Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Modelling

The EU can set global tech norms---DSA, DMA, and Denmark prove.

Heering 21, Jonas Heering is an M.A. candidate in German and European Studies and a candidate for the Certificate in Diplomatic Studies. His research at ISD examines how EU and US officials can use diplomatic tools to counter authoritarian "sharp power,” with a focus on disinformation campaigns. At Georgetown, he also co-chairs the Transatlantic Policy Symposium and is a producer at The Europe Desk podcast. He currently works as a research assistant for ISD, as well as for Georgetown's Mortara Center for International Studies and Department of Government. Prior to Georgetown, he interned with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Washington, D.C. He graduated summa cum laude from Texas Christian University with a dual degree in Political Science and Management., (John, “Analysis | The United States needs a tech diplomacy strategy”, Medium, https://medium.com/the-diplomatic-pouch/the-united-states-needs-a-tech-diplomacy-strategy-1a488241fffc) //CHC-DS ‍

Earlier this year, Denmark became one of the first countries in the world to release a tech diplomacy strategy. The strategy comes at a time when governments across the world are clashing with “Big Tech.” On the one hand, democratic governments are seeking to mitigate the threat that digital technologies pose to the fabric of their societies, as the EU’s announcement of its Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) demonstrates. On the other, authoritarian governments like Russia and China are further cracking down on tech companies and using digital surveillance tools to limit opposition voices and further cement their rule. The coming years will be critical to define global rules and norms on digital speech, surveillance, internet governance, the digital economy, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), among other issues. To ensure a leading role in this effort, the United States should develop its own tech diplomacy strategy. This strategy should include the appointment of a U.S. tech ambassador at large and should be centered on close transatlantic cooperation.

The rise of TechPlomacy Recent events have demonstrated the need for a comprehensive Technology Diplomacy Strategy. From reports that several U.S. social media companies took down posts of government critics in India, to the Burmese military’s use of Facebook to incite ethnic violence, the power of digital technologies and the companies that control them is increasingly a cause for concern. The Danish government has led the field in making technology policy a core diplomatic objective. In 2017, it became the first country in the world to appoint a tech ambassador, with offices in Silicon Valley, Brussels, and Beijing — three regional hubs that are already shaping the international technology order, albeit in different ways. Unlike traditional diplomats, the ambassador’s work is not limited to one country or international organization, but on issues that connect tech hubs globally.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Modelling

Countries follow on --- clearer EU stance on tech regs galvinzes broader support for EU leadership

Franke and Torreblanca ’21 – Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Jose Ignacio, Senior policy fellow and head of the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a position he has held since the launch of ECFR across Europe in 2007.,(“GEO-TECH POLITICS: WHY TECHNOLOGY SHAPES EUROPEAN POWER, 7/21, ) – sel

What Europe needs to do ECFR has put forward recommendations on how to address all these sources of vulnerability, from 5G and undersea cables to military AI. The EU needs to improve its data sovereignty by adopting strict regulations on data privacy and ensuring that these are exported to countries and companies that access Europeans’ data. EU member states should create an ecosystem in which smaller 5G players that focus on software and virtualisation can scale up their operations and cooperate effectively with larger European and US companies. The EU should heavily invest in exporting technologies and practices that protect democracy and help achieve technological sovereignty, and in learning from others’ experiences in this realm. But more important than these individual fixes is deeper engagement with the external implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states. Outreach to partners The EU needs a global strategy for improving its partners’ access to reliable and safe technology. Otherwise, the bloc will leave a space that others will fill. Democracies would be further weakened and impoverished. Autocracies would thrive. Europe would be wrong if it thought it could set out its own rules and standards and let the rest of the world adapt. The Brussels effect, by which Europe silently exported its data privacy regulation to the rest of the world, will not easily repeat itself. GDPR happened when technology was still under the geopolitical radar. Now, technology has been (geo)politicised and both governments and industry actors know how closely intertwined power, technology, and regulation are. Both China and the US are reaching out to third countries. The US has programmes such as The Clean Network, which aims to help its allies end their use of Chinese 5G. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative includes a digital component. And Chinese firms, with governmental support, export facial recognition and surveillance techniques to autocracies around the world. The challenge for the EU is in working with like-minded countries and multilateral bodies – such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also regional arrangements such as those in Latin America, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – to develop fair, open, and values-driven technological standards. The EU should deploy the incentive of access to its digital market to strengthen its alliances. The bloc should use its financial institutions to incentivise EU firms to invest in countries that are seeking to adopt these critical technologies but, at the same time, want to reduce their technological dependence on China. The EU should also consider establishing a comprehensive and compelling tech package that would allow it to become a geopolitical player in the area. This ‘tech compact’ should include: upgrading existing or prospective trade agreements to grant improved access to the EU digital services market to countries that comply with EU standards in areas such as data flows, privacy, and AI; offering technical assistance to governments and parliaments wishing to align with the EU on regulatory issues; offering funding guarantees for connectivity investments; coordinating positions on technical standards in multilateral organisations; and offering cyber security and democracy-protection packages. In contrast to other great powers, whose tech offers are often based on coercion and the exploitation of weakness, the EU should stand for a principled approach based on partnerships, mutual interests, consent, and solidarity. Also, as it is already doing, the EU should continue scanning its internal market for vulnerabilities in critical technological sectors, identifying high-risk vendors, and ensuring reciprocity in market access to these technologies for countries that restrict or curtail digital trade. It will not be sufficient for the EU to merely approve internal regulations in the expectation that others will accept them, such as in the case of the GDPR. For example, the bloc is already operating on bilateral agreements with like-minded countries such as Japan to implement data privacy clauses that ensure the free and safe flow of data. But this is not enough in itself. The EU should aim higher – through multilateral institutions such as the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, or through groupings such as the G20 – to establish a global data privacy regime whose standards are valid for most democracies, if not for all countries (as those ruled by authoritarian regimes may opt out). A key component of this is the transatlantic relationship. A major agreement on data privacy with the US would help break the current dynamic of regulatory fragmentation, helping both the country and the EU jointly take on China and other illiberal regimes. The importance of cooperation between the EU and its member states The European Commission and other Brussels institutions are positioning the EU as a powerful actor in the global debates about tech regulation. But not all member states appear to feel the same sense of urgency. As of today, 21 member states have now published AI policy documents in which they identify areas of focus, develop recommendations, and decide funding priorities. These strategies reveal that most EU member states primarily see AI through an economic lens. Almost all the strategies were written by or under the leadership of economics ministries (or variations thereof) or, less often, ministries of innovation. With very few exceptions – such as France – most EU countries do not engage with the challenges posed by the way that the development and use of AI might affect the international balance of power. Even fewer discuss or even mention the impact of AI on defence. If the EU moves forward on technology issues without the support of its member states, it risks losing credibility and the capability to influence others. Worse, it could leave empty spaces in Europe that external actors fill. But, if the EU and its member states work together closely on technology issues, the bloc will be strengthened – and will lead by showing that its rules and regulations, such as those on privacy or trustworthy AI, work at home. In this, the EU can benefit from member states’ diplomatic reach in various regions. It is crucial for Europe to recognise and consider the international second- and third-order effects of any actions it takes in the technological space. It needs to acknowledge that these actions have an impact on its geopolitical power. They influence the EU’s soft power as a role model, its positioning relative to other major players’ plans, and its geopolitical room for manoeuvre.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Modelling

