as a zero-sum game, it should be seen holistically and historically. Professor Qian Shengdan stated unequivocally that the "Thucydides' Trap" was incompatible with historical events and may not apply to Sino-US relations. Several Western academics share this viewpoint. For example, Henry Kissinger claims no "Thucydides' Trap" between China and the US until individuals make it a "self-fulfilled prophecy" (Coker, 2015). In his essay "Beware the Thucydides Trap's Trap," James Holmes argues that the Sino-US relationship is fundamentally different from the Athenian-Spartan relationship and the Anglo-German alliance before World War I. Richard Lebow similarly disputes the inevitability of conflict between Athens and Sparta, arguing that the Peloponnesian War might have been averted if both sides had shown greater empathy and therefore taken a more moderate posture (Lebow, 2021). 4.1.3 Realistic Views Rather than agreeing or disagreeing with the concept, the third point of view is concerned with finding a replacement parallel to represent Sino-American ties. For example, Professor Yan Xuetong suggests that the battle between China and the United States is "more like a football game than a boxing fight," implying that it is not always a zero-sum game that ends in a knockout. Indeed, the term "new type of major-country relations" has become more widely used in recent years; despite their current trade disputes and increasingly intense competition, both China and the United States are aiming for a reciprocal relationship of "no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation." (Bondaz, 2015) 4.2 Responses of the Leaders As the "Thucydides' Trap" concept grows in popularity, it is frequently discussed by prominent Chinese and American leaders and officials. Both Chinese and American leaders are hopeful about their countries' ability to avoid the "Thucydides' Trap." China's President Xi Jinping declared in 2014 that "we all need to work together to avoid the 'Thucydides' Trap." In his address in Seattle on September 24, 2015, he said unequivocally that "[t]here is no such thing in the world as the so- called Thucydides' trap." However, if powerful countries repeatedly commit strategic miscalculation errors, they may build such traps for themselves." (Ling Shengli and Lv Huiyi, 2018) In response, then-US President Barack Obama stated in 2015 that he did not agree with the concept of "Thucydides' Trap" and its significance to US-China ties. Although President Trump has not said firmly if there is a "Thucydides' Trap" between China and the United States, he has often stated that both nations should preserve cooperation while managing their disagreements. President Trump stated at his meeting with President Xi at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017 that the US "is eager to further deepen cooperation with China in business, military issues, and people-to- people exchanges... ". He also stated, "[i]n the next months and years, I look forward to developing an even stronger partnership between our two nations, China and the United States of America, as well as even deeper friendships and interactions amongst our people. Clearly, neither the Chinese nor the American leaders believe their country will fall into the "Thucydides' Trap" (Ling Shengli and Lv Huiyi, 2018). Even though Chinses and American leaders have been shown an optimistic viewpoint on the Thucydides' Trap, some world leaders have shown a pessimistic view on it. President Lee Kuan Yew is a case in point. As he stated, “Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West. The Chinese will want to share this century as co-equals with the United States.” ( Allison, Lee Kuan Yew: The Sage of Asia, 2015). Further he views that China “is the biggest player in the history of the world,” and the United States and others will have to adjust to this reality. But this adjustment may not be peaceful. (Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, 2014) 05. Pushing and Pulling Factors of the Thucydides Trap Analysts have warned that the South China Sea could be the tipping point for a military conflict between the two. As always, the USA is seeking military dominance and superiority in Asia- Pacific and elsewhere. Notably, while supporting the US-led war on terror for its reasons, China still criticized the USA for increasing its military presence across the world after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Straits Times, 2002). It appears that the Trump administration is conscious of the unfavorable aspects of its foreign policy ("interventionism" and "unilateralism" in international politics), notably in the Middle East. However, the United States cannot alter the global system as China seeks to grow its strength and influence globally and reform the old liberal international order (Yahuda, 2019). Some analysists view that the military tension between US and China was declining under the Joe Biden administration. These analyses show that, after former President Donald Trump launched his trade war with China, indications are that President Joe Biden’s administration is continuing his confrontational approach to the bilateral relationship while rallying Western and regional allies around calling out Beijing for its flouting of international norms (Yang X. , 2021). Nevertheless, agreements as, AUKUS will enhance the war tension between US and China while providing a fertile ground for a ‘Thucydides Trap’. On September 15, 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed AUKUS, a trilateral security treaty for the Indo-Pacific region. According to the deal's provisions, the United States and the United Kingdom will assist Australia in deploying nuclear-powered submarines (Biscop, 2021). Cooperation in "cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and more subsea capabilities" is also included in the pact. Australia's air force, navy, and army would all gain enhanced long-range attack capabilities as part of the arrangement. Instead of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing cooperation, which includes New Zealand and Canada, the alliance will focus on military capability (Oxford Analytica, 2021). China has criticized the new agreement as "extremely irresponsible." Zhao Lijian, a foreign ministry spokesman, stated that this agreement "seriously undermines regional peace and stability and intensifies the arms race." In Washington, the Chinese embassy accused the countries entering this agreement of having a "Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice" (BBC, 2021). Nevertheless, some analysts argue that neither China nor the United States intends to reorder the world by winning a decisive war. Because they both know that a confrontation of this magnitude might be disastrous, they are attempting to win without fighting, relying on international laws and rule-making to confine their opponents and mold the world in their favor. Unlike previous great power competitions, the United States and China are competing over the content of international laws. As a result, both camps will rely on "new global norms and agreements” (Scott, 2021) 5.1 Is the Thucydides Trap a replacement of Churchill Trap? Winston Churchill made his now famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College, Fulton, March 5, 1946, an event that many have seen as the symbolic inauguration of the Cold War. (Kluge, 2003). The term “iron curtain” had been employed as a metaphor since the 19th century, but Churchill used it to refer specifically to the political, military, and ideological barrier created by the U.S.S.R. following World War II to prevent open contact between itself and its dependent eastern and central European allies on the one hand and the West and other noncommunist regions on the other (Trust, 2021). US diplomat George Kennan came to a similar conclusion and became the architect of the “containment” policy. He argued that the Soviet Union was determined to spread of communism throughout the world and was fundamentally opposed to coexistence with the West. Kennan doubted the potential effectiveness of attempts to reconcile and pacify the Soviet Union, but Kennan was confident that the Soviet Union would understand the logic of military power and temper its ambitions in the face of strong Western opposition (George Frost Kennan and John Lukacs, 1997). According to some experts, the' Thucydides trap exaggerates the possibility of war between emerging and dominant powers in the modern era. The most significant difficulty for China and the United States, according to this viewpoint, is to avoid falling into the 'Churchill trap.' By repeating the follies of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, both camps will be involved in a long-term struggle. The 'old' history of the ancient East Asian bipolar system, as well as modern Sino-US interactions in East Asia, suggest that, in addition to hegemonic war and the cold war, the two poles have a 'third type of great power relationship.' This third kind is known as 'co-ruling .' The two superpowers jointly lead most small and medium-sized states rather than being geographically divided according to their separate domains of influence. (Yang Y. , 2018). 06. Is there a Way Out? According to Graham Allison, there are some possible avenues for both the China and USA to avoid possible war-tension. Firstly both the camps should realize that the 'War between nuclear superpowers is madness'. Both China and the USA own robust nuclear arsenal; hence leaders must recognize that war would be suicidal. The second lesson for both parties is to 'Leaders must be prepared to risk a war they cannot win'. It is clear that if war occurs, both nations lose, and millions die — an option no rational leader could choose. (Allison, The Thucydides Trap, 2017). Nevertheless, if a nation is unwilling to risk war, its opponent can win any objective by forcing the more reliable power to yield. Consequently, leaders must be willing to select paths that threaten destruction. The third lesson defines the new "precarious rules of the status quo." These rules include arms- control treaties and precise road conventions for air and sea. The fourth lesson is that parties should understand that 'Domestic performance is decisive.' Domestic issues of a country will have an impact upon international matters. (Allison, The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?, 2015). By establishing compromises on problematic areas, the US and China might clear the way for cooperation on challenges like global terrorism and climate change, where the two countries' shared national interests outnumber their differences. Overall, leaders must recognize that their existence is contingent on prudence, communication, limitations, compromise, and cooperation. As Allison points out, dwindling civic involvement, institutionalized corruption, and a general lack of faith in politics are all concerning indicators of the American democracy. Both countries' leaders would do well to