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2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › ---Defense Autonomy NB

EU-NATO coordination is possible now — but US intervention via security cooperation wrecks it — link alone turns case.

Bergmann et al. ’21 — Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. James Lamond is a fellow at the Center. Siena Cicarelli is a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center. June 21, 2021; "The Case for EU Defense"; Center for American Progress; ; //CYang

This is a major structural shift that Washington and NATO simply must reckon with. But, instead of seeing this development as a challenge to the current structure of the NATO alliance, it should in fact be seen as a huge opportunity. The once seemingly impossible task of integrating European forces and addressing fragmentation and redundancies has now been made possible through Europe forming a political union.

Yet U.S. policy has consistently opposed EU defense efforts since the late 1990s, arguing that EU defense efforts would undermine NATO. State Department officials’ oft-repeated claim, virtually unchanged over the past three decades, is that an EU defense structure would “duplicate” NATO, making the treaty organization obsolete. Democratic and Republican administrations have repeated the mantra “no duplication” so often that it has become U.S. policy doctrine.5 But rarely, if ever, is the concern about possible duplication actually unpacked and assessed.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU-NATO Coop

Chinese tech leadership leads to nuclear war

Kroenig, professor of government, writes in 2018, Deputy Director for Strategy, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Matthew, Nov 12, 2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?” BAS, )

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU-NATO Coop

Asian control over semiconductors causes Chinese tech leadership.

Maire 21 [Robert Maire is the last man standing in terms of writing with tremendous depth and breadth about the art of making computer chips. There is no one else communicating the issues of the industry with his level of expertise and perspective., 10-07-2021, "The U.S.-China battle for dominance will be determined by the virtually invisible semiconductor chip — The Technology Letter", Technology Letter, https://www.thetechnologyletter.com/the-posts/the-us-china-battle-for-dominance-will-be-determined-by-the-virtually-invisible-semiconductor-chip, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]

Much as atoms are the building blocks of matter, semiconductors are the fundamental building blocks of the modern technology world. Chips enable and compose the internet, computers, smart phones, transport, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and all the world’s data.

The ability to lead and control the design and manufacture of chips determines who dominates globally in all of these areas, and new, yet unknown, applications. Wars today are won by information, command and control. He who has the best information and the ability to use it, wins.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU-NATO Coop

EU-NATO coordination relieves semiconductor dependencies on Asia via coordinated security efforts from the EU.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Such an approach to procurement could prove particularly helpful given the rising threats coming from vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled Western countries’ strong dependency on Chinese supplies, both in the medical and technological fields (though the supply issues around personal protective equipment were addressed relatively rapidly).75 A recent study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies identifies 103 categories of electronics, chemical, mineral/metal, and pharmaceutical products in which the EU is critically dependent on imports from China.76 At the same time, as economies worldwide have started to recover from the pandemic and embark on ambitious investment plans to boost innovation in their national industries, the demand for semiconductors — crucial for building microchips, which are essential in any modern technology — has increased and become one of the central issues of the U.S.-China competition. This issue is further complicated by geopolitical concerns; a large proportion of semiconductor manufacturing occurs in Taiwan.77 The U.S. and the EU have recently begun initiatives to increase the domestic production of microchips. In June, the U.S. Senate passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, which allocates $52 billion toward the effort.78 And the EU followed suit with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen committing to a similar amount.79 The U.S. and EU discussed the issue during their inaugural Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in September 2021.80 These discussions represent a first step toward breaking the ice on trans-Atlantic cooperation, particularly related to developing new technologies that are vital for enhancing geopolitical and economic security. But the main takeaways are that the U.S. and the EU are facing the same challenges and that the EU has increased its geopolitical ambition and range of interests. So far, there is no similar dialogue platform between NATO and the EU — a fact that hinders inter-institutional cooperation in the procurement domain. In fact, if NATO and the EU develop different standards, it could lead to duplication and hinder logistical and strategic interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space. For this reason, it is especially important for NATO and the EU to establish deeper communication on procurement and the definition of common standards. Increasing connections and synergies between industrial clusters within the trans-Atlantic space, particularly for materials such as semiconductors and microchips, would decrease dependence on geopolitically risky supply chains. Moreover, developing common standards when it comes to procurement, data privacy, and weaponry components would facilitate technological exchanges as well as the interoperability of equipment (be it artificial intelligence or more traditional military supplies) across the NATO-EU space. Given the increasing importance of new technologies for economic development, industrial advancement, and innovation, the only alternative to a shared approach in the trans-Atlantic space would be increased competition among allies and reduced interoperability — which would inevitably create more advantages for competitors to exploit.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU Unilateral

EU strength prevent global conflict and transnational threats---extinction

Dr. Rosa Balfour 19, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, MA in History from Cambridge University, MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre, Associate of LSE Ideas, “The European Foreign Policy in a Hostile Environment”, The Progressive Post, 4/11/2019, https://progressivepost.eu/debates/next-economy/european-foreign-policy-hostile-environment

In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism.

Strategic autonomy’ and ‘complementarity with NATO’ usually appear in the same sentence in the European debate – the latest doctrinal iteration to be found in the EU Global Strategy of June 2016. The ensemble reflects Europe’s need to rely on its transatlantic relationship for security and territorial defence, empowering it to carry out foreign policy too. The EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement of enlarging to Central Europe after the Cold War, pursued in tandem with NATO expansion, is testimony to this pairing.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › 1NC Shells › 1NC—EU Unilateral

The CP solves the entirety of case, revitalizes lagging EU leadership, solves CMR, and spurs innovation.

