2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › EU Grid Collapse
Gray 19 (Editor Richard Gray leads BBC Future's editorial and commercial strategy), 8/24/19, accessed 6/28/22, “ What Would Happen in an Apocalyptic Blackout”, (JB)
She is right. While the term “black sky” events illustrates perhaps the most visible impact of widespread power failures, it fails to convey the scale of the impact these can have. In our modern world, almost everything, from our financial systems to our communication networks, are utterly reliant upon electricity. Other critical infrastructure like water supplies and our sewer systems rely upon electric powered pumps to keep them running. With no power, fuel pumps at petrol stations stop working, road signs, traffic lights and train systems go dead. Transport networks grind to a halt.
Our complex food supply chains quickly fall apart without computers to coordinate where produce needs to be, or the fuel to transport it or refrigeration to preserve it. Air conditioning, gas boilers and heating systems also rely upon electricity to work.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › EU Grid Collapse
NEA 21 (The Nuclear Energy Agency is an intergovernmental agency that is organized under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.), 12/13/21, accessed 6/28/22, “The role of nuclear energy in mitigating climate change”, . (JB)
One key advantage that the nuclear sector has is that it is an established industry with proven technologies and supply chains. Nuclear energy already displaces 1.6 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide emissions annually. Through refurbishments and , the nuclear sector can continue displacing carbon dioxide for decades to come: up to 50 gigatonnes of cumulative carbon emissions between 2020 and 2050.
There is also significant potential for new builds of large-scale nuclear energy reactors, which could displace 23 gigatonnes of emissions between 2020 and 2050 by replacing fossil power generation. This includes replacing coal power, which is among the most intensive emitters of carbon dioxide but is particularly widespread in developing countries, where demand for energy is forecast to grow quickly as more parts of their economies link up to the electricity grid. Currently, non-OECD countries China and India account for the biggest shares of such new projects.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › EU Grid Collapse
Alderman 22 (Liz Alderman is the Paris-based chief European business correspondent for The New York Times, covering economic and inequality challenges around Europe.), 2/10/22, accessed 6/28/22, “France Announces Major Nuclear Power Buildup”, (JB)
Climate change and the nuclear industry’s potential role in it have become a central issue in France’s coming presidential election. Most candidates, with the exception of France’s Greens party, have said nuclear power is needed to meet climate goals.
The nuclear industry is a national priority in France, creating about 200,000 jobs directly and indirectly.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › EU Grid Collapse
Alderman 22 (Liz Alderman is the Paris-based chief European business correspondent for The New York Times, covering economic and inequality challenges around Europe.), 2/10/22, accessed 6/28/22, “France Announces Major Nuclear Power Buildup”, (JB)
President Emmanuel Macron announced a major buildup of France’s huge nuclear power program on Thursday, pledging to construct up to 14 new-generation reactors and a fleet of smaller nuclear plants as the country seeks to slash planet-warming emissions and cut its reliance on foreign energy.
The announcement represented an about-face for Mr. Macron, who had previously pledged to reduce France’s reliance on nuclear power but has pivoted to burnishing an image as a pronuclear president battling climate change as he faces a tough re-election bid in April.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › EU Grid Collapse
Nelson, Romero 22 (Jonathan Nelson is the director of institutional relations at Constella Intelligence. Alejandro Romero is an ECFR council member and the chief operations officer of Constella Intelligence.), 3/7/22, accessed 6/27/22, “Why Europe’s energy industry is vulnerable to cyber-attacks”, (JB)
Russia’s war on Ukraine has created widespread concern that European energy supplies and infrastructure will come under intensifying cyber-attacks. The Putin regime, which has long used such disruptive tactics, may retaliate against Western economic sanctions with cyber-warfare. European states and energy companies should reflect on the laundry list of such attacks that have occurred in recent years to recognise and respond to the risks they face in this area.
On 7 May 2021, the US Colonial Pipeline suffered a critical ransomware cyber-attack – the largest cyber-attack on infrastructure in US history. This prompted the authorities to declare a state of emergency in 17 US states along the east coast and in Washington, and resulted in major fuel shortages and long queues at gas stations throughout affected sectors. By early February 2022, a slew of subsequent had struck oil and gas facilities across Europe, disrupting the operations of multiple oil transport and storage companies in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and threatening production and distribution in the sector.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Hybrid war
Underwood et. al. 22 (Major Andrew Underwood, USA, is Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5), Europe, NATO, Russia. Colonel Andrew Emery, USAF, is the Space and Missile Defense Planner in the U.S. Military Delegation to the NATO Military Committee (JCS) at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Haynsworth, USA, is currently serving in the Commander’s Action Group in the NATO Special Operations Headquarters at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium. Commander Jennifer Barnes, USN, most recently served in the Commander’s Action Group at U.S. Africa Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany), 4/14/22, accessed 6/24/22, “All Quiet in the Eastern Front: NATO Civil-Military Deterrence of Russian Hybrid Warfare”, (JB)
As Russia has evolved to increasingly rely on hybrid warfare as a major component of its strategy, NATO must adapt accordingly. NATO’s model must shift from a reliance on traditional military deterrence and expand to incorporate political, economic, and social spheres to counter aggression below the level of armed conflict. Since NATO’s structure does not readily support innovation or active (versus passive) deterrence measures, new ideas and emphases are needed to address these challenges.
