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2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

China’s winning

Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

American primacists have advanced a number of clever but unconvincing arguments in an attempt to downplay the significance of the ongoing economic power shift from America to China. For example, some primacists assert that per capita GDP is a better yardstick of national power than aggregate GDP; that newly developed metrics of national power have diminished the importance of GDP as a measure of a state’s economic power; that China is far behind the United States in advanced technology; and that China is incapable of doing innovation.35 This last claim is ubiquitous among primacists.36 It is, however, undermined by recent developments. For example, in September 2016 China began operating the world’s largest radio telescope, which is intended to project China’s ambitions deep into the universe, and bring back the kind of dramatic discoveries that win honours such as Nobel Prizes.37 In August 2016 China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which could lead ‘to new, completely different methods for transmitting information’.38 In another example of how China is catching up with the United States in innovation and technology, in June 2016 a Chinese computer (using made-in-China microprocessors) topped the ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.39 In July 2017 China’s State Council announced an ambitious plan to sprint to the front of the pack in artificial intelligence (AI), including both military and civilian applications.40 Indeed, The Economist recently observed that already ‘China could be a close second to America—and perhaps even ahead of it—in some areas of AI’.41 And China is moving to the forefront in green technologies (solar panels and wind-generated power) and in electric cars.42

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

China is winning---outpacing the US in all major areas.

Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt 12-07-21 [Mr. Allison, a professor of government at Harvard, is author of “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” (2017). Mr. Schmidt was CEO of Google, 2001-11 and executive chairman of Google and its successor, Alphabet Inc., 2011-17 and is a co-author of “The Age of AI: And Our Human Future,” (2021); Wall Street Journal; “China will soon lead the US in tech”; https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/china-will-soon-lead-the-us-in-tech-global-leader-semiconductors-5g-wireless-green-energy-11638915759//ZW]

Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns announced in October that the agency is establishing two new major “mission centers,” one focusing on China and the other on frontier technologies. This action reflects his judgment that China is the “most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century” and that the “main arena for competition and rivalry” between China and the U.S. will be advanced technologies. The question Americans should be asking is: Could China win the technology race? A new report on the “Great Technological Rivalry” from Harvard’s Belfer Center answers: Yes. The report isn’t alarmist but nonetheless concludes that China has made such extraordinary leaps that it is now a full-spectrum peer competitor. In each of the foundational technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 5G wireless, quantum information science, biotechnology and green energy—China could soon be the global leader. In some areas, it is already No. 1. [graphic ommited] Last year China produced 50% of the world’s computers and mobile phones; the U.S. produced only 6%. China produces 70 solar panels for each one produced in the U.S., sells four times the number of electric vehicles, and has nine times as many 5G base stations, with network speeds five times as fast as American equivalents. In the advanced technology likely to have the greatest effect on economics and security in the coming decade—artificial intelligence—China is ahead of the U.S. in crucial areas. A spring 2021 report from the National Security Commission on AI warned that China is poised to overtake the U.S. as the global leader in AI by 2030. U.S.-born students are earning roughly as many doctorates each year in AI-related fields as in 1990, while China is on track to graduate twice as many science, technology engineering and mathematics Ph.D.s as the U.S. by 2025. The Harvard report adds that China now clearly tops the U.S. in practical AI applications, including facial recognition, voice recognition and fintech. The U.S. still has a dominant position in the semiconductor industry, which it has held for almost half a century. But China may soon catch up in two important arenas: semiconductor fabrication and chip design. China’s production of semiconductors has surpassed America’s, with its share of global production rising to 15% from less than 1% in 1990, while the U.S. share has fallen from 37% to 12%. In 5G, the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Board reports that China is on track to replicate the economic and military advantages America gained from being the global leader in 4G. China has installed 950,000 base stations to America’s 100,000. By the end of last year, 150 million Chinese were using 5G mobile phones with average speeds of 300 megabits a second, while only six million Americans had access to 5G with speeds of 60 megabits a second. America’s 5G service providers have put more focus on advertising their capabilities than on building infrastructure. The Chinese Communist Party has made no secret of its ambitions: China intends to become the global leader in the technologies that will shape the decades ahead. The party’s 2013 economic reform plan highlighted technological innovation as the way to avoid the trap of getting stuck as a middle-income country. The celebrated “Made in China 2025” program aims to dominate domestic production of 10 emerging technologies, including 5G, AI and electric vehicles. China also plans to extend its lead in robotics to sustain its position as the manufacturing workshop of the world. In May, Xi Jinping clearly stated his judgment that “technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.” It is striking how successful China has been in meeting its ambitious technology targets. In sum, although the U.S. remains the global leader in many important races, including aeronautics, medicine and nanotechnology, China has emerged as a serious competitor. Fortunately, Americans are beginning to wake up to this reality. In June the Senate passed the Innovation and Competition Act with bipartisan support, authorizing $250 billion of investment in science and technology over the next five years. Unfortunately, that legislation has stalled in the House and faces an uncertain future as part of the annual defense bill. More recent congressional spending proposals, such as the $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill and the $1.7 trillion social-spending package, have included investments in research and development in areas like green technologies and energy storage. While these investments are greatly needed, it will take more attention and investment in strategic technologies to compete with China. Unless the U.S. can organize a national response analogous to the mobilization that created the technologies that won World War II, China could soon dominate the technologies of the future and the opportunities they will create.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

China wins the tech race now.

Jie Lu 10-05-2021 [Head of Investments China; Robeco; “China: navigating the push towards technology leadership”; https://www.robeco.com/us/insights/2021/10/china-navigating-the-push-towards-technology-leadership.html//ZW]