Csernatoni 19 [, PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

Less than a century ago, Edmund Husserl’s warning words about Europe were more than farsighted: “the gravest danger menacing Europe is its lassitude” (quoted in Bauman 2014). Applied to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), his words ring even truer. In the current climate of fiscal and economic austerity, recent debates on the EU’s security and defence capabilities have centred on Europe’s clear lag, warned against cuts in national defence budgets, and called for a new level of ambition and ‘pooling and sharing’ strategies for enhanced defence cooperation at the European level. Nevertheless, the case for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy is even harder to endorse in domestic debates over resources and priorities, especially concerning high-tech security technologies. The European defence sector contends with public finances under pressure from growing pension burdens, shrinking recruitment pools and states increasingly cautious about interventionist military operations or unwarranted military capabilities spending.

This chapter looks at the EU’s recent impetus to fund for serious military capacity build-up through dual-use and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous robotics. According to the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) “go beyond what is known!” and “[v]isionary thinking can open up promising avenues towards powerful new technologies” (FET 2018). FETs have been allocated a provisional budged of €2.696 million under the Horizon 2020, having three complementary lines of actions: FET Open funding projects on new ideas for radically new future technologies, including unconventional research and innovation collaborations and practices; FET Proactive nurturing emerging themes and establishing a critical mass of European researches in order to build new interdisciplinary research communities; and FET Flagships that are “1-billion, 10-years initiatives where hundreds of excellence European researchers unite forces to focus on solving an ambitious scientific and technological challenge” (FET 2018). The Work Programme of 2018–2020 (FET 2018–2020) under the Horizon 2020 started in 2016, highlighted among others a new generation of robotics technologies, human-machine interfaces and cooperation, cognition and AI as well as quantum computing and its advantages to solve challenging industrial and scientific problems such as the development of protocols, controls and benchmarking for real life applications (FET 2018–2020, pp. 34, 38).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › 2NC – Net Ben – I/L

Conditioning allies solves – spurs behavior change and causes positive demonstration effects

Melissa Dalton 16, July 2016, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, “Smart Conditions: A Strategic Framework for Leveraging Security Assistance”, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160706_Dalton_SmartConditions_Web.pdf//tyei

The United States provides security assistance to international partners as a means to achieve its foreign policy and supporting defense objectives. These objectives include developing partner nations’ military capabilities to enable them to control territory, building interoperability with U.S. forces, and securing peacetime and contingency access to critical air, land, and sea nodes. 1 Security assistance also aims to deepen political and military relationships that can advance the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The outcomes and second order effects of security assistance cannot be easily separated from policy or politics, because they influence the partner country’s monopoly on the use of violence and thus its cohesion as a state.2

As a result, when the policies of countries receiving U.S. security assistance fundamentally diverge from U.S. interests, the United States faces a dilemma. If it cuts off assistance to demonstrate American displeasure, it may risk losing leverage in working with the partner on other security objectives or broader foreign policy priorities, although that leverage may be ill-defined or overstated. On the other hand, if the United States ignores the policy divergence, it may lose credibility with the partner, as it then becomes difficult to reasonably press for reform while continuing assistance flows. It may also diminish perceptions of U.S. moral leadership, thereby also putting wider U.S. foreign policy objectives at risk in that country as well as internationally. Security services are often the tool of authoritarian governments, and U.S. support for those security services can enable them to continue repressive tactics and reinforce perceptions that the United States is willing to choose a security relationship over the well-being and rights of a country’s citizens.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › 2NC – Say Yes

Positive conditionality is effective – especially for intel-sharing and defense cooperation

Tommy Ross and Melissa Dalton 20, 1-17-20, Tommy Ross, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Rormer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners//tyei

The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.

First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › 2NC – Perm Fails

The AFF fails to reconcile policy disagreements that conditions solve – especially with authoritarian allies

Could also be used for turns case?

Melissa Dalton 16, July 2016, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160706_Dalton_SmartConditions_Web.pdf//tyei

The complexity of global challenges ranging from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and cyber threats will require the United States to partner with countries around the world to achieve common security objectives. In support of this approach, partners will require assistance from the United States in building the capacity and capabilities of their security forces and to improve interoperability with U.S. forces. However, inevitably, policy disagreements and clashing interests will arise between the United States and its security partners, and the United States will have to find ways to reconcile its security objectives and its broader foreign policy goals. Smart and strategic use of conditions on security assistance, when the United States has leverage in a security relationship, may help close these policy gaps. Assessing donor and recipient vulnerability at the front end of U.S. policy deliberations can help calculate leverage and determine the right kind of conditions that should be applied. Smarter use of conditions will not completely resolve the tensions in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when it comes to dealing with authoritarian regimes that the United States relies upon to achieve its security objectives. Broader and deeper policy research and discussion is needed on navigating the nexus of U.S. security and human rights objectives. In the meantime, and to further that evolution, the United States should adopt a set of guiding principles for conditions on security assistance to improve the consistency and credibility of its foreign policy

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Democracy QPQ › 2NC – Perm Fails

Unconditional security assistance fails – it rewards bad behavior and is treated as entitlement

Adams and Sokolsky 15, 6-22-15, Gordon Adams – IR Professor @ Stanford University, Richard Sokolsky – Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, “Good Money After Bad: Time to Overhaul U.S. Security Assistance”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/22/good-money-after-bad-time-to-overhaul-u-s-security-assistance//tyei

The United States has made security assistance and security cooperation a centerpiece of its global engagement. Security, U.S. leaders often argue, should come first in coping with such challenges as terrorism and insurgencies. However, U.S. security assistance programs routinely fail to achieve their goals, in part because they are too small, reward “bad behavior,” are treated as an entitlement and, most importantly, do not recognize the critical link between security and governance.

