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2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Gradualism

Iterative legal development is inevitable---at each step, AI will be matched with tailored controls

Adam Thierer 16, MA in International Business Management and Trade Theory from the University of Maryland, BA in Journalism and Political Philosophy from Indiana University, Former President of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, Revised and Expanded Edition, p. 41-66

Most notable in this regard is the scathing social criticism of the prolific techno-skeptic Evgeny Morozov, who goes so far as to argue that the very term “the Internet” is a meaningless construct.20 He engages in a sort of radical deconstructivism that suggests we are all somehow being fooled into thinking the Internet is as important or meaningful as most of us, quite rationally, believe it is. Morozov also rails against what he regards as the irrational exuberance of digital innovators, who supposedly believe technology can solve all the world’s hard problems. He refers to this as “solutionism” and castigates all those who would engage in a “mindless pursuit of this silicon Eden” or “romantic and revolutionary” thinking about how new technology might improve our lives.21 The critiques set forth by the latest crop of critics have become even more specialized, zeroing in on emerging technologies such as robotics,22 artificial intelligence,23 sensors,24 and the Internet of Things.25 Again, the concerns range from social (e.g., privacy, safety, and security) to personal (e.g., impact on learning and concentration) to economic (e.g., fears about automation and job dislocation). And it is not unusual to also hear a fair share of end-of-world dystopian scenarios thrown around in many of their books and essays, including Terminator-inspired tales of killer robots destroying humanity.26

The critics often fail to devise a coherent political or regulatory agenda for countering what they see as an overreliance on technology. However, when they do come clean about their policy intentions, they are usually calling for quite radical policy interventions, often aimed at imposing sweeping political control over the future course of technological innovation.27

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Good AI---Link

It’s impossible to only regulate ‘bad’ AI without stifling the ‘good’. Tech is too far off and unpredictable AND humans have no current baseline for understanding, let alone assessing or guiding, productive means. Premature regulation drives straight to extinction.

Gönenç Gürkaynak 18, Founding Partner of ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, LL.M. from Harvard Law School, İlay Yılmaz, Partner at ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, and Güneş Haksever, LLM from Istanbul Bilgi University, Attorney at IBM Turkey, “Stifling Artificial Intelligence: Human Perils”, Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 32, Issue 5, 12/12/2018, [note – ‘ANI’ = ‘artificial narrow intelligence’]

3. Protecting human dominance through regulation or setting tailored goals to maintain human existence

Having a timeless and robust definition of AI is of paramount importance when thinking of regulating AI. One cannot regulate a certain subject without establishing a robust definition of what it regulates. The ambiguity of the definition of AI is mainly due to the “I”, “intelligence” of the AI. Concepts like “intelligence”, “consciousness”, “free will” and “soul” accompanying it are yet to have deterministic definitions although the greatest minds of our planet have tackled them for thousands of years (Burkeman, 2015).21

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Superweapons---Offshoring

They’ll move to DEWs, heliobeams, or gravity weapons---those destroy the universe!

Phil Torres 18, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, Founder of the X-Risks Institute, Writer Appearing in Skeptic, Free Inquiry, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Truthout, Erkenntnis, Metaphilosophy, Foresight, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology, “Should Humanity Colonize Space?”, Medium, 3/31/2018, https://medium.com/@philosophytorres/should-humanity-colonize-space-181ca78905fd

Second, there could be so many different species and civilizations in the future that determining who exactly perpetrated an attack could pose an impossibly complicated forensic challenge. This too could undercut the threat of retaliation.

And third, so could the weapons available to technologically advanced future civilizations. For example, the US military is already experimenting with “direct-energy weapons” (DEWs) like laser and particle-beam weapons that can attack a target at or nearly at the speed of light. Since nothing travels faster than light — not even a message saying, “Help us, we were just attacked!” — the use of powerful DEWs by a Kardashev type II civilization, for example, could eliminate the threat of a counterstrike.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Countermeasures---Offshoring

Even the strictest possible regs won’t stop determined scientists and even one is enough---the only check is quickly deployable defensive tech BUT that’s wrecked by regulation

Ray Kurzweil 18, Received 21 Honorary Doctorates, Received the 1999 National Medal of Technology and Innovation, American Inventor and Futurist, Member of the National Academy of Engineering, BS in Computer Science from MIT, “The Deeply Intertwined Promise and Peril of GNR”, Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security, Ed. Yampolskiy, p. 31

Insights from the brain-reverse-engineering effort, overall research in developing AI algorithms, and ongoing exponential gains in computing platforms make strong AI (AI at human levels and beyond) inevitable. Once AI achieves human levels, it will necessarily soar past it because it will combine the strengths of human intelligence with the speed, memory capacity, and knowledge sharing that nonbiological intelligence already exhibits. Unlike biological intelligence, nonbiological intelligence will also benefit from ongoing exponential gains in scale, capacity, and price-performance.

Totalitarian relinquishment. The only conceivable way that the accelerating pace of advancement on all of these fronts could be stopped would be through a worldwide totalitarian system that relinquishes the very idea of progress. Even this specter would be likely to fail in averting the dangers of GNR because the resulting underground activity would tend to favor the more destructive applications. This is because the responsible practitioners that we rely on to quickly develop defensive technologies would not have easy access to the needed tools. Fortunately, such a totalitarian outcome is unlikely because the increasing decentralization of knowledge is inherently a democratizing force.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Offshoring Impact---Turns Bad AI

Offshoring worsens AI danger---it’ll be constrained by U.S. social norms, but not if it moves abroad

John O. McGinnis 17, George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law at Northwestern University and a Contributing Editor at Law & Liberty, Graduate of Harvard College, Balliol College, Oxford, and Harvard Law School, “Accelerate Rather than Regulate Artificial Intelligence”, Law & Liberty, 7/19/2017, [language modified]

But trying to slow down or have the government direct and restrict AI (which is much the same thing) in the United States would only allow other nations to advance AI faster. And since AI is at the heart of modern military operations, the United States would lose its essential military advantage. If the United States remains the best hope for freedom for [hu]mankind, certainly as compared to China, our greatest competitor in AI, that is a disastrous geopolitical policy.

