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2022 Georgetown Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Solvency › 2NC --- No Integration

NATO consensus is impossible---a number of issues ensure political disagreements are insurmountable.

Joubert 12 – Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Geopolitical Studies of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, UQAM

Vincent Joubert, “Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: lessons learned for NATO?,” NATO Defense College Rome, Research Division, Research Paper, No. 76, May 2012, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep10366.pdf

In addition, the potential for NATO to play a bigger role in defending the information infrastructure by implementing a credible cyber deterrence strategy is limited by political disagreements on the conditions and circumstances which would prompt any collective response to cyber attacks. NATO is currently focusing on implementation of an active cyber defence strategy, with improved security standards and requirements. While improved defence will to a certain extent dissuade potential aggressors, this is of course not enough for it to be considered as a real deterrent in its own right. For actual cyber deterrence (by punishment), there is the prerequisite that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be considered applicable to cyber attacks. In this respect the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence reiterates that any collective defence response is subject to political decisions of the North Atlantic Council, and that NATO will remain flexible on how it will respond to cyber attacks. This flexibility can be interpreted in two ways: as a deliberate position calculated to keep potential aggressors in a state of uncertainty regarding the consequences they might face, or as a sign that the Alliance has difficulty in achieving consensus on a firm response option. In the first case the aggressor might indeed be dissuaded from attacking NATO’s information networks by fear of an unforeseeable retaliation. Unfortunately, however, leaving response options unspecified creates a degree of ambiguity which might be perceived as reflecting political disagreements among the Allies on when and how NATO should intervene. If this were indeed the case, it might actually give an adversary good reason to favour cyber attacks over other forms of action against the Alliance’s – or the individual Allies’– critical infrastructure. In other words, the rationale for a cyber attack would be that political and conceptual divergences within NATO might delay the consensus required to trigger a collective response. Here, an interesting historical parallel is often drawn with the ambiguity regarding NATO’s nuclear deterrence in Europe during the Cold War: the point made by some analysts is that the experience of nuclear deterrence as practised by NATO and other actors can be usefully applied to the cyber domain, insofar as nuclear deterrence doctrine prevented nuclear conflicts. Unfortunately, nuclear and cyber deterrence differ significantly in both technical and strategic terms. Attackers might thus interpret the perpetuation of ambiguity in NATO’s nuclear and cyber retaliation posture as additional proof not only of political disagreements, but even of strategic misunderstanding.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
NEG --- OCO’s › Solvency › 1NC --- No Integration

Allies will resist---a litany of constraints ensure disagreement.

Häussler 10 – Assistant Legal Advisor of Operational Law at the Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT, Norfolk/Va., USA)

Ulf Häussler, “Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty,” International Cyber Security, Legal & Policy Proceedings, Chapter 6, 2010, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2010/01/LP_Proceedings_2010-2.pdf

Political Policy and Institutional Arrangements

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › China DA › 1AR --- Turn

The US will be destroyed by Chinese cyber now --- Integrating better capabilities is key

Lewis, 22 (James Lewis, James Lewis writes on technology and public policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he is a senior vice president and directs the Strategic Technologies Program. Before joining CSIS, he was a diplomat and a member of the Senior Executive Service with extensive negotiating, politico-military, and regulatory experience., 2-25-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, The National Interest, "The West Is Already Fighting in a Cyber Conflict", https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/west-already-fighting-cyber-conflict)//Babcii

The West’s historic weakness in cyber defense encourages opportunism. Russia began computer network espionage in the 1980s, going after defense research and technology. China began cyber espionage in earnest in the early 2000s, when it connected to high-speed global networks. China is omnivorous when it comes to stealing intellectual property (IP) for commercial purposes. While U.S. cyber defenses are now stronger, they are not strong enough to stop these advanced opponents. 

Russia has natural advantages. Its cyber efforts build on a decades-long legacy of signals intelligence, espionage, and influence operations. Russia’s universities crank out skilled mathematicians and programmers. Close ties between the Kremlin and the “Vory” (Russian criminal groups that became powerful after the collapse of the Soviet Union) create a culture where crime is deeply interwoven with government. This is blended with (as we have seen in Ukraine) a powerful urge for revanchism and a general disdain for Western democracies that the Biden administration has only just begun to reverse. 