PATHOLOGIES

2022 Michigan Kritik

2AC – Russia revisionist

Russian revisionism is the greatest threat to the international order by constant escalation and expansionism through aggressive military force – empirics

Pisciotta 20 (Pisciotta, Barbara, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Roma Tre University, 2020, "Russian Revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria." Italian Political Science Review 50.1, pp. 87-106, doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.18) nihara

Most scholars of international relations today believe that the international order is in crisis. Haas (Haas, 2015) suggests a gradual transformation of the international system into a post-hegemonic global governance, Acharya (Acharya, 2014) the formation of a less centralized system based on regional level interactions, and Kahler (Kahler, 2013) the emergence of new rising powers as moderate reformers influencing the change of international rules through the existing forums.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2AC – Securitization Theory = Racist

Securitization theory is irredeemably racist

Alison and Richter-Monpetit 20 (Howell, Alison, and Melanie Richter-Montpetit. “Is Securitization Theory Racist? Civilizationism, Methodological Whiteness, and Antiblack Thought in the Copenhagen School.” Security Dialogue, vol. 51, no. 1, Feb. 2020, pp. 3–22, doi:10.1177/0967010619862921) nihara

Abstract This article provides the first excavation of the foundational role of racist thought in securitization theory. We demonstrate that Copenhagen School securitization theory is structured not only by Eurocentrism but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. Classic securitization theory advances a conceptualization of ‘normal politics’ as reasoned, civilized dialogue, and securitization as a potential regression into a racially coded uncivilized ‘state of nature’. It justifies this through a civilizationist history of the world that privileges Europe as the apex of civilized ‘desecuritization’, sanitizing its violent (settler-) colonial projects and the racial violence of normal liberal politics. It then constructs a methodologically and normatively white framework that uses speech act theory to locate ‘progress’ towards normal politics and desecuritization in Europe, making becoming like Europe a moral imperative. Using ostensibly neutral terms, securitization theory prioritizes order over justice, positioning the securitization theorist as the defender of (white) ‘civilized politics’ against (racialized) ‘primal anarchy’. Antiblackness is a crucial building-block in this conceptual edifice: securitization theory finds ‘primal anarchy’ especially in ‘Africa’, casting it as an irrationally oversecuritized foil to ‘civilized politics’. We conclude by discussing whether the theory, or even just the concept of securitization, can be recuperated from these racist foundations. Introduction Securitization theory has unquestionably made a significant impact. Its founding texts are among the most widely cited international relations scholarship (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995; Wæver et al., 1993), spawning active research programs and new ‘generations’ of securitization theory. The concept of securitization has travelled to disciplines beyond international relations, and even entered public discourse. What is so appealing about this theory? Perhaps the most tempting aspect of securitization theory is its methodological rigor. It provides a clear set of steps and standards for identifying how referent objects (e.g. migration, health, cyberspace) become security problems and deciding whether they should indeed be ‘securitized’. This readymade methodology can be applied to all sorts of empirical areas. However, students and scholars of security ought to resist this temptation of a readymade approach and inquire more deeply into securitization theory’s core theoretical assumptions and methodology. This article argues that racist thought is fundamental and integral to classic securitization theory’s conceptual and methodological project. While other scholarship has worked either to incorporate analysis of race into securitization theory (Amin-Khan, 2012; Ibrahim, 2005; Mofette and Vadasaria, 2016) or to overcome securitization theory’s Eurocentrism (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), this article offers something different. It is the first to excavate the foundations of securitization theory in racist thought. We demonstrate that classic securitization theory is fundamentally and inextricably structured not only by Eurocentrism but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. What does it mean to excavate the racist foundations of a theory? That we use the ‘r-word’ and white supremacy as categories of analysis is sure to raise eyebrows. Even sympathetic readers might wonder if the problem we identify is more appropriately characterized as Eurocentrism. Critique of the Eurocentric character of much Western scholarship and cultural production has made significant inroads across academic disciplines, including international relations (Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013). Our analysis is inspired by this research and extends some of its insights. Yet there is more to be said. Black studies and decolonial scholarship demonstrate that much orthodox and critical Western social and political thought is predicated upon epistemological and ontological premises that are not simply Eurocentric but racist, specifically white supremacist. In international relations, recent debates have addressed the question of whether postcolonial international relations should proceed solely through an analytic of Eurocentrism or whether we need to more specifically address racism and white supremacism (Gruffydd Jones, 2016; Hozić, 2016; Rutazibwa, 2016; Sajed, 2016). Sajed (2016: 168) suggests that the term ‘Eurocentric’ potentially neutralizes the foundational and continuing racism of the discipline. Rutazibwa (2016: 192) asks, ‘what existing power structure does this reluctance [to name racism] serve?’ Echoing these concerns, we ask: What is at stake in the reluctance to name racism in analyses of international security? Racism is a fundamental system of power that has profoundly shaped the world for the past several hundred years. Moreover, as is now well established, international relations emerged to provide intellectual support for the imperial and (settler-)colonial ambitions of Western states (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004a; Krishna, 2001; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Drawing on black studies, indigenous studies, and decolonial scholarship, we illustrate the racist modes of thought that underpin classic securitization theory by deploying three concepts beyond Eurocentrism: civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. The argument presented here is not a personal indictment of any particular author. Contrary to commonsense notions that reduce racism to interpersonal prejudices of openly bigoted individuals, racism and white supremacy are systems of power (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Epistemic racism is intrinsic to Western knowledge structures, and not merely a failure of individual scholarship (Bhambra, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2003). Just as the ongoing racialized distribution of life chances across liberal societies is not simply the effect of intentionally racist individuals, racialized knowledge production is not simply the result of bad or flawed individual theorists. Colonial and racist assumptions about racial and civilizational difference animate the core political categories and theoretical frameworks of Western social and political thought. As we demonstrate, this is also true of classic securitization theory. We begin by acknowledging that discussions of racism or colonialism are not entirely absent in classic securitization theory. Security: A New Framework for Analysis briefly discusses the racial politics of US domestic societal security (Buzan et al., 1998: 130). In one of securitization theory’s original formulations, Wæver discusses neo-Nazi attacks on asylum-seekers and racist justifications for the securitization of migration (Wæver, 1995; 70; see also Buzan et al., 1998; 42, 44–45). Colonialism is sometimes referenced (see Buzan et al., 1998: 61, 63, 98, 129; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 14–18, 221), and white supremacism is mentioned as a potential ‘macrosecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 263). Our argument is not that race is absent in securitization theory, but that racist political thought is integral to it, even when classic securitization theory texts discuss race or colonialism. The article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the securitization theory framework and notable criticisms of it. The second focuses on the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory, showing how its conceptualization of ‘politics’ and ‘security’ is founded in civilizationist thought. The third section focuses on securitization theory’s methodology, highlighting its methodological whiteness. The fourth section illustrates how antiblackness is a crucial building-block in securitization theory’s conceptual division between security and politics. Securitization theory finds ‘primal anarchy’ especially in ‘Africa’, which it casts as irrationally oversecuritized, making it a foil to ‘civilized politics’. Throughout, we focus on classic articulations of securitization theory associated with the Copenhagen School. Classic securitization theory is very much an ongoing intellectual project that continues to be assertively defended by its founders (Buzan and Wæver, 1997; Wæver, 2011, 2015), and its basic precepts are in need of questioning in new ways. However, we are not unaware of divergences in ‘second-generation’ and other iterations of securitization theory. We therefore conclude with some thoughts about whether other versions of securitization theory emulate or dispense with the racism of classic securitization theory, and a discussion of whether the theory, or even just the word ‘securitization’, can be salvaged.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2AC – Security K – Scenarioplanning