Indeed, even without regulation my great fear is that the United States will fall behind China in developing AI. Given that data is what trains modern AI, China’s sheer size gives it an advantage because it generates more data. And even beyond its potentially larger pool of researchers, its universities are more geared to the sciences than are ours. Of course the United States does have advantages, such as finer top universities and a more attractive, more free society. Thus, what the United States can best do to accelerate AI here is to give after an appropriate security vetting a green card to any Ph.D from a bona fide university or to any student who has been accepted here to a doctorate program in computer science. And as I have suggested, it should also accelerate government grants to encourage the development of a friendly AI–one that is not dangerous to humans.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Offshoring

They’ll move to havens with lax standards to dodge regulation

Dr. Amanda Askell 19, Research Scientist on the Policy Team at OpenAI, PhD in Philosophy from New York University, Dr. Miles Brundage, AI Policy Research Fellow with the Centre for the Governance of AI at Future of Humanity Institute, PhD in Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology from Arizona State University, and Gillian Hadfield, Schwartz Reisman Chair in Technology and Society, Professor of Law, and Professor of Strategic Management at the University of Toronto, PhD in Economics from Stanford University, “The Role of Cooperation in Responsible AI Development”, Computers and Society, https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04534

1.4.4 The difficulty of constructing effective AI regulation

There is currently little in the way of AI-targeted regulation, including government regulation, industry self-regulation, international standards, and clarity on how existing laws will be applied to AI (see note 13). Well-designed regulatory mechanisms can incentivize companies to invest appropriate resources in safety, security, and impact evaluation when market failures or coordination failures have weakened the other incentives to do so. Poorly-designed regulation can be harmful rather than helpful, however. Such regulation can discourage innovation (Heyes, 2009) and even increase risks to the public (Latin, 1988).

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 2NC---Offshoring

Offshoring’s quick, easy, and guaranteed by overwhelming economic incentives---it zeros solvency

Matthew U. Scherer 16, Senior Policy Counsel for Worker Privacy at the Center for Democracy & Technology, J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center, Former Editor-in-Chief of The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, M.S. in Educational Policy from the University of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education, Attorney at Buchanan Angeli Altschul & Sullivan LLP, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies”, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 29 Harv. J. Law & Tec 353, Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 2016, Lexis

The sources of public risk that characterized the twentieth century -- such as nuclear technology, mass-produced consumer goods, industrial-scale pollution, and the production of large quantities of toxic substances -- required substantial infrastructure investments. This simplified the regulatory process. The high cost of building the necessary facilities, purchasing the necessary equipment, and hiring the necessary labor meant that large corporations were the only non-governmental entities capable of generating most sources of public risk. Moreover, the individuals responsible for installing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure typically had to be at the physical site where the infrastructure was located. The physical visibility of the infrastructure -- and of the people needed to operate it -- made it extremely unlikely that public risks could be generated clandestinely. 61 Regulators thus had little difficulty determining the "who" and "where" of potential sources of public risk.

By contrast, AI research and development can be performed relatively discreetly, a feature that AI shares with many other Information Age technologies. In 2009, Professor John McGinnis wrote that "[a]rtificial intelligence research is done by institutions no richer than colleges and perhaps would require even less substantial resources." 62 This actually overstated the resources necessary to participate in AI development, particularly with the rise of open-source programming. Simply put, a person does not need the resources and facilities of a large corporation to write computer code. Anyone with a reasonably modern personal computer (or even a smartphone) and an Internet connection can now contribute to AI-related projects. Individuals thus can participate in AI development from a garage, a dorm room, or the lobby of a train station. This potential for discreetness provides the most jarring difference between AI and earlier sources of public risk.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 1NC---Governance Bad

AI controls are inevitable, but will be gradual and incrementally ratchet up over time---they’ll start with liability and transparency, then move into specific applications, solving downside risk without imposing premature and ineffective regulation

Chris Reed 18, Professor of Electronic Commerce Law at Queen Mary, University of London, LLM from the University of London, “How Should We Regulate Artificial Intelligence?”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, Volume 376, Issue 2128, 9/13/2018, https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsta.2017.0360

Using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to replace human decision-making will inevitably create new risks whose consequences are unforeseeable. This naturally leads to calls for regulation, but I argue that it is too early to attempt a general system of AI regulation. Instead, we should work incrementally within the existing legal and regulatory schemes which allocate responsibility, and therefore liability, to persons. Where AI clearly creates risks which current law and regulation cannot deal with adequately, then new regulation will be needed. But in most cases, the current system can work effectively if the producers of AI technology can provide sufficient transparency in explaining how AI decisions are made. Transparency ex post can often be achieved through retrospective analysis of the technology's operations, and will be sufficient if the main goal is to compensate victims of incorrect decisions. Ex ante transparency is more challenging, and can limit the use of some AI technologies such as neural networks. It should only be demanded by regulation where the AI presents risks to fundamental rights, or where society needs reassuring that the technology can safely be used. Masterly inactivity in regulation is likely to achieve a better long-term solution than a rush to regulate in ignorance.