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › China DA › 1AR --- Turn

Closer integration with Europe is key to prevent EU-Chinese coop that allows them to win the race

Schuman 2-16-2021, MA, international affairs, correspondent for TIME. (Michael, "Europe can’t stay neutral in US-China stand-off", POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-cant-stay-neutral-in-us-china-stand-off/)

China also represents a long-term economic threat to Europe — not merely because it is an advancing competitor in a global market economy, but because Beijing’s policies are designed to use and abuse that open world economy to eventually dominate it. Beijing’s leadership makes no secret of its goal to foster high-tech industries and national champions to overtake its established Western rivals, fueled by untold billions of state aid. By one estimate, the Chinese government has lavished more than $100 billion on its electric vehicle sector, in the form of subsidies for buyers, research and development support and other aid. Another $49 billion has been committed to create a Chinese competitor to Airbus. Partnerships with European companies are vital to the success of China’s agenda. Beijing sees joint ventures and other corporate cooperation with foreign companies as a way to extract the advanced technology and know-how required for China to catch up to, and then leapfrog over, the Western world. An October report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argues that the Chinese are targeting key sectors of the German economy — including industrial equipment and electronics — with the aim of pillaging them. China’s economic relations with Germany are “a template for the CCP strategy to dominate the 21st-century economy and set the rules for the modern world,” the report contends. In other words, by continuing to engage with China, Germany is gaining today, but paving the way to its doom tomorrow. There’s little chance European politicians can talk China into a better relationship. After seven years of negotiations, the EU’s recent investment agreement with China “amounts to so little,” lamented Brussels-based think tank Bruegel in a January analysis. Littered with vague pledges and lacking methods of enforcement, Bruegel noted that even on market access, the agreement’s primary focus, “only a few concessions have been made bilaterally and all of them are limited.” Simply hoping the Chinese will play fair is naïve. While Beijing threatens and blusters that Europeans must keep their markets open to 5G gear from Huawei, the Chinese are sidelining European telecom firms in the China market. Ultimately, China is simply not a true partner for Europe. The longer Europeans fail to grasp this, the weaker their position will become. China will continue to exploit the divisions between democracies to advance its interests. European politicians will strain relations with the U.S. by cynically reaping economic benefits from China while Washington does all the fighting. By the time Europe realizes it needs America’s help, it could discover Washington has found other, more reliable friends. Ultimately, the choice between the U.S. and China should be determined by what Europeans want their role in the world to be. They could defend the liberal order they helped create and continue to participate in global leadership. Or they could sit back and watch authoritarian China knock away the pillars of the current order, and the sources of European influence with them. Is the choice really that hard?

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › China DA › 2AC --- Turn

The problem is capability NOT intent --- The plans integration of cyber strategy into NATO effectively solves Chinese hybrid war

Lauren Speranza 20, director for trans-Atlantic defense and security at the Center for European Policy Analysis, 7/8/20, “China Is NATO’s New Problem,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/

