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2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- Democracy A/O

Democracy solves global nuke war – extinction

Yulis 17 (Max, Penn Political Review, “In Defense of Liberal Internationalism”, 4/8, pennpoliticalreview.org/2017/04/in-defense-of-liberal-internationalism/)

Over the past decade, international headlines have been bombarded with stories about the unraveling of the post-Cold War world order, the creation of revolutionary smart devices and military technologies, the rise of militant jihadist organizations, and nuclear proliferation. Indeed, times are paradoxically promising and alarming. In relation to treating the world’s ills, fortunately, there is a capable hegemon– one that has the ability to revive the world order and traditionally hallmarked human rights, peace, and democracy. The United States, with all of its shortcomings, had crafted an international agenda that significantly impacted the post-WWII landscape. Countries invested their ambitions into security communities, international institutions, and international law in an effort to mitigate the chances of a nuclear catastrophe or another World War. The horrors and atrocities of the two Great Wars had traumatized the global community, which spurred calls for peace and the creation of a universalist agenda. Today, the world’s fickle and declining hegemon still has the ability, but not the will, to uphold the world order that it had so carefully and eagerly helped construct. Now, the stakes are too high, and there must be a mighty and willing global leader to lead the effort of diffusing democratic ideals and reinforcing stability through both military and diplomatic means. To do this, the United States must abandon its insurgent wave of isolationism and protectionism, and come to grips with the newly transnational nature of problems ranging from climate change to international terrorism. First, the increase in intra-state conflict should warrant concern as many countries, namely in Africa and the Middle East, are seeing the total collapse of civil society and government. These power vacuums are being filled with increasingly ideological and dangerous tribal and non-state actors, such as Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab. Other bloody civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, and the Congo have contributed to the deaths of millions in the past two decades. As the West has seen, however, military intervention has not been all that successful in building and empowering democratic institutions in the Far East. A civil crusade, along with the strengthening of international institutions, may in fact be the answer to undoing tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions, thereby mitigating the prospects of civil conflict. During the Wilsonian era, missionaries did their part to internationalize the concept of higher education, which has contributed to the growth of universities in formerly underdeveloped countries such as China and South Korea.[1] In addition, the teachings of missionaries emphasized the universality of humanity and the oneness of man, which was antithetical to the justifications for imperialism and the rampant sectarianism that plagued much of the Middle East and Africa.[2] Seeing that an increase in the magnitude of human casualty is becoming more of a reality due to advancements in military technology and the increasing outbreaks of civil war, international cooperation and the diffusion of norms that highlight the importance of stable governance, democracy, and human rights is the only recourse to address the rise in sectarian divides and civil conflicts. So long as the trend of the West’s desire to look inward continues, it is likely that nation states mired in conflict will devolve into ethnic or tribal enclaves bent on relying on war to maintain their legitimacy and power. Aside from growing sectarianism and the increasing prevalence of failed states, an even more daunting threat come from weapons that transcend the costs of conventional warfare. The problem of nuclear proliferation has been around for decades, and on the eve of President Trump’s inauguration, it appeared that Obama’s lofty goal of advocating for nonproliferation would no longer be a priority of American foreign policy.[3] In addition, now that the American president is threatening to undo much of the United States’ extensive network of alliances, formerly non-nuclear states may be forced to rearm themselves. Disarmament is central to liberal internationalism, as was apparent by the Washington Naval Treaty advocated by Wilson, and by the modern CTBT treaty. The reverse is, however, being seen in the modern era, with cries coming from Japan and South Korea to remobilize and begin their own nuclear weapon programs.[4] A world with more nuclear actors is a formula for chaos, especially if nuclear weapons become mass-produced. Non-state actors will increasingly eye these nuclear sites as was the case near a Belgian nuclear power plant just over a year ago.[5] If any government commits a serious misstep, access to nuclear weapons on the behalf of terrorist and insurgent groups will become a reality, especially if a civil war occurs. States with nuclear weapons require domestic stability and strong security, which is why states such as Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan could be in serious trouble in the event of a domestic uprising or military coup. The disarmament of all states is essential for human survival, and if it is not achieved, then a world full of nuclear weapons and an international system guided by realpolitik could give rise to nuclear warfare. In today’s world, nuclear weapons leave all states virtually defenseless. But, for nuclear deproliferation to become a cornerstone of the global agenda, a pacifying and democratic power must rise to the limelight to advocate the virtues of peace, stability, and human rights. Those who equivocate democratic interventionism as an idealistic crusade cannot be further from the truth. Some, however, see it as an effective foreign policy that has a grand scheme for peace in mind.[6] The latter contention, despite being widely disputed, holds the premise for the democratic peace theory. Throughout the history of all democracies, not one modern-day democracy has fought against another democracy.[7] Whether that’s because of ideational symmetry, similar objectives and morals, or generally pacific foreign policies, such a phenomenon must be given attention by policymakers. According to liberal internationalists, democracies make better partners, tend to move towards increased political and moral agreement, oppose illiberal regimes, and support disarmament policies. This supposition is heavily supported by the smooth post-WWII transitions that the German, Japanese, and Italian governments underwent. All of the governments were formerly fascistic and authoritarian, but with intensive military and economic support from the West, they became some of the most shining exemplars of democratic societies. Even today, Germany is the backbone of the European Union and repeatedly champions democratic norms, such as human rights, economic freedom, and individual liberty.[8] Equipping other countries with the necessary foundations for democracy is no easy feat, but the fight for peace far outweighs the costs of inhabiting a world rife with nuclear-armed authoritarian and belligerent states. In conclusion, liberal internationalism can have a lasting legacy on the prospects for peace if it is executed properly. Putting democracy, humanism, and liberty on a pedestal is what states ought to do if they seek to save humanity from itself. Although the rise of transnational issues pertaining to climate change, nuclear weapons, and civil wars should make international cooperation an increasingly desired aim, states seem to be thinking just the opposite. Only time will tell whether this is a short-lived trend, or a more ominous warning for the world at large.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- Democracy A/O