emphasize their domestic issues by improving residents' quality of life. Finally, parties need to understand that hope is not a strategy. Allison views that if the USA hopes to avoid catastrophic war with China while protecting and advancing American national interests, lessons of the Cold War should be well studied. Both the camps need to be aligned with strategic thinking rather than relying on hope. (Allison, Avoiding the Thucydides Trap, 2018) Most of the scholars view that, a new structure for the bilateral relationship is required, taking into account key areas of rivalry and collaboration. Harvard Professor Joe Nye expressed hope that the United States will have enough time to handle China's ascent without falling into the second element of the trap: overreaching out of fear (Coker, 2015). According to Allison, the US and China have significant national interests in preserving the survival of their respective countries and must work together to resolve concerns that have clouded the economic relationship. This means coming up with new laws to account for China's unparalleled economic growth and global power status. In addition, policymakers should consider the appeal for a world that is "safe for variety" followed by the ' Cuban Missile Crisis '. This development would allow countries with diverse political systems, economic development methods, and philosophies to peacefully coexist (Allison, Avoiding the Thucydides Trap, 2018). 07. Summarizing the Findings The first research question of the paper was: 'is the 'Thucydides Trap' a correct metaphor to examine the present global power structure?' The study finds diverse viewpoints on the validity of the 'Thucydides Trap' for a proper analysis of the US-China relationship. The 'Pessimistic' scholars recognize Thucydides Trap as an accurate metaphor for analyzing the present tension between USA and China. Nevertheless, 'Pessimistic' and 'realistic' scholars have not identified 'Thucydides Trap' as an ideal metaphor to examine the current development between USA and China. According to some analysts, other metaphors are more suitable to elaborate US-China relations than the 'Thucydides trap.' For an intense some analysts' view that the 'Churchill trap' is a more present risk to China and the US than the 'Thucydides trap,' and consequently one to which both should pay due to heed and take precautions to avoid (Yang Y. , 2018). Nevertheless, Graham Alison provides a strong argument for using the 'Thucydides Trap' to explain several scholars later admitted US-China relations and this notion. Consequently, the paper finds that the Thucydides trap provides an avenue to examine the current development between the USA and China with data analysis. The second research question was: 'Can China and USA escape the Thucydides Trap?’. Avoiding the trap might be difficult indeed, yet not impossible. As being describe by Graham Alison, 'Thucydides Trap' can be avoided with huge and painful adjustments by the super powers. Hence, 'pessimistic' and 'realistic' scholars have shown some of the avenue for avoiding the trap. Further, as being states by the 'Thucydides Trap', when Sparta attacked Athens, it forced the other Greek city-states to pick a side, and a massive Greek war ensued that lasted for decades. Great power dynamics may undoubtedly cause tensions, but the judgment is still on whether a 'conflict in Asia is unavoidable'. Smaller states play disproportionate roles at times, but not always. For example, during the conflict, Athens subdued Melos, a city-state that had wanted to remain neutral in the Peloponnesian War. Based on these findings, it is clear that the 'Thucydides Trap' is not an ‘unavoidable' circumstance. Graham Allison suggests that the main five lessons that both superpowers should learn to avoid the trap are: 'realizing the destructiveness of nuclear superpower war', 'preparing to risk a war they cannot win', defining the new "precarious rules of the status quo", realizing that 'domestic performance is decisive', and understanding that hope is not a strategy. Most other scholars also suggest that drastic changes should be made by both the camp to escape from the trap. Hence, 'the USA and China need to make serious adjustments to avoid the trap'. 08. Conclusion War, as Thucydides explains, is preventable. Since individuals can do little to address power imbalances, the only obstacle they face is poor decision making. So suppose war can be prevented. In this case, it implies that in making decisions, individuals, leaders, and people avoid interpersonal interactions creating the "real trap" that the ancient thinker warned us. As for the future of Sino- American relations, no one knows precisely. However, we can predict the future based on the current development of the two great powers. The United States has used hard power in several world crises. However, China has only used soft power at the most critical moments. This trend reduces the risk of war between the two countries. To deal with China's ascent, it appears the United States will employ a mix of commitment and containment. Similarly, a military clash with the United States will negatively impact China's economic progress. But, on the other hand, limitations and flaws in China's regional accent, notably its rising reliance on Middle Eastern oil, will push Beijing to stick to its "peaceful development" approach. All in all, in a bipolar system, the United States and China will find a way to coexist, thus avoiding the 'Thucydides trap.'