EU regs get modelled around the world – overcomes any deficits because all of NATO will adopt the plan, BUT not through NATO, so it avoids the DA.

The Economist 21 [The Economist, 04-24-21, "The EU wants to become the world’s super-regulator in AI", Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/24/the-eu-wants-to-become-the-worlds-super-regulator-in-ai, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Most laws are local—except in the digital realm. When the European Union comes up with some new tech regulation, it can quickly spread around the world. Global companies adopt its typically strict rules for all their products and markets in order to avoid having to comply with multiple regimes. Other governments take more than one page from the EU’s rule book to help local firms compete. The textbook example for what has been dubbed the “Brussels effect”, is the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which went into force in 2018 and swiftly became the global standard.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Diplomacy

The EU’s diplomatic and crisis management expertise solves better.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

While NATO is reinventing itself in the face of pressing challenges like China and climate change,58 the EU has advanced in tackling cybersecurity, regulating and exploring new technologies and developing its Indo-Pacific strategy.59 The EU’s advantages over NATO in the diplomatic and economic domains, especially when it comes to crisis management and political pressure, should be taken into account in broader discussion of NATO-EU coordination.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solves NATO

They misunderstand NATO – only the CP solves.

Bennet 18 (Kirk Bennett, 7-5-18, retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer., American Interest, "NATO and European Security in the Trump Era," https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/07/05/nato-and-european-security-in-the-trump-era/, [AB])

Much of the traditional American reserve toward European strategic autonomy has emanated from a concern that it would be EU-centric and would undermine NATO without actually creating any robust, effective EU alternative. Judging by recent statements from some American officials, this concern persists. It is misplaced, for a number of reasons. First, Western security simply requires a stronger European component, and the question of whether that component wears an EU or a NATO hat is tertiary. Indeed, because of the overlap between EU and NATO membership, there is no reason it could not be dual-hatted. It would be far better, especially for Washington, to have EU-centric security arrangements that could handle a Balkan crisis than to have an impotent NATO-centric Europe that relied completely on the United States for all hard-security measures. Second, European strategic autonomy could hardly undermine NATO more than the resentments engendered by the current imbalance in capabilities and political will. Third, if the Europeans manage to wreck NATO without creating any capable alternative, it is they, not the United States, who will bear the consequences. Donald Trump seems to grasp these considerations, and for all his bluster and seeming hostility toward America’s European allies, he is instinctively the greatest friend of European strategic autonomy ever to sit in the White House.

The rise of Trump prompted the intriguing idea of proclaiming Angela Merkel as the new leader of the Free World. Realistically, however, Germany’s atrophied military capabilities make such a suggestion risible. I remember some 15 years ago hearing Germany described as the Sick Man of NATO. Well, the patient hasn’t shown any improvement in the interim. In the absence of German/European strategic autonomy, Merkel’s devotees might aspire at best to elevate her to the leadership of some postmodern fantasyland devoid of hard-security challenges. Unfortunately, the real-life Europe—with an assertive Russia, unstable borderlands, disruptive immigration, and terrorism—bears little resemblance to such a vision. Moreover, with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, selfless German multilateralism is very much taking a back seat to German economic interests, at the cost of seriously undermining both the economy and security of Ukraine and Germany’s easternmost EU partners. “Germany First” might not be the slogan, but at least as far as Nord Stream 2 is concerned, it is the reality.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solves NATO

EU defense cooperation is critical to NATO’s effectiveness

Garamone 17 – (Jim, “NATO Secretary General Stresses Change, European Union Integration”, US Dept of Defense, 12/20, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1401214/nato-secretary-general-stresses-change-european-union-integration/)//AK