Pursuing activities to deter hybrid warfare certainly poses risks and challenges to NATO and its member states and partners. Activities in these spheres might risk further blurring lines between military and nonmilitary responsibilities. Individual member laws and EU regulations might complicate these efforts. Civil institutions could be at risk of being identified as military targets in the event of a linear war.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Hybrid war
Polyakova & Boulègue (Alina Polyakova President and CEO of CEPA, Mathieu Boulègue Senior Research Fellow Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House), 1/29/21, accessed 6/24/22, “THe Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare: Executive Summary”, (JB)
Russia’s military interventions in Syria, Venezuela, and, more recently, Libya raise the question whether the Kremlin is still being opportunistic or whether it has revised its military strategy to better project force around the globe based on a single playbook. These interventions have taken advantage of preexisting chaos and weakness that Russia did not directly cause. Together with its growing conventional power, Russia is now far more confident about using hard power in the hybrid mix.
The aforementioned changes in Russian military thinking reflect a reinvigorated confidence in the efficacy of chaos as a competitive strategy. If anything, the Kremlin leadership feels vindicated about the usefulness of hard power options, while categorizing nonmilitary means as a tool to prepare conflict environments and make the use of force more effective. This is best exemplified by Kalev Stoicescu’s chapter on Estonia, where the threat of Russia’s military action cannot be dissociated from hybrid tools aimed at testing the country’s resolve below the threshold of Article V of NATO’s founding treaty, which commits the Alliance to collective defense.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › democracy
Poast and Chinchilla 20 (Paul Poast & Alexandra Chinchilla, Paul Poast is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Chinchilla is a Rosenwald Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security and Niehaus Postdoctoral Fellow at The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion,” International Politics, 04/30/2020, LH
In what way should one expect NATO to enhance democratic development? After all, as highlighted above, democracy is a core principle of the institution. Much of the existing work on NATO and democratic development points to several avenues of possible influence: socialization, guidance from NATO about how to create and implement reforms, NATO pressure to implement reforms, and legitimizing new democracies by helping them provide the public good of security through NATO membership. It is important to note that each of these mechanisms for how NATO could prompt reform should begin operating before full NATO membership is achieved. Once prospective members are given a promise of membership in the form of the MAP, they will be brought into close contact with NATO members and therefore exposed to the socialization mechanism. If domestic reform is a necessary condition for NATO membership, prospective members participating in the MAP should begin reforming so that they can reap the benefits of membership. Finally, if democratic reforms made to gain NATO membership persist, NATO membership should also be associated with higher levels of democracy in new member states. Below we discuss each of these means for NATO influence proposed in the literature.
First, NATO may have a subtle impact on future member states by socializing military and civilian leaders from states seeking membership to respect democratic norms. Democracy is dependent not only on the formal institutions of a country, but also on whether elites are willing to abide by democratic constraints on their power rather than undermine or dismantle them. The example of Poland’s recent democratic backsliding despite the former presence of formal democratic institutions illustrates this point. Even when democratic reforms preceded NATO involvement, NATO could still have a democratizing influence by socializing military and civilian elites to respect democratic reforms—particularly civilian control of the military. NATO created the conditions for regular, institutionalized interaction between elites from partner states and longtime member states within the institutional framework of the alliance and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), making socialization possible. NATO taught military officers and civilian defense policymakers who had served most of their professional lives under a communist system about the norms of a democracy and their role in it (Gheciu 2005b). This socialization logic outlined by Alexandra Gheciu and others is not in conflict with our argument, as we measure changes in democratic institutions rather than changes in elite attitudes. However, recent democratic backsliding in some NATO countries indicates that either the right elites were not socialized by NATO or the main effect of NATO socialization was teaching elites to value civilian control of the military and continued engagement with NATO.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Nuke escalation
Lynas 22 British author and journalist who has written multiple books on the environment and climate change, Mark Lynas, 03/10/2022, “What Science Says: Could Humans Survive a Nuclear War Between NATO and Russia?”, (JB)
If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia?
