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2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “NATO”

Cooperation with NATO is necessary now to prevent existential risks---threats are real, but cooperation can help mitigate risk

Kagan 22, Robert---Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institute (“The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” Foreign Affairs, vol 101, no 3, 2022, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=54&id=&page=)

Thankfully, that was not to be. But now that Putin has made his mistakes, the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early, before they have built up a head of steam and the price of stopping them rises. The challenge posed by Russia is neither unusual nor irrational. The rise and fall of nations is the warp and woof of international relations. National trajectories are changed by wars and the resulting establishment of new power structures, by shifts in the global economy that enrich some and impoverish others, and by beliefs and ideologies that lead people to prefer one power over another. If there is any blame to be cast on the United States for what is happening in Ukraine, it is not that Washington deliberately extended its influence in eastern Europe. It is that Washington failed to see that its influence had already increased and to anticipate that actors dissatisfied with the liberal order would look to overturn it.

For the 70-plus years since World War II, the United States has actively worked to keep revisionists at bay. But many Americans hoped that with the end of the Cold War, this task would be finished and that their country could become a "normal" nation with normal -- which was to say, limited -- global interests. But the global heg- emon cannot tiptoe off the stage, as much as it might wish to. It especially cannot retreat when there are still major powers that, because of their history and sense of self, cannot give up old geopolitical ambitions -- unless Americans are prepared to live in a world shaped and defined by those ambitions, as it was in the 1930s.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Miscalc”

Miscalc is a useful frame---it recognizes the complexity of the international arena, which solves the link

Nordmann, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, ‘18

(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel, pg. 279 – 294)

The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. It could be trusted and, in fact, had to be trusted in many ways. The weapons were carefully monitored, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Deterrence”

Deterrence is the most ethical military posture---it’s fundamentally defensive and views the use of force as exclusively a last resort---there’s zero chance of the aff spilling up to affect overall global peace which makes some middle-ground military solution imperative

Eldridge Colby 7, Adjunct Staff Member of the RAND Corporation, formerly a staff member in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and on the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2007, “Restoring Deterrence,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 413-428

One might ask: If deterrence is so effective at providing security, then why has there been a rush to abandon it in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and 9/11? Shouldn’t such a successful policy have earned greater loyalty? The answer to these questions illuminates the serious divisions among Americans about what the purpose of our foreign policy should be.¶ Deterrence was not a policy that won out in the Cold War because it was the most loved. It was, instead, the best of a menu of bad options. Hard right anti-Communists thought deterrence weak, a concession of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and a failure of Western will. They called for the rollback of Communist suzerainty, even going so far as to advocate preventive strikes against the Soviet Union and China before they were able to field nuclear weapons. The left, meanwhile, detested deterrence as an immoral use of terror as a threat, a reliance on weapons whose very existence they decried. Believing that no state objective could justify the use of nuclear weapons, the left advocated reducing our strategic forces, moving towards abolition, and a conciliatory policy towards the Soviets. Since neither the right nor the left could win out—fortunately—deterrence arose as an option few liked but all responsible parties could endorse.20¶ With the collapse of the Soviet threat, this agreement lost its raison d’être. Interventionists left and right broke free of the restrictive bonds a deterrence and containment strategy had put in place. For hard-edged advocates for U.S. primacy, like Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney, a deterrence posture would prevent the United States from exercising regional hegemony in the Middle East or East Asia. For neoconservative and liberal interventionists like Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blair, or Michael Ignatieff, anxious to spread democracy, halt genocide and other humanitarian crises, and “end tyranny in our world,”21 deterrence was too hesitant about such interventions. And for pacifist leftists—and even a few old hawks—deterrence was a system of terror itself, one that could be discarded at the end of history. They, therefore, called for abolishing nuclear weapons, the end of using threats for security, and internationalizing security responsibility. Deterrence was left with few friends.¶ Its erstwhile friends should now consider returning. Contrary to the arguments of the pacifist-inclined left, a strategy of disarmament and conciliation is morally irresponsible in the face of Al Qaeda and its like. Despite what the neo-conservatives and the liberal interventionists had hoped, the high moral rhetoric of liberating Iraq has yielded to a grimmer sense of the moral duties of considering consequences, necessity, and proportion. We have relearned the truth of the critiques of revolutionary France and of Woodrow Wilson—that even the honest pursuit of high-minded liberal aspirations can yield death and chaos. History has its own ways and means and we should moderate our hope for its coming with a reverential fear of its wrath.¶ In between these two extremes, deterrence is a security policy that offers a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral. It is more moral because a deterrent posture would entail a strategy that is more proportionate, more necessary, more responsive, and, ultimately, more just. Indeed, deterrence comports with the fundamental human intuition that it is generally only moral to fight when attacked. In this it complies with the classical conception of just war, which mandates that wars only be conducted when one's cause is just, waged by a legitimate authority, motivated by a right intent, fought with a real prospect of success, conducted proportionately, and undertaken only as a last resort. Deterrence satisfies these criteria. It is a defensive strategy that responds to invasions or attacks, and is therefore just; it sets out relatively clear guidelines for when it mandates that the government fight, and, therefore, is governed by legitimate authority. It is driven by a desire to protect, deter, and avenge, and is therefore motivated by right intent; its realistic red lines and threats are backed up by the awesome power of the United States, and therefore likely to succeed; and it responds when attacked and asks from the rest of the international community only respect for its marked out positions rather than revolutionary transformation, and is therefore proportional.22 Finally, by its nature it is undertaken as a last resort rather than preventively.23 It was the fundamental moral attractiveness of this position that continually frustrated both Soviet efforts to decouple Europe from the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War and occasional American efforts to roll back the Soviet empire.¶ But theorizing about war and peace cannot remain at the level of abstraction. It must bear moral responsibility for actual consequence and the power of contingency, as Max Weber pointed out.24 And deterrence, defense by calculation, uniquely satisfies the moral requirement that leaders, whatever their benevolent intentions, are basically responsible for the consequences that contingency produces from their actions. This it does by grounding a nation's security on its own credible threats—not on either changing the world through force, as neo-conservatives advocate, nor by hoping that a more peaceful world will emerge, as the left proposes. Both of these extremes ground security on radical changes in the way the world operates, and, therefore, necessarily enmesh us in the rest of the world's affairs, thereby exponentially expanding our vulnerability to all the permutations that chance and contingency may produce. Deterrence, rather, narrows our profile, and thereby reduces our exposure to risk.¶ A deterrent posture follows John Quincy Adams’ adage that America should not go seeking monsters to destroy and the ancient dictum that a moral act is a proportional one.25 Perhaps the greatest sin of the recent strategy is its disproportion, its confusion of the necessary with the desirable. It may be desirable to “end tyranny” and distribute the blessings of liberty worldwide, but its desirability must be carefully balanced against the costs of its enactment. If Iraq teaches us anything, it must be that a moral policy is not only one guided by the best of intentions, but one that is realistic.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “China—1AR

Err aff---the China threat is real

Jacob Stokes, senior policy analyst in the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 8-14-2020, "The Chinese Military Threat Is Real," Democracy Journal,

Taking seriously the prospect of Chinese aggression does not require viewing Beijing as an avaricious power that is seeking global domination—the CCP is not the Nazis or the Soviets. China’s narrower goals, however, are still dangerous. Beijing defines its sovereign territory expansively to include Taiwan, disputed islands and rocks in the East and South China seas along with the waters themselves, and land on the border with India. Therefore, even “defensive” goals seek to redraw the map, using force if necessary, with major implications for the United States and its alliance commitments, especially with Japan and the Philippines. Xi told former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis that China would not compromise on “even one inch” of territory it claims.

Beijing’s implicit long-term goals are also fueling tensions. No one outside of Xi Jinping and his inner circle can know Beijing’s intentions with absolute certainty. Plus, ambitions can expand over time. But a straightforward reading of China’s aspirations based on scouring statements from leaders and official documents includes revising the political and security order in Asia to reduce the role of Washington and its regional alliances, thereby removing the major constraint on Chinese power. In essence, China seeks a tacit dominance in a hierarchical Asia with Beijing at the top. When Xi talks about building an “Asia for Asians” and a “community with a shared future for mankind” that is what he means.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “China”—2AC

Securitizing China war is good---instills caution and risk-aversion in politics

Wang 20, Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. (Yuan-kang, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations", H-Diplo | ISSF, )

Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? Chan warns that the discourse on Thucydides’s Trap and power transition can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If leaders believe in Thucydides’s Trap and act accordingly, it may create the anticipated conditions that make war more likely. Talking and thinking in terms of Thucydides’s Trap will influence the state’s construction of its identity as well as its definition of interests and preferences. The discourse is harmful because it encourages ‘othering’ the opponent and contributes to confrontation. Should we, then, throw out the proposition that war is more likely when the system is undergoing a power transition? It might be worthwhile to go back to what Thucydides’s Trap refers to: “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary, unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict.”[112] Instead of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, this statement should induce caution from leaders in Beijing and Washington. Understanding the danger of war is the first step to avoid being trapped in it. Like Chan, Allison seeks to offer “a set of principles and strategic options for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap and avoid World War III.”[113] Obviously, historical analogies cannot completely capture an ongoing event. Allison himself cautions against “facile analogizing” and emphasizes that “the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”[114] The purpose of analogizing Thucydides’s Trap is not to shoehorn China and the United States into the roles of Athens and Sparta respectively, as Chan suggests (17-18), but to underscore the enduring feature of international politics throughout the ages. The dynamics of conflict highlighted by Thucydides remain as relevant today as it was two thousand years ago. Many scholars accuse structural theory of determinism, as Chan does, (14, 34), even though structuralists do not adopt it. States can go to war for a variety of reasons. Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. The proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement. The structural tensions cause by power shifts can substantially increase the probabilities of war, much like dry leaves waiting for a spark, but it does not mean that war will inevitably break out. Properly understood, Thucydides’s Trap cautions us to be prepared for the danger of war during a power transition. Overall, Chan’s book provides a stronger critique of power transition theory than of Thucydides’s Trap. Students of power shifts should take his argument seriously and avoid the pitfalls he identifies. We should not, however, hastily dismiss the warnings of Thucydides’s Trap.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “AI”—2AC

AI is a real threat, but empirics prove that norms solve---legal apparatuses are key

Maas 19, Matthijs---Faculty of Law, Centre for International Law, Conflict and Crisis, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark; Center for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK (“How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol 40, no 3, 2019)

More often, norms—implicitly the “nuclear taboo” against the (first) use of nuclear weapons (Carranza, 2018), and explicitly the norms encoded by international legal instruments, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—appear to have served as a factor in constraining nuclear proliferation, though such norm enforcement is not without challenge (Knopf, 2018). Nonetheless, these global legal instruments can function, in part because they can provide shared normative frameworks that disseminate and promote non-proliferation norms, -interests and -identities at the domestic-political level, tipping the balance of domestic contestation towards coalitions seeking non-proliferation. While one might expect such effects of “norms capture” to be stronger in liberal societies than in non-liberal ones, some scholars have suggested that even in the latter case, state elites who are not accountable to their own publics simply come to internalize the normative characterization of a successful state as one that abides by its treaty commitments (Rublee, Bertsch, & Wiarda, 2009, p. 222), or at the very least, have incentives for compliance with international non-proliferation norms, to foster a reputation for reliability in the eyes of other states (Williamson, 2003, p. 81). Moreover, global international regimes—defined by Krasner (1982) as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (p. 2)—can serve as Schelling Points around which global society can coordinate multilateral collective sanctions or rewards (Müller & Schmidt, 2010).

To what extent have non-proliferation norms driven nuclear restraint? Of course, it can be hard to disentangle causal connections between membership in normative (legal) instruments such as the NPT and nuclear restraint, since such behavior could reflect existing policy preferences by the states. Some reviews of the nuclear (non-)proliferation records have suggested that “NPT membership and the NPT regime's norms have modest or marginal impacts on nuclear proliferation” (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 185), though others found that, when accounting for states’ ex ante treaty commitment preferences, state ratification of the NPT treaty regime was “robustly associated with a lower likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons” (Fuhrmann & Lupu, 2016, p. 530).

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: Realism Good/True—1AR

Realism is not interventionism

John J. Mearsheimer, 2018, Prof of Poli Sci @ UChi, The Great Delusion LIBERAL DREAMS AND INTERNATIONAL REALITIES, Yale University Press, e book page 220-221

Most students of international politics associate realism with rivalry and conflict. This, of course, is one reason realism is so unpopular in liberal societies.2 It is also disliked because realists consider war a legitimate tool of statecraft that can be employed to either maintain the balance of power or shift it in an advantageous way. Advocates of realpolitik downplay the prospects for cooperation among states, moreover, because they think countries have to provide for their own security, given that they operate in a world with no higher authority to protect them. To maximize their survival prospects, those states have little choice but to compete for power, which can be a ruthless and bloody business. Realism does not inspire a hopeful outlook for the future.

Nevertheless, realists are generally less warlike than liberals, who have a strong inclination to use force to promote international peace, even while they dismiss the argument that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. This point is illustrated by Valerie Morkevičius’s observation, in her comparison of the two bodies of theory, that most realists opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, while America’s three most prominent just war theorists (Jean Elshtain, James Turner Johnson, and Michael Walzer) “viewed the war more positively.” She concludes that “conventional wisdom holds that realists support the recourse to war more than just war theorists. I argue that the opposite is true: just war theory produces a more bellicose orientation than realism.”3

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: Realism Good/True—2AC

Realism is the most ethical paradigm—it accepts the inherent insecurity of the nuclear age as a precondition for genuine hospitality. Rejecting the nation-state lapses into liberal interventionism and global nuclear civil war.

Lundborg, 19—Swedish Defence University (Tom, “The ethics of neorealism: Waltz and the time of international life,” European Journal of International Relations, Volume: 25 issue: 1, page(s): 229-249, dml)

Conditioned by the trace, survival is thus inseparable from finitude and the constant threat of erasure (Derrida, 1976: 167). According to Derrida (1984b: 65, emphasis added): ‘it belongs to the trace to erase itself, to elude that which might maintain it in presence’. In this way, the trace also points to the elusiveness of life, and to the fact that nothing can ever guarantee the infinite existence of anything. It tells us that life is nothing but a ‘play of traces’, which lacks an absolute origin and is inherently mortal (Derrida, 1984a: 15). This play of traces brings us back to Hägglund’s notion of the ‘time of life’, which highlights the central importance of temporal finitude for grasping the general conditions of life. As he puts it: ‘This radical finitude of survival is not a lack of being that is desirable to overcome. Rather, the finitude of survival opens the chance for everything that is desired and the threat of everything that is feared’ (Hägglund, 2008: 1–2). There is, then, an important ‘double bind’ to the tracing of time. On the one hand, it is because nothing is infinite, immortal or present in itself that new life can emerge. On the other hand, the lack of self-presence means that life can never be immune to alteration, contamination and death. In order for anything to live, it must consequently be mortal and open to unpredictable change (Derrida, 1976: 143). Even if an infinite and immortal life, free from dangers, might seem desirable, it would be a self-refuting desire since it implies desiring the end of the possibility to desire anything at all. More precisely, it would be the same as desiring the end of the continuous flow of time that allows new life to emerge while exposing everything that lives to the threat of coming to an end. Immortality cancels out the time of mortal life and renders survival obsolete. Counterintuitively, Hägglund (2008: 32–33) thus notes, mortality can be seen as the ‘best’ or most desirable, while immortality is the ‘worst’ or least desirable. While this may seem like a rejection of life, it is, in fact, an affirmation of life. It positively affirms the chance to live precisely on the condition that inherent in any movement of survival is the risk of life coming to an end. Refusing this risk would be the same as refusing to live, since to live is to negotiate the relationship between life and death. Temporal finitude is significant, moreover, not only for grasping the general conditions of life, but for explaining why any act of survival must encounter the uncertainty of the future. Returning to Waltz for a moment, it is precisely this uncertainty that makes it impossible to know if today’s friend will stay a friend or suddenly turn into an enemy: ‘In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy’, writes Waltz (2000: 10). If we were able to acquire full knowledge of if and when a friend becomes an enemy, we would bring the future under our control. However, then the future would no longer be a genuinely open future, in which the chance of survival is inseparable from finitude and mortality. Survival would then lose its value and become redundant as life turns into nothing but a calculable formula. So, what are the implications of Derrida’s notion of survival and his critique of the ‘calculable’ for our understanding of ‘ethics’? First of all, it means that ethics cannot be translated into static ethical ideals. As Derrida has elaborated on in relation to a wide array of issues, including justice, responsibility, hospitality, friendship and the gift, ethics rather depends on maintaining openness to the perpetual coming of the future. This openness means that none of these issues can ever be linked to something pure, uncontaminated and incorruptible that is immune to unexpected alterations. To take one specific example, hospitality is, for Derrida, crucial for thinking about ethics (see Derrida, 2000). This is because an act of hospitality suggests that the self does not simply exist in pure isolation of what lies ‘outside’ the self, but must always negotiate its relation with the non-self, that is, the other. Ethics is, for this reason, inseparable from hospitality since both terms highlight the necessity of relating to and opening up space for others. At the same time, hospitality cannot be ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ in the sense of conforming to a static metaphysical ideal. For Derrida, not only would such an ideal be impossible to achieve in the Kantian sense11, it would be essentially undesirable. This is because the very aspiration towards a pure metaphysical ideal would have as its aim the closure of the uncertainty that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. The welcoming of strangers must therefore always involve a chance as well as a threat: the chance of some sort of positive and friendly transformation, and the threat that the other turns into an enemy doing harm to the host (Derrida, 2000: 15; Hägglund, 2008: 103–105). The only way to eliminate the potential threat inherent in any act of hospitality would be to make the self completely immune to the other. Such immunity, however, would close down the self–other encounter before it could happen at all. Derrida (2003: 129) thus rhetorically asks: The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ignore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? Derrida’s point here is that hospitality categorically cannot correspond to something pure, like a universal ideal situation beyond violence. This is because without the threat of violence, the very act of welcoming the other would not be possible in the first place. In order for this act to be ‘possible’, it must simultaneously be ‘impossible’, in the pure metaphysical sense (see also Bulley, 2017: 12; Vaughan-Williams, 2007: 121). While ethics is often linked to a seemingly self-evident desire to reach an absolute metaphysical ideal, Derrida’s philosophy contests the desirability of such ideals altogether and offers a stark warning against any attempt to immunize the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’, ‘peace’ from ‘violence’, ‘friends’ from ‘enemies’, and so on. This is why, in Derrida’s view, there has to be a violent or non-ethical opening of ethics (Derrida, 1976: 140; 1978: 128). To desire the closure of this opening would be the same as desiring the elimination of that which makes any ethics possible at all: its exposure to the uncertainty of the future, and the indestructible threat that inheres in all encounters with others. Rather than linking ethics to a desire for the purely good, ethics in the Derridean sense is therefore tied to an affirmation of the uncertainty of the future, which opens up to the ‘good’ as well as the ‘bad’. The ethics of neorealism Derrida’s notion of the violent opening of ethics fits remarkably well with the two core assumptions of Waltz’s theory of international politics: the anarchic structure of the international political system and states’ desire to survive within this system. On this basis, it can be argued that there is, indeed, an ethics of neorealism. It is found in the ‘Waltzian baseline’ rather than in attempts to use that baseline to establish law-like patterns of behaviour.12 To grasp the ethics of neorealism, it is therefore necessary to shift focus from causal laws and testable hypotheses, to the structural conditions that shape and affect the behaviour of states in a non-deterministic manner.13 Hence, the ‘structure’ in Waltz’s theory has to be grasped as an open structure that leaves ample room for chance and contingency. Crucially, if we could know for certain what states will do on the basis of either the structure of the system or some predetermined motives of the subjects within the system, the uncertainty of international life would disappear and the ‘politics’ of international politics would lose its meaning.14 Rather than trying to rectify the lack of certainty by creating a stronger sense of certainty, it is therefore imperative to affirm the uncertainties created by the system. It is important, moreover, to oppose the distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility, since the reproduction of this distinction blocks from view the conditions of international life that make ethical thinking and action possible in the first place. Positivist social science and liberal interpretations of Kant are thus, very crudely put, the main obstacles to grasping the ethics of international life. In resisting both moves, neorealism does not seek to close down the violent opening of ethics inherent in the structure of anarchy, for example, by formulating metaphysical ideals informing states how they should act or how they ought to become friends rather than enemies. There can be no absolute friendship between states, and no state can ever offer absolute hospitality to another state. At the heart of every inter-state relation, there is mistrust, uncertainty and incalculability. To positively affirm the latter is not to say that uncertainty or incalculability is good per se. Rather, it implies that they are seen as basic and irrefutable conditions of international life, which, consequently, are not even desirable to overcome. Hence, it also implies that as long as there is international life, there must be ‘the ominous shadow of the future [that] continues to cast its pall over interacting states’ (Waltz, 2000: 39). Crucially, Waltz’s reference to this shadow should not be read as an expression of determinism. It expresses rather an affirmation of uncertainty: the ‘uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions’ (Waltz, 1979: 105). In order to give friendship in international politics a chance, so to speak, the possibility that a friend suddenly becomes an enemy must never be eliminated. Attempts to create absolute trust in inter-state relations are therefore not only impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but essentially undesirable.15 Along similar lines, Derrida explains how friendship is possible only if one remains open to the deception of the other, since it is precisely the unconditional openness to whatever may happen in the encounter between self and other that makes it possible to develop any sort of friendship in the first place (Derrida, 2005: 219). Even if we were to accept Alexander Wendt’s (1999) distinction between different ‘cultures of anarchy’, some of which are more ‘friendly’ than others, it is not self-evident that a culture in which friendship is prioritized over enmity is actually a better one. This is because in order to exclude the possibility that a friend may suddenly become an enemy, one must first eliminate the time of international life that makes the self–other encounter possible in the first place. For the same reason, the key message of democratic peace theory — that all states should become democracies in order to minimize or eliminate the possibility of wars — is not only practically impossible, but also ethically undesirable. It is impossible to verify because there is no democracy that is immune to corruptibility (Waltz, 2000: 10), but, in addition to that, it can be seen as undesirable since the notion that all states must conform to the same universal ideal cancels out their freedom to act, to take moral responsibility and so on. The undesirability of a system that eradicates violence, borders and discrimination is further underlined by Waltz (1979: 111–114) in his discussion of the ‘virtues of anarchy’. Therein, he attacks the idea of transforming the international system into a world government. Not only would such a transformation ‘be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’ (Waltz, 1979: 112), but it would take away the constitutive violence at the heart of inter-state relations in the structure of anarchy. The constant possibility of war in the international system means that states will always be wary of provoking others in the search for security. As he puts it: The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to war has strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the risks entailed.… The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to long and costly wars has … sobering effects. (Waltz, 1979: 113–114) In this way, the conditions of peace in the international system can be said to rest on the constant possibility of war. In making this point, Waltz argues against moral universalism. Hence, unwittingly or otherwise, he also opens up space for ethical negotiation by recognizing the finitude of the political subject, who is free to interact with others only on the condition that self and other do not have to conform to the ‘same’ universal ideal. The subject is thus able to take moral responsibility and ponder on how to make ethical decisions, which, without difference and alterity, would turn into a strictly formal procedure based on the ‘mechanical application of rules’ (Zehfuss, 2009: 146). Responsibility and ethical decisions are, thus, made possible precisely by the impossibility of predetermining what is the ‘right’ decision in any given context. As Derrida argues, irrespective of how thorough the decision-making procedure is, and regardless of how much knowledge is acquired before taking a decision: the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything. Even if one knows everything, the decision, if there is one, must advance toward a future that is not known, that cannot be anticipated. (Derrida, 2002b: 231) The impossibility of anchoring the decision in rational calculation is, in this sense, what creates the chance for any decisions to be taken at all. The instant of the decision belongs, then, not to a fully present moment in which the subject calculates the future consequences of the decision, but to a future that is incalculable (see Derrida, 2002a). It is precisely this incalculability, and the uncertainty of the future, that Waltz’s conception of anarchy positively affirms. Rather than making the instant of the decision obsolete by transforming the decision into a mere application of rules, anarchy makes the ethical decision ‘possible’. Even if Waltz repeatedly claims that the desire to survive is a purely pragmatic assumption made strictly for the purpose of constructing an explanatory theory, it is not neutral or innocent. First and foremost, Waltzian neorealism expresses an ethics due to the way it affirms states’ desire to survive by stipulating the necessary conditions of their survival. More precisely, it affirms the uncertainty of international life by refusing to reduce the play of relations between states to a calculable formula or a regulative ideal, and that rather embraces chance and contingency as central features of the anarchic system — features that make states simultaneously free and insecure.16 In this light, the primary significance of Waltz’s theory is not as an explanatory theory, but as a theory that affirms the time of international life, defined by the uncertainty of the future and the logic of the erasable mortal trace.17 It is this notion of the future that makes it possible for states, as finite political subjects, not only to survive, but also to try to take moral responsibility and make ethical decisions. Why universal ethical ideals are both impossible and undesirable What are the implications of my reading of Waltzian neorealism as an ethics? First of all, it contributes to a new understanding of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to theorize what it might mean to replace the structure of anarchy with an international or world political order that is supposedly ‘more’ ethical. If ethics is inextricably interlinked with the structural conditions of survival, then any attempt to challenge neorealism from an ‘ethical’ perspective must do so by replacing one structure of survival with another, and there can be no guarantees that the new structure will be less violent. While this does not in any way prevent such attempts from being made, it does highlight the risky nature of trying to resolve problems of war and violence in international politics on ethical terms. For example, the idea of creating a new form of political community that transcends the exclusionary borders of states may seem naturally desirable (e.g. Linklater, 1982). Yet, regardless of how sophisticated theories become in terms of articulating the content and meaning of such a community, there can be no guarantees that attempts to actualize it will not result in even more violence. There are no guarantees, as John Mearsheimer (1994: 44) puts it, that ‘a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse’. Moreover, it is important to point out that the value of a neorealist ethics is not that it provides a ‘coherent ethical theory’. One interesting attempt to create such a theory is found in Frost’s (2009) Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations. For Frost, the point of developing a coherent ethical theory is to demonstrate how international relations can be grasped primarily in ethical terms, rather than as a struggle for power and survival. His assumption is that ‘to engage in international relations at all … is to make ethical claims for oneself and to recognize the ethical standing of others’ (Frost, 2009: 19). Frost links his theory partly to the diverse practices that shape international interactions, and partly to an ‘ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute the practice’ (Frost, 2009: 27). While the background theory is based on an English School-inspired notion of the anarchic system/society of states, the practices added to it have the potential to shape international relations in a direction that is ethically desirable. Arguing for and against the ethical standing of our interlocutors, ‘we construct and reconstruct the social practices within which international relations are conducted’ (Frost, 2009: 94). The main goal of these practices, according to Frost, should be nothing less than resolving the tensions within the current international system between citizen rights and global human rights (Frost, 2009: ch. 3). In contrast to cosmopolitan theories, however, he argues that this goal is attainable within the anarchic structure of the system, through the ethical adjustment of that system (Frost, 2009: 113). This adjustment involves renegotiating the relationship between citizen rights and human rights through practice. Frost (2009: 173) writes: ‘Participants in global civil society and the society of states need to take their own values seriously and need to attempt to make them real for everybody everywhere’. According to Frost, the segregating borders of states are thus meant to persist, while the violent forms of exclusion that these borders enable are to gradually fall away through the aspiration of a common goal that embraces everybody everywhere. From the perspective of my reading of a neorealist ethics, however, the notion of a common universal goal underpinning Frost’s ethical theory is not only impossible, but also undesirable. This is not because the ideal itself is ‘bad’. Rather, it is because it is precisely the absence of a common goal beyond segregating borders that makes ethical negotiation possible in the first place. As soon as such an ideal has been formulated, and the guidelines for how to attain it have been articulated, the incalculable future in which the encounter between self and other is allowed to play out is cancelled out. As previously noted, while this encounter might result in more or less violence, it is the uncertainty of the future that makes the encounter possible in the first place. Frost’s attempt to formulate a universal ethical ideal that embraces everyone everywhere while, at the same time, retaining the segregating borders of the international system is thus problematic. The primary reason for this, then, is that in articulating a universal ethical ideal, his theory works to undermine the conditions of international life. In brief, what Frost fails to recognize is that what makes international ethics possible is also what makes impossible the aspiration of a universal ethical ideal that is applicable to everybody everywhere — like that of a perfect alignment of citizen rights and human rights. Rather than seeking to resolve these tensions, the tensions should be kept alive. Only in this way can we, moreover, maintain a distinctly international ethics without reverting to a ‘global ethics’. For the latter to make any sense, it has to be based on ideals that transcend the borders of states, whether those ideals are linked to a specific goal or just to a general attitude of openness to political negotiation and contestation (Hutchings, 2010: 215). Irrespective of what precisely they are supposed to entail, the ideals associated with a global ethics become problematic as soon as the attempt is made to transform difference and the plurality of wills into one and the same will. It is problematic for the same reason that philosophical attempts to create a new metaphysics that is supposed to resolve the violence of metaphysics. Such attempts can only have as their aim the ultimate destruction of the very possibility of philosophical thought and writing, which, per definition, are metaphysical and therefore violent (see Derrida, 1978). The temporal horizon of neorealism To argue against the desirability of universal ethical ideals is, essentially, to recognize the importance of finitude for thinking about international ethics. Waltz’s neorealist conception of international anarchy and of the desire of states to survive therein offers one way of affirming this notion of international ethics. This is not to say, however, that international anarchy in Waltz’s theory should be seen as a perfect ideal that all politics and ethics must aspire to maintain. In order for my deconstructive approach to the ethics of neorealism to make any sense, the international must also be seen as something finite and deconstructible, rather than as an end in itself. To think of the finitude of the international, we do not have to look for something that ‘transcends’ or comes ‘after’ the international, like a world government or cosmopolitan community.18 We only have to focus on the principles that, according to Waltz, are meant to keep the international order alive: the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive. While these are mutually dependent, they also point to a situation in which the struggle to stay alive might threaten the system in which this struggle takes place. To illustrate this point, consider the issue of nuclear deterrence, which Waltz controversially saw as a possible method of creating a more peaceful international order (see Waltz, 1990b). For Waltz, only if nuclear catastrophe remains a real possibility will states need to actively deter the nuclear threat.19 Thus, nuclear deterrence ‘works’ only if nuclear war remains a constant possibility, hence only insofar as the problem of nuclear war is not permanently resolved (Waltz, 1990b: 743–744). What creates the possibility of nuclear war constitutes, in this sense, the conditions of international security and peace. What makes the prospect of nuclear war different from other wars is, of course, the planetary scale on which its effects are likely to be felt. As such, it poses a threat not only to individual states, but also to the entire system of states. On this point, there is another parallel to be drawn between Waltz and Derrida, for whom apocalyptic discourses on nuclear war are interesting because they highlight ‘the absolute effacement of any possible trace’ (Derrida, 1984c: 28). Hence, these discourses raise the stakes of survival even further by pointing to the finitude of everything that lives, as well as to all those attempts at keeping the apocalypse at bay, deferring it through deterrence and so on (Derrida, 1984d: 29). Understood as a global threat to the entire international order, nuclear war highlights the temporal horizon of the whole neorealist project as conceived by Waltz. This is the horizon of the horizon, or the structure of the structure, which gives meaning to the ‘international’ as a finite as opposed to infinite category shaping the behaviour of states. Rather than simply reaffirming a static world-view, which perpetually reproduces itself in a circular fashion, Waltz puts forward a notion of the international that is both finite and mortal. The international continues to live on in this sense, but only on the condition that it is exposed to the threat of coming to an end. Other examples of how the international system may come to an end relate to the increased impact of global capital and global warming. While these are often depicted as typical examples of transnational phenomena, they nevertheless emanate from a system in which states are free to make sovereign decisions, for example, on how to deregulate the emissions of pollutants and financial markets. Individual states are thus free to actively contribute to setting in motion processes that might put an end to the system that conditions their survival. In this way, there is a self-destructive potential built into the system, which threatens to make it collapse from within and on its own terms (see also Frost, 2009: 163–168). Crucially, the self-destructive potential of international politics does not contradict Waltz’s theory. After all, he argues that the system shapes, not determines, state behaviour. He recognizes that as long as states interact within an anarchic structure, they are simultaneously free and insecure. This freedom and insecurity mean that survival in international politics can never become a predictable science that is able to ‘remove the uncertainty of politics’ (Waltz, 1990a: 37). Sometimes, the struggle to survive does more harm than good to the ones seeking to survive. Sometimes, this struggle may even set in motion processes the effects of which will be felt on a planetary scale, provoking an irreversible decay of the entire system of sovereign states. Conclusion The ethics of neorealism, as argued in this article, stems from the mutual interaction of the two core themes of Waltz’s theory: the structure of anarchy and states’ desire to survive. Together, they affirm Derrida’s notion of the violent opening of ethics: the opening to a future that makes new life possible while exposing everything that lives to finitude and the threat of erasure. Ethics and violence are, thus, inextricably interlinked, which means that any attempt to immunize the former from the latter is untenable. Before any moral obligations, and before any normative commitments, the ethics of neorealism addresses the more fundamental problem of what it means for states to live and be free in a system that guarantees nothing. In this way, Waltzian neorealism articulates the basic conditions of international life, which all attempts to theorize international ethics, either by remaining ‘within’ the international system or by arguing in favour of its transcendence, must come to terms with. One of the main challenges that springs from my reading of the ethics of neorealism relates to how universal ethical ideals not only become impossible to achieve in the practical sense, but are also fundamentally undesirable. They are undesirable because the desire to fulfil them undermines the conditions that make international life possible in the first place. On this basis, a whole range of attempts to theorize the meaning and implications of international ethics, which in various ways hold on to the notion of ethical ideals beyond the violence of inter-state relations within an anarchic structure, become untenable. This even includes classical realism and the thought of Morgenthau, whose sharp distinction between ethical desirability and political possibility dissolves in light of the neorealist ethics presented in this article. According to this notion of ethics, then, the desirable cannot be placed beyond political possibility since it essentially is political possibility: the possibility of whatever happens in the interaction among states in the structure of anarchy. As was pointed out in the penultimate section of this article, there is also a temporal horizon of neorealism. This horizon is best illustrated by the threat of nuclear war and highlights the possible end of the entire international political system. The threat of nuclear war demonstrates why this system, just like the state, ought to be seen as a finite as opposed to infinite category. Stressing the finitude of the system means that there is no metaphysical truth, moral or otherwise, to which it either can or should conform. It also means that there is always space, and time, for an ongoing ethical-political negotiation. While the latter might very well include efforts to produce a ‘lesser violence’, its main force is that of a perpetual coming of the future. As long as this future is allowed to play out, there is, I believe, reason to be optimistic: optimistic not about the possible fulfilment of universal ethical ideals, but about the future itself, and whatever it holds for international life.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: No Prior Questions—1AR

No prior questions

Jackson, professor of IR – American University, ‘15 (Patrick Thaddeus, “Must International Studies Be a Science?” Millennium - Journal of International Studies vol. 43, no. 3, p. 942-965, June)

These diverse methodologies have different approaches to causation, to case comparison, and to explanation in general; those differences, in turn, mean that different scientific methodologies generate different kinds of valid claims with different epistemic statuses, and should not be regarded as poor approximations to or deficient forms of one another. While neopositivists look for cross-case covariation as the truest mark of causation, critical realists look for dispositional causal powers, analyticists apply ideal-typical models to disclose the specific features of individual cases, and reflexive scholars ground their claims in their own social locations. There is no reason why this plurality has to lead to relativism, but neither should it be misunderstood as creating a simple, homogenous account of the world; translation challenges persist, and the result of a pluralist science is a variety of warranted knowledge-claims.22

But for all of this internal diversity, there are important commonalities among these varieties of scientific methodology that serve to distinguish them, as a group, from other forms of knowing. Following Max Weber, we might characterise all four of these scientific methodologies as aiming at a ‘thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality’,23 or, to put it another way, as participating in a form of knowing that emphasises systematic claims, public criticism intended to improve those claims, and a specific kind of ‘worldliness’ that excludes references to divine commands and magical forces. This is not to say that a claim has to achieve some specific level of systematicity, publicity, and/or worldliness in order to be regarded as ‘scientific’; the commonality I am highlighting here is not a candidate for a demarcation criterion that would allow us to distinguish science from non-science in any kind of definitive fashion.24 Instead, I am suggesting that in the space marked out by these methodologies, questions about a claim’s systematicity, its susceptibility to public criticism, and its worldliness are in some sense appropriate questions to ask. In effect, to regard ourselves as being engaged in scientific inquiry is to invite these questions, and to submit our claims to evaluation in terms of these criteria.

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: 2AC Frontline

Shim ‘14

(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: 2AC Frontline

No prior questions---err aff on empirics and concrete action---the neg’s endless questioning causes paradigm wars and means we never take action

Isacoff 15 (Jonathan, Associate Professor of Political Science and the Chair of Environmental Studies @ Gonzaga, “Why IR Needs Deweyan Pragmatism,” Perspectives on Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2015, pg. 26-33)

The well-known RCT scholars Shepsle and Bonchek humorously note that while it might not be “rocket science,” the study of politics should be scientific.46 Others, especially postmodernist critics, argue against the notion of political science and IR as science. A Deweyan pragmatist approach would suggest that this debate is not useful. By that, I mean that what IR is or is not is not nearly as important as what it achieves. So the question should not be whether IR is scientific, but rather, how scientific does it need to be to get the job done? To this, there are many answers, but I suggest a line of reasoning: the scientific method in the most general sense is useful in helping to explain how and why, all else equal, causal processes work. Put differently, if we want to know how and why some states go to war and others do not, it would be more useful—in the sense of getting logically coherent, empirically verifiable answers—to analyze historical cases systematically than it would be to consult with a shaman or use a crystal ball to obtain an answer. This is not say that there is not an important role for textual interpretation in the process of studying war and other international phenomena. Indeed, I elsewhere argue that interpretation of historical texts is crucial to making valid claims about wars.47 But the main point here is that interpretation is a means toward an end, namely, the process of coping with the world via human experience. Toward that end, interpretation is necessary and useful, but it is not the end itself. A second point is that there is clearly a pragmatic and justifiable need for certain types of quantitative methods, namely, statistics, though not necessarily formal models, in some segments of IR. Taking a simple example for illustrative purposes, if one wished to study the effect of speed limits on motor vehicle fatalities, the use of aggregate data statistically analyzed would be far superior to standing on the corner waiting for an accident to observe or reading several diary accounts of individual accidents. The key point here, however, is not that statistical methods are inherently better, or more “rigorous” than any other type of method. Rather, the use of statistically analyzed data to find answers to problems of highway fatalities creates knowledge that if properly applied, would alleviate “concrete human woes,” which is to say it would help to save lives. That is pragmatic political science.48 What Is a Problem? Many political scientists believe in the idea of having a “problem orientation” for the field. For example, Atul Kohli asserts that there is a strong consensus among leading experts “that comparative politics is very much a problem-driven field of study.” “What motivates the best comparative politics research are puzzles of real-world significance,” writes Kohli, in “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium.”49 Similarly, Ian Shapiro, responding to the question of what would be a better alternative than RCT asks the question: “What is the phenomenon to be explained?… The formulation of alternative explanations, in other words, should be a problem-driven activity.”50 This is clearly consistent with Deweyan pragmatism; in fact, it is inherently pragmatist. “A Deweyan pragmatic approach to political inquiry,” writes Maurice Meilleur, “would transform political science from a discipline, based on a set of methods, into a profession, based on a set of problems.”51 But what, more specifically, is a “problem orientation?” First, it is clear that Kohli and his colleagues mean an empirically driven problem orientation. That is, the study of politics should be driven by empirical, not theoretical or methodological problems. Careful not to push this point too far, a Deweyan pragmatist would suggest that theorization is an important activity, but it must not lose its link to problems of human experience, which is to say empirical problems. However, Kohli and others advocating an empirically driven problem orientation have little to say about how to identify and value problems. After all, there is a limitless supply of political problems only a fraction of which can be studied. In response, I would argue that some problems are more significant to the detection and response to human suffering and thus more deserving of study, than others. This is itself a tricky ethical problem, for who is to say what is or is not a “real problem?” One reader of this manuscript suggested that “What is really going on here, when one scratches the analytical surface, is not that IR theorists aren't discussing problems; it's that they are discussing problems that the author does not feel are worthy of attention. But why should we accept that the author's “problems” are more important or privileged? Why does the author get to decide what a “real” problem is?” This is a good question but it is a misreading of the argument. Nowhere does Dewey or this author imply that any individual could or should decide or dictate which problems matter and which do not. To the contrary, the question of “who decides” is a public deliberation problem, a subject Dewey addressed exhaustively in his classic The Public and Its Problems.52 According to Dewey, problems are the direct outcome of a public's determination of its common good. A full analysis of how this works, or in some cases, fails to work in practice is beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to note that there is no argument here for the privileging of one private individual's notion of what constitutions “real problem” versus that of another. That is for the public to decide. Human Woe and Issues That Matter The final point to be made about reconstruction stems directly from the previous discussion: some problems matter more than others with regard to the alleviation of concrete human suffering. Which issues matter the most in our world? Ultimately, per Dewey's political philosophy touched on above, that is for the public to decide. Assuming that there ever could be a “common good,” we can hypothesize that people might choose to focus on issues that affect them daily, issues such as climate change, poverty, health care, education, racism, and sexism, as well as war and peace, all issues that are of grave importance to humanity. IR, especially in its American form, with its disproportionate emphasis on global security and great power war, has given scant attention to too many other issues, and when attention is given to the “lesser” topics, they are relegated to sub-sub-specializations within the discipline, “Gender and IR,” for instance. More problematic from the standpoint of pragmatism, the approach-driven wing of the discipline is more concerned with which paradigm has scored more points in the epic contest for paradigmatic supremacy than with the matter of how the world could or should respond to climate change or why hundreds of million of children lack basic nutrition and medical care. The interpretivist/linguistic wing, in contrast, is more concerned with how texts are interpreted in graduate seminars than with the fact that children in inner cities cannot even read a text at all.53 Many IR scholars are still fighting over whether and to what extent “unit-level variables” should be taken into consideration in understanding international politics (and if so, whether one might still rightly be accepted in the club of realism).54 Others are trying to demonstrate that IR constructivism is really “liberalism in disguise.”55 This is not a stab at “why realism is (yet again) wrong.” It is a critique of the self-definitionally obsessed, paradigm-driven culture of academic IR. I would not go so far as to claim that there are no scholars who study everyday politics; many clearly do.56 Rather, the problem is that that the incentive structure to contribute to the “big debates” of the discipline, namely, those at the paradigmatic level, is a project that drifts ever afar from the problems of “concrete human woe” that affect the other millions of people who happen not to have graduate degrees in IR.

2022 MGC Kritik
Alternative › L: A2 “Reflexivity”

The aff isn’t reflexive---it does not change the fundamental nature of security

Steele 7 (Brent, Professor of Political Science – University of Kansas, “’Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts’: From Classical to Reflexive Realism”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, p. 284-285)

This skeptical view of the eschaton means that rather than being biased, like neorealism, toward the status quo,30 reflexive realism is instead perpetually skeptical of the authority exercised by state elites, and specifically the ‘big ideas’ that become a part of elite discourse which can lead to dangerous policies.31 Rather than reifying power, reflexive realism asks us to challenge the manner in which power is projected. Scan the words used in this reflexive presentation of realism. Far from being the dominant, mainstream, status quo monolith that we were trained to recognize in graduate school, it is instead ‘inevitably antagonistic toward political power y [a] rebellion against the seduction of prevailing structures of power, identity, and knowledge’ (Williams 2005a: 179, emphasis added).32 Budding IR scholars may tend to forget that what motivated especially the post (World War II) realists in their seemingly contrarian positions was their concern for the republics in which they wrote. Morgenthau was attempting to ‘perform’ a ‘service for his adopted country’ (Lebow 2003: 242). With reflexive realism, we look back at classical realist writings for evidence of such contemplation about contemporary problems. Morgenthau and Niebuhr not only buck the common portrayal of ‘hawkish’ realists, they provided some of the most insightful arguments against the Vietnam War. Writing in 1969, Morgenthau stated that his: concern is justified not only historically, in view of the shortcomings of our [American] foreign policies, but also pragmatically, with a view toward avoiding the mistakes of the past. It is now generally admitted that our Vietnam policy has failed, but, if we were to let it go at that, we would risk applying the same faulty assumptions and principles that have brought the Vietnam disaster upon us to other situations with similarly disastrous results (1969: viii). According to Jace Weaver (1995), Niebuhr was a proponent of American exceptionalism until this war. Despite the fact that Niebuhr recognized how certain religions and patriotism blinded nation-states from their own limitations, he still viewed the US’ mission as one of necessity during the Cold War. Yet this view would quickly change,33 so that by 1967, ‘The contradiction between our [American] ideal aims of a peace of conciliation and such an imposed peace, which only a defeated enemy would accept, can be understood only in the light of an ironic self-deception — ironic because we are the victims of our own ideology’ (Niebuhr 1968: 11, emphasis added). And by 1969, Niebuhr would assert that anti-communist ‘fanaticism y ha[d] caused [the United States] to stumble into the most pointless, costly and bloody war in [its] history’ (Niebuhr, quoted in Reinitz 1980: 120). Like the classical realists they resource, reflexive realists now provide a particularly salient, effective critique of contemporary foreign policy, but one that is unique when compared to that made by mainstream realists. The current debate over the Iraq War between neoconservatives and mainstream realists in the US has appeared in various forums, most notably in the neoconservative publication Commentary (Rosen 2005). Stephen Walt (2006: 4) stated in a future issue thAT Realists were in the vanguard of the opposition to war with Iraq in 2003y Today, with thousands of Americans and Iraqis killed and wounded, a price tag that will eventually exceed $1 trillion (!), and no end in sight, which group seems to have the clearest vision of our national interest? For all its limitations, realism remains a more valuable guide to U.S. foreign policy than the idealistic fantasies offered by its primary intellectual opponents. Walt’s is a cost/benefit analysis of policy, one echoed in the ISG report noted at the beginning of this article. However, it fails to comprehensively challenge the philosophy that has driven the Bush administration’s Iraq policy. A critique of the Iraq War set in the mold of Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s critique of Vietnam would begin by asserting how hubristic impulses for American hegemonic expansion actually hastened American demise. The inability to recognize the limits of power in international politics was a strategic miscalculation — demonstrating the cyclical pattern of human history rather than the linear trajectory assumed by eschatologies. The abnormal (and thus imprudent) behavior, according to reflexive realism, was to invade Iraq.

2022 MGC Kritik
Impacts › M: A2—Util

Even representations of catastrophic nuclear war neurologically re-wires debaters into anxiety politics---err neg because you’re psychologically predispose to favor the aff’s impacts

Lybarger 18 – Jeremy Lybarger, American Psychological Association, March 2018, ("The threat of nuclear war", American Psychological Association: Monitor on Psychology, Vol 49, No. 3, Available online at https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/03/nuclear-war, Accessed 9-4-2020)

On Jan. 13, Hawai’ians received a terrifying text: "Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawai'i. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill." The alert was triggered accidentally, but chaos reigned for nearly 38 minutes until a correction was issued. The state’s governor later reported that ­children sought refuge in manholes, stores closed and denied shelter to terrified customers and cars drove at high speed. Three days later, Japan’s public broadcaster, NHK, mistakenly sent a similar alert warning that North Korea had just fired a missile. A correction was issued in five minutes. The mishaps further intensified the anxiety of many Americans who were already alarmed by the elevated tensions between the United States and North Korea. Last November, North Korea tested a missile that experts believe can strike anywhere in the U.S. mainland. The rhetoric between the two nations has escalated as well. Last September, Pyongyang threatened to reduce the United States to "ashes and darkness," while President Donald Trump has promised to deliver "fire and fury" to Kim Jong-un’s regime. Such nuclear brinksmanship hasn’t been seen since the twilight of the Cold War. For the first time in at least a generation, Americans are confronting not only the possibility of a nuclear attack, but also a 24/7 news cycle transfixed by that possibility. Last August, a CBS poll found that 72 percent of Americans are uneasy about a possible conflict with North Korea. That same month, the Chicago ­Council on Global Affairs reported that 75 percent of Americans consider North Korea’s nuclear program a top threat. In perhaps the most dramatic example of simmering panic, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the Doomsday Clock, which symbolizes the likelihood of global catastrophe, to two minutes to midnight in January. The last time it was this close was in 1953. While no one knows what the future holds, people’s fears are very real—and the threat appears to be cropping up more often in psychologists' offices. Although there are no hard numbers to report, anecdotally psychologists say they are seeing more anxiety over a possible nuclear showdown. 'Clinically significant anxiety' People were particularly uneasy in Hawai’i, even before the false alarm. Last December, the state tested its nuclear warning siren system for the first time since the Cold War. The Hawai’ian Islands are about 4,600 miles from North Korea. A nuclear missile would make landfall in 20 minutes and kill an estimated 18,000 civilians. Molly Bahr, a licensed therapist in Honolulu, says that never in her 10-year career has she seen such an increase in the “frequency and intensity of fear and clinically significant anxiety,” even among clients who haven’t previously experienced such symptoms. Unlike during the nuclear scares of the 1950s, ’60s and ’80s, today’s anxiety ricochets nonstop between cable news, social media and online forums. In an age of breaking news alerts on smartphones, simply being an informed citizen means volunteering oneself for continuous stress. Graham Davey, PhD, an emeritus professor of psychology at the University of Sussex in England who specializes in anxiety disorders, notes that contemporary news consumers are experiencing ­trauma-like symptoms because of their exposure to broadcasts and breaking news. “One of the effects that we’ve researched is that exposure to negative news causally influences your own personal worries by making you catastrophize them more,” Davey says. (In a 1997 study, Davey and his colleagues found that people exposed to negative news reported feeling sadder and more anxious after, and they also tended to obsess over their own worries more.) Internalizing negative news is especially prevalent in the United States, where APA’s 2017 Stress in America survey found that 95 percent of Americans follow the news regularly. One in five Americans, or 20 percent, report that they check their social media constantly, a significant increase over 2016. More than half of those surveyed said that the news causes stress. Nobody knows the potential long-term psychiatric effects of nuclear anxiety. Clinical studies on the matter are scarce, and because America hasn’t grappled with a serious nuclear adversary in decades, the pathology of this anxiety has yet to be fully documented. Davey suggests that the anxiety is temporary and tied to negative news reports, but when the news is overwhelmingly negative, as many patients feel it is today, anxiety is a chronic response. Advising patients Laura Brown, PhD, a psychologist in Seattle, was 10 during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. She believed then that her hometown of Cleveland was a target, so she practiced a prayer ritual and wrote imploring letters to President John F. Kennedy. “I still remember how frightened I was and how frightened the adults were,” Brown says today. “I was fearful that the world could end at any moment.” More than a half-century later, Brown once again lives in a city that she believes could be in the crosshairs of a rogue regime. Seattle, one of the most populated metro areas on the West Coast, has strategic value as a nuclear target. It’s near the Whidbey Island and Kitsap naval bases and the Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base). In addition, Boeing Aviation operates several facilities in the area. “I’ve never experienced so much discussion from people who are feeling anxious and fearful,” Brown says. She advises clients to reduce their time online and read news when they’re less likely to feel vulnerable: midafternoon, for example, instead of just before bedtime. These strategies are the starting point for recommendations of psychologists now counseling an unprecedented influx of patients worried that America is careening toward disaster.

2022 MGC Kritik
Impacts › M: Root Cause—War

Security politics are the root cause of warfare---it creates the necessary conditions for unending conflict through propaganda to naturalize militarism

Boggs 11 – Carl, Ph.D. Political Science, University of California, Berkeley (“The Global IndusTrIal Complex”, Published by Lexington Books, 2011, ISBN 978-0-7391-3697-3) RMT

As the American people are asked to endure burdensome costs and sacrifices of war and preparation for war, mechanisms of legitimation take on new meaning. Empire, a bloated war economy, recurrent armed interventions, hardships on the home front—all these must be made to appear “natural,” routine, even welcome if not noble. The historical myth of national exceptionalism, combined with hubris associated with economic, technological, and military supremacy, contributes to this ideological function. To translate such an ideological syndrome into popular language and daily life, to fully incorporate it into the political culture, is the task not so much of a classical state-run propaganda system as a developed hegemonic ideology reliant more on education and the media. In the United States, media culture has evolved into an outgrowth of megacorporate power that sustains the most far-reaching ideological and cultural network in history. Hollywood films alone have for many decades served as a crucial vehicle for legitimation of Empire. The repetitive fantasies, illusions, myths, images, and storylines of Hollywood movies (not to mention TV and other outlets) can be expected to influence mass audiences in rather predictable ways, much along lines of advertising and public relations. One popular response to the flood of violent combat, action-adventure, sci-fi, and horror films (with their companion video games) is stronger readiness to support U.S. military operations that, in an intensely patriotic, violent milieu will require little overt justification except where American casualties are deemed excessive. Such ideological legitimation is needed in a context where even the ensemble of corporate, military, and government power cannot suffice.

Despite its command of institutional power, tools of violence, and material resources, therefore, the system requires something along lines of a culture of militarism. In the United States, militarism has indeed evolved into an ideology forged by media culture, political messages, academic discourses, and patriotic indoctrination. If the linkage between militarism and daily life goes back in history, it has taken on new dimensions with the dramatic growth of the media and popular culture over the past few decades. If the culture of militarism endows warfare with a popular sense of meaning and purpose, it also constitutes the hegemonic façade behind which the power structure can more or less freely operate, domestically and worldwide. The decay of American economic, political, and social life cannot be understood apart from this destructive cycle—likely to worsen as the elites strive to maintain the advantages of Empire against new challenges. By the early twenty-first century it was obvious that war, and orientation to war, had become a way of life in the United States, a society in which both leaders and general population could be said to have grown addicted to war. If the United States fails to qualify as a full-fledged “warrior society” at the level of ancient Sparta, Nazi Germany, interwar Japan, or even Israel today, the military influence is perhaps even more pervasive—though not always recognizable as such—owing to the global presence of American power.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Realism—Real World =/= Theory”

Epistemology shapes the “real world”---trying to disentangle the two creates bad policies

Little et al. 15 – Adrian, Professor of Political Theory and has been Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences since 2007; Alan Finlayson, Professor of Political and Social Theory at The University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom; Simon Tormey, political theorist based in the School of Social and Political Sciences, 2015 (“Reconstituting Realism: Feasibility, Utopia and Epistemological Imperfection,” Contemporary Political Theory (Vol. 14, 3, 276–313), August 2015, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Palgrave Macmillian)

In arguing for a process of reconstituting our understanding of realism in politics, this contribution seeks to break down some established understandings of the terms of political theory and ‘real politics’. It argues that political theory should be politically engaged, that the reason that it is political theory rather than ethics is precisely because it has implications for how the world is organized and raises action-based questions of how to achieve objectives. The challenge here is not only that political theorists need to think about the application of their work, but also that we need to think more clearly about what constitutes the ‘real world’ of politics to which it is applied. To unnecessarily distance the two, is an easy trap to fall into. For example, while Swift and White (2008) argue that political theory has a vital role to play in practical issues, they still differentiate theory from a real politics, which is depicted as the things politicians do and the strategies they employ to gain election.

While this activity is undoubtedly part of real politics, it does not entirely constitute what is real. In short, far too many political theorists readily accept an intuitive version of the ‘real’ without sufficient interrogation of that reality and the sometimes flimsy epistemological interpretations underpinning it. By failing to address the epistemological foundations of what constitutes ‘real politics’, commentators such as Swift and White – despite their arguments for political theorists to make modest contributions to real politics – actually reinforce an artificial divide between political theory and real politics. Thus, at the same time as Swift and White recognize that political theorists need to be more engaged with practical issues, their division between the two encourages a culture in which non-engagement is viewed as a sustainable position for theory. This provides an opportunity for realists to avoid serious challenge to what they consider to be real (Geuss, 2008, pp. 59–60)

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Realism—No Prior Questions”

Interrogating what constitutes the “real” is a crucial prior question

Little et al. 15 – Adrian, Professor of Political Theory and has been Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences since 2007; Alan Finlayson, Professor of Political and Social Theory at The University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom; Simon Tormey, political theorist based in the School of Social and Political Sciences, 2015 (“Reconstituting Realism: Feasibility, Utopia and Epistemological Imperfection,” Contemporary Political Theory (Vol. 14, 3, 276–313), August 2015, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Palgrave Macmillian)

The issue at stake is how to unsettle the grounds on which discourses of realism are constructed if political theorists are to develop a meaningful account of what is actually possible in terms of political action. Potentially this could provide the basis upon which new formulations can emerge that can help to challenge and reconstitute the terms of the real. Thus, rather than getting embroiled in standard debates about what realism does and does not mean as an approach to politics and international relations, this contribution focuses on a more narrowly defined topic – the constitution of the real – and suggests that there are at least two significant fronts on which the process of reconstituting realism can be enacted. The first front is the systemic limitations of existing political institutions in dealing with complex plurality, and the second is the inability of prevailing constructions of ‘the real’ to provide an appropriate understanding of the emotive and psychological dimensions that may guide political activity.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Realism”—2NC

3---Realism is a white supremacist fantasy---that turns case by creating a cycle of paranoia that generates tensions

Agathangelou and Ling 9 – Professor at York University that specializes in Postcolonial Theory, Feminist Political Economy, STS and decolonial justice movements [Anna Agathangelou]

Professor of International Affairs at the Julien J. Studley Graduate Programs in International Affairs, The New School [L.H.M. Ling]

Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, “Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds,” Routledge, 2009, 49-54, https://www.routledge.com/Transforming-World-Politics-From-Empire-to-Multiple-Worlds/Agathangelou-Ling/p/book/9780415772808

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: A2 “Realism”—2NC

1---Complexity means realism is wrong

Little et al. 15 – Adrian, Professor of Political Theory and has been Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences since 2007; Alan Finlayson, Professor of Political and Social Theory at The University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom; Simon Tormey, political theorist based in the School of Social and Political Sciences, 2015 (“Reconstituting Realism: Feasibility, Utopia and Epistemological Imperfection,” Contemporary Political Theory (Vol. 14, 3, 276–313), August 2015, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Palgrave Macmillian)

There is a growing literature on complexity theory that has fundamental implications for how we think about the real in social and political terms (Cilliers, 1998; Richards, 2002; Urry, 2003; Harrison, 2006; Geyer and Rihani, 2010). Borrowing from its origins in the natural sciences (specifically the work of Nobel Prize winning chemist, Ilya Prigogine), complexity focuses on the chaotic blend of the orderly and disorderly in social and political life. This implies that phenomena cannot be properly understood through experimentation in controlled environments such as the laboratory. Instead, complex environments are much more dynamic with a plurality of actors engaging with phenomena in a multiplicity of different ways and generating effects that are unknown to each other.

Complexity in the social sciences suggests that the issues we engage with are in a constant process of development rather than being static entities – ‘facts’ – that just have to be acted upon. Moreover, the effects of political action are not linear, given that multiple other parties are acting on the same issue simultaneously. Thus, action on an issue with a specific outcome in mind does not guarantee that intended result as the actions and behaviours of other interested parties may interrupt the linearity of action and outcome. For this reason, the actual nature of things is dynamic and always in a stage of complex temporal development so that a snapshot of what reality actually entails can only be momentary (Connolly, 2010, pp. 17–42).

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: NATO Co-op

NATO cooperation shores up racial capitalism---empirics prove alliances are sustained by colonial interventions and media campaigns---err neg on impact analysis because their threat inflations are connected to propaganda to secure Western interests

Campbell 19, Horace---Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse, author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya (2013) (“Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis,” Counter Punch, April 9, 2019, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/)

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran. Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted. There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima. The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO. NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored by clandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies. “NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5] The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States. War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America. At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn, “The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7] In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states thatwithin 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Trumanadministration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%. NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9] Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war It was not by accident that the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers. Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner had been mandated told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today. In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany. One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14] This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15] Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists. Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009. The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO. Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’ Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe, “Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17] The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism. The fiction of collective western security was effectively broken while after the Asian economic crisis, US capital mobilized NATO to defend Wall Street. In this defense of Wall Street, NATO incessantly bombed Kosovo for 79 days in 1999 as it gave itself a new mission to enlarge US military power right up to the doorstep of Moscow. Gingerly, NATO expanded under US President Bill Clinton from 12 members to 16, then to 19, then to 26 by 2004 and by 2009 to 28 members. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO. In 2019 there were 29 members of NATO. In his presentation before the US Congress Stoltenberg advocated for a further expansion of NATO and boasted of the high state of readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which had been created in 2002. NATO and the Weaponization of finance Global NATO was the preeminent force to orchestrate the weaponization of everything. Michael Hudson has outlined finance as warfare and the weaponization of finance in the current phase of imperialism. It will be important to grasp the present sanctions regime of the USA as a form of warfare. In the current literature on imperialism, the term weaponization of finance refers to the foreign policy strategy of using incentives (access to capital markets) and penalties (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive diplomacy. The multiple wars agains Iran represent a model example of the weaponization of finance, the weaponization of information and the weaponization of trade. Under the Presidency of Barack Obama,Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, noted that the weaponization of finance offers to the US “a new battlefield…one that enables [the US] to go after those who wish [the US] harm without putting [US] troops in harm’s way or using lethal force.” Instead of fighting countries militarily, the US can now “cripple them financially. The Obama administration had retreated from a full scale weaponization of finance with Iran by signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) with Iran in 2015. Under the terms of this agreement in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union, it was agreed that Iran would accept the P5+1 would ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel had opposed this agreement. When Donald Tromp became President of the United States, his administration renounced the JCPOA in 2018 and then signed an executive order reimposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to do business with Iran. The order gave companies 90-day or 180-day grace periods to extract themselves from existing Iranian contacts or face punitive US measures. Those NATO partners of the USA who signed the JCPOA refused to accept the sanctions imposed on Iran and in 2019 agreed to create a special purpose vehicle to manage their trade with Iran. Britain, Germany and France rolled out INSTEX in February 2019 as one way to break the weaponization of Finance by the USA but in the cat and mouse game of economic warfare, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have not yet been transparent on the full mandate of the special purpose vehicle. These developments mirror the weaponization of trade [19] and finance within NATO and the problems of inter imperialist rivalry in West Asia. The threats against the countries that created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran must be taken very seriously, especially in the context of the political insecurity generated by BREXIT. This period reminds the world that of the depression when trade wars and currency wars eventually fueled open fighting in World War II. Finance as warfare Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there have been efforts by countries holding US debt to limit their exposure to the dollar. In 2009, the Russians and the Chinese worked to establish an alternative international institution involving Brazil, Russia, India and China, later including South Africa and called BRICS. Within the context of BRICS, the Chinese set about a slow process to internationalize its currency, the RMB and undertook currency swaps to avoid the US dollar. After failing to negotiate successfully within the Bretton Woods institution for an increase of its drawing rights commensurate with its volume of international trade, the Chinese embarked on major economic and financial ventures under the banner of One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. When the AIIB was launched in 2015 with 57 countries, the former Treasury Secretary of the US, Lawrence Summers noted that the launch of the AIIB was a turning point and ‘the creation of the AIIB will undermine the leadership role the U.S. has long enjoyed in global finance.’ Both Russia and China intensified their swap trading efforts and Russia settled its crude sales to China. “In March 2018 news broke that Beijing is planning a pilot project for the second half of the year to pay for imported crude oil with renminbi instead of dollars. The two countries allegedly selected for the pilot are Russia and Angola, with rumors that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may become involved. If this venture is successful, it will act as a spur to similar schemes for other imports and primary products.” China was joining the leaders of Europe and the countries in Asia and West Asia who were calling for a multi-currency financial system. Many progressive economists noted that it was not a matter if more countries would flee the dollar, but when. One economist writing from Singapore wrote, “the emergence of a multicurrency or multi-asset international payments system will take time. It doesn’t portend a collapse of the global payments system, but does point to a redistribution of global wealth. The seigniorage harvested by the US as the world’s banker will gradually fall, narrowing the room for maneuver in US economic policy, which for the last 70 years has had the greatest influence on markets globally. As the power of the dollar wanes, the US will be pressured to adjust to a world economy vastly changed since 1945.” [20] The German financial leaders along with France were maneuvering to speed this change with the establishment of the special purpose vehicle to continue trading with Iran. At this time of writing the specific details of the specific purpose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is still being worked out, but the statements of former Ambassador Nicholas Burns before Congress on March 26 made it clear that the Foreign Policy establishment in the USA will not retreat from the weaponization of Finance, especially since INSTEX allows members of NATO to continue trading and financial arrangements with Iran, China and Russia. In so far as Global NATO is serving the task of defending the dollar, the extent to which China has created an alternative clearing system in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) will be seen as another blow to US financial hegemony. Although in its first rollout of the CIPS system, the Chinese went to great length that it would cooperate with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, the current US intelligence war against the Chinese telecom firm Huawei point to the integration between Finance, information warfare and cyberwarfare. [21] In the book, The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger discussed the debates within this highest levels of US intelligence and the Federal Reserve of whether the USA should use its Federal Reserve and cyber warfare to backdoor into the Russian Central Bank to make money disappear. It is in this context where one can note in the planning of NATO strengthening the cyber capabilities is at the top of the Agenda. The Harvard study emphasized the importance of winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age. The convergence of cyberwarfare, economic warfare and information warfare is being taken to new levels under the current administration with its wide ranging sanctions against countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Traditional books on NATO had surveyed the integration of diplomacy, sanctions and weapons procurement, but the new push of the USA in formulating its position of unrivalled dominance is turning out to be another front for defending the dollar. In a world where the USA had imposed sanctions on Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, North Korea, Syria, Sudan along with individual sanctions against individuals in Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, the logic of these sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury has now clarified to the allies of the USA in NATO the importance finance was warfare. It was the former Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, who had warned that the over use of sanctions could dull their effectiveness. His logic was simple: Sanctions work because they cut targets off from dealing with U.S. citizens and American financial institutions—a complete severance from the world’s largest economy and its most important financial center. If Washington used this power idly, Lew suggested, it could encourage countries to find partners outside of the United States, and undermine sanctions’ deterrent effect. What Lew did not acknowledge was the relationship between the Treasury, Global NATO and the financial wars. Much of the scholarship on the printing of dollars miss the way in which the infusion of capital in emerging economies further enmesh these societies into the instability of the system. Ultimately, the export of the oscillation of the US economy deepens social and political challenges on the world and reinforces the militarization of the international political economy. Michael Hudson outlined three ways in which flooding of dollars through debt leverage and QE supported the military: (1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers; (2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media, (3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit. He continued, “Strange as it may seem and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.” After the financial crisis in Europe, Quantitative Easing was extended to the Eurozone and Japan, but in the continuing re alignment, of global capitalism, US capital is working hard to decapitate Russia and China as opponents of Global NATO. The currency wars and weaponization of finance is now accompanied by the weaponization of trade and the weaponization of information. Sanger’s The Perfect Weapon War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Agehas opened one window into how full spectrum dominance and the militarization of space is now linked to the weaponization of information and cognitive hacking. We now have new terms of warfare, terms such as “fake news”, “disinformation,” “weaponized information,” “post-truth” and “alternative facts.” Weaponized information (WI) defines a new method messaging and dissemination of content that contains falsehoods, facts taken out of context and pieces of truth strategically released, in an attempt to manipulate knowledge and beliefs. The NATO destruction of Libya was one clear example of how falsehoods were refined to lull workers in Europe to support the destruction of Libya The weaponization of Finance and the Destruction of Libya Not enough is being done to expose the real role of Global NATO and the role of so called humanitarian operatives in ensuring that humanitarian interventions become a force multiplier. Currently, many countries of the EU collaborate with France in the North African region in the fabrication of terror to ensure the deployment of the US Africa Command and French forces in Africa. In Western Europe, NATO has been very successful in ensuring confusion, demoralization, paralysis, and apathy in relation to western imperialism in Africa. African scholars and progressives are very clear that while calling for the dismantling of NATO there must be a call for the EURO to break from the CFA franc zone. Nicolas Sarkozy was very clear that the intervention in Libya was to save the Euro. Africans cannot have a Newtonian view of the struggle against imperialism to assure those from the European left who want solidarity with Africans while supporting French imperialism in Africa. Global NATO and French machinations are involved in a delicate dance and there is silence from the left in the EU when it comes to Europe’s 4000 km strategic radius that covers the entire area of West Africa, North Africa and down through East Africa to Somalia. It is beyond this commentary to delineate the ways in which German scholars, religious organizations, German foundations and non-governmental organizations are now implicated in the criminal acts of France in Africa, especially the war on terror. It is the task of the progressive movement to penetrate the areas of cooperation and conflict between European capitalists and Wall Street so that European workers do not continue to complicity support ‘humanitarian interventions.’ When 200 African scholars wrote the open letter on the impending crime against the peoples of Libya, there has been and continue to be silence on the part of the left in Europe and the United States. Barack Obama had described the intervention in Libya as a mistake and the British Parliamentary Committee outlined how the Libyan intervention had been based on lies. Obama may have considered the intervention a mistake, but his understanding of the process did not reveal how Goldman Sachs was thoroughly implicated the destruction of Libya. The case in the London High Court of the Libyan Investment Authority vs Goldman Sachs brought out revealing evidence of how firms such as Goldman Sachs and others involved in the financialization of the energy markets sought to mobilize the resources of oil rich states with Sovereign Wealth Funds to keep alive the private equity, hedge funds and structured derivatives markets of the global capitalist economy. Most societies and peoples in the world want these banks to be brought under control. But Goldman Sachs benefitted in the ruling because in 2014, two and a half years after the case was brought before the High Court, there was a war in Libya and there was no government therefore one could not represent the Libyan Investment Authority in this arena. We see therefore that the financial institutions are direct beneficiaries of the warfare that is going on in Libya. When the United Nations passed Resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 in 2011, those who had signed these resolutions did not understand then that the resolution was for regime in Libya.[22] The current fighting in Libya remains one of the most inglorious aspects of the 70 year history of NATO but there is silence among those celebrating 70 years of NATO. [23] Since the writings on Finance capital over a century ago by Rudolph Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin the role of finance in the international system has grown beyond the parameters outlined by those who linked finance capital to modern imperialism.[24] After the collapse of the dollar/gold system of 1944 the financial industry of the West has become the axis on which international capitalism spins.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: Deterrence

The attachment to credible deterrence creates imperial violence and instability---sustained and predictable deterrence postures are impossible in IR, which instead becomes a justification for military interventions

Grovogui 16 – Director of the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell University.

Siba N. Grovogui, “Time, technology, and the imperial eye,” Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the present, forging radical alternatives, 2016, 49-51,

Importantly, the predicates underlying this ideological formulation of the relationship between the West and others suggests necessity and enforcement through cooperation or confrontation. In either case, the contemporaneous Western language of geopolitics has provided pre-ordained answers: redress through treaty enforcement, wars of attrition, and enforcement through military interventions. As a result, from the discovery of the New World through the slave trade and colonialism and decolonization, the relations between, on the one hand, continental Europe states and European entities dispersed through the world and, on the other, political and cultural entities elsewhere have been mediated by a language of command unilaterally directed at others: the assumption of the sovereign right to defend the ‘national interest’ and unidirectional extra-territoriality.