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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Erdogan Support Fine

Ignore polls—lack of opposition unity and election reform boosts Erdogan

Malik and Curran 4/7 — Hasnain Malik is Strategy & Head of Equity Research @ Tellimer Research Patrick Curran Senior Economist "Turkey's electoral reform improves the prospects of ruling AKP," Tellimer 4-7-2022, https://tellimer.com/article/turkeys-electoral-reform-improves-the-prospec, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Turkey's parliament passed a law reducing the threshold for votes won in the general election for a party to enter parliament from 10% to 7% on 30 March and President Erdogan gave his approval on 6 April.

This change suits the MHP, the parliamentary ally of AKP. This is because the MHP's support in opinion polls has dropped below the old 10% threshold to nearer 8%.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › Uniqueness › UQ — Erdogan Support Fine

It’s neck and neck now

Turkish Minute 6/6 — Turkish Minute, "Slim majority of respondents believe Erdoğan would not win re-election: survey," Turkish Moment, 6-6-2022, https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/06/06/majority-of-respondents-believe-erdogan-would-not-win-re-election-survey/, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

A narrow majority of respondents of a public survey conducted by the Ankara-based Metropoll company believe that incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would not win re-election if a presidential vote had been held in May.

"Would Erdoğan win re-election if the presidential election was held this Sunday?" was the question asked to respondents in Metropoll's "Turkey's Pulse" survey conducted in May.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › 1NC › 1NC

Greece war goes nuclear – accidental and intentional escalation is likely

Psaropoulos 18 (John Psaropoulos, independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe. Freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others; “Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?”; Washington Examiner; 3/28/18; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/greece-vs-turkey-are-we-headed-for-an-intra-nato-war kp)

The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey hosts one of the world’s highest concentrations of high-tech weaponry. Sixty-seven surface ships and two dozen submarines are deployed on a body of water the size of Lake Superior. The two air forces command 448 fighter jets armed with smart bombs and guided missiles. On land, 832 heavy tanks and more than 2,500 lighter artillery vehicles—as much tank firepower as in all the rest of Europe combined—could rapidly be brought to bear along a Greek-Turkish border only 105 miles long.

These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible, most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a dangerously narrow sea.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › 1NC › 1NC

Erdogan starts a diversionary war against Greece to regain popular support

Choulis et al. 21 — Ioannis Choulis Assistant Lecturer Department of Government, Marius Mehrl Postdoctoral Researcher at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, University of Munich. Kostas Ifantis is Professor of International Relations, Department of International, European and Area Studies, Panteion University of Athens. (2021) Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020, Defence and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2021.1933312 WMK

Despite not being a top security priority, Greek-Turkish relations are still regarded as a serious external threat in Ankara (Gürsoy 2017:6). The Aegean dispute, especially contests over territorial waters and airspace, is present in every Turkish National Security Policy Document (Gürcanli 2014). Moreover, a series of surveys between 2017 and 2019 reveal that 43.2% of Turks consider Greece a threat to Turkey and 59.7% oppose mending the Greek-Turkish relations (Aydin et al. 2020:66–69). The importance of Greece in Turkish strategic considerations is also evident from the increased number of airspace violations throughout the last decade. Violations of the Greek-claimed airspace offer significant benefits to Ankara, both internationally and domestically. In the international arena, the continued Turkish objection to the status of the Aegean islands will be helpful for future negotiations or arbitration since they act as a proof of Turkish claims in the region. Additionally, airspace violations bring the issue of territory on the bilateral agenda to force Greece to acknowledge the dispute over the island status and engage with it. What’s more, airspace incursions serve as Ankara’s direct challenge to Greek sovereignty over the area and are seen as part of long-term planning to ‘Finlandize’ Greece and Cyprus (Williams 2010; Ifantis and Triantaphyllou 2018). Internationally, the airspace violations thus serve as a tool to project Turkish sovereignty claims on the contested territory. Domestically, the incursions may allow the ruling party to gain points with its constituents. Particularly in the last years, the AKP has become challenged electorally and had to accept the ultranationalist MHP as junior coalition partner (Ulgen 2018). Likewise, the Turkish economy has stagnated and inflation is soaring. In such times of domestic challenges, governments have an incentive for diversionary behaviour, and given the historic rivalry, Greece is a particularly likely target for Turkish acts of diversion (Mitchell and Prins 2004; Mitchell and Thyne 2010, Tir 2020). To that end, Mehrl and Choulis (2021) find that the number of Turkish incursions in the Greek-claimed airspace increases when leader approval ratings are low. Incursions into the contested airspace may thus also serve as acts of diversion for Ankara, benefitting its domestic position. Turkish incursions in the Greek claimed airspace also enable the Turkish armed forces to gather data on Greek air defences, such as response times, that may be useful for future military endeavours. Consequently, as long as the risk of an escalatory response is sufficiently low, the costs of Turkish airspace incursions, namely operational costs and potential accidents, are outweighed by the benefits.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › 1NC › 1NC

NATO cooperation decimates Erdogan’s support

Tremblay 22 — Pinar Tremblay Professor in the Economics department at California State Polytechnic University - Pomona (Brendan Tremblays mom lol) "Turkish public support for NATO declines," Al-Monitor, 3-8-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/turkish-public-support-nato-declines, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK

Public opinion also seems to support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s policy on the conflict. Indeed, perceptions of NATO in Turkey are rather negative, even at a time when countries like Finland and Sweden are considering joining the organization.

While there have not been polls on support for NATO since the invasion began, in recent years Turkey has consistently ranked as having the lowest support for NATO among member states.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Erdoğan Disadvantage › 1NC › 1NC

“Say yes” means Erdogan caves to a US-led NATO initiative. That wrecks his current political strategy that requires distancing from the West and absolute prioritization of the Turkish-led agenda

Daou 6/22 — Mark Daou is a political activist and politician. He cites David Rigoulet-Roze, a Doctor of Political Science, teacher and researcher, who specializes in the Middle East region. “With an eye on re-election, Turkey’s Erdogan risks the ire of Western partners," France 24, 6-22-2022, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220622-with-an-eye-on-re-election-turkey-s-erdogan-risks-the-ire-of-western-partners, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Between stalling Sweden and Finland’s bids for NATO membership and threatening a fresh military offensive against Kurds in northern Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to be capitalising on the world’s focus on Ukraine to strengthen Ankara’s geopolitical standing – even at the expense of NATO and Western partners. Such moves may be targeting a domestic audience ahead of June 2023 presidential elections, with Erdogan trying to galvanise nationalist sentiment as a worsening economic crisis threatens his popularity at home.

In recent weeks, Erdogan has once again complicated Turkey’s relationship with its NATO allies – stalling Swedish and Finnish plans to join the bloc; threatening another military incursion into northern Syria; refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia; and reviving tensions with perennial rival Greece over the Aegean islands.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Materiality Good

Material action paves the way for a post-colonial future which breaks down the settler-native binary and gives natives autonomy in policy

Bashir and Busbridge, 18. [Bashir Bashir, Ph.D., London School of Economics and a senior lecturer in the department of sociology, political science and communication at the Open University of Israel and a research fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Rachel Busbridge, Ph.D., and has held research positions at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, La Trobe University and Freie Universitaet Berlin as an Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and has taught sociology and politics at al-Quds University, al-Quds Bard College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of South Australia, Deakin University and Swinburne. 04-09-2018. “The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine” (Political Studies), vol. 67, no. 2, May 2019, pp. 388–405, doi:10.1177/0032321718767029.]//Don Markos

Theorising Decolonisation For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the wide-reaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of self-determination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best. Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (pre-modern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies. Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation, but in settler colonial contexts this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity. Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may be thought of as decolonising rests on the robustness of the relationship they envision and the space they carve for equal membership in and to a postcolonial polity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Perm

Perm solves- only working through jurisdiction solves decolonization

Buchanan 17 (Brenton, Society and Space Organization, “Lumpy Space, Colonial Place: Jurisdiction As Infrastructure And (Post)Colonial Place Making In The Marshall Islands”, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/lumpy-space-colonial-place-jurisdiction-as-infrastructure-and-post-colonial-place-making-in-the-marshall-islands)

