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2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Tech Inev

The technology age is inevitable. Global capitalism, political momentum, and militarism prove.

Kelly ’16 (Kevin; 2016; Awarded author, founder of Wired Magazine, citing data from the past thirty years; Book, The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future)

In the three decades since then, this technological convergence between communication and computation has spread, sped up, blossomed, and evolved. The internet/ web/ mobile system has moved from the fringes of society (where it was pretty much ignored in 1981) to the center stage of our modern global society. In the past 30 years the social economy based on this technology has had its ups and downs and seen its heroes come and go, but it is very clear there have been large-scale trends governing what has happened. These broad historical trends are crucial because the underlying conditions that birthed them are still active and developing, which strongly suggests that these trends will continue to increase in the next few decades. There is nothing on the horizon to decrease them. Even the forces we might think could derail them, like crime, war, or our own excesses, also follow these emerging patterns. In this book I describe a dozen of these inevitable technological forces that will shape the next 30 years. “Inevitable” is a strong word. It sends up red flags for some people because they object that nothing is inevitable. They claim that human willpower and purpose can— and should!— deflect, overpower, and control any mechanical trend. In their view, “inevitability” is a free will cop-out we surrender to. When the notion of the inevitable is forged with fancy technology, as I do here, the objections to a preordained destiny are even more fierce and passionate. One definition of “inevitable” is the final outcome in the classic rewinding thought experiment. If we rewound the tape of history back to the beginning of time and reran our civilization from the start again and again, a strong version of inevitability says that, no matter how many times we reran it, every time we end up with teenagers tweeting every five minutes in 2016. That’s not what I mean. I mean inevitable in a different way. There is bias in the nature of technology that tilts it in certain directions and not others. All things being equal, the physics and mathematics that rule the dynamics of technology tend to favor certain behaviors. These tendencies exist primarily in the aggregate forces that shape the general contours of technological forms and do not govern specifics or particular instances. For example, the form of an internet— a network of networks spanning the globe— was inevitable, but the specific kind of internet we chose to have was not. The internet could have been commercial rather than nonprofit, or a national system instead of international, or it could have been secret instead of public. Telephony— long-distance electrically transmitted voice messages— was inevitable, but the iPhone was not. The generic form of a four-wheeled vehicle was inevitable, but SUVs were not. Instant messaging was inevitable, but tweeting every five minutes was not. Tweeting every five minutes is not inevitable in another way. We are morphing so fast that our ability to invent new things outpaces the rate we can civilize them. These days it takes us a decade after a technology appears to develop a social consensus on what it means and what etiquette we need to tame it. In another five years we’ll find a polite place for twittering, just as we figured out what to do with cell phones ringing everywhere. (Use silent vibrators.) Just like that, this initial response will disappear quickly and we’ll see it was neither essential nor inevitable. The kind of inevitability I am speaking of here in the digital realm is the result of momentum. The momentum of an ongoing technological shift. The strong tides that shaped digital technologies for the past 30 years will continue to expand and harden in the next 30 years. These apply to not just North America, but to the entire world. Throughout this book I use examples from the United States because readers will be more familiar with them, but for each I could have easily found a corresponding example in India, Mali, Peru, or Estonia. The true leaders in digital money, for example, are in Africa and Afghanistan, where e-money is sometimes the only functioning currency. China is way ahead of everyone else in developing sharing applications on mobile. But while culture can advance or retard the expression, the underlying forces are universal.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Sustainable – Dematerialization

Capitalism causes dematerialization which solves sustainability

Zitelmann 21 – studied history and political sciences, graduating with a doctorate “summa cum laude” in 1986. His dissertation was published in both German and English: Hitler. The Policies of Seduction. Rainer Zitelmann began his career lecturing history at the Freie Universität Berlin from 1987 to 1992. He then became chief editor at one of the leading and most prestigious publishing houses in Germany, Ullstein-Propyläen. He followed this with the role of section editor at the major German daily newspaper “Die Welt”, which he held until 2000. (Rainer, "Consumption Presumption: Are Human Beings Destroying the World?," National Interest, 2-12-2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/consumption-presumption-are-human-beings-destroying-world-178114)

Some people claim that we need to cut our consumption or there will be no hope for the planet. Such claims are based on the thesis that continued growth increases the rate at which the earth’s finite resources are consumed and, moreover, leads to irreversible climate change. And such warnings are by no means new. In 1970, for instance, the Club of Rome attracted a great deal of attention with the publication of The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, which has to date sold more than thirty million copies in thirty languages. The book warned people to change their ways and had a clear message: the world’s raw materials, and in particular, oil would soon be used up. In twenty years, the scientists predicted, we would have used the very last drop of oil. Of course, the Club of Rome’s models for the depletion of oil—and almost all other major raw materials—were wrong. According to the scenarios presented in The Limits to Growth, we should now be living on a planet that has been devoid of natural gas, copper, lead, aluminum and tungsten for decades. And we were supposed to have run out of silver in 1985. Despite the bleak forecasts, as of January 2020, the United States Geological Survey estimated silver reserves worldwide at 560,000 tons. Employing an extensive array of data, the American scientist Andrew McAfee proves in his book More from Less that economic growth is no longer coupled to the consumption of raw materials. Data for the United States, for example, show that of seventy-two resources, from aluminum to zinc, only six are not yet post-peak. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the U.S. economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually decreasing. Back in 2015, the American environmental scientist Jesse Ausubel wrote an essay, “The Return of Nature: How Technology Liberates the Environment,” showing that Americans are consuming fewer and fewer raw materials per capita. Total consumption of steel, copper, fertilizer, wood and paper, which had previously always risen in line with economic growth, had plateaued and was now in constant decline. Such across-the-board reductions in natural resource consumption are only possible because of much-maligned capitalism: companies are constantly developing more efficient production methods and reducing the amount of raw materials they consume. Of course, they are not doing this primarily to protect the environment but to cut costs. What's more, a constant stream of innovations has promoted the trend of miniaturization or dematerialization. Just think of your smartphone. How many devices has your smartphone replaced and how many raw materials did they use to consume? Nowadays, many people no longer have a fax machine or street atlas because they have everything they need on their smartphone. Some even use their phones instead of a wristwatch. You used to need four separate microphones in your telephone, cassette recorder, Dictaphone and video camera, today you just need one—in your smartphone. The finite nature of the world’s natural resources is one argument against growth, climate change is another. Let’s take China as an example: China currently emits more CO2 than any other country in the world and is building a number of new nuclear power plants in order to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. With the new build program well underway, China’s first new-generation nuclear power plant recently went into operation. In the very near future, China intends to start exporting power plants. The latest generation of nuclear power plants is much safer than earlier models—and can play a pivotal role in the fight against climate change. In the United States, Joe Biden is already evaluating the advantages of small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power plants. As the name suggests, SMRs are smaller than traditional nuclear fission reactors and offer a maximum capacity of three hundred megawatts. In the United Kingdom, for example, a consortium led by Rolls-Royce has announced plans to build up to sixteen SMR power plants. So far, two reactors of this type are in operation, both onboard the floating nuclear power plant “Akademik Lomonosov, which supplies heat and electricity to the Siberian city of Pevec and its one hundred thousand inhabitants. Anticapitalists blame capitalism for resource consumption and climate change. But political decisions—such as Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy—frequently have a negative impact on climate change. Telling people to cut their consumption must seem like pure mockery to the hundreds of millions of people around the world who are still living in extreme poverty. What they need is more capitalism and economic growth. Just like in China, where the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from 88 percent in 1981 to less than 1 percent today. Andrew McAfee’s book has an optimistic message about how we don't have to turn back the clocks and cut our consumption: capitalism and technological progress are allowing us to steward the world’s resources, rather than stripping them bare.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Cap Good/Transition Bad

Growth is sustainable, degrowth fails, and the alt collapses global living standards.

Noah Smith 9/6/21. Assistant Professor of finance @ SUNY Stony Brook, an economics PhD student at the University of Michigan, an academic editor in Japan, and a physics major at Stanford. “People are realizing that degrowth is bad.” https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/people-are-realizing-that-degrowth

I was going to write a lengthy post explaining why “degrowth” — the idea that we need to halt economic growth in order to save the planet — is a very bad idea. But in the meantime, other people have written that post, or recorded that podcast, and done it well. These include Branko Milanovic, Kelsey Piper, and Ezra Klein. So instead I’ll write a shorter post trying to catalog and boil down the arguments against degrowth.