NATO is key to curb pre-World War II authoritarianism

Marten 17 – Kimberly Marten, International security expert and Russia watcher; Professor at Barnard College, Columbia University; Ph.D. in Political Science at Stanford University, March 2017, “Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations: Center for Preventative Action,

Although some NATO members have failed to live up to the alliance’s democratic ideals, their integration into the NATO community and continuing desire for the security benefits it provides may serve as a brake on what otherwise could be untrammeled authoritarianism. At a time of growing ethnic nationalism in Europe, NATO’s integration of European military command structures and the continued European reliance on U.S. intelligence and force projection capabilities through NATO is especially important. One of NATO’s early purposes was not merely to deter the Soviet threat but to bring postwar German military forces into the alliance structure and calm French fears of a third world war. NATO was a crucial enabler of peace not only after World War II but also after the Cold War because some Europeans feared that German reunification in 1990 could create a new military juggernaut. NATO’s military integration now means that even if right-wing nationalists were to rule a European state, they could not threaten their neighbors without a drastic and expensive overhaul of force capabilities, deployments, infrastructure, and policy, providing a long warning time for any possible aggression. NATO continues to provide protection not merely from Russia but within Europe itself.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- Cohesion › 2AC --- Democracy A/O

NATO key to democracy---checks war

Menon and Ruger 5/20 –Rajan Menon holds the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair in Political Science at the City College of New York/City University of New York and is a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University and a Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs, Ph.D. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, William Ruger is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato Institute. He earned his Ph.D. in Politics from Brandeis University and an A.B. from the College of William and Mary. NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net assessment. Int Polit 57, 371–400 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7

Those who championed NATO expansion also believed that it was essential to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in post-Cold War Europe. US leaders in the executive branch, the legislature, and the foreign policy community more generally (i.e., specialists in universities, the media, and think tanks), general agree that a NATO with strong US leadership was essential for democracy’s success in the alliance’s newest states and that emergence of authoritarian regimes in the states east of NATO’s old perimeter would lead to turmoil there or even war, a denouement that would ill serve US interests. The proponents of NATO enlargement also considered it essential for promoting economic reform and bringing militaries under civilian control in countries that had been part of the Soviet bloc for decades (e.g., US Information Agency 1996; Holbrooke 1995, 41–42; Talbott 1997; Albright 1997a). They disagreed with critics who warned that NATO’s eastward expansion would eventually provoke resistance from a resurgent Russia and force the USA to bear the burden involved in protecting several militarily weak states near or adjacent to the Russian border. Beyond that, advocates of reconfguring NATO after 1991 insisted that it should move out of area to help control confict, consolidate stability, and advance human rights in countries outside Europe. Included in this new agenda were humanitarian interventions (to stop mass atrocities) and stability operations in countries emerging from civil war.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- AT --- A5 Thumps

A5 vagueness is intentional---leaves NATO flexibility room in deterring attacks

Ghavam 16 – Z’hra M. Ghavam, Master of Arts in Security Studies Europe and Eurasia. National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

September 2016, “NATO’S PREPAREDNESS FOR CYBERWAR,” https://archive.org/details/natospreparednes1094550552

3. Clarity NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments. Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines: Our policy also recognizes that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm, therefore, that cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.209

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- AT --- OCO’s Bad

Offensive capabilities are a key component of an effective deterrence strategy.