In their work, both Lauren Benton and Shiri Pasternak examine the fluidity of legal relationships through conceptions of jurisdiction which overlap, entangle, and shift over time. As Pasternak explains, seeing “jurisdiction as a spatial category… [allows] for the examination of the production of colonial space through the work of jurisdiction” (emphasis mine. 2014: 147) Pasternak’s geographic lens positions law and space as political, as contested categories that come together in constituting colonial claims to authority; to colonial jurisdiction over others. As a result, layers of colonial and imperial authority “become thicker or thinner as peoples’ movements through space produce new arrangements and negotiations of power,” (Pasternak, 2014: 149) bringing with them further systems of domination. As unevenly asserted and applied across space and time, jurisdiction-as-infrastructure opens up a refutation of the completeness of the colonial project. Infrastructure, in this sense, is understood not only as a ‘structure,’ but also as ‘process’; one that works to produce other systems and relations. This perspective highlights the productive aspects of jurisdiction, rather than accepting legal authority and law as removed from the space they claim. Instead, when framed as infrastructure, jurisdiction is shown to be a process of “overlapping authority claims between Indigenous, state, regional, and private interests, and it can help parse the ways in which these jurisdictional encounters produce colonial space” (Pasternak, 2014: 146). The importance of this emphasis on process and production is that, even as laws are instituted and legal systems established, jurisdiction forms its necessary and underlying infrastructure; “the power to speak the law” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). Jurisdiction-as-infrastructure highlights this claim-making, opening up law and legal authority as a contested category. Mentioned above, this approach refuses an acceptance of “law” as a pre-spatial category, positioning instead not only the content of the law but its claim to applicability over a given space as something that must be established, and therefore maintained. As such, law is produced through claims to jurisdiction, and by situating it as such in the colonial process reveals uneven and contested geographies of power. Law, legal systems, and the authority to impose them become highly historicized objects, ones that are spatially and relationally contingent in their production, enactment, and perpetuation. Through examining jurisdiction as infrastructure then, colonial and imperial authority not only become, but already are, contested and contestable claims. By asserting that legal authority is continually produced, the voices of Indigenous claims and contestations become themselves jurisdictional “lumps that betray patterns of partial and uneven state sovereignty” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). The singular authority that colonial powers claim is instead unsettled and made to compete. This framework importantly resists the perspective of the fatal impact theory, wherein the colonial encounter produces a terminal “historical descent into a state of nothingness and hopelessness” (Smith, 1999: 88) of Indigenous cultures and peoples, as well as reduction of the colonized to “the concept of “bare lives” … [withdrawing] all form of agency from the bodies targeted by this violence” (Lambert, 2017: 13). Its spatial qualities belie the finality of colonial authority, as the emphasis on the power “to speak” the law, rather than the law itself, allows for non-colonial and non-state forms of authority to be recognized. Jurisdiction works as a process over time to establish and claim authority over space. As necessarily contingent, relational, and historical, for this short intervention an examination of the long imperial/colonial history of the Marshall Islands reveals some of the ways that jurisdiction takes on “a quality of lumpiness” (Benton, 2005: 701). At the same time the contemporary work of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT), established under the Compact of Free Association (COFA), opens up space to discuss both the possibilities of resistance through jurisdictional claims and the incompleteness of the postcolonial project. Moving from infrequent economic exchange with Spain (established through the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1594), German interests in the islands were recognized in 1885. However, their relationship with the islands was primarily established in 1878 through a treaty with one local chief, granting them exclusive use of a Jaluit Atoll harbor and trading privileges. The combination of inter-imperial and German-indigenous relations positions, even tacitly, indigenous jurisdiction over access and use of island harbors and resources on a relatively even plane with imperial claims. Yet, in 1914, when the Japanese seized the Marshall Islands from Germany during WWI, it was not a renegotiation of a treaty between the new imperial power and local chiefs, but rather seizure of one empire’s land and transference of control to another. Viewed as a German protectorate, the shifted context meant that since “a state of war existed between… nations… therefore the takings were legal” (emphasis mine. Benton, 2005: 705). As inter-imperial conflict, the transfer from German to Japanese possession overlapped with German-Indigenous treaties. As the former did not require a reconsideration of the latter, it implicitly arranges them in a hierarchical legal relationship. Centering jurisdiction as infrastructure, Japanese claims over Germany’s imperial relation to the Marshall Islands is temporarily troubled. If this “transfer” is something necessarily produced, then by what authority does Japan claim possession of the Marshall Islands, especially considering the German-Marshall relationship was negotiated directly with local Islander authority? Rather, these transfers should be seen less as a shifting of powers but a cementing of certain legal relationships that works to produce a privileging of imperial and colonial claims over those of indigenous peoples. This did not equate in a complete erasure, as much as the imperial/colonial project might desire, but rather a layering on of different dominating relations. This fungibility of (imperial) authority shifted not necessarily under the auspices of a single imperial power, but rather across powers through imperial jurisdictional understandings and transitions through conquest. In this way, “territory… was constructed not just for empire but also in empire, and at its margins” (Benton, 2005: 701). Divesting the Marshallese of authority was not a foregone conclusion, but one produced out of the very practice of empire. When the United States defeated Japan in the islands in 1944, assertion of authority over the Islands in 1945 was in this sense a claim less in relation to the Marshallese peoples, but rather against the Japanese empire. Perhaps an irony of this shifting web of jurisdiction between imperial powers is found in a statement from the UN in 1947 (itself newly established and working to assert its own claims to authority) made to declare the Marshalls a trust territory of the U.S. Not only was this the only trusteeship “designated as a “strategic” territory,” granting greater latitude over the securitization of the region, but the UN declared the responsibility of the U.S. to “protect the inhabitants… against the loss of their lands and resources” (emphasis mine. Barker, 2013: 22). This language implies a form of ownership by the Marshallese over the islands, yet positions it as a subordinate claim to the paternalistic oversight of the U.S. This reflexive maneuvering of possession and authority constitutes a “cynical grounds for recognition” that “also entrenched the subordination of Indigenous societies” (Pasternak, 2014: 159). Through representing Marshallese possession of their islands, U.S. (and UN) authority is asserted, structured, and simultaneously folds Marshallese claims under this oversight. Though a shifting terrain, this post-World War II legal relationship is predicated on preceding imperial ones, and their own claims to “speak the law” in Marshallese lands. The infrastructure of inter-imperial jurisdiction becomes productive of US claims to the islands, as seized from Imperial Japan, as well as the UN’s claim to be able to designate a certain kind of authority over them. The long historical process started with infrequent Spanish trading, when understood though conceptions of jurisdiction over the islands reveals the long production of the islands as colonial space, privileging (primarily) Western imperial authority over Indigenous claims over their land. This imperial history of the Marshalls forms the centuries long preamble and pretext that established a legal context wherein the United States could be “granted” the Islands as a strategic territory under their trusteeship; pursuing sixty-six nuclear tests between 1946-1963 and ongoing ballistic missile testing in the islands. As the Cold War continued, the Marshallese of various communities sent petitions through both US and UN channels to protest and improve their position under US “strategic” oversight. Understanding these within the productive infrastructure of jurisdiction, American legal authority and aspects of the colonial dynamic are brought into question through both an invocation of UN authority, and the very voices of the Islanders who petition, protest, and contest. Within a broader framework of Cold War decolonial movements, the basis of and imperial power to “speak the law” became increasingly troubled. In addition to gaining periodic concessions, tensions between indigenous movements and continued US investment in the Marshall Islands as a military (test) site culminated in the 1980s with negotiations for the COFA. As a victory for indigenous sovereignty this nominally recognizes Marshallese self-government even as it simultaneously perpetuates US military and colonial interests. Following jurisdiction through the COFA, the establishment of the NCT was to provide “jurisdiction to render final determination upon all claims past, present, and future” (Pevec, 2005) regarding the nuclear testing program. Given $150 million for these ends, Smith-Norris (2016: 40) notes how the “finality” of this agreement also resulted in the dismissal of all claims pending in the United States, as courts in the US were divested of jurisdictional authority over these matters. Although woefully underfunded, and the possibility of pursuing legal cases within US courts being denied, the findings of the NCT function as an avenue for pressuring the United States for further redress for the legacy of its testing program. It is noted (Smith-Norris, 2016: 41) that having awarded $341,049,311 in damages to the Enewetakese alone in 2000, the findings of the NCT are not immediately actionable (though payments are made as much as is possible). Instead, assessment of damages, processing of claims, and the power to speak the law in cases of redress for nuclear testing, contamination, and devastation has become a new lump in the US-Marshallese relationship. Though quickly running up against a limited budget, this shifting jurisdictional geography opens up a site of resistance as well as a look into the incomplete nature of decolonization. After an independent review of the NCT by former US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 2003 and a 2012 UN investigation into impacts of the testing program, the findings of the NCT comprise a mechanism of knowledge production about the legacies of nuclear contamination independent from US oversight. As the Marshallese continue to argue for adequate compensation through the NCT, examining jurisdiction as infrastructural process through which colonial and imperial authority can be asserted, its “return” through decolonization belies the uneven power dynamics and systems that continue to pervade colonizer/colonized relations. However, through the NCT and its claim to jurisdiction over damages due to the Marshallese people as a result of the United States’ nuclear testing and colonial domination, these contestations might be seen as more than an uneven power dynamic. These claims to authority by the NCT, and by extension the Marshallese people, are not simply petitions to US or UN law. They are themselves claims to sovereignty that are one part of a larger decolonial struggle, where the NCT’s jurisdiction produces a new vision and future for the Republic of the Marshall Islands. It seems true that the “decolonization” promised through the COFA and the establishment of the NCT is not a recognition of an originary, total jurisdiction, but a modified and contingent one that maintains other structures of domination. Just as jurisdiction opens a recognition of the process and contested nature of coloniality, as part of the postcolonial project it reveals its own incompleteness. The ability of the US to deny responsibility for the ongoing impacts of its nuclear colonialism and payment of damages concluded by the NCT makes clear that jurisdictional authority is but one of the necessary components for a true decolonization of the Marshall Islands. Yet employing it as a point of intervention can help reveal the contours of domination that make up the lumpiness of imperial and (post)colonial dynamics. For a historical approach, consideration of jurisdiction as infrastructure can help to make clear the long duration, and process, of imperial and colonial imposition and assertions of authority. Important to this is that jurisdiction as productive of the colonial context and relationship helps to set the stage for other forms and systems of power; jurisdiction does not travel alone. For the decolonizing process then, understanding it as infrastructure can reveal other forms of colonial persistence. Even as jurisdiction is “returned” or recognized in purportedly (de)colonized peoples, unequal power dynamics and neo-colonial systems persist through other forms. Being productive of colonial and imperial claims to authority, a site of contestation that “actively works to produce something” (Dorsett and McVeigh quoted in Pasternak, 2014: 151) it is also a process of multiple “things” in the making. Perhaps as an ethical statement, this framework also insists on hopeful potential and possibilities for decolonial struggles, even as it provides a valuable critical approach to understanding the complexities of colonial domination. Centering debates and claims worked out through jurisdiction can reveal both the production and persistence of colonialism, but also competing systems and visions of post- or de-colonial futures.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › State Good