Evaluating conflict dynamics through scenario analysis that applies political-strategic analytical requirements aids development of more rigorous, transparent, and realistic scenarios to avoid militarized crises escalation of hybrid warfare – BUT, does NOT limit effective response

Heath & Lane 19 (Timothy R. Heath, Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining RAND in October 2014, he served as the senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group. He has over twenty years of experience researching and analyzing military and political topics related to China. In addition to his publications with the RAND Corporation, Heath has published numerous articles and one book. Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, he has extensive experience analyzing China's national strategy, politics, ideology, and military, as well as Asian regional security developments. He has a Ph.D. in political science from George Mason Unversity and an M.A. in Asian studies from George Washington University. Matthew Lane, 2019, “Science-Based Scenario Design A Proposed Method to Support Political-Strategic Analysis,” RAND Corporation, ) nihara

CHAPTER ONE

2022 Michigan Kritik

2AC – Security – FW

Our framework is necessary to open up new pathways to solve complex security threats through citizen engagement

Bisogno 17 (Raymond Bisogno, June 2017, “Problem Solving in Homeland Security and Creating Policy Conditions For Enhanced Civic Engagement: An Examination of Crowdsourcing Models,” The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security, ) nihara

This thesis begins with the premise that the world has become a more dangerous and complicated place due to the spread of terrorism, increasingly damaging weather events, and other threats to national and economic security. These threats (in their broadest sense) have become more diffuse, and the challenges the government faces to combat them more complicated. It may not be, at the end of the day, reasonable to expect government to address the entire threat landscape with existing resources alone and leave the public at large essentially unaffected, or perhaps more importantly, uninvolved. The conditions for tapping into citizens’ intellectual capacity for problem-solving, however, may not be present. This thesis explored the potential of crowdsourcing for this purpose, examining cases in various disciplines to discover what worked well and what did not. A principal focus of the research was crowdsourcing experiments and engagement models, as well as a strategy for leveraging technology in these pursuits.

2022 Michigan Kritik

2AC AT: NATO Evil

NATO can be used for progressive ends---it empirically prevents conflict

Schablein 18 (Jared Schablein, chair of the Lower Shore Progressive Caucus, a local chapter of Progressive Maryland, 7-25-2018, “Supporting NATO is progressive”, Progressive Maryland, accessed 7-17-2022, )//kpt

Currently, President Trump like the administrations of old has continued many of these same reckless policies and pointless aggressive wars.  However, President Trump has taken these reckless policies a dangerous step further by undermining and trying to destroy agreements and policies that keep peace and stability in at-risk parts of the world by constantly attacking our closest allies with false claims and outrageous rants. One of the few current US foreign policies that is agreeable and good for both the country and world at large is the United States’ involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, better known as NATO.  

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 2AC – Sustainable

Leadership is sustainable-multipolarity’s not inevitable

O'Hanlon 21- -- (Michael E. O'Hanlon- Director of Research - Foreign Policy Co-Director - Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Africa Security Initiative Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair, "China is definitely on the rise. But don’t write off American dominance just yet.", 10-28-2021, Brookings,