NATO is evolving and adapting to changing times, and part of that evolution must involve the European Union, the alliance secretary general said at the French Ecole Militaire yesterday. Jens Stoltenberg told students at the illustrious university in Paris that NATO has proven its ability to evolve to face changing threats. “Our history has taught us that our ability to adapt is crucial to our success,” the secretary general said. “Again and again, faced with a changing world, the alliance has evolved.” The alliance formed to combat the Soviet Union and ensure Western Europe’s freedom and independence. It evolved when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. It evolved again with the al-Qaida attacks on 9/11, with NATO taking a lead role in Afghanistan. Three years ago, the alliance had to change again when Russia illegally annexed Crimea -- the only time since World War II that a European country has seized part of another by force. And in the Middle East, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria captured Mosul and Raqqa, and declared those cities as parts of its so-called caliphate. “As a result, NATO has to both strengthen our collective defense at home and manage crises beyond our borders,” Stoltenberg said. Deter, Defend In Europe, NATO allies “have implemented the largest reinforcement of our deterrence and defense since the Cold War,” he said. The NATO Response Force tripled to 40,000 troops, including a high-readiness force, ready to move within days. The alliance also stepped up military exercises and enhanced air policing in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. “We have deployed almost 5,000 troops in four multinational battle groups to the east of the alliance,” he said. Those battle groups are in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. And the allies are continuing to increase defense spending, he said. “NATO’s actions are defensive, proportionate and in line with our international commitments,” the secretary general said. “Our aim is not to provoke conflict, but to prevent conflict. We don’t want a new Cold War, and we don’t want a new arms race.” Russia is a neighbor and the alliance approach to Russia combines strong defense with meaningful dialogue. But Russia is only one problem that must be dealt with. “Since 9/11, NATO allies have stood together in solidarity against terrorism,” Stoltenberg said. “In Afghanistan we have transitioned from combat operations, to the training and advising of local Afghan forces. But we are now increasing the number of troops serving in our mission to 16,000 NATO soldiers in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.” The alliance is also a full partner of the global coalition to defeat ISIS. NATO assets -- such as the AWACS capability -- and NATO expertise are on display throughout Iraq, the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. NATO Stronger With EU “NATO is strengthening its collective defense and, at the same time, projecting stability in its neighborhood,” Stoltenberg said. “Both of those are more effective when NATO and the European Union work together.” Stoltenberg had one big statistic to back up his claim: About 94 percent of the EU’s population lives in a NATO member nation. Talks continue and the two alliances have made progress. “We have boosted our cooperation on cyber defense, maritime security, fighting terrorism and countering hybrid warfare, among many other things,” the secretary general said. “Neither NATO nor the European Union have all the tools to tackle the challenges alone, but together we are a formidable force for good.” He called on France, a founding member of both NATO and the EU, to play a key role to ensure the coherence of these efforts. “I am convinced a strong European defense is good for the European Union, it is good for Europe and it is good for NATO, as long as it respects three key principles,” he said. Build, Strengthen, Compliment The first is to build the necessary capabilities: spending more and spending better. That means tackling the fragmentation of the European defense industry. “The U.S. has one type of main battle tank, while Europe has 17 different types,” he said. “The U.S. has four types of frigates and destroyers; Europe has 29. The U.S. has six types of fighter planes; Europe has 20.” He does not want to eliminate competition, but he does want to see some coherence, interoperability and cost savings in the process. “Second, a stronger European defense also needs to involve non-EU allies to the fullest possible extent, of course respecting the autonomy and integrity of the European Union,” he said. Stoltenberg said nations on both sides of the Atlantic continue to be engaged in European security. “For the first time in years, the United States and Canada are increasing their military presence on our continent,” he said. “And, after Brexit, non-EU allies will account for 80 percent of NATO defense spending, and three of the four battle groups in the eastern part of the alliance will be led by non-EU allies.” There is no way the EU can replace NATO, he said, but it could strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. Finally, a stronger European defense needs to compliment, not duplicate, NATO’s own efforts. “On duplications, for instance, NATO already has a well-established defense planning process,” Stoltenberg said. “We’ve had it for decades, and as part of that process, we identify in detail the capabilities that each ally needs to deliver to ensure the alliance has the tools it needs to do its job. It would be a mistake for the EU to duplicate that process. Capitals should not be faced with two conflicting lists for capability requirements.” “We share 22 members, so to compete would be like competing with ourselves,” he continued. “That makes no sense. Our roles are distinct but mutually reinforcing. We must work together in a coherent way.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solves NATO

Only the CP can bolster NATO – it’s a power multiplier.

Belin 19. Celia Belin – Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe. “NATO matters, but the EU matters more,” April 2, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/02/nato-matters-but-the-eu-matters-more/

As it turns 70 this week, the Atlantic alliance has no shortage of champions in Washington, even if it lacks one in the Oval Office. Yet, the focus on NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—alone can be misleading by magnifying the importance of the defense alliance in the European project. In reality, the trans-Atlantic community has relied on two pillars: a successful defensive alliance and an even more successful project of European integration. Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later—and 16 new members later—the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans. Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group—as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations. The neighbors of the European Union are no fools. Those who seek prosperity and stability hope to join the EU club. Those who reject the model set by the West and liberal democracies feel threatened by the European Union—it is the prospect of Ukraine moving into the EU’s orbit through an Association Agreement that triggered Russia’s hostility and ultimate aggression, not NATO. The power of attraction of the European Union, at least as much as the security guarantees of NATO, has helped stabilize Eastern Europe. Despite these realities, Americans often indulge in a scornful disregard for the EU. Recently, benign contempt has taken an ugly turn. Since taking office, President Trump and his administration have attacked the European Union and individual member states repeatedly, with near impunity. At first sight, American complaints appear to be centered on the issue of Europe’s trading power, which rivals that of the United States. For Donald Trump, the EU was created to “take advantage of” the United States and it is “worse than China.” Early in his mandate, the American president pushed for tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatened to go after automobiles, until a meeting with EU Commission President Juncker put a brake on the downward spiral. However, a deeper look reveals a fundamental ideological contention: The brand of nationalism and populism that defines this administration stands in direct contradiction with the very existence of a liberal, supra-national body such as the European Union. As laid out by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Kiron Skinner in December 2018, the administration holds the view that “international institutions have steadily encroached on the rights of sovereign nations” and that “nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests”—an indictment of the EU’s very existence. The ideological clash is reminiscent of older times. Addressing a crowd in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump likened the European Union to the Soviet Union, criticizing a similar “steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people,” an equivalency popular in conservative circles. Similarly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested in a December 2018 speech in Brussels that EU bureaucrats were not really working for the interests of European citizens. By making no secret of his personal support for euroskeptic forces, Donald Trump has become an active political opponent of the European Union in its existing form. He celebrated the Brexit vote, expressed support for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen ahead of the French presidential elections, disparaged Angela Merkel repeatedly, and appeared to rejoice at the Yellow Vests protest movement. He criticized Theresa May for negotiating a “soft” Brexit, and even recommended to Emmanuel Macron that France leave the EU. The American president has nominated ambassadors famously critical of the EU, and his administration demoted the EU ambassador’s status without notification, before reversing under criticism. As Donald Trump torments both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, all rush to NATO’s bedside, and few worry about the EU. Truthfully, Atlanticists love to love NATO. It stands for values, valor, unity, solidarity. NATO won the Cold War. Celebrating NATO is celebrating the military. It is much harder to love the EU, the bureaucracy, the politics, the regulations. The EU lacks democratic appeal, and its slow-moving decisionmaking process create many frustrations. Unlike in NATO, the United States sits on the sidelines, it does not control who enters, or who stays in. The EU is also an economic peer competitor, a tough trading partner, and a sovereign international actor, at times non-compliant with American demands. Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO—or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake. In a world where the strongmen are striking back, Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Unilat Solvency › Block – Solvency – Norms

The EU can shape multilateral norms, especially in emerging tech---JCPOA proves.

Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

4.2 EU Strategic Sovereignty, Partnerships and Multilateralism The case of the JCPOA provides evidence of how multilateralism is functional to European strategic sovereignty, but it is also illustrative of how the EU can effectively use its strategic partnerships, especially the one with the US, and multilateralism to mutually reinforce one another. If the E3/EU have done so on an issue of high politics over which they only have limited influence, there surely is much potential for the EU to shape multilateral norms, institutions and regimes in policy areas in which it wields more power, such as trade and regulations.53 The fact that great power competition increased as the crisis with Iran unfolded creates structural incentives for the EU, the US, the UK and other like-minded countries to seek convergence. By closing ranks with its allies, the EU increases its ability not just to resist pressure from systemic rivals such as Russia or China but also to engage them from a position of strength. Containment of Russia’s geopolitical sway in Europe, countering information warfare and protection from the political use of China’s investment policy and technology exports are structural interests around which the EU can build a renewed partnership with the US and others.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – CP Good

Learning about EU policies is critical for policymaking education.

AYSPS 13 [Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 07-30-2013, "Students Compare/Contrast U.S. and European Union Policies During Study Abroad", https://aysps.gsu.edu/2013/07/30/students-comparecontrast-u-s-and-european-union-policies-during-study-abroad/, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

While immersing themselves into their new surroundings, the students were expected to demonstrate a basic knowledge of EU history and institutional structures, including comparing and contrasting EU and US policies as well as their strengths and weaknesses. This was accomplished through assigned readings, goal statements, case studies, group presentations and position papers.

“My favorite part of the experience and what I learned most about was how Europe recognizes that climate change is a serious issue and how they are working to combat it,” says Ryan Forman, an MPA student. “Europe is so far ahead of us in terms of working to reduce greenhouse gases and using renewable energy. When we were driving through Germany, we didn’t have to go far to see a wind turbine.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – International Fiat

Talking about international countries are important.

Matanock 20 [Aila M. Matanock, Department of Political Science, University of California 2020, "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals", Annual Reviews, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033504, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

International actors at times seek to help bring peace, democracy, and human rights. Studies of how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents are proliferating. They show that opposition groups have trouble trusting incumbents to adhere to the political bargains they strike because incumbents can use their familiarity with state institutions and can use their asymmetric hold on power during bargain implementation to violate terms by retaining more of the status quo than agreed. International actors can overcome these “reversion problems,” however, by using monitoring mechanisms (often focused on electoral campaigns) and incentives conditioned on compliance. Reversion problems, and enforcement by international actors as a solution, are common across issue areas—arising when domestic actors try to end civil conflict, open elections, and reduce repression—but the literatures in these issue areas have largely remained segregated. This review proposes advancing this research agenda by unifying them and (re)examining the conditions under which this solution works best.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDCP

Severance is a voter for clash evasion – we PIC out of USfg action.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” ]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU Unilat

The cp sets regulations that spill-out globally --- the perm undermines EU push for leadership and autonomy and breeds dependence on the U.S.

Sherman and Komaitis ‘21

(Konstantinos Komaitis and Justin Sherman, Justin Sherman is a fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative, “US and EU tech strategy aren’t as aligned as you think,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The geopolitical shifts of the past four years have caused many in Europe to value strategic self-determination and limiting dependence on foreign powers. In a March letter to von der Leyen, four European leaders, including Germany’s Angela Merkel, articulated this desire: “We believe that Europe needs to recharge and complement its current digitisation efforts with a self-determined and open digital policy which includes digital sovereignty as leitmotif.” The statement is notable for several reasons: It abandons the phrase “cyber sovereignty” and its evocations of Chinese and Russian internet control; positions Europe as the exporter and not consumer of policy; and expresses a willingness for a European leadership role regarding internet governance questions. Europe might be the first to set the rules of the online game, but this alone cannot win the game. Because the internet is founded on and continues to create interdependencies between nations, eliminating dependence on other countries is not just challenging but to some extent contradictory. For instance, European Union privacy rules and limits on cross-border data flows have necessitated the establishment of adequacy decisions and other agreements to enable data to continue flowing across borders. Interconnections and interdependencies between countries have become pervasive and will relatively remain so in a globally interoperable system. Given this limitation, Europe has focused on regulation and, over the past few years, has managed to establish itself as the de facto global regulator for the internet on a number of issues. When it came into force in 2018, the GDPR represented the world’s most ambitious privacy regulation. Its impact was felt globally, so much so that some 80 countries around the world have implemented GDPR-like statutes. The recently released Digital Services Act package, which addresses rules and responsibilities for online platforms and rules on competition policy, continues the trend of European rule-making leading the way internationally. Meanwhile in Brussels, the digital policy agenda is crowded with issues that range from online terrorism to cybersecurity, data governance, and encryption. All this policy activity has placed Europe at the heart of internet governance discussions, but not necessarily in a way that fully satisfies either Europe or its allies. Regulation alone is not enough. Many European observers have adopted the view that in order to be competitive in the tech sector, Europe needs to invest in infrastructure. In the past year alone, Europe has embarked on a series of activities that hint at its wish to become an infrastructure pioneer, while also building the legal framework to support it. GAIA-X, the federated Franco-German cloud initiative is an example; proposals for a European DNS—no matter how poorly thought out they are—are another. In and of itself, building infrastructure is not bad: It could contribute to increased innovation. But many key questions remain, especially the feasibility of such grand ideas in practice. Europe’s main challenge is that it continues to be technologically dependent on both the United States and China, placing it in the middle of a technology conflict that will most likely continue and may escalate. Europe faces two different dependency hurdles. The first is its dependence on China. The EU’s economic links with China’s tech sector are pervasive, and Chinese software and hardware are used throughout the EU internet ecosystem. Europe knows that China’s cheap equipment and financial promises come with attachments and tradeoffs that Europe is struggling to make in a coordinated fashion. For example, Europe’s indecisiveness and lack of a harmonized strategy among its member states with regards to the deployment of 5G equipment from Huawei, is a case in point. Germany and other countries seem keen to continue some sort of collaboration with China, albeit within limitations, whereas countries like Italy have prevented national operators from making deals with Huawei. The second dependency hurdle is with the United States. European policymakers understand it is impossible to cut ties with America’s digital companies altogether. Instead, they are focused on how these companies should behave within its borders. By taking advantage of its economic standing, Europe drafts regulation that aims to shape the business models of big technology companies. The impact of this can be quite profound if one considers the opportunities it creates for Europe as a global regulator. However, this also raises a number of questions for cooperation with the United States. When member states are focused on regulation in ways that are still notably different from counterparts in the United States, it begs the question of just what kinds and degrees of internet strategy cooperation are most realistic for the U.S.-EU relationship. This approach seems to be paying off, but not without hiccups. Europe’s experimentation with regulation allows it to set the agenda on complex internet governance questions. Despite its unintended consequences, the GDPR continues to be the most influential privacy regulation in the world. In contrast to the chaotic debate in the United States over Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the DSA at least provides some clarity on how regulators envision the roles and responsibilities of online platforms. With both the DSA and the GDPR, European policymakers have resisted regulation that aims to make sweeping changes to the internet’s core properties. But this is not a guarantee for the future. As Europe becomes more inward looking, it may push further in its approach to asserting a measure of online sovereignty. Similar to other countries around the world, Europe is facing some hard facts. The internet is becoming less—less global, less interoperable, less open. The internet remains unable to resist the centralization of economic power to a few big players and has become increasingly weaponized through such activities as disinformation campaigns. This type of behavior will most certainly intensify and, as it does, Europe will need to make some crucial choices. What kind of an Internet does it want? Sooner or later, the United States will face inevitably the same dilemma. This is a point where both allies will converge: recognizing that historically hands-off approaches to the internet no longer suffice in an age of harmful company behavior, internet insecurity, and authoritarian affronts on the open internet. But, ultimately, the biggest obstacle for collaboration will be their divergent views on how regulation should shape the internet: the United States will most likely continue to insist on a market-based approach, perhaps with some minimal interventions, while Europe will persist in a more institutional-oriented process. This schism will be difficult to bridge because it is part of the countries’ historical and cultural background. Yet, it can also act as an opportunity. Realizing this difference should encourage both actors to turn their attention to the internet itself. Their common, shared goal can be to rally behind the values that have defined the internet since its early days: its architectural design. The critical properties of the internet can become the starting point and the shared understanding in moving forward, regardless of which approach each decides to follow. This would place both allies in stark contrast to countries like China and Russia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