The state is inevitable—engaging the state doesn’t necesarilly mean endorsing it—they devolves politics into a dogmatic void that the right will fill

Choat, 16—PhD in Political Science at Queen Mary University of London, member of the Political Studies Association, Senior Lecturer in the School of Economics, Politics, and History (Simon, “Marxism and anarchism in an age of neoliberal crisis,” )

The anarchist critique of Marxist organisational forms is unconvincing, then, because it does not acknowledge the diversity of Marxist approaches and it tends towards a theoreticism that sees a linear, causal, and continuous line from theory to practice. Nonetheless, there are significant differences of strategy between anarchism and Marxism: it is just that these are less to do with organisation as such, and are much more broadly to do with differing attitudes toward politics and the state. Although some (though by no means all) anarchists have supported formal political organisations, with rules, membership criteria, and even internal discipline (Schmidt and van der Walt 2009: 247-263), they have traditionally rejected any engagement with the state – whether it be voting, demanding legal rights or protections, forming political parties, or attempting the revolutionary seizure of government – on the basis that such engagement can only end up replicating the oppressive hierarchies that they are fighting: either it will lead to new forms of dictatorship and bureaucracy (such as developed in the Soviet Union); or it will lead to parliamentary reformism and hence merely reinforce existing structures and relations of power. If Marxists support (qualified) engagement with the state and even the formation of political parties, however, it is not because they think that centralised hierarchies are desirable or inevitable, but because they begin from a different understanding of politics. They argue that the anarchist abstention from state politics denies us the most effective means of political action: we disempower ourselves rather than the state when we refuse to engage with it. Making demands on the state does not necessarily entail an endorsement of the state, any more than the demands that are made by employees during a strike are an endorsement of the employer or of the system of wage-labour (Marx 1988). Anarchists themselves have at least implicitly recognised the efficacy of political engagement by occasionally supporting the policies of certain governments and even participating in elections (Engels 1988; Franks 2012: 216). More than this, abstention from state politics is not a genuine option: whether we like it or not, we are all already involved in state politics, because we are all always already submitted to state power, control, and oppression. Anarchists are concerned that participation in conventional politics will lead to parliamentary reformism. But this concern is itself ultimately premised on a tacit acceptance of the liberal-parliamentary understanding of politics: to claim that we can safely repudiate state politics simply by refusing ever to enter a polling booth is to assume that ‘the state’ stops at the door of Parliament. Marxists, in contrast, have argued that the state apparatus includes educational institutions, the media, churches, the family, and so on (e.g. Althusser 1971): simply in going about our daily lives we are all therefore implicated in state politics. Given our necessary involvement within politics, the question is not whether we engage with it, but how we do so; even libertarian Marxists like Holloway argue that engagement with the state is inevitable (Holloway 2005: 40). In contrast, the anarchist recommendation of disengagement from the state risks a politics of withdrawal and isolation. There are two related reasons why under our current conditions in particular the Marxist willingness to engage in state politics is preferable to an anarchist position. The first is the dominance of neoliberalism today. Given the strength of neoliberalism since the crisis that it created, there is a strong case for a certain pragmatism in our response. A danger of the prefigurative politics favoured by anarchists is that it dogmatically dictates an a priori exclusion of certain forms of political action. For Marxists, on the other hand, political strategies must be decided according to particular conditions and within a certain context. In a context in which private companies are increasingly undertaking tasks previously performed by the state, the active defence of state services and institutions can be viewed as a radical position to adopt: defending welfare provision, public pensions, universal healthcare, and free higher education should be seen not as a reformist compromise with the existing order but as safeguarding the gains of class struggle against capitalist processes of accumulation by dispossession. This leads to the second reason for doubting the refusal of state politics as a viable tactic under current conditions, which concerns the specific role of the state under neoliberalism. The anti-state politics of anarchism may have made sense during eras in which the state could plausibly be presented as the main threat to freedom and equality: during the period of nation-building and imperialistic expansion in the mid- to late-19th century, of the rise of fascism in the early-20th century, or even of the development of welfare capitalism after WWII. But it has far less purchase in an era in which neoliberalism, as both the official ideology and a form of everyday common sense, is anti-statist. Put simply, the attack on state power too easily echoes the rhetoric of neoliberalism itself (Taylor 2013: 735). When government actors themselves are explicitly endorsing the retreat of the state, then anarchist attacks on state power have limited efficacy either as a tactical call to arms or as a convincing analysis of our present conjuncture. In practice, of course, it is true that neoliberalism has not dissolved state power. But nor has the relation between state and capital remained the same under neoliberalism, such that our analyses, strategies, or rhetoric need not alter. The nature of this relationship between state and capital will be examined in the next section.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › State Good

Their understanding of the state as unified, immutable, and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors creates a pessimism trap that stifles Indigenous agency and activism.

Lightfoot, 20—associate professor in First Nations and Indigenous Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Ojibwe (Sheryl, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” Pessimism in International Relations, Chapter 9, pp 162-170, SpringerLink)

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Liberal democracy is self-reflexive and good

Youngs, Director-General FRIDE, ’11 [February 2011, Richard- Professor Politics University of Warwick, “Misunderstanding The Maladies Of Liberal Democracy Promotion” ] //Don Markos