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: China War › AT: China Heg Bad

China’s economic hegemony will sustain developing countries.

NguyenHuua & Örsal, 19

(Tam & Deniz, Tam and Deniz are researchers at Leuphana University Lüneburg, A new and benign hegemon on the horizon? The Chinese century and growth in the global South

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/206617/1/1681792362.pdf)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: China War › AT: Yes China Heg

Chinese hegemony is impossible – no one else wants it

Ikenberry 18 – is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 3/9/18 (John, "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive", Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 32.1, accessed 6/22/22)//jd 

Competitive Order Building Even if we were to assume that China, as the leading non-Western state, wanted to undermine and replace the existing liberal international order, the constraints on doing so are overwhelming. Presumably, an alternative order would be less open and less rule-based. Historically, such orders have been organized into various illiberal political formations: regional groupings, imperial zones, spheres of influence, and closed autarkic blocs. How might China and other rising states build a comprehensive alternative to the existing order? As a start, China would need to be able to come forward with some alternative set of rules and institutions, presumably reflecting an alternative model of political and economic organization. This might be a so-called “Beijing Consensus,” an international order that accommodated (and even promoted) illiberal and authoritarian polities and statist economic relations. China does have its own statist approach, but it is not clear how this approach might work as a wider model of global order. First, China’s mercantilist strategy seems to work best when the rest of the world is relatively open and liberal in orientation. A closed world in which great powers carve out spheres of influence cuts off China from markets and investment opportunities. If all the countries of the world adopted the Chinese model, this would restrict China’s market space and leadership opportunities. Second, a Chinese-led illiberal international order would require some buy-in by other states, and this is also problematic. China is the largest and leading non-Western developing country, but it is the only rising state that is genuinely illiberal and authoritarian. It is not clear that Brazil, India, South Africa, or even Turkey is eager to embrace and operate within a Beijing consensus. If China were to try to promulgate a Sino-centered order—a hegemonic/imperial order that did not immediately rest on the consent and cooperation of other states—it would face very steep costs. If these potential partner states did not experience substantial material benefits from participating in the Chinese-led order, China would need to spend resources to entice and bully these states into cooperation. This would be a very huge task for a developing country with mid-range per capita income. Over the longer term, the success of a Chinese-centered order would depend on its ability to “outcompete” liberal internationalism. But the less the rival order is open and negotiated, and the less that China—as a rival hegemon —is willing to exercise restraint and provide public goods, the greater the difficulty it will have in establishing a viable and legitimate alternative. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › AT: Transition › AT: Transition Wars