China is definitely on the rise. But don’t write off American dominance just yet. Even if the trade wars between the United States and China that dominated the Trump era have receded slightly, many other issues have intensified. China tested a hypersonic and potentially globe-spanning weapon this summer. It conducted dozens of sorties by combat aircraft that touched on Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification zone and otherwise menaced the island of 23 million (plus much of the world’s semiconductor production capacity) that it claims as its own. The Pentagon’s artificial intelligence guru, Nicolas Chaillan, recently resigned with a warning that the United States is losing the AI race to China. Intelligence and military officials warn that China may be expanding its nuclear arsenal by up to several hundred warheads. And commanders of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii have estimated that China might well attempt to take Taiwan within a half-dozen years or so, given its military modernization trends. We should not overreact to these troubling trends. They are serious. They are, however, far from truly foreboding. China is flexing its muscles more than preparing for war; this is not the equivalent of Europe in the late 1930s, given how much China depends on a stable international order for its continued success. We do need to stay vigilant, remember the art of war even in this age of (relative) peace, and expand our economic as well as military toolkit for crisis management. We need not and must not panic, however, because doing so could turn manageable crises into truly scary ones. First, let’s remember America’s many strengths. Our military budget is about three times’ China’s, and our allies in Europe and East Asia together outspend China themselves (even if not all would fight in a war in the Pacific, admittedly). The loose coalition of European nations and the U.S. also represents the consumer market of more than a billion comparatively wealthy individuals whom China needs in order to sustain its still-export-driven economy. That means we have many tools of economic, as well as military, warfare if needed. Since 1945, seven Democratic and seven Republican U.S. presidents have collectively upheld a rules-based international order that has established a very strong norm against interstate aggression, making any Chinese attack on Taiwan hugely problematic for President Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders in Beijing. The world’s response to an actual attack against Taiwan — and this is the scenario that is truly the most worrisome for its potential to shake world peace — would likely be rather unified and strong. China knows it. For this reason, I believe that U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and other parts of the government need to be careful and restrained with their rhetoric (as most but not all are). China may have growing capacity to attempt to seize Taiwan, but it knows that actually making the attempt would be a cosmic roll of the dice, to be attempted only under the most extreme of circumstances. Beyond these broad advantages are a number of specific factors working in our favor to direct China’s rise in a generally peaceful direction: Even if our AI efforts, at the Pentagon and elsewhere, could be better focused, we enjoy numerous advantages in high technology vis-à-vis China, including in stealth, submarine technology, and long-range strike platforms like aircraft carriers. Even if China’s military is bigger than ours in some ways — total troop count, total ship count — ours is much better (and battle-hardened). Also, just to take one frequently misused statistic, if China’s navy has more ships than ours, we have a fleet with larger vessels, meaning the U.S. Navy wields twice the total ship tonnage, based on calculations my colleagues and I have done. Every time China fortifies another artificial island, should it continue down that path, we can respond. We can add bases in the Indo-Pacific region ourselves, or tighten various security partnerships, as with India. We should do this with restraint, and proportionality, to be sure — but the bottom line is that the United States has lots of allies and China does not. We also have a globally capable military that can, for example, continue to uphold our access to the South China Sea even when Beijing wrongly and dangerously claims it as territorial waters. If China does attack Taiwan, with the goal of reunification, I believe it is far more likely to attempt a blockade (combined with cyberattacks) than an outright invasion. Moving big ships near the coasts of a vigilant adversary is very hard to do in the era of precision-strike weaponry and advanced mines. In a blockade scenario, we have other options besides fighting right next to Taiwan — we can, for example, use economic warfare backed up by our military to interfere with China’s access to oil and other commodities coming from the Persian Gulf and Africa. To be sure, the United States needs to stay vigilant — and to keep getting “stronger” ourselves, as Brookings Institution scholar Ryan Hass argues in a new book of that very title. Our military command and control must be more resilient in order to makes sure our “kill chain” is robust. Our armed forces need more long-range strike platforms, including more bombers and long-range unmanned systems operating off aircraft carriers and attack submarines, given China’s ability to threaten nearby U.S. bases. Nations need to diversify and harden their economies, and the global supply chains that undergird them, so that China does not have the upper hand in any future economic warfare scenarios. Managing China’s rise is going to be a challenge for America and her allies for a generation. But if we stay calm in crises, and make ourselves stronger and more resilient militarily and economically, we should have the tools needed to sustain the peace.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 2AC – LIO Good – !

America is key to stability of the liberal world order- aggression will lead to nuclear war

Kagan 18 – (Robert Kagan- the Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, "The Jungle Grows Back (Kobo eBook)", 9-18-18 https://www.politics-prose.com/ebook/9780525521662)//mishelle