Reflections on liberalism’s future Current international political trends are complex and still in flux. History shows that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and dominant political dynamics can prove strikingly changeable. The easy triumphalism of the liberal democracy agenda in the 1990s was misplaced. However, much criticism now risks over-shooting.18 The Bush administration provided an easy dog to kick. But its excessive awfulness skewered the nature of conceptual debate: critical theory has become as lacking in self-reflexivity as the ‘liberal imperialism’ it everywhere sees and excoriates. A nuanced view is warranted of the ‘democracy backlash’.19 We should be attentive to a lack of flexibility in the conceptualisation of democracy. The consideration of a variety of models is necessary and desirable. However, the evidence does not sustain the suggestion that the most serious problem with democracy promotion today is an excess of the ‘liberal’ in liberal democracy. Indeed, in many places quite the reverse is true. The most worrying problem is not practitioners’ lack of willingness to consider varieties of democratic institutions, but the lack of priority attached to advancing core liberal rights. As Western powers decline, this trend is likely to deepen in the future. Liberalism will increasingly be on the back foot. In this sense, those that assume that liberalism is dominant risk lagging behind the policy curve. Dahl’s definition of democracy may be partial and narrow, but can we really not say with confidence that it is better than the authoritarianism that the West is still propping up under the guise of respect for ‘local values’? Moreover, the ‘liberal overdose’ argument is curious to the extent that since the end of the 1990s a central thrust of debate common to development, security and governance circles has been ‘the rediscovery of the state’. The stress on core liberal political norms is today under- not over-played. It continues to be the centrally important area where local reformers look to the international community for support – most commonly, in vain. Deliberations over precise institutional configurations and second-generation reforms are of a lesser order of importance. Michael McFaul observes that some debates about the intricate sequencing of reform and different varieties of institutional pathways look incongruous, as the US can today do little to influence such details, but rather simply back core democratic values.20 Yet it still hesitates to do so, for all the standard commentary on US ‘liberal imperialism’. Liberal internationalism is still de-legitimised by the pervasive assumption that it is concerned primarily with mobilising military force in support of democratic values; it must be made clearer that military power is simply anathema to the standard day-to-day agenda of democracy support. There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation, deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested ‘alternative forms of democracy’ breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to ‘accuse’ Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author’s experience, conversations with policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily prescriptive. Donors’ tendency to see democracy through the prism of their own political systems still often surfaces. But in terms of the way that the ‘democracy’ in democracy support is defined conceptually it would seem somewhat redundant now to warn donors of the dangers of heavily-prescriptive institutional templates. There is some evidence of the self-reflexive policy-learning on the part of democracy promotion practitioners that many critics assume is entirely lacking. Indeed, genuine doubt over the most suitable paths forward has reached the point where some actors’ policies are reduced to immobilism. The problem is that while policy-relevant knowledge has accumulated, it has done so in an ad hoc fashion and has not been systematised into common or comprehensive new approaches.21 The influences on democracy strategy of academic traditions are eclectic. If we were to trace the philosophical roots of European good governance and democracy support policies, it is simply not the case that Locke prevails over all else. The breadth of democracy assistance programmes goes way beyond the Schumpeterian. The stress on the role of the state and the existential identity-value of the political community found in many current policy initiatives finds resonance (if unconsciously) in thinking that historically stood as the antithesis to political liberalism. Such a line can be traced from Aristotle’s view of the political community as a biological organism; to Rousseau’s insistence that the general will embodies a mystical, spiritual collective identity of the political community above and beyond the will of the majority; through to Hegel’s system centred on the state as the organic embodiment of collective interests and identity, the ‘absolute’ within which the individual finds his very meaning. This is not to say any such strand of thinking would capture entirely the ideas that inform today’s foreign policies. However, the pertinent point is that the underpinnings of these policies can be seen in writers who were in combat with Lockean liberalism. The standard European discourse on equality being more important than formal political democracy has a direct echo in (politically) anti-liberal Rousseau. Concerns over the ‘tyranny of the majority’ that inform power-sharing strategies in post-conflict situations have a long line of antecedent philosophers who inveighed strongly against the will of the majority, from Aristotle through even to Kant (who was concerned with the republican separation of executive and legislation but certainly not with augmenting popular power against the aristocracy). Even Benthamite radical utilitarianism shines through, in its concern with a strong rule of law to restrain individual freedoms and ensure greater equality in the furtherance of collective interests. If any modern philosopher is the thinker of choice for today’s discerning Eurocrat it is Habermas, not the classic liberals. In general, deliberative democracy has been most widely advocated as a means of situating abstract cosmopolitan universalism within concrete and varied social settings.22 And all this is quite apart from the more obvious cases of cynical realpolitik that take their cue from the more violent illiberalism of Machiavelli and Hobbes.23 It is self-evident that liberal democracy now shares the conceptual field with rivals in a way that it did not in the 1990s. This may provide for vibrant debate and much-needed selfexamination. But it does not necessarily mean that alternatives have superior legitimacy. Allowing analytic space for a wider variety of forms and definitions of democracy does not mean that sovereign democracy, Islamic democracy, tribal democracy or Bolivarian democracy are necessarily superior or more in tune with local demands. With the West accused of being overly-prescriptive of a liberal form of democracy, it would be subversive of the critique to jump straight into advocating other pre-cooked forms. It should be remembered that a form such as social democracy is just as ‘Western’ in it origins as liberal democracy: there is no reason a priori to assume that it corresponds more closely to ‘local demands’ in the way that is routinely and rather uncritically suggested (however one may oneself desire socially democratic outcomes). If the ascendance of conceptual competitors can add usefully to the parameters of desirable political reform, it is not incompatible with this that they should at the same time sharpen the West’s defence of core liberalism. Critical theorists skate a thin line: they issue pleas for a rethinking of democracy, but scratch beneath the surface and what they really lionise is undemocratic state-led development; theirs is in fact not a genuine concern with reconceptualising democracy so much as a pretty wholesale questioning of the democracy agenda, dressed up in softened discourse. A central pivot of many such critiques is the criticism of liberalism’s teleological arrogance. But this centres too much on one influential book published at one rather distinctive moment in time24; liberalism more broadly and properly understood is not teleology. Moreover, many writers argue against teleology and prescription but then in the next breath confidently assert that social democracy must be a superior and more acceptable form of democracy outside the West and one which has a more sustainable long-term future. This may be the case, but they have no philosophical justification for saying so without replicating the very same methodological features they profess to dislike in ‘liberal’ tenets – and thus contradicting themselves. Clearly, more debate about different forms of political representation would be healthy. Allowing space for a plurality of routes to and types of political reform would sit well with the core spirit of democracy. However, while more flexibility and open mindedness are still required in democracy promotion, there is a risk of being unduly defensive about the virtues of liberal democracy’s core tenets. The problem in many places of the world is the absence of liberalism’s core values, not their excess. Vigilance in the need for democracy’s reconceptualisation is indeed merited. But it would be a muddled reasoning that took this to provide a case for the wholesale pull back from the (already anaemic) support for liberal democracy’s notion of fundamental political rights. We need more fully to understand local demands. But there is an automatic assumption routinely made that such demands are for more diverse, anti-liberal political forms. This may in many places be the case, but the evidence must be assembled. One cannot simply assert this as if it were axiomatic to the emerging world order; there is no reason for supposing a priori that this is a natural outcome of the rebalancing of international order. The evidence that exists points, again, to a more nuanced conclusion: a demand for the essential tenets of liberal universalism, made relevant to and expressed through the language and concepts of local cultures and histories. A growing focus within political philosophy has been on ‘capabilities’: negative liberal freedoms need to be deepened but also combined with the locally-rooted capabilities that ensure their effective realisation.25 The central thrust of Locke’s liberalism was anti-dogmatism and prudence. The irony – and, for anyone concerned over democracy’s health, the tragedy – is that international support for a supposedly liberal democratic agenda is today associated with exactly the opposite of these values. It is the non-dogmatic spirit that liberalism must work to recover: liberal democracy as a system that (simply) creates space for a variety of different local choices. Advocates and opponents of liberalism are trapped in a circular debate over this matter: while core liberal freedoms are required to make such local choices, critics insist that those very liberal rights are themselves a corruption of local autonomy. The imperative is not for liberalism to cede to other creeds, but to work towards squaring the circle that has always existed at its heart: that is, liberalism is in its very essence the rejection of utopian political design, yet, if not pursued with care, it can appear as an unbending utopia. This defines its challenge: can liberalism stand convincingly as an anti-utopian creed whose own propulsion requires courageous normative conviction? Can it strike the Rawlsian balance of deepening a plurality of values without descent into relativism?

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Sweeping theories of radical indigenous ontological difference ignore the nuances of actual struggles that strategically repurpose settler categories

Rosenow, 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40 But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research. In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place. This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together. The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46 But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference. 3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple. The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else: Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50 However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52 Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53 Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico. It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57 Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58 Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort. Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62 Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63 Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans: It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me. You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference. It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64 By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68 Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable. By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)? This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections. 4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters. The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74 What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77 Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters. Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79 But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others). Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Settler colonialism is an essentialist framework – in its desire to simplify the Native/Settler binary, it reproduces epistemological whiteness and undermines Indigenous knowledge

Andersen 9 (Chris, Associate Professor of Native Studies at Alberta, “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density”, Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 15 No 2 2009, pg. 80-100) //Don Markos

Champagne’s abstraction, imprecision and internal contradictions make it difficult to produce definitive conclusions about his work. However, Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid the essentialism which grounds it. My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘continued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to overshadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’. His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant, whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily struggles. For example, Champagne proposes that ‘[i]mproving existing theories or categorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and col- onial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘most current theories do not provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’.44 One of many questions which arise from such statements, of course, is the extent to which Indigenous studies—which must necessarily place itself within the same academic relations of power that shape ‘Western’ disciplines—can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque Champagne is writing on its behalf (more on this in part three). Of more immediate concern: given that Native studies must operate within the forms of power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines, what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne, it is our valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western concepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, pre- cisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of Western disciplines: race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control ... the focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclusion into US society as a primary goal.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Now is the time to rethink the way we think about outer space by shifting to an indigenous engagement with it

Smiles 20 (Deondre, “The Settler Logic of (Outer) Space”, October 26, 2020, AB

Indigenous Engagement with ‘Space’ [image omitted] "River of Souls" by Carl Gawboy (as published in Indian Country Today, 4/2/16) I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space. After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans? One potential avenue of Indigenous involvement comes through the active involvement of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous perspectives in space exploration, of course. This involvement can be possible through viewing outer space through a ‘decolonial’ lens, for instance. Astronomers such as Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz have spoken about the need to avoid replicating colonial frameworks of occupation and use of space when exploring places such as Mars, for example (Mandelbaum, 2018). The rise of logics of resource extraction in outer-space bodies have led to engagements by other academics such as Alice Gorman on the agency and personhood of the Moon. Collaborations between Indigenous people and space agencies such as NASA help provide the Indigenous perspective inside space exploration and the information that is gleaned from it, with implications both in space and on a Earth that is dealing with climate crisis (Bean, 2018; Bartels, 2019). Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” [image omitted] (Photo Credit: Indigenous Education Institute) These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same. [i] While this essay focuses on an American context, I highly recommend reading Alice Gorman’s piece “The cultural landscape of interplanetary space” for some examples outside of the United States, such as the British/Australian Woomera rocket range and its effects upon Aboriginal peoples.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K Affs › CYBERNETICS

Attempts to restrain and control crisis creates a state of insecurity that makes conflict inevitable, this creates a vortex of death where the clean up of one crisis only guarantees the next–––exporting violence in order to preserve domestic peace makes instability perpetual

18[ teaches social anthropology at HSE St Petersburg and is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Social Anthropology, “Hybrid Peace: Ethnographies of War,” Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 47, pp. 251-262, 2018, ]