But first, let’s go over the standard argument, so we can see why these new arguments are necessary.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Cap Good/Transition Bad

Here's the math

Hausfather 21 – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries, Accessed 4-11-2021, LASA-SC)

Emissions reductions in the US have been a result of a wide variety of factors; this includes the switch from coal generation to lower-carbon natural gas, the rapid expansion of wind and solar generation, reduced industrial energy consumption, reduced electricity use in buildings, and reductions in transportation emissions — particularly as a result of increased vehicle fuel economy and reduced miles driven per-capita. Since 2005, US territorial emissions have fallen around 15%, with consumption emissions falling around 18% (much larger reductions were seen in 2020, and some of this is expected to persist). At the same time, GDP has increased by around 29%.

In the UK, territorial emissions have fallen by nearly 40% and consumption emissions have fallen by around 30%, while GDP has increased by 22%. Similar to the US, there are a wide variety of drivers of UK emissions reductions, though renewable energy generation, reductions in electricity use, and reductions in industrial and residential energy use are the largest contributors.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Cap Good/Transition Bad

Capitalism is sustainable – solves climate impacts

Hausfather 21 – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries)

The past 30 years have seen immense progress in improving the quality of life for much of humanity. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 billion to around 650 million. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 increased by 56%. Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, something has begun to change. Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, peak oil is upon us — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative decoupling between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP falling for the past 60 years. This is the case even in countries like India and China that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people have absolutely decoupled emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions. One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore leakage. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries has actually declined over the past 15 years. This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) have jointly declined. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. Absolute decoupling is possible. There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Cap Good/Transition Bad

Cap is sustainable – innovation is key to solve the climate and the alt can’t solve

Karlsson 21 – Associate Professor in political science at Umea University (Rasmus, "Learning in the Anthropocene" Soc. Sci. 10, no. 6: 233. 18 June 2021)

Unpacking this argument, it is perhaps useful to first recognize that, stable as the Holocene may have seemed from a human perspective, life was always vulnerable to a number of cosmic risks, such as bolide collisions, risks that only advanced technologies can mitigate. Similarly, the Black Death of the 14th century should serve as a powerful reminder of the extreme vulnerability of pre-industrial societies at a microbiological level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think of the Holocene as providing a relatively stable baseline against which the ecological effects of technological interventions could hypothetically be evaluated. With most human activities being distinctively local, nature would for the most part “bounce back” (even if the deforestation of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period is an example of that not always being the case) while larger geophysical processes, such as the carbon cycle, remained entirely beyond human intentional control. Even if there has been some debate about what influence human activities had on the preindustrial climate (Ruddiman 2007), anthropogenic forcing was in any case both marginal and gradual. All this changed with the onset of the Great Acceleration by which humans came to overwhelm the great forces of nature, causing untold damage to fragile ecosystems and habitats everywhere, forever altering the trajectory of life on the planet (Steffen et al. 2011b). In a grander perspective, humanity may one day become an interplanetary species and thus instrumental in safeguarding the long-term existence of biological life, but for the moment, its impact is ethically dubious at best as the glaciers melt, the oceans fill up with plastics, and vast number of species are driven to extinction. Faced with these grim realities, it is of course not surprising that the first impulse is to seek to restore some kind primordial harmony and restrain human activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, even if their aggregate impact may have been within the pattern of Holocene variability, pre-modern Western agricultural societies were hardly “sustainable” in any meaningful sense. Experiencing permanent scarcity, violent conflict was endemic (Gat 2013), and as much as some contemporary academics like to attribute all evils to “capitalism” (Malm 2016), pre-capitalist societies exhibited no shortage of religious intolerance and other forms of social domination. It is thus not surprising that some have argued the need to reverse the civilizational arc further yet and return to a preliterate hunter-gather existence (Zerzan 2008) even if this, obviously, has very little to do with existing political realities and social formations. Under Holocene conditions, the short-term human tragedy may have been the same, but it did not undermine the long-term ability of the planet to support life. In a world of eight billion people, already accumulated emissions in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant warming under the coming centuries, with an increasing probability that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Agreement even if all fossil-fuel emissions were to stop today (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). This means that sustained negative emissions, presumably in combination with SRM, will most likely be needed just to stabilize global temperatures, not to mentioning countering the flow of future emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), assuming that all the pledges submitted under the Paris Agreement are fulfilled, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees will still require negative emissions in the range of 100—1000 gigatons of CO2 (Hilaire et al. 2019, p. 190). The removal of carbon dioxide at gigaton scales from the atmosphere will presumably require the existence of an advanced industrial society since low-tech options, such as afforestation, will be of limited use (Gundersen et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2020), especially in a future of competing land-uses. It is against this backdrop of worsening climate harms that the limits of “precaution”, at least as conventionally understood, become apparent. While degrowth advocates tend to insist that behavioral change, even explicitly betting on a “social miracle” (Kallis 2019, p. 195), is always preferable to any technological risk-taking (Heikkurinen 2018), that overlooks both the scope of the sustainability challenge and the lack of public consent to any sufficiently radical political project (Buch-Hansen 2018). While there may be growing willingness to pay for, say, an electric vehicle (Hulshof and Mulder 2020), giving up private automobile use altogether is obviously a different animal, to say nothing about a more fundamental rematerialization of the economy (Hausknost 2020). Again, the problem is one in which change either (a) remains marginal yet ecologically insufficient or (b) becomes sufficiently radical yet provokes a strong political counterreaction. A similar dynamic can be expected to play out at the international level where countries that remain committed to growth would quickly gain a military advantage. To make matters worse, there is also a temporal element to this dynamic since any regime of frugality and localism would have to be policed indefinitely in order to prevent new unsustainable patterns of development from re-emerging later on. All this begs the obvious question, if the political and economic enforcement of the planetary boundaries are fraught with such political and social difficulties, would it not be better to instead try to transcend them through technological innovation? Surprisingly, any high-energy future would most likely be subject to many of the same motivational and psychological constraints that hinder a low-energy future. While history shows that existing nuclear technologies could in theory displace all fossil fuels and meet the most stringent climate targets (Qvist and Brook 2015), it seems extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, that thousands of new reactors will be built over the course of the coming decades in response to climate change. Outside the world of abstract computer modelling, real world psychological and cultural inertia tends to ensure that political decision-making, at least for the most part, gravitates to what is considered “reasonable” and “common sense”—such as medium emissions electricity grids in which wind and solar are backed by biomass and gas—rather than what any utilitarian optimization scenario may suggest. Even if the global benefits of climate stabilization would be immense, the standards by which local nuclear risks are assessed, as clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident which led to a worldwide retreat from nuclear energy despite only causing one confirmed death (which, though obviously regrettable, has to be put in relation to the hundred and thousands of people dying every year from the use of fossil fuels), underscores the uneven distribution of perceived local risks versus global benefits and the associated problem of socio-political learning across spatial scales. Almost two decades ago, Ingolfur Blühdorn identified “simulative eco-politics” as a key strategy by which liberal democracies reconcile an ever-heightened rhetoric of environmental crisis with their simultaneous defense of the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn 2007). Since then, declarations that we only have “ten years to save the planet” have proliferated, and so have seemingly bold investments in renewable energy, most recently in the form of US President Joseph Biden’s USD 2.25 trillion climate and infrastructure plan. Still, without a meaningful commitment to either radical innovation or effective degrowth, it is difficult to see how the deployment of yet more wind turbines or the building of new highways will in any way be qualitatively different from what Blühdorn pertinently described as sustaining “what is known to be unsustainable” (Blühdorn 2007, p. 253). However, all is not lost in lieu of more authentic forms of eco-politics. Independent of political interventions, accelerating technological change, in particular with regard to computing and intelligent machine labor, may one day make large-scale precision manipulation of the physical world possible in ways that may solve many problems that today seem intractable (Dorr 2016). Similarly, breakthroughs in synthetic biology may hold the key to environmentally benign biofuels and carbon utilization technologies. Yet, all such progress remains hypothetical and uncertain for now. Given what is at stake, there is an obvious danger in submitting to naïve technological optimism. What is less commonly recognized is that naïve optimism with regard to the prospects of behavioral change may be equally dangerous. While late-capitalist affluence has enabled many postmaterial identities and behaviors, such as bicycling, hobby farming, and other forms of emancipatory self-expression, a collapsing economy could quickly lead to a reversal back to survivalist values, traditional hierarchical forms of domination, and violence (Quilley 2011, p. 77). As such, it is far from obvious what actions would actually take the world as a whole closer to long-term sustainability. If sustainability could be achieved by a relatively modest reduction in consumption rates or behavioral changes, such as a ban on all leisure flights, then there would be a strong moral case for embracing degrowth. Yet, recognizing how farreaching measures in terms of population control and consumption restrictions that would be needed, the case quickly becomes more ambiguous. While traditional environmentalism may suggest that retreating from the global economy and adopting a low-tech lifestyle would increase resilience (Alexander and Yacoumis 2018), it may do very much the opposite by further fragmenting global efforts and slowing the pace of technological innovation. Without an orderly and functioning world trade system, local resources scarcities would be exacerbated, as seen most recently with the different disruptions to vaccine supply chains. In essence, given the lack of a stable Holocene baseline to revert to, it becomes more difficult to distinguish proactionary “risk-taking” from “precaution”, especially as many ecosystems have already been damaged beyond natural recovery. In this context, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies that can be expected to be most crucial for managing a period of prolonged overshoot (such as next-generation nuclear, engineering biology, large-scale carbon capture and SRM) are also ones that traditional environmentalism is most strongly opposed to. 3. Finding Indicators From the vantage point of the far-future, at least the kind depicted in the fictional universe of Star Trek, human evolution is a fairly straightforward affair along an Enlightenment trajectory by which ever greater instrumental capacity is matched by similar leaps in psychological maturity and expanding circles of moral concern. With the risk of sounding Panglossian, one may argue that the waning of interstate war in general and the fact that there has not been any major nuclear exchange in particular, does vindicate such an optimistic reading of history. While there will always be ups and downs, as long as the most disastrous outcomes are avoided, there will still be room for learning and gradual political accommodation. Taking such a longer view, it would nevertheless be strange if development was simply linear, that former oppressors would just accept moral responsibility or that calls for gender or racial justice would not lead to self-reinforcing cycles of conservative backlash and increasingly polarizing claims. Still, over the last couple of centuries, there is little doubt that human civilization has advanced significantly, both technologically and ethically (Pinker 2011), at least from a liberal and secular perspective. However, unless one subscribes to teleology, there is nothing inexorable with this development and, it may be that the ecological, social, and political obstacles are simply too great to ever allow for the creation of a Wellsian borderless world (Pedersen 2015) that would allow everyone to live a life free from material want and political domination. On the other hand, much environmental discourse tends to rush ahead in the opposite direction and treat the c limate crisis as ultimate evidence of humanity’s fallen nature when the counter-factual case, that it would be possible for a technological civilization to emerge without at some point endangering its biophysical foundations, would presumably be much less plausible. From an astrobiological perspective, it is easy to imagine how the atmospheric chemistry of a different planet would be more volatile and thus more vulnerable to the effects of industrial processes (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009), leaving a shorter time window for mitigation. Nick Bostrom has explored this possibility of greater climate sensitivity further in his “vulnerable world hypothesis” (Bostrom 2019) and it begs to reason that mitigation efforts would be more focused in such a world. However, since climate response times are longer and sensitivity less pronounced, climate mitigation policies have become mired in culture and media politics (Newman et al. 2018) but also a statist logic (Karlsson 2018) by which it has become more important for states to focus on their own marginal emission reductions in the present rather than asking what technologies would be needed to stabilize the climate in a future where all people can live a modern life.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
AFF – Cap K › Cap Good – Impact Turns › Cap Good/Transition Bad