Research and development (R&D) statistics illustrate this ambition. Supported by higher economic growth, China is actually expected to take global R&D leadership this year, and outspend the US for the very first time.1 China now leads the pack in many areas, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G telecommunication networks, ultra-high voltage electricity networks or high-speed rail. While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight. Over the past few years, Chinese officials have increased their emphasis on the need to become less dependent on foreign technology. Some have even theorized a so-called ‘technology decoupling’, advocating self-sufficiency in a number of critical industries. However, one key consideration to bear in mind is that China’s technology push amid rising tensions with the US does not necessarily herald a full economic decoupling, nor an era of deglobalization, as some have argued.2 For now, US restrictions on exports to China issued in 2020 remain essentially focused on a few select technologies, where non-US alternatives are difficult to find. Meanwhile, China's main policy goal remains to improve the country’s manufacturing capability to produce higher value-added goods and services, and keep the economic growth engine roaring. Policy makers acknowledge that this will be impossible without importing advanced technologies from the US, Europe, Japan, or South Korea. Figure 1: MIC 2025’s ten strategic industries [graphic omitted] Source: China State Council, MERICS, Robeco, September 2021. China’s technology ambitions were formally articulated in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC 2025) initiative, a ten-year comprehensive blueprint aiming to modernize further the country’s industrial base. MIC 2025 identifies ten strategic sectors, including aerospace equipment, medical devices, or high-tech ships, in which China intends to excel and secure a leading position. Focus on a few selected technologies Even under the MIC 2025 umbrella, the designated ten core industries are clearly not all being pursued with the same intensity. In recent years, China has been prioritizing efforts in a small number of emerging technologies, including AI, semiconductors, robotics, and new energy vehicles (NEVs), 3 with colossal efforts being deployed from a human and a financial perspective. Figure 2: Top 20 countries in AI paper output 1997-2017 [graphic omitted] Source: China Institute for Science and Technology Policy, July 2018, “China AI Development Report 2018”, Tsinghua University. AI, for instance, is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level.4 The Chinese AI-related ecosystem benefits from various supporting factors, including the country’s gigantic market size which provided a unique opportunity to assemble large datasets, and a long-standing friendly policy environment. AI is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level China seems therefore poised to become a leader in AI-empowered businesses, like speech and image recognition applications. At global level, the main AI services providers remain large US technology giants, but Chinese firms are catching up fast. China already employs the world’s largest cohort, by far, of AI professionals, with over 12,000 AI jobs in 2019, versus roughly 7,500 for the US.5 Another area where strong progress has been made NEVs. China has the world’s largest fleet of NEVs in circulation, far ahead of Europe and the US, as well as the world’s largest battery-charging network. And although the country’s NEV car registrations were overtaken by European ones last year, it remains one of the most dynamic markets, largely dominated by local manufacturers. Figure 3: Market share of top five battery makers [graphic omitted] Source: SNE Research, March 2021. China has also managed to secure a leading position in various areas of the NEV supply chain. This is especially the case for electric battery production, where the largest Chinese manufacturers have emerged as global leaders along with their South Korean and Japanese competitors. Altogether, China accounts for over 70% of global battery cell production capacity. 6 Three investment themes China’s technology push is offering opportunities in many industries, but finding these is not always straightforward. Not all initiatives have lived up to expectations, so far, and political will does not warrant success. Yet that does not mean opportunities in areas where results have been mixed are entirely absent, nor that policy success will necessarily lead to attractive returns for investors. From this perspective, we have identified three major investment themes worth considering: the relentless rise of NEVs, the advent of ‘industry 4.0’ in China, and an increased focus on the localization of supply chains. Given the bright prospects these three trends offer, we believe this is where some of the most interesting opportunities are to be found.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- China Wins the Tech Race

China is winning the tech race--- patents, exports, and GDP prove.

Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald 2018 [Paul K. MacDonald is an American political scientist and a Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, Twilight of the Titans, Conclusion, “Retrenchment as Reloading,” https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2092847//ZW]

Scholars have offered conflicting assessments about the trajectory of American power. Some contend that China’s rise is inexorable and that the United States is already in decline. “There is abundant evidence that American global hegemony is steadily eroding,” Martin Jacques observes, adding, “The rise of China will change the world in the most profound ways.” 18 Arvind Subramanian concludes, “The economic dominance of China relative to the United States” is “imminent” and will be “broad-based.” 19 Others argue that China’s ascendance is fragile and that America’s exceptional features will insulate it from decline. “China is rising, but it is not catching up,” Michael Beckley maintains, in large part because “trends favor continued U.S. dominance.” 20 Joseph Nye similarly argues, “China is nowhere near close to the United States,” warning that “the greatest danger we have is overestimating China.” 21 Politicians echo this skepticism. In a 2014 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama declared, “America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise—who suggest that America is in decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away—are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics.” 22 There are many complex issues bound up in this debate. Scholars differ on what metrics to use, what timeframes to examine, and what comparisons to make. We follow the method that yielded the most commonsense cases: lasting ordinal transitions involving relative shares of great power gross domestic product (GDP). Using this approach, the United States is on pace to enter acute relative decline sometime in the next decade. 23 To be perfectly clear, this prediction depends on a number of factors that are hard to predict. Extrapolating out from present trends is notoriously unreliable, and much depends on the baseline year one chooses to begin with. There will be shocks and surprises, and it is impossible to know their frequency, magnitude, or direction. Yet using our terminology, the United States is likely to face a decline that is small or medium in magnitude. This is good news for the United States and for China, since it affords both powers the time and space to manage the impending transition. It deserves emphasis that China is no world-beater, the United States is no weakling, and American decline is likely modest. As always, much depends on the measures used. Power is an intricate concept and sensitive to context. Every measure of power has its drawbacks, and we already detailed many of the fl aws of using GDP in chapter 3. We agree that GDP trends mask a great deal of nuance, cross-national GDP fi gures are imprecise, and China’s fi gures are more suspect than most. Yet GDP is determinate and correlates with a number of compelling metrics, many of which suggest that China is indisputably gaining ground on the United States. Over the past decade, the United States has experienced a decline in global share of high technology exports, trademark applications, market capitalizations of its publicly traded companies, and renewable energy production. Meanwhile, China has gained relative to the United States in terms of patent applications, high technology exports, and information and communication technology service exports. 24 Even when it comes to GDP per capita, which many claim provides “a much more robust indicator of national power,” China is gaining ground. 25 China’s GDP per capita has tripled over the past decade, and the U.S. advantage has declined as a result. Naturally, these are not the only indicators one could point to, and economic measures may lose traction on the political consequences of China’s rise. Yet experts come to similar conclusions: Thomas Christensen finds China’s rise very real, though the United States retains a commanding lead on many measures, and Jonathan Kirshner sees American economic advantages fading. 26 Even U.S. policymakers, who reject the term decline, nevertheless acknowledge that the distribution of international power is shifting. In his West Point speech, President Obama observed, “The world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents new opportunities, but also new dangers.” 27 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conceded, “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. . . . Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests.” 28 Whether one prefers the term “rising power” or “emerging power,” the implication is the same: the geopolitical landscape is shifting, and U.S. policymakers must plan accordingly.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- CCP Collapse Impact

Collapse risks Chinese lashout and global nuclear war

David, 8 – professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins (Stephen, Catastrophic Consequences : Civil Wars and American Interests, p. 116-121)