Transition wars are peaceful

White 08 [2008, White, Lynn T., Lynn T. White III is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, and in 2007-08 he was the Acting Director at Princeton of the China and the World Program., “Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power- Transition Theory: A Critique”, China Perspectives, ]//AA

1Is a future Sino-American war probable or not? If it began, would it likely be started by China as a rising power, or by America as a declining hegemon? 2Many theorists of power transitions have seen the twentieth century’s world wars as conflicts started by Germany seeking to replace Britain as a world hegemon. Contemporary application of that paradigm suggests that America, while still strong, might muster resources to resist China’s rising power. Steve Chan argues, however, that this version of power-transition theory is inaccurate as a description of the past and self-fulfilling as a prophesy of war. He likens the future Sino-American power shift to smoother transitions, such as that from Britain to the US. 3Although “officials and scholars construct realities (...) the U.K. chose to appease the U.S. and oppose Germany.” Chan suggests Britain’s motives were not cultural: “The argument for [Anglo-American] affinity will hardly suffice to explain London’s decision to recruit Japan as a junior partner in the Asia Pacific during the late 1800s (...)” (p. 4). He claims that Germany’s main fears in the 1910s and 1930s were of a rising Russia, and that Berlin’s efforts to keep London (and then Washington) neutral failed when smaller allies’ interests in war trumped the interests of larger powers in peace. Tails wag dogs before major conflicts. 4Chan suggests that rising states are rational enough not to go to war merely because of past humiliations or current regime-type differences. Instead, they become violent when they expect the result of war may be a net gain for them. “Wars happen because there are discrepancies between states’ power shares and their benefit shares” among either newcomers or hegemons. Danger arises when national leaders believe they do not receive a “‘fair’ share of benefits in proportion to their power” (p. 75). For example, if a dissatisfied state has prospered from exports (as China has, at least until 2009), a keen sense of past insults may shape rhetoric without creating violence. 5Chan predicts that a Sino-American power transition “is unlikely to materialize in the next three or so decades at the earliest, if at all” (p. 9). Taiwan, if it declared independence, could threaten this peace. But Chan expects (and joins this reviewer in hoping) that American policy can avoid a war by continuing to assure both Beijing and Taipei that the US will not defend such a declaration. 6To make his critique, Chan parses both logical categories and empirical evidence. While commending Chan’s variety of styles of argumentation, this reviewer prefers the specific histories to the incorporeal logics. It is possible to object to some of the ways the book mixes them. For example, Chan notes that most power-transition theorists in Germany before either world war saw the US as a non-central contender in world politics because of Berlin’s overly exclusive attention to the European continent. But it might be simpler to say that Berlin underestimated the reactions of both London and Washington and overestimated Germany’s power. Greater immunity to the lure of the abstract could lead a writer to express more direct hope that Beijing does not act externally until its power is enough for peaceful Chinese success. 7To take another example, it is hard to estimate the truth of a sentence such as “A severe sense of insecurity, rather than overconfidence, was the impetus behind Japan’s military planning [before Pearl Harbor]” (p. 56). Insecurity and overconfidence are both documentable as factors in this mistake. Social scientists, including many whom Chan rightly criticises, tend to like the kind of monocausal explanation that could have been avoided here. 8Chan organises a convincingly full panoply of historical similes and theorised causations (including several versions of realism, institutionalism, and constructivism). To make a long story short, he concludes as an optimist. Big wars can occur when rising powers underestimate extended deterrence by hegemons that do not make their interests clear. But Chan does not think this will happen any time soon in the Sino-American case, where both major powers are nuclear, and where the most relevant deterrence is of an attack on Taiwan, presuming the island does not legally renounce its option to be part of China. 9The danger of Sino-American war would come from US indecision over whether to deter a conflict if it could, or to make concessions if it could not. Chan says the PRC’s neighbours, including Taiwan, are more likely to engage China’s prosperity than resist it. He argues that if China receives adequate net benefits from its overall relations with America, there will be peace. He guesses that “current trends favour an eventual settlement of Taiwan’s status” (p. 119). Severe economic depression, more nationalist definitions of “benefit” among Beijing leaders, and/or a resurgence of Taiwanese nationalism might suggest less optimism—but Chan suggests that politicians can continue to avert a war. 10This reviewer guesses Chan is right, even though some of his interpretations are expressed in unnecessarily complex forms. He claims, “For a policy of pivotal deterrence to be credible, Taipei must be made to believe that Washington does not really intend to abandon it should it declare formal independence” (p. 101). This sentence depends on an involuted discussion of differences between “pivotal” and “extended” deterrence, but that framework omits consideration of factors such as American naval capabilities or internal politics in Taiwan or the PRC—and after Chan introduces such factors, the discourse becomes convincing. Some theory is always needed before empirical data are gathered, but Chan is all too faithful to contemporary political science on the unusual occasions when he puts deduction prior to induction without noting the iterative feedback between them. 11Important prospective readers of this book are in China. Some, apparently including the Peking University Dean Wang Jisi, would believe Chan’s opinion that no power transition may take place soon. Their foreign policy is thus careful. But the most important readers of the book are American, if they see Chan’s evidence that declining hegemons (often spurred to war by much smaller allies) have made crucial decisions that led to world wars. 12A power transition point is evidenced if one nation’s power surpasses that of another. Yet there are big problems with criteria such as a “composite index of national capability,” which has been used by researchers in the Correlates of War Project, and also with criteria developed by the CIA and others. Chinese social scientists such as Tsinghua Professor Yan Xuetong have been avid surveyors of national power, and Yan includes a subjective factor: the degree of will to use objective capabilities. “Soft” cultural power has also been subject to surveys: numbers of tourists or foreign students or movies. Dangers of unnecessary tragic war lurk in the wide grey-area ranges (not points) in which asymmetric conflict is possible and the crossover of effective power is uncertain. 13A problem of power-transition theory, which Chan mentions but does not stress, is that power is meaningless when separated from the goals for which it is exerted. The current global “superpower” has not been all that super in places such as Somalia, or in serving its own interests in the Middle East. Chan’s criticisms of power transition are cogent, and he might have extended them by stressing that it is hard to interpret measures of power abstracted from its purposes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Links---LIO › 2NC---L---LIO Russia-War