This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The growing ubiquity of algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations'.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 1NC---Governance Bad

AI regulation overshoots, destroying productive applications necessary to prevent existential catastrophes

Gönenç Gürkaynak 18, Founding Partner of ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, LL.M. from Harvard Law School, İlay Yılmaz, Partner at ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law, and Güneş Haksever, LLM from Istanbul Bilgi University, Attorney at IBM Turkey, “Stifling Artificial Intelligence: Human Perils”, Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 32, Issue 5, 12/12/2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3285264

Although scientists have calculated the significant positive welfare effects of Artificial Intelligence (AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies. Not only would Schumpeter dislike us for spoiling creative destruction, but the AI thinkers of the future would also rightfully see our efforts as the ‘dark age’ of human advancement. This article provides a brief philosophical introduction to artificial intelligence; categorizes artificial intelligence to shed light on what we have and know now and what we might expect from the prospective developments; reflects thoughts of worldwide famous thinkers to broaden our horizons; provides information on the attempts to regulate artificial intelligence from a legal perspective; and discusses how the legal approach needs to be to ensure the balance between artificial intelligence development and human control over them, and to ensure friendly artificial intelligence.

Our technology, our machines, is part of our humanity. We created them to extend ourselves, and that is what is unique about human beings. – Ray Kurzweil1

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › Cooperation Advantage › 1NC---Governance Bad

That causes catastrophic AI since it’ll be controlled by rogues with no precautions AND without defensive countermeasures

Robert A. Freitas 22 Jr., JD from the University of Santa Clara (Santa Clara, CA), School of Law, Research Fellow at the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing, Won the 2009 Feynman Prize in Nanotechnology for Theory, BS in Physics and Psychology from Harvey Mudd College, “Molecular Manufacturing: Too Dangerous to Allow?”, Nanotechnology Perceptions, Volume 2, Number 1, Republished at The Lifeboat Foundation, https://lifeboat.com/ex/molecular.manufacturing

Attempts to block or “relinquish” [3, 12] molecular manufacturing research will make the world a more, not less, dangerous place [13]. This paradoxical conclusion is founded on two premises. First, attempts to block the research will fail. Second, such attempts will preferentially block or slow the development of defensive measures by responsible groups. One of the clear conclusions reached by Freitas [4] was that effective countermeasures against self-replicating systems should be feasible, but will require significant effort to develop and deploy. (Nanotechnology critic Bill Joy, responding to this author, complained in late 2000 that any nanoshield defense to protect against global ecophagy “appears to be so outlandishly dangerous that I can’t imagine we would attempt to deploy it.” [12]) But blocking the development of defensive systems would simply insure that offensive systems, once deployed, would achieve their intended objective in the absence of effective countermeasures. James Hughes [13] concurs: “The only safe and feasible approach to the dangers of emerging technology is to build the social and scientific infrastructure to monitor, regulate and respond to their threats.”

We can reasonably conclude that blocking the development of defensive systems would be an extraordinarily bad idea. Actively encouraging rapid development of defensive systems by responsible groups while simultaneously slowing or hindering development and deployment by less responsible groups (“nations of concern”) would seem to be a more attractive strategy, and is supported by the Foresight Guidelines [10]. As even nanotechnology critic Bill Joy [14] finally admitted in late 2003: “These technologies won’t stop themselves, so we need to do whatever we can to give the good guys a head start.”

2022 Michigan Negative
K › Security › 1NC – Link

Satellites, and specifically environmental monitoring systems, fuel environmental security rhetoric through the use of the visual as a uniquely distinct medium.

Delf Rothe 17, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, June 23, 2017, “Seeing like a satellite: Remote sensing and the ontological politics of environmental security”, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399?casa_token=StJp7_PKhUkAAAAA%3Ac_wg-VURPt3gATjXf35OGB5PQZ85Int99mWbYn1AZptShG7WJmCASah20h2sqqHIqZ9iXCxCjcmF#_i2 \\SYang

In the aftermath of the so-called linguistic turn in the social sciences, an increasing number of scholars in International Relations studied how environmental problems have been discursively framed as security problems. Starting from the assumption that security threats are not simply objectively given, they showed how different authorized actors – including politicians, scientists, and military officials – have successfully reframed environment problems like climate change as security concerns (Buzan et al., 1998; Floyd, 2010). The merit of these works has been to demonstrate that ‘framing matters’ (Dalby and O’Lear, 2016: 5): that the way in which environmental problems are perceived and treated politically depends on how they are framed discursively. They revealed that different discourses of environmental security identify different threats (e.g. climate-induced migration, scarcity-induced conflicts, or natural disasters), multiple referent objects to be protected (e.g. the environment vs. the nation-state vs. vulnerable populations), and heterogeneous policy responses to organize this protection (Detraz and Betsill, 2009; McDonald, 2013; Trombetta, 2008).

Notwithstanding these merits, the literature on the securitization of the environment has been criticized for its narrow focus on securitizing speech acts and linguistic threat constructions and for drawing a stark boundary between the physical reality (which is not directly perceivable) and the socially constructed world (the meaningful representation of reality). By concentrating on ‘threat perceptions rather than an actual danger emanating from objective factors’ (Mayer, 2012: 167), linguistic constructivist approaches might thus unwillingly play into the hands of climate skeptics. Furthermore, the one-dimensional relation between discourses and practices implied by linguistic constructivist works has been criticized (Rothe, 2016). Asking how certain speech acts unidirectionally shape policy responses to environmental threats, they would fail to acknowledge the mutually constitutive relationship between discourses and practices.

2022 Michigan Negative
K › Capitalism › 1NC – Link

Modern satellite infrastructure has functioned as the panoptical architecture of surveillance capitalism and the security state, enabling the surrender of all agency, accelerating the transfer of information, furthering globalization of liberal capitalism, and augmenting geopolitical competition.

