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2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – Not Key

OSCE not key to Moldova conflict prevention – past empirics prove

Khorolskaya 22 [Maria Khorolskaya, 01-01-2022, “OSCE’s Involvement in Conflict Resolution Across the Post-Soviet Space, moderndiplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/01/01/osces-involvement-in-conflict-resolution-across-the-post-soviet-space/]\\pairie

The OSCE participated in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict once its most acute phase had been overcome. In particular, the organisation was puzzled by the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of representatives of the armed forces of Moldova, Russia and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. According to its mandate, the mission should assist in laying the groundwork for dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, collecting information about the situation in the region, providing consultations, and encouraging negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on the status of the PMR and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Late in 1999, the mandate of the OSCE mission was expanded with the additional task of “ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments”.

The participation of the OSCE mission in the settlement of the crisis is ensured both through observers and through involvement in the negotiation process. The OSCE, along with Russia and Ukraine, is a guarantor of the 5+2 format. Over 28 years, the mission has helped to resolve a number of issues, including the opening of traffic on the bridge across the Dnieper River near the village of Gura Bîcului, providing Moldovan farmers with access to plots in the Dubăsari District of Transnistria, recognition of documents and license plates, etc. However, one cannot speak of a substantial intermediary contribution by the OSCE to the conflict resolution process. Progress in this process can only be achieved by changing the policies of the leading actors. Thus, the proposals of the mission representatives on possible ways out of the crisis did not find support in Chisinau and Tiraspol (1993 Report No. 13 by T. Williams, Head of Mission, proposing a special status for Transdniestria) [4].

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – Perm do the CP

All NATO member’s are in the OSCE – the counterplan engages with their individual member states that is obviously a way the plan could be done

GLOBE [GLOBE, “NATO/EU/OSCE Membership overlap,” GLOBE,

The membership of NATO, the EU and the OSCE overlap to a large degree (figures A and B). Moreover, this membership overlap has increased, especially after NATO’s and the EU’s eastern expansions, driving increased interaction, but also causing several interorganizational problems.

NATO, with a total of 30 member states, and the EU, consisting of 27, share 21 member states (figure C). The member states that are only a member of the EU and not of NATO are five neutral EU states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) as well as Cyprus. The member states that are only a member of NATO and not of the EU are six European states (Albania, Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway, Turkey and the UK), as well as the two North American members: Canada and the USA.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 2NC – US- China War

Attempting to maintain heg makes war with China inevitable

Edelstein 2018 – Prof in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Dept. of Government @ Georgetown David M and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “It’s a trap! Security commitments and the risks of

Since its 2010-2011 announcement, the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in the South and East China Seas. Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface around some of these locales, neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in ownership of contested areas. Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies for what they suggest about China's territorial ambitions. They are therefore important to the United States for the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its allies in their disputes with the P.R.C. by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor, clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and - above all - has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the "status quo" in contravention of China's own interests (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015;Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016).Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle: the more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct USChinese confrontation. In other words, treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China. This is entrapment of the purest sort. The United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia, maintain Asia's political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian maritime disputes. To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners is in the United States' interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.3

The second driver of entrapment comes from the response by East Asian countries themselves. It will be some time before we have detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama administration to pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the East Asian response since 2010-2011 suggests that moral hazard is increasing risks for the United States. One of the most striking trends in East Asia since the pivot is the renewed assertiveness of East Asian states in dealing with China Gohnston 2013; Associated Press 2015). This trend includes independent action by the Japanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a forward-leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at minimum, helps to justify a Chinese response.Japan, Korea, and others lobbied for the pivot for the express purpose of having the United States help them manage the rise of China - the implication being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 2NC – US- China War

Retrenchment is necessary to prevent a US-Sino war

MacDonald 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science @ Wellesley College Paul K and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, Cornell U Press, p. 199-200

International relations thinkers are rightly obsessed with rise and fall, war and peace. To date, most of them have looked at the historical record and not seen much cause for optimism. As new powers rise and old powers fall, the prospects for peace diminish because aggression pays and domestic politics is rife with dysfunction. Long placid periods are punctuated by thunderous bursts of war and change. Fear, honor, and greed come to the fore, and the tragedy of great powers politics repeats once more.