Specifically true in tech regulation

Grevi 19 (Giovanni Grevi, a Senior Associate Fellow of the European Policy Centre, 7-19-2019, European Policy Centre, "Strategic autonomy forEuropean choices: The key to Europe’sshaping power" )//guyB

Technology has always been a primary source of prosperity and power. Today, new and emerging technologies are reshaping the domains, terms and tools of cooperation and competition on the international stage. Technological innovation is simultaneously accelerating and increasingly diffused. The acceleration of digital innovation particularly creates unprecedented opportunities for sustainable human development and well-being, civic and political participation, and international cooperation. However, it also affects the distribution of power at all levels, expands the grounds for economic and political competition and creates new vulnerabilities. The diffusion of technological innovation to new economic powerhouses and the major advances made by China in key sectors, from fifth-generation mobile technology (5G) to AI, will carry far-reaching implications for economic growth, normative reach, political influence and security in different parts of the world. As noted above, much of the current competition between the US and China is about employing technological primacy as an enabler of international leadership. The EU will fail to advance towards strategic autonomy if it is not at the forefront of both technological innovation and the efforts to regulate the applications of new technologies in ways that are consistent with its interests and values.49 As a recent paper by Timmers put it, “mastery of digital technologies is an essential capability for future competitiveness, protecting society’s values and bridging the ‘sovereignty gap’.”50 From this standpoint, the capacity for technological innovation is also a major requirement for Europeans in order to be able to make basic choices on their future economic and social models, as opposed to living with the choices made by those who drive innovation outside of Europe. For example, in 2018 the European Commission launched a series of initiatives to shape a European 14 approach to AI, directed to not only support technological development but also deal with the impact of AI on labour markets, develop talents and skills, and shape a governance framework for the multiple applications of this emerging technology. The Commission has established a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), tasked with supporting the evolution of the EU approach to the ethical, socioeconomic and legal implications of AI. This Group delivered a report on ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI in April 2019 and another on policy and investment recommendations, including on a suitable governance framework, in June 2019.51 These are the first steps in shaping a distinct European approach to AI, which is essential both to enable Europe’s future competitiveness and to prevent dangerous uses of this technology, such as for mass surveillance. According to some estimates, the application of AI could raise global GDP by 14%, or $15,7 trillion, by 2030. In particular, the economic impact of AI would lift China’s GDP by 26%, that of North America by 14.5%, that of Southern Europe by 11,5% and that of Northern Europe by 9,9%.52 The EU holds strong assets in facing the technological innovation challenge, such as excellent research institutions, a wide pool of talent and a large internal market. According to the Reuters’ list of the 100 most innovative universities in the world, 46 (and eight of the top ten) are in the US, 27 in Europe and 23 in Asia.53 However, there is a need for urgent action in preserving and expanding these assets. Europe has failed to meet the objective of spending 3% of its GDP on research and development (R&D), with investment at around 2% (about the same share of GDP as in China) in 2017; compared to 4.2% in South Korea, 3.3% in Japan and 2.8% in the US.54 The competition for global talent is in full swing between academic institutions and corporate actors, while the Single Market is failing to deliver its full potential, whether through larger access to venture capital or the free flow of digital services. Besides, the EU is falling behind major competitors in the US and China on various fronts of innovation.55 The EU holds strong assets in facing the technological innovation challenge, such as excellent research institutions, a wide pool of talent and a large internal market. China is leading in setting the standards for 5G, even though EU companies such as Nokia and Eriksson have a strong track record too. Furthermore, China benefits from the largest domestic market in the world, which will in turn generate massive volumes of data, further empowering Chinese companies in the digital economy. Europe’s delay in the development of a competitive 5G industry implies that EU countries will face problems concerning both the security of their networks – as the current controversy surrounding Huawei shows – and the control of the data generated by hyper-connected economies and societies.56 These are both central requirements for strategic autonomy. When it comes to AI, China and the US are leading in R&D and host the largest shares of high-value AI start-ups by far. The more advanced AI is, the more performing the millions of devices connected through the IoT will be. In 2018, the EU was home to 132 of the 500 most important IoT companies in the world, while 236 were based in the US and 27 in China.57 Low levels of venture capital are another major obstacle. Despite growing quite fast in the last five years, venture capital in Europe stood at only $17.6 billion in 2017, against $71.9 billion in the US and $70.8 billion in Asia.58 Besides, the average size of venture capital funds in Europe is €60 million – half the US average – and they mostly operate within individual member states.59 The scarcity of growth funding for companies past the launch phase is particularly problematic, as promising European digital start-ups are often acquired by non-EU (mostly American) companies and funds. Supporting Europe’s technological leadership and therefore strategic autonomy will require decisive action at three levels: Firstly, Europeans should decide what priorities to concentrate their resources on, from fundamental research to the full innovation cycle. A recent report by the High-level Strategy Group on Industrial Technologies has updated a previous list of six “key enabling technologies”, defined as the essential technology building blocks underpinning EU industrial leadership. The new entries on this list are AI, digital security and connectivity.60 In parallel, the work of the Strategic Forum for Important Projects of Common European Interest – identifying and supporting strategic European value chains – is one of the vectors of Europe’s fledgling industrial policy approach. Alongside areas of ongoing cooperation on batteries, high-performance computers and microelectronics, six additional areas have been selected for pooling resources. q Secondly, larger resources must be available to support innovation policies. 61 Member states will soon face a moment of truth in the next phase of negotiations on the upcoming MFF, when they will have to decide on the Commission’s proposal to raise the share of the budget dedicated to innovation, including Horizon 2020 (H2020), by over 40%. While this is necessary, it will be equally important to ensure that the EU and national funds and initiatives work hand in hand to maximise impact. This will require better coordination between national strategies concerning the major sectors of technological innovation (e.g. AI), which are often developed in separate national silos. There will also be a need to build on the pilot experience of the European Innovation Council to target the most promising start-ups for funding under H2020. Crucially, Europeans must devise tools to provide more flexible financing to EU firms, particularly 15 high-potential start-ups that struggle to move from the research phase to market access. q Thirdly, the regulatory framework must be updated or even established to enable the deployment and leveraging of new technologies and maximise the advantages of the Single Market, while ensuring security and seeking to establish a level playing field with external partners. As mentioned above, the EU’s experience with the regulation of the free flow of data is a case in point. Besides, the AI HLEG’s recent report fleshes out recommendations for a European approach to the governance and regulation of this crucial set of technologies. It calls for shaping regulation according to different types and levels of risk, reviewing existing legislation across various domains (from civil and criminal law to consumer protection and competition), expanding institutional capacity and expertise and fostering a Single Marker for trustworthy AI in Europe.62 Additionally, building on the March 2019 Commission recommendations on the cybersecurity of 5G networks63, a much stronger pan-European regime should be established to ensure that all member states and providers meet high security requirements.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