Limnéll 13 – Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland

Jarno Limnéll, “Offensive Cyber Capabilities are Needed Because of Deterrence,” The Fog of Cyber Defence, National Defence University, Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy, Publication Series 2, Article Collection no. 10, 2013, https://cyberwar.nl/d/20130200_Offensive-Cyber-Capabilities-are-Needed-Because-of-Deterrence_Jarno-Limnell.pdf

Offensive Weaponry is Required for Credibility and Deterrence

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- AT --- OCO’s Bad

Credible offensive capabilities are key to deterrence.

Mazanec & Thayer 15 – Director in GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management team; Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland

Brian M. Mazanec, Bradley A. Thayer, “Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace,” Palgrave McMillan, 2015,

Deterrence-in-kind: developing offensive cyber capabilities

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- AT --- OCO’s Bad

Preempting and degrading adversarial capabilities is key to solve.

Sulmeyer 18 – Director of the Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center

Michael Sulmeyer, “How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense: Deterrence Isn't Enough,” Foreign Affairs, March 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense

Today’s fight in cyberspace occurs in the gray zone between war and peace. If the United States hopes to win, it should spend less time trying to persuade its competitors that it is not worth hacking and more time preempting them and degrading their ability to do so. It is time to target capabilities, not calculations.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- AT --- OCO’s Bad

An offensive strategy solves---effectively deters adversaries by imposing credible costs.

Borghard 20 – Assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow

Erica D. Borghard, “Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to Change Adversary Behavior,” Lawfare, March 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/operationalizing-defend-forward-how-concept-works-change-adversary-behavior

Here, I want to focus on the first end state: the theory of victory for how defend forward can change adversary behavior below the level of armed attack. Defend forward hypothesizes the U.S. can change adversary behavior through making attacks less effective and, cumulatively, by altering the adversary’s decision calculus regarding the perceived benefits, costs and risks of conducting malicious campaigns against the United States.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Meltdowns Impact

Meltdowns make Earth unlivable.

Slocum 15 — Christopher Slocum, Researcher at Arizona Oil & Gas, J.D. from University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, 2015 (“A Theory for Human Extinction: Mass Coronal Ejection and Hemispherical Nuclear Meltdown,” The Hidden Costs of Alternative Energy Series The Hidden Costs of Alternative Energy Series, July 21st, Available Online at )

With our intelligence we have littered the planet with massive spent nuclear fuel pools, emitting lethal radiation in over-crowded conditions, with circulation requirements of electricity, water-supply, and neutron absorbent chemicals. The failure of any of these conditions for any calculable or incalculable reason, will release all of a pool’s cesium into the atmosphere, causing 188 square miles to be contaminated, 28,000 cancer deaths and $59 billion in damage. As of 2003, 49,000 tons of SNF was stored at 131 sites with an additional 2,000-2,400 metric tons produced annually. The NRC has issued permits, and the nuclear industry has amassed unfathomable waste on the premise that a deep geological storage facility would be available to remediate the waste. The current chances for a deep geological storage facility look grim. The NAS has required geologic stability for 1,000,000 years. It is impossible to calculate any certainty 1,000,000 years into the future. Humanity could not even predict the mechanical failures at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, nor could it predict the size of the tsunami that triggered three criticality events at Fukushima Daiichi. These irremediable crises span just over 70 years of human history.

How can the continued production and maintenance of SNF in pools be anything but a precedent to an unprecedented human cataclysm? The Department of Energy’s outreach website explains nuclear fission for power production, providing a timeline of the industry. The timeline ends, as does most of the world’s reactor construction projects in the 1990s, with the removal of the FCMs from Three Mile Island. One would think the timeline would press into the current decade, however the timeline terminates with the question, “How can we minimize the risk? What do we do with the waste?” (The History of Nuclear Energy 12). Nearly fifteen years into the future, these questions are no closer to an answer. The reactors at Fukushima Daiichi are still emitting radioisotopes into the atmosphere, and their condition is unstable. TEPCO has estimated it could take forty years to recover all of the fuel material, and there are doubts as to whether the decontamination effort can withstand that much time (Schneider 72). A detailed analysis of Chernobyl has demonstrated that nuclear fall-out, whether from thermonuclear explosions, spent fuel pool fires, or reactor core criticality events are deleterious to the food-chain. Cesium and strontium are taken into the roots of plants and food crops, causing direct human and animal contamination from ingestion, causing cancer, teratogenicity, mutagenesis and death. Vegetation suffers mutagenesis, reproductive loss, and death. Radioactive fields and forest floors decimate invertebrate and rodent variability and number necessary to supply nature’s food-chain and life cycles. The flesh and bones of freshwater and oceanic biota contribute significantly to the total radiation dose in the food-chain. Fresh water lakes, rivers and streams become radioactive. Potable aquafers directly underlying SNFs and FCMs are penetrated by downward migration of radioisotopes. Humans must eat to live. Humans must have water. No human can survive 5 Sv of exposure to ionizing radiation, many cannot survive exposure to 1 Sv.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Hybrid War Impact