In this book, we developed a dissenting view. Starting from standard assumptions, we reasoned that the world is harsh enough to discipline domestic faction but not so harsh as to regularly demand aggression. Leaders have an array of policy tools to react in their own ways to shifting conditions, and states can seize control of their fates. Decline encourages retrenchment, but this is no bad thing and seldom a belligerent one. Past policymakers have done an admirable job keeping their ships of state from running aground, and today’s policymakers have better ships, better gauges, and better weather.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 2NC – Mearsheimer

Multipolarity is inevitable – nothing will stop the relative decline of US leadership and the rise of other powers; this is only something to fear if the US tries to maintain its status as the unipolar leader because it necessitates a confrontation with those rising powers

Mearsheimer 2018 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago John, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, Yale University Press, p. 227-229

If the United States had not been deeply involved in the developing world, might the Soviet Union have invaded a host of minor powers and turned them into puppet states? Perhaps the Soviets might have attacked a few smaller countries, but the result would not have been a steady string of communist victories. On the contrary, the Soviets would have ended up in one quagmire after another. Just look at what happened when the Soviet military moved into Afghanistan in 1979. They were stuck for ten years and ultimately suffered a humiliating defeat. U.S. interests would have been well served if the Soviets had had more Afghanistans, just as Moscow would have been well served if the United States had had more Vietnams. Baiting and bleeding the other side was a smart strategy for both superpowers.

Yet it is still difficult for American policymakers to think along these lines. Most of them fail to appreciate the power of nationalism and instead overestimate universal ideologies like communism and liberalism. Nevertheless, the historical record shows that the best strategy for a great power dealing with minor powers is to avoid getting involved in their domestic politics-and certainly not to invade and occupy them unless it is absolutely necessary. Aggressive intervention is what great powers should try to draw their rivals into doing. U.S. policymakers should keep this lesson in mind if the Sino-American security competition continues to heat up. A proper understanding of the relationship between liberalism, nationalism, and realism suggests that even the mightiest powers on the planetincluding the United States-should pursue a foreign policy of restraint. Any country that fails to understand that basic message and tries instead to shape the world in its own image is likely to face unending trouble.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC – Heg = War

Specifically we’ll go to war with Russia and China because of entrapment

Edelstein 2018 – Prof in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Dept. of Government @ Georgetown David M and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “It’s a trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment” in US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint, Routledge Press, p. 32

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble.

Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States - whose interests are clear - to ride to their defense. In the next section, we take a preliminary look at some evidence to test these claims. We focus on events in East and Southeast Asia over the last few years. Some have characterized Chinese aggression in recent years as reactionary. That is, China has felt compelled to respond to perceived provocations from smaller Asian nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Even though the US does not have formal security commitments to either country, Washington subsequently feels compelled to signal to these countries that it will stand up to Chinese aggression.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC – Heg = War

Hegemony causes war, proliferation, and terrorism

Mearsheimer 2018 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago John, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, Yale University Press, p. 2-3

This enthusiasm notwithstanding, liberal hegemony will not achieve its goals, and its failure will inevitably come with huge costs. The liberal state is likely to end up fighting endless wars, which will increase rather than reduce the level of conflict in international politics and thus aggravate the problems of proliferation and terrorism. Moreover, the state's militaristic behavior is almost certain to end up threatening its own liberal values. Liberalism abroad leads to illiberalism at home. Finally, even if the liberal state were to achieve its aims-spreading democracy near and far, fostering economic intercourse, and creating international institutions-they would not produce peace.

The key to understanding liberalism's limits is to recognize its relationship with nationalism and realism. This book is ultimately all about these three isms and how they interact to affect international politics. Nationalism is an enormously powerful political ideology. It revolves around the division of the world into a wide variety of nations, which are formidable social units, each with a distinct culture. Virtually every nation would prefer to have its own state, although not all can. Still, we live in a world populated almost exclusively by nation-states, which means that liberalism must coexist with nationalism. Liberal states are also nation-states. There is no question that liberalism and nationalism can coexist, but when they clash, nationalism almost always wins.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › --AT: Plan stops decline

Their impacts are fear-mongering, no risk of decline

Fettweis 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University Christopher J, Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press, p. 168-170

