2022
Georgetown
Negative
Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐in‐residence at American University’s School of International Service
Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint
The Myth of the Offense
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCO’s cause escalation with Russia over Ukraine
Healey, 22 (Jason Healey, Healey is a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, 3-9-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, War on the Rocks, "Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After - War on the Rocks",
Second, Western offensive cyber operations might spark war. U.S. cyber espionage and operations against Putin, his cronies, or Russia’s military forces will appear far more ominous to Putin if he believes they are aimed at regime change. Could Putin turn the other cheek if the United States were to electronically raid the cryptocurrency wallets of Russia’s sanctions-avoiding kleptocrats? He might feel the need to escalate his own cyber operations as part of his own version of defending forward. Escalation could happen on the battlefield as well. , teams from U.S. Cyber Command are “in place to interfere with Russia’s digital attacks and communications.” Other teams are almost certainly collecting digital intelligence on the location and intent of Russian combat forces. The United States is sharing such intelligence with the Ukrainians but . That may change soon, as the United States seeks to alleviate intensifying attacks on civilians. And with his KGB-bred paranoia, Putin might already see the presence of U.S. defensive and intelligence teams operating on or against Russian military networks as evidence of direct U.S. involvement in the war. Confirming his apparent belief that Ukraine is just a NATO puppet, this might force a response, either inside or outside of cyberspace. Further, if Western governments have infiltrated Russia’s operational military networks, they may feel pressure to disrupt those networks to prevent civilian massacres. Because cyber capabilities are billed as non-lethal, reversible, and non-escalatory, tub-thumping newspapers may push decision-makers to take shots they might not otherwise: “We can’t create a no-fly zone but .” Some may succumb to this pressure, potentially causing a larger conflict. Future Risks Even if Russia and the West avoid direct conflict this time, they might not be so lucky the next. As relations worsen, future disruption of critical Western infrastructure by Russian intelligence, such as the and attacks, are less likely to be viewed as mere crimes. Repeated crises bordering on war may further erode the tacit agreements and relative restraint of quieter times. After repeated iterations of intensifying cyber operations, both Russia and the West may feel their backs to the wall with few options left other than military force when the next crisis — physical or cyber — emerges. Under extreme conditions, some of the same characteristics that lead cyber capabilities to be a pressure release might have the opposite effect, a mechanism that Bob Jervis and I have described as the . If Putin believes a direct conflict with NATO is likely and expects its adversaries to , he could conclude that the best possibility for success is to launch a massive preemptive cyber attack. Since the U.S. military may seem otherwise unbeatable, this Russia to “compensate with audacity in order to redress the balance.” The more the United States brags about its overwhelming offensive cyber advantage, but frets over weak defenses, the more any adversary might feel the need to .
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Alt cause – lack of staff wrecks cyber operations
Collier, 20 (Jamie Collier, Writer for war on the rocks, “CYBER RESERVES ARE NOT A SILVER BULLET”, war on the rocks, may 22, 2020, )//babcii
The most significant long-term challenge facing American and British cyber agencies is not China or Russia — it’s a shortage of cyber talent. This workforce deficit isn’t only affecting intelligence agencies. One looked at 11 countries’ cyber skill shortages and extrapolated that the global deficit of qualified personnel sits at over four million unfilled positions and argues that the workforce needs to grow by a staggering 145 percent. Government agencies struggling to match the lucrative private sector salaries on offer naturally find themselves on the back foot. Cyber reserves, conscription models, and are often touted as a panacea for boosting government recruits. Yet, are not enough. Cyber reserve models are often impractical and fail to materially address nascent policy challenges. While cyber reserves can certainly play a limited role in improving security, states such as Britain and the United States should instead continue to focus on policy initiatives that are better aligned with their political cultures and operational requirements. Working with the private sector provides more scalable reinforcements and enables a coordinated approach to protecting what is often predominantly privately-owned infrastructure. Both approaches can certainly co-exist, yet robust public-private collaboration will often trump the whims of volunteers. Practical Limitations of Cyber Reserves Calls for underestimate the logistical challenges of implementation. This has led to failing to address the nature of cyber operations or the lengthy timelines often involved. As much as anything, both offensive operations and securing networks are a collection of practices that require full-time staff and an organized approach. Most large government departments