Perm fails- strategic autonomy’s a precondition to EU sovereignty

Grevi 19 (Giovanni Grevi, a Senior Associate Fellow of the European Policy Centre, 7-19-2019, European Policy Centre, "Strategic autonomy forEuropean choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power" )//guyB

Paul Timmers frames strategic autonomy as “the ability, in terms of capacity and capabilities, to decide and act upon essential aspects of one’s longer-term future in the economy, society and their institutions.”28 This paper’s author has argued that strategic autonomy requires “the ability to set objectives and mobilise the necessary resources in ways that do not primarily depend on the decisions and assets of others” and that it rests on four pillars, namely the Single Market, the euro, the capacity for technological innovation and the capacity to provide for Europe’s security.29 In a recent contribution, Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro propose to replace the concept of strategic autonomy with ‘strategic sovereignty’, which subsumes geoeconomic and geopolitical issues within an overarching approach and allows “Europeans to decide their policies for themselves and bargain effectively within an interdependent system.”30 Pursuing strategic autonomy is therefore part of a renewed effort to strengthen the basis for European sovereignty. Taking a step back, the political, institutional and functional components are common to practically all the definitions of strategic autonomy and are relevant to all areas where it can be pursued. Politically, strategic autonomy requires a common understanding of large goals, which is predicated on mutual trust and a sense of shared destiny. In a political system of 28 countries, the EU’s adequate institutions are also crucial in enabling decision-making, setting rules and managing pooled resources in flexible, effective and legitimate ways. The functional dimension includes both the material and immaterial resources that are to be aligned to fulfil major goals and enable autonomous action when necessary, whether they be adequate funds, military capabilities or cutting-edge technological expertise. 11 Strategic autonomy should also be related to the question of European sovereignty and considered a precondition for it, with the understanding of sovereignty as “the ability to control outcomes and respond to the fundamental needs of the people”.31 This is the heart of European integration: sharing sovereignty in some domains to become more effective in its exercise. Pursuing strategic autonomy is therefore part of a renewed effort to strengthen the basis for European sovereignty in changing international and domestic contexts. Given the serious internal and external challenges to Europe’s cohesion as illustrated in this Discussion Paper, the requirements for European sovereignty are not those of the past. In this sense, strategic autonomy contributes to sovereignty in three ways: in terms of responsibility, resilience and peer partnership. Firstly, advancing strategic autonomy implies taking responsibility for Europe’s future to a further extent than is the case today. This requires creating the conditions for Europeans to make shared decisions about critical issues (e.g. the application of new technologies, a sustainable development model, major foreign policy matters) and be equipped to implement them. q Secondly, strategic autonomy is about strengthening the EU’s own resilience to the challenges of globalisation (from financial shocks to massive migration flows) as well as to the political and economic tactics employed deliberately by others to divide Europe. q Thirdly, strategic autonomy is not about isolation, but rather building a stronger platform for cooperation and partnership. In a world where big powers are more assertive, strategic autonomy is necessary to enter into peer partnerships with the heavyweights; and to avoid asymmetric relationships, where isolated EU members lack bargaining power. Concerning the scope of strategic autonomy, this should be assessed against the background of the large shifts and challenges outlined above. As the EU faces multilevel competition – of which economic statecraft, technological prowess and hybrid tactics are critical dimensions –, delimiting the pursuit of strategic autonomy to defence and security affairs is out of sync with the new strategic environment. Strategic autonomy entails the mobilisation of all relevant EU resources to strengthen Europe’s global role, which is, in turn, essential to meet the needs and expectations of its citizens. Two final elements must be stressed to articulate the concept of strategic autonomy as applied to the EU. For one, autonomy is not a binary concept but a matter of degree. Full autonomy is, in many cases, unachievable and not necessarily desirable, but progress can be achieved to make Europe more self-reliant in advancing its interests and values. For another, strategic autonomy takes time. Where Europe lags, such as in completing the Single Market, developing some technological sectors or defence capabilities, it will of course not catch up overnight. However, a clear sense of direction should drive efforts over time, and its progress should be regularly and seriously assessed. Bearing that in mind, some of the building blocks of strategic autonomy are illustrated in the following sections. 4. Strategic autonomy across the board A meaningful approach to Europe’s strategic autonomy should encompass three principal domains – the economy, technology, and security and defence matters. Progress in all three is essential in order for Europe to take more responsibility not only for its security and prosperity, but also for a stable, rules-based international order. The EU agenda for the next five years and beyond should focus not only on advancing strategic autonomy in distinct areas or policy fields but also, and crucially, on taking an overarching approach to strategic autonomy, assessing how progress in some fields (or lack thereof) impacts others. For example, it is hard to envisage the EU maintaining its economic clout and therefore regulatory power if it falls behind the curve of technological innovation. Likewise, the capacity to protect critical infrastructures from cyberattacks is essential not only to the defence and security of the Union but also to its broader economic resilience and competitiveness. Adequate military capabilities to uphold stability in Europe’s extended neighbourhood and protect the openness of the global commons – notably the sea, outer space and cyberspace – are also critical to the security of the flows that Europe depends upon for its prosperity and stability. Furthermore, it is only by taking an encompassing view of strategic autonomy that the EU will be able to leverage it for a larger, positive global agenda and narrative in support of rules-based cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