Jocelyn Wills 17, assistant professor of history at Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Tug of war: Surveillance capitalism, military contracting, and the rise of the security state, Introduction: Satellites and Surveillance Capitalism \\SYang

On 4 October 1957, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Humiliated by the Soviet feat, the United States quickly countered, launching its Explorer satellite on 31 January 1958. On 29 July 1958, the US Congress then passed the National Aeronautics Space Act, declaring that “activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of humankind.”1 Signed into law by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Act established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct all non-military activity in outer space while also incorporating elements of the US Army Ballistic Missile Agency and Naval Research Laboratory. NASA began its official operations on 1 October 1958, with a mission to create a space program based on non-military and commercially promising satellites for scientific research, communications, terrain mapping, meteorological and environmental monitoring, and other Earth resource applications. Knowing that NASA’s satellites would collect images from countries other than the United States, the agency’s representatives also entered into cooperative agreements with US allies, assuring other countries’ representatives that NASA had peaceful intentions.2 Sputnik-1, Explorer-1, the creation of NASA, and a quick succession of additional satellite launches by the United States and the USSR captured the imagination of technological enthusiasts around the world. As conspicuous political acts performed on the world stage during the Cold War, those launches also inaugurated a global space race, accelerated the arms race, and encouraged other nations to compete for the military and commercial spoils of satellite surveillance.3 In an agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom soon entered the space race, sending its Ariel satellite into orbit on 26 April 1962. Constructed by NASA at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, and launched aboard an American rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, Ariel distinguished the United Kingdom as the third nation to send a satellite into orbit. Damaged by an American high-altitude nuclear test, Ariel never lived up to its promise. Nevertheless, the launch signalled the United Kingdom’s commitment to the development of a space program, including a pledge to devote its efforts to peaceful scientific research and commercial applications.4 On 29 September 1962, Canada followed the United Kingdom into outer space, sending its Alouette satellite into orbit aboard an American rocket launched from the Pacific Missile Range at California’s Vandenberg Air Force Base. Built by the Special Products Applied Research (SPAR) division of de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, and assembled by the Electronics Division of Canada’s Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE), Alouette distinguished Canada as the fourth country to launch and the third one to build a satellite. Although several more years passed before satellite technologies reached beyond military, government, and scientific communities, Canada announced its stake in peaceful Earth observation, including its intention to develop remote sensing technologies (to acquire information via aerial photographs, satellite images, and other observation systems, and to detect and classify objects and phenomena without making physical contact with them). The country’s policymakers also tied Canadians to American developments, both signing continental trade and defence sharing agreements as well as vigorously promoting space exploration, scientific research, and the engineering disciplines as vital for protecting both national and continental interests.5 As other nations joined the space race over the next thirty years, developments in computing, digitization, and satellite reconnaissance, imaging, and communications pushed the boundaries of surveillance capitalism. Following the formal dissolution of the USSR on 26 December 1991, Americans then moved swiftly to commercialize the Internet, deregulate communications and financial industries, and assist in the further liberalization of the global economy and the evolving space industry. By the end of 2012, NASA’s National Space Science Data Center confirmed that more than 6,600 satellites had launched into orbit since Sputnik, with the vast majority of them reaching outer space after 1993.6 By 2012, Space Security Index (SSI) reported that artificial orbiting objects had reached approximately 8,300. The United States owned about half of all active satellites, with fifty other countries and several international consortia and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) owning the others. Although satellites have declined in price, launching them remains expensive. As a result, by the end of 2012, only nine countries and one intergovernmental organization (the European Space Agency) had launching capabilities, with the United States dominant. In 2011 alone, global actors had embarked upon eighty space launches that placed 126 new satellites into orbit, with participating nations contributing billions of dollars to the effort. SSI further revealed that the International Space Station (ISS) had already cost US$100 billion, with most of it paid for by the taxpayers who helped to fund billions of dollars’ worth of other space initiatives. “Advanced and developing economies alike depend on these space-based systems,” SSI observed, with commercial space revenues “steadily” increasing “since the mid-1990s. From satellite manufacturing and launch services to advanced navigation products and the provision of satellite-based communications,” SSI declared, “the global commercial space industry is thriving, with estimated annual revenues in excess of $200 billion.”7 SSI also disclosed that operational satellites accounted for fewer than 5 per cent of the objects orbiting the Earth during 2012, while the remaining 95 per cent represented orbital debris due to anti-missile testing, accidents, and dead batteries.8 One of China’s older weather satellites is among that debris, blown out of the sky in January 2007 when the Chinese conducted their first test of an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) and, according to one commercial space writer, put “other nations on notice that their commercial and military space assets were vulnerable to attack.”9 As part of an article on Sapphire, Canada’s first military satellite, the commercial space writer mentioned neither the fifty-year history of US and USSR anti-missile testing nor the more recent space-based collisions and accidents cited by Space Security Index as central to the creation of orbital debris. Regardless, the article reflected a trend among business-friendly space writers employing national security concerns to justify increased budgets and private-public initiatives for ASAT detection, “collision avoidance maneuvers,” and “debris mitigation efforts.”10 All of these initiatives now promise to become as significant as satellite launches and what their information-gathering capabilities have revealed about the Earth and its people, with “rapidly increasing revenues associated with satellite services” and the protection of commercial space systems linked to the government contractors who manufacture and maintain the satellites, ground receiving stations, advanced navigational products, and security systems that receive data for both civilian and military users.11 This book weaves the history of one of those government contractors – Canada’s MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA) – into a larger narrative about the ways in which the forces of surveillance capitalism integrated Canada into regional, industrial, academic, and military alliances, particularly but not exclusively with the United States. Founded in Vancouver, British Columbia, during 1969, MDA evolved from a four-person software consultancy into a multinational supplier of space-based systems. A significant provider of the world’s ground stations that receive, process, archive, and exploit satellite data, MDA received global recognition in the 1970s for its pioneering work in the commercial applications of remote sensing and synthetic aperture radar (SAR, a high-resolution device that provides surface mapping no matter the weather conditions, cloud cover, or levels of darkness). MDA also became the prime contractor for Canada’s powerful Radarsat-2 Earth observation satellite and the official data distributor for Radarsat images worldwide. Other notable feats include MDA’s global delivery of the navigational systems that support aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly known as drones), as well as its role as primary builder of Sapphire, and central contributor to Canadarm-2 (the remote manipulator component of the robotic, mobile servicing system that moves equipment and supplies around the International Space Station and supports astronauts working in space). MDA has additionally received credit as the incubator for Vancouver’s high-technology corridor, with many of the firm’s former employees launching some of British Columbia’s most successful technology ventures. Of the surviving firms, most work as important surveillance-related government contractors in their own right.12 As Canadians celebrated the fifty-year anniversary of Alouette-1, and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) readied the nation for the launch of Sapphire at the end of 2012, MDA’s strategies culminated in the acquisition of the US Space Systems/Loral (SS/L), a global provider of communications satellites and subsystems. According to industry analysts, the SS/L acquisition furnished MDA with a “critical mass in the commercial satellite manufacturing industry.”13 When the deal closed on 2 November 2012, MDA had also created one of the world’s most significant communications and information systems integrators, an achievement that promised “to boost estimated earnings” and provide “a platform to win upcoming space contracts” and more “defence and intelligence work” from the US government. The US government soon fulfilled that promise, in multiple contracts that gave MDA