defend their networks 24 hours a day. Security operations centers run around-the-clock monitoring for potential threats. Likewise, vulnerability management programs, used to patch high-severity flaws, require constant vigilance and active coordination in order to stay ahead of the threat. Within these contexts, full-time staff who have experience working together develop continuity and established workflow patterns to ensure threats aren’t missed. Cyber espionage campaigns are no different. It is assumed that operations conducted by prominent state espionage groups, often , rely on technical wizardry alone. Yet, rather than their ability to exploit flashy zero-day vulnerabilities or deploy highly bespoke malware, it is often their operational capabilities that make the difference. This was captured by National Security Agency and former cyber security White House advisor Rob Joyce, who . This is largely due to the involved in cyber operations. This can include extensive open source research on employees ahead of sending phishing emails, putting in the hours to fully understand a target’s infrastructure, or waiting for the right moment to move laterally within a network. Crucially, successful operations often come down to gritty abrasion. Full-time staff, shift patterns, and established routines are at the foundation of a successful campaign. Supplementary staff waltzing in with the occasional weekend or evening to spare might be able to contribute, yet these operational realities limit their ability to substantially move the needle.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
They’re coordinating with civilian institutions, accelerating political response times, and boosting overall resilience to hybrid threats.
Oguz 16 – Ph.D, Security Expert at the International Strategic and Security Research Center
Safak, 2016, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare?” Insight, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26300458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A54f0cb5a96b9cf9c79b2b9b43d8623b9
2022
Georgetown
Negative
NATO is ready for hybrid war---they’ve rapidly modernized political and military responses.
Oguz 16 – Ph.D, Security Expert at the International Strategic and Security Research Center
Safak, 2016, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare?” Insight, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26300458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A54f0cb5a96b9cf9c79b2b9b43d8623b9
2022
Georgetown
Negative
NATO consensus is impossible---a number of issues ensure political disagreements are insurmountable.
Joubert 12 – Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Geopolitical Studies of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, UQAM
Vincent Joubert, “Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: lessons learned for NATO?,” NATO Defense College Rome, Research Division, Research Paper, No. 76, May 2012, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep10366.pdf
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Allies will resist---a litany of constraints ensure disagreement.
Häussler 10 – Assistant Legal Advisor of Operational Law at the Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT, Norfolk/Va., USA)
Ulf Häussler, “Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty,” International Cyber Security, Legal & Policy Proceedings, Chapter 6, 2010, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2010/01/LP_Proceedings_2010-2.pdf
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › case
Lonergan & Montgomery 22 (Mark Montgomery is the Executive Director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Erica D. Lonergan is an Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute. She is also a Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.) 1/25/22, accessed 6/24/22, “Pressing Questions: Offensive Cyber Operations and NATO Strategy”, (JB)
Finally, there is an obvious risk that moving toward a more offensive posture in cyberspace will increase the likelihood of . While these concerns should not be ignored, academic has found for the argument that cyber operations cause escalation. That said, the alliance should consider how to strengthen existing , particularly with Russia, to enable more effective communication and transparency about cyber operations. The expert consultations between Russia and the United States that both governments agreed to in , for example, or recent between Russia and NATO members over the Ukraine crisis, are important to strengthen processes for crisis management and reduce the risk of instability—including that which may stem from cyber operations.
NATO has slowly begun to address the use of offensive cyber operations, and has generally limited itself to the use of these tools in traditional military campaigns. The ongoing crisis with Russia on Ukraine’s border is exposing the risk in this approach. NATO needs to figure out a way forward fast.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › Protection vs. Prevention
Grinavich, '20 – Director of Engineered Solutions at Vector Security (Jim Grinavich; "Business Security: The Difference Between Protection and Prevention"; Vector Security; https://www.vectorsecurity.com/blog/business-security-the-difference-between-protection-and-prevention; 1-23-2020, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-NoC
Prevention generally comes before protection and is meant to avert the threat before it occurs. An example of prevention for business security includes a set of rules or reminders about best safety practices for cyber security.