Russian hybrid war escalates globally

Trenin, 18 (Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Program, 1-25-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, Carnegie Moscow Center, "Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War", http://carnegie.ru/2018/01/25/avoiding-u.s.-russia-military-escalation-during-hybrid-war-pub-75277)//Babcii

. The war is being fought simultaneously in a number of spheres, on different levels, and in the never-ending, twenty-four-hour news cycle. This aspect of warfare is particularly true of the field of information, which is of prime importance in the Information Age that emerged with the end of the Cold War. From cyber conflicts and the use of artificial intelligence to the predominance of propaganda and fake news, the main battles of the Hybrid War are taking place outside of the purely physical realm and in the domain of new information technologies. Just as important to the Hybrid War is economics, which has been the key driver of globalization that paralleled the rise of these innovative information technologies. The prominence of the U.S. media and the United States’ immense financial power give it a huge advantage in both fields. As a result, the weapons of choice in the Hybrid War are those that use information and economic power to discredit and sanction one’s adversaries.3 Politically, the Hybrid War includes the outside stimulation of political changes in other countries through street activism and the promotion of specific values, parties, or popular movements. It has been characterized by interference in elections, political transitions, and other political processes, including various efforts to hack sensitive information, spread compromising or damaging materials and fake news, encourage character assassinations, and impose personal and other noneconomic sanctions (for example, restrictions on travel, seizure of assets, imprisonment, or deportation) on opponents. The existence of a common information space makes waging political warfare on foreign territory much easier and more attractive than ever before. Cross-border promotion of democracy and support for the color revolutions that dominated the 2000s (for example, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine) have now found counterparts in emerging solidarity among those who espouse more conservative and traditionalist values, such as political systems based on authoritarian models and strict national sovereignty.4 Military power is not out of the picture—though its use is different than in the Cold War. The static standoff of million-strong armies in Europe and the long shadow of the nuclear arms race have drawn down or faded. Nuclear deterrence between Russia and the West remains in place but at lower and more stable levels than during the Cold War. Today’s risks of miscalculation derive from potential incidents involving conventional forces. A token military standoff has reemerged along Russia’s border with NATO countries, but, to date, this standoff bears no resemblance in either scale or scope to the forces that faced each other during the Cold War. The main focus is on developing new military technologies and novel means and ways of prosecuting warfare—from outer space to cyberspace—that blur or eliminate the distinction between wartime and peacetime. Like its predecessor, the Hybrid War is a war in the time of peace. Even more than in the past, however, the onus is on national leaderships to minimize the number of casualties, ideally to zero. Russian military strategists had developed the concept of hybrid warfare even before the actual conflict broke out in earnest between the United States and Russia in early 2014. Analyzing the experience of the post-Soviet color revolutions and the 2011 Arab Spring, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote in February 2013 that the “consequences of new conflicts are comparable to those of a real war”; in many cases, nonmilitary methods “are substantially more effective than the power of arms,” and greater emphasis is placed on “political, economic, information, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary means” and “covert military measures,” including “information warfare and actions by special forces.” In this environment, “overt use of military force, often in the form of peacekeeping or crisis management, takes place only at a certain stage, mainly to achieve final success in a conflict.” With regard to the U.S.-Russia confrontation, another key feature has surfaced: asymmetry between the sides’ capabilities. POWER ASYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIC ACTIONS Although Gerasimov was referring to a hybrid war when discussing new means and methods of warfare, this analysis uses the newly fashionable term to describe the current U.S.