the market value and visibility its executives and shareholders had long craved as “the top technology stock in Canada over the past year.”14 Although financial news reports finally acknowledged MDA’s significance to Canada’s place within the global surveillance power core, the firm still remains largely invisible in the historical record and to the general public. According to David Ebner of the Globe and Mail, MDA’s obscurity has much to do with the ephemeral nature of systems engineering. Whereas one can touch and see products, MDA’s “technology isn’t widely recognized by most people because” the firm “generally operates unseen, in the background,” Ebner argued. As a result, “when MDA’s Radarsat satellites monitor Canada – the surveillance can spotlight down to a single metre – there isn’t any obvious MDA or Made in Canada stamp that people can see or cheer.”15 Operating “unseen, in the background,” MDA has played a critical role in the long-term development of the information systems and products that proliferate in global positioning devices, flight navigation systems, drones, mobile satellites, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR, also known as “Battle Command”), and a host of other networks that dominate various industries, from communications and financial services to environmental monitoring and resource extraction. Although they did not initially work on surveillance technologies for overtly political reasons, MDA’s scientists and engineers also played a part in turning satellites into a multi-billion-dollar commodity and outer space into a competitive, militarized zone. Along with other technological enthusiasts, they embraced satellites, the commercialization of space, and a notion of the “end of ideology.” In practice, however, their work has contributed to the expansion of the neoliberal project of privatization, fiscal austerity, deregulation, free trade, and reduced social spending, as well as the use of more efficient data mining systems, precision surveillance, first-strike capabilities, and the use of robotics for commerce as well as war. Engineering systems such as the ones they developed have also helped to remove the last barriers to routine aerial surveillance and the monitoring of everyday life. It would be a mistake, however, to see MDA’s founders, executives, scientists, and engineers as principal architects of this change; recent scholarship on the importance of social capital networks as well as ongoing revelations about surveillance and military-industrial adventurism have exploded the myths that a bright line divides business from government and the “great” man or woman from the socially constructed universe in which they operate. That MDA existed at all made it an entrepreneurial enterprise: the first of its kind in Vancouver, the firm helped to establish a hightechnology presence in BC’s Lower Mainland. But MDA’s history also reveals that business enterprises succeed or fail not simply on technological innovation, the personal qualities of those who lead them, the first-mover advantages that early entrants enjoy, or the “visible hand” of executives and managers who develop strategies and structures for continued expansion. Indeed, business survival always reflects the contingencies of larger social structures and cultural tropes, government priorities and changing educational, legal, and political policies, and unanticipated events and exogenous shocks beyond the control of any inventor, business founder, investor, executive, worker, government bureaucrat, or policymaking body. No different, MDA depended on these phenomena as well as the taxpayers who supported government spending on surveillance and those who hoped to profit from enhanced information-gathering techniques. “Without the benevolence” of the Canadian government, one long-time employee suggested, “MDA would never have grown beyond the size of a very, very small company.”16 MDA’s history therefore reminds us that corporations are juridical constructs and entrepreneurs instruments of state power, with both providing ways for governments to spread risk and for gatekeepers to favour certain individuals and businesses over others. By placing surveillance capitalism at the centre of Canada’s political economy, this book argues that MDA matters to our understanding of poilcymaking and business-government relations during the Cold War and into the twenty-first century. Reflecting the assumptions of capitalism’s culture of individual striving, people at MDA hoped to profit from living and working in a society where government officials promised to nurture their technical skills, reward their surveillance-based work, and bail them out when they stumbled. No matter their technical, business, or political skills, some realized their ambitions while others did not. Some had the ability to sell their ideas and motivate others, but lacked the skills to make the firm a profitable one. Others had excellent negotiating, managerial, and marketing skills, but still failed to realize returns from the “best practices” they had learned from management literature and the experiences of others in similar circumstances. Always, they engaged in complex negotiations with the capitalist system and government policies that provided incentive for some activities and discouraged others. MDA survived because members of the firm’s evolving executive team ultimately embraced MDA’s role as a systems integrator and procurement contractor for governments worldwide. Over time, they also understood that power resided not in the technologies they developed but rather in Ottawa and Washington, DC. Once done, they learned how to lobby the government to keep Canada’s space program on the budgetary agenda. In turn, the federal government encouraged MDA’s surveillance-based work because it promised to expand Canada’s influence as a significant, albeit junior member of the international power club. Canadian policymakers also appreciated that “countries which have less competitive industrial strengths in the areas of information technology face an increasing risk of losing trade, influence and economic power both within the community of developed nations and in the broader context of trade with developing countries.”17 MDA therefore provides more than a case study about how one particular firm managed to survive in the competitive space industry; it serves as a window into a corporate world girded by potent forces at the nexus of state, capital, and geopolitical power games. That nexus has included myths about space exploration’s peaceful purposes as well as competitive posturing for the spoils of surveillance-based commerce. Largely well-intentioned and with little interest in war, people at MDA nevertheless got caught up in the excitement of technological development, capitalist ambitions, and state incentives for both. Their eventual move into military work also reflects the unique security but problematic cultural relationship that integrated Canada into a continental defence economy with the United States while members of each country struggled to define their national identities and the imperial role each would play during the Cold War and beyond. As that relationship played out, Canadians consistently feared the overwhelming influence of their more powerful southern neighbours. Whether Conservative or Liberal, policymakers thus attempted to protect Canadian sovereignty and an autonomous international identity while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of their geographical proximity to as well as trading relationship with the United States. They also concerned themselves with foreign investment in the Canadian economy and the brain drain of technical talent that such investments might engender. Hoping to realize a “fair share” of the bounty promised by participation in world trade organizations and international governing bodies, they additionally wrestled with balancing desires to project Canada’s peacekeeping role and the realities of the country’s place within the American military-industrial complex. Satellites played a prominent role in that struggle. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SATELLITES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SURVEILLANCE STUDIES Artificial satellites, those ubiquitous “eyes in the sky,” twinkle as stars in various orbits. Some stand alone; others work in constellations. All contain powerful computers and subsystems, including those for propulsion, power, and communications. They vary in size and purpose, but ultimately they all gather information, with each of them launched to perform particular jobs for military and commercial purposes, often both. Whether for reconnaissance, remote sensing, or communications, satellites track assets, map resources, and communicate information to users on Earth and in outer space. In constant competition, those who own satellites seek to create more powerful features and capture more information for their own uses and profit, for “without a comparable capability,” one Canadian task force on satellite surveillance stressed, “we may never learn what other nations know about us, which must be viewed as a serious non-military threat.”18 Governments and their private contractors use reconnaissance (or spy) satellites to gather intelligence on military and other activities in outer space and on Earth. Launched into polar orbit, the most powerful among them can cover the entire globe every fourteen days. They come in four basic varieties and interact with each other. Optical-imaging satellites use light sensors to detect missile launches and weapons on the ground. Radar satellites use synthetic aperture radar to see through clouds and darkness. Signals-intelligence satellites employ powerful receivers to capture radio and microwave transmissions from every foe and friend. Relay satellites quickly move data from spy satellites to military bases on Earth, thereby speeding up the communications process for engagement. As surveillance studies scholars remind us, reconnaissance satellites are very useful tools for militaries and the police-security state.19 Remote sensing (also known as Earth observation) satellites measure and photograph the surface of the Earth and oceans as well as the atmosphere. Like most non-military satellites, Earth observation satellites typically launch into geostationary orbit over the