But NATO, long worried about Russia, has largely been silent on China. Now, that is changing. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently called on the alliance to stand up to Beijing’s “bullying and coercion,” underscoring how China’s rise is fundamentally shifting the global balance of power. It’s apparent that NATO can no longer ignore the threat. If the alliance hopes to remain competitive, it will need to develop a new strategy for dealing with Beijing. First, NATO needs a common assessment of China’s hybrid threats—a mix of diplomatic, economic, security, information, and technological actions designed to quietly undermine democratic states and institutions to Beijing’s benefit while avoiding a traditional conflict. While China’s conventional military threat in the Indo-Pacific is far from NATO’s borders, its hybrid activities are happening in the alliance’s own backyard. Cyber-espionage, intellectual property theft, infiltration of critical infrastructure, debt manipulation, and disinformation are prime examples. While these threats may seem to fall outside of NATO’s purview, they pose serious security risks for the alliance. For instance, China’s desire to invest in Lithuania’s Klaipeda Port may not look like a problem for NATO on its surface. But its investments have worrying strings attached that give China operating control over the infrastructure. That control could decrease allies’ willingness to move military forces—including sensitive technologies—through the port and its surrounding networks. This could lead to disrupted planning and fewer military exercises, decreasing NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States during a crisis with Russia. This could also open the door for pragmatic collaboration between China and Russia to undermine trans-Atlantic security. Allies need to forge a shared understanding of these risks through information-sharing and dialogue—no small feat for countries that do not see eye to eye on China. Some are even willing to ignore such vulnerabilities, due to economic benefits or disenchantment with trans-Atlantic institutions. The United States has a critical role to play in getting allies on the same page and setting common goals for countering China’s hybrid activities. Second, NATO needs to focus on public diplomacy. NATO has an important role to play in the battle against the CCP’s global narratives, which Beijing promulgates through hybrid activities. To defend the trans-Atlantic values on which the alliance is built—freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights—NATO should clearly communicate China’s violations of these principles and its propaganda efforts to cover them up. (These include, among others, human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea.) NATO should also enhance its outreach to key partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, which can serve as important counterweights to Chinese influence in the region. Effective public messaging also means getting serious about attributing the blame for attacks, as the European Commission recently did over Chinese disinformation around COVID-19, to raise the pressure on Chinese officials. Trans-Atlantic countries have struggled to shape China’s behavior because they cannot prove malign intent or agree to call out Beijing for its subversive efforts. Allies should develop clearer guidelines—what needs to be proved, by whom, and to what degree—to enable collective attribution. NATO is strongest when it speaks with one voice. It should use that voice to demand transparency and change from China. Third, the alliance should step up its counteroffensive. China’s hybrid actions intentionally blur the lines between what is legally permissible, politically inappropriate, and downright escalatory. This makes it difficult for leaders to determine appropriate responses, producing a reactionary approach thus far. But an intensifying geostrategic competition has already begun. To compete in this environment, the trans-Atlantic community needs a more proactive approach. Rather than waiting for China to invest in the next major European port, allies should coordinate legislation to prevent the riskiest Chinese acquisitions. And rather than waiting for more Chinese cyberintrusions, allies should collaborate on responsible, targeted offensive cyberactions. Over time, this would help dissuade China from manipulating investments in critical infrastructure, conducting cyber-espionage, and other hybrid activities. While adopting a more offensive posture remains controversial among certain allies, it is gaining traction across Europe and is strongly supported in Washington. Although NATO, as a defensive alliance, should not implement such a counteroffensive, policymakers should leverage it as the primary forum to coordinate actions among willing nations. Fourth, NATO needs to deepen its cooperation with other key players, such as the European Union and the private sector. Where NATO lacks the mandate and means, the EU and multinational businesses play critical roles in developing, implementing, and enforcing the legislation and financial incentives necessary to counter Chinese hybrid threats. Complementary to that, NATO and its allies can focus on providing intelligence, defending cyberspace, developing capability targets for new technologies, conducting exercises and contingency planning, informing resilience requirements for secure infrastructure, and bolstering deterrence. Despite the political obstacles that impede more formal NATO-EU cooperation, allies should look to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki to bring together NATO and EU staff, national officials, and industry voices in one place to align their counter-hybrid policies for China. The Chinese government’s manipulative efforts around the coronavirus have thrust China’s hybrid activities to the center of trans-Atlantic debates. Policymakers need to seize the moment and respond by “using NATO more politically,” in Stoltenberg’s words. NATO is first and foremost about its nations. In the fight against China’s hybrid threats, these nations bring much more to the table than military power alone. They have access to a broad range of tools—military, political, economic, technological, and information—which the alliance can use to its collective geopolitical advantage in the competition with China. What NATO needs now is a strategy to leverage those tools in a coordinated manner. That will go a long way in solving NATO’s China problem.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › PTX DA › 1AR --- No Link

NATO is bi-part

NATO, 22 (NATO, 5-20-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, NATO, "NATO Secretary General welcomes US Congress Delegation to NATO headquarters", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195748.htm)//Babcii

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed a US Congressional Delegation to NATO headquarters on Friday (20 May 2022), thanking the lawmakers for the strong and bipartisan commitment of the United States to NATO, as demonstrated by both chambers of Congress. The delegation included Senate and House committee chairs Senator Patrick Leahy, Senator Bob Menendez and Congressman Richard Neal, along with 13 other distinguished Democratic and Republican senators and representatives.