A few things can be said with certainty, however. First, the main engine of U.S. decline-the rise of challengers-has not occurred. Whether because of high costs, the essential benevolence of U.S. unipolarity, or some other factor, the world has not witnessed widespread balancing behavior over the last twenty-five years. States have generally tolerated unprecedented disparities in material power without much reaction at all. No new coalitions have formed to counter U.S. capabilities, which would be symptomatic of "external balancing," and few states are building up their militaries, or "internally" balancing the United States.24 The only major exception to this rule is China, but its commitment to balance is less clear than is sometimes portrayed. Beijing has consistently chosen to devote a very small percentage of its GDP toward defense-at or near 2 percent-a rate that is not growing.25 Increasing Chinese defense expenditures are a reflection of its growing economy, in other words, but not necessarily an increased imperative to balance the United States. Although the real level of Chinese spending is hotly debated, the Peoples' Republic could certainly devote more to its defense if it felt the need.

Second, perceptions of decline thrive during periods of uncertainty, especially those following foreign-policy disasters. It is no coincidence that Paul Kennedy wrote Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the United States in the 1970s or that Otto Spengler wrote about the decline of the West from the perspective of Germany in the early 192os.26 The mixed bag of negative emotions that follow foreign-policy catastrophe-anger, guilt, shame, doubt, insecurity-contributes to an overall sense of pessimism about the future and about foreign policy in general. Disasters always seem to portend even greater ones to come. Status is fueled by perception as much as reality, and when pessimism reigns, decline seems imminent.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC– Decline Inevitable

The failure of US leadership and Trumpism makes hegemonic decline inevitable

Posen 2018 - Ford International Prof of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies @ MIT Barry, "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump's Surprising Grand Strategy," 97 Foreign Aff. 20 (2018)

Hegemony is always difficult to achieve, because most states jealously guard their sovereignty and resist being told what to do. But since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. foreign policy elite has reached the consensus that liberal hegemony is different. This type of dominance, they argue, is, with the right combination of hard and soft power, both achievable and sustainable. International security and economic institutions, free trade, human rights, and the spread of democracy are not only values in their own right, the logic goes; they also serve to lure others to the cause. If realized, these goals would do more than legitimate the project of a U.S.-led liberal world order; they would produce a world so consonant with U.S. values and interests that the United States would not even need to work that hard to ensure its security.

Trump has abandoned this well-worn path. He has denigrated international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, which make nice scapegoats for the disruptive economic changes that have energized his political base. He has abandoned the Paris climate agreement, partly because he says it disadvantages the United States economically. Not confident that Washington can sufficiently dominate international institutions to ensure its interests, the president has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, launched a combative renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and let the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership wither on the vine. In lieu of such agreements, Trump has declared a preference for bilateral trade arrangements, which he contends are easier to audit and enforce.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › --xt Decline Peaceful

Hegemonic decline will be peaceful

Fettweis 2017 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University Christopher, "Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace," Security Studies, 26:3, 423-451, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394

Why has armed conflict declined to historically low levels? What accounts for the post-Cold War peace, and how long is it likely to last? Surely no questions are more important for either the theory or practice of international relations, and few are harder to answer. Only by understanding the causes of the New Peace can we extrapolate its likely future, however, and plan accordingly. Of the many possible independent variables, none is more controversial than the suggestion that hegemonic stability is at work. The possibility that the United States, wittingly or not, has essentially established a global Pax Americana is generally overlooked by the major scholarly works on the subject. This stands in stark contrast to the policy world, where the many positive aspects of unipolarity and/or US hegemony are articles of faith, rarely discussed and never seriously questioned. Scholar and public intellectual Michael Lind spoke for many when he wrote, “in my experience, most members of the U.S. foreign policy elite sincerely believe that the alternative to perpetual U.S. world domination is chaos and war.” 4 One of those is certainly Robert Kagan, who noted, “Pinker traces the beginning of a long-term decline in deaths from war to 1945, which just happens to be birthdate of the American world order. The coincidence eludes him, but it need not elude us.”5

This paper examines the theoretical, empirical, and psychological foundations of that widespread belief. The first section discusses the New Peace and its potential explanations; the second explains the difference between unipolarity and hegemony, and examines the logic of the hegemonic-stability argument; the third turns to the evidence, comparing both US power and grand strategy to conflict levels; the fourth examines the political psychology of hegemony and reviews some major findings that provide insight into how international order can be misperceived. Insights from that field are crucial in any discussion of the relationship between US power and global stability, which is built far more on belief and perception than evidence.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › --xt Cognitive Dissonance