equator. They use sensor technologies to detect objects and other phenomena via electromagnetic radiation signals from aircraft, satellites, and other systems, taking pictures of and classifying those objects without having to make physical contact with them. With SAR onboard, remote sensing satellites can map the entire surface of the Earth in the same ways that sonar technologies map the oceans, day or night, in all weather. Google Earth provides just one example of their power. Because they are very expensive to launch, Earth observation satellites are funded and used mainly by governments, to detect mineral and oil deposits, changes in agricultural activities and forests, weather damage, military bases, submarine wakes in the ocean, and other assets. MDA’s Radarsat-2, launched into the sun-synchronous polar orbit during 2007, can cover the Arctic daily, Canada every seventy-two hours, and the entire Earth every twenty-four days. The Canadian government has given MDA the right to sell Radarsat images to others around the world, as an export for economic development. MDA can downlink images to multiple ground stations in real time, or store them in the satellite’s computer until within range of a ground station. Once other countries, companies, and individuals have those images, they too can see resources, thereafter exploiting them for various applications, including city and regional planning, resource extraction, market segmentation, intelligence work, warfare, and a host of other reputable and nefarious activities.20 Most communications satellites also launch into geostationary orbit so they can circle the Earth within the same time that the Earth rotates just once. With their powerful antennas, these satellites send radio, television, and telephone transmissions, so that the Earth-bound can receive live broadcasts, use cellular telephones, and communicate by e-mail, among other activities. All of these devices record activities, making it easier for their owners to share information with each other. 21 There are many other satellites, including those used for astronomy, meteorology, navigation, search and rescue, space exploration, and other scientific applications. Working interactively with the space stations that make living in outer space possible, as well as with aircraft (including drones), ground-based computers, multimedia platforms, geographical positioning systems (GPS), and other technologies, satellites have created the panoptical architecture for the global surveillance state we experience and serve, all the while increasing the power of the elite who own and control the technologies and firms that produce them. As Michel Foucault observed, surveillance networks make us self-policing subjects. We daily use technologies we can no longer seem to do without, whether on the job, through the cash register, or at the ballot box. We “check in” with authority figures, even perform for them. We congregate with online communities because we have few public spaces left to meet. We trade civil liberties for protection because we receive daily reminders that we live in a dangerous world. We consign our control to the awesome power of the networks and inanimate objects created to extend shareholder value and the power of the elite. Ultimately, we even connect our identities to machines, watching, touching, and speaking into them, inviting them to become one with us.22 Investigative journalist Christian Parenti has argued that we do all of these things because surveillance techniques developed in earlier eras have gone global, become ubiquitous, “mundane, decentralized, and even convenient.”23 The conveniences of surveillance technologies come at a price, just as earlier conveniences came at a price to those enthralled by railroads and telegraphs, automobiles and radios, and airplanes and televisions. Technological revolutions have created great wealth, but they have not necessarily effected a greater distribution of that wealth or a more peaceful and inclusive world. “If the twentieth century has shown us anything,” Joel Mokyr concluded in his intellectual history of technology and the “useful” knowledge economy, “it is that the capacity of humans for intolerance, stupidity, and selfishness has not declined as their technological power has increased.” He also conceded, “The institutional setup of the world is such that holdouts that reject modern technology or cannot adopt it will eventually have to change their minds.” Canadian policymakers therefore embraced space exploration and surveillance technologies as a way to maintain Canada’s sovereignty and relevance, marketing both on their abilities to create a “new” world order of economic and social opportunities without end.24 Sociologist Vincent Mosco captured the force of such strategies a decade ago while tracing the dot-com bust of the late 1990s to the seductive power of the Internet. With Internet enthusiasts demonstrating “a remarkable, almost willful, historical amnesia,” Mosco observed that each generation “has renewed the belief that, whatever was said about earlier technologies, the latest one will fulfill a radical and revolutionary promise.” As a result, when the dot-com bubble burst, many Internet enthusiasts were shocked to learn that the power structures they thought they had overthrown remained remarkably resilient.25 MDA’s history resonates with these findings. Thanks to the mythological power of space exploration, MDA’s engineers and scientists thought they were different from previous generations, that their technical expertise could insulate them from past imbroglios. After all, they reasoned, they were well-educated, scientifically adept, computer-literate professionals, the vanguard of a new economy. 26 People from all walks of life rationalize their decisions and choose selective memories to make sense of their current circumstances and imagine themselves as active agents of the systems they develop and the structures they support. But as social anthropologist Hylton White recently observed, in an environment structured for competition and unending expansion, capitalism inevitably turns each new wave of technological enthusiasm, every gadget and new profession from an exotic first to a ubiquitous necessity. 27 This is just one of the consequences of the willful innocence people at MDA and elsewhere possess. In her study of engineering and the legitimacy of state power, sociologist Chandra Mukerji has argued that “the intelligence of engineering is not just pragmatic, but also deeply invested in social, legal, and moral conceptions of power” that privilege efficiencies over ecological awareness and quality-of-life issues as well as “produce an engineered world that shapes our lives – in ways we systematically ignore.”28 Surveillance studies scholars concur, including David Lyon, whose work continues to stress that surveillance is a “morally and politically loaded activity,” with what “we disclose to whom, and under what conditions” a highly significant act of state power. 29 Sociologists and surveillance studies scholars have contributed a great deal to our understanding about the synergies between capitalism, state power, military aims, academic research, and technological change, particularly in the Internet era. With few exceptions, however, most tend to focus on the United States, the United Kingdom, and other “great powers” while remaining remarkably silent on the history of the secondary powers that have helped to serve the interests of capital and the hegemonic ambitions of the United States. They also have the propensity to explore the state without examining the businesses involved in the space-faring enterprise. This omission flows, in part, from the classified nature of defence-related work; however, disparate sources can help to connect the dots between governments and their surveillance contractors. Tug of War draws upon interviews I conducted with MDA’s founders, employees past and present, and government patrons during 1992–93, and prior to MDA’s larger leap into the secret world of international defence/military contracting. Once transcribed, the tapes of those interviews produced an oral history of more than 1,000 pages. As I reread and reflected on that oral history after the heady dot-com boom had busted, terrorists had flown airplanes with sophisticated flight information systems into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and the US government had stepped up its war footing, ultimately invading Iraq in 2003 on manipulated intelligence derived from military briefings and private contractors, I knew I had a larger story to tell. I therefore turned to archival material at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), some of it received through several requests under the Freedom of Information and Protection Act, as well as publicly available business records, government documents, and other sources that could place MDA’s trajectory within the larger context of surveillance capitalism’s expansion, the Cold War’s emphasis on permanent military preparedness and continental integration, and the rise of the North American security state. Interviewees who spoke about MDA’s first decade focused on the excitement of their technological innovations. Those who discussed the 1980s and early 1990s emphasized the business strategies and structures MDA had instituted to survive the winds of technological change and global competition, including the pull of military contracting. And documents collected after MDA went public in 1993 disclosed the ways in which the firm capitalized on neoliberalism, systems integration, and the expansion of the world’s surveillance architecture. Together, these sources have given me the luxury of hindsight, an increasing appreciation about the concatenation of events that pulled MDA into surveillance capitalism and a larger tug of war, and a better understanding about the ways in which time, memory, and selective amnesia shape the histories we tell ourselves and others over time.30 The MDA case therefore demonstrates that historians have much to contribute to the field of surveillance studies, particularly when they search for sources that allow them to trace how those asserting no particular interest in gaining military power nevertheless get drawn into the promises of space exploration, larger state objectives, and the US military-industrial complex.31