-Russia confrontation. Unlike its Cold War predecessor, this conflict is asymmetrical. At least since the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the United States’ equal in terms of both nuclear and conventional military power. Even beyond its own vast land mass and immediate sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, it wielded considerable ideological power in many Western countries and in the Third World and presided over a system of alliances in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The Russian Federation, by contrast, has few formal allies, no satellite states, and a handful of protectorates, if one includes the self-proclaimed states of Abkhazia, Donbass, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. It has no ideology to compare with the comprehensive dogma of Marxism-Leninism, and although it is still a nuclear superpower, it lags far behind the United States in non-nuclear military capabilities. Economically, Russia—with its estimated 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product—is a dwarf. Neither the balance nor the correlation of forces, however, will determine the outcome of this confrontation. Despite the glaring asymmetries in the national power of the two sides of the conflict, the course of events is not predetermined. As a nonlinear, highly asymmetrical conflict, the outcome likely will result from domestic developments in Russia or the United States or both. Both countries are facing serious problems that could prove decisive in the final calculations of the Hybrid War. The United States is going through a triple crisis of its political system, exemplified but not caused by the arrival of President Donald Trump and the virulent domestic opposition to him and his policies. A crisis of social values lies beneath this political crisis and points to a widening gap between the more liberal and the largely conservative parts of the country. At the same time, the United States faces a crisis within its own foreign policy as it struggles to reconcile the conflict between the more inward-looking U.S. national interest and the international liberal order of the U.S.-led global system. Russia, though outwardly stable, is approaching its own major crisis as the political regime created by Putin faces an uncertain future after the eventual departure of its figurehead. Putin’s Kremlin is already working on a political transition that would rejuvenate the elite and improve its competence and performance, but, at the same time, Russian society is also changing and Putin’s heirs cannot take its support for granted. Gross inequality, sluggish economic growth, low vertical mobility, and high-level corruption will present a range of serious challenges to the future Russian leadership. The eventual outcome of the Hybrid War could be reminiscent of the downfall of the Soviet Union, which was far less the result of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War than of a misguided effort to reform the Soviet Union itself. Russia might break down and break up again, or it might decide on a foreign policy more geared toward its economic needs than to a certain concept of world order. As for the United States, it might decide to limit its global commitments and redesign its international role as the world’s preeminent but no longer dominant state. Yet, in doing so, it will need to accept that its change in status will come with a certain price and that it will not be able to take advantage of the benefits of the position it once enjoyed. Asymmetries in power lead to asymmetric actions, which as Gerasimov suggested are intended to “neutralize the enemy’s superiority in warfare” or “identify and exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities.”5 By an order of magnitude—or more—Russia is outgunned, outmanned, and outspent by the combined forces of the United States and its allies. To stay in the fight, it must rely on its few comparative advantages and seek to use them to maximum effect. These advantages include the geographical proximity of some of the main theaters of operation, such as Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where Russia has escalation dominance; the Russian political system, which allows for secretive, swift, and decisive action; and Moscow’s willingness to take much higher risks in view of the disproportionally higher stakes involved for the Russian leadership and a national culture that historically has tolerated higher losses in defense or protection of the Motherland. Through swift decisions and actions, made without prior warning, Russia is capable of surprising its adversaries and keeping them off-balance. This situation promises an uncertain, hard-to-predict, and risky environment, where miscalculation can lead to incidents or collisions that, in turn, lead to escalation. Granted, these incidents would be of a different kind than the tank standoff at Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie in late October 1961 or the Cuban Missile Crisis barely a year later. Escalation resulting from miscalculation would not be automatic, but the wider damage it could cause needs to be taken seriously. AVOIDING MISTAKES LEADING TO ESCALATION The Hybrid War is highly dynamic and, so far, has no agreed-upon rules. In this sense, it resembles the Cold War of the early 1950s rather than that of the 1970s. However, it is possible, up to a point, to avoid military escalation during the Hybrid War. U.S.-Russian antagonism does not mean that the two countries’ interests are in total opposition. Unlike in the second half of the twentieth century, neither party envisions a real shooting war against its adversary and neither wants to allow the situation to become uncontrollable. The most obvious ways to manage the confrontation are incident prevention, confidence building, and arms control. Incident prevention, on the face of it, should be easy. Since the early 1970s, Moscow and Washington have had agreements in place to avoid incidents, which in the Cold War days carried the risk of escalation to nuclear levels. Effective prevention requires a degree of professionalism, adequate safety measures, and reliable channels of communications. However, during a Hybrid War, these preconditions cannot be taken for granted. Acting from a position of relative weakness, Russia is likely to compensate for its inferior overall strength by raising the stakes of confrontation.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- Russia Impact