Mr Stoltenberg updated the delegation on work to reinforce NATO's deterrence and defence and on Allies' efforts to provide and sustain support to Ukraine, including security assistance. They also discussed the historic application by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Mr Stoltenberg said he welcomed the strong US bipartisan support for admitting Finland and Sweden into the Alliance.  He also noted the importance of addressing the security concerns of all Allies.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › PTX DA › 1AR --- No Link

Slew of cyber policies are inevitable BUT are wildly popular and build PC

Patel, 22 (Pooja Patel, Senior Manager of Advocacy Signal Ground, 4-21-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, Signal Group, "Cyber policy isn’t going away anytime soon", https://signaldc.com/cyber-policy-isnt-going-away-anytime-soon/)//Babcii

Throughout the 117th Congress, there continues to be strong bipartisan, bicameral momentum to coalesce around key cybersecurity initiatives. This has been all the more enhanced by the Biden Administration’s prioritization of this issue. Especially in an increasingly tense and partisan atmosphere, where policymakers will continue to diverge from bipartisan agreements with an election on the horizon, cybersecurity issues will continue to be a strong opportunity for lawmakers to facilitate real impact through efforts that cross party lines. Thus far in the 117th Congress, cybersecurity policies and funding have garnered attention in nearly every major funding package. This includes large funding infusions within the 2021 American Rescue Plan, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the FY 2022 omnibus package. Beyond inclusion in these broader packages, there has also been significant traction to move smaller, less controversial bills that can quickly move through the legislative process, which has been supplemented by strong advocacy efforts from influential cybersecurity leaders on both sides of the aisle. Over the next few months when very little policy will get done due to the upcoming elections, cybersecurity policy remains one of the few areas where policy changes could occur – ranging from large funding opportunities to policy implications concerning jurisdiction of federal cybersecurity programs, and more. Cybersecurity remains well-positioned to receive strong attention over the next several months, and policymakers from both sides of the aisle will continue to act on opportunities to secure wins in this policy space.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › PTX DA › 2AC --- No Link

Increased support AND coop with NATO is inevitable BUT popular

CRS, 21 (CRS, Congressional Research Service, June-3-2021, accessed on 6-19-2022, Sgp.fas, "NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress", https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46066.pdf)//Babcii