Protection is the next step and usually takes over if prevention fails. Protection is a combination of security equipment and safety procedures used to defend against and eliminate threats. A monitored fire alarm and subsequent emergency evacuation plan are examples of quality protection.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › Protection vs. Prevention
Invision Security 18, <<security service information organization >>, “Protection And Prevention. What Is The Difference?,” Invision Security Group, 05/29/2018,
Prevention is the act of assessing a hazard in advance and taking steps designed to lower its chances of happening. Protection is safeguarding your company against threats you know you’ll have to face or are currently facing.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › More definitions:
Bacon n/d “What Is Security?” <<QUALS>>, SearchSecurity, Accessed 24 June 22
Security for information technology (IT) refers to the methods, tools and personnel used to defend an organization's digital assets. The goal of IT security is to protect these assets, devices and services from being disrupted, stolen or exploited by unauthorized users, otherwise known as . These threats can be external or internal and malicious or accidental in both origin and nature.
An effective security strategy uses a range of approaches to minimize vulnerabilities and target many types of cyberthreats. Detection, prevention and response to security threats involve the use of , software tools and IT services.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › More definitions:
CISA 19. What Is Cybersecurity? | CISA << government agency of cyber security and infrastructure that is compromised of researchers and experts hired through the bureaucratic process >>, Accessed 24 June 2
Cybersecurity is the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. It seems that everything relies on computers and the internet now—communication (e.g., email, smartphones, tablets), entertainment (e.g., interactive video games, social media, apps ), transportation (e.g., navigation systems), shopping (e.g., online shopping, credit cards), medicine (e.g., medical equipment, medical records), and the list goes on. How much of your daily life relies on technology? How much of your personal information is stored either on your own computer, smartphone, tablet or on someone else's system?
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › A2 OCO’s are Defensive/Prevent Attacks
Devanny ’20 Devanny, D PhD. Lecturer in the Department of War Studies and Deputy Director of the Centre for Defense Studies. “The Ethics of Offensive Cyber: Reflections on the role of the national...” (2020, December 7). Feature from King's College London. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-ethics-of-offensive-cyber-reflections-on-the-role-of-the-national-cyber-force //kinsey
Turn off the lights in Moscow? This is just one of the possible uses of offensive cyber operations (OCOs) briefed to the press by senior British defence sources. Put simply, OCOs ‘project power to achieve military objectives in, or through, cyberspace.’ In everyday language, we are talking about ‘cyber attacks’ – from knocking websites offline to disabling computers on a network, shutting down a power grid, manipulating centrifuges in uranium enrichment facilities, or undermining an adversary’s air defences.
Over the last decade, the UK government has talked more openly about its cyber capabilities. The latest step was the prime minister’s , which has been operational since April. Uncertainty remains, however, about the role of OCOs in wider UK strategy and how our political leaders are navigating the complex choices involved in deciding when to use cyber operations to secure national objectives and project British values overseas. For example, should OCOs only target an adversary’s defence and security infrastructure, or should the UK follow the contemporary trend in targeting civilian infrastructure, as implied in the Moscow scenario briefed to the press?
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › A2 OCO’s are Defensive/Prevent Attacks
Nor et al. ’20 Jörg Noll, Osman Bojang, Sebastiaan Rietjens NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, 2021 ISBN : 978-94-6265-418-1 . //kinsey
The security and defense policies of the Baltic states are strongly influenced by the Russian aggression of 2014. This also holds true for NATO. The alliance has deployed around 4,500 troops to Poland and the Baltic States since 2017. There is a large consensus amongst academics and practitioners that this mission, labelled Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), should deter Russian aggression. However, the strategy to do so remains highly ambiguous and unclear (see also Running’s chapter in this volume). While many official NATO documents as well as observers simply refer to the strategy as deterrence, others, either explicitly or implicitly, distinguish between deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. The exact nature of the strategy can have far reaching consequences in terms of allocation of resources, strategic communication, (perceived) effectiveness as well as the very foundation of the alliance itself: the trust of every ally that it is protected by NATO in case of aggression.