Mearsheimer , PhD, 19

( , Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

Finally, the crusader mentality that underpins the attempts to build a liberal international order leads to the poisoning of relations between the unipole and any major power in the system that is not a liberal democracy. Although the dominant state will be strongly inclined to make war on minor powers to promote liberal democracy, it will rarely ever attack major powers for that purpose, especially if they possess nuclear weapons.56 The costs would be too great, and the likelihood of success would be especially low. Hence, U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War period have never seriously considered invading China or Russia, even though the United States is far more powerful than either of those countries. Nevertheless, the United States has been committed to turning China and Russia into liberal democracies and absorbing them into the U.S.-dominated liberal world order. U.S. leaders have not only made their intentions clear, but they have also relied on nongovernmental organizations and various subtle strategies to push Beijing and Moscow toward embracing liberal democracy. In effect, the aim is peaceful regime change. Predictably, China and Russia have resisted the unipole’s efforts for the same reason that minor powers have contested U.S. efforts to shape their domestic politics, and indeed for the same reason that Americans now recoil at the idea of Russia interfering in their country’s politics. In a world in which nationalism is the most powerful political ideology, self-determination and sovereignty matter hugely for all countries. China and Russia have also resisted the spread of the liberal order for realist reasons, because it would allow the United States to dominate the international system economically, militarily, and politically. Neither Beijing nor Moscow, for example, wants U.S. military forces in its neighborhood, much less on its borders. Thus, it is hardly surprising that China talks about pushing the U.S. military out of the Western Pacific and that Russia has long been deeply opposed to EU and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Indeed, moving those institutions toward Russia eventually led to the Ukraine crisis in 2014. That ongoing conflict has not only poisoned relations between Russia and the West, but it has incentivized Moscow to find ways to weaken both the EU and NATO. In short, both nationalist and realist calculations caused the two major powers in unipolarity to contest the unipole’s efforts to build a robust liberal international order.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Links---LIO › 2NC---L---LIO Democracy