If this scholarship charts global extensions of US security concerns, how is this assemblage of security and war theorized? Reyna (2016) draws on a Marxist structuralist view of global socioeconomic inequalities and contradictions. He makes a case both for the globalization of US warfare and for its imperial character from the early beginnings of the United States since its independence in 1783. But he focuses in detail on the period from 1945 to 2014. The most recent decades are described in terms of the “situational fixation” on oil and terror (Reyna 2016, p. 309). For instance, the US war in Afghanistan was an attempt to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where they formed from elements of the US-supported anti-Soviet mujahideen movement. But, for Reyna, it is also part of the “scramble” for Caspian oil that started in the 1990s. Because this area was landlocked, “Central Asian [oil] wars have actually been fought outside the Caspian Basin in areas suitable for pipelines,” namely in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Kosovo (Reyna 2016, p. 412). Force is a central category in Reyna’s approach. But it is a complex construct because its use is simultaneously the mark of a given system’s expansion and entropy. Elites’ structural dispositions produce d´elire—a constitutive anxiety that leads to violent action where and when, for this elite, “peace fails” but which in turn does not resolve but exacerbates socioeconomic and political contradictions. In Afghanistan, despite changing tactics and deploying new military technologies, including drones, the US military intervention failed on both oil and counterterror fronts (Reyna 2016, pp. 419–23). It is such a failure that engenders what Besteman (2017) terms a “security empire”: the “imposition” of multiple security regimes, in Somalia as her case in point, that are managed from the outside. These security regimes are constituted through the imperial logic of the US domestic concerns but with unintended consequences. She argues that it was the US foreign policy toward Somalia after 9/11 that enabled the emergence of Al Shabaab as an effective anti-Western terrorist group (Besteman 2017, p. 411). This action, in turn, made suspect, and thus vulnerable, Somalian refugees in the United States. In short, the incoherence and multiplicity of these security regimes are, in fact, generative of the opposite: “spaces of uncertainty, fear and violence” (p. 405). This view stems from Foucault’s (2003) understanding of the foundational role of security for the modern biopolitical state. If Reyna focuses on security elites as agents who decide on going to war, this perspective is about governance regimes over various populations that are continuous across “multiple and often interlocking spatial scales” that branch out from body, family, neighborhood, city, and region to the national and the global and, in turn, generating these spatial scales themselves (Gluck & Low 2017, p. 285). There is a homology between these ¨ spaces and scales, but it is relative. This perspective does not constitute a “Russian doll model of a fixed and nested hierarchy” but one of criss-crossing flows, linkages, and horizontal networks (p. 285; see also Fawaz & Bou Akar 2012, Goldstein et al. 2010). It is also hierarchical; its relatively homologous base is to ensure, however improbably, that there is no violence, whereas its top is to ensure that it can exercise violence. We see a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence distributed unevenly in these spaces—hence the concept of “empire” in the singular rather than that of multiple “empires.” A military isomorphism developed along these spatial scales (Pretorius 2008) in what one may call security metrology, but of course it is not for all kinds of arms. A relative homology may blur the distinction between domestic and international states of security, but other distinctions are clear: There are constitutive acts of warfare that some agents, such as Reyna’s elites, can legitimately do and that others cannot and should not. Hardt & Negri (2000) identify the Christian concept of the just war in the face of the enemy that represents a moral as well as a military threat as underpinning this monopoly of violence. But it is Agamben (2005) who had been influential in linking these forms of governance and specific means of warfare. Drawing on Schmitt’s Political Theology, he highlighted the extralegality as a conceptual foundation of sovereignty, making it possible to address ethnographically the new reality of war, e.g., the unaccountability of its brutality, subcontacting, violations of human rights, use of foreign territories for prisons and violent interrogation, etc. This approach has been useful for understanding the beginning of the War on Terror. But both this war’s duration and its geopolitical effects—some revealed by the ethnographies of war that I discuss here and some that are still to be explored—challenge the analytic developed by Agamben. First, this perspective assumes a singularity of the concept of sovereignty. Here, the work of Asad (2007) on suicide bombing is suggestive of alternative views of sovereignty as well as of dangers of reading such alterity through a Euro-American lens, whether Orientalist or Agamben-inspired. Not all contemporary forms of citizenship are grounded in the distinction of z¯o¯e and bios—of bare or “natural” life versus “full” or “good” life. Not all contemporary forms of sovereignty have a legalistic foundation—specifically, the Roman law to which the state of emergency is a state of exception. Kalinin argues that the contemporary language of the Russian state is Bakhtinian as it draws on the notion of the outside that is nonfinalizable and thus unaccountable but not exceptional. He exemplifies this concept of the nonfinalizable with a statement of Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu about the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine: “It’s very difficult to look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if there’s not any cat. And it’s...stupid to look for a cat [there], if the cat is smart, bold and polite” (Kalinin 2017, p. 5). This statement simultaneously denies and admits, jokes and does not joke. The phrase “polite people” has become a euphemism for Russian troops in Crimea during its 2014 annexation. Second, in the hybrid peace that has emerged as a result of this warfare and global security regimes, these different forms of sovereignty are mutually constituted. The argument that Besteman (2017) makes with regard to Al Shabaab in Somalia as engendered by US foreign policy is applicable to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The comment by Sergey Shoigu that Kalinin discusses is intended for a domestic audience. But if it implies at all the issue of international legitimacy of recent military interventions, it is only to question who exactly is the sovereign who decides on exceptions. In turn, Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical statements beginning with those from his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference consistently called into question the legitimacy of Western interventions from Kosovo to Iraq and Libya. But he also used these interventions to shape his own idiom of Russian sovereignty and its zone of influence (Russkii mir)—and not just to take Western interventions as a mark of a “new normalcy,” to borrow a 2001 phrase from US Vice President Dick Cheney, and not just to assert that the “theater of operations” that this “new” normalcy inaugurates (Masco 2014, pp. 7–8) is not a single-actor stage, but also to ground it in the narrative of the “old” normalcy of the Soviet and Russian imperial legacies. Third, the ethnography of war that I have discussed has raised doubts about whether this view of sovereignty is not contingent on “Schmittean politics” in which both sovereignty and security are territorially bound. Masco makes this point by drawing on the political philosopher Carlo Galli: Globalization is the epoch in which the State no longer protects its citizens from external turbulence. The principle of protego ergo obligo (“protection, therefore obedience”) was the load-bearing column of modern politics, but in the global age, anything can happen anywhere, at any moment, precisely because the State no longer filters disorder from the external environment (terrorist acts, migratory flows, the movement of capital) and is no longer capable of transforming it into internal peace. (Galli 2010, p. 158, cited in Masco 2014, pp. 35–36). Yet even if the state’s goal remains this filtering of disorder, this simply cannot be achieved by a global extension of domestic security. As Gusterson (2016) demonstrates, drone warfare and global surveillance technologies, while creating a global panoptic space, are not accompanied by a territorial rule aimed at transforming this gaze into disciplinary power. These technologies of global vision are deployed to guard security within select red lines and to do so by pointed and “nomadic” interventions (see on this further below). However, the recent shape of the “external environment” to which Galli refers is not simply global. It constitutes distinct territorial patterns of sources of danger and targets of military interventions. For instance, Reyna grounds the decision of US security elites to go to war in what he calls “Shultzian Permission.” This principle takes its cue from US Secretary of State George Shultz’s comments about one of the occasions when the Reagan administration resorted to violence: “If nothing else worked, the use of [military] force was necessary” (Reyna 2016, p. 45). War is a certain time when politics fails. However, this is not just time but also space. George Shultz’s case in point was not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) but Grenada and Panama. Politics has not (as yet) failed in the relations between nuclear powers and in relations between nuclear powers and strong nonnuclear states, such as Turkey. The United States does not conduct undeclared drone warfare against Russia or China. There are places, however, where one can afford to have politics fail and where one can also afford significant enemy casualties while reducing one’s own to a minimum. This worldview is entrenched geopolitically as well as culturally and assumes a hierarchical division of spaces and populations. It was this that Schmitt (2006) has put as nomos: order that constitutes order, an ordo ordinans or “order of ordering” (p. 78). In other words, I argue that the analytical purchase of a “Schmittean politics” looks different if it does not privilege Schmitt’s Political Theology and The Concept of the Political but incorporates his other writing as well.

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K Affs › PESS

Revolutionary acts of indigenous resistance and black resistance must work together to combat the colonial structure as a collective movement of struggle

Kidane 13(Luam Kidane, 10-29-2013, "Building connections across decolonization struggles," ROAR Magazine, , Luam Kidane’s curatorial work, research, and writing examines movement building at the intersections of anti-authoritarian thought and practice, cultural production and articulations of self-determination. She is the co-curator of NSOROMMA, a pan-African arts initiative.) // JL AA

