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2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy D

Democratic peace theory is cherry-picked, and dyadic between two democracies at best.

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Democracy D

Alt causes

Klaas ’21 [Brian; June 11; associate professor of global politics at University College London; the Washington Post, “Opinion: The world is horrified by the dysfunction of American democracy,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/11/pew-research-global-opinion-us-democracy/]

It’s official: America is no longer a “shining city upon a hill.”

Data released Thursday from Pew Research shows that our allies are beyond delighted that the Trump presidency has ended. Confidence in U.S. leadership has soared. Our friends are breathing a sigh of relief.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Democracy D

Democracy resilient but doesn’t solve

Doorenspleet 18 --- Renske Doorenspleet, associate professor at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Warwick University, in the United Kingdom, Chapter 7: CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE VALUE OF DEMOCRACY”, First Online: 22 July 2018, Page 239-243, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91656-9_7

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database5 for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes.

The first finding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War D

Russia won’t and cant expand hybrid attacks

Dr. Samuel Charap 16, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oxford, M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, B.A. in Political Science and Russian from Amherst College, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”, Survival, Volume 57, Number 6, December 2015 – January 2016

Secondly, the setting of eastern Ukraine made Moscow’s objective far easier to pursue. In fact, the region is the most permissive environment outside Russia’s borders for this kind of operation. The Donbas shares with Russia a common language, as well as historical and cultural traditions. It is connected to Russia by thick cross-border interpersonal ties. Russian business and intelligence networks deeply penetrate the region. The Russian military had near-complete knowledge of the battlefield, and, given the highly porous border, thousands of kilometres of access to the theatre. Ukraine’s already weak governance had essentially collapsed in the east after the revolution. And there was already widespread resentment among the population towards the post-Maidan government. Polling data from April 2014 showed that over 70% of residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions considered the new government in Kiev ‘illegal’.11 In short, eastern Ukraine is perhaps the only place beyond Russia’s borders where Moscow can sustain an insurgency, and events in early 2014 made it an even softer target. As a counterfactual, one could imagine the fate of a hypothetical deployment of ‘little green men’ to Lvov, the traditional home of Ukrainian nationalism located in the west of the country. They would likely have ended up hanging from the lamp posts, not leading an armed insurgency.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Hybrid War D

Hybrid tactics fail

Lanoska 20 [Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo, "Thank goodness for NATO enlargement", 4/7/20, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8.pdf]

Even the use of so-called hybrid tactics may have limited efficacy in the Baltic region. The three Baltic countries have been subject to an intense Russian disinformation campaign since at least 2014. Nevertheless, local public opinion remains largely supportive of NATO and other defense policy measures aimed at boosting deterrence. One reason why these societies may be inoculated against Russian disinformation is that they have grown accustomed to seeing Russia in adversarial terms, thus making average citizens critical of pro-Kremlin narratives (Lanoszka 2019). In addition, the Baltic states have integrated their minority populations far better than is often assumed. Although many Russophones may still lack citizenship rights in Estonia and Latvia and so are more likely to experience political discrimination and economic hardship, they nevertheless retain key benefits associated with living in the European Union (Trimbach and O’Lear 2015). They may have sympathies for aspects of Russian foreign policy, but these sympathies do not translate into a preference to be reunited with Russia (Kallas 2016). Accordingly, Russia faces serious obstacles replicating what it did in Crimea. Russians living in Crimea were generally sympathetic to being part of Russkiy Mir (‘Russian World’), making them more willing to be the objects of an annexation effort (O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov 2016, 761). Further, Russia does not have an existing military presence in the Baltic countries—as it did with the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol—that it could leverage to achieve easy faits accomplis and dissuade potential challengers from organizing.

In sum, NATO does not need to have a heavy footprint in the Baltic region to deter Russian aggression. Russia would have to overcome major operational challenges if it wished to undertake a successful conquest of the Baltic countries. Of course, none of this is to invite complacency about Baltic security. The Baltic states and Poland should deepen regional cooperation in order to ensure that no key policy differences exist between them (Jermalavicius et al. 2018). They also face potential vulnerabilities at sea and so need to improve the resilience of their undersea and maritime infrastructure (Schaub et al. 2017). Still, the defensibility of the Baltic region helps illuminate why Russia resorts to disinformation campaigns, airspace incursions, vague nuclear threats, and other attempts at subversion. It cannot do much more lest it would provoke an unwanted response.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Hybrid Ward D

Hybrid war doesn’t spillover to kinetic conflict

Jyri Raitasalo 19, military professor of war studies at the Finnish National Defence University, 2/3/19, “The Hidden Benefits of Great-Power Conflict with China and Russia,” https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/hidden-benefits-great-power-conflict-china-and-russia-42932

The fact that practically all serious security threats facing the West have moved to the gray zone is a positive thing. This means that most—if not all—threats that the western states are confronting are nonmilitary in nature. This development has reduced the probability of war breaking out between western states and their adversaries. This is a new development as many western states have overused their militaries during the post–Cold War era to the detriment of other tools of statecraft.

“Gray-zone conflicts,” “hybrid warfare,” “political warfare” and “competition short of armed conflict” have become mainstream ways to frame and conceptualize contemporary threats facing the United States and its allies and partners in Europe. The western outlook to gray-zone conflicts accentuates daily dangers which over time corrode western shared understandings, narratives and institutions. According to the western reading of the situation, the tools at the disposal of today’s gray-zone actors vary from information warfare specialists to internet troll farms and offensive cyber actors.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Hybrid Ward D

Hybrid deterrence high

Rynning 20 --- Sten Rynning is Professor of War Studies and Vice Dean for Research at the faculty of business and social sciences, the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) in Odense, Denmark, “Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice,” NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/43303/2021_Book_NLARMSNetherlandsAnnualReviewO.pdf

Deterrence by denial (i.e., an ability to deny Russian objectives by defensive measures) is only possible for NATO at the lower rungs of this ladder, and NATO has not been idle here either. In fact, most of the early measures taken by NATO in response to the annexation of Crimea fall into the deterrence of denial category and centre on rapid reaction capacities, especially in the shape of a NATO Response Force (NRF) upgraded for deterrence purposes. The NRF now has a reinforced, quicker spearhead—a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force potentially up to 13,000 troops strong, and then two complementing brigades with support (each 13,000 strong) forming a layered, sizeable reaction force explicitly linked to collective defence purposes and regularly exercised in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.35 In 2016, in response to the foreseeable difficulties of projecting mainly Western forces into zones of conflicts close to Russia, NATO decided to established an “enhanced forward presence”—four multinational battalion-sized battle groups —in the Baltic states and Poland, and a “tailored forward presence”—mainly naval forces—in the Black Sea region. Whether these forces can credibly “deny” Russian objectives in the case of limited war is a bone of contention. Most observers and sometimes NATO itself employ the descriptor “tripwire” to these forces, thus indicating that they are triggers that promise to unleash NATO’s big guns and therefore part and parcel of deterrence by punishment. However, US diplomats (interviewed on background) feel more confident that the US battalion embedded (in Poland) in the collective forward presence posture would actually be able to fight and survive, and thus deny Russian objectives. That may be so, in which case the conclusion is that NATO has a moderate-to-low—and geographically focused—capacity for deterrence by denial and then a more general and impressive capacity for deterrence by punishment. NATO’s unquestionable capacity for deterrence by denial is rather found at the level of grey zone, non-kinetic conflict. In this regard, NATO has upgraded not only its cyber defences and enhanced intelligence coordination, as mentioned, but has enhanced coordination with the European Union on hybrid threats, with a 2016 joint declaration leading to a common work program and a collaborative Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, located in Helsinki, the 2016 adoption of societal resilience benchmarks that, while mostly falling outside NATO’s political-military remit, nations must meet, and finally the decision in 2018 to organize counter-hybrid support teams that can tailor assistance to individual allies and circumstances.36 NATO’s full range of actions in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea —a range to which this brief overview can do only limited justice—thus combines deterrence by denial (grey zone conflict, societal resilience, reaction and forward deployed forces to counter limited land grabs) and deterrence by punishment (the full chain of reaction and deployable forces, from conventional to nuclear). NATO’s strong suit is the military piece of this posture, but it has considerably adapted to grey zone conflict scenarios in an effort to achieve a comprehensive deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia’s unified (kinetic and non-kinetic) and uninterrupted (all domains, in war and peace) doctrine of “new generation warfare”.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Hybrid Ward D

NATO response will always be proportional

NBC 10 --- NBC News, Red Tape, “Could cyber skirmish lead U.S. to war?”, June 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/could-cyber-skirmish-lead-u-s-war-flna6C10406234

Imagine this scenario: Estonia, a NATO member, is cut off from the Internet by cyber attackers who besiege the country's bandwidth with a devastating denial of service attack. Then, the nation's power grid is attacked, threatening economic disruption and even causing loss of life as emergency services are overwhelmed. As international outcry swells, outside researchers determine the attack is being sponsored by a foreign government and being directed from a military base. Desperate and outgunned in tech resources, Estonia invokes Article 5 of the NATO Treaty -- an attack against one member nation is an attack against all. It requests an immediate response from its military allies: Bomb the attacker's command-and-control headquarters to stop the punishing cyber attack.

Now, the U.S. government is faced with a chilling question: Should it get dragged into a shooting war by a cyber attack on an ally? Or should it decline and threaten the fiber of the NATO alliance?

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- NATO Unity D

No impact---NATO’s ineffective.

Christopher Roach 18. Attorney and commentator in The Federalist, the Washington Legal Foundation, the Marine Corps Gazette, and the Orlando Sentinel. 07-16-2018. “What Good Is NATO?,” https://amgreatness.com/2018/07/16/what-good-is-nato/

NATO’s weakness stems not only from dubious grand strategy, but also from its limited practical value. Consider the Libyan Campaign. No longer Europe’s hour, NATO’s member states aligned with one another to persuade the U.S. to join a dubious campaigns, where highfalutin rhetoric of human rights masked realpolitik concerns for things like oil. The NATO tail ended up wagging the American dog, and the U.S. military had to make up for key NATO deficiencies in logistics, electronic warfare, surveillance, and airpower. In the end, the NATO allies worked together and toppled Qaddafi, but the place fell apart, jihadis exploited the ungoverned space, a U.S. ambassador was killed, and the campaign did little to contribute to U.S. or European security interests. A paragon of the managerial class, Hillary Clinton summed it up with her callous retort: “What difference at this point does it make?” Libya is not the exception. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO’s European members repeatedly have shown very meager power projection capabilities. In Afghanistan, where many of our NATO allies assisted our campaign after the 9/11 attacks under NATO’s Article 5, individual NATO participants often operated under wildly different rules of engagement, limiting the effectiveness of various nations’ contingents. While there are common standards across NATO, ties of history and friendship, as well as a common Western culture, it’s not so clear that these factors have ever overcome the divergent abilities of NATO members when called to action. In short, as it has expanded its membership and its mission, NATO has become less effective. And, to the extent it is effective at all, the United States has always had to do most of the work.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- NATO Unity D

Alliance is resilient, but fails

Gowan 15 – Richard Gowan, Research Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. to Europe: Don’t Go Soft on American-Led Global Order”, World Politics Review, 3-16, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15297/u-s-to-europe-don-t-go-soft-on-american-led-global-order

The United States sent its European allies some stern signals about their obligations to the American-led international order last week. On Monday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power visited Brussels, where she warned NATO members to halt their “dangerous” defense cuts and called on European powers to offer more troops to United Nations peace operations. Power argued that European armies, which currently provide less than 10 percent of all U.N. peacekeepers worldwide, could have a “momentum-shifting” impact on beleaguered blue helmet missions in trouble spots such as South Sudan. Instead, she underlined, “European countries have drawn back from peacekeeping,” while the European Union has shied away from high-intensity missions. This was an accurate but uncomfortable message for EU and NATO members, whose appetite for stabilization missions remains very low after their Afghan nightmares. Power emphasized threats from the Middle East and North Africa to bolster her argument. Later in the week, anonymous U.S. officials sent a reminder that they expect European assistance in Asia, too. This time, the sore point was economic cooperation rather than military affairs. Washington has taken umbrage at Britain’s decision to invest in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a new organization proposed by China to offset the U.S.-backed Asian Development Bank. A U.S. source told the Financial Times that the U.K. seemed to be adopting a stance of “constant accommodation of China.” British journalists seemed shocked that the U.S. might question Washington’s “special relationship” with London. In reality, the relationship has been on the rocks for some time, as U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration has worked out thorny but productive alternative relationships with Paris and Berlin on political, security and economic matters. Yet the U.S. criticism of the U.K. involvement with the AIIB revealed a deeper concern about potential challenges to U.S. leadership in the international system—and Europe’s commitment to sustaining American primacy in particular. The current multilateral system rests on two basic pillars. The first of these is a U.S. political commitment to work through international institutions, even if this is often more a matter of rhetoric than reality. The second is the continued willingness of Western European governments and Japan to pay a large chunk of the costs of this system, in addition to backing the U.S. against challengers such as Russia and China. This has never been an entirely stable set-up. It has most obviously broken down over individual crises such as the 2003 Iraq War, when France and Germany lined up with China and Russia to oppose the U.S.-led invasion. More fundamentally, it has been clear ever since the long process of decolonization brought waves of Asian and African states into the U.N. and other international institutions in the 1950s and 1960s that the “global order” could not rest on a trans-Atlantic bargain indefinitely. It has nonetheless proved to be a remarkably durable arrangement. The U.S., EU members and Japan combined continue to pay nearly 80 percent of the U.N.’s main budget. Their shared grip on the institution remains powerful. Non-Western powers have invested in elements of the international system: China has aimed to expand its limited role in the International Monetary Fund, while Arab countries have focused on humanitarian aid in response to the crises in their neighborhood. But the overall U.S. and European dominance of these institutions is extremely hard to break. The benefits to Western policymakers are also clear. Non-Western officials at the IMF believe that the fund has been far too deferential to the EU over the eurozone crisis, even if the European Commission has at the same time argued that the IMF has been unduly critical of EU efforts. In the meantime, close observers of the U.N. believe that Britain, France and the U.S. are now actually more powerful in the Security Council than they were 10 to 15 years ago, despite collisions with Russia and China over matters such as Syria, as they have consolidated their powers to draft resolutions and control the organization’s peace operations and sanctions regimes. The Obama administration, with its emphasis on building relations with non-Western powers, seemed intent on challenging this state of affairs. It did so to some extent in its early years. Washington ganged up with Asian governments in the G-20 to impose IMF reforms that were meant to reduce European leverage in the organization, although the measures have subsequently been held up in the U.S. Congress. Obama’s team also tried to show greater sensitivity to Russia’s positions on crises like Syria than previous U.S. administrations. But the U.S. has failed to re-engineer international cooperation. Russia remains obstreperous, and China seems more interested in developing new organizations, such as the AIIB, than investing in existing U.S.-led bodies. Episodes such as the 2011 Libyan war, when Beijing and Moscow waved through the Western intervention and then went on to slam it, have left doubts about the chances of putting international institutions on a new political footing. Having looked for better partners elsewhere, the U.S. is stuck with Europe. And yet Europeans seem to be distinctly reluctant to play along. NATO countries appear likely to respond to Power’s plea and do a bit more for peacekeeping in the near future, as the Netherlands and Nordic countries have recently done in Mali. But “stay at home-ism” is still a credible power doctrine for some members of the alliance. Meanwhile, most EU members, with honorable exceptions such as Sweden and the U.K., severely cut their development and humanitarian budgets during the financial crisis. In economic terms, no EU member can afford to ignore China’s wealth and markets. So the European pillar of the international system looks very weak indeed. This does not mean that it is about to crack. European policymakers are not about to dump Washington, and they still take its criticisms to heart, as the attention given to Power’s speech demonstrates. If China’s ambassador to the U.N. gave a speech in Brussels, it would very likely go unnoticed. But the U.S. has to assume that, at best, European governments are going to be less consistent and predictable supporters of the post-1945 multilateral system—and that the system as a whole will suffer as a result.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- NATO Unity D

NATO is obsolete—not necessary to solve conflict.

Christian Whiton, 7/6/2018 (State Department senior advisor in the Donald Trump and George W. Bush administrations, “NATO Is Obsolete,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive, along with a laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2 percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense. These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion. Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities, knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but end the practice of having over-burdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans' security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- NATO Unity D

NATO doesn’t solve conflict—just makes war more likely:

MEDEA BENJAMIN, 12/6/2019 (co-founder of CODEPINK for Peace, “Why NATO should be obsolete,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The three smartest words that Donald Trump uttered during his presidential campaign are “NATO is obsolete.” His adversary, Hillary Clinton, retorted that NATO was “the strongest military alliance in the history of the world.” Now that Trump has been in power, the White House parrots the same worn line that NATO is “the most successful Alliance in history, guaranteeing the security, prosperity, and freedom of its members.” But Trump was right the first time around: Rather than being a strong alliance with a clear purpose, this 70-year-old organization that is meeting in London on December 4 is a stale military holdover from the Cold War days that should have gracefully retired many years ago. NATO was originally founded by the United States and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions, the entire globe became a Cold War battleground. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded but NATO expanded, growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. North Macedonia, set to join next year, will bring the number to 30. NATO has also expanded well beyond the North Atlantic, adding a partnership with Colombia in 2017. Donald Trump recently suggested that Brazil could one day become a full member. NATO’s post-Cold War expansion toward Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward, has led to rising tensions between Western powers and Russia, including multiple close calls between military forces. It has also contributed to a new arms race, including upgrades in nuclear arsenals, and the largest NATO “war games” since the Cold War. While claiming to “preserve peace,” NATO has a history of bombing civilians and committing war crimes. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. And far from the “North Atlantic,” NATO joined the United States in invading Afghanistan in 2001, where it is still bogged down two decades later. In 2011, NATO forces illegally invaded Libya, creating a failed state that caused masses of people to flee. Rather than take responsibility for these refugees, NATO countries have turned back desperate migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, letting thousands die. In London, NATO wants to show it is ready to fight new wars. It will showcase its readiness initiative—the ability to deploy 30 battalions by land, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval vessels in just 30 days, and to confront future threats from China and Russia, including with hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare. But far from being a lean, mean war machine, NATO is actually riddled with divisions and contradictions. Here are some of them: French President Emmanuel Macron questions the U.S. commitment to fight for Europe, has called NATO “brain dead” and has proposed a European Army under the nuclear umbrella of France. Turkey has enraged NATO members with its incursion into Syria to attack the Kurds, who have been Western allies in the fight against ISIS. And Turkey has threatened to veto a Baltic defense plan until allies support its controversial incursion into Syria. Turkey has also infuriated NATO members, especially Trump, by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system. Trump wants NATO to push back against China’s growing influence, including the use of Chinese companies for the construction of 5G mobile networks—something many NATO countries are unwilling to do. Is Russia really NATO’s adversary? France’s Macron has reached out to Russia, inviting Putin to discuss ways in which the European Union can put the Crimean invasion behind it. Donald Trump has publicly attacked Germany over its Nord Stream 2 project to pipe in Russian gas, but a recent German poll saw 66 percent wanting closer ties with Russia. The UK has bigger problems. Britain has been convulsed over the Brexit conflict and is holding a contentious national election on December 12. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, knowing that Trump is wildly unpopular, is reluctant to be seen as close to him. Also, Johnson’s major contender, Jeremy Corbyn, is a reluctant supporter of NATO. While his Labour Party is committed to NATO, over his career as an anti-war champion, Corbyn has called NATO “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security.” The last time Britain hosted NATO leaders in 2014, Corbyn told an anti-NATO rally that the end of the Cold War “should have been the time for NATO to shut up shop, give up, go home and go away.” A further complication is Scotland, which is home to a very unpopular Trident nuclear submarine base as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. A new Labour government would need the support of the Scottish National Party. But its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, insists that a precondition for her party’s support is a commitment to close the base. Europeans can’t stand Trump (a recent poll found he is trusted by only 4 percent of Europeans!) and their leaders can’t rely on him. Allied leaders learn of presidential decisions that affect their interests via Twitter. The lack of coordination was clear in October, when Trump ignored NATO allies when he ordered U.S. special forces out of northern Syria, where they had been operating alongside French and British commandos against Islamic State militants. The U.S. unreliability has led the European Commission to draw up plans for a European “defense union” that will coordinate military spending and procurement. The next step may be to coordinate military actions separate from NATO. The Pentagon has complained about EU countries purchasing military equipment from each other instead of from the United States, and has called this defense union “a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defence sector.” Do Americans really want to go to war for Estonia? Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack against one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” meaning that the treaty obligates the U.S. to go to war on behalf of 28 nations—something most likely opposed by war-weary Americans who want a less aggressive foreign policy that focuses on peace, diplomacy, and economic engagement instead of military force. An additional major bone of contention is who will pay for NATO. The last time NATO leaders met, President Trump derailed the agenda by berating NATO countries for not paying their fair share, and at the London meeting, Trump is expected to announce symbolic U.S. cuts to NATO’s operations budget. Trump’s main concern is that member states step up to the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense by 2024, a goal that is unpopular among Europeans, who prefer that their tax dollars go to nonmilitary items. Nevertheless, NATOSecretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will brag that Europe and Canada have added $100 billion to their military budgets since 2016—something Donald Trump will take credit for—and that more NATO officials are meeting the 2 percent goal, even though a 2019 NATO report shows only seven members have done so: the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia. In an age where people around the world want to avoid war and to focus instead on the climate chaos that threatens future life on earth, NATO is an anachronism. It now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing around the globe. Instead of preventing war, it promotes militarism, exacerbates global tensions and makes war more likely. This Cold War relic shouldn’t be reconfigured to maintain U.S. domination in Europe, or to mobilize against Russia or China, or to launch new wars in space. It should not be expanded, but disbanded. Seventy years of militarism is more than enough.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- NATO Unity D

NATO doesn’t solve

Ranhotra 22 --- Sanbeer Singh Ranhotra is a political columnist at TFIPOST, “The irrelevance of NATO is now out in the open” February 25, 2022, https://tfiglobalnews.com/2022/02/25/the-irrelevance-of-nato-is-now-out-in-the-open/

NATO is a headless chicken. It has been reduced into an insignificant entity which when told to shut up by Russia, goes to a corner and quietly sits down – making sure to behave itself. It is quite remarkable how Ukraine thought this organisation would come to its aid in the event of a large-scale Russian invasion. Leave alone military aid, NATO has not even been able to agree on a decisive economic sanctions package that would have an immediate effect on Moscow.

Russia has invaded Ukraine. The world is outraged. The United States and its allies are angry. NATO is infuriated. But here’s the ridiculously painful part: NATO can do nothing but mutely spectate as Russian President Vladimir Putin redefines Eastern Europe. Essentially, NATO has failed. It had one mandate – to protect Europe. It has failed to achieve its primary objective, and this would have lasting consequences for the security alliance.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Attribution Doesn’t Deter

Attribution won’t stop hybrid attacks

Detlefsen 15 --- MAJ William Detlefsen United States Army. “Cyber Attacks, Attribution, and Deterrence: Three Case Studies”, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 23-05-2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1001276.pdf

Cyberspace is a relatively new and poorly understood domain of human activity. Despite the potential for expression, exchange of knowledge, and creation, it quickly became another area for human conflict. These conflicts range from the petty to major state competition for power and resources. To explore the likelihood of deterrence providing some level of stability and peace, this monograph examined three different cyber attacks, the ability for the victims to attribute the attack, the response chosen, and the effect on future cyber attacks.

Across the three different incidents, there are different dynamics at work. The DDoS attack against Estonia was a low-grade nuisance, whose broad attack base supported plausible deniability by a single actor. The Estonian government suspected Russian government involvement, but could not publicly attribute it to specific actors. Even if they could attribute it, there is the question of whether or not the Russian government would have helped stop the attacks. Given the unwillingness of the Russian government to assist in the investigation and the repeated statements that the attacks were simply acts of civil disobedience by concerned patriots, it is unlikely the Russian government would have helped stop the attack.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Attribution Doesn’t Deter

Even successful attribution fails to deter

Sweijs & Zilincik 19 --- Tim Sweijs Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, and Samo Zilincik, associated research fellow with a new article in the Texas National Security Review, “Report Part Title: Deterrence by Democracies in a Hybrid Context”, Published by: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep24191.6.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aac9305baa499cc4635e8cc7dc28c6da2&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1

The opaqueness of hybrid activities typically complicates any deterrent efforts which benefit from transparency and clarity.79 After all, only if actions can be observed by the deterrer and attributed to a particular actor, is it possible - relying on backwards inductive logic - to deter that actor from taking that action in the first place. Hybrid conflict challengers, it is said, can easily circumvent any red lines laid down by the deterrer and rely on plausible deniability for cover.80 Examples that are sometimes pointed at include both the Russian government’s denial that green little men invading the Crimean peninsula were Russian,81 chemical attacks on UK soil, cyberattacks on critical US infrastructure of various origins, and a variety of attempts to manipulate the information domain in various European countries and in North America. But both for traditional and new domains that argument does not necessarily seem to hold up. In fact, as we have seen in many of these cases, the perpetrator either could have been identified or was in fact identified. In other words, attribution took place. Despite Putin’s denial that the green little men invading the Crimean Peninsula were Russian, this was not - or should at least not have been - hard to verify for Western military intelligence services. In the Skripal chemical attacks on British soil in March 2018, the UK government announced within eight days that the toxin was of Russian provenance, and the perpetrators were identified and charged later that year. Attribution in the cyber domain poses more challenges.82 As Joseph Nye explains:

“If [..] attackers do use the Internet, they can mask the point of origin behind the flags of several remote servers, which can be located in a variety of jurisdictions. They can use nonstate actors as proxies and create false flags. … Moreover, knowing the true location of a machine is not the same as knowing the ultimate instigator of an attack.”83

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Attribution Impossible

NATO coop cant overcome the attribution problem

Horowitz 10 --- Michael Horowitz, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has also held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard. “A Common Future? NATO and the Protection of the Commons”. Transatlantic Paper Series No. 3 October 2010. https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/Trans-Atlantic_Papers_3-Horowitz.pdf

Cyberspace is also a realm where traditional notions of deterrence may break down. Deterring a threat by issuing counter-threats to deliver a devastating response to any cyber attack against the United States and its NATO allies may seem like an attractive solution to the cyber security challenge. The high costs associated with defending networks from cyber intrusions and the relatively low costs of launching a cyber attack have led many to analogize cyber deterrence to nuclear deterrence.31 However, cyber attacks lack the stable footprint of conventional military forces. The fact that terrorist attacks do not leave a “return address” is accentuated in the case of cyber warfare. In the case of a cyber attack, for example, even tracking down the specific computer from which an attack was launched might not give the attacked country sufficient information to distinguish whether a country, terrorist group, or rogue individual launched an attack from that particular computer. These concerns, in part, are why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that denying adversaries access to U.S. information systems in the first place, rather than planning to retaliate in case of an attack, encompasses the bulk of U.S. defensive efforts.32 The United States and its NATO partners must invest heavily in defending their networks from intrusion and cannot be confident that maintaining nascent retaliatory capabilities will suffice to deter attacks. Furthermore, while strong cyber ties between NATO members might not ensure that deterrence succeeds, weak cyber ties will almost certainly encourage adversaries to launch more cyber incursions against NATO members.33 Finally, since many future wars will likely include major cyber components, thinking about cyberspace as a very separate sphere of warfare delinked from other areas of conflict is counterproductive.34

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › Ext --- Attribution Impossible

Attribution impossible

Fier 21 --- Justin Fier Director for Cyber Intelligence & Analytics at Darktrace, “In Cyberwar, Attribution Can Be Impossible — and That's OK”, October 18, 2021, https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/in-cyberwar-attribution-can-be-impossible---and-that-s-okay

An enemy you can neither see nor identify looms large. But it's time to acknowledge a hard truth: In today's world, attack attribution in cyberspace can be impossible for all but the best-resourced governments and organizations. A recent analysis of more than 200 cybersecurity incidents associated with nation-state activity since 2009 found that half of them involved "low budget, straightforward tools that could be easily purchased on the darknet."

The reality is apparent: We may never know who is behind incidents that create chaos and cause damage in most cases.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Attribution › 1NC --- Attribution Impossible

Advanced techniques make attribution impossible

Finlay & Payne 19 --- Lorraine Finlay is a lecturer in the School of Law at Murdoch University, Christian Payne is a Lecturer in Computer Science at Murdoch University, “The Attribution Problem and Cyber Armed Attacks”, American Journal of International Law>AJIL Unbound>Volume 113, 24 June 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/attribution-problem-and-cyber-armed-attacks/ADC0F451A9B560D8A070A753E61E874F

There are, broadly speaking, two aspects to the attribution problem. The first is the technical problem of how to identify the true origin of a particular attack and the identity of those who carried it out. The second is the legal question of whether and if so, when, factual attribution allows a state to be held responsible for the cyberattack under international law.

The technical consequences of the unique characteristics of cyberattacks have been widely acknowledged. Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany have highlighted two key differences between cyber and other kinds of attacks: the boundlessness and anonymity of the cyber domain.Footnote11 As cyberspace is not limited by physical or geographical borders, questions of jurisdiction and enforcement become more complex. Perpetrators use various techniques to obscure their true location, and isolating the origin of a cyberattack is extraordinarily difficult when attacks are routed through multiple machines in multiple locations across the world. These techniques make the task of retrospectively establishing a forensic link between an attacker and an incident extremely difficult. They allow cyberattacks to be carried out with little risk to those involved, with perpetrators able to mask their identity and potentially even misattribute blame.

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Trade impact D

No trade impact.

Victoria Pistikou et al. 21, Assistant Professor, International Political Economy, Democritus University of Thrace; Eftychia Tsanana, Lecturer, Economics, University of Macedonia; Thomas Poufinas, Faculty Member, Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, "A Financial Analysis Approach on The Impact of Economic Interdependence on Interstate Conflicts," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 11, No. 5, 09/03/2021, Sci-Hub.

This indicates that the increase of economic interdependence does not lead to a decrease of the interstate conflict as captured by defense expenses. On the contrary the increase of exports of country 1 to country 2 leads to an increase of the expenses of both countries. Hence, both countries seem to consider the conflict as vivid even though some trade activity is built. This may be attributed to the fact that the defense expenses of these countries are not necessarily related to the particular interstate conflict with the investigated pair in the dyad. It could also be due to the fact that the economic crisis has potentially led to a decrease of both the economic activity and the defense expenses in some cases. This explains partially the results. Furthermore, country 1 is not always the stronger economy. In addition, it is not necessarily the country that has initiated the conflict. These findings indicate that the topic needs to be further investigated so as to incorporate more dyads and potentially additional proxies of interstate conflict and economic interdependence in order to realize whether the latter impacts the former.

[Table omitted]

2022 SDI Negative
**On-case** › A2: Resilience › Ext --- Trade impact D

Trade resilient

Lawrence 21 --- Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert L. Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment, Harvard, “The Unappreciated Trend Toward Unilateral Trade Liberalization”, Peterson Institute For International Economics, March 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb21-6.pdf

During the 2008 financial crisis, the volume of world trade initially plummeted by more than it had during the Great Depression in the 1930s (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2010). Since many developing countries could legally raise their applied tariffs without violating their WTO commitments, there were widespread fears that the protectionist responses that had occurred during the Great Depression were likely to be repeated. Yet the system displayed remarkable resilience. Undoubtedly the disastrous experience of the 1930s served as an important consideration motivating the G20 countries to issue statements pledging their opposition to protectionism.12 But their actions spoke even louder than their words.

As shown in figure 1, the crisis is simply not evident in the average global tariff data for 2008 and 2009: The average applied MFN tariff rates in the immediate aftermath of the crisis were no higher than they were before it. This is not to say that no countries raised their tariffs, but the increases were offset by other countries’ reductions.13 In addition, as chronicled by the Global Trade Alert (a network of trade analysts that monitor trade policy actions), some countries did use temporary tariff measures such as safeguards antidumping and countervailing duties.