It’s sustainable. Only capitalism can counteract their impact.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21, D'Alemberte Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law, “2 How Capitalism Saves the Environment,” Capitalism and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, 10/31/2021, pp. 28–55

2.8 CHOOSING CAPITALISM TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT: LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT

Finally, a third reason that capitalism is suited to the job of environmental restoration and protection is its ability to undertake and complete projects at very large scales. In keeping with a major thesis of this book, construction at very large scales should give us a little pause, because of the propensity of capital to metastasize into a source of political resistance to change. But some global problems, especially climate change, may require very large-scale enterprises.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Threats Real – Specific Scenarios › Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare causes securitization – the plan is key to reverse that trend

Unver et.al ’22 (Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University - Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Kurnaz Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University - Department of Political Science and Public Administration “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis”, February 21, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4040148) //CD

Over the last few years, disinformation, information warfare and fake news have become important strategic and political concepts in international relations(Cour la, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019). Although these terms aren’t new and are as old as the term ‘propaganda’, their mainstream use within the context of digital communication skyrocketed after the 2016 US elections (Grinberg et al., 2019). However even before that, these terms had begun to enter into the foreign policy discourse of NATO countries following the 2014 Russian military operations in Ukraine. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Russia had already designated information warfare as part of its 2010 Military Doctrine, which was updated again 2014 with a special emphasis on digital communication (Renz, 2014). A year prior, the importance of the digital space for military doctrinal considerations was outlined by General Valery Gerasimov - Russian Chief of the General Staff. In his 2013 article titled ‘The Value of Science is in the Foresight’, Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.” (Galeotti, 2019) These three texts are generally accepted as the doctrinal basis of modern Russian information operations that were demonstrated both in Ukraine in 2014, and later in Syria, after mid-2015 (Sinovets, Renz, 2015). Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Threats Real – Specific Scenarios › China Cyber War

Chinese cyber warfare is real – unchecked that makes conflict inevitable

Wu and Duffy 21 (Dr. Benson Wu, Co-Founder & CEO, CyCraft Technology Chad Duffy VP of Strategy, CyCraft Technology CyCraft Technology Corp Is a leading Taiwan-based security provider and specializes in threat-hunting solutions, “China Implicated in Prolonged Supply Chain Attack Targeting Taiwan Financial Sector,” CyCraft Technology Corp on Medium. https://medium.com/cycraft/china-implicated-in-prolonged-supply-chain-attack-targeting-taiwan-financial-sector-264b6a1c3525) //AA

Taipei, Taiwan — 22 February 2022 — CyCraft, a leading managed detection and response (MDR) provider based in Taiwan, uncovered intelligence regarding the November 2021 cyberattacks targeting the Taiwan financial and securities trading sector; CyCraft further attributed the cyberattacks to APT10 — a China state-sponsored hacker group widely believed to be associated with the Chinese Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS).

The November 2021 attacks were originally attributed to password mismanagement; however, following a security incident response (IR) investigation conducted by CyCraft into the second wave of February 2022 attacks, new evidence uncovered the exploitation of a severe vulnerability in commonly used financial software aided by a newly identified hacking technique, Reflective Code Loading.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Threats Real – Specific Scenarios › China AI

Empirical evidence shows China is increasing military AI systems to compete with US, showing how the threat is now and prevalent.

Jensen et al, 19 - Benjamin Jensen is an Adjunct Hurst Professorial Lecturer who has taught and helped develop courses on peace, conflict resolution, foreign policy, and strategy at AU since 2006. AND** Christopher Whyte is an assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness. His research interests include a range of international security topics related to the use of information technology in war and peace, political communication and cybersecurity doctrine/policy. AND ** LtCol Cuomo next had the opportunity to serve as the Director, Infantry Officer Course. Upon completion of this assignment, he served for two years as an Operational Planner and Ground Combat Element Integration Officer within Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation. (Benjamin M Jensen, Christopher Whyte, Scott Cuomo. “Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence”. 7-24-2019 https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz025 )

Artificial intelligence has not only begun to be introduced by states in various spheres of activity, but has also become part of everyday life. China, as an emerging great power, strives to maintain and improve its positions in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) at a rapid pace, with military artificial intelligence as one of its priorities. The article analyzes the activities of the Chinese government aimed at the development of military artificial intelligence systems, examines the existing threats, and also provides recommendations on the use of automated weapons.

The use of artificial intelligence by large states has become one of the main means to achieve dominance on the world stage. Along with the use of automated systems in vital spheres (education, industry, medicine, etc.), achieving economic superiority and improving living standards, artificial intelligence has also become an integral part of warfare and the defense sector. According to statistics, China currently ranks second after the United States in terms of artificial intelligence development, and the global market in this area is growing by 44.5% annually, while the cost of AI development ranges from 1.6 to 2.7 billion dollars, which is approximately equal to the cost of American AI. These data clearly demonstrate that China is striving to compete with the United States in the near future and rise to the highest level of artificial intelligence development. The widespread introduction of artificial intelligence in China has become the national interest of the country and has come to the fore, so the concept of the transition of war from "informational" to "intellectual" has influenced the speed and nature of the development of artificial automated systems [1]. Since 2014, Xi Jinping has been paying particular attention to changes related to the development of military technologies, that is why at the meeting of the Politburo in August the Chinese leader set the goal to develop artificial automated systems in the military sphere for the reformation of the RMA. An important step forward in the development of military AI is considered to be the adoption of the "White Paper" in 2015, namely the Chinese Military Strategy, which refers to a "new stage" in the development of military AI. As part of this, 7 areas were identified in which the PLA is mastering artificial intelligence, where the most popular are intelligence, intelligent and autonomous transport, intelligence and information weapons, as well as automatic target recognition. The turning point in the development of AI in China was the adoption by the State Council of China of the "Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Program" in 2017 in which the main directions of the development of artificial intelligence were highlighted. А plan was developed with the purpose of improving military equipment, making command decisions, as well as increasing funding for paramilitary systems, as Xi Jinping said. This implementation was the first initiative on the national level that is directly focused on the development of paramilitary AI as Chinese common strategy. China has set a benchmark for the Development of its C4ISR among which are command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. At the moment, China has many goals, and, in addition to economic superiority, China also seeks to gain military leadership, which is confirmed by the Communist Party in a report from the Ministry of Defense and Military Power of China for 2020. According to the report, the PLA plans to reach a qualitatively new level of military equipment and warfare, which will be carried out with the aim of conducting a systemic war, as well as the ability to seriously repel hostile neighbors. Conflicts with the Uighurs, unresolved contradictions with Hong Kong and Taiwan, conflicts in the South China Sea - all these problems motivate China to accelerate the pace of development in the military sphere, in particular in the field of AI, as well as to change the approach to warfare.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Threats Real – Specific Scenarios › AI Tech Race

The international security is currently at high risk, especially as countries compete to make breakthroughs in AI.

Schmidt 22 - Eric Schmidt, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2007, is the former Chief Executive Officer of Google and former Executive Chairman and Technical Advisor of Alphabet, Inc. He is also a Founder of the Schmidt Foundation, the Schmidt Ocean Institute, and Schmidt Futures. He is the Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project and was the Chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence from 2019 to 2021. (Eric Schmidt, “AI, Great Power Competition & National Security”, 5-1-22, )

Breakthroughs in AI are accelerating global commercial competition and transforming the international security environment. The reach and influence of foreign-based network platforms present risks to American society and require us to confront questions about their origin and purpose. Meanwhile, AI technologies are enhancing several existing national security threats, and will change the way states try to gain leverage against adversaries and exercise coercion and influence in other societies. The open nature of free and democratic societies, combined with their increasing reliance on poorly secured digital networks, makes them especially vulnerable. In the military realm, AI holds the prospect of augmenting cyber, conventional, and nuclear capabilities in ways that make security relationships among rivals more challenging to predict and maintain, and conflicts more difficult to limit. Even as they compete, rivals should explore limits on AI capabilities. The AI ecosystems of the principal global competitors, the United States and China, remain intertwined, and a calibration of the bilateral technology relationship requires both selective decoupling and continued collaboration in areas of mutual interest. These changes require a comprehensive national strategy for the next decade that preserves global leadership advantages for America's economy and security.

The second decade of the twenty-first century featured two major developments that, together, are shaping the third decade we have now entered. The geopolitical landscape is marked by intensifying competition between the United States and its major power rivals, China and Russia. At the same time, the scientific landscape is characterized by significant advances in artificial intelligence, which promise tremendous economic and strategic advantages for those who capitalize on them.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Thesis Indicts – Securitization Theory Wrong › Securitization Theory Too Limited

Securitization theory is flawed – scope too limited to be useful for accurately analyzing geopolitical developments beyond the West

Masua ’22 (Robinson Masua Ph.D Student, Department of Security and Correction Science, School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University. “Security is about survival: assessment of the assumption underlying the securitization theory”. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. April 4, 2022 http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/SS202204003.pdf) //CD

The Securitization theory in security studies is applauded because of its widening concept of security analysis from the traditional military and positivist approach that security is real and we need real methodologies to deal with it. But besides its strengths in security studies it has found some serious criticism both in its function as a paradigm for analysing security processes and in overcoming the normative dilemma of analysing contemporary global security. The approach to securitization has often been criticized for being too limited, too focused upon the speech act and thus not serving a useful purpose in the study of real world situations (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008). It therefore falls short of referring to non-speech acts and practices (i.e. body language, visual representations in media) in the process of securitization. The main criticism is that of being a Eurocentric approach to security. For example, Wilkinson (2007), describes the case of Kyrgyzstan to show that the securitization theory is unable to sufficiently account for developments beyond the West for two reasons: First, she says, the theory takes it for granted ‘that European understandings of society and the state are universal’. Wilkinson sates that theorists within the Copenhagen School must explicitly question normative concepts such as state and society. Second, the theory’s emphasis on the speech act may be unsuited to non-Western contexts where limitations to speech exist, and where securitization may take place through other means, including action. Realists have also argued that the securitization theory widening of the security agenda risks giving the discipline of security studies "intellectual incoherence". For any paradigm to retain its theoretical precision and utility, and having in mind not everything can be defined as a security issue, as well as to remain engaged with the existing contentious definition of what is security, Wæver discusses the apprehension towards redefining security until the concept becomes meaningless and the analyst is no longer able to discuss operations of security working within a specific field (Wæver, 1995, pp. 48-49, 56; Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24). The point is that the securitization theory is too broad in definition of security and actually as scholars we end up not being sure not differentiating security, human development and sustainable development. The other problem of the securitization theory is the assumption of a normal state of politics that can be distinguished from exceptional measures, especially separation of politics and society. Holbraad and Pedersen (2012), argues that revolutionary Cuba provides a case of a non-liberal non-Western state where the liberal assumptions underpinning Copenhagen School cannot explain fully the separation of the two- politics and society. They posit that the liberal distinction between the state and society collapses in a revolutionary ontology, with revolutionary states assuming themselves to be the people. Thus, rules and exceptions cease to exist for a revolutionary state because the state is society (Holbraad & Pederson, 2012). The Securitization theory assumes a basic level of stability and cannot therefore be applied to exceptional situations where there is no such thing as normal politics. A good example is the work of Greenwood and Weaver Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN: 2581-6241 Monthly, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed, Indexed Journal Impact Factor: 5.146 Volume - 5, Issue - 4, APRIL - 2022 Publication Date: 25/04/2022 Available online on – http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/ Page 17 (2013), who test the paradigm in the context of Egypt during the Arab Spring. They point out that the Arab Uprisings separated regimes from societies in a number of states, toppling previously embedded authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In other states, regimes framed protesting groups as existential threats, reconstructing the nature of political organization amidst the conflation of domestic and regional, normative and geopolitical agendas.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Thesis Indicts – Securitization Theory Wrong › Reality Shapes Discourse

Discourse doesn't shape reality

Riley et al, 07 (Dr Wendy Sims-Schouten: Deputy Director of Arts & Sciences and Associate Professor at University College London, Chartered Member of the British Psychological Society; Sarah Riley: Professor in Critical Health Psychology at Massey University, New Zealand; Carla Willig: professor of psychology at University of London, associate editor of the Journal of Health Psychology, member of the editorial board of Qualitative Research in Psychology; sage Journals; February 1, 2007; “Critical Realism in Discourse Analysis: A Presentation of a Systematic Method of Analysis Using Women's Talk of Motherhood, Childcare and Female Employment as an Example” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959354307073153 ) //KM

In critical realism, language is understood as constructing our social realities. However, these constructions are theorized as being shaped by the possibilities and constraints inherent in the material world. For critical realists, material practices are given an ontological status that is independent of, but in relation with, discursive practices. The advantage in taking a critical realist, rather than relativist, approach is that analysis can include relationships between people's material conditions and discursive practices. Despite calls to develop a critical realist discourse analysis there has been little empirical critical realist work, possibly because few have addressed the critique that critical realists have no systematic method of distinguishing between discursive and non-discursive. In this article we outline a three-stage procedure that enables a systematic critical realist discourse analysis using women's talk of motherhood, childcare and female employment as an example.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Thesis Indicts – Securitization Theory Wrong › Realism Good – NATO

Realism is the only way to ensure US and NATO security – Countries will not stop in pursuit of cyberattacks on a military scale.

Daricili and Celik 21 (A. Burak Daricili, Case Officer in the Department of Intelligence and Security; Soner Celik, of Suleymen Demirel University, “National Security 2.0: The Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructure,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2181981) //AA

Intellectuals such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a pessimistic perspective that can be applied to the ways in which national security needs to be understood. Those intellectuals accepted the international system as an area where states continuously fight with each other to pursue their own selfish interests. For this reason, it is impossible to establish universal peace, as the Idealists desire. This line of reasoning is accepted by Realists such as Carr and Hans Morgenthau; in their view, the only way to prevent a state from becoming a hegemon in the international system, where there is a constant conflict of interests among states, is for states to balance each other’s power.11 The pessimistic viewpoint of classical Realists is accepted by neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, according to whom security or insecurity is a result of the anarchic nature of the international system on a large scale. Therefore, international policy will continuously sustain a tendency to violence.12 The Realist political approach accepts states as the main actors of the international system; since the interests of each country differ from each other, there is always the possibility of war, and some kind of conflict or fighting is inevitable. The Realist approach defines the international system as anarchic, and characterizes international policy as a power struggle in which security is the main agenda item in the realm of international relations. In this respect, the security concept for Realist theoreticians is discussed through “insecurity” in general terms, and this theoretic approach is explained via themes of power, threat and insecurity. Cyberspace-based developments, today, propose new approaches to states’ threat, security and deterrence agendas. Some states have even begun to see cyber attack and cyber conflict as important methods of engaging in strategic defense and inflicting damage on their opponents. Developments in cyberspace bring along new security risks; the importance of removing these risks has thus also increased, compelling states to develop strategies to address this issue. For Realist theorists, this makes the international system even more uncertain and anarchic than before, especially given that cyber attacks can be caused not merely by states but by individuals.13 In Realist terms, the diversification of risks to cyberspace resources, and the inability to determine the source of these risks, deepens the anarchic structure of the international system. A cyberspace attacker can hide his or her identity by using various forms of crypto software and programs. The attacker can even conduct a “false flag”14 operation, making it appear that the source of the cyber attack is another state or a state-sponsored hacker group by using similar software. All of these circumstances deepen the insecurity of the international system and reinforce the mutual distrust between states. Power struggle and competition in the international system have expanded into a new dimension thanks to internet-based developments. Many states have used these technologies as an opportunity to develop their hard power. Improving military power with the help of cyber-based technology and skill has become an important goal for these states. Allocating budgets, making investments, training experts and establishing cyber military commands in tandem with conventional army development are now essential for states in order to reach a powerful attack and defense capacity in cyberspace.15 All of these developments contribute to what Realists call the “security dilemma,” a phenomenon whereby “many of the instruments that are used by a state to increase its security decrease the security of others.”16 And it is ongoing. When one state makes a military investment or takes a military measure, this is taken as a threat by another state, which then applies similar measures, which in turn are interpreted by other states as a threat. The threat perceptions of states vis-à-vis one another escalate, in some cases leading to an armament race with mutual measures taken back and forth.17 Based on the security dilemma concept, states evaluate international relations as a zero-sum game, and plan their behavior patterns in the international system based on the assumption of relative earnings. They also avoid cooperation by asking the question, “who will benefit more?” instead of, “how can we both profit?” As indicated above, the Realist approach adopts a competitive and confrontational security perspective on the axis of anarchy. Given the rigidity of this perspective, the limitations and difficulties of cooperation in the Realist paradigm come into prominence. Because the structure of the international system is anarchic, according to this approach, this insecure environment prevents states from cooperating in the long term,18 a situation exacerbated by the anonymous structure of cyberspace and its accompanying uncertainties, which diversify and deepen risks. Concerning all these evaluations, the mentality that has started to gain credence recently is that critical infrastructure is an inseparable part of a state’s cybersecurity and thus its cybersecurity strategies. This perspective is clearly emphasized in the national cybersecurity documents of many states. For example, Turkey’s National Cyber Security Strategy (2020–2023) Document states, “Cybersecurity is an inseparable part of national security. Providing national security in an absolute manner depends on achieving [our] goals in the cybersecurity field.”19 As mentioned above, the security of critical infrastructure and information systems that are mostly managed by internet technologies has become vital to the security of any state. States, now, are aware that cyber attacks targeting critical structures can be a serious threat, and that such attacks can negatively affect their political, economic and military security.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › Securitized Representations Good › Extinction Impacts

Securitization is essential to survival because it brings attention to existential threats and demands immediate action

Masua 22 (Robinson Masua Ph.D Student, Department of Security and Correction Science, School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University. “Security is about survival: assessment of the assumption underlying the securitization theory”. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. April 4, 2022 http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/SS202204003.pdf) //BK

Securitization is one of the most talked about, contested and revised concept of theoretical framework in Security Studies and specifically in Critical Security Studies. According to Williams, (2003), the concept is connected with the Copenhagen School and is seen as a synthesis of constructivist and classical political realism in its approach. Buzan and Weaver defined securitization as: a successful speech act through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 491). According to Lieven (2020, pp. 6-9), securitization begins with a speech act concerning a particular threat, by an authoritative national leader, institution, or party. The speech act attempts to shift the threat from normal politics into a security concern, thereby legitimating extraordinary measures to contain the threat. Securitization is a process-oriented conception of security, which stands in contrast to materialist approaches of classical security studies. Classical approaches of security focus on the material dispositions of the threat including distribution of power, military capabilities, and polarity, whereas securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security in order to allow for the use of extraordinary measures. Moreover, the securitization act, to be successful, must be accepted by the audience, regardless of the subject matter being a real threat. As Thierry Balzacq puts it: "securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion" (Balzacq, 2005). The audience may take several forms including technical, bureaucratic, public, and policymaking, and different audiences can perform different functions by accepting a securitization, as has been explored by (Roe, 2008). Securitization is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995) Like any other concepts in social science the concept of securitization has been revised and developed but there are still key concepts that has stood time and space. For example, the idea that security is not something real or given, but a process or move that someone applies in order to bring a discussion beyond the realm of everyday politics and to a sphere where extra ordinary, out-of- hand measures ought to be deployed and “actions outside of normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24) are justified. It is important to note that securitization as a process is different from politicization. According to Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, (1998), a public issue can be politicized once it is discussed in political debate and a politicized issue will subsequently require government decisions based – at least in democracies- on careful consideration of possible odds reflecting logics and features on the individual political system. For that reason, securitized issue is perceived as an issue that constitutes Existential threat to a certain entity be it the state or else and requires extra-ordinary and emergency measures (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 23-24). Within politicized issues there is room for debate and the outcome of such debate is generally or better theoretically open. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN: 2581-6241 Monthly, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed, Indexed Journal Impact Factor: 5.146 Volume - 5, Issue - 4, APRIL - 2022 Publication Date: 25/04/2022 Available online on – http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/ Page 11 On the other hand, securitization demands firm actions and does not offer much room for political choice because it is so urgent that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of political but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 29) In the securitization process the term existential threat is very important as it provides the crucial criterion for analysis of securitization as some authors suggest should be textual analysis (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 29). This idea of labelling a threat as existential means that not only extra ordinary measures outside legal framework as a coercive necessity but also provides a moral or ontological justification for “emergency measures”. The assumption here in is that if the enemy is not stopped or the threat is not contained the most precious feature of a state/society/habitat is at stake and its very existence and survival. Look at the case of Saddam Hussein Iraq and USA invasion in 1993. It was informed by this logic of extentialism of Iraq as a threat to the other neighbouring countries including Kuwait. Buzan, Weaver and Wilde (1998, p. 25) asserts, a securitization must be intersubjective and accompanied by “saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”. This bring about debate on securitization and political again, that not everyone could perform it as long as it is not successful, that is has a measurable political impact (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998). Also Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, (1998) call it as many securitization moves, which include speech acts performed towards an audience by securitization actor seeking to convince it of existential character of a threat towards referent object. Therefore, the emergency measures should be taken to contain or eliminate the existential threat. Where we have a recurring or pervasive threats to certain referent object, the securitization can become institutionalized. Examples of institutionalized securitization is of a state where it sustains a standing army or relies on the services of its secret agencies and also the dikes preventing large parts of the Netherlands from being flooded which are a commonly agreed upon feature of the Dutch security (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 28). Figure 1: The Securitization Process. Source: (Emmmers, 2010, p. 138). According to Buzan, Weaver and Wilde (1998, p. 24), the securitization process is a three-way process- can go either side or come from one side to the other in the cycle. That an issue can either be non-politicized (the state does not deal with it, and it is not an issue in the public debate)- de-securitization, politicized (an issue that is part of public debate and policy) or securitized (an issue that is presented as an existential threat, and can be dealt with using measures outside normal politics), and that ‘any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum’ (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24) . So apart from security issue being securitized as shown on above figure, or after being securitized it can be de-securitized again. Therefore, de-securitizations are processes ‘in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ stated by Buzan and Waever, cited in (Coskun, 2008, p. 405). Thus, the key aim of (de)securitization theory is to identify what, when, where and how an issue is moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to become a threat to security and beyond normal politics – and the other way around (Snetkov, 2017).

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Aff Answers › No Link › Cyber – “Cyber Doom” Narrative

No link – studies prove “cyber doom” narratives don’t produce generalized anxiety and are informed by real incidents of cyber conflict

Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects. Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings. At the heart of the “cyber doom” narrative is the assumption that information about cyberattacks released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber operations of foreign countries and organized crime1— produces anxiety about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between cyber operations, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often discussed in unclear terms by scholars than is the determining role of techno-strategic conditions. Despite the recent turn by some to consider the societal impact of OCOs (Lin and Kerr 2017; Lindsay 2020; Whyte 2020), most research on cyber conflict continues to emphasize logic-of-the-domain explanations for the behavior of cyber-capable actors.2 This makes a certain sense because the domain is human-made and malleable. However, it is also puzzling given the scope of cyberspace and the degree to which digital action impacts both private industry and civil society across numerous levels. Though the mechanisms of interaction may be less precise than is the case with other forms of state power, the literature on public opinion, morale, and psychology in foreign policymaking tells us that popular perceptions of threat are shaped by a host of factors that then impact the formulation and implementation of state security policy. In this article, we take aim at the “cyber doom” narrative logic as an initial step toward clarifying the relationship between cyber conflict, its portrayal, and public thinking about digital insecurity. Consequently, we align with critics of the narrative itself but argue that such criticisms make overly simplistic assumptions about public opinion and national security that do little to enrich and undergird evolving cyber conflict research. The logic of the core argument about digital disaster aside, the broader “cyber doom” argument— i.e., that the rhetorical and cognitive prospect of doom has some effect on a population—is undertheorized and understudied. This point is particularly important because scholarship aimed at explaining the sources of state public policy on cyberspace makes the curious misstep of holding domestic population preferences constant while focusing on third image determinants of strategy development. Authors argue that publics cyclically react with some fear to emergent threats and that, therefore, public policy is best explained by the incidence of cyber conflict or steps taken by state peers. Given that such assumptions are clearly far from safe on the merits, this article aims to ascertain whether or not negativity among the general public associated with malicious behavior in cyberspace is as salient as broadly claimed. We add evidence to the argument that the “cyber doom” narrative is unrealistic (Lawson 2013) by showing that the assumptions found therein are misleading. Our study finds that sensitivity to cybersecurity threats is situationally shaped by exposure to negative reporting but that the onset of associated dread is not a given. Instead, it is influenced by expectations of the role of technology in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to negative effect as are those who remain not so deeply embedded in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more sensitive to cybersecurity threats to their person as the information they consume becomes more negative, and this personal concern facilitates a heightened sensitivity to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level. Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel environmental circumstances on individual opinion formation is shaped by issue embeddedness, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting nevertheless that the unique characteristics of such a development matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is clearly premised on personal threat sensitivity. These findings suggest that not only “cyber doom” is strategically and functionally unrealistic, but the effects of the idea’s securitization are also minimal and prone to diminishment over time. In doing so, they speak to the broad research program on public opinion and audience dynamics in foreign policymaking. More specifically, in line with recent work (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), our study suggests that citizens are far more capable of responding to threat stimuli absent elite cues. Significantly, our work joins research that locates responsiveness to policy issues in the interaction of cognitive priors and social context with incoming information about new events. Judgment is rarely as linear as the “cyber doom” narrative suggests in its linking of negative reporting, fearful response, and sensitivity to threat inflation. Instead, individuals are conditioned by social circumstances such that even novel threats are incorporated into the horizon of issues the public encounters. The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first introduces the theoretical framework supporting the underlying claims investigated and adopts existing frameworks to account for the effects of continued exposure to cyber threats. The second discusses the experimental design employed. Though common across political science research, the methodology is only recently employed in cybersecurity and cyber conflict scholarship in response to (1) difficulties related to obtaining observational data and (2) the growing interest in individual-level behavior as impactful in digital affairs (Gross, Canetti, and Vashdi 2017; Gomez 2019b; Jensen and Valeriano 2019). This is followed by the presentation and analysis of results. Finally, an in-depth discussion is offered that further develops the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. The findings are not limited to the validity of the core “cyber doom” narrative and the general disposition of non-elites toward cybersecurity issues. Instead, we contribute to the body of scholarship on public opinion in foreign policymaking and speak to ongoing research linking decision-making and the modern digital information environment.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Security K › Miscellaneous › Cap K – Crisis Cap – AT: “No alternative”

Capitalism relies on producing catastrophes to expand access to new markets and delegitimize criticism – refuse the claim of no alternative in favor of analyzing capitalism’s construction of crises that opens space for revolutionary potential

Masco 15 - Joseph Masco is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago and author of The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror, also published by Duke University Press, and The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post--Cold War New Mexico, [“The Time of Catastrophe: Catastrophe’s Apocalypse,” 2015, Routledge, eBook ISBN9781315552187]RA

When is the Catastrophic? Think about the strangeness of today’s situation. Thirty, forty years ago, we were still debating about what the future will be: communist, fascist, capitalist, whatever. Today, nobody even debates these issues. We all silently accept global capitalism is here to stay. On the other hand, we are obsessed with cosmic catastrophes: the whole life on earth disintegrating, because of some virus, because of an asteroid hitting the earth, and so on. So the paradox is, that it’s much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more modest radical change in capitalism. “In relation to the history of organic life on earth,” writes a modern biologist, “the paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens constitutes something like two seconds at the close of a twenty-four hour day. On this scale, the history of civilized mankind would fill one-fifth of the last second of the last hour.” The present, which, as the model of Messianic time comprises the entire history of mankind in a enormous abridgement, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the universe. In the early twenty-first century, narratives of end times proliferate—terrorism, peak oil, emerging disease, boom and bust capitalism, and a destabilized biosphere compete with each other for public attention. The difficulty of prioritizing which catastrophe should take precedence over all the others has created a curious new kind of psychosocial fatigue, where claims on imminent destruction are met with a retreat inward or simply a shrug. How is it that Americans, residents of the most powerful country in human history (unchallenged across military, economic, and political domains) have come to feel so precarious and vulnerable? It is important to note that our politics of catastrophe involve cultural formations as well as material assessments; they are historical projections that articulate fear but can also work to block both thought and action. Žižek (building on similar comments by Jameson about capitalism now seeming more permanent than the world) helps us see one dimension of this problem by underscoring the current lack of alternative ideologies to constitute the future today.37 The demise of the large social engineering projects of the twentieth century, and the rise of an unrestrained neoliberalism in their wake, combine to create a vision of a market driven future that can only produce profit by generating boom and bust cycles and extraction regimes that leave ruin in their wake.38 Disaster has actually become a kind of industry in recent years, revealing an unplanned obsolescence for urban infrastructure breaking down under shifting environmental condition and lack of maintenance. This has enabled radical new kinds of corporate experimentation and profit-making, making disaster highly lucrative.39 The formal end of the welfare state project (largely coterminous with the end of the Cold War, if not the nuclear danger) has also diminished the public space devoted to positive visions of a collective future in American life. It is difficult to find official commitments to a steady improvement in the qualities of collective life of the kind once used to balance images of nuclear catastrophe. Today, we are more than a generation removed from the kind of social contract that engineered most American institutions, and are instead increasingly reliant on market logics to design the collective future.40 Thus, we have inherited from the twentieth-century’s contest of utopian visions a world still organized by nuclear weapons but subject to the radical destabilizing effects of a boom and bust global capitalism that operates on ever-shorter windows of profitability and with fewer restraints and responsibilities. The reluctance of our systems of governance to imagine different futures, let alone to organize society on behalf of them, leaves crisis the predominant mode for political expression, as imminent danger becomes the primary motivating force outside of capital. Consequently, competing domains and scales of endangerment now seem to buffet U.S. citizens without respite, as the bursting of bubble economies resides alongside the minute-to-minute danger of a nuclear blast within the century-long sequence of anthropogenic environmental change. In a striking passage from his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin evokes geological time as a way to shift the story of human beings on planet earth.41 All human history becomes a brief moment of planetary time from this perspective, which raises the important question how temporality itself informs the cataclysmic and whether human beings have the right senses to understand collective danger at all. Pre-figuring the language of the anthropocene, Benjamin uses geological time to disrupt the time of capital and to reposition humanity as merely one kind of life on planet Earth, a species which may or may not be able to avoid the cataclysmic end most creatures meet. But if danger incubates in the present, revealing itself in the catastrophic act, how can we see through a normative everyday to assess accruing danger operating on all possible temporal scales—particularly the forms that people generate and thus collectively control? Benjamin suggests that a radical emancipatory insight is also incubating in the present, a Messianic potential that could shift perception itself allowing a different kind of time to emerge, one that is not coded as “progress” (tied to homogenous empty time) and that is outside of capitalism. For Benjamin, just as the cataclysmic is coded into everyday life, so is the possibility for a radical shift in perception and with it an emancipatory politics. That this “potential” has not been activated is, for him, the ongoing state of emergency that he critiques so forcefully. In this way, he shifts the “emergency” from the narratives of violence that can function as heroic vehicles for self-sacrifice and warfare in the moment, to a more structural assessment of how social institutions normalize and render invisible the violence of capitalism itself. What Benjamin asks us to consider is how social institutions function as an expression and achievement of human engineering, and thus how the human-made can be remade under different concepts of value and with different futures in mind. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would, in this case, be to see the agentive behind the everyday crisis, to see the possibility of a social order not yet conceived as forestalled in the name of history, class, or the status quo. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would be to enter into a radically different temporality, a perspectival space for Benjamin in which structural violence is revealed as manufactured, enabling the current moment to be opened as a space of revolutionary critical potential. From this perspective, perhaps the proliferation of catastrophic images and narratives today has less to say about new objective degrees of endangerment than a shift in the psychosocial mechanisms of normalization and absorption. And here we might focus on a temporal paradox of our security culture today concerning the relation of nuclear danger to climate crisis. The nuclear danger of Cold War—the fears of a nuclear war that would consume global civilization in an instant—seems distant to many American in the twenty-first century but the technological systems built to enable it are still present and active. The global nuclear infrastructure remains on high alert and nuclear war could still be launched at a moment’s notice and between ever more nuclear powers. The Presidents of the U.S. and of Russia still carry launch codes with them every second of the day, and weapons scientists and defense personnel maintain a state of the art global nuclear system of war fighting. Americans tend to see global nuclear crisis now as an issue of the past, a matter for the last century (replaced by a wide range of terrorist threats). But today there are many more nuclear weapons on the planet than in 1958 when The Power of Decision was made, and the U.S. has committed to maintaining a state of the art arsenal for the indefinite future. Indeed, the nuclear fetish, despite the end of underground nuclear testing in 1992, remains firmly in place: In 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy asked Congress for funds to build a new nuclear complex for the twenty-first century, involving new weapons designs and production facilities—amounting to a $1 trillion expenditure over the next three decades.42 Thus, while perceptions of nuclear danger have changed markedly since 1958, the technological possibility of a total ending has only increased: we live today on the edge of nuclear war and just don’t seem to notice it anymore.43 So what was once a national fixation on nuclear crisis no longer mobilizes in the same way, attaining an embedded-ness in everyday life that can be ignored by most citizens in favor of other concerns. Similarly, the climate crisis of the twenty-first century was already present in 1958, when The Power of Decision articulated the terms of national crisis and Unchained Goddess warned viewers of a destabilized future environment. In the first decade of the Cold War, earth scientists publicized disturbing trends in their data sets, documenting shifts in air, water, and land quality via industrial pollutants. The debates about radioactive fallout from nuclear testing led to the Partial Test Ban treaty in 1963, which moved U.S. nuclear testing underground, eliminating the production of new radioactive fallout from the U.S. test program. However, the larger lesson of how industrial activity was harming the biosphere was left unaddressed as a security problem for decades. Had climate change risen to the level of a nation crisis in the 1950s the world would have been spared the coming destabilization of ecosystems, species die-offs, flooding, illness, and drought projected in the IPCC reports. Indeed, climate scientists now identify 1950 as the beginning of the “great acceleration”—a period of startling changes in human consumption patterns linked to the advance of the middle class and escalating carbon emissions.44 In other words, the inauguration of the global nuclear danger was also the inflection point for climate change, simultaneously installing two catastrophic potentials into everyday life that operate on vastly different time scales. Americans focused on the crisis of nuclear war in the twentieth century while missing the other incremental crisis of their own making, the expansion of a consumer economy that has become a highly destructive force on planet earth. Thus, nuclear and climate dangers are human-made crises decades in the making, and are deeply embedded within a petroleum-based capitalist-militarist-industrial system. After World War II, the security state embraced nuclear danger as its coordinating principle while rejecting the environment as a major security concern. Partly this is explained by the radically different temporalities evoked by each kind of danger: nuclear crisis playing out in minutes and hours while climate crisis plays out over decades and centuries. However, each crisis also evokes a different kind of sovereignty and requires very different kinds of governance. A global denuclearization project could substantially reduce the nuclear danger in a few years, but global warming is a planetary phenomenon that requires vast international cooperation—indeed, it now demands a post-national security logic of planetary defense. Perhaps this is also why so many images of climate change in the U.S. rely on tropes developed to communicate the danger of nuclear weapons, a way of acknowledging a collective danger without forcing a change in existing conceptual structures or modes of response. In U.S. public discourse, nuclear and climate dangers are both grounded in images of a world that is no longer capable of supporting human society, a time when as nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, once put it, the “survivors would envy the dead.”45 This kind of catastrophic narrative, in its depiction of a perfect and total loss, however, requires an apocalyptic rendering precisely because it is an historical and highly politicized artifact. What is required now is a critical engagement that assesses not only the possibility of total endings but also the instrumentalities, ideologies, and practices that inform them. Perhaps today this could take the form of a reassessment of industrial reasoning itself and an effort to “cancel the apocalypse” not by a heroic suicide bombing (as in Pacific Rim or The Power of Decision) but rather by attending to local infrastructure itself as a social project that needs constant critical reassessment and reinvention to acknowledge radically changing environmental conditions. This would mean embracing both middle and deep futures as a collective security project, and thinking through multigenerational toxic legacies as well as imminent dangers (see Orff and Misrash 2012).46 Above all, it would mean focusing expert and public energies not on rehearsing the perfect catastrophes of total endings but rather on the qualities, consequences, and insights of living in messy aftermaths.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Security K › Case Impact Defense › Cyberattacks

Cybersecurity threats are overblown and have more to do with creating the perception of a threat than the harm of the attack itself.

Fouad 19 – Noran Shafik Fouad is a Postdoctoral Research Associate, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, [“The Peculiarities of Securitising Cyberspace: A Multi-Actor Analysis of the Construction of Cyber Threats in the US (2003-2016)”, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 2019]RA

The nature of the cyber threat: between existentiality and urgency

Unlike other security sectors, cybersecurity threats are always perceived in the form of attacks, or hostile, purposeful, and deliberate actions by an enemy/adversary against the referent object(s). While this attack logic can still be used occasionally in all sectors, it is the dominant one in cybersecurity. All cyber operations, even the ‘defensive’, involve the use of malware by an actor to gain unauthorised access into the target’s system. A vulnerability in a system is not threatening per se if not exploited, and this exploitation requires an adversary’s or another party’s involvement. Although the resemblances with the military sector here are high, one more aspect makes cybersecurity more distinctive: the question of existentiality. According to the securitisation theory, the defining feature of security is the idea of existentiality; i.e. security is concerned with the survival of a certain referent object(s), which justifies the calls for urgent responses. In cybersecurity, despite the existence of existential discourses, the existentiality assumption is not as straightforward as it is in other sectors for multiple reasons. Firstly, the majority of cyber attacks that are seen as the most serious in history were neither objectively existential from a technical viewpoint, nor portrayed as such by the concerned actors. Stealing military, commercial, or personal information can hardly affect the survival of the state, the private sector, or any individual. Similarly, denying customers/citizens access to certain services through denial of service attacks (DOS) does not pose an existential threat to anyone. This does not mean that cyber threats cannot be hyped, exaggerated, or presented in urgent terms, since all those qualities are not essentially linked to existentiality. Secondly, the indirect nature of the majority of cyber attacks and the non-physicality of their consequences, although does not undermine their seriousness and urgency, acts as an impeding rather than a facilitating condition to the existentiality assumption. The empirical analysis also proves that existentiality is not the only reason for threats to register in the cybersecurity debate and that it is not a precondition for perceived urgency. Generally, cybersecurity is marked by different understandings of disruptive and destructive implications of cyber threats, and all invoke a certain level of urgency. The majority of discourses emphasise these ‘disruptive’ implications, including huge financial losses that can slow down the economy, loss of productivity and global competitiveness, customers’ loss of confidence in the information infrastructure, etc. Though not portrayed in ‘survival’ terms, these disruptive implications are still perceived as immanent, urgent, and as serious threats to national security. 3.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Security K › Case Impact Defense › Cyberattacks

Scholarly articles tend to inflate the issue of cyber warfare into having a much larger impact than it does in reality, leading to fear amongst citizenry.

Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA

State-sponsored OCOs are an increasingly common feature of the international system in the twenty-first century. In the past decade, incidents caused by these have taken a number of forms and each year has brought a dramatic overall uptick in the number of significant and publicly disclosed incidents. Simultaneously, there has been an immense diversification of those elements of government, industry, and civil society targeted, a trend that is apparent even in data that often misrepresent the impact of cyber events on civil society actors (Maschmeyer, Deibert, and Lindsay 2020). Cyber operations increasingly target prominent political personas and organizations in aid of influence campaigns in a remarkably prominent fashion. Moreover, beyond the routine theft of confidential information, malware designed to tamper with the function of industrial control systems across power generation, factory production, and even dam infrastructure is found with some relative frequency. Herein lies the broad assertion that physical effects from OCOs seem more likely today than ever before. Interestingly, even as cyber conflict evolves and becomes commonplace, professional narratives and media representations remain somewhat static (Dunn Cavelty 2008, 2013; Gomez and Villar 2018). Since at least 2007, when distributed denial-of-service operations targeting Estonia constituted the first major cyber assault on a NATO member state, the potential for catastrophic damage resulting from malicious digital behavior surfaced as a recurring narrative in Western punditry and popular commentary. Despite such depictions, the growing empirical record suggests the limited efficacy of publicly disclosed OCOs. Only a handful of deployments of malicious code have been captured to date that were intended to cause the physical effects that are so often the substance of doomsayer reporting. Of these, most did not execute. As an instrument of foreign policy, Iasiello (2013) and others argue that cyber operations often fall short of achieving their objectives despite advances in capabilities. Similarly, the latest version of the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID) data, which tracks major interstate cyber conflict incidents between 2000 and 2016, illustrates the limited coercive potential of OCOs by identifying the rarity of concession-generating incidents (Valeriano and Maness 2014). The absence of empirical support for the revolutionary potential of cyber operations encourages criticism of those who oversell the strategic utility of the method (Gartzke 2013; Lindsay 2013; Maness and Valeriano 2016; Borghard and Lonergan 2017; Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017), with the result that the real-world impact of cyber conflict remains somewhat unclear even as the landscape of incidents becomes more densely populated. This growing skepticism surrounding the exercise of cyber power,3 however, continues to go against how the issue is framed in broader scholarship and in the public eye. Scholars still regularly cite the assumptions of “cyber doom” as they present their work, particularly in technical research (Dunn Cavelty 2009; Lawson et al. 2016). Furthermore, Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) observe that media reporting continues to depict OCOs as existential threats to cyber-dependent societies. Continued references to this narrative, even among otherwise skeptical researchers, are puzzling. While the six-year Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) study encompasses some of the most prominent cybersecurity incidents,4 it also permits the observation of its limited effects. Cyber operations that reflect the prevalent narrative are typically inaccessible to the majority of state actors (Pytlak and Mitchell 2016). Moreover, there is reason to think that prominent operations that could affect public perceptions of the shape of global cyber conflict should be few and far between. For one thing, the ability to inflict damage to critical infrastructure requires significant financial, scientific, and organizational resources (Slayton 2017). For another, if concessions are to be obtained, sustained pressure is typically required, which is challenging with OCOs relative to other mechanisms of state power (Borghard and Lonergan 2017). Lastly, strategic considerations also need to be considered. As most interactions in cyberspace are regionally bound and may involve rivalries, restraint is necessary to manage escalatory risk (Valeriano and Maness 2015; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2017). Unlike conventional capabilities, cyber operations and their corresponding tools do not communicate intent well and increase the risk of misperception (Buchanan 2017). It seems clear that while much conceptual and empirical clarifications about cyber conflict exist in scholarly and professional settings, there remains a distorted view of the impact of information about cyber conflict on the average citizen. This is problematic for a range of reasons, perhaps most notably because of how the diversification of cyber conflict has increasingly brought questions about the nature, integrity, and function of public information environments to the fore of strategic discussions about digital insecurity.

2022 UTNIF Kritik
Security K › AT Common 2AC Arguments › AT: Threats Are Real – General

Be skeptical of every aff claims their threats are real – their rhetorical acts are only meant to deepen the ruse of securitization. Skepticism makes the entire system crumble.

Ojeda, 22 – Michelle Domenica Maffei Ojeda is a master’s degree candidate in Research in International Relations with mention in Security and Human Rights, [“Political Discourse Analysis over the Securitization Discourse from the US towards Venezuela: The Case of Obama and Trump (2015-2020)”, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO Ecuador Department of International Studies and Communication, April 2022, https://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec/bitstream/10469/18466/2/TFLACSO-2022MDMO.pdf]RA

The pivotal point over securitization is that speeches with a receptive audience create a threat. The more an idea is accepted by the audience, it becomes a reality. On the same note, for the process of securitization to work properly, it requires a political actor, which in this case is Obama and Trump along with an audience that will take their words as legitimate. According to Buzan “unless an idea is widely held, it cannot count as part of the idea of the state” (1983, 53). Language to work properly, or any speech act, it requires a teleological classification, what is good and what is bad, and for it to be accepted by the audience/society. Language itself is violent and requires a binary logic to outline the limitations of its own fields by excluding, when there is exclusion- the gray areas in the concept do not interrelate- then the more difficult is to forget or re-arrange the core block of an idea. Language is built in a way that the more you use an object as a threat, the audience will eventually believe it and get in sync. The analysis of threat construction from the securitization theory, states that the perception of threat is not something exogenous. Rather is constructed by widely accepted ideas from the collectivity, the audience, also known as the “us”. A threat is not physical or tangible but rather represent an existential danger to the construction of the “us” . It is everything that can categorically be foreign in our identity creeds. We must take into account that at the core, national security in the securitization theory is also linked with the notion of securitizing oneself from outside and domestic threats for survival. Hence, the political elite that invokes “securitization” will also inherently mention the consequences of taking no response at all, increasing fear through the possible weakening of state foundations/institutions, which is an extension of the nation and of individuals. The foundation to understand a threat is the construction of the ‘us’ versus the antagonist ‘other’, both are mutually sustaining and not excluded. This mutual constitution of language can be seen through the fact that Venezuela and the EE.UU. are antagonist and still have deep economic ties and be highly interdependent (Bonfili 2010).