Decline will be slow and peaceful – all of their impact claims are rooted in cognitive dissonance

Fettweis 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University Christopher J, Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press, p.172-173

Not all declines have gone so smoothly for the people who experienced them, of course. Sudden and sharp collapses, whether accompanied by marauding Goths and Vandals or not, are usually unpleasant experiences. The Soviet empire collapsed all at once, as did those of the Habsburgs and Ottomans, which led to instability, economic stagnation, and violence. No such rapid collapse is likely in the United States' future, however. Even the most inveterate pessimists do not envision a sudden reversal of fortunes and end of the unipolar system. All declinists predict a gradual, if inevitable, relative weakening, largely as the result of rising wealth and power elsewhere.38 The American experience is much more likely to resemble the gradual, graceful decline of Spain or Great Britain than the catastrophic collapse of Rome or the Soviets. And some scholars have even proposed that Chinese leadership would be accompanied by a greater degree of international stability, given Beijing's general disinterest in promoting revolutionary democratic change.39

The end of unipolarity will have positive aspects as well. Perception is likely to improve in Washington, for one thing, at least in certain areas. Researchers have found that the kind of overconfident self-assessments that impoverish the decision making of unipolar powers can be diminished if power is reduced.40 Once their dominance ends, over time the U.S. public might come to perceive the world in a more accurate way and craft better policies to deal with it. Or at least one can hope.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC – Collapse Peaceful

Hegemonic decline will be peaceful

MacDonald 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science @ Wellesley College Paul K and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, Cornell U Press, p. 2-3

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly confl icts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › AT: Taiwan war

The 1AC is neocon rhetoric aimed at making a mountain out of a molehill. China won’t attack Taiwan.

Cohen '21 [Michael, 11/19/2021, "No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan," https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan]

One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would look more like the World War II Marine assaults on the rough and unforgiving terrain of Pacific islands than it would D-Day (which was no walk in the park, either) but against an exponentially more competent and technologically advanced military. Even if somehow China were successful in invading Taiwan and occupying the island, it would then find itself in the position of having to pacify and potentially rebuild an advanced nation of 23 million people (two million of whom are members of the nation’s military reserves).

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC – Peaceful rise

China’s rise is peaceful and they won’t displace the US.

Nathan '22 - Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University [Andrew, March/April, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making]

The country’s geographic position is also unfavorable. Along its land and sea borders, China confronts distrustful neighbors. Among them are seven of the 15 most populous countries in the world (India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam) and five countries with which China has fought wars within the past 80 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam). None of China’s neighbors is culturally Chinese or ideologically aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. All may cooperate with China at various times and to varying degrees for strategic or economic reasons, but all seek to hedge against Chinese domination, often by cultivating relations with the United States. As Chinese behavior has become more assertive, this counterbalancing behavior is growing more evident. India has compromised its traditional strategic autonomy in order to participate in joint military exercises with Australia, Japan, and the United States as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad. Japan has taken the unprecedented step of officially declaring stability in the Taiwan Strait to be a national interest. And Australia has reaffirmed its U.S. alliance by accepting help in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines under the 2021 AUKUS agreement. China is unlikely to achieve anything like hegemony over any but the smallest of its neighbors.

Geography helps explain another Chinese weakness: its lack of allies other than North Korea. There are countries that are nearby enough to receive substantial help from China in the case of a military conflict, but they all fear China more than they fear any other state. The lack of allies is more a liability than an asset, for it deprives China of ways to multiply the pressure it can put on uncooperative neighbors and of the ability to position sizable military forces around the world. To be sure, none of the United States’ 60-some allies and partners has interests identical to Washington’s. None can be counted on to follow every component of U.S. strategy toward China. But U.S. alliances and partnerships still complicate China’s military calculations, increase the pressure on Beijing to comply with the international norms preferred by other states, and expand the alternatives available to countries considering whether to accept Chinese investments.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC/2AC – AT: War

Diplomacy, internationalism, globalization, and deterrence mean no chance of war.

Thorton '22 - Senior Fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School [Susan, March/April, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making]

John Mearsheimer’s article engenders a sense of foreboding and doom. “Engagement may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history,” he writes. As a result, “China and the United States are locked in what can only be called a new cold war. . . . And this cold war is more likely to turn hot.”

