2022
Georgetown
Negative
Forcing all NATO countries to adhere to uniform ethical guidelines hamstrings innovation and the competitiveness of the DIB.
Castro & McLaughlin 19 --- *Vice President, ITIF, and Director, Center for Data Innovation. **Research Analyst Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
Daniel & Michael, 2-4-2019, "Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence," ITIF, https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence/
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18 – Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council
Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11-12-2018,
Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Wheeler, visiting fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, Chairman of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) from 2013 to 2017, ‘20
(Tom, “Digital Competition With China Starts With Competition At Home,” )
The United States and China are engaged in a technology-based conflict to determine 21st-century international economic leadership. China’s approach is to identify and support the research and development efforts of a handful of “national champion” companies. The dominant tech companies of the U.S. are de facto embracing this Chinese policy in their effort to maintain domestic marketplace control. Rather than embracing a China-like consecration of a select few companies, America’s digital competition with China should begin with meaningful competition at home and the allAmerican reality that competition drives innovation.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Transatlantic AI innovation is surging now.
Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21
Investment challenges
2022
Georgetown
Negative
AI will never develop consciousness.
Meg Young 21, Postdoctoral Fellow at Cornell Tech's Digital Life Initiative, “DLI Debate: Does AI Pose an Existential Threat to Humanity?,” Cornell Tech, 5/16/21, https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/post/dli-debate-does-ai-pose-an-existential-threat-to-humanity
Returning to what Salome has asserted, let's pause for a moment to take in the argument that AI poses an existential risk to humanity. An existential threat is one that will destroy life on earth---to literally wipe it out. This argument warns that AI will become super intelligent, overpower its human creators to pursue its own unimaginable ends, and to menace life as it takes over the planet. But what would need to be true for that to be possible? AI would need to be intelligent in a meaningful sense. Meaning it can reason, form its own goals, and pursue those goals across contexts. In other words, it would need to be able to think for itself. The philosopher John Searle refers to this idea that AI will ever be able to do that as quote, “an enormous philosophical confusion about the correct interpretation of AI technology.” He points out that consciousness is essential to intelligence. And that without it, even an advanced system like IBM Deep Blue is not playing chess in the same way a chess master like Garry Kasparov is. Instead, it is just performing a computation. We know that AI is not conscious and not at risk of becoming so, because consciousness is an enduring mystery in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology. Basic science is not able to characterize consciousness and where it comes from in vivo, so why do we think that computer scientists will be able to recreate it in silico?
2022
Georgetown
Negative
We’ll adapt to AI.
Amy Zhang 21, PhD candidate at Cornell studying Operations Research and Research Assistant at Cornell Tech, “DLI Debate: Does AI Pose an Existential Threat to Humanity?,” Cornell Tech, 5/16/21, https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/post/dli-debate-does-ai-pose-an-existential-threat-to-humanity
First of all, AI as a tool is not smart. It needs you to tell it exactly 1. what is the specific goal to achieve, 2. a success metric that is meticulously defined, and 3. information to use as a basis that you prepare and feed in. Then to what extent can you say that AI does bad things? For example, if a company is allowed to set maximizing the time spent in an app as its ultimate goal, is it the algorithm’s fault for achieving it? Or if we task a model to mimic our speech by showing it all of Twitter to use as example, and it produces language that mirrors some of the toxicity, can we call the model racist? What it really comes down to is in how these systems are designed, and whether it is done with the level of awareness and sensitivity required in really thinking through these human aspects.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Other states will inevitably deploy militarized AI and future tech---attempts at norm-setting just signal weakness and cede the race to adversaries.
Matt Bartlett 19, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland, focuses on the gauntlet of legal and policy issues raised by technology, particularly emerging technologies like AI, blockchain and cryptocurrency, “The AI Arms Race In 2019”,
This piece will show just how ineffective such activism has been, however well-intentioned. The arms race in AI is already underway — and has been for years. It is now 2019, and we cannot waste time pretending Pandora’s Box hasn’t already been opened. This is the time to take stock of the latent evidence of weaponised AI, and consider the geopolitical incentives that produced this quagmire.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Interoperability challenges are structural---they can’t be fixed through consultation or dialogue.
Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21
Interoperability challenges
2022
Georgetown
Negative
The US is already innovating, AND existing NATO structures can help set norms
Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21
Investment challenges
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Won’t go nuclear or draw in NATO
Tom Rogan 2/28, foreign policy/national security writer for the Washington Examiner, Bachelor of Arts in War Studies from King's College London, a Master of Science in Middle East politics from SOAS, and a Graduate Diploma in Law from the University of Law, London, “Why Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons,” Washington Examiner, 2/28/22, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/why-russia-is-highly-unlikely-to-use-nuclear-weapons
As Russia struggles to conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has moved his strategic nuclear forces to a heightened alert posture.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Zero chance Russia attacks NATO after Ukraine
Paul Miller 22, professor of the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University, “Ukraine Is Not World War III,” The Dispatch, 3/8/2022, https://thedispatch.com/p/ukraine-is-not-world-war-iii?s=r
War gets the blood up. Gary Kasparov—former world chess champion turned dissident against Putin’s Russia—claimed on March 3 that “this is already World War III.”
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Larger Russia war is impossible---they don’t have capabilities AND deterrence prevents going nuclear.
Limor Simhony 22, policy advisor and researcher based in London, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III,” Foreign Policy, 4/1/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/
The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Tons of issues are fracturing NATO. It’s a structural problem of interest divergence, not something that can be solved through limited dialogue.
Eugene Rumer & Richard Sokolsky 4/11, Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Putin’s War Against Ukraine and the Balance of Power in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4-11-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/11/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-and-balance-of-power-in-europe-pub-86832
Notwithstanding the allies’ early show of unity in the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, some of their differences and challenges to a more robust NATO posture have not disappeared entirely. These include the varying interests and priorities of the EU’s and NATO’s diverse members, as well as likely disagreements over which threats and challenges should be privileged in resource allocation decisions (among issues ranging from the Russian threat, China, climate change, pandemics, immigration, borders, refugees, or diversification of energy supplies). It would be prudent to not take for granted that Europe will forge the political unity and raise the billions of euros it will require to create a first-class military that might substitute for or provide a substantial addition to NATO’s military kit.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Interoperability challenges are structural---they can’t be fixed through consultation or dialogue.
Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21
Interoperability challenges
2022
Georgetown
Negative
NATO allies say no---divergent demands and public opposition.
HeikkilÄ 22, 7-4-2022, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › AT --- Ukraine Cyberwar Now
Lonergan and Yarhi-Milo 22 — Erica Lonergan, Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the Political Science Department and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, former Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, PhD and M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, 2022 (“Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/)
What are the implications of this for the current Ukraine crisis? Thus far, while cyber operations have been used on both sides of the conflict, they have not played a decisive role on the battlefield. So far, the United States has been focused on providing cyber defense support to Ukraine and NATO, reportedly to include dispatching Cyber Command’s cyber mission teams to Eastern Europe, as well as seeking to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation in response to U.S. and Western sanctions, especially attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure.
However, if the nuclear dimension of the crisis becomes more acute, policymakers may be tempted to turn to cyber operations to signal resolve to deter Russia in the nuclear domain. Such an approach could be seen as particularly appealing precisely because cyber operations are not kinetic and, therefore, less dangerous than other military moves. But this could have the inverse effect of making nuclear escalation, rather than deterrence, more likely, for the following reasons.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › AT --- Ukraine Cyberwar Now
Kallberg 22 — Jan Kallberg, Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, PhD in Public Affairs and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Texas, LLM from Stockholm University, 2022 (“Ukraine: Russia will not waste offensive cyber weapons,” The Cyberwire, March 14th, Available Online at )
Cyberattacks, in this war, are a last resort, not an opening gambit.