President Biden has signaled support for Stoltenberg’s proposals and, more broadly, has pledged renewed U.S. support for NATO and increased cooperation and consultation with NATO allies. Although these statements have been welcomed across NATO, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its allies could persist, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-standing concerns about defense spending and burden-sharing. U.S. allies also may continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals experienced during the Trump Administration and concerns about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to “America First” policies by a future Administration. Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent support for NATO. During the Trump Administration, congressional support at times was viewed by some as an effort to reassure allies troubled by President Trump’s criticisms of the alliance. Over the past several years, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation reaffirming U.S. support for NATO (e.g., H.Res. 397, H.R. 676, H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232, and H.Res. 256 in the 115th Congress; S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 and H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 in the 116th Congress) and in some cases sought to limit the President’s ability to withdraw from NATO unilaterally (H.R. 676 in the 115th; S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 in the 116th Congress). At the same time, Congress continues to assess NATO’s utility and value to the United States, and some Members are concerned about key challenges facing NATO, including burden-sharing, managing relations with Russia and China, and divergent threat perceptions within the alliance. Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Key Defense and Security Challenges ............................................................................................ 2 Deterring Russia........................................................................................................................ 3 Transition in Afghanistan .......................................................................................................... 4 Expanding NATO Engagement in Iraq and Addressing Broader Instability in the Middle East and North Africa ................................................................................................ 4 Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security .............................................. 5 Enhancing Resilience ................................................................................................................ 6 Defense Spending and Burden-Sharing........................................................................................... 7 Enhancing Political Cohesion.......................................................................................................... 9 Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO ............................................................ 10 Tensions with Turkey .............................................................................................................. 12 Commitment to Democratic Values ........................................................................................ 14 Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 15 Figures Figure 1. NATO Members and Dates of Accession......................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2013-2020......................................................... 8 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 16 Introduction The United States was the driving proponent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) creation in 1949 and has been the unrivaled leader of the alliance as it has evolved from a collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a globally engaged security organization of 30 members (see Figure 1). Historically, U.S. Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy that brings benefits ranging from peace and stability in Europe to the political and military support of important allies, including many of the world’s most advanced militaries. During his term in office, former President Donald Trump openly challenged long-standing U.S. support for NATO, however, arguing, among other things, that NATO was a “bad deal” for the United States.1 Although past U.S. presidents criticized burden-sharing dynamics within NATO, none did so as stridently and publicly as Trump. Trump’s criticisms contributed to heightened political tensions between the United States and Europe, prompting some allies to question his Administration’s commitment to NATO and to criticize its perceived unilateral approach to foreign policy issues. Trump Administration officials maintained that the United States remained committed to NATO, highlighting the Administration’s requests in 2017 and 2018 to increase funding for the U.S. force presence in Europe and its efforts to secure defense-spending increases across the alliance in recent years. Many allies have welcomed President Joe Biden’s pledge to renew U.S. support for NATO and to prioritize consultation and cooperation with allies. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said the currentne U.S. Administration presents “a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in relations between Europe and North America.” 2 Allied heads of state and government are to meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on June 14, 2021, to set NATO’s agenda for the coming year. Key allied priorities include the following:

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Security K › 1AR --- No Link

Overarching theories don’t apply.

Gomez 16 – Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, Assistant Lecturer at De La Salle University, M.A. in International Security from the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals

Miguel Alberto N. Gomez, “Arming Cyberspace: The Militarization of a Virtual Domain,” Global Security and Intelligence Studies, Spring, https://www.ibei.org/arming-cyberspace-the-militarization-of-a-virtual-domain_54871.pdf

The increasing frequency of offensive cyberspace operations (OCOs) directed toward states, particularly the disclosure of Stuxnet in 2010 that appears to have been aimed at disrupting Iran’s nuclear development program, has prompted a reassessment of state behavior in cyberspace. In the years since, states have gradually militarized cyberspace through the establishments of various programs that have framed this as a new domain of warfare. Yet despite the pace of these transformations, a unified theoretical understanding of this phenomenon continues to remain conspicuously absent. To date, scholars have attempted to explain such by highlighting the advantages offered by cyberspace while others have cited the growing fear-based rhetoric grounded by the increasing societal dependence on technology. Neither of these, however, can adequately explain why certain states have militarized while others have not despite predictions of such taking place. Consequently, this study, encompassing the period from 2011 to 2014, proposes that depolarizing these respective arguments may close the existing theoretical gap. In doing so, the study employs a quantitative analytical approach that examines how cyberspace had been militarized across states as a function of both strategic considerations and resource requirements which are both driven by rational choice and societal perceptions regarding this domain.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Security K › 2AC --- No Link

OCOs are a unique danger --- they’re not securitized.

Gomez 16 – Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, Assistant Lecturer at De La Salle University, M.A. in International Security from the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals

Miguel Alberto N. Gomez, “Arming Cyberspace: The Militarization of a Virtual Domain,” Global Security and Intelligence Studies, Spring, https://www.ibei.org/arming-cyberspace-the-militarization-of-a-virtual-domain_54871.pdf

Conclusions and Future Direction

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › T › 2AC --- CI --- Security Cooperation

Security coop is any action by the DOD including information sharing

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the body of the most senior uniformed leaders within the United States Department of Defense, May-23-2017, accessed on 6-16-2022, Jcs, "Security Cooperation", https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf)//Babcii

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Extra › Extra --- Random Cards

The US can’t do it alone --- Whole of system is key

Talihärm, 13 (Anna-Maria Talihärm, Anna-Maria Talihärm is Senior Analyst of the Legal and Policy Branch, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence , August 2013, accessed on 6-16-2022, United Nations, "Towards Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberwar Through International Cooperation | United Nations",