Despite everything that has happened, if we reject the counsels of the new “realism” and resume our support for the liberal world order, it is still within our capacity to defend it and put off its collapse, perhaps for quite some time. Today the order remains intact, despite the hostility of the present administration and the weakness of the last. The international structures supporting it are durable. This is partly because they rest on geographical realities and a distribution of power that still favor the liberal order and still pose obstacles to those who would disrupt it. It is also because liberal values, though under assault, remain a force that binds the democratic nations of the world together. Authoritarianism also has its appeal and will always compete with liberalism, but the authoritarian governments do not feel the same sense of commonality as the monarchies and aristocracies of the early nineteenth century. The Chinese and Russians are not adversaries, but they are not allies either. They share little except their antipathy to liberalism. The democratic nations, however, are bound together by more than common adversaries, as the post–Cold War era has proved. America’s alliances in Europe and Asia have so far held, therefore, despite the weakening of America’s commitment under two administrations. There is still a liberal world order to be salvaged, if the American people decide it is worth salvaging. They will also have to decide that they are prepared to pay the costs, and those costs have not changed. It took great and consistent exertions of American power and influence to create and sustain this world order. It will take no less to continue upholding it into the future. Americans over the past two decades have become convinced that the United States is doing too much when actually it has been doing too little. Much of what needs to be done to shore up the order requires only diplomatic and economic measures. The United States needs to return to the deep engagement with Europe that characterized the relationship from the postwar years to the early post–Cold War years. Americans must understand that a healthy liberal Europe is the anchor of the order from which they benefit. Therefore such matters as the negotiation of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, the Eurozone crisis, the cyber threats from Russia, and European energy supplies must be addressed not just as European problems but as transatlantic problems that affect the United States, too. The United States also needs to work with European governments to address the democratic backsliding in Europe. Nations that entered the EU and NATO after the Cold War had to meet high standards of democratic governance in order to gain membership. If some have ceased to meet those standards, they need to be suspended from membership or denied some of the benefits of membership. Hungary and Turkey cannot expect to enjoy the benefits of NATO, and, in Hungary’s case, EU membership, so long as they celebrate their “illiberalism” and reject the basic premises of the liberal world order. Finally, the United States needs to return to the liberal compact when it comes to trade and international institutions. It was a serious blow to the liberal order when the United States walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership—and a great boon to China. The order will suffer further if American trade policies seek “wins” over close allies like Canada and Germany. Americans need to understand that the free trade regime undergirds the order from which they benefit as much or more than anyone. It is not a “win” if that regime collapses into the protectionism that characterized the decades before World War II. Then there is the question of maintaining America’s military predominance in the international system. For all the talk of “soft” power and “smart” power, it is ultimately the American security guarantee, the ability to deploy hard power to deter and defeat potential aggressors, that provides the essential foundation without which the liberal world order could never survive. Members of Congress from both parties have underfunded the military since the beginning of the post–Cold War era, but especially over the last decade. Defense secretaries from both parties have raised alarms about the increasing inability of the armed forces to perform their missions of deterrence around the world. And the dangers of war have only grown in recent years, not diminished. Americans need to remember that deterring a war is much less expensive than fighting one. It is not only the money to preserve power, however, but also the willingness to apply that power, with all the pain and the suffering, the uncertainties and the errors, the failures and follies, the immorality and brutality, the lost lives and the lost treasure. Most of what we need to do to sustain the liberal order will not require sending troops, but there will be times when it will be necessary. It is simply dishonest to tell the American people that the relative security and prosperity they have enjoyed can be sustained without the occasional threat or use of force. There will be challenges on the Korean Peninsula, in the South China Sea, in the Middle East, and along the fault lines between Russia and NATO. We would like to be sure that there will be no more Iraqs and Vietnams, and we should do our best, learning from past mistakes, to avoid such failures. But it would be foolish to imagine we can avoid mistakes and failures entirely. There is no doctrine other than pure isolation and inaction that can prevent such tragedies. The Obama administration offered a doctrine of not doing “stupid” things; others have spoken of the need to fight only “necessary” not “unnecessary” wars; in the past people have argued for fighting only for “vital” national interests in “core” areas and avoiding fights in the “periphery.” The problem with all of these sensible-sounding proposals is that it is often only in hindsight that we can be sure what was “stupid” and what was “necessary,” what was “vital” and what was “peripheral” and safely ignored. There were many smart people who believed that American intervention in Vietnam was essential to forestall a communist victory, that it was a vital strategic interest for the United States, partly to protect Japan and partly in the overall effort to resist aggression. An equally long and distinguished list of foreign policy thinkers and politicians supported the war in Iraq because they believed it was vital to protect the world from what most believed were Iraq’s WMD programs and from a serial aggressor and mass killer. Later on, when those efforts failed, when the intelligence proved faulty and the political-military strategies inadequate, many of those who supported those wars declared not only that they were a mistake but they were an obvious and avoidable mistake—even though they themselves did not see it at the time. That is one of the problems: many mistakes are not obvious until they are made. So, too, the distinction between supposedly “necessary” and “unnecessary” wars. Prior to December 1941 and Germany’s declaration of war on the United States, many American experts and the great majority of the American people did not think it was necessary to go to war in Europe to defeat Hitler. As for wars on the periphery, the world is not a collection of distinct regions neatly walled off from one another. We may call one region “Europe,” one “Asia,” and one “the Middle East,” and we may say we will intervene in one but not the other. This is an artificial construct, however. Regions abut one another and bleed into one another; their histories, cultures, and religions as well as their economies are tightly entangled. Great powers have been intervening in the Middle East and Persian Gulf for centuries, before there was oil and before there was a Suez Canal. To extricate ourselves from the Middle East would mean extricating ourselves from the world connected to and through the whole region. Even that might not keep us from having to intervene. In recent decades we have learned, tragically, that what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. Americans would love never to have to think about the Middle East again, but no administration has succeeded in extricating the United States from it—not even Obama. Meanwhile, the more we rely on proxies like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel to determine the course of events in the Middle East, the less it will be a course we would choose. Even if they could manage the task without us, which seems unlikely, it will be their interests they will be protecting, not ours, and not those of the liberal order. For the United States, it is not a question of all in or all out. We cannot intervene everywhere, and we haven’t ever come close to doing so. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we will still be required to make decisions: when to intervene, how to intervene, how much to commit, and how long to stay, and the answers will not be obvious and the outcomes will not be certain or even predictable. Nor will our interventions “solve” the problem; or they will solve one problem and create others. Those who insist on outcomes that pose no further dangers and require no further involvement are asking the impossible. Our intervention in World War II defeated Hitler but led to Soviet communist control of half of Europe and four decades of Cold War. That is the messy reality. President Obama said he didn’t like the idea of just putting a lid on problems like Syria. But the most masterful foreign policies in history, whether those of a Bismarck or a Disraeli, have always been about containing rather than solving problems. America’s entire grand strategy since World War II has been about putting lids on problems, in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere. Whether that is good or bad depends on what’s under the lid and whether it is better to keep things under it than to let them out. The American people would like a foreign policy that avoids mistakes and disasters, and who can blame them? But that is a bit like wanting to throw touchdowns but not interceptions, to make only good investment decisions, or to win all your cases. The price of failures in foreign policy is measured in human lives and national treasure, and therefore the greatest care must be taken to get it right, but it nevertheless remains a human activity and therefore subject both to our foibles and the failure of our best-intentioned efforts to predict the future. People don’t stop what they’re doing after a mistake is made; they try to do a better job next time. We can’t quit having a foreign policy, even if our geography, our wealth, and our power sorely tempt us to try. There are, moreover, two kinds of errors: errors of commission and errors of omission. After World War I, Americans were more focused on the former; after World War II, they worried more about the latter. Today we are fixated almost entirely on errors of commission. A couple of years ago, Robert Merry, the editor of The American Conservative, made a list of “America’s Five Biggest Foreign Policy Fiascoes.” At the top of the list was Iraq, followed by America’s entry into World War I, the Vietnam War, the intervention in Somalia, and the Bay of Pigs “invasion.” These were all acts of commission. But what about the “fiascoes” that resulted from our failure to act? What about our failure to destroy al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan before three thousand people were killed in the Twin Towers and the Pentagon; or the failure either to deter or to prepare adequately for a Japanese attack on the Philippines, which led in early 1942 to the death of ten thousand American and Filipino soldiers in three months of fighting followed by the deaths of thousands more in the infamous Bataan Death March? Was that not a far worse error than the tragedy which led to eighteen American dead in Mogadishu? What about the price the liberal world order, and particularly America’s key allies in Europe, have paid for our failure to contain the crisis in Syria? Were not these errors of omission more costly than our errors of commission in Somalia? At the root of such thinking is the belief that there is an escape from power or that it is possible to wield power without error and without failure. Americans, blessed by their favorable geography and wealth, still believe they have a choice between engaging the world and letting the world fend for itself. There has been no shortage of realists, idealists, progressives, and conservatives telling them that substantially disengaging from our alliances and overseas commitments is possible and cost-free. But the real choice we face is not between the good and the bad but between the bad and the worse. It is between maintaining the liberal world order, with all the moral and material costs that entails, or letting it collapse and courting the catastrophes that must inevitably follow. What is likely to follow is a return to the multipolar power struggles that brought so much devastation to the world before the United States redirected the course of history. That is where the deep ruts lead, back to the state of the world prior to 1945. Only this time, the powers competing and clashing will be armed with nuclear weapons. It is ironic that some of those who spent the Cold War warning that America’s hawkish foreign policies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem to fear nuclear war in the competitive multipolar world that may be our future. We have yet to test the question of whether nations with nuclear weapons can go to war, because so far the United States and the liberal world order have prevented such wars. But if history is any guide, to count on the horror of new weaponry alone to maintain the peace is a most risky bet. Had you cast that bet before the two world wars, you would have lost. These days some experts tell us it was the existence of nuclear weapons that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to blows, but few at the time had any confidence that nuclear weapons were a guarantor of peace. Throughout much of the Cold War there were those who simply assumed that the world was heading inevitably toward Armageddon. They were wrong that it would come as a result of American Cold War policies, but in the long run they may still prove right. — These are the quandaries we cannot avoid no matter how hard we try. Reinhold Niebuhr believed that what he called “the world problem” could not be solved if America did not “accept its full share of responsibility in solving it.”187 To support a “world community beyond our own borders” he went on, both was virtuous and reflected a “prudent understanding of our own interests.” But he also predicted that Americans would be “the poorer for the global responsibilities which we bear.” And poorer not just in a material sense but also in a moral sense. It was impossible “to build a community without the manipulation of power,” and it was impossible “to use power and remain completely ‘pure.’ ”188 As Hans Morgenthau put it, “Whoever wants to retain his moral innocence must forsake action altogether.” Niebuhr did not want Americans to have an “easy conscience” about the things they were going to have to do, for there was always the danger that they would enjoy power too much and would use it to dominate others rather than to address the “world problem.” But he also did not want their “uneasy conscience” to “tempt us into irresponsibility.”189 Americans, it is fair to say, have not enjoyed power too much. These days, they would prefer to wield it less. Yet the struggle for power in the international system is eternal, and so is the struggle over beliefs and ideals. If it is not our system of security and our beliefs shaping the world order, it will be someone else’s. If we do not preserve the liberal order, it will be replaced by another kind of order, or more likely by disorder and chaos of the kind we saw in the twentieth century. That is what the world “as it is” looks like. That is what history and human nature have led to in the past and will lead to in the future if not continually shaped, managed, and resisted