The lingering threat of offensive cyber operations is Putin’s last card – together with nukes. There is no rational reason that Putin’s Russia would play the offensive cyber card without some reasonable prospect of geopolitical gain.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › AT --- Ukraine Cyberwar Now
Kallberg 22 — Jan Kallberg, Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, PhD in Public Affairs and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Texas, LLM from Stockholm University, 2022 (“Ukraine: Russia will not waste offensive cyber weapons,” The Cyberwire, March 14th, Available Online at )
When Russia’s strategic calculus would dictate major cyber attacks.
Russia will use advanced strategic cyber at well-defined critical junctures. For example, as a conflict in Europe unfolded and dragged in NATO, Russian forces would seek to delay the entry of major US forces through cyber attacks against railways, ports, and electric facilities along the route to the port of embarkation. If US forces can be delayed by one week, that is one week of a prolonged time window in Europe before the main US force arrived, and would enable the submarines of the Northern Fleet to be positioned in the Atlantic. Strategic cyber supports strategic intent and actions.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 2NC --- Deconfliction Turn
Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)
Problematically, authorities associated with using cyber capabilities are typically held at the strategic and national level; how tactical or operational commanders might call upon cyber means as part of future MDO remains unclear (Nettis, 2020). Responsibilities for cyberspace also often fall at least partly to civilian agencies, adding the complexity of cross-government cooperation. The private sector’s role developing and applying technologies in the cyber domain (and, increasingly, space) also necessitates that NATO work more closely with industry, academia and others than for land, maritime or air operations (Ablon et al., 2019). This presents operational, policy and legal difficulties for C2, and cybersecurity challenges associated with reliance on industry-owned networks, though Allies continue to evolve novel mechanisms for partnering with industry to address cyber threats (Carr, 2016).
There is also the question of tempo: how to synchronise operations in cyberspace with the delivery of effects in other domains (Reilly, 2020). Though cyber attacks might initiate in a moment, the underlying tools and exploits may take years to develop and the lead times and scale of their eventual effect may be difficult to predict or measure given the difficulties with battle damage assessment in cyberspace or the EMS (Patrikarakos, 2017; US Joint Staff, 2019). Similarly, commanders may lack awareness or understanding of available cyber instruments and their limitations and effects compared to more familiar weapons in the physical domains, limiting inclusion in joint planning and decision-making (Carbonell, 2017).
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Case-turn --- Info-sharing Bad: Offense › 2NC --- Deconfliction Turn
Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)
Policy differences exacerbate conceptual ones. Allies differ in their policy and legal constraints, strategic cultures, threat perception, resources, planning and budgetary cycles and forces (Sondhaus, 2006). While solidarity ultimately remains NATO’s strongest asset, these differences create seams that adversaries can exploit. This is especially so with cyberspace, where there is more sensitivity and less commonality to emerging national approaches than in more established domains, and to MDO, which is inherently predicated on integration and interoperability (Sharpy, 2020).
Information sharing is especially problematic for the cyber dimension of MDO, with Allies reticent to share details of their capabilities across NATO given security concerns and political sensitivities. The issue of permissions is also a ‘significant challenge in the development of cyber capabilities’, especially where reconnaissance on Allied soil and networks is required to detect hostile cyber activity (Watling & Roper, 2019). Nations also have differing policy, legal and ethical stances on key technologies on which MDO relies. This includes the use of offensive cyber capabilities or basing of hypersonic missiles or longrange penetrating fires in Europe, which some fear could be destabilising and escalatory (Quintin & Vanholme, 2020). NATO similarly lacks a common approach to governance and use of AI, autonomy and automation, all envisaged as essential enablers for JADC2 (Williams, 2020). This affects the levels of autonomy (with the human in, on or out of the loop) used for sensor data fusion and decision-making, or to deliver effects using uncrewed platforms, automated cyber systems and human-machine teaming (Scharre, 2018).