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2022 Michigan Kritik
Alt › Alt – Demilitarization

Demilitarization has worked empirically – key to promoting disarmament and preventing further unchecked violence

Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, 1-11-2017, Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark is Associate Professor of International Law at the Åland Islands Peace Institute. Currently she heads the research project “Demilitarization in an increasingly militarized world. International perspectives in a multilevel regulatory framework – the case of the Åland Islands”. "Demilitarization as a Constructive Tool for Co-operation and Peace: the Example of the Åland Islands," No Publication, https://www.osce.org/magazine/293346//CDMoney

In 2017 Finland is celebrating its centennial. This year, it marked an even older anniversary: on 30 March 2016, it was 160 years since the demilitarization of the Åland Islands, an archipelago of more than six and a half thousand islands scattered in the middle of the Baltic Sea between what is today mainland Finland and Sweden. They are inhabited by almost 29,000 people, the vast majority of whom are Swedish speakers. The demilitarization of the Åland Islands was established by a tripartite convention between Great Britain, France and Russia and confirmed in the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War. To be sure, it was hardly a naïve love of peace that motivated the agreement, nor was there at the time any particular concern for the wellbeing of the people who populated the islands. The logic of the demilitarization was, and still is, that of ensuring that this small piece of territory would not be fortified and therefore would be less attractive militarily and less dangerous than it would otherwise be. This was of particular concern for neighbouring Sweden, one of the driving forces behind the agreement, even though Sweden chose to remain outside the settlement of 1856 for various reasons. An early confidence-building measure With the Convention on the Demilitarization of the Åland Islands, the superpowers of the time wanted to provide a pragmatic solution to the challenge of strengthening, as it was put in the French original text, “les bienfaits de la paix générale” – “the benefits of general peace”. Rather than competing for military presence in and territorial control of this controversial territory, the states parties accepted to keep away from it and create a platform for communication about matters that concerned it. One could call it an early confidence-building measure. The demilitarization agreement can be seen as a forerunner to the collective security system that was established through the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920, with the aim of limiting the use of force in interstate relations and creating new avenues for addressing conflicts and threats to peace. The idea of collective dispute settlement was at the core of the League of Nations system, but, as we all know, it collapsed, or rather took time out (in part as a result of the unwillingness of the superpowers of that time to follow the rules they had themselves enacted) before being succeeded by the United Nations and the United Nations Charter in 1945. Meanwhile, the Convention on the Demilitarization of the Åland Islands was strengthened through the adoption in 1921 of the Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands. Among the ten original signatories was Finland, which had been recognized by then as an independent state and become a member of the League of Nations. Finland had already been granted territorial sovereignty over the islands through a dispute settlement by the League of Nations earlier that same year. The internationally entrenched binding rules on neutralization for the islands are distinct from the policy of neutrality and non-alliance of Finland. The neutralization rules added to the previous international legal commitments the prohibition of using “directly or indirectly” the Åland Islands “for any purpose connected with military operations” in times of war. A long tradition In fact, demilitarization was nothing new in the late 19th century. The first documented examples date back to the early Middle Ages and rules requiring the demolition of fortifications and prohibiting their reconstruction were found regularly in peace treaties concluded in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. An early example was the 1559 Treaty of Château Cambrésis (between France and Spain), which included a prohibition of fortifications in the area of Thérouanne. In 1768, Denmark ceded several islands in the mouth of the river Elbe to Hamburg and at the same time it was provided that no military installations were to be built on these islands. A large number of demilitarization arrangements were included in the treaties ending the First World War, e.g. on the Saar Region, the Free City of Danzig, Spitsbergen/Svalbard and islands in the Mediterranean. This pattern continued well into the period following the Second World War, for instance with regard to the Dodecanese Islands, Pelagosa and the Free Territory of Trieste. A special case, in terms of the level of institutionalization of its internationalized management is that of Antarctica. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty stipulates that “in the interest of all mankind…Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”. A more recent, though inconclusive, effort towards demilitarization was the 1999 plan by the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan for Cyprus. One element of the plan was the demilitarization of the island. Sovereignty maintained Demilitarization and neutralization can be understood as limitations to territorial sovereignty, but they function, simultaneously, as confirmations of the idea of territorial sovereignty and control of territory. In fact, the Åland Islands regime is premised upon clear territorial sovereignty and thus the ability and legal right as well as obligation – of Finland in this case – to repel attacks and imminent threats against the zone, in order to safeguard its demilitarized and neutral status. However, this same solution is also an exception and a provocation to our thinking about the ways in which such territorial sovereignty can be exercised. The rules of demilitarization and neutralization entail a legally binding promise of giving priority to diplomatic means of communication and negotiation, before means of military power, even though power relations are acknowledged. The demilitarization is managed primarily by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The system requires transparency and communication on alleged controversies, something which became even clearer in the 1940 bilateral treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. Both Sweden and the Russian Federation have consulates on Åland. The Governor of the Åland Islands heads the state administration on the islands, attends to state security matters and functions as a link between the Republic of Finland and the regional government and parliament of the self-government of Åland. The Governor, who is appointed by the President of the Republic of Finland with the agreement of the Speaker of the Åland parliament, also maintains regular contact with the consulates. Demilitarization is a small step towards disarmament. It is a recognition of the fact that the arms races that took place in many countries prior to both 1914 and 1939 were strong contributing factors to the outbreak of the devastating World Wars. The financial frustrations of these pre-war periods are absent today. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2015 Human Development Report, most countries in the OSCE region belong to the top strata of countries with a very high or high human development level. Still, we are witnessing, in Europe and beyond, a slow but steady escalation of aggressive rhetoric and military expenditures and activities, alongside an expanding use of force internationally. It is seldom easy or fruitful to try to establish who was first to start a conflict and who should take the largest blame in the midst of a difficult situation. Under such conditions we need to strengthen tools and strategies of communication and co-operation wherever we can and find new ways of promoting disarmament. Demilitarization is one of them. It is a pragmatic and contextual solution which requires cautious management by all parties concerned and a commitment to the restriction of the use of force. Could it be useful in new situations? What about the Arctic, for instance? Could a different but similar solution be envisaged here, relying on the old idea that the Arctic areas should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Alt › Alt – Demilitarization

Through the act of repurposing the military as a means of demilitarization, a just transition can be better advanced.

Burke and Smolyar, 22 (Matthew Burke and Nina Smolyar, B.S. in Natural Resources from Ohio State, M.A. in Parks, Recreation and Environmental Education, M.P.A. from University