LIO failures make countries turn to authoritarianism

Mearsheimer ’19 (, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

The 2007–08 global financial crisis not only did enormous damage to many peoples’ lives, but it also called into question the competence of the elites who manage the liberal international order.47 In addition to the deterioration in relations between Russia and the West, there are worrying signs of potential conflict with China, which is determined to change the status quo regarding the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the China-India border. Unsurprisingly, the United States is now more interested in containing rather than engaging China. In fact, the Trump administration recently said that admitting China into the WTO was a mistake, as Beijing’s protectionist policies clearly show that it is unwilling to play by that institution’s rules.48 Finally, the number of liberal democracies has been declining since 2006, reversing a trend that once looked unstoppable.49 Relatedly, soft authoritarianism appears to have become an attractive alternative to liberal democracy, a development that was almost unthinkable in the early 1990s. And some leaders extol the virtues of illiberal democracy, while others govern countries that are committed to political systems based on deeply held religious beliefs. Of course, liberal democracy has lost some of its appeal in recent years, especially because the United States’ political system often looks dysfunctional. Even serious scholars worry about the future of American democracy.50 In sum, the liberal international order is crumbling.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---US Wrecks LIO

The US’s dissatisfaction with international action means continuous LIO power decline

Kagan, PhD, ‘17 (Robert, served in the State Department from 1984 to 1988 as a member of the policy planning staff, as principal speechwriter for Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and as deputy for policy in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. He is a graduate of Yale University and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and holds a doctorate in American history from American University. He is currently the Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the  in the  program at Brookings and a contributing columnist at The Washington Post, publish 6/24/2017, accessed 7/5/2022, “The twilight of the liberal world order”, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/)//lexmw

In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and facilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence. This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power. That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests. With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have signaled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---Authoritarian Countries

Mearsheimer , PhD, 19

(John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

The most important requirement for building a liberal international order is to spread liberal democracy far and wide, which was initially seen to be an eminently feasible task. It was widely believed in the West that politics had evolved to the point where there was no sensible alternative to liberal democracy. If so, then it would be relatively easy to create a liberal international order, because spreading liberal democracy around the world would meet little resistance. Indeed, most people would welcome the idea of living in a Western-style democracy, as appeared to be the case in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. This endeavor, however, was doomed from the start. To begin, there never has been and never will be universal agreement on what constitutes the ideal political system. One can argue that liberal democracy is the best form of government (I would), but others will invariably favor a different governing system. It is worth remembering that during the 1930s, many people in Europe preferred communism or fascism to liberal democracy. One might then point out that liberal democracy ultimately triumphed over those two “isms.” Although that is true, the history of the 1930s is a reminder that liberal democracy is not the preordained order of things, and it is not unusual for elites and their publics to opt for alternative political systems. Thus, it should not be surprising that illiberal democracies are appearing in Eastern Europe, while China and Russia have embraced authoritarian rule, North Korea is a dictatorship, Iran is an Islamic republic, and Israel increasingly privileges its Jewish identity over its democratic character.51 Nor should it be surprising that there has never been a time when more than 50 percent of the countries in the world were liberal democracies.52 This diversity of opinion about what constitutes the best governing system combines with nationalism to make the process of spreading liberal democracy around the world extremely difficult. Nationalism, after all, is a remarkably powerful political force that places great emphasis on self-determination and sovereignty. Nation-states, in other words, do not want other nation-states telling them how they should order their political system. Thus, trying to impose liberal democracy on a state that prefers an alternative form of government is almost certain to provoke fierce resistance.