Russian hybrid war escalates and causes World War III.

Peter Apps, 3-2-2018, [Peter Apps is a Reuters global affairs columnist and formerly a Future of War fellow at New America, "Commentary: Putin’s nuclear-tipped hybrid war on the West", U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-russia-commentary/commentary-putins-nuclear-tipped-hybrid-war-on-the-west-idUKKCN1GD6H2 //Weese]

This month marks the fourth anniversary of Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea, an event that shocked the world and shook European faith in the post-Cold War security order. In retrospect, it has become clear that, for Putin, annexing the peninsula was not so much an end goal as a declaration of future intent, an early escalation in a broader and more ambitious effort that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko recently termed, with little obvious exaggeration, Russia’s “World Hybrid War” on Western democracy itself. In an unusually bellicose speech on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin put Moscow’s remilitarization and its confrontation with the West at the heart of his pitch for re-election. His approach to this confrontation, which many now term “hybrid warfare,” mixes nuclear posturing and cutting-edge technology with covert action, and was deliberately designed so as to make it very difficult for the West to respond. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia did not, it must be said, invent hybrid warfare. Combatants have always looked for innovative ways around the rules and conventions of conflict, and Israel, Iran and the Gulf states have employed common hybrid tactics – including cyber attacks, and the use of armed proxy groups – for years. China’s leaders, too, have found increasingly unorthodox ways to push back against the United States and its allies in their immediate neighborhood; it recently emerged that, while Western nations were distracted by North Korea’s nuclear program, China artificially expanded islands in the South China Sea in support of its territorial ambitions. What Moscow has successfully done, however, is to refine a variety of old and new techniques to a higher level, and to employ them in a wider range of ways. As with China and Iran, Russia’s aim in developing and perfecting its hybrid warfare capabilities is to weaken and undermine the United States and its allies without sparking all-out war. It’s a dynamic that brings with it some very real dangers, not least of accidental conflict. The American air strikes that killed dozens, if not hundreds, of Russian mercenaries in Syria last month marked the bloodiest confrontation between the two nations in decades. U.S. prosecutor Robert Mueller’s decision to charge 13 Russians and several Russian companies with interfering in the 2016 election also amounts to a significant escalation. Exactly what prompted Russia’s interest in reheating Cold War-era animosities remains a subject of much debate among Western security analysts. Many, however, see its roots in the anti-government protests that rocked Russia in 2011 and 2012, the most serious such unrest since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Putin was widely believed to be furious that American diplomats had wooed pro-democracy and anticorruption activists, and to have concluded that Washington hoped to subvert his power. When Russia invaded Crimea early in 2014, and when a wider conflict erupted in Russian-speaking Ukrainian regions later that year, it acted with ruthless efficiency. By using troops wearing uniforms without insignia or identification – who became known universally as “little green men” – Russia achieved surprise and dominance on the ground before authorities in Kiev, let alone Washington, really knew what was happening. It would be hard to overstate how much this took U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration by surprise. The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, published only days before the Crimea annexation, barely mentioned Russia and prioritized the risk of war with China as well as ongoing action against Islamist militant groups in the Middle East and beyond. Russia’s seizure of the strategically important Crimean peninsula, and its apparent role in shooting down a Malaysian Airlines flight over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, forced the United States and its European allies to urgently reconsider their beliefs about Russia’s intentions. Since then, NATO has deployed battle groups to Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (in case Moscow is tempted to try out the techniques it used in Ukraine against NATO members). In some ways, this resembles the Cold War, but it is in many respects a much more dynamic confrontation. Russia is now far more closely intertwined with the West, through investments and business deals, and this gives it new vulnerabilities – to sanctions, for example. Mueller’s prosecution of former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort – who has a long history of business interests to the former Soviet Union – has drawn attention to just how convoluted some of these dealings have become. Russian money has been essential to the success of many Western businesses, possibly including those of President Donald Trump. But many powerful Russians are similarly beholden to the West – which is one reason so many of them have been frantically lobbying Congress to ensure their names aren’t included on upcoming sanctions lists. NATO members concerned about Russian political interference have recruited armies of bloggers and social media activists to push back against Russian messaging, and established new monitoring bodies to track Russian disinformation efforts. But, in hindsight, they may have interpreted that threat too narrowly. Rather than simply concentrate its efforts on spreading subversion on Europe’s vulnerable periphery, Moscow appears to have concentrated on destabilizing the West’s most powerful countries. The most recent Mueller indictments allege that, by mid-2014, Russia’s preparations for its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections were well underway, and that it had already made significant progress with plans to boost its political influence in Europe. (These plans, the indictment suggests, included paying off the so-called “Habsburg group” of well-connected former European politicians.) Meanwhile, the ongoing fighting in Ukraine – as well as Russia’s post-2015 military intervention in Syria – has prompted a major Western reappraisal of Russia’s military capabilities. In addition to its newer hybrid warfare tactics, Russia has proved increasingly adept at combining the use of drones, electronic warfare and more conventional heavy artillery to lethal effect against Ukrainian forces using more traditional Western equipment and tactics. The seizure of Crimea prompted NATO to deploy a significant, and permanent, ground force to the Baltic countries and Poland. New fronts continue to erupt, and Western analysts increasingly worry over Russian activity in the Western Balkans. Putin’s explicit nuclear threats this week will likely cause the United States and its European allies to reconsider their own nuclear postures. It seems far from impossible that the United States would decide to increase its nuclear footprint in Eastern Europe. Just over a century ago, a similar welter of international anxiety and confusion formed the base of dry tinder that World War One would set alight. Russia and its rivals must take great care not to allow history to repeat itself.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- Russia Impact

Multiple pathways to escalation

Gady 15 – Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Franz-Stefan Gady, “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War,” The Diplomat, 4 May 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/

Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the risk of accidental nuclear war, according to Cartwright, while “the sophistication of the cyberthreat [to nuclear weapons] has increased exponentially.”