EU overreliance on the US creates weak points which turn NATO deterrence---the CP increases EU coordination which solves defense autonomy and the AFF.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

A weak European military European defense spending, specifically related to nations falling short of the NATO 2% of GDP target, has been a major issue in U.S.-EU relations. While Barack Obama’s administration exerted diplomatic pressure, Donald Trump’s engaged in open confrontation on this issue. Neither administration obtained significant results, however; and as Afghanistan has shown, Europe is still far too reliant on the military protection of the United States — an issue that weakens NATO’s posture. Over the past few years, the EU has strengthened both its legal and financial mechanisms to be more competitive on the security side. In December 2017, under articles 42.6 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council established a Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism to deepen cooperation between willing member states. These states have agreed to binding commitments on investment, planning and management to advance their defense capabilities in the service of both national and multinational operations (including those of NATO and the UN). PESCO currently has 46 projects in several domains, from training to maritime and land exercises to cyber and military mobility.33 Through the European Defense Fund, the EU also has allocated 7.9 billion euros (roughly $9 billion) for the 2021-2027 period to research innovative defense products and technologies through collaborate development projects.34 But while these initiatives represent a step toward better European coordination on defense issues, they are completely reliant on political will and inter-governmental coordination — as security is not a competence of the EU but an inalienable prerogative of its member states. In fact, many of the PESCO projects appear to be severely delayed.35 U.S. experts interviewed for this research also point out the bad shape of European defense and more broadly its dependence on the United States for even more reachable defense objectives. A report from the Center for American Progress mentions the example of France’s anti-terrorism operation in the Sahel, where the U.S. ended up supporting basic air-refueling and surveillance flights.36 A detailed study by the Clingendael Institute points out that if the EU wants to be a credible actor in crisis management, primarily in its neighborhood, then it should be able to operate crossspectrum in the air, land, sea, cyberspace, and space domains — which cannot be done without more serious investments in European defense.37 The case of Afghanistan — where Europeans decided to leave after the U.S. withdrawal despite the predictable consequences on migration and political instability — offers a concrete example of such shortcomings.38 As Brookings expert Michael E. O’Hanlon points out, Afghanistan operations did not require high-tech equipment or massive resources; but the fact that European countries involved in NATO operations in Afghanistan did not step up to preserve a military presence in a crucial theater for European security speaks to their unpreparedness in terms of stockpiles of equipment and inability to conduct such operations without the help of the United States.39 Germany’s defense capabilities are also emblematic: Despite having more fiscal leeway and being at the forefront of European technological innovation, Berlin has not invested in its military, which still lacks critical equipment such as body armor, night vision gear, and helicopter spare parts.40 In this regard, evidence suggests that integrating and strengthening European defense would undoubtedly offer more openings for specialization, boost resource allocation and more broadly improve readiness. Yet such opportunities are highly contingent on building trust between allies and increasing political will, which will inevitably take time and be achieved in different ways. Recently, some inter-governmental initiatives outside of the EU and NATO frameworks were taken to tackle these shortcomings. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) with the aim of deepening military cooperation between like-minded European governments sharing a strategic culture. Through intelligence sharing, scenario planning, joint planning and exercises, its 13 participants are working to strengthen their military cooperation so that they can offer rapid responses in case of a crisis. The E2I is particularly relevant because one of its members is the United Kingdom, which is not currently part of any PESCO projects. The U.K’s involvement signals the importance of the relationship and responsibilities that the it shares with European partners on security. While limited, the initiative is an example of how Europe and the U.K. can strengthen their security cooperation. As the U.K. has left the EU, stronger defense cooperation between the U.K. and the EU would also positively impact NATO through fostering synergies and interoperability. However, while relevant, these initiatives are insufficient for Europe to play a credible role as a security actor in its eastern and southern neighborhoods. And such weaknesses endanger the deterrence power of the NATO alliance against Russia and ultimately reduce the opportunities for the EU more broadly to defend its security interests.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

U.S. will control tech if they are driving the cooperation --- undermines the net benefit