Those who see China as a threat to the United States, and to the West more generally, point to its explosive growth as a source of concern. A stronger China, they argue, will be a more assertive China, which spells bad news for the United States, given the range of issues over which the two countries disagree. A wealthy, militarily strong China may no longer choose to accept the de facto independence of Taiwan, or it may compete aggressively to gain dominance over Asia, or replace American influence among the oil-rich states of the Middle East. Arguments over trade, human rights, and the environment may take a different tone when America is dealing with an adversary of equal or even greater strength. Whether because the United States and China each lead different civilizations, or simply because the rise of a competing hegemon typically creates trouble for the existing world leader, the prospect of a continued rise in China’s power unsettles many in America. 2 These fears may indeed be justified, but continued economic and military growth is not the only possible future for China. It is at least as likely that China in the coming years will fall victim to violent instability, bringing to a screeching halt its seemingly inexorable rise. Instability may come from those angry at not sharing the fruits of China's newfound prosperity, growing discrepancies of wealth in a state founded on principles of equality, mounting corruption by insensitive officials, incompetent governmental policies, and the absence of institutions to channel discontent. This anger matters because it is directed at a government whose "mandate of heaven" is increasingly shaky, since no one—including the leadership elite itself—believes in the Marxist-Leninist ideology that is trotted out to justify its rule. All of this takes place in an environment where the regime's ability to monitor and suppress antigovernment activity has never been lower. If economic growth can somehow continue its upward spiral producing enough benefits to coopt key groups, China may be able to avoid nationwide instability in the coming years. However, if as seems likely, the Chinese economy stalls and the escalating expectations of the Chinese people are no longer met, widespread civil conflict becomes all but certain. While some American policymakers would greet the prospect of a China mired in internal conflict with relief, a crippled China presents its own threats to American interests, threats that are in many ways more dire than those posed by a rising China. American and Chinese economies have become closely inter- twined with huge amounts of American investment in China and even larger Chinese purchases of American bonds. If domestic unrest undermines this relationship, any hope of China becoming prosperous would be dashed, while the American economy would be throw n into recession —or worse. China is a great power with a population of 1.3 billion people, bordering on 14 countries. Its collapse would threaten the stability of close American allies such as South Korea and Japan, create opportunities for mischief by Russia and North Korea, and produce a humanitarian catastrophe unprecedented in world history. Should China choose to stave off internal unrest through aggressive actions against Taiwan, prospects for a Sino-American military confrontation become all too real. Precisely because China needs good relations with its neighbors and the United States to continue on its path of economic growth, there is reason to hope that the Chinese leadership would not deliberately opt for bellicose policies. If China is wracked with instability, however, Chinese leaders may not be able to control what happens within and outside their borders, endangering key American concerns. Understanding the consequences of a failing China for the United States re- quires first grasping why a stable China is so important to American concerns. As will be seen, China plays a central role in American economic and strategic interests. Why China, despite its seeming prosperity and progress, may fall victim to civil unrest is then examined. Unlike Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico, China forces us to confront what the collapse of a great power would be like. Far from a welcome occurrence, the implications of such an event are potentially catastrophic for America, China's Asian neighbors, and the world community. American Interests in China The United States cares about what happens in China, because America's prosperity and well-being rests on China remaining stable. China is the second largest trading partner of the United States (after Canada ), a relationship whose disruption would be disastrous for both countries. The low cost of Chinese exports has kept inflation down in the United States, while delighting consumers with S40 DVD players and S20 digital cameras. These benefits, while highly visible, pale in comparison to the critical role played by Chinese purchases of American securities. China holds over one trillion dollars in foreign reserves, one of the largest holders of such reserves in the world. Because China exports so much and imports so little, it accumulates huge amounts of dollars. This would normally cause the Chinese currency (yuan) to gain in value, thus reducing its exports and its mammoth reserves. To preserve its critical export sector, however, China has not allowed the yuan to float freely and instead has kept its value relatively constant by buying dollars to the tune of S20 billion per month, ensuring that its reserves will continue to grow. Approximately 707c of these reserves are in U.S. dollars, with the great majority in U.S. treasury bonds, widely seen as the most secure investment one can make, since they are backed in full by the American government. A major reason why interest rates in the United States have been kept low is because China buys so many of these bonds. These low interest rates are central to the health of the American economy, fostering economic expansion and high home prices. The housing market is especially critical, as it has been the major engine of growth for the American economy over the past several years, as homeowners (many of whom have saved little) borrow against the ever rising values of their houses, stimulating the economy with their robust consumer spending. If China stops buying American treasury bonds or dramatically slows down their purchase, American interest rates would need to increase in order to attract other buyers, making business expansion more costly , houses much more expensive, and dramatically cutting consumer spending.' China displayed its economic clout the day after the Democrats won control over both houses of Congress in November 2006, when the head of China's central bank declared that the Bank would diversify more of its reserves into nondollar currencies. This prompted an immediate worldwide sell-off of American dollars, which dramatically cut the dollar's value. If such a seemingly benign announcement could produce this effect, one shudders to think of the impact of a major Chinese sell-off of American bonds on the United States.4 Some have taken solace in the view that Chinese self-interest would prevent Beijing from acting in ways that would harm the American economy. If, for example, China halted its purchase of American securities, China too would suffer as the value of the bonds in its possession would also decrease. If China is convulsed with domestic disorder, however, it would be unable to purchase the American bonds, plunging the U.S. economy into crisis. An unstable China also presents major strategic concerns for the United States. Since the death of Mao in 1976, China has largely cooperated with the United States on key foreign policy goals. China has been a prime player in talks with North Korea, striving to contain the damage done by Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. In part because of China’s concerns about its own Islamic minority, Beijing has worked with Washington after 9/11 to confront terrorism. China has become a major international player in the United Nations, contributing more troops to peacekeeping missions around the world than any other Security Council member. 5 With Washington’s endorsement, China joined the World Trade Organization, where it is expected to play a major role in lowering tariffs and establishing rules for free trade that the world (and it) will follow. To be sure, the United States and China do not agree on everything. The United States is concerned about China's lack of democracy, overlooking of human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere, border disputes with its neighbors, close ties with Iran, and continuing claims to Taiwan. Nevertheless, in a world increasingly divided between those fostering terror and instability and those seeking to maintain order and enhance prosperity, China clearly belongs in the latter camp, much to America's relief. If China is beset by internal disorder, however, there is no telling what kind of regime might emerge in its wake. The brutal civil war in China in the late 1940s gave birth to an equally brutal government that made life miserable for its neighbors and America for decades. A twenty-first-century civil war could well bring about the emergence of a hostile, expansionist China that, armed with nuclear weapons and a strong economy, posed an even greater threat to American interests and world stability than its Maoist predecessor. A strong China is necessary to preserve Asian stability, a vital interest of the United States. The prosperity of Asian nations is directly linked to the surging Chinese economy. In the 1990s, Asian nations produced goods largely for non-Asian countries, particularly the United States. By 2005, more than half of all regional exports were to other states in the region, with China the most likely destination. China is the number one trading partner of such Asian powerhouses as South Korea and Japan, both of which now provide more direct investment to China (over S5 billion per y ear) than even the United States.6 Moreover, China has emerged as the major player in Asian multilateral organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). None of these organizations could meet their goals of fostering economic and political interdependence without the active cooperation of China. Insofar as economic interdependence and international institutions promote peace and security, the continued economic growth and stability of China is essential for Asia. The importance of a stable China to American strategic interests is best seen by considering what might happen if China unraveled. One of the first consequences would be millions of refugees pouring from China’s borders, unsettling its neighbors. The stability of key American allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would be severely tested as they try to cope with this massive human flow along with the economic shockwaves of China's dissolution. Nor would the United States be immune, as mam Chinese may take advantage of corrupt officials or professional human smugglers ("snakeheads') to make their way to America's shores. North Korea, unpredictable under normal circumstances, may flex its military muscle along its borders with China and South Korea, with dreadful results. Ethnic minorities in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang might seize the moment to attempt to break away from Beijing's domination, fostering even greater instability. China's control of its more than 200 nuclear weapons, usually very secure, may be compromised, with the arms eventually falling into unknown hands. The territorial disputes that China has with Russia, Vietnam, India, and others could well degenerate into armed warfare as China loses control over its own military forces and its neighbors seek to take advantage of its internal strife. As Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping remarked (following the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations), the collapse of Chinese rule would have terrible effects that would go far beyond China's borders: "And if a civil war broke out, with blood flowing like a river, what 'human rights' would there be? If civil war broke out in China, with each faction dominating a region, production declining, transportation disrupted and not millions or tens of millions but hundreds of millions of refugees fleeing the country, it is the Asia-Pacific region, which is at present the most promising in the world, that would be the first affected. And that would lead to disaster on a world scale."9 While Deng may have had reason to exaggerate the effects of the toppling of the Chinese regime, his concerns ring true. American relations with China would be severely damaged in the wake of Chinese unrest. The Chinese regime might single out the United States as an enemy in order to stifle civil strife by fostering anti-American nationalism. If China violently suppressed protests, as it did during the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, the American Congress might retaliate with economic sanctions, further escalating tensions between China and the United States. Especially if China takes actions against groups favored by the United States, such as Chi- nese Christians, the American leadership is likely to react harshly against Beijing. Chinese leaders already worry about the United States exploiting internal unrest to remove them from power. Actual American support of insurgent groups even if it is confined to expressions of sympathy, could be taken as a sign that Washington had joined with the rebels, throwing Sino-American relations into crisis. China would very quickly turn from an erstwhile ally into a superpower adversary. The deterioration of the American relationship with China would be especially dangerous regarding Taiwan. Under the best of circumstances, Taiwan presents a flash point in the Chinese-American relationship. China's claims that Taiwan is a renegade province belonging to the People's Republic fly in the face of America's commitment to protect Taiwan, a democratic and prosperous ally. So long as Taiwan does not declare its independence, the United States and China can agree to disagree about Taiwan's future, but should internal unrest engulf China, this uneasy and informal accommodation could unravel. If China falls victim to widespread instability, the pressure to act against Taiwan would be enormous. It would give China the excuse to impose martial law, improving its abilities to suppress any budding revolt. China's claims to Taiwan enjoy near unanimous approval among the Chinese people. Acting against Taiwan would enable the Chinese leadership to fan the flames of nationalism, one of the few means at its disposal to rally support for an otherwise illegitimate regime." A Sino-Taiwanese confrontation could also come about inadvertently if the Chinese leadership decided to provoke a crisis over Taiwan only to find itself at war as popular emotions prevented a peaceful resolution of the crisis. If a Taiwanese leader decided to exploit Chinese unrest by declaring independence, the Chinese government might have no choice but to launch an attack. As the political scientist Susan Shirk argues, no Chinese regime can stand aside and allow Taiwan to announce its independence without going to war if it expects to survive in power.12 Whether through miscalculation or brinksmanship, war with Taiwan producing a Sino-American confrontation could well be the unintended out- come of Chinese civil conflict. China is well prepared to take forceful action against Taiwan if it decides to do so. China has been constantly upgrading its air and sea capabilities for a possible invasion across the Straits of Taiwan. 13 If China chooses not to invade, it could launch the hundreds of ballistic missiles deployed on its coast against Taiwan or it could blockade its two principal ports. Given that Taiwan is critically dependent on foreign trade (75% of its GDP) and imports of fuel for energy consumption (95% of its energy needs come from outside the country), either of these actions would cripple the island state. 14 It is difficult to see the United States remaining indifferent to a brutal assault against one of its allies. Perhaps most worrisome, we simply do not know all of the effects that the collapse of China would bring. The prospect of civil unrest in China threatens an existing great power poised perhaps to become the major power of the twenty-first century. The impact of civil conflict in China cannot be isolated to one or a handful of consequences. As seen in the French Revolution of 1789– 1799 and the Russian Civil War of 1918– 1920, great powers do not suffer civil violence quietly, or alone. Given China’s central role in the world economy, enormous population, nuclear arsenal, and growing international influence, the unraveling of China cannot help but be shattering for the world. Change can be beneficial, and the weakening of a prospective superpower competitor would be celebrated in some American quarters. Nevertheless, an uncontrolled, cataclysmic transformation in China would threaten American interests as much as, if not more than, the purposeful designs of Maoist China a generation ago.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- CCP Collapse Impact