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- Cyber Impact

It will trigger NATO Article 5 commitments and risk kinetic warfare.

Imeson 19 – Writer for the Financial Times

Michael Imeson, “Russia cyber aggression fuels tensions with west,” Financial Times, October 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0aa7a6e0-ca52-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0

Russian government-backed cyber aggression is heightening concerns from the west following a spate of high-profile incidents, prompting threats of countermeasures from the likes of NATO, the EU and UK.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- Cyber Impact

Even small attacks could cause an escalatory spiral---that’s uniquely likely under times of crisis

Davis 19 – Member of the NATO parliamentary assembly and also a repetatur for the science and technology committee.

Susan Davis, October 13 2019, “NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security and Defence, Stabilizing Deterrence,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin. fc

66. As argued, states most likely do not see a cyber attack as a viable option for a pre-emptive, disarming first strike. However, in a crisis or pre-war situation, states could perceive a significant “cost of going second” (Davis, 2014). In such situations, one side “may well be frightened of what would happen if the other side attacks and may be convinced that going first will be advantageous” (Davis, 2014). This could lead to high escalatory risks. 67. In short and intense conflicts, pressures to use cyber attacks on military targets are high, as they are just another tool in the box, and the probability of attacks on critical infrastructure is still low, since they would not degrade the defender’s capabilities quickly enough to make a crucial difference (Lewis, 2018). If the war is expected to last longer, the latter type of attacks could appear more tempting, however. 68. Another key problem is the difficulty of determining the intent of a cyber intrusion (Lindsay, 2015). When a defender detects a breach, he may not know whether the intruder wants to spy on him, pursue active defence measures, gain a foothold for future defensive measures, or prepare for an imminent or future cyber attack (Slayton, 2017). It is extremely difficult to gauge intent in cyber space, and, in such cases, states tend to assume the worst (Hennessey, 2017). As a result, this can lead to misperception and an escalatory spiral (Slayton, 2017).

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- S --- Coop Key: Attribution

That’s key to draw redlines and preserve cyber-deterrence

Maigre 22 – senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia

Merle Maigre, "NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 4-6-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security

Action Plan for the Next Five Years

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 1AR --- S --- Coop Key: Attribution

Intelligence-sharing is key to proactive deterrence and attribution.

Dominick Namias and Jacob Chace, 3-24-2022, [Dominick Namias is a Legislative Fellow at the United States House of Representatives and has a BS in politics and government from Liberty University. Jacob Chace is a government and journalism student at Liberty University, "U.S. WARFARE WITHIN THE FIFTH DOMAIN: DETERRING RUSSIAN CYBER AGGRESSION," Liberty University, https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=hsgconference]

The 2021-2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis is revealing of Russia’s ultimate strategy in two ways. Firstly, it is now clear that a cyberattack will more than likely precede a kinetic attack, especially when there is little resistance to that aggression. Secondly, there will be more aggressive action coming out of the Russian Federation and NATO and the U.S. are not properly prepared on the cyber-defense front. The evidence for the latter point has been addressed earlier with the examples of successful cyberattacks against the United States such as the Colonial Pipeline and JBS infrastructure attacks as well as the Notpetya attack.

NATO has been primarily concerned with building up cybersecurity in member states. The next step, led by the United States, is to go on the offensive and accurately identify the sources of these cyber aggressions. On several occasions, Russia has been able to hide behind the idea that the cyber-attackers are not state-affiliated and fiend responsibility of aggressions from within the Federation:

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- Coop Key: Attribution

Info sharing with NATO is critical to effectively attribute responsibility for cyberattacks

Maigre 22 – senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia

Merle Maigre, "NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 4-6-2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security

When should states publicly attribute cyberattacks? Effective public attribution requires a clear understanding of the attributed cyber operation and the cyber-threat actor, but also the broader geopolitical environment, allied positions and activities, and the legal context. The public attribution framework put forward by Max Smeets and Florian Egloff in March 202127 distinguishes four factors that act as enablers or constraints in public attribution. These factors are intelligence, incident severity, geopolitical context, and post-attribution actions. The combination of these four components enables consistent decision-making about whether to publicly disseminate information about an adversary’s actions, privately tell the adversary, or restrict knowledge of the intrusion to the government and potentially other partners.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- Coop Key

Only the Alliance provides a forum for collaboration

Vivo and Fertasi 16 – Diana De Vivo joined the IES in October 2017 as part-time Doctoral Researcher on counter-terrorism, radicalisation and gender. She holds a Master's Degree (cum laude) in International Relations and Politics and a Bacherlor's Degree (cum laude) in Political Sciences from the University of Naples "L'Orientale", Italy. She currently works full time at NATO and has worked previously at the European External Action Service (EEAS)and the Calabria Region Delegation to the EU, the Italian Delegation to NATO, the Joint Force Command NATO in Naples, in a Private International Law Firm and at "L'Orientale" University in Naples (Italy). Nadja El Fertasi was a Senior executive at the NATO Communications and Information Agency. She worked with NATO for 20 years. 8-1-2016, "Cyber resilience: protecting NATO’s nervous system," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/08/12/cyber-resilience-protecting-natos-nervous-system/index.html