Ringhof and Torreblanca 22 [Julian Ringhof, José Ignacio Torreblanca, 5-17-2022, "The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player", ECFR, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-geopolitics-of-technology-how-the-eu-can-become-a-global-player/, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Today’s major powers engage in comprehensive global technology politics. The weaponisation, mastering, and control of digital technologies is the new ‘Great Game’. These power dynamics are helping shape technological spheres of influence. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific – but also in central Eastern Europe and the Balkans – have fallen or may soon fall under Chinese or Russian technological influence or dominance. China is luring countries into technological dependencies to undermine their political sovereignty through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. Beijing also shields its own citizens from foreign influence with its ‘great firewall’ and develops industrial strategies to secure its technological autonomy from the West. It uses digital disinformation to influence public opinion in other countries, mounts cyberattacks and cyberespionage to strengthen its industrial base, strategically deploys attractively-priced 5G technologies abroad to gain control of telecom networks, and tries to impose its technical standards through international organisations. Together with Russia, China is attempting to ingrain authoritarian values into the global cyberspace. Russia is also leveraging and restricting mass media and social networks to protect its interests, shielding its population from democratic temptations, and waging an information war against the West and its allies with the aim of undermining citizens’ faith in democracy. Meanwhile, the United States tries to offset Chinese and Russian influence, seeks to maintain its cutting-edge advantage on military artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and backs and protects the interests of its major technology companies globally. It also denies other nations access to key technologies, monitors critical investments in the technology sector to avoid security risks, seeks to secure and control critical supply chains (especially of semiconductors), and imposes export controls and even embargoes on sensitive technologies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – EU (NATO/Unilat Version)

US and European interests are mutually exclusive---including the US trades off with EU autonomy.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ) //CHC-DS ‍

The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation.

Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › Perm/Theory › Block – A2: PDB – Generic (NATO version)

Europeans are skeptical over US approaches on AI.

Franke 21, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on geopolitics and warfare., (Ulrike, “Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ) //CHC-DS ‍

Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

Differing views on China

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU-US Coop

Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” BAS, )

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU-US Coop

U.S. and EU should cooperate over emerging tech --- that formalizes cooperation in other areas and blunts Chinese economic competition AND tech hegemony

Atkinson ‘21

(Robert, PhD from UNC, is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based technology policy think tank. He is also author of the book, The Past And Future Of America’s Economy: Long Waves Of Innovation That Power Cycles Of Growth. He has conducted ground-breaking research projects on technology and innovation, is a valued adviser to state and national policymakers, and is a popular speaker on innovation policy nationally and internationally. Previously, Dr. Atkinson served as the first Executive Director of the Rhode Island Economic Policy Council. Prior to that, he was Project Director at the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. While at OTA, he directed The Technological Reshaping of Metropolitan America, a seminal report examining the impact of the information technology revolution on America’s urban areas. He is a board member or advisory council member of the Alliance for Public Technology and the Information Policy Institute. Dr. Atkinson was appointed by President Clinton to the Commission on Workers, Communities and Economic Change in the New Economy. He is also a member of the Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, “Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Today, in what could become a second Cold War, this time with China, the U.S. and Europe need to put great emphasis on cooperating economically. The reason for this is straightforward: From the vantage point of each of the transatlantic partners, China poses a threat to our economic competitiveness. More transatlantic technology cooperation needed As such, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and the EU to build upon the initial steps of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The goal must be, first, to reduce economic tensions between the two regions and second, to foster formal cooperation. This is especially true with regard to supporting advanced and emerging technology development and production. China: Unfair, state-directed capitalism As Barry Naughton notes in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, China has not only become the world’s manufacturing workshop. It is also seeking to be the world leader in emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence and others. What’s more, China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism. To be sure, both the EU and the United States have industrial policies – but these policies mostly support foundational elements like workforce training, infrastructure and R&D. China looking for dominance In contrast, China’s predatory regime, especially subsidies to industry, goes way beyond what is considered acceptable industrial policy. On top of that, the Chinese Communist Party compels technology transfer for market access, encourages intellectual property theft and operates tax and regulatory policies that discriminate against EU and U.S. firms. That, combined with real strengths of the Chinese economy – a massive domestic market that lures in foreign investment, a massive technical and scientific labor force and improving research universities – mean that China is gaining rapidly technologically. At the expense of EU and U.S. That gain has and will come at the expense of the EU’s and U.S.’s global market shares in advanced technologies. The result of that shift cannot be underestimated. Initially, China systematically assembled the components needed to be the manufacturing workshop of the world. This systematic approach has made it hard, even with the Trump tariffs and measures by Japan and other countries, to move production out of China. Silicon China? Now, China is seeking to establish the same robust innovation ecosystem that will give it strong reinforcing strengths. China wants to be not Silicon Valley, but Silicon China – and not just for IT, but for every advanced technology. The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT. If China were to achieve this leadership position, its lead will become self-reinforcing as competitors weaken and China’s advantages (e.g., capital, STEM workers, patents, tacit knowledge) improve. Not another Asian tiger If China were simply following the path of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), there would be less to worry about. All of these countries, as well as Japan, only sought comparative advantage in some industries – as opposed to absolute advantage in most industries. More crucially, they were (or quickly became) democracies that did not seek to challenge long-standing principles of the rule of law and human rights. A Maoist global hegemon? China not only seeks absolute advantage in most if not all advanced and emerging industries. Under the leadership of President Xi, it has become clear that China is reverting to its Leninist and Maoist authoritarian origins. If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon. That would give China the ability to hold the West hostage for key products and supplies. What to do? Three steps There are three key steps the United States and Europe should take. First, stop fighting each other economically. Resolving the long-standing Boeing-Airbus feud and focusing on the real challenger – China’s Comac – was a good first step. The United States eliminating its steel and aluminum tariffs on EU imports was a good second step. For its part, Europe, including member states like Germany and France, needs to dial back its “digital sovereignty” agenda which is targeted at the United States and U.S. companies. Second, both regions need to ramp up cooperation against unfair Chinese economic practices, including cooperation on cybersecurity, investment screening, bringing trade cases before the WTO and cooperative export controls. Time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation Finally, and most ambitiously, it is time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation. In a world where the development of technology has become much more technologically complex, neither region is large enough to specialize in all major technologies. Therefore, each region should allow the other region’s companies to participate in government-funded industry research programs, like the EU’s Horizon 2020 program and similar U.S. programs that agencies like the National Science Foundation operate. Moreover, as the governments roll out or expand specialized technology programs in technologies like 6G, energy storage, battery technology, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU firms, universities and governments. Finally, governments should review and minimize or eliminate regulatory barriers to science and technology cooperation, including enabling easier cross-border work of scientists and engineers. Conclusion The sooner the EU and the U.S. can stop seeing each other as the competition and work to address the real technology competitiveness challenge – China – the more likely both regions can ensure their economic futures, while upholding critical values.