looked at a Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100 weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories held each by Russia and the US.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Nuke escalation
Richard Walker 21 (Distinguished University Professor), 6/15/21, accessed 6/24/22, “Biden-Putin Summit: Experts Warn of Cyber Nuclear Nightmare”, (JB)
The allies signed off on a new "Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy," affirming that, if serious enough, a cyberattack could lead to the invocation of NATO's core Article 5: that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
Recent targets have included , the and election campaigning in France. Ever more corporations have been held up by ransomware, with their systems blocked in an attempt to extort money.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Nuke escalation
Cimbala 22 (Stephen J. Cimbala, Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, “Nuclear-Crisis Management and Cyber War—A Dangerous Crossroads,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, LH
POTENTIAL DISRUPTERS Information or cyber warfare has the potential to attack or to disrupt successful crisis management with regard to each of the preceding attributes.24 First, infowar can muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications networks.25 The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack; however, destroyed or altered information also may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been interpreted correctly when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal “resolve” instead of “yield” to its opponent on a particular issue; side B, misperceiving what it has received as a “yield” message, may decide to continue its aggression, but then meets unexpected resistance, causing a much more dangerous situation to develop. There is also the possibility of cyber-enabled preemption to disable enemy nuclear missiles before they reach the launchpad or during the launch itself. Apparently, the United States has used such “left-of-launch” techniques against North Korea.26 During a nuclear crisis, would such a move be accepted by the attacked party as one of intimidation and deterrence or, to the contrary, would offensive cyber war against missile launches prompt a nuclear first use or first strike by the defender for fear of losing its retaliatory capability?
Infowar also can destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for successful crisis management. One way it can do this is by disrupting communication links between policy makers and military commanders during a period of high threat and severe time pressure. Unanticipated problems, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, may arise under these conditions. For example, political leaders may have predelegated limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restrictive conditions; only when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of predelegation, would military commanders be authorized to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their commands.27 Clogged, destroyed, or disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military commanders perceive a situation to be far more desperate, and thus permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really is. For example, during the Cold War, disrupted communications between the U.S. national command authority and ballistic-missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a joint decision by submarine officers and crew, in the absence of contrary instructions, to launch.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › Nuke escalation
Cimbala 22 (Stephen J. Cimbala, Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, “Nuclear-Crisis Management and Cyber War—A Dangerous Crossroads,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, LH
Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a nonnuclear, or even a postnuclear, military-technical arc of development. War in the digital domain offers, at least in theory, a possible means of crippling or disabling enemy assets without the need for kinetic attack, or at least while minimizing physical destruction.4 Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are the very epitome of “mass” destruction, such that their use for deterrence—the avoidance of war by the manipulation of risk—is preferred to the actual firing of same. Unfortunately, neither nuclear deterrence nor cyber war will be able to live in a distinct policy universe for the near or distant future.
Nuclear weapons, whether held back for deterrence or fired in anger, are incorporated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The weapons and their C4ISR systems must be protected from attacks both kinetic and digital in nature. In addition, the decision makers who must manage nuclear forces during a crisis ideally should have the best possible information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber forces and command systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk acceptance of possible opponents. In short, the task of managing a nuclear crisis demands good information and clear thinking. But the employment of cyber weapons in the early stages of a crisis could impede clear assessments by creating confusion in networks and the action channels that depend on those networks.5 The temptation to take preemptive cyber action—for example, intrusive cyber reconnaissance of commandand-control (C2) systems—might “succeed” to the point at which nuclear-crisis management becomes weaker instead of stronger. Related to this, one challenge of the second nuclear age is that conventional war is more likely to take place within a nuclear context. Paul Bracken has noted the following:
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › !! – Space War
Boucher 22 – Director of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s Space and High-Altitude Research Center. (Craig Boucher; "On Space War"; Modern War Institute; https://mwi.usma.edu/on-space-war/; 1-6-2022, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-AZ
Over the past few years, there has been a huge uptick in public discourse about the “militarization of space”—a phrase that may sound concerning, but it is also nothing new. Much of this discussion has been driven by the founding of the United States Space Force and reestablishment of the United States Space Command. Regardless of how these moves may look to some, as someone who was a party to the discussions surrounding these decisions, I can confidently say that they were not taken lightly, nor were they aimed at establishing the United States as the aggressor in the space domain. The United States did recently formally recognize space as a new warfighting domain, but in order to understand why this happened it is necessary to examine the history of warfare and human activity in the space domain.