Chinese leadership is vital to regime legitimacy – loss of it exacerbates social pressure for CCP collapse

Edney, 15 – Kingsley Edney is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations of China in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds (“Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China” Politics, Volume 35, Issue 3-4 November 2015 Pages 259–272, Wiley)

The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of China's most complex national security challenges and the most widely cited reason for the country wanting to increase its soft power. According to Li (2009, p. 31), soft power is ‘primarily utilized to refute the “China threat” thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China's domestic socio-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China's rise’. Deng (2009, p. 64) argues that in China the concept of soft power ‘to a large extent, means the ability to influence others in world politics with the goal of achieving great power status without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of hostile balancing or war’. In his analysis of the concept's role in China's rise, Ding (2010, p. 266) argues that the country's soft power strategy is one of reassurance that helps ‘to deal with foreign challenges and create a friendly international environment’. Rawnsley (2012, p. 126) notes that China's soft power strategy has been prompted by the emergence of a ‘China threat’ discourse in the West and therefore China's soft power can be seen as ‘not only reactive, but defensive’. Nye also claims that its soft power strategy is intended ‘to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbors’ and that soft power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China (Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013). This kind of national security perspective helps explain why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China's soft power project.

‘Regime security’ generally refers to ‘the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule’ (Jackson, 2010, p. 187). In China's case, however, the insecurity of the regime is generated by the possibility not only of violent challenges, but also of ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian), which is an extremely seriously concern for the CCP, particularly following the ‘color revolutions’ that have occurred in some post-Soviet states (see Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 88–89). The ‘regime’ can be defined as ‘the small state of persons who hold the highest offices … and/or are the elite that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the state’ (Job, 1992, p. 15). While this article uses the term ‘regime security’ rather than ‘state security’, it should be noted that there is often no clear dividing line between the two within a ‘state-embedded polity’ (Gilley, 2006, p. 501) such as China, where there is significant penetration of the state by the CCP. Despite China's successes in dealing with many of the common sources of insecurity for developing states, such as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15), two important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and lack of national cohesion.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- War Impact

Attempting to prevent China rise causes war.