Despite the lack of consensus on exactly what constitutes cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism, governments need to ensure that their infrastructure is well protected against different types of cyberthreats and that their legal and policy frameworks would allow to effectively prevent, deter, defend and mitigate possible cyberattacks. Not being able to agree on common definitions of central terms such as “cyberattack” and “cyberwar” should not prevent states from expressing the urgency of preparing their nations for possible cyberincidents.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Extra › Extra --- Random Cards

US expertise and resources necessary for quick and flexible NATO cyber response

Albon et al., 22 (Lillian Albon, , , , , , Lillian Ablon is an information scientist at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School., 6-1-2022, accessed on 6-16-2022, Rand, "Cyberspace as a Military Domain: Lessons for NATO", )//Babcii

The integration of cyber effects into military operations to operationalize the domain fully is an ongoing process at the national level, just as it is an area of development for NATO. The United States, for example, has experimented with multiple approaches to develop planning processes and personnel to integrate with operational staffs—including liaison officers from its Cyber Command to the geographic and other functional combatant commands and creating Joint Cyber Centers across the headquarters staffs to combine intelligence, operations, planning, and communications—but these approaches are still evolving. In addition, the authorities to execute cyber operations, while often focused on offensive action, are also an ongoing discussion in defensive operations. This is where a series of high-level strategy and operational tabletop exercises can inform NATO how best to identify the key issues, experiment with alternative constructs, and evaluate the most useful approach that works for the alliance. Workforce NATO will need staff officers, civilian personnel, and other augmentees who not only are steeped in the technical aspects of cyberspace but also understand how cyberspace operations can contribute to the overall success of NATO NATO concluded an agreement with the Estonian government in 2014 to leverage its national cyber range for NATO use.52 Determining whether this range architecture is sufficient for all of NATO’s needs will first depend on conducting a needs assessment and capability gap analysis. It is reasonable to conclude that NATO’s exercise and training regimen for cyberspace will grow in the coming years, which would indicate a need for more capacity and certainly a need for greater range capability to adapt to changing technology.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- AT --- Trust Turn

Network intrusions are the largest internal link --- They destroy confidence in the alliance --- Sustained cooperation and integration is essential

Smeets, 21 (Max Smeets, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich (Switzerland), Aug 2021, accessed on 6-19-2022, Hcss, "NATO Allies' offensive cyber policy: A growing divide?",

Steady divergence Yet when it comes to the direction of allies’ cyber policy, growing differences are apparent – especially in the development and deployment offensive cyber capabilities. First, even though most states now have – or are in the process of – establishing a cyber command, operational capabilities vastly differ across states. Whereas some governments are increasingly allocating significant resources to conduct cyber operations – and are now starting to benefit from these investments – the majority of allies still run their cyber commands on a budget of a few million a year –an amount that is insufficient for effective operations in the cyber domain. Secondly, until a few years ago, NATO members’ strategic visions were largely aligned. National cyber strategies shared a common threat focus on operations that could potentially cause major societal havoc, such as taking down the power grid. Allies’ national strategies were also largely unified in their vision to address this threat, discussing the need for deterrence, resilience, and norms. However, this changed with the publication of the US Department of Defense’s strategy on Defend Forward and US Cyber Command’s vision on Persistent Engagement. The United States emphasizes the need to cause friction “wherever the adversary maneuvers,” operating “globally, continuously and seamlessly” (potentially) below the threshold of armed attack. “We must…maneuver seamlessly across the interconnected battlespace, globally, as close as possible to adversaries and their operations, and continuously shape the battlespace to create operational advantage for us while denying the same to our adversaries,” in the words of NSA director and Cyber Command head Gen. Paul Nakasone. Whereas deterrence is about changing your adversary’s cost-benefit calculus, Persistent Engagement is about taking the opportunity away from the adversary to act. Third, NATO member positions on how international law applies – particularly the obligations of states vis-a-vis sovereignty – are now more divergent than a decade ago. Whereas countries like the Netherlands and France are located on the side of the “sovereignty as a rule” camp, the United Kingdom has taken the position that a remote cyber operation by one state into another’s cyber systems or network does not violate the latter’s sovereignty. Where to go from here? The divergence in cyber policy across NATO member states is problematic. Allies disagree on both the goals of cyber policy and the ways and means to achieve them. This can cause tension between allies, especially when it comes to the necessity and legitimacy of operating on each other’s national systems and networks. Some may argue that these differences result from differences in maturity. Some states simply have not caught up with the latest developments, goes the argument. This assumes a single path to cyber maturity or that the dynamics of cyberspace pull all states in the same direction. It suggests that – even without major policy coordination – allies’ cyber policies will converge over time. But a more persuasive understanding of the current trend is that even though states can learn from each other’s institutional progress, differences do not merely stem from states “lagging behind.” These states are on a different policy path. This means it requires dedicated and sustained policy attention to, at a minimum, coordinating the different policies of states – and potentially bring them closer together.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- AT --- Trust Turn