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Spaceforce DA? › 1NC – Impact

Space wars!

UCS 19, The Union of Concerned Scientists, national nonprofit organization founded more than 50 years ago by scientists and students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 12/10/2019, "Creating a Space Force Would Trigger a Space Arms Race and Threaten US Satellite Security, Science Group Says," https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/space-force-would-trigger-arms-race, sg

WASHINGTON (December 10, 2019)—A congressional conference committee has agreed to include the creation of a space force in a must-pass defense bill in exchange for paid parental leave benefits for federal workers. What is missing from the debate over the horse trade, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), is the fact that a space force is a very bad idea

Below is a statement by Laura Grego, a physicist and senior scientist in the Global Security Program at UCS.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Spaceforce DA? › 1NC – Impact

Space Force involvement causes militarized arms races AND undermines multilateral governance.

Robert Farley 20, Senior Lecturer in Security and Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, 12/1/2020, "Space Force: Ahead of Its Time, or Dreadfully Premature?," https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/space-force-ahead-its-time-or-dreadfully-premature,

The primary legal instrument for managing the militarization of outer space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.64 The treaty regulates space exploration and colonization and establishes rules for the peaceful use of space and the heavenly bodies therein, including the moon. The treaty bans the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, although it does not prohibit military operations altogether.65 While the prospects for multilateral governance of space seem grim, especially in context of current American policymaking, the inception of the Space Force necessarily raises questions about the future of multilateral management of space. Will the institutionalization of the Space Force make it easier or more difficult to develop mechanisms for multilateral space governance?

Military services tend to warily view arms control arrangements that affect their auto­nomy in their specialized domains. The events described in the 1964 film (and 1962 novel) Seven Days in May, in which an Air Force general seeks to topple an arms control–minded American president in a coup, are overstated, but services have historically opposed arms control limitations that affect their core priorities. The Royal Air Force’s preference for offensive bombing doctrines during the interwar period, and its belief that the realities of war would rapidly blow past any legal limitations, undoubtedly influenced the United Kingdom’s approach to international law in the 1920s and 1930s.66 Similarly, the U.S. Navy (and its counterparts in Britain, Japan, and elsewhere) resented the Washington Naval Treaty process because it limited the construction of their most prized vessels.67

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Spaceforce DA? › 1NC – Link – Domain Awareness

Militarization causes space war.

Bryan Bender 22, senior national correspondent for POLITICO and adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism, 3/12/2022, "Moon battle: New Space Force plans raise fears over militarizing the lunar surface," https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/12/space-force-moon-pentagon-00016818, sg

The Pentagon maintains these new pursuits, all launched since the creation of the Space Force three years ago, are primarily designed to help secure a growing private space economy and safeguard civilian astronauts. In all, the newest branch believes nation-states and commercial companies will fly nearly 100 missions — both crewed and uncrewed — to the moon between now and 2030.

But space policy and security experts also fear that the armed forces could outstrip NASA in space exploration and thrust what has largely been a peaceful competition into a military contest.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Spaceforce DA? › 1NC – Link tradeoff

Space force steals NASA’s budget and prioritizes military goals.

Robert Farley 20, Senior Lecturer in Security and Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, 12/1/2020, "Space Force: Ahead of Its Time, or Dreadfully Premature?," https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/space-force-ahead-its-time-or-dreadfully-premature, sg

The ties between NASA and the military agencies managing space are extensive and cross‐​cutting, including personnel, technology, and various communications platforms. The establishment of the Space Force is not expected to have any direct impact on NASA, although second‐​order effects associated with the militarization of space may have some effect on how the agency handles its responsibilities.59 The Space Force could also draw funding and expertise from NASA if it takes responsibility for any dual‐​hat civilian‐​military missions. Some space infrastructure could also contribute to both the Space Force and NASA missions.60 Undoubtedly, a tighter relationship between NASA and the Space Force carries some dangers, as existing civilian missions could become targets for enemy action if they are too closely associated with the Space Force. Pressure from the Space Force could also compromise elements of NASA’s scientific mission by prioritizing military goals.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Politics DA › 2NC – Cyber Link

Committee will derail any cybersecurity bill, unless Biden uses PC to get him on board

Tim Starks & Eric Geller 19, writers for Politico, 2/11/2019, “Where cybersecurity legislation 'goes to die' in Congress”, Politico, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/11/cybersecurity-ron-johnson-1160081

Wisconsin Republican Sen. Ron Johnson leads the committee with broad oversight over the nation’s most important cybersecurity issues, including protecting consumers and U.S. elections from hackers.

But he’s also a major reason little legislation on these topics ever passes, according to lobbyists, cybersecurity policy experts, lawmakers and congressional aides from both parties who spoke with POLITICO.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Politics DA › 1NC – Cybersecurity link

Cyber security reform is seen as authoritarian surveillance legislation.

Peter Hess 16, writer for Scienceline, "Controversial new cybersecurity law may compromise privacy"; Scienceline; Published: 1-24-2016; Accessed: 2-5-2022; https://scienceline.org/2016/01/controversial-new-cybersecurity-law-may-compromise-privacy/

The recent, highly publicized cyberattacks on Sony and the U.S. government’s Office of Personnel Management exposed sensitive data about millions of people. In Congress, lawmakers responded by approving the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, or CISA. But some critics say the bill, which President Obama signed into law on Dec. 18, not only would have done nothing to prevent those attacks, but also erodes personal privacy.

CISA encourages companies to share digital signatures — unique codes that track the origins of electronic communications, including the sender’s IP address — associated with possible security threats, both with each other and with the U.S. government. Supporters say this information sharing makes it easier for companies and the government to quickly get out ahead of security threats by alerting each other to the origin and nature of potential breaches. Opposition to the new law has come from technology companies, along with advocacy groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, that are worried about protecting privacy.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – AT: Attribution

Predictive technology solves attribution – AI means it’ll only get more accurate.

Justin Lynch 19; Associate Editor at Fifth Domain, contributor to the New Yorker, Foreign Policy, the Atlantic; 2/8/19; "The struggle behind predicting a cyberattack," https://www.fifthdomain.com/industry/2019/02/08/the-struggle-behind-predicting-a-cyberattack/

The idea that public data can point to future cyberattacks has been embraced by several government agencies.

The intelligence community’s research arm, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, is researching how data can help forecast a cyberattack by using sensors that predict when a target is vulnerable to hackers. BAE Systems, Charles River Analytics, Leidos, and the University of Southern California are the prime contractors on the project.

2022 Michigan Negative
DA › Ambiguity DA › 2NC – AT: New Domain/Inexperienced

Article 5 is appropriately flexible – builds in discretion and empirically works for traditional and cyber threats.

Sydney Freedberg 14; Deputy Editor at Breaking Defense, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University; 11/7/14; "NATO Hews to Strategic Ambiguity on Cyber Deterrence," https://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/natos-hews-to-strategic-ambiguity-on-cyber-deterrence/]

NATO is now taking cyber threats as seriously as the Russian tanks and nuclear weapons it was created to deter. But the alliance has a long way to go just to shore up its own network defenses, and it explicitly eschews any role on the offense. NATO has not even written a formal policy on how it would deter a cyber attack. The net result is a certain degree of strategic ambiguity — but then NATO has survived and even thrived on ambiguity for decades.

The crucial development: September’s NATO summit declaration that the alliance’s hallowed Article 5 — which says an attack on one member is an attack against all — applies equally to virtual attacks as to physical ones.