Chas W. Freeman, Jr. 01-20-10 [Charles "Chas" W. Freeman, Jr is an American retired diplomat and writer. He served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, “China’s Challenge to American Hegemony: Remarks to the Global Strategy Forum,” https://mepc.org/speeches/chinas-challenge-american-hegemony//ZW]

Napoleon is said to have predicted that, when China woke from its slumbers, it would "astonish the world." The Little Corporal was a loquacious fellow who got much wrong but he seems to have gotten this right. In a mere three decades, China has risen from impotence and backwardness to a leading position in global affairs. This year it will become the second biggest producer of goods and services, something projected just five years ago to happen only in 2020. China is clearly on the way to regaining its historic position as the world's largest economy, displacing the United States. (Given continued rapid growth in the Chinese economy, slow growth elsewhere, and progressive revaluation of the Renminbi Yuan, this could happen much sooner than many expect.) The prospect of transcendent Chinese wealth and power, coupled with America's devaluation of its own political and economic prestige, has led to mounting speculation about China's emergence as a global hegemon to rival and, perhaps in time, surpass the United States. Not so long ago, in the Cold War, the world order was defined by the relationship between the Soviet Union and America as the overlords of rival blocs of nations. Recalling this, some pundits foresee the reemergence of a bipolar world in which the United States and China exercise joint leadership in a so-called "G-2." With the collapse of the USSR, there have been no rivals to American leadership when Washington has chosen to lead. The United States — which spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined — has enjoyed absolute military superiority in every region of the globe. Some imagine China as a "peer competitor" for global dominance. Since 1974, when Deng Xiaoping addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York, China has been at pains to deny any possibility that it might seek such dominance. As the Chinese defense "white paper" put it last year: "China will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes." In saying this, China is inadvertently echoing the American isolationists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The United States did not then seek to dominate or control the international state system, nor did it pursue military solutions to problems far from its shores. In time and in reaction to events, however, America came to do both. Why has China, alone among nations, felt obliged to assert that it does not aspire to regional or global hegemony? Is this simply propaganda, intended to distinguish Beijing from Brezhnev's Moscow or from the militarism of contemporary Washington? Is it a contrite acknowledgment and repudiation of imperial China's past hegemonic status in East Asia? Or is it sincere counsel to future generations of Chinese not to bully their neighbors or the world once they have the power to do so? If so, is there something unique about China that causes its leaders to believe they must make a special effort to resist deep-seated hegemonic impulses? This has become a timely question. After a couple of bad centuries, China is back. It believes, with some justification, that for most of its history it was the largest, wealthiest, best governed, and technologically most advanced society on the planet. China brims with confidence that it can regain this status, which it considers the natural order of affairs, and that it will do so in this century. Analogies to other rising powers with shallower histories — France, the United States, Germany, Japan, the USSR — are not helpful in predicting the consequences of China's rise. China has no messianic ideology to export; no doctrine of "manifest destiny" to advance; no belief in social Darwinism or imperative of territorial expansion to act upon; no cult of the warrior to animate militarism or glorify war; no exclusion from contemporary global governance to overcome; no satellite states to garrison; no overseas colonies or ideological dependencies to protect; no history of power projection or military intervention beyond its immediate frontiers; no entangling alliances or bases abroad. China has a very persuasive explanation of its national interests. It says it needs domestic tranquility and peace on its borders in order to pursue its continued modernization and economic development. It seems very comfortable with a multipolar world order, where peace and economic growth prevail. But anyone with experience of negotiating with the Chinese can attest that they are capable of both haughtiness and petulance. Some of this sort of conduct seems to have been on display at Copenhagen last month. How a still-more-powerful China conducts itself in the future will be decided in part by Chinese realities as shaped by Chinese history. But Chinese behavior will also reflect how the rest of the world, including most notably the incumbent hegemon — the United States — reacts and interacts with China as China rises. And future Chinese conduct cannot be separated from the character of China's domestic politics. An autocracy that feels free to ignore the rule of law at home is unlikely to defer to international law and procedure abroad. Whatever the meaning of China's assurances that it will not pursue hegemony or engage in military expansionism in future, we cannot be certain that it will not. There are grounds for optimism, especially with respect to China's use of military power. China's history includes examples of aggressive actions along its borders — especially in Korea and Vietnam. But overall China has been notable for its cautious, defensive, and inward-looking national security posture. The Great Wall stands as a symbol of this as does the scuttling of the Ming fleet in 1437. Despite a formidable history of innovation in military technology and warfare on a scale commensurate with its huge population and vast size, the Chinese strategic tradition stresses that weapons are inauspicious instruments to be used only when the use of force is unavoidable. The People's Republic of China has used force when measures short of war have proven inadequate to secure its borders or strategic interests (as in Korea, India, and Vietnam), but, by marked contrast with India in Goa or Indonesia in Timor-Leste, it gave diplomacy the decades needed to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues without bloodshed. Beijing has shown a similar preference for negotiations rather than the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. Cross-strait tensions are lessening. It should be encouraging that China has insisted on United Nations authorization for its military activities abroad, which are directed at peacekeeping and against piracy. Still, China is modernizing its military at a peculiar moment of history. The United States inherited worldwide military superiority from the collapse of its Soviet rival. Without much discussion, it has embraced the neo-conservative agenda of sustaining this superiority at all costs. But rising Chinese defense capabilities erode American supremacy. China's new anti-carrier weapons endanger U.S. force projection capabilities in the Western Pacific; its anti-satellite programs imperil U.S. global surveillance and communication capabilities; its growing operations in cyberspace menace U.S. government operations and the economy of the American homeland alike. These are serious challenges not just to American hegemony but to core U.S. interests. They have begun to draw a response. The result is a deeply troubled Sino-American military relationship despite the diminishing prospects for war in the Taiwan Strait. China will persevere in its efforts to build a credible counter to American coercion. The United States will not soon abandon its obsession with the retention of absolute military superiority everywhere. A less hegemonic objective would allow the U.S. to accommodate a more powerful China while retaining the ability to prevail in any conflict with it. As things are, increasingly overt military confrontation between China and the United States is likely. These inherent tensions — along with those arising from the huge bilateral trade imbalance in favor of China — are why the idea of a US-China duopoly like the so-called G-2 is infeasible even if it were desirable, which it is not. Still, the world economy is about to see the displacement of the United States from its 20th Century preeminence. China will join the U.S., the EU, and Japan at the top. India, Brazil, Russia, and others in the G-20 will follow. What is in prospect is not the hegemony of one or two countries but its opposite — a multipolar balance of economic power. China, like Japan, is, of course, a country with a population vastly larger than it can prosperously support on its own resource base, large as that is. And China is late in the search for access to raw materials for its burgeoning industries. (So is India.) China has a vital interest in the perpetuation of a global economic order open to trade and investment. China is now enmeshed in multilateral organizations in which it must daily demonstrate its dedication to the sovereign equality of nations, great and small. All this enforces the respect for comity that is the essence of a "responsible stakeholder." It informed People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's cautious suggestion last spring that it would be better to manage the dollar down to a sustainable international role than to have it collapse. But America is out of practice at dealing with independent power centers. For the past two decades the United States has been the undisputed global hegemon. For 40 years before that, it was the indispensable arbiter of the bloc of nations known as the "free world." American politicians are unaccustomed to formulating policy through multilateral consultations with other nations. Beijing isn't very good at this either, but seems more open to it than Washington. The United States will, as always, do what must be done, after it has exhausted all of the alternatives. But this will take time and cost the United States further prestige and influence. Meanwhile, China's global role will grow, especially if Beijing sustains the modesty and competence for which its diplomats have become known, rather than the arrogance that some of its domestic officials increasingly exemplify. The Chinese Communist Party has delivered prosperity to ordinary Chinese, which is why it enjoys their support. Eighty-six percent of Chinese think their country is on the right track. Chinese see proof of the superiority of their political-economy in the apparent effectiveness of its response to the financial crash and its aftermath. Their government's policies have so far succeeded in sustaining high rates of economic growth through programs that enhance long-term economic and intellectual competitiveness. The contrast with the muddled self-indulgence of Washington's response to the crisis, in particular, is striking. Americans have so far shrunk from the hard decisions necessary to restore fiscal integrity to their government or to reverse serious decay in their nation's human and physical infrastructure. The recession has joined foreign wars and continuing deterioration in relations with the Islamic world as a factor accelerating American decline. China seems certain to emerge from the crisis with a much larger and more competitive economy. The generation born under the single-child policy is coming of age. It is far more inclined to consumption than its frugal predecessors. A faster transition to growth driven by domestic consumption than many have thought possible seems in prospect. China's imports are now rising much more rapidly than its exports. Its balance of payments surplus, huge as it still is, fell by half in 2009. Continuing economic growth, deepened ties with Asian neighbors, the progressive internationalization of a yuan that is rising in value, all promise domestic stability and greater international stature for China in coming years. The current self-congratulatory mood in China is therefore entirely understandable. Yet it masks the underlying weakness of the Chinese political system. Government in contemporary China derives its legitimacy almost entirely from its ability to deliver continued rapid economic growth. It stands for no credible values, neither trusts nor is trusted by those it rules, suffers from a high level of corruption, and has no clear vision for self-improvement. If America's politics are widely viewed as so venal as to be dysfunctional, the Chinese system is seen as cynically manipulative and of questionable legitimacy. Without political reform, China will remain vulnerable to unrest should the economy falter. If there is no rule of law in China, Beijing's word will be doubted abroad. Despite its economic successes and growing defense capabilities, China's international influence will remain limited as long as it fails to evolve an attractive political system. It is not impossible that it may do so but there is no evidence at present to suggest that it will. A Chinese perception that the United States is attempting to leverage its military superiority to keep China down could goad Beijing into efforts to dislodge America from its position of global dominance. Given the continuing disparities in national power, the ensuing struggle would be a long one. The trigger would probably be some incident derived from U.S. military operations offshore China or from the Taiwan issue, to which Sino-American relations remain hostage. This is unlikely, but, unfortunately, it is not impossible to imagine. As I speak, for example, China is actively considering how to put effective pressure on the United States to halt arms sales to Taiwan. China wants Washington to live up to Ronald Reagan's commitment to restrain and reduce such sales in return for credible pursuit by Beijing of a peaceful settlement of its differences with Taipei. Sanctions on selected American companies — modeled on those the U.S. Congress has imposed on Chinese companies selling objectionable items to others — are apparently among the options before China's leaders. In the current economic climate, any such move by China could trigger a nasty confrontation and unleash an orgy of American protectionist retaliation that would likely set off a trade war. I do not consider such a development likely. If nothing else, however, the possible consequences of miscalculation by Beijing or Washington illustrate the global stake in continuing prudent management of the Sino-American relationship by both sides. It is important to see China as it is, not as we wish or fear it to be. In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that China "has become one of the great Democracies of the world." That was nonsense, of course. But so, I believe, are perceptions of China as an emerging anti-democratic hegemon. The more likely prospect is that China will take its place alongside the United States and others at the head of a multilateralized system of global governance. In such an oligarchic world order, China will have great prestige but no monopoly on power comparable to that which the United States has recently enjoyed. America has already lost its global political hegemony. But, for all the reasons I have mentioned, China is neither inclined nor capable of succeeding to this role. The Anglo-American financial model is much tarnished by recent events. But no alternative to it has yet emerged. It seems certain that whatever does replace it will be crafted by many hands, only some of which will be Chinese. American consumption is no longer the sole driver of the global economy. The China market has come to play an important part in sustaining world growth. But China is not the only economy that is rising. In some areas of global trade and investment, China will be a dominant factor. In others, it will not be. In the military arena, even if fiscal limitations force retrenchment, the United States will, for many years to come, remain the only power with global reach. Americans will find it difficult to adjust to a world in which we are no longer all-powerful in all spheres. But we are a flexible and resilient people who can and will accommodate change. Neither we nor the Chinese will cease to pursue our national interests as we see them. In many instances, these views will more or less coincide. On such matters, if others agree, there will be global progress. Where we disagree, we will come under pressure from others to search for common ground. Neither of us will be so powerful that we can ignore such pressure. In short, the world in future will be more "democratic" and, likely, more muddled than in the past because many countries, not just the United States or China, will share power in it. There will be ample opportunity for countries with trusted relationships with Washington and Beijing to influence how they participate in global affairs. There will be no hegemon, and there will be no "G-2."