I cannot agree that the U.S. policy of engaging China was a major strategic blunder. During the Cold War, that policy succeeded at convincing China to stop sponsoring communist revolutions in East Asia and helped counter the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, engagement enabled massive economic growth in China that lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty—a significant reason that the share of people worldwide living in extreme poverty, by the World Bank’s definition, fell from 36 percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 2015. Surely, this counts as a major human achievement.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC - NATO Bad

NATO is useless and causes a moral hazard – best for the US to exit

Whiton 2018 - Senior Fellow @ the Center for the National Interest Christian, "NATO Is Obsolete," Jul 6, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-25167?page=0%2C1

After the alliance was established in 1949, its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, summed up its purpose concisely: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The unofficial mission matched the time well: Western Europe’s postwar future was clouded by the prospect of a Soviet invasion, American insularity, or German militarism—all possible given the preceding decades of history.

Nearly seventy years later, none of these concerns still exist. Furthermore, NATO's opposing alliance during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, quit the Soviet Bloc in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself passed into history in 1991—twenty-seven years ago.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Leadership Advantage › 1NC - NATO Bad

NATO is ineffective and risks a European war with Russia

Jenkins 2018 - Guardian columnist Simon, "Donald Trump is right. Nato is a costly white elephant," Jun 12, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/12/donald-trump-nato-costly-white-elephant-russia

Donald Trump is a pig, a liar, a woman-hater, a racist, a monster of bombast – and did I mention a disrupter and total bastard as well? Does that feel better? Comment on the current US president seems to require a wallow in the pit of competitive contempt. But it just plays his game.

I regard Trump as an aberration, a temporary trauma afflicting US politics. He honours the thesis of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, that America’s constitution often drives the republic to the abyss, only to drag it back again. But even monsters can ask the occasional good question. Thus Trump this week on Nato, a body so mired in platitude and waffle it has lost sight of its true purpose. Trump wants to know what Europe really regards as its defence policy, for he thinks it takes America for a ride. Nato was founded in 1949 in response to Stalin’s blockade of Berlin. It was meant to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Since then, it has welcomed the American nuclear shield, at vast cost to America. Otherwise, its only military achievements have been the breakup of Yugoslavia and the loss of a squalid 17-year war in Afghanistan. Neither has anything to do with the North Atlantic. Nothing better symbolised this than Theresa May’s bizarre gift to Trump this week of 450 British troops for Kabul.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Dual Use Advantage › --xt No Food Wars

No ag impact

Steven Pinker 11, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars,

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Dual Use Advantage › -xt Shortages Locked in

Ukraine guarantees global food shortages.

Puma '3/1 - director of the Center for Climate Systems Research at Columbia University’s Climate School [Michael J and Megan Konar, 3/1/22, "What the War in Ukraine Means for the World’s Food Supply," https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/opinion/what-the-war-in-ukraine-means-for-the-worlds-food-supply.html]

As we watch Ukrainian refugees arrive by car and foot in Poland, it’s hard not to recall World War II, when the region was ravaged by fighting, famine spread and millions of Ukrainians died of starvation.

We’re nowhere near that point; this time, however, food disruptions won’t remain an insular crisis. What is happening in Ukraine now already is radiating outward and threatening food availability in less prosperous nations that have come to depend on exports of grains and other food products from Ukraine and Russia.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet › AT: Dual Use Advantage › AT: Food Shortages

Russia’s war guarantees price spikes and fertilizer shortages – makes their impact inevitable.

Lu '3/24 [Christina, 3/24/2022, "Russia’s Invasion Unleashes ‘Perfect Storm’ in Global Agriculture," https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/24/russia-war-ukraine-food-crisis-wheat-fertilizer/]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threatens to spark a global food crisis, as simultaneous disruptions to harvests and global fertilizer production are driving up food prices and sending economic shock waves throughout the world.

After a month of war, economists and aid agencies say the world is facing merging crises that could rapidly spiral into a global food emergency. The conflict has already slashed Russian and Ukrainian exports of crucial commodities such as wheat, sunflower oil, and corn, a disturbance that has rippled across import-reliant countries in the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, the ongoing energy crunch has drastically increased fertilizer prices and transportation costs, squeezing the key inputs for global agricultural production.