Unwillingness to share new cyber technology undermines cohesion

Bazin, 17 (Aaron Bazin, Lt. Col. PsyD, U.S. Army, 9-27-2017, accessed on 6-19-2022, Army University Press, "An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO",

Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align. Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up. Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand. Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31 Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1AR --- AT --- NATO Ineffective

Empirical evidence flows aff.

Hamilton 22 — Lee Hamilton, Senior Adviser for the Indiana University Center on Representative Government, Distinguished Scholar at the IU Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Professor of Practice at the IU O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, 2022 (“Commentary: NATO still relevant, still facing challenges,” The Daily News, February 4th, Available Online at https://www.newburyportnews.com/opinion/commentary-nato-still-relevant-still-facing-challenges/article_b7d2cbe6-845a-11ec-824f-e7dc02262f0f.html)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the largest peacetime alliance in the world and has been arguably the most successful such alliance in history.

It has had remarkable success in achieving its basic goals: containing Soviet expansion, checking the rise of nationalism and helping integrate Europe.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- AT --- NATO Ineffective

NATO is effective — neg authors are overly critical.

Skaluba 22 — Christopher Skaluba, Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former Adjunct Professor at Syracuse University, 2022 (“No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective,” Atlantic Council, January 18th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine.

First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine.. In reality, it’s Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- Alliance Impact

Unraveling of the global alliance system triggers every impact—And solves nothing, because history proves that the war will come to us

Mira Rapp-Hooper, Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, 2020, Saving America’s Alliances: The United States Still Needs the System That Put It on Top, Foreign Affairs

The stakes of failing to reform the alliance system could scarcely be higher. If Washington does not act, it will miss the opportunity to protect its dearest interests on relatively favorable terms, before China’s growing power and Russia’s revanchism undermine the system’s proven guarantees. The reform agenda recommended here is vast, but it is far less burdensome than a U.S. foreign policy that cannot rely on allies. The United States can no more go it alone now than it could in the immediate postwar years. Whether the United States has alliances or not, American security and prosperity will still require an open and independent Asia and Europe. Even if Washington pulled back from both theaters, the United States would still face cyberattacks, financial and infrastructural disruptions, and assaults on its democratic institutions. And by retrenching, Washington would lose whatever readiness for conflict it currently has. If the country later joined a war abroad, it would have to do so only after significant time delays and without the allied cooperation that might have allowed it to prevail. Put simply, the United States might fall into a conflict that it could have instead deterred—one now waged with hypersonic speed and destruction.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 1AR --- NATO Cohesion Impact

An integrated NATO is key to numerous existential threats

Goldgeier 10 – James M. Goldgeier, James Goldgeier is a Professor of International Relations and Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2017-19 and in 2018-19, he held the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-Russia Relations at the John W. Kluge Center. Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., Government, Harvard University, Febuary 2010,“The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations Press,