Traditional deterrence theory presumes a rational actor perspective. Over time the role of psychology and actor specific perceptions has become more appreciated, in particular in the third wave in the deterrence literature. Most of these studies have focused on the history of the deterrent relationship and the nature of signaling behaviour. However, although strategic culture has been widely acknowledged as an important shaping factor of strategic behaviour, the role of strategic culture has been largely ignored in deterrence studies. This contribution aims to address this gap. Specifically, this chapter focuses on how strategic culture influences the Baltic countries’ behavior towards deterrence.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › A2 C/I: Cybersecurity includes deterrence
Cybersecurity aids deterrence primarily through the principle of denial. It stops attacks before they can achieve their goals. This includes beefing up login security, encrypting data and communications, fighting viruses and other malware, and keeping software updated to patch weaknesses when they’re found.
But even more important is developing products that have few if any security vulnerabilities when they are shipped and installed. The Mirai botnet, capable of , takes over devices that have gaping security holes, including that users can’t change. While some companies such as , others, including many Internet-of-Things vendors, do not.
Cybersecurity guru aptly characterizes the prevalence of insecure Internet-of-Things devices as a . Simply put, the market favors cheap insecure devices over ones that are more costly but secure. His solution? Regulation, either by imposing basic security standards on manufacturers, or by holding them liable when their products are used in attacks.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › A2 C/I:Cyber Sec = Sec of Cyberspace
Jaikaran 20 – Analyst in Cybersecurity Policy
Chris Jaikaran, "Cybersecurity: A Primer," Congressional Research Service, 12-15-2020, //kinsey
The Nature of Cybersecurity
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › Ext-Interpretation
Shively 00 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-182)
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › Ext-Interpretation
David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box //kinsey
One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 2NC › Ext-Interpretation
Merriam-Webster n/d “Cybersecurity Definition,” Merriam Webster, . Accessed 6/24/22 //kinsey
Definition of cybersecurity : measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack.
Examples of cybersecurity in a Sentence:
2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 1NC – Defensive › 1NC Topicality – “Cybersecurity”
Aftergood ’14 Aftergood, Steven, directed the from 1991-2021 and was the plaintiff in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency which led to the declassification and publication of the total intelligence budget for the first time in fifty years “Offensive Cyber Operations in US Military Doctrine.” Federation Of American Scientists, FAS, 22 Oct. 2014, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/offensive-cyber/. //kinsey
A newly disclosed Department of Defense doctrinal acknowledges the reality of offensive cyberspace operations, and provides a military perspective on their utility and their hazards. Attacks in cyberspace can be used “to degrade, disrupt, or destroy access to, operation of, or availability of a target by a specified level for a specified time.” Or they can be used “to control or change the adversary’s information, information systems, and/or networks in a manner that supports the commander’s objectives.” However, any offensive cyber operations (OCO) must be predicated on “careful consideration of projected effects” and “appropriate consideration of nonmilitary factors such as foreign policy implications.” “The growing reliance on cyberspace around the globe requires carefully controlling OCO, requiring national level approval,” according to the newly disclosed , Joint Publication 3-12(R). That publication was first issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a SECRET document in February 2013 (as JP 3-12, without the R). But this week it was reissued as a public document. It is unclear whether the public document has been redacted or modified for release. The discussion of “offensive cyberspace operations” in the original, classified version of JP 3-12 led to adoption of that term in the official DoD lexicon for the first time in , where it has remained through . Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) are “intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace. OCO will be authorized like offensive operations in the physical domains, via an execute order (EXORD).” The is fairly candid about the challenges and limitations of cyberspace operations. “Activities in cyberspace by a sophisticated adversary may be difficult to detect” and to attribute to their source. Yet such detection and attribution capabilities are “critical” for enabling offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. By the same token, “first-order effects of [US cyberspace operations] are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult,” requiring “significant intelligence capabilities and collection efforts” to evaluate.