On October, 4, 2013 Herman Wallace, an Afrikan Freedom Fighter, died in the United States after being held in solitary confinement for 42 years. On October 7, 2013, Indigenous groups joined in an international day of action, to “proclaim the importance of indigenous sovereignty” and to mark the 250th anniversary of the Royal Proclamation: a document claimed to be both a foundational recognition of Indigenous rights in Canada and “a British declaration of ownership.”Two separate days and two seemingly disconnected struggles. In order for our stories not to die in the silences that separate them, our movements must move toward what Pamela Palmater has called the “fundamental change that is needed to keep the status quo from killing our people.” We must flip the script of our seemingly isolated struggles by connecting the pathways that transcend colonial borders, and by reflecting on the strategies we are employing in our shared struggles for freedom. The rallying cry of the Idle No More movement first surfaced online in November 2012. Since then little has changed. Bill C-45 — the Orwellian Jobs and Growth Act against which the movement first arose — has become law. The 13-point Declaration of Commitments that ended Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike has yet to be implemented. The Harper government refuses to support a national inquiry into murdered and missing Indigenous women. On October 7th, UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya was finally allowed to enter Canada to begin his inquiry. Where are we, as the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island, since the first wave of actions swept across public consciousness? Herman Wallace was released three days before his death. After 42 years of imprisonment, Federal Judge Brian A. Jackson ordered his release on a technicality because women were excluded from the jury in his trial. The release said nothing about the contradictions of a legal and penitentiary system built on slavery and genocide, holding captive an Afrikan activist fighting for the freedom of his people. To mitigate the tragedy of Wallace’s passing, many have tried to find comfort in the notion that he might have found peace and freedom in death. But in what state are our struggles if we somehow find reprieve in death? BEAUTIFUL, BUT THE STRUGGLE ISN’T SO LOVELY [A]s architects of discourse and as builders of a movement, what do we know about the bottom of the barrel? How is that place of knowledge, clarity, injustice and violence reflected in our work? What everyday choices would we make if we were accountable to that place?— Alexis Pauline Gumbs Colonialism, displacement, and the violence of the state has Afrikan communities under continual siege. The bottom of the barrel for Afrikans is a place of abject poverty, alienation from ancestral histories, and a place where every 28 hours an Afrikan person in the United States is murdered. The everyday survival of Afrikans, in a world that sees us as valuable only in terms of profit margins, is a revolutionary act in and of itself. But we must constitute our revolutionary struggles beyond just survival. What everyday choices are we making as Afrikan communities? What structures of governance are we creating or replicating? How do these structures affect our fight for self-determination? Afrikan communities are in a state of emergency. Our people are being killed in the name of ensuring the growth of capital and, by extension, the systems of white supremacy that embody its cultural hegemony. We are seeing these patterns from Haiti to the Congo. The continual subordination of Afrikans is the basis on which white supremacy flourishes. There is an inherent contradiction in the fact that Afrikans’ continue to seek refuge from this violence by imagining our freedom within the state. As Sem Mbah and I.E. Igariwey put it in their book, African Anarchism, “electoralism in Africa [and the Diaspora] is merely a diversionary tactic used to mask the transfer of power from one group of exploiters to the other. The fact that countries such as Congo, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Malawi have lately installed multi-party electoralism is evidence that it leads to nothing really new.” As architects of discourse and builders of movements, it is imperative that we shift our political paradigms and begin to act on alternatives that can provide for the material needs of Afrikan peoples, without further tightening the chains of our oppression. Our self-determination cannot be confined to systems of governance that require us to always be hungry in order to function. Kai Barrow calls this contradiction “raw opposition” — a space that is created when people fighting to be free must navigate the reproduction of oppressive systems: “this contradiction creates a “raw opposition” that is explosive… As organizers, our challenge is to identify the nature of our raw opposition and build/create within the space between oppression and freedom. We are charged with entering the space of raw opposition with clarity, precision, and analysis, passion, energy, and generosity.” The choices we make as organizers, if we were responsible to the explosive raw opposition, must incorporate anti-authoritarian alternatives. Our appeals to the state are precisely what allowed our Afrikan Freedom Fighters to sit in solitary confinement for 42 years to find freedom only in death. Our appeals to the state have gone unanswered. We must do things differently. We must, as C.L.R. James put it in his History of Pan-African Revolt, turn away “from protests by asking for reforms, to protests by revolutionary action.” WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE CALL-TO-ACTION BECOMES THE ACTION ITSELF? The Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island must also turn away from the endless cycles of protests and appeals to the state, by seeking new forms of revolutionary action. Before the glazed-eyed apathy of our media-haze became a stupor-induced refrain of endless proclamations, calls-to-action, proposed mobilizations and incessant repetitions of demands, there was movement. Indigenous people have long refused to be idle in the face of ongoing colonial violence. Our resistance remains a precondition of our survival. And though our organizational networks have expanded through the recent upsurge in Indigenous activism, existing colonial power structures remain intact. Indigenous resurgence continues to be met with equal and opposing force. How are we enacting new forms of struggle in the face of state violence and corporate coercion? The persistent survival of Indigenous nations has long been perceived by settler society as inherently outmoded, savage and obstructive. Yet the seeds of our strength can be found in the occluded spaces of this narrative of domination. Indigenous peoples’ collective capacity to obstruct, to interrupt and — substantively — to break from the destructive force of the colonial status quo, constitutes much of our “raw opposition” and regenerative political power. Our strength is constituted in a pre-colonial Indigenous nationhood that remains rooted in our homelands and territories, manifest in our laws, ways of life and traditional systems of governance. Our power predates the state’s official revisionist histories. Indigenous nationhood exceeds the limits of the settler imagination. The legacy of the Idle No More movement is to have given renewed voice to this disruption. When the movement exploded into public consciousness with the full force of our repressed histories of resistance, our struggles were made visible: colonial Canada was laid bare. And when thousands of our people lined the halls of parliamentary buildings, malls and public spaces, our multiplicity coalesced, powerfully, into the unitary force of a determined presence. We were many as one. But emergent fault lines became visible in the silences that followed. While some fight for decolonization, others continue to pursue ideals of justice and freedom defined by settler paradigms of state-based rights and recognition. Our movement has succumbed to new forms of stasis. We have been coerced into accepting the false promises of fulfilled treaty partnerships, revenue sharing agreements, Royal Proclamations, and United Nations declarations. Networks of Established Activism, and an accompanying phalanx of settler sympathizers, have infiltrated our movements at every turn. And this defanged form of contention is now performed through re-purposed protests, marches and re-branded public demonstrations. The “Indigenous rights revolution” has become a mechanical spectacle. Yet, facing this crisis of credibility, the rhetoric of sovereignty continues to be called upon to designate all forms of Indigenous political action. Sovereignty is proclaimed with every neoliberal utterance of selfhood, public declaration of presence, and aphoristic status update. What happens when the call-to-action becomes the action itself? Declarations of revolution remain trapped in their own enclosed rhetoric — abstracted from action and severed from the very doing and becoming that are necessary for us to produce alternative “possible futures”. Action becomes the production of affect, divorced from the more urgent project of transforming the material conditions of colonization that have produced our oppression in the first place. And as the recent crisis in Elsipogtog demonstrates, every assertion of Indigenous autonomy that disrupts the flow of capital sparks a new round of state violence and repression. “THE LOUDER MY VOICE THE DEEPER THEY BURY ME” Our organizing demands clarity of purpose in our actions in order to mutually reinforce our shared struggles, as peoples and nations, seeking to reorder our world. Actions that do not move us closer toward these objectives have to be jettisoned. If we can accept that raw opposition exists in the silences between battle cries and spectacularized public sentiments, we can recuperate the power of a potential found in interstitial disruptions of state-made memories. If we accept the current corporate form of Indigenous activism and Afrikan electoralism as the basis from which to articulate our political demands, we will encounter a form of colonial bondage which dictates that the struggle for freedom be waged in terms that are already accepted by state institutions. What does this freedom look like? As George Manuel reminds us, “They say freedom has no colour. It’s pure white”. Our survival as Afrikan peoples and the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island will be determined by how well we are able to build movements not for the sake of their own motion, but with the capacity to conceive and enact transformations of our existing political institutions. The textures of this transformation will require us to weave our resistance with fabrics of creativity and accountability. These dreams of freedom mean that our acts of resistance are inextricably linked as Afrikan peoples and Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island. But fundamentally, what this means is that we need to seriously, purposefully and with urgency begin look to each other — not to the state — for our self-determination. As Kuwasi Balagoon put it, “freedom is a habit” we need to start practicing.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K Affs › PESS

Criticisms of decolonization and suggestions of them being anti black remain attatched to the settler colonial understandings of property and land, black and indeginous struggles are not only compatible but necessary to work with eachother

Curley et al 22[Andrew Curley is a researcher at the University of Arizona, Pallavi Gupta is a PHD candidate at UNC, Lara Lookabaugh is a PHD candidate at UNC, Christopher Neubert is a PHD candidate at UNC, Sara Smith is an associate professor at UNC]