If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today, the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world of transnational threats, the debate would be over whether to follow liberal and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies without regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by the realists to uphold the current order. The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and NATO should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be frayed, they are stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. Common history and values matter, as do the resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies, the member states are threatened by forces such as Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. For the United States, the alliance is a source of legitimacy for actions in places like Afghanistan. For Europe, NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power. While NATO alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing the member states, it can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries necessary to provide for the common defense. For all its faults, NATO enables the United States to partner with close democratic allies in ways that would be difficult without a formal institution that provides a headquarters and ready venue for decision-making, as well as legitimacy and support for action that ad hoc U.S.-led coalitions do not. As has been true since the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago, the United States (and Europe) should want NATO to succeed. After the Cold War, the alliance dramatically redefined itself. In the 1990s, it fostered stability across Europe by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans. In the 2000s, it broadened its scope through the mission in Afghanistan as well as a counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (in addition to continuing the enlargement process). But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention away from Europe. These members seek to return NATO to a more traditional understanding of its role defending against threats on the continent, particularly as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the Soviet collapse. In November 2010, NATO will release a new “strategic concept” to guide the alliance going forward. That document must state clearly that providing for collective defense in the twenty-first century goes well beyond defending against the “armed attack” of Article V. To remain relevant, NATO must expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare. By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to counter these modern threats, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. If NATO fails to accept a growing global role, then the United States will lose interest in investing in the alliance’s future. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more robust NATO offers it the chance to counter them. Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the AsiaPacific region.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- NATO Cohesion Impact

NATO is key to avert all existential threats

Nicholas Burns 18. Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Director, American Secretaries of State Project. “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance.” Harvard’s Belfer Center. 9/5/2018. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez, you have asked for an assessment of NATO’s value to the United States. In my judgment, NATO continues to be of vital importance to American security interests in five principal ways. First, NATO is at the core of one of the most significant foreign policy accomplishments in American history—the creation of a long-term peace in Europe following the close of the Second World War. Because of NATO and the emergence of the European Union, Europe is united after centuries of division and war. NATO’s military strength has been a major reason for the absence of war with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1949. A recent Atlantic Council study reminds that America spent 14.1 percent of its GDP on defense during the First World War, 37.5 percent during the Second World War and 13.2 percent during the Korean Conflict. We spend nothing close to those levels now in large part due to the great power peace we have enjoyed for over seventy years. NATO has been a major factor in that peace. And due to the expansion of NATO and the European Union eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union, millions of East Europeans now live in free, democratic societies—a significant success for U.S. diplomacy. Second, NATO delivers additional benefits to U.S. military objectives and operations beyond our shores. NATO is at the heart of our defense of North America and Europe from nuclear and conventional threats. British and French nuclear weapons join ours in deterring aggression in the North Atlantic area. Since the late 1940s, every Administration has believed that the best way to defend our country is through American forces forward deployed in Europe with the NATO allies. This strategy remains right for today given Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its current pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO remains our primary vehicle for deterring Putin in Eastern Europe. The NATO allies host a great number of critical bases for U.S. forces—Ramstein in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Rota in Spain, Souda Bay in Greece and Incirlik in Turkey—that serve as a platform for our presence in Europe, as well as for U.S. force projection against terrorist groups in North Africa and the Middle East and for our continued military operations in Afghanistan. Europe is a critical link in the development of our Ballistic Missile Defense network focused on the Middle East with Turkey, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and other allies all hosting elements of this system. NATO allies continue to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in the Middle East. Many of the allies play lead roles in other counter terror operations such as French forces in Mali supported by the U.S. In Afghanistan, the NATO allies remain with us in combat operations and in training the Afghan military. Over 1000 soldiers from European and other partner nations have died there during the last seventeen years. NATO continues to maintain the hard-earned peace in Kosovo with European troops bearing the large share of the burden. An EU-led force has taken on all of the peacekeeping responsibility in Bosnia, freeing up the U.S. for other activities. Third, the NATO allies are among our closest and most supportive global partners as we confront the great transnational challenges that define this century—the fight against terrorism, the entire complex of cyber threats, climate change, the risk of pandemics, mass migration and others. The NATO allies and our partners in the European Union act together with us on these and other issues. This is of incalculable benefit to the U.S. Neither Russia nor China have treaty allies. NATO is a significant advantage for the United States when it acts as a force multiplier for American interests.