The Theory of War
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › !! – Space War
Toscana and Muñoz Mosquera 21 – Borja Montes Toscano is a Legal Assistant at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe. Andrés Muñoz Mosquera is one of the three NATO senior legal advisors ("Legal Aspects of Space: NATO Perspectives"; NATO Legal Gazette; https://www.act.nato.int/application/files/5716/4032/2170/legal_gazette_42.pdf; 12-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-AZ
The space domain has recently become a new field full of new opportunities due to the advancements in technology. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities may arise as states and private companies exploit this domain to achieve strategic competitive advantage in different areas (e.g. weather monitoring, transport, environment and agriculture, science, communications, among others), and draw benefits out of them. These realities may pose challenges to the existing rule of law in the space domain leading to legal uncertainty and an apparent governance vacuum. In addition, possible technological disruptions (e.g. satellites’ interferences) may distort information gathered, which is essential for NATO’s operations and missions, including collective defence, crisis response and counter-terrorism.
Hence, these concerns have resulted in NATO’s new space policy, and in this way recognizing space as new operational domain two years ago.4 The 1980s and 1990s bore witness that concluding new binding agreements for outer space matters beyond the existing ones would be extremely difficult. However, the fluid legal regime for the outer space does not entail that customary international law is inapplicable.5 The crystallization of an international customary norm is a lengthy process, as is the development of treaties, and thus the introduction of a Rules-Based International Order (RBIO). Several factors within the space domain cannot be under-estimated by the Alliance such as space-based strike weapons, space support for the Alliance’s operations or dual-use material/devices.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › China
Odgaard 4/25 (Liselotte Odgaard, Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a non-resident Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on Chinese foreign, security and defence policy, Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Aarhus University in Denmark. “NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space,” The Washington Quarterly, 4/25/2022, ) -LH
Rather than highlighting the need for a division of labor within NATO, the 2022 invasion has highlighted that Russia’s appetite for threatening Europe with military action is closely entwined with its long-standing strategic cooperation with China. Intelligence reports that China told Russia in February 2022 not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing testify to the closely orchestrated Chinese-Russian approach to the West.18 Moscow and Beijing are both strategic opponents of the US, a shared status that has spurred them to coordinate their separate geostrategic priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, forging unison pushback against what they consider Western encroachments on their spheres of interest.19 The poorer than expected performance of the Russian armed forces in its 2022 war with Ukraine has pushed China to try to appear neutral. Nevertheless, China has joined Russia in opposing further enlargement of NATO, and in the Indo-Pacific, Russia has joined China in opposing Taiwanese independence.20 It would be wise for Europe and the US to plan for Sino-Russian geostrategic coordination to continue unless more clear evidence that China will abandon Russia is presented. One thing is certain: China will work with the partners that help it advance a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. And to counter this development, Europe and the United States need to devise effective mechanisms for joint responses to Beijing as well as to Moscow.
A US-European division of labor is not likely to help NATO develop tools to defend itself against threats from China and Russia. The lack of electronic warfare in Russia’s war with Ukraine has revealed gaps between its concept of operations and the tactics of the Ukrainian military. As demonstrated in prior operations in Syria and the Donbas, Russia will adapt and learn in the short and long term. For example, Russia can be expected to improve its electromagnetic spectrum management in order to enhance its planning and management of forces on the battlefield. Meanwhile, China is watching the performance of the parties involved in the war with a view to update its cyber and space capabilities as well as strategic concepts. As a consequence, both Russian and Chinese threats will continue to increasingly emerge in the cyber and space domains. This calls for global and functional defenses rather than an exclusive geographical focus. It is more important than ever to design NATO for a future where threats toward transatlantic security are global and requires a unified response.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › Impact scenarios › China
Odgaard 4/25 (Liselotte Odgaard, Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a non-resident Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on Chinese foreign, security and defence policy, Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Aarhus University in Denmark. “NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space,” The Washington Quarterly, 4/25/2022, ) -LH
China’s challenges to US and European security constitute such common threats across a broad range of sectors. These include gradual reinterpretations of principles of international law, the subversion of universal liberal market economic practices, and cyber insurgencies targeting a wide range of civilian and military entities. These Chinese policies all have major military implications because they are related to developments in the operating principles, capabilities, and priorities of China’s armed forces. Only NATO can offer an integrated transatlantic response to the military aspects of Chinese policies that threaten those sectors across the globe, including European actors. NATO’s involvement is essential if the credibility of the alliance’s security guarantees is to be preserved and an effective response to China’s encroachments on a liberal rules-based order is to be established. The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. NATO is key to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China sufficiently.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › Active defense good
Sulmeyer 18 (Michael Sulmeyer, Michael Sulmeyer is Director of the Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He previously served as Director for Plans and Operations for Cyber Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense: Deterrence Isn’t Enough,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense)-- LH
The United States has been the victim of repeated cyberattacks by foreign powers, and it seems to have little power to stop them. During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Russian hackers broke into the Democratic National Committee’s e-mail servers and made more general efforts to influence the election’s outcome, as detailed in Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s indictment of 13 Russians and three Russian entities. In February, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials warned that the Russian government would again try to use cyber-operations to interfere with midterm elections in November. That same month, the White House publicly blamed Russia for “the most destructive and costly cyberattack in history,” the 2017 NotPetya malware campaign, which crippled the government of Ukraine before spreading to multinational corporations such as FedEx and Maersk, causing billions in damage.