Whereas Garba and Sorentino suggest that land struggles are antiblack, we contend that the authors’ own understanding of land remains ontologically attached to settler colonial understandings of land as property, despite a quick acknowledgment of Native epistemologies of land. This we suspect emerges from the conflation of settler colonial studies as a scholarship, whose categories are most in dispute here, and decolonisation as an Indigenous-led political project that challenges the foundations of white supremacy in the first place (see also A Simpson ; Snelgrove et al. ). To distinguish between these analytics, we follow King’s (:65) designation of white settler colonial studies, in reference to the work of Wolfe () and how his premise and scholarship “end up consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and Indigenous studies”. King (:65) observes that this practice, paradoxically (or not), “enacts a discursive shift that privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement, and settler colonial relations … this works to displace conversations about genocide, slavery, and the violent project of making the human (humanism)” (see also O’Brien ; Snelgrove et al. ). Tuck and Yang (:5) write that settler colonialism undoes Indigenous relationships with the land, cosmologically, epistemologically, and ontologically, rendering Indigenous peoples “premodern” and “savage”. Garba and Sorentino critique Tuck and Yang’s point, accusing them of leaving Indigenous understandings of land undefined. In this way, Garba and Sorentino replicate the ontological violence of colonialism, demanding Indigenous peoples account for themselves while insinuating Native land projects are suspect, or “not methodologically innocent” (2020:772)—guilty of the crime of wanting their land back. If we begin from these categories, we concede to a world that is how the settler-enslaver wishes it to be. We must unsettle these definitions of land. Against an understanding of land-as-property or land-as-resource, Native scholarship provides more nuanced and relational theorisations of land that are not accounted for in settler categories (see e.g. Daigle , ; Liboiron ). As Tonawanda Band of Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman (:71) writes, “maintaining relationships to the land is at the heart of Indigenous peoples’ struggles”. Native feminists help us understand land and bodies as intimately connected, as sites of colonial struggle, relationality, and community (Cabnal ; Denetdale ; Goeman ; Paredes ; Yazzie ; see also Zaragocin and Caretta ). Tanana Athabascan scholar Dian Million (:26) unpacks the difference between Indigenous and settler-colonial understandings of land; she writes, “Indigenous peoples’ lifeways as ancient nations are different ontological and material interpretations of life that question and offer alternative imaginaries outside of capitalism”. We cannot accept the settler-enslaver definition of land or the premise that Black people in the Americas are dispossessed from connection to land through slavery in such a way that past and future connections to land are foreclosed (Lanier ; McKittrick ). While settler-enslaver truth asserts a clear, distinguishable division among colonised subjects, the project of settler colonialism has “never been concerned with which came first, or which is more elemental” and remains pervasive precisely because it rejects its own dichotomies and thrives in ambiguity (Leroy ). As Kauanui (:258) writes, “to assert blackness as ontological is to recapitulate colonising thought, to take colonial ideology as truth”. Cordis (:10; see also Kelley 2017) succinctly describes this problem in settler colonial theory as maintaining the dis/placement of Black bodies “through an implicit association of Blacks as dislocated or attenuated settlers or exploited labourers, eliding the intersection of blackness and indigeneity or Black indigeneity”. Robin D.G. Kelley () points to the acceptance of settler truths as a pitfall of settler colonial studies in Wolfe’s () formulation. Wolfe (:2) declares that the role colonialism gives Indigenous people “is to disappear”, but that, “By contrast, though slavery meant the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonised for their labour rather than for their land”. For Kelley (:268), this limits Indigeneity to the Americas and Australasia, and erases African Indigeneity “through linguistic sleight of hand”, because “Africans are turned into Black Americans”, a renaming that “severs any relationship to their land and Indigenous communities”. Kyle Mays (:43) disassembles the Black/Native binary that settler colonial studies relies on, asking: “what if we take seriously that those Africans who were Indigenous peoples stolen from their own places of home and forced to labour on dispossessed land, were actually Indigenous?” By recognising Indigeneity beyond the Americas, Mays frames Black Indigeneity as an analytic that allows connection between contemporary African American cultural expressions and belonging and Africa. This belonging is generated through cultural practices, but is complicated when claims to land and reparations assume the unimpeded futurity of the settler state as undergirding these claims. Mays’ engagements with Black Indigeneity remind us of the necessity of working through multiple and contextually-grounded frames of analysis and claim-making. As Vimalassery et al. (:3) explain, “when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely … effects and enactments of colonial unknowing”, that is, a refusal to know how colonisation has shaped the world—the “act of ignoring” colonialism is an “epistemological orientation that works to preempt relational modes of analysis” (Vimalassery et al. :1). “Colonial unknowing” also speaks to “the artificial impasse” in academic scholarship, and citational practices. We argue that these acts of unknowing also permeate scholarship. Citizenship and the categories of the white supremacist state, for instance, foreclose the possibility of Indigeneity for both enslaved Africans and migrants. Jackson () highlights how Indigeneity and Black identities come together in the formation of creole racial categories, one example of the multifaceted expressions of Black Indigenous identities which are place-based and context specific. In her work with Indigenous women migrants to the United States from Mexico and Guatemala, Speed (:9) describes how the Indigeneity of migrants is erased when they cross the border into the US and are categorised as Guatemalan or Mexican nationals: “The erasure of Indigenous migrants’ identity as Indigenous people is one in a long series of technologies used by settler states to eliminate Indigenous people, and as scholars we should not participate in reifying settler-imposed national borders in ways that facilitate such erasures”. Building on Coulthard’s () “grounded normativity”, Byrd gives us the language of arrivants, subverting settler-enslaver categories with a more generous reading of land and its ability to enable movement. Byrd’s “grounded relationalities” acknowledges Black and Indigenous people’s relation to land and sovereignty—“in place and in movement” (Byrd et al. :5). Through reduction and conflation, a people’s struggle for liberation is casually disregarded. Reductions limit our understanding of the processes and violence of settler-colonialism and slavery or push towards overdetermination by employing a single framework, inhibiting interdisciplinary dialogue and solidarity. Decolonisation is a political project to end oppression, restore sovereignty, and liberate colonised peoples. In her own work, Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd rejects the impasse and draws on the political agenda of Black feminists to strategise Indigenous liberation. Citing the Combahee River Collective, she writes, “we are left to ponder to make correct this core axiom: ‘If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression’” (Byrd :208).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Policy Affs › OCOs › L––Russia

From Geronnimo to Gernoimo EKIA settler memory frames the native as the eternal enemy. The projection of nativity onto the modern enemy of the US is a part of the collective settler memory that pursues the elimination of the other while reliving fetishized moments of settler colonial violence. This logic is embedded in engagements with foreign enemies deemed as threats by the US that become the racialized punching bag of the US’ settler colonial tendencies and a continuation of the US’ settler colonial project abroad.

Bruyneel 15[Kevin Bruyneels is a Professor of Politics at Babson College, “Codename Geronimo: settler memory and the production of American statism,” Settler Colonial Studies, 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090528]