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 2AC – LIO Good – !

US military power solves nuclear war- America international Led Order key

Jones 18 – (Seth Jones- the Harold Brown Chair and is director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "The Future of Warfare is Irregular", 8-26-2018, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/future-warfare-irregular-29672)//mishelle

AMONG THE Trump administration’s most significant national security decisions has been the shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition. The United States is increasingly engaging in global rivalry with “revisionist” states like China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. To do this well, some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States needs to develop capabilities to fight—and win—conventional and possibly even nuclear wars against these states if deterrence fails. As the National Defense Strategy argues, “The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field a lethal force.” While there are good reasons to focus U.S. national security on balancing against global and regional state adversaries, it would be a mistake to assume that most future conflict will be conventional or even nuclear. It won’t. The United States remains the world’s preponderant military power. For Russia, Iran, North Korea and even China, conventional or nuclear war with the United States would be risky and prohibitively costly. What’s more, America’s struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the U.S. military is vulnerable when faced with adversaries that resort to irregular strategies, operations and tactics. These realities suggest that competition between the United States and its main adversaries will likely be irregular—not conventional. Russia will likely continue to focus on a suite of overt and covert actions, from supporting state and nonstate proxies in Syria, Ukraine and potentially the Baltics to information warfare. Iran will attempt to expand its power through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain—not by amassing a more potent army, navy or air force capable of fighting conventional battles against the United States. China is already spreading its influence in the Pacific by utilizing economic coercion, conducting a sophisticated information campaign, and resorting to fishing vessels and other “grey zone” tactics to lay claim to islands. Even North Korea will likely continue to develop its special operations and cyber capabilities.The future of conflict means that the United States needs to prepare to compete with these states not primarily with divisions, aircraft carriers and strategic bombers—but by, with, and through state and nonstate proxies, cyber tools, and overt and covert information campaigns. At the moment, however, the United States is ill-prepared for irregular competition. WHILE THE United States needs to prepare for the possibility of conventional and nuclear war, neither will likely be the primary means of competition for at least two reasons. First, the United States remains the dominant global military power. Its defense budget is still larger than the defense budgets of the next eleven countries in the world combined. More importantly, the United States’ land, air, naval, space and cyber capabilities are formidable. For Russia, Iran, North Korea and even China, conventional or nuclear war with the United States would be risky. The gap between the United States and China, in particular, is narrowing. Beijing is developing more accurate, long-range missiles; integrated air defense; fourth-generation fighter aircraft; enhanced naval power projection; more advanced space and counterspace capabilities; and nuclear forces, including a new generation solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile, the df-41. But U.S. military capabilities surpass those of its competitors. Second, the costs of conventional and nuclear war are likely to be staggering. Over the past several years, the U.S. government and think tanks have conducted numerous wargames and analyses of conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea, Iran in the Middle East and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula. The results are generally bleak. Most conclude that war could lead to tens or hundreds of thousands of dead soldiers and civilians, domestic unrest, billions of dollars in economic damages, a global economic downturn and the potential collapse of long-held alliances. In addition, these conflicts might escalate to nuclear war, raising the number of dead to millions of civilians, create far-reaching environmental destruction and trigger unthinkable global financial costs. A U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the American GDP by between 5 and 10 percent, according to a rand report. As the report concluded: A long and severe war could ravage China’s economy, stall its hard-earned development, and cause widespread hardship and dislocation. Such economic damage could in turn aggravate political turmoil and embolden separatists in China. Both the United States and China would also suffer huge numbers of military and civilian deaths and risk large-scale destruction of their military forces. If war expanded to include their allies, economic and casualty figures would skyrocket even further. Wargames that involve a conflict between NATO and Russia, including scenarios with Russian forces invading one or more Baltic countries, often escalate to include the threat—or use—of tactical nuclear weapons. Even a conventional war in the region could led to substantial destruction. If one or both sides used nuclear weapons, the number of casualties would be virtually unthinkable. These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and even Pyongyang pause. During the Cold War, Moscow and Washington confronted a similar bleak reality, which meant that most competition was irregular. THE COLD War offers a useful historical lens to assess the risks of conventional and nuclear war between major powers. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The United States and other NATO countries deployed forces close to the intra-German and Czech-German border to stop Warsaw Pact forces from conducting an armored blitzkrieg into West Germany. NATO also planned for nuclear war, limited or otherwise. The United States amassed a vast nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD), which assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and Soviet Union nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 2AC – No China Rise