D. NATO’S CYBER PARTNERSHIPS 46. A strong network of partners is essential in an increasinsgly interconnected world, and this applies in particular to cyber security and defence. NATO therefore engages with a wide range of partners, including industry, academia, partner nations, and other international organisations. 47. Industry plays a central role in providing technical solutions and innovations, but they also own or operate a substantial share of Allied information systems. In the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP), the Alliance therefore provides a forum for NATO entities and national experts to engage with industry representatives (and academia) from member states. The NICP aims at facilitating information sharing on cyber threats and at improving the ability of Allies to detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents. The Partnership covers 12 priority areas, notably supply-chain management; best practices; awareness raising; education, training, and exercises; and innovation. 48. Cyber security and defence cooperation is very often a key component of NATO collaboration with partner nations. NATO has particularly deep partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine, which includes extensive cyber cooperation initiatives. Through the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, the Alliance supports Georgia’s cyber capabilities, interoperability, and cooperation with individual Allies. NATO also established a Trust Fund on Cyber Defence in conjunction with Ukraine in 2014. The Trust Fund aims at developing strictly defensive capabilities in the area of cyber security incident response, including through setting up two Incident Management Centres. Ukraine also receives NATO training in employing the Trust Fund’s related technologies and equipment. Other notable recent cyber cooperation initiatives with partner nations include agreements with Finland, the Republic of Moldova, Jordan, and Iraq.

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- US Key

US coop is key – it has the most advanced cyber capabilities within NATO – examples prove.

Laura Oolup, 2019, [MA candidate at the University of Tartu in the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, "CYBER AS A DETERRENT: UTILIZING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES IN NATO’S DETERRENCE POSTURE," University of Tartu, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/223009731.pdf]

The US has been considered the cyber power who “has the most advanced cyber capabilities within NATO” (Arts 2018:2). Therefore, it is not surprising that when the Defence Secretary Mattis at the time pointed out during the announcement of the US offering its cyber capabilities for the use of NATO is already willing to do so today (Mattis 2018). The US new cyber strategy allows military to carry out cyber operations to protect its systems, networks and national critical networks in general (Nakashima 2018). Furthermore, it seems that the utilization of the offensive cyber capabilities is not considered limited to deterring only cyberattacks as it is said, the intention is also to “ensure the US military’s ability to fight and win wars in any domain, including cyberspace” (Department of Defense 2018:1-2).

The offensive cyber capabilities the US is developing, have the purpose to counter cyberattacks, but at the same time be considered as any other means during war time. The offensive cyber capabilities should be flexible. This means, the US should have in its use various offensive cyber capabilities that can cause different types of effects depending on the situation and necessity (Department of Defense 2018:3). They are aimed to use as retaliatory measures in kind to cyberattacks but also as means to enhance the US military advantage in any way. Therefore, in the strategy it is mentioned that “during wartime, US cyber forces will be prepared to operate alongside our air, land, sea, and space forces to target adversary weaknesses, offset adversary strengths, and amplify the effectiveness of other elements of the Joint Force” (Department of Defence 2018:1).

2022 Georgetown Affirmative
AFF --- OCO’s › Adv --- OCO’s › 2AC --- S --- US Key

NATO has cyber capabilities, but coordinating with the US is key to a credible deterrent

Laura Oolup, 2019, [MA candidate at the University of Tartu in the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, "CYBER AS A DETERRENT: UTILIZING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES IN NATO’S DETERRENCE POSTURE," University of Tartu, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/223009731.pdf]

The US has been widely acknowledged as the global cyber power which is at the forefront with the offensive cyber capabilities. Therefore, the US is extremely important asset for NATO to have credibility and capability imposing retaliatory threat in cyberspace. The US has not been clear in words either which capabilities exactly it possesses, but the actions give a taste of it. The SCADA-attack against the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz that caused kinetic effects is a significant reflection of it (Zetter 2014). What can be noted here is that the offensive cyber capabilities have been presented through their deployment.

Additionally, the existence of and participation in exercises like the Crossed Swords organized primarily by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence accredited by NATO, enables Allies to improve their offensive cyber capabilities and mirrors to the enemy which capabilities are being obtained. During this year’s exercise, the participants from cyber commands and special operation forces tested their offensive skills on attacking industrial control systems and also unmanned ground vehicles (CCDCOE 2019).