To see the way in which settler memory connects the dots from Geronimo to Bin Laden as it concerns American state practices I now examine the relationship between colonial and imperial statist violence as articulated in a book published in late 2011, in the wake of the Bin Laden assassination. The book’s title is Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to Bin Laden. The book’s author is Benjamin Runkle, a Harvard trained political scientist who was a US Army captain in the Iraq War, worked as a speechwriter for the National Security Council during the W. Bush Administration and also worked as a staff member for the House Armed Services Committee. In 2014, he was program director for the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, and the organization’s motto is ‘Securing America, Strengthening Israel’. Runkle is thus both a product and an agent of US liberal colonialism and its imperial articulations, and he provides here an insider’s perspective on the production and purposes of American statism, expressed as much habitually as consciously. The book’s first sentence offers a call to contemporary memory: ‘It is both a cliché and an understatement to say that Tuesday, 11 September 2001, is a day that will forever be etched into the memory of all Americans who lived through it.’ 22 The historical chapters begin with the ‘Geronimo Campaign’ and then focus on the US military’s effort to ‘hunt’ down, in order, Emilio Aguinaldo of the Philippines in 1901 near the end of the Philippine-American war, Mexican Revolutionary General Pancho Villa from 1916–1917, Panamanian leader Manual Noriega in the late 1980s, Mohammed Farah Aideed of Somalia in the early 1990s, and then Saddam Hussein, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and Osama Bin Laden in the early twenty-first century. As is clear, all eight of these targets of American state violence are racial and ethnic others to the white settler American somatic norm. As well, all eight stem from nations or regions shaped by colonialism and imperialism, and each in their particular way offered forms of resistance to US state imperatives, a number of whom were direct or indirect allies of the USA at some point in time. To draw these similarities is not to defend or easily analogize any of these figures in terms of their individual politics, practices, and ideologies, but to place their targeting in the context of the development of American statism that is premised upon colonialist and imperialist practices, institutions, and violence. The fact that Runkle starts this narrative with Geronimo is itself no coincidence. It speaks to the necessary power of history and memory in the production and legitimation of American liberal colonial statism and US imperialism. Runkle is as an advocate for the American state practice of what he calls ‘manhunts’, proposing that ‘strategic manhunts will be increasingly attractive to future policymakers’. As well, he bemoans the way in which ‘the individuals targeted by US forces are often sanitized and romanticized by history, while the “quiet professionals” who protect us are often forgotten’. 23 Runkle also argues that manhunts are ‘not assassinations,’ because the essence of the latter is its ‘treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personell. Conversely, strategic manhunts use at least some overt deployment of uniformed forces acting under an established chain of command.’ 24 Here Runkle’s perspective reflects and re-iterates American statist practices in their constitutive relationship to settler memory, from someone trained in an elite US educational institution, deployed in combat in the US military, and who worked in two of the three federal branches. From his insider’s viewpoint, Runkle’s perspective is helpful because he offers an acute assessment of US liberal colonial practices in at least two respects. First, I would argue that Runkle is correct that those who are deemed to be the outlaws to the American state do, at times, become transformed, ‘sanitized and romanticized,’ although not by history, but in and through the politics of collective memory. Interestingly, though, of the eight ‘manhunt’ targets discussed in his book, it is really only Geronimo who has gone through this mnemonic transformation to such a significant degree, and maybe to a lesser extent Pancho Villa. But by my reading the other figures are either forgotten for the most part (Aguinaldo), or are in no evident way romanticized (Noriega, Aideed, Hussein, bin Laden) in American political culture. It is really Geronimo alone who epitomizes this form of mnemonic transformation, and in that respect it is a distinctly settler form of memory, one which seeks to transform him into a heroic but tragic figure who represents both the development of and resistance to colonialism, but thereby also stands mnemonically as the tamed, defeated product of US settlement. In other words, Geronimo’s persistent place in settler memory stands as evidence of US occupation being a settled matter and how it became so, with the ‘manhunt’ form standing here as an historical event that legitimates and sutures the practices of organized statist military actions as key components of contemporary settler colonial assemblage. Secondly, while I disagree with Runkle’s parsing of assassination versus strategic manhunt in an ethical sense, politically he offers what I deem to be an accurate, insider’s understanding of the purposes and practices of American statism when he claims that strategic manhunts are historically persistent, institutionalized, overt state functions, not rogue, covert, or atypical operations. ‘Strategic manhunts’ and operations of their ilk are not the exceptions to the functioning of statism. They are the statist rule for a liberal political community built upon colonial conquest and maintained through settler violence, law and memory. I would include the execution of the Dakota 38 and the massacre at Wounded Knee as two other such examples – two among many we can locate – that need to be remembered not as rogue exceptions to liberal statist practice, but rather as the rule of liberal colonial statism and US political development. They are not outside or at odds with statism, they are statism in practice. With regards to the invocation of Geronimo’s name, then, it is not a minor matter that Runkle’s narrative begins with Geronimo the historical person and ends with the killing of Bin Laden under the codename Geronimo. Rather, it points to the necessary role of settler memory in iterating and legitimating the purpose of statism in a liberal colonial context such as the USA. To invoke the name ‘Geronimo’ is to first call forth the violence of and resistance to colonial conquest and in American lore the settler victory over Indigenous peoples, and then to connect it mnemonically to the colonialist and imperialist practices of contemporary American statism. And the role of settler memory here is more powerful, more constitutive of settler ideology, by the likelihood that the association of Geronimo with Bin Laden, while not random, was likely more a product of the work of habitmemory than recollection-memory. As deployed here, settler memory habitually reminds the American population that the cold, violent state remains the vengeful defender of yore, and that the work of statist dispossession – of land, of life, of identity – goes on, and must do so. In this regard, ‘Geronimo EKIA’ is a prime example of a settler mnemonic that turns violent statist practices into unifying gestures linking past conquests to those of the present, and back again. We can see efforts to make this wider linkage clear in more radical political critiques that were articulated in the aftermath of the Bin Laden assassination. These critiques did not speak in language of multiculturalism or recognition, but rather in the discourse of colonialism. For example, on the show Democracy Now, Anishinaabe writer and activist Winona LaDuke offered her analysis, stating: The reality is that the military is full of native nomenclature. You’ve got Black Hawk helicopters, Apache Longbow helicopters. You’ve got Tomahawk missiles. The term used when you leave a military base in a foreign country is to go ‘off the reservation, into Indian Country’. So what is that messaging that is passed on? It is basically the continuation of the wars against Indigenous people.25 And Suzan Harjo, in an interview separate from her appearance at the Senate hearing, offered a similar reading to LaDuke’s, arguing that the use of Geronimo’s name shows ‘how deeply embedded the “Indian as enemy” is in the collective mind of America’. 26 I agree with their assessments, but would also add that what we see here, as we can with the many other examples of these forms of identity appropriation, is that the work of settler memory is fundamental to the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonial assemblage through a relationship to the past that is not about forgetting. It is a powerful form of national remembering. Conclusion In the contemporary era, I would include politics itself as among the facets of existence that settler colonialism colonizes. That is, settler colonial assemblage defines and seeks to bound that which is legitimately subject for debate and contestation as it concerns the distribution and role of power, identity, interest and institutions. Before one can even ask the question of settler colonial violence, dispossession, and appropriation, the question may be rendered moot, outside the bounds of legitimate, or realistic, politics. In this light, my suggestion here is that the response to such appropriations as that of Geronimo’s name should not be to ask the White House for an apology, and thus concede the status of this statist institution. Instead, the association should be embraced, in one key respect. To embrace the association is not to stand in alliance with Osama Bin Laden or Al Qaeda at all or the US military, but rather to re-assert the fact that Geronimo was, indeed, an enemy of American statism and settler colonialism. It is to maintain the political posture of friend versus enemy, and to render as important and necessary the status and actions of what political theorist Joel Olson called the zealot or fanatic as an important political category that holds out the possibility for more radical transformation of the political order.27 It is to say that the use of Geronimo’s name is not simply the sign of an absence of respect or sensitivity for Indigenous people, but is more evidence of the active presence of settler colonial assemblage in the specific form of US liberal colonialism. In sum, in critiquing the problem with the Codename Geronimo case, we should seek to avoid either reproducing a politics of recognition and multicultural discourse or diagnosing it as a sign of collective amnesia, as if only people knew all the ‘facts’ of history things would be fine, or better. Rather, in this regard, LaDuke and Harjo get it right I believe in emphasizing the persistent posture of American warfare against Indigenous people. While this is a difficult framework to ponder, it is the appropriate one for a decolonizing, unsettling politics which insists on drawing clear lines for and against settler colonialism. In this sense, the unsettling response here is to put settler memory front and center as an active contemporary practice, in which Geronimo’s name is utilized by the US military because the invocation of his legend habitually calls forth – possibly unlike any single figure in US-Indigenous history – the appropriative violence of settler colonial conquest that fundamentally shapes, as an active verb in the twenty-first century, the political development and status of American liberal colonialism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Policy Affs › OCOs › L––Russia

The villainization of Russia within US media constructs the possibility for violence to be justified by the western order – only a reorientation towards our analysis and norms can dissolve the securitization that keeps a constant war

Lazarov 20 (Same old Russian Enemy? A Content Analysis of the Portrayal of Russians in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare Danny Ivan Lazarov, Malmo University, Sweden, Peace and Conflict Studies, Bachelor Thesis, FK103L, 15 credits Spring Semester 2020, Supervisor: Katrine Gotfredsen, ) // JLHS AA

While the cold war might be a distant memory to many people in the world, today its effect on society is still being felt. Russians are still villainized in Western and particularly US media from movies to local news. From popular news station Fox News constantly presenting news stories from Syria about the Russian troops bombing and attacking Syrian rebel strongholds focusing more on the Russian government involvement within the conflict and less the Syrian government which it supports (McKay, 2019), to constant reporting on Russian meddling in in the US elections of 2016 (Pappas, 2018) showing them as masterminds manipulating elections and governments around the world. This idea of stereotypes and norms which persists after war or in this case the cold war, can be attributed to what Johan Galtung Calls negative peace the idea that violence does not end when the peace is signed between nations but instead lives on in the form of cultural violence (Galtung, 2013, pp 173). Cultural violence is according to Galtung the aspects of culture who promotes or make direct and structural violence acceptable. This culture comes in many forms such as media in general (Galtung, 2013, pp 41). In a sense this means that media can be used to create an environment where violence is justified and feels right to the perpetrator. With this idea of negative peace it could be argued that while at the moment the stereotypes and ideas which are spread by the media might seem to be passive and neutral, used for entertainment and not for war, they can easily be turned into something negative creating an enemy image which is one of the requirements for armed conflict to be justified according to Louis Oppenheimer (2003, pp 2). While this study does not deal with this problem directly, by highlighting these forms of cultural violence it brings awareness of their existence making it possible for them to be further debated and researched in future papers. This thesis is also highlighting the relationship which at times is forgotten between media, public culture, and politics and that everything can be political. This theme is explored in the book War, Politics and Superheroes: Ethics and Propaganda in Comics and Film by Marc Di Paolo (2011). Di Paolo explores how different political discourses and ideas show up in comics and films. From stories such as Batman fighting against Osama Bin Ladin to Superman fighting the KKK (2011, pp 49, 138). His book shows us that entertainment media can be influenced by politics both reflecting important political discourse’s but also important political events such as the Punisher being influence by Middle Eastern conflicts and the Vietnam war (Di Paolo, 2011, pp 115). This means that all entertainment media can be influenced in the same way, from films to video games making the studying of entertainment media important as to understand how and what political discourses are spread by video games.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Policy Affs › SPACE ASSETS › L––ASATS

Environmental monitoring systems place indigenous groups on the backburner only ensuring their erasure.

Thill 18 [Zackery Thill received his master’s degree from Lund University, “Rights Holders, Stakeholders, and Scientists: A Political Ecology of Ambient Environmental Monitoring in Alberta, Canada,” University of Oregon, http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23767]

States increasingly rely on ambient environmental monitoring systems to provide information on environmental conditions in order to make science-based decisions on resource management. This kind of monitoring relies on a network of state and intergovernmental agencies to generate indexes, thresholds, and indicators to assess the status of air, water, and biodiversity. As a result, these thresholds and indexes generate representations of environmental change, and they establish acceptable limits on pollution. However, in settler states like Canada, there are often major gaps in how First Nations experience environmental change compared to the agencies that produce the science. In recent years, monitoring has taken on a new importance because the findings from these agencies contribute to understanding how industrial development impacts First Nations’ treaty rights. Many First Nation communities have called for greater say in government agencies and have advocated for indicators that represent both their basic environmental concerns and their treaty rights. Using oil sands monitoring agencies as a lens, this dissertation examines the politics of environmental knowledge production between Indigenous groups and the state. I employ the “logic of elimination” concept from settler colonialism studies to explore the extent to which Indigenous groups have been incorporated in research design, decision-making, and the establishment of environmental thresholds. I use interviews, participant observation, and a Q-method survey to develop an understanding how settler colonialism functions not only through policies and legislation, but also scientists’ positionalities. The findings from this research demonstrate that monitoring agencies have no uniform policies to guide how they work with First Nations. Because of this, agencies have continually engaged with First Nations as stakeholders—not rights holders. This designation places First Nations on the same level as other interest groups and limits their abilities to shape what is monitored and how thresholds are set. As a result, the stakeholder position offers few avenues for First Nations to ensure treaty rights are considered in monitoring activities.