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- War Impact

Attempting to sustain US primacy guarantees conflict and wrecks relations

Swaine, 15 – senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, “The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to "How to Deter China"” Foreign Affairs, May/June, proquest)

For most of the postwar era, these perspectives coexisted relatively easily, primarily because Beijing was too weak to push its own view and was able to rise steadily within the U.S.-sponsored order. But times have changed; China has outgrown its subordinate status and now feels strong enough to press its case in the western Pacific.

This development should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great-power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing incentive to work with Washington and the West to sustain continued economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other nations while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As its overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, Beijing will naturally become less willing to accept unconditionally military, political, and economic relationships and structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. And it will increasingly worry that Washington might resort to pressure or force to try to undermine Chinese security moves in the western Pacific and head off the United States' impending relative decline.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- War Impact

Clinging on to the inevitable decline of Western hegemony results in Sino-American war

Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

Even as it stays within the post-1945 international order, Beijing is not doing so to preserve it. In this sense, as Martin Jacques has observed, China is playing a double game. It is operating ‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’.87 The creation of the AIIB, which Beijing intends should ultimately eclipse the IMF and World Bank, is a good example of this strategy. American scholars and policy-makers believe that a lock-in strategy can be employed to head off any Chinese attempt to create a new international order, or to create a parallel order. They believe this because they have imbued the concept of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized, liberal international order’ with a talismanic quality. In so doing they have air-brushed Great Power politics out of the picture. As they see it, rules and institutions are politically neutral and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. Hence, they can be an effective substitute for declining hard power. However, rather than existing separately from the balance of power, rules, norms and institutions reflect it. Hence the world is no more likely to continue upholding the Pax Americana once US power declines than Britain’s dominions and former colonies were inclined to perpetuate the empire after the Second World War. The fate of the Pax Americana, and that of the international order, will be determined by the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry. As the British scholar E. H. Carr observed, a rules-based international order ‘cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and the political interests which it serves’.88 The post-Second World War interna- tional order is an American order that privileges US interests.89 Even the discourse of ‘liberal order’ cannot disguise this fact. Today, the ground is shifting beneath the Pax Americana’s foundations. Those who believe that lock-in can work view international politics as being, in essence, geopolitically antiseptic. For them, Great Power competition and conflict are transcended by international institu- tions, rules and norms. This is not how the real world works, however.90 Great Power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from Great Power politics. Nor are they neutral. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. In his classic study of international relations between the world wars, The Twenty years’ crisis, Carr analysed the political crisis of the 1930s caused by the breakdown of the post-First World War order symbolized by the Versailles Treaty.91 The Versailles system cracked, Carr argued, because of the widening gap between the order it represented and the actual distribution of power in Europe. Carr used the events of the 1930s to make a larger geopolitical point. International orders reflect the balance of power that exists at time of their creation. Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s). When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position. The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China’s revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana’s days are numbered.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- War Impact