China will not be able to maintain the Chinese led order- China doesn’t have its own statist approach and no country will follow on

Ikenberry 18 – (Ikenberry, G- theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He is known for his work on liberal International Relations theory, such as the books After Victory and Liberal Leviathan, "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive", 2018, Cambridge University, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2011286898)//mishelle

Even if we were to assume that China, as the leading non-Western state, wanted to undermine and replace the existing liberal international order, the constraints on doing so are overwhelming. Presumably, an alternative order would be less open and less rule-based. Historically, such orders have been organized into various illiberal political formations: regional groupings, imperial zones, spheres of influence, and closed autarkic blocs. How might China and other rising states build a comprehensive alternative to the existing order? As a start, China would need to be able to come forward with some alternative set of rules and institutions, presumably reflecting an alternative model of political and economic organization. This might be a so-called “Beijing Consensus,” an international order that accommodated (and even promoted) illiberal and authoritarian polities and statist economic relations. China does have its own statist approach, but it is not clear how this approach might work as a wider model of global order. First, China’s mercantilist strategy seems to work best when the rest of the world is relatively open and liberal in orientation. A closed world in which great powers carve out spheres of influence cuts off China from markets and investment opportunities. If all the countries of the world adopted the Chinese model, this would restrict China’s market space and leadership opportunities. Second, a Chinese-led illiberal international order would require some buy-in by other states, and this is also problematic. China is the largest and leading non-Western developing country, but it is the only rising state that is genuinely illiberal and authoritarian. It is not clear that Brazil, India, South Africa, or even Turkey is eager to embrace and operate within a Beijing consensus. If China were to try to promulgate a Sino-centered order—a hegemonic/imperial order that did not immediately rest on the consent and cooperation of other states—it would face very steep costs. If these potential partner states did not experience substantial material benefits from participating in the Chinese-led order, China would need to spend resources to entice and bully these states into cooperation. This would be a very huge task for a developing country with mid-range per capita income. Over the longer term, the success of a Chinese-centered order would depend on its ability to “outcompete” liberal internationalism. But the less the rival order is open and negotiated, and the less that China—as a rival hegemon —is willing to exercise restraint and provide public goods, the greater the difficulty it will have in establishing a viable and legitimate alternative.

2022 Michigan Evidence
LIO Good › 2AC – No China Rise

Biden is actively containing China – Indo-Pacific Strategy proves

Swaine, 22 – (Michael D. Swaine- , Director of QI’s East Asia program; Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute, "Biden pursues China-containment in new Indo-Pacific strategy", 7-25-2022, Responsible Statecraft, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/07/biden-pursues-china-containment-in-new-indo-pacific-strategy/)//mishelle

Even as the Ukraine crisis continues to escalate, the security situation in Asia remains far from calm. However, the Biden administration’s recently-released Indo-Pacific Strategy is both disappointing and dangerous in the manner in which it doubles down on containing China. By doing so, the United States is enhancing the risk of great power war and missing a major opportunity to engender economic prosperity and tackle the existential threat of climate change. The depiction of the relationship with Beijing presented in the two documents that spell out the strategy is almost entirely negative and zero-sum in nature. When China is mentioned directly, it is described as using all dimensions of its power to engage in “coercion and aggression” across the globe. It is cast as pursuing “a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.” Beijing is supposedly committed to undermining international law and “transforming the rules and norms that have benefitted the Indo-Pacific and the world.” The broad-brush, unqualified message conveyed is very clear: China presents a dire threat to the Indo-Pacific region and the world that must be countered on all fronts by the U.S and its allies and partners. The Indo-Pacific Strategy makes no attempt to provide a vision or program for how an authoritarian China can coexist peacefully and productively with the U.S. over the long term, other than as a subordinate or compliant power. The document merely states that the U.S. objective “is not to change China but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”