The Russians are not the only ones hacking at the United States’ expense. Chinese hacking groups have stolen U.S. intellectual property from industrial manufacturers and military contractors. In 2015, China weaponized its “Great Firewall” and conducted distributed denial of service attacks against U.S. websites, including GitHub, which Beijing wished to punish for hosting content that the Chinese leadership found undesirable. In 2014, North Korean hackers attacked the U.S. film studio Sony Pictures to block the release of a movie, The Interview, that depicted the attempted assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The attack erased the content of thousands of computers, released embarrassing internal e-mails, and intimidated Sony into canceling the movie’s theatrical release. Iran too has lashed out in cyberspace, attacking U.S. financial institutions and a dam in New York.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › NATO key
Ekstedt, Parkhouse, and Clemente 12 (Victoria Ekstedt, Tom Parkhouse, Dave Clemente, “National Cyber Security Framework Manual,” NATO’s CYBER DIMENSION, 2012, ) - LH
NATO’S CYBER DIMENSION Digital communications are the backbone of society and, whilst they are a capability that NATO exploits for operational and administrative advantage, it is neither an environment that NATO, nor its Member States, can claim to control. The ability to collect, process and deliver vast amounts of data requires huge increases in military and bureaucratic efficiency. At the same time, all NATO nations need to work with the fact that their dependence on cyberspace, including the internet, is a major vulnerability and, unless invested in, will result in deteriorated overall resilience.571 NATO, the armed forces, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that work with it expose themselves to known and unknown risks while operating in the digital domain. Business as usual for NATO includes the procurement and organisation of military capabilities, engaging in the political processes that support the operation and coherence of the North Atlantic Council, and the administration and control of the NATO command elements and forces assigned to NATO activities. It is a huge undertaking with operational, logistic, economic, political, technical, environmental and reputational risks.
The Alliance is inextricably linked to the digital domain and is faced with many threats that create problems for Member States since cyberspace is international by nature. The interconnectivity makes a weakness of one country a weakness in all, which means that states and organisations cannot deal effectively with cyber threats on their own.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › NATO key
Skaluba 17 (Christopher Skaluba, Christopher Skaluba served as the principal director for European and NATO policy in the office of the secretary of defense from 2012 to 2015, “IN PRAISE OF NATO’S DYSFUNCTIONAL, BUREAUCRATIC TEDIUM,” Texas National Security Review, 11/7/2017, ) -LH
A year after Donald Trump’s election to the presidency, the furor around his approach to transatlantic security has predictably calmed. Part of the reason is saturation. Like antibiotics, provocation of one’s allies loses its potency when used excessively. Part of the reason is that the president has found a more willing and compelling foil, in the form of Kim Jong Un, than those buttoned-up European leaders he accuses of freeloading. Certainly, part of the reason includes the administration’s Russia-related scandals and Robert Mueller’s investigation. The president’s hostility toward NATO has always felt more like a sop to Moscow than a matter of principle and thus not a good look with indictments swirling.
But much of it has to do with the nature of the alliance itself. NATO’s bread and butter is cooperation on activities like planning, doctrine, interoperability, and logistics — things which are uninteresting to the general public discourse and largely resistant to the rhetorical or policy whims of even the president of the United States. Cooperation in these areas, while camouflaged to all but the most intense NATO watchers, can move the needle to the benefit of the United States in concrete and practical ways. As Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis heads to Brussels for his third meeting of NATO defense ministers in ten months, it is precisely to ensure such work continues.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
case › misc › NATO key
Skaluba and Rodihan 22 (Christopher Skaluba and Conor Rodihan, “No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective,” Atlantic Council, 1/18/2022 LH
As the crisis over Ukraine intensifies, key stakeholders are looking to Brussels for signs of Western resolve. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 12, the Alliance delivered: In a vivid expression of solidarity, it categorically (and unanimously) rejected Russian demands to forgo future expansion or withdraw forces from member countries.
Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or sending anti-tank weapons—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices.