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2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Turf Wars Link

No turf wars link – AND no impact to minor tensions

Reveron 7 Derek S. Reveron, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, PhD public policy analysis, MA political science, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8-30-2007, /GoGreen!

Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, a combatant commander works extremely closely with his Political Advisor (POLAD) and the country teams where his engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, there are tensions with strategic impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”73 However, both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders understand they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans. 74 Yet an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination, but also interagency and combined planning.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Mission Creep Link

No mission creep link – DoD self-restrains – AND fiat solves anyway

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

DoS crowds themselves out anyway

Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, /GoGreen!

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.

Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

No leverage link – prefer studies

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Militarization Link

No net benefit – “militarization” is fake news – the structural irrelevance of diplomats in the face of technological change – NOT authority – is what matters

Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, /GoGreen!

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the career service, often to key posts. In this new Trump administration, politicians or business friends of the President have already been appointed to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing and London, continuing a practice which goes back across the last five or six presidencies. Even more disturbing from a career Foreign Service point of view is the Administration’s decision to appoint a non-career Director General of the Foreign Service, for the first time in the Department’s history.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Perm: Do Both – 2AC

There’s no functional difference – especially if they include DoD implementation

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!

“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Perm: Do CP – 1AR

Most comprehensive independent review of both cooperation and assistance authorities agrees

GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, /GoGreen!

House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.

[FOOTNOTE 4]

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Perm: Do CP – 1AR

This is the DoD definition all of their ev and ours is referencing

DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, /GoGreen!

G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.

country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: No Solve NB if DoD Implements

It’s sufficient

Rand 15 Dr. Dafna H. Rand, former Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security, formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff; and Stephen Tankel, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, former Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense; “Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” Center for a New American Security, August 2015, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report_Security-Cooperation_FINAL.pdf /GoGreen!

1. Consolidate, rationalize, and rebalance the many security assistance and cooperation authorities. With a glut of new authorities, policymakers have begun using them in a piecemeal and disconnected fashion. In addition to the imbalance and lack of coordination between State and DoD authorities, the connection between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities has been lost, and State’s position as the lead agency in determining the strategy and direction of security assistance has been diluted. DoD and State should develop a coordinated reform proposal that consolidates DoD’s glut of new and overlapping authorities and transfers the appropriate authorities to State, even if administration remains under DoD’s purview in certain cases. Consolidation should also ensure that the provision of assistance and cooperation can be done through regional budgetary funds and to consortia of partners. Finally, the proposals should be presented to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Congress should commission a study by the Congressional Research Service, GAO, or an independent commission to produce new proposals and hold hearings on these proposals to solicit insight and recommendations. The collective findings should inform new legislation codifying the necessary reforms to the post-September 11, 2001, authorities.

2. Undertake regional reviews of security assistance and cooperation programs. Because some of the objectives of security assistance and cooperation will always conflict and there will continue to be debates about how to scope U.S. objectives, it is incumbent on policymakers to candidly prioritize goals, delineate where they are willing to accept risks, and plan ahead to mitigate anticipated consequences associated with these risks. This is best done through a regional framework. The National Security Council should direct representatives from the regional bureaus at State and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at DoD to work together to produce joint reviews of U.S. security assistance and cooperation in their respective regions. Each review should prioritize U.S. interests and objectives in the relevant region, provide relevant updates on the regional environment, and delineate how assistance and cooperation are being deployed to realize U.S. objectives. Reviews should also identify where objectives conflict as well as where U.S. policymakers are taking clear risks as they weigh and make trade-offs among U.S. foreign policy priorities. Policymakers need to discuss ways in which to mitigate these risks. These reviews should clearly delineate short- and long-term goals and identify where these are complementary or in conflict. In the event of potential conflicts or moral hazard, reviews must make a clear case for why they are prioritizing either short- or long-term objectives. Over time these reviews should take into account new methods of measuring outcomes. These reviews should inform and be informed by an ongoing effort by embassy-based diplomats, defense attachés and Office of Security Cooperation chiefs to coordinate their security assistance and cooperation plans in the field in order to identify areas for potential cooperation and conflict. State should have ultimate responsibility for coordinating and producing the final product for the National Security Council (NSC). Finally, the president should establish a commission composed of outside experts and former officials to assess and provide feedback periodically on these regional reviews and to offer external, objective views on these documents.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: No Solve NB if DoD Implements

DoD implementation of the rare components that actually require military personnel does NOT thump our net benefit – Bergmann says “unifying decision-making on policy—not the details of implementation” is key (in AT: Deficit – DoD Key)

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

The DOD’s security assistance authorities and funds related to train and equip accounts should be transferred by Congress from the DOD to the State Department. The State Department should have full decision-making authority over all U.S. funding for security assistance programming—as indeed the Foreign Assistance Act requires.84 While the DOD would remain the agency in charge of implementing programs, the State Department needs to have the lead in deciding what, who, and when to fund security assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should work with Congress to pass legislation to transfer the requisite resources and authorities to the State Department, including the DOD’s Section 333 program and train and equip accounts such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, the Iraq Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: 2017 NDAA Solves

The 2017 NDAA only made things worse

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Recent efforts to reform the security assistance architecture tend to get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This has led to an inevitable focus on incremental tweaks that address tactical-level concerns. These weedy discussions, while useful, often take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given—and therefore, do not address the broader strategic and budgetary issues and imbalance between diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, policymakers and politicians often get lost in the technical nature of these discussions, lack broader historical context, and are easily persuaded by officials with a stake in largely preserving the status quo and in protecting their offices, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, they quickly lose interest in reform. A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.

Obama administration efforts attempted to improve interagency cooperation

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – AT: Coordination Shields

Mere coordination is insufficient – CP alone is key

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Turf Wars

Only counterplan alone solves

House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, /GoGreen!

For the UOW to be able to plan and implement effective strategy, the bureaucratic culture in much of Congress and the government agencies must significantly evolve. Political culture in Washington, D.C. is risk averse and focused on election cycles rather than countering long-term strategic goals of U.S. adversaries. Turf wars and tunnel vision plague interagency relationships, and tensions between civil and military leadership create barriers to cooperation. Some concrete measures can facilitate unconventional warfare strategy development. The President and the National Security Advisor must empower the State Department and the OUW to enforce coordination of long-term interagency efforts supporting American foreign policy. This requires special selection and development of adaptive leadership that is willing to work together in creative, closely coordinated, and synchronized operations under guidance by the State Department and the National Security Council to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests the creation of political warfare career tracks in relevant government agencies, which would establish a trained community of political warfare expertise in the government to help sustain long-term operations and planning.[xvi]

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Turf Wars

Yes turf wars

Corker 17 Bob Corker, U.S. Senator (R-TN), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Managing Security Assistance To Support Foreign Policy,” Senate Hearing 115-666, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 9-26-2017, /GoGreen!

This is the committee's second hearing on security assistance in just over a year, but it is an issue that has been raised during many of our other meetings. This kind of assistance is an investment in our own security. We help ourselves by helping other nations police their own neighborhoods. Which nations we help and how we help them are crucial foreign policy decisions.

Since the 1960s, the law provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, has the responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and training programs. We need to be clear on that because our security demands that we work across agency lines to develop coherent security assistance programs that serve our interests and those of our partners.

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Leverage

CP alone solves

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

The State Department, in coordination with the DOD, the National Security Council, and other relevant agencies, should implement a policy planning process that includes defining outcomes and goals for the provision of U.S. aid. This should include weighing security, political, and economic factors in a partnership, and assessing what kind of support a country should receive. By centralizing security assistance at the State Department, U.S. officials would be able consider the entire range of concerns in bilateral relationships. Pushing forward security assistance without adequately considering the partner’s capacity to effectively absorb assistance—or assessing whether the partner will use it properly and not commit abuses with U.S. weapons and training—can be wasteful at best or extremely dangerous at worst. For example, despite the U.S. Africa Command spending millions of dollars on security training and support in Mali before 2011, the government quickly collapsed in the face of an insurgent force enabled by al-Qaida-affiliated groups—a clear failure of U.S. security assistance goals.87 Reforms to security assistance must focus on expediting the process only after a comprehensive deliberation on a range of issues has occurred.

Congress should also grant more flexibility to the State Department to guide allocations. If State Department leaders determine that appropriations for a given partner would not best be utilized for security assistance, the State Department should have the flexibility and authority to provide political or economic aid instead. This could help address today’s challenge where U.S. security assistance is provided to fragile states that lack effective institutions or accountable, transparent processes to effectively utilize security aid. Benchmarks should be also established that would help determine whether U.S. assistance is helping partners build more capacity and use U.S. equipment and training in the right ways.88

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Leverage

Perception of the possibility of cancelling the plan is key to leverage

Ellehuus 21 Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; and Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with CSIS’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, former deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service; “NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously,” War On The Rocks, 6-9-2021, /GoGreen!

When Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed experts to examine NATO’s future, they noted that a “drift toward NATO disunity … must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” To date, allies have lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. The European Union can theoretically address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism and conditionality on its funding. NATO, by contrast, has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally that violates the alliance’s founding principles and no financial carrots that might incentivize good behavior.

Good Intentions Won’t Be Enough

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – XT: Leverage

The plan devastates ability to leverage SC for democracy gains

Mehta 17 Aaron Mehta, Senior Pentagon Correspondent and Associate Editor for Defense News, graduate of Tufts University, “Standoff Brews Over the Future of US Security Assistance,” Defense News, 3-28-2017, /GoGreen!

One central argument of State’s advocates is that DoD’s parallel security-assistance apparatus undermines statecraft. By creating a second track where nations can go to get American military goods, ambassadors in the field are robbed of key carrots and sticks when pushing on issues such as human rights.

For example, in 2015, Kenya received $48.2 million in funding for 1206 counterterrorism train-and-equip missions, according to figures compiled by Security Assistance Monitor. That same year, a State Department human rights report cited Kenya’s "security force abuses, including alleged unlawful killings, forced disappearances, torture, and use of excessive force; interethnic violence; and widespread corruption and impunity."

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – Readiness DA

Extinction

Alan Dowd 15, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose, “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”, https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the only thing that keeps the peace, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – Readiness DA

AND, independently collapses readiness

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!

Various legislative and policy changes have attempted to modernize the SSA paradigm to keep pace with the threat environment. The most recent innovations, to include “1206” (now 2282) “train and equip,” Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), have received mixed reviews and assessments that generally fall along predictable parochial lines. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that the current framework has become a cumbersome “patchwork” of authorities atop an outdated foundation. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the second decade of the 21st century would bring relief from the post-9/11 fatigue of foreign crisis and engagements and that this lull would allow the national security apparatus to “reset” itself and prepare for a new model of conflict in the 21st century. However, the pace of escalating global conflict in recent years defied those expectations, leaving little bandwidth or space to do more than add to, or tinker with, the “patchwork” framework.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

2022 SDI Counterplan
NEG CP—DoS SA › Competition › AT: Perm – Do Both – Miscalc DA

AND, perception alone causes miscalculation by China and Russia and nuclear war

Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, /GoGreen!

Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.