A refusal of the US to accommodate China’s status could go nuclear

Onea, 14 - Tudor Onea is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-doctoral Fellow with the Department of Government at Dartmouth College (“Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and great power rivalry” Review of International Studies, Volume 40 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 125-152

Rivalries between great powers over dominance have captured scholarly attention since the days of Thucydides. However, the bulk of studies have concentrated on shifts in capabilities, while neglecting the motives that produce such positional rivalries. The status anxiety hypothesis is an effort to address this omission, by tracing their occurrence and continuation, sometimes for decades, to the clashing status requirements of the dominant power and those of the next-in-line state. In a nutshell, status anxiety argues that the refusal of the dominant power to allow the succession of the challenger will be a fundamental cause of rivalry, worsening as the rising power threatens to overtake the current leader in additional dimensions. The purpose of this article was to formulate this hypothesis as well as subject it to preliminary testing. The findings suggest that status anxiety represented a significant influence, though not necessarily excluding additional balance of power considerations, in the foreign policy decision-making of declining dominant powers: France in the mid-eighteenth century and Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Status anxiety thus helps account for the hostility France manifested towards Britain, and Britain towards German demands for superior status, a reaction which is more problematic to account for by theories stressing solely physical security and material gains.

A further contribution of this endeavour is that it suggests the existence of a dominant power club, distinct from the club of major or great powers, and, as such, following a different set of rules.138 The existing status literature has concentrated exclusively on the latter club, arguing persuasively that there is no impediment for granting either admission to new members or opportunities for further advancement to current ones.139 Hence, status competition in the great power club is seen as non-zero sum. But the dominant power club has a membership of one, which makes it unfeasible for the dominant power to satisfy the demands of dominant power aspirants without voluntarily surrendering its supremacy. Accordingly, status competition over the dominant position is more likely to be zero-sum and lead to rivalry.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- War Impact

That causes extinction

Wittner, 11 - Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York [Lawrence, November 28, Huntington News, COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?, , accessed 7/3/16, GE]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

AI risks are ignored--- overcorrect your bias to weigh AI as the greater threat--- it’s coming soon.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Conclusion Our analysis shows that the AI risks field is much more varied than accepted by the two main points of view: (1) AI as job-taker and (2) AI that quickly takes over the world. AI could pose a global catastrophic risk in the very early stages or at the very late stages of its evolution. No single solution can be capable of covering all risks of AI. Even if AI is banned, other global problems will arise in its absence; thus, controlling AI safety requires a complex and continuous effort. It is especially worrying that the risks of narrow AI viruses and early self-improving AI (young AI) are neglected by both camps. Such risks are nearer in time and not overshadowed by other potential risks. In addition, these risks cannot be solved by the mechanisms proposed to control more advanced AI, such as AI alignment. The risks of conflict between two benevolent AIs or halting of late-stage AI have also generally been ignored. Most of the risks discussed here could happen within a very short period of time, less than a decade, and could have very different natures. More study is needed to address these urgent risks.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

Unethical AI development causes mindcrime---outweighs extinction

Nick Bostrom 14. Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. 1st Edition, Oxford University Press.

Mind crime Another failure mode for a project, especially a project whose interests incorporate moral considerations, is what we might refer to as mind crime. This is similar to infrastructure profusion in that it concerns a potential side effect of actions undertaken by the AI for instrumental reasons. But in mind crime, the side effect is not external to the AI; rather, it concerns what happens within the AI itself (or within the computational processes it generates). This failure mode deserves its own designation because it is easy to overlook yet potentially deeply problematic. Normally, we do not regard what is going on inside a computer as having any moral significance except insofar as it affects things outside. But a machine superintelligence could create internal processes that have moral status. For example, a very detailed simulation of some actual or hypothetical human mind might be conscious and in many ways comparable to an emulation. One can imagine scenarios in which an AI creates trillions of such conscious simulations, perhaps in order to improve its understanding of human psychology and sociology. These simulations might be placed in simulated environments and subjected to various stimuli, and their reactions studied. Once their informational usefulness has been exhausted, they might be destroyed (much as lab rats are routinely sacrificed by human scientists at the end of an experiment). If such practices were applied to beings that have high moral status—such as simulated humans or many other types of sentient mind—the outcome might be equivalent to genocide and thus extremely morally problematic. The number of victims, moreover, might be orders of magnitude larger than in any genocide in history.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

Slaughterbots and AI initaited doomsday strikes.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Slaughterbots and the dangers of a robotic army Robotic minds do not require full AGI to have some form of agency: they have goals, subgoals, and a world model, including a model of their place in the world. For example, a robotic car should predict the future situation on a road, including the consequences of its own actions. It also has a main goal—travel from A to B—which constantly results in changes to the subgoal system in the form of route creation. A combination of this type of limited intelligence with limited agency may be used to turn such systems into dangerous self-targeting weapons (Turchin and Denkenberger 2018b). Commentary on narrow AI viruses It appears that if a narrow AI virus were to affect only one of the above-listed domains, it would not result in an extinction-level catastrophe. However, it is possible that there will be many such viruses, or a multipandemic (Turchin et al. 2017), or one narrow AI that will be able to affect almost all existing computers and computerized systems. In this case, if the virus(es) were deliberately programmed to create maximum damage—which could be in a case of a military grade Narrow AI virus, like the advanced version of Stuxnet (Kushner 2013)—global catastrophe is a possible result. If the appearance of narrow AI viruses is gradual, antivirus companies may be able to prepare for them. Alternatively, humans could turn off the most vulnerable systems to avoid a global catastrophe. However, a sudden breakthrough or a synchronized surprise attack could spell doom. Failure of nuclear deterrence AI Nuclear weapons are one of the most automated weapon systems. Because they must be launched immediately, almost all decision making has been done in advance. An early warning alert starts a preprogrammed chain of events, where the high-level decision should be made in minutes, which is far from optimal for human decision-making. However, the history of nuclear near misses shows (Blair 2011) that computer mistakes have been one of the main causes, and only quick human intervention has prevented nuclear war, e.g., the actions of Stanislav Petrov in 1983 (Future of Life Institute 2016). We can imagine failure modes of accidental nuclear war resulting from failure of the nuclear weapons control system. They may be similar to the Russian “dead hand” perimeter system (Bender 2014), arising if a strategic planning AI chooses a dangerous plan to “win” a nuclear war, like a Doomsday weapon (Kahn 1959), blackmail, or a pre-emptive strike.

* I couldn’t find the entire text for this, so I left the card as is.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

Biohacking makes multipandemics.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Biohacking viruses Craig Venter recently presented a digital-biological converter (Boles et al. 2017), which could “print” a flu virus without human participation. The genomes of many dangerous biological viruses have been published (Enserink 2011), so such technology should be protected from unauthorized access. A biohacker could use narrow AI to calculate the most dangerous genomes, create many dangerous biological viruses, and start a multipandemic (Turchin et al. 2017). A computer virus could harm human brains via neurointerfaces (Hines 2016).

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

AI would hack our CI--- and we can’t turn it off.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Stuxnet-style viruses hack global critical infrastructure A narrow AI virus may also affect civilian infrastructure; some, but not all ways in which this could be possible are listed below. Remember that in the case of global catastrophes, the conditions necessary for most catastrophes could exist simultaneously. Several distinctive scenarios of such a catastrophe have been suggested. For example, autopilot-controlled and hacked planes could crash into nuclear power stations. There are around 1000 nuclear facilities in the world, and thousands of large planes are in the air at every moment—most of them have computerized autopilots. Coordinated plane attacks happened in 2001 and a plane has been hacked (Futureworld 2013). Self-driving cars could hunt people, and it is projected that most new cars after 2030 will have some self-driving capabilities (Anderson 2017). Elon Musk has spoken about the risks of AI living in the Internet; it could start wars by manipulating fake news (Wootson 2017). Computer viruses could also manipulate human behavior using blackmail, as seen in fiction in an episode of Black Mirror (Watkins 2016). Another example is creating suicide ideation, e.g., the recent internet suicide game in Russia, “Blue Whale” (Mullin 2017), which allegedly killed 130 teenagers by sending them tasks of increasing complexity and finally requesting their suicide. The IoT will make home infrastructure vulnerable (Granoff 2016). Home electrical systems could have short circuits and start fires; phones could also catch fire. Other scenarios are also possible: home robots, which may become popular in the next few decades, could start to attack people; infected factories could produce toxic chemicals after being hacked by viruses. Large-scale infrastructure failure may result in the collapse of technological civilization and famine (Hanson 2008; Cole et al. 2016). As industries become increasingly computerized, they will completely depend on proper functioning of computers, while in the past they could continue without them. These industries include power generation, transport, and food production. As the trend continues, turning off computers will leave humans without food, heating, and medication. Many industries become dangerous if their facilities are not intensively maintained, including nuclear plants, spent nuclear fuel storage systems, weapons systems, and water dams. If one compares human civilization with a multicellular organism, one could see that multicellular organisms could die completely, down to the last cell, as the result of a very small intervention. As interconnectedness and computerization of the human civilization grow, we become more and more vulnerable to information-based attacks.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AI Impact

Killer drones cause global war and totalitarianism.

Alexey Turchin and David Denkenberger 05-03-2018 [Turchin is of the Science for Life Extension Foundation, Moscow, Russia, Denkenberger is of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Nashville, USA, AI & Society, 147-163 (2020), “Classification of global catastrophic risks connected with artificial intelligence,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-018-0845-5#Abs1//ZW]

Military AI systems There are a number GCRs associated with military systems. Some potential scenarios: military robotics could become so cheap that drone swarms could cause enormous damage to the human population; a large autonomous army could attack humans because of a command error; billions of nanobots with narrow AI could be created in a terrorist attack and create a global catastrophe (Freitas 2000). In 2017, global attention was attracted to a viral video about “slaughterbots” (Oberhaus 2017), hypothetical small drones able to recognize humans and kill them with explosives. While such a scenario is unlikely to pose a GCR, a combination of cheap AI-powered drone manufacture and high-precision AI-powered targeting could convert clouds of drones into weapons of mass destruction. This could create a “drone swarms” arms race, similar to the nuclear race. Such a race might result in an accidental global war, in which two or more sides attack each other with clouds of small killer drones. It is more likely that drones of this type would contribute to global instability rather than cause a purely drone-based catastrophe. AI-controlled drones could be delivered large distances by a larger vehicle, or they could be solar powered; solar-powered airplanes already exist (Taylor 2017). Some advanced forms of air defense will limit this risk, but drones could also jump (e.g., solar charging interspersed with short flights), crawl, or even move underground like worms. There are fewer barriers to drone war escalation than to nuclear weapons. Drones could also be used anonymously, which might encourage their use under a false flag. Killer drones could also be used to suppress political dissent, perhaps creating global totalitarianism. Other risks of military AI have been previously discussed (Turchin and Denkenberger 2018a).

*Trigger warning for this card: discussion of suicide.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- Generic China Rise Good

Slow economic growth is the key variable – increasing US growth makes a cling to hegemony inevitable that causes great power war

Taliaferro, 18 – professor of political science at Tufts University (Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. et al. (2018) Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1093/isr/viy023

Conflict between hegemon and challenger can take many forms, ranging in intensity from a sustained rivalry for geopolitical influence in one or more geographic regions to a major or hegemonic war. Again, we narrowly defined peaceful change as a process in which the hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more geographic regions. This may entail the hegemon withdrawing its military forces and forward bases from a region, renegotiating, or modifying alliances and economic agreements with regional states, often at the behest of the challenger. It is important to note that peaceful change might occur in one locale, while conflict might occur simultaneously in another locale. Lastly, the likelihood of either of the two outcomes—conflict and peaceful transition— depends upon the grand strategic adjustments by the hegemon as well as the challenger.

Neoclassical Realist Theory of Peaceful Change

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- Generic China Rise Good

China rise is inevitable--- it’s only a question of how the US reacts.

Mark Beeson and Corey Crawford 02-10-2022 [Mark Beeson is of the University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, Australia, Corey Crawford is of the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia; Chinese Political Science Review (2022), “Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony, and Geopolitics,” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y//ZW]

For many observers outside China, especially in the US, there is no doubt that China is bent on replacing America as the dominant power in the world (Mosher 2000). Indeed, for some observers, China’s elites are following nothing less than a 100-year plan to replace the US as the world’s dominant power (Pillsbury 2015). Prominent realist scholars worry that there is a certain structurally determined inevitability about both China’s rise and the chances of a conflict between the US and the PRC as the latter increasingly seeks to assert its growing power and influence (Allison 2017). While Western IR’s collective failure to predict the end of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in inter-state wars, or recognise the importance of national strategic cultures and beliefs in shaping thinking about security, suggests that we should be very cautious about its collective epistemic authority, there is no doubt that China’s behaviour has changed. One of the most important expressions of this possibility can be seen in the sophistication of China’s political and diplomatic elites as they have come to play a more prominent part in what some IR theorists describe as ‘international society’ and the institutional architecture that constitutes it (Clark 2014). At one level, hopes and expectations about China’s leaders being ‘socialised’ into the ways of Western diplomacy have been realised: China is nothing like the disruptive, revolutionary force that it was under before Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger engineered the celebrated rapprochement with the PRC (Kissinger 1994; van Ness 1970). At another level, however, it is clear that China’s foreign policy goals continue to reflect ‘national interests’ and values, especially under the increasingly coordinated and centralised leadership of Xi Jinping (Lampton 2015). Indeed, not only are Chinese policymakers still pursuing national goals, but they are doing so in ways that are also often strikingly similar to those employed by the US in an earlier era.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › 1NC › 1nc --- Nato Expansion

NATO massively increases U.S hegemony--- that’s a force multiplier.

Thimm 18 [Dr Johannes Thimm is Senior Fellow at the research division The Americas at SWP. He has published numerous articles on US foreign policy, 4-9-2018, NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin] Eric

NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy

First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington. Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power. European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while the United States mostly calls the shots. US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.