Offensive realists believe that cooperation is really difficult in international politics. Thus, a hegemon might be necessary for international stability from the perspective of hegemonic stability theorists. By contrast, neoliberal institutionalists believe that regimes make cooperation possible without a hegemon. Interestingly enough, the UNC plays a bridging role in filling the gap between the two groups of thought. The UNC as a multinational entity provides the US, a hegemon, with an opportunity to cooperate with other actors. To put it another way, the UNC has characteristics of both a hegemon and regime. The US-led UNC allows cooperation to be more likely by multinational actors’ compliance with the regime rules, not by hegemony-led enforcement. The UNC’s primary task has been to make the Korean Peninsula stable by maintaining the armistice and this will continue to be its mission in the future as well. Simultaneously, the UNC leaves the US as the greatest beneficiary of its existence, in terms of hegemony maintenance. The UNC as an international entity gives the US political, military, economic and institutional leverage over the other actors on the Korean Peninsula. Political leverage is when one state makes other states do what it wants and when it is able to command them. The UNC offers a consolidated legitimacy to oversee the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula (Salmon, 2019). The UNC also provides the US with the leverage to command the 16 Sending States who comprise the UNC because only the US general is authorized to assume the responsibilities of the UNC Commander (CDR). The CDR’s position leaves the US as a dominant voice in security and diplomatic arrangement in the region. The UNSCR 84 clearly establishes the UNC as ‘a unified command under the United States’ (The United Nations homepage). No other states can challenge the US’s authorization unless the U.N. changes it. Although the 16 states who comprise the UNC are able to express their opinion, the only person in charge who makes a final decision is the US general. Thus, the US’s opinion, hierarchically, takes priority over the others. Likewise, although policies are developed and decided under the name of the UNC, the US-preferred ones seem most likely to be espoused. The liaison officers from the sixteen Sending States play their role for peace on the Korean Peninsula under the organization of the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC). They participate in the theater-level exercises with the CFC to coordinate with the dispatch of military assets in the event of war. Interestingly enough, the MNCC is with the U-3, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Operations, of the UNC and it has been bolstered to work more closely with the UNC since 2015 (Creamer, 2017, p. 19). Since the U-3 is just one of the staffs of the UNC CDR, the US technically is presumed to have an influence on them. Seen in this light, the US as the commander is able to ‘integrate international support’ by effectively using a legal international entity (Creamer, 2017, p. 25). The US as the UNC CDR has the right to implement personnel management for other states. In 2018, the US designated a non-American general to assume the duties as the UNC Deputy Commander (DCR) for the first time since 1950. On 30 July 2018, Canadian Lieutenant General Wayne D. Eyre took office as the UNC DCDR as part of the effort to revitalize the UNC (Song, 2018, July 30). Then in 2019, the US named Australian Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer as the UNC DCDR to replace Lieutenant General Eyre (Yi, 2019). All of the designations could be fully interpreted as the US exercising its political clout to control the actions of member states of the UNC. The existence of the US-led UNC allows the US to play a leading role in international meetings. On January 16, 2018, the US and Canada co-hosted an international meeting for foreign ministers and representatives of 20 countries in Vancouver (US Embassy & Consulate in Korea Homepage). This meeting was officially billed as the ‘Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula’ aimed at dealing with North Korea’s denuclearization. All of the foreign ministers except for India’s were affiliated with the UNC (Creamer, 2017, p. 21). Two insights stand out from this meeting. First, the very existence of the UNC allowed this ministerial-level diplomatic meeting to be made. Thus, this meeting showed how influential the UNC as an international entity is to the world. Second, since the US takes a leading position in the UNC, the US looked eligible for this meeting as a co-host. In this vein, the UNC helped the US hegemony be viewed as a benevolent one. Similarly, the UNC entitles the US general to convene multinational meetings in South Korea. The most viable example is the Ambassador Roundtable. The US four-star general in the name of the UNC CDR calls monthly meetings by inviting ambassadors from the 16 UNC member states plus some states invited by the UNC commander. Two generals from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) countries are also invited and key staff members attend the meeting. The Ambassador Roundtable clearly shows how influential the US hegemony is in the region using the tool of the UNC. The US general as a host is seated in the centre with ambassadors seated around him. The UNC CDR makes opening statements and then gives them his thoughts about military situations and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. The ambassadors from member and invited states are eager to listen to him because the US general as the UNC CDR has significant power and responsibility. At the end of the meeting, the UNC CDR again as a host, makes closing remarks. There is no other place in the world that a military general is able to invite high ranking diplomats and convene this kind of meeting. A meeting arrangement seems closer to military–civil relations on an international level, not civil–military relations. In a nutshell, this kind of meeting itself based on the regime of the UNC makes the US wield wider political clout to all member states and the NNSC countries. The NNSC is technically an independent organization from the UNC.1 Since both organizations are aimed at maintaining the Korean Armistice, however, they work together in many ways. For instance, the NNSC team also joins in the UNCMAC-led SIT. Furthermore, the UNC CDR hosts the Change of Responsibility ceremonies for NNSC members. On 30 May 2019, the UNC CDR, the US General Abrams hosted the ceremony for incoming NNSC Swedish Member, Major General Corneliusson at the US base, Camp Humphreys (dvids, 2019). This is a clear example showing how close these two organizations are to each other, meaning the US has political clout over NNSC countries as well, namely Sweden and Switzerland. Inherently, the UNC is a multinational entity and thus all affiliated states together manage the regime. However, there exists a hierarchy in this organization because the US is exclusively able to take the command position. Thus, although the UNC, not the US, authorizes the DMZ access of certain personnel, the most influential player within this organization is the US, which alone decides who is allowed to enter into DMZ. The DMZ belongs to South Korea’s territory. South Korea, however, does not have the right to authorize the DMZ access although the UNC does. Meanwhile, as more people want to enter into the DMZ, the US’s influence becomes greater. The DMZ has been at the core of the talks toward North Korea’s denuclearization, particularly in 2018 and 2019. As a result, a number of people outside of the Korean Peninsula rushed to join the DMZ tour. Although there is a regulation on who is eligible to gain access, it cannot provide guidance for all situations. Thus, somebody needs to decide whether they are allowed to enter into the DMZ or not. Since the US general takes command of the UNC and US personnel to take the key positions, the US enjoys privileges to decide who is permitted. In June 2019, Seoul invited Germany’s governmental officials to learn lessons from their unification process JTBC News (2019, September 17)., South Korea’s news outlet, reported that the UNC did not authorize their access to the DMZ for safety reasons. The fact that one state has exclusive rights to give permission to access the area, particularly at the centre of political gravity, under the pretext of the internationally recognized regime, could be sufficiently interpreted as that it is armed with political leverage. By the same token, an initiative proposed even by a host nation would be impossible without the UNC’s authorization in a situation where the proposal is related to its area of responsibility. In September 2019, Seoul laid out the initiative to transform the DMZ into an ‘international peace zone’, which has been announced for the first time at the UN (UN News, 2019). International support matters to make this initiative work. Thus, Seoul posted a six minutes promotional video on the DMZ peace zone initiative on the Blue House’s YouTube channel aimed at securing ‘the support of the international society’ (Yonhap News, 2019, November 6). Similarly, the UNC has once again been at the core as the key player who makes the initiative possible because the DMZ is under the UNC’s control. The UNC has full authority over the highly regarded geopolitical areas such as the DMZ. Thus, inter-Korean or multinational activities crossing the territorial border are not feasible politically as well as diplomatically without the UNC’s coordination. On 3 October 2019, when peace-seeking efforts were growing, the UNC Commander, General Robert Abrams, stressed that ‘while [the two Koreas] may continue the dialogue, all of that would have to be brokered, adjudicated, observed and enforced by UN Command’ (2018, October 3). The UNC’s full control of these areas renders the US’s political and diplomatic leverage influential. As North Korea’s denuclearization has become the central focus in the world as well as on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC’s roles and responsibilities are taken as important as well. Thus, the UNC’s political leverage has become more influential, contributing to strengthening the prestige of the US as a hegemon in the region. The DMZ is not simply a military area but has become a political domain. In this political domain on the border, the US remains the most influential political actor mainly thanks to the existence of the UNC. The US’s political clout benefitted by the UNC cannot be easily transferrable to the one to its growing hegemonic rival, China. The UNC is basically a military organization, not a governmental one and thus in some sense, the US enjoys military leverages and utilities greater than other states. Although the UNC, technically as well as legally, is a multinational military organization, it does not take any directive from the international body. Rather, just one actor, the US, gives directives to the UNC through the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).2 The document on the history of the unified command, published by the US JCS, shows that the UNC belongs to one of its commands (The US JCS, 2013, pp. 15–16). The military is hierarchical culturally as well as structurally. Thus, who can give directives determines everything from the priority of current tasks to the future policy design. In this respect, the US military in Washington certainly has massive leverage over the UNC, an internationally driven legal entity, which functions as the influential military command on the Korean Peninsula. The UNC has had an influence over military operations or exercises on the Korean Peninsula where South Korea, a host nation, sixteen Sending States and NNSC countries participate directly or indirectly. Historically, the UNC used to have a full OPCON from 1950 to 1978. During this period, the UNC served as the warfighting command at a theater-level of operation as well as peacetime management. In 1978, its OPCON was transferred to the CFC but the UNC is still honoured as a vital command which used to defeat the communists. The US-led UNC’s military contribution is embedded in the history of the Korean War, which helps the US keep its hegemonic authority. The US four-star general, acting as the UNC CDR, hosts the Armistice Agreement Commemoration Ceremony on July 27 every year. In these ceremonies, the achievements by the UNC and soldiers’ sacrifices are commemorated. In this area, the US serves as a hegemonic spiritual leader thanks to the US command position. Currently, the UNC has no function of warfighting command. It still has a powerful function of peace command, though. In some sense, the UNC’s peace management authority is more influential because the Korean Peninsula does not remain at war most of the time. A full-scale war has not broken out since the end of the Korean War. The UNC plays a key role in investigating incidents that occur in the DMZ or around five islands at the Yellow Sea. When an incident occurs in its area of responsibility, the UNCMAC under the UNC dispatch the SIT to investigate whether they violated the Korean Armistice Agreement. The ‘armistice spirit’ also is a key ruler at the investigation and thus the scope of the SIT’s activity could be wider simply beyond the DMZ. Most of the time, military personnel are the main people who are investigated, but even civilians are often investigated too. When a wildfire happens within the DMZ, a civilian firefighting helicopter enters into the DMZ under the UNC’s permission. If a pilot accidentally crosses the MDL, the SIT investigates him. The UNC also intervenes in handling arms control of two Korean forces in the DMZ areas as shown in the JSA demilitarization in 2018 (Chung, 2019, pp. 484–485). Moreover, the UNC enjoys a certain tool to engage in the ROK-US military exercises and training through the NNSC. The UNC tasks the NNSC to observe them in its efforts to assess their nature over whether they are deterrent and defensive. Exercise scenarios and key staff ideas are important matters that the NNSC observes. After various observations, including major component commands, the NNSC produces its report and two generals of the NNSC deliver it to the UNC CDR. The fact that one country-led entity can ask other countries to observe the exercises of a certain alliance is evidence that it exercises military leverage over other countries. The UNC allows foreign bases to be expanded into Japan which makes its military missions more achievable. Japan is not a member state of the UNC but ironically the UNC Rear is located in Japan, which includes eight states (Graham, 2017). There is no international legal basis for the UNC Rear. Instead, the US concluded a mutual agreement with Japan and thus in 1957, the UNC Rear was established in Japan for the UNC’s military use. Those seven bases play a bridging role in receiving military assets from the Sending States aimed at providing them with the UNC at war. If the UNC is dissolved, the UNC Rear will be dismantled, which would not be helpful for maintaining the US’s influence in the region. Likewise, the UNC serves as a key entity to coordinate military assets from the Sending States. Without the UNC, the US finds it hard to ask for help from other states in times of crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The existence of the UNC makes coordination with the Sending States work autonomously. Thus, the US military’s mission success seems more likely under the existence of the UNC. Inherently, its influence over the UNC is aimed at making the Korean Peninsula stable. However, the US’s daily cooperation with member states makes them more likely to be on its side if it is confronted with a revisionist China. The UNC CDR produces an Annual Report at the end of every year and sends it to the UN according to UNSCR 84. Since the UNC CDR is inherently the US general, the US JCS has an influence over them. Annual reports state what the UNC has done for the year and the UNC CDR’s thoughts for evaluation. They make the UNC’s military mission to be recognized as important as well as fully legal by the international audience. To put it another way, the US’s hegemony is taken as benevolent through the well-functioned UNC from the military point of view as well. The UNC is basically a military organization and thus it has less economic influence than political or military. However, there is some role to play for economic leverage and utilities by the US The budget connection allows affiliated states to regard the US as a benevolent hegemon and thus encourage them to comply with the US-led order. The United States Forces Korea (USFK) deals with a military budget for all American soldiers who work under the CFC and the UNC. South Korea also contributes to its service through the defense cost-sharing process by the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). The NNSC’s budget connection with the US encourages US policies to be adopted. Despite the independent nature of the NNSC, the US military provides them with a variety of financial assistance from base facilities to transportation, service workers on camp and even drivers. The Korean Armistice Agreement states the UNC’s obligation to offer them (The Korean Armistice Agreement, 1953, p. 13). The NNSC camp, which belongs to South Korea’s territory and is located in the JSA, is practically not their base. The camp is located on an American base. Accordingly, the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) of the US Army takes care of facilities, electricity and painting on the camp. No American soldiers live on the camp but the US is in charge of the base for the NNSC personnel, leaving the one as an extremely rare case. Whenever an actor is financially supported by another, the former becomes reliant on the latter. Seen in this light, the US exercises economic leverage over the NNSC. Similarly, the US provides military personnel of the Sending States who work in the UNC with financial assistance, such as military quarters or houses. Thus, in some sense economic leverage makes the US’s bond with the Sending States stronger. The existence of the UNC makes the connection possible, contributing to the US hegemony’s maintenance at the end of the day. Furthermore, Washington in the Trump era tends to see alliances from the viewpoint of economic interest. In a situation where the UNC has increased its political and military leverage by a window of opportunity from denuclearization and peace posture, the US’s support or assistance has become more vital. The increased political and military leverage seems to promote the US to be armed with economic leverage as well. Washington has pushed Seoul to pay much more for South Korea’s defense since 2018 and is expected to continue to do (Kim, 2019). In particular, the US reportedly demanded more than five times at the negotiation in 2019 to South Korea regarding defense cost-sharing, which clearly shows the impacts of its security role on economic clout (Lee, Cha, and Shin 2019). Although political, military and economic leverage is inherently rooted in the internationally given legal institution of the UNC, the UNC itself possesses institutionally driven leverage that it can use to make other actors follow the US’s directions or requests without strong opposition. The logic is in the works because of its inherently given institutional justification. The UNC was the first organization which was established under the logic of collective security. That rare institutional setting tends to encourage the UNC to continue to be recognized as valuable. Maintenance of a hegemony requires soft power as well as hard power. The UNC was given legally by the international entity, the UNSC although the US had an influential role to make it. Then the US-led UNC is taken as a peace promoter, not warmonger thanks to its unique roles. Thus, the US’s activities by the UNC’s mission seem to increase its softer power in the region. The US’s attempt to build institutional leverage by the UNC had already begun in the time of its establishment in 1950. Who gave its name: the UN or the UNSC? Neither did. The UNSC just mentioned ‘a unified command’. The US, though, called this unified command ‘the United Nations Command’. The organization’s name thus creates the illusion for international audiences that the UN is in charge of the UNC. However, it is far from the truth. In 1995, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made it clear that the UNC has nothing to do with the UN (Ahn, 2019). In the meantime, its name has officially been used since 1950 without resistance. As such, it has institutionally been acknowledged by international audiences as time went by. The fact that the words of ‘the United Nations’ is included in its name makes international audiences misunderstand that the UNC’s activities are being made exclusively for the world. The name-led institutionalization has clearly been a great success from the US’s viewpoint in the sense that it has made international audiences think of the US-led organization as a purely multination one and that the US is not acting alone. This helps sustain the perception of that of the US is a benevolent hegemony power. The longer regimes exist, the stronger they become. This logic could be referred to as institutional inertia. The UNC has functioned without any cessation ever since 1950, which serves as a very rare case from the viewpoint of the durability as well as its origin. In principle, there is no single player who deals with the UNC’s mission. Thus, its decisions are not taken as unilateral. In reality, since only US generals assume the command position, the UNC’s decisions seem likely to be heavily preferable to the US’s interests. Although the UNC stands firm institutionally, the UNC CDR still attempts to remind others of the strong legal ground by annually hosting Armistice Agreement Commemorative Ceremony. Considering a number of tasks, the UNC has only a small staff dispatched from member states, which consists of 30 key staffs officers in addition to the UNCMAC Secretariat personnel. In this regard, the UNC could be the most cost-effective organization of all militaries in the world. How is this possible? The prestigious nature of the UNC as an institutionally firm regime makes up for its limited personnel, which makes the Sending States, the NNSC and Japan contribute to the missions more. In summary, the UNC’s institutionally driven leverage creates the perception of the US as a benevolent hegemon in East Asia, a position in which it rarely finds itself in other regions of the world. The US increases its influence over the Asia-Pacific region through the UNC’s security management of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the UNC serves as a ‘the two-for-one entity’ for promoting US interests. From the US’s perspective, ‘killing two birds with one stone’ is the biggest prize from the existence of the UNC. However, this ‘two-for-one’ perspective is not likely accepted by the other members of the UNC, who may focus on its primary mission only, that of maintaining the armistice. Accordingly, a ‘for whom’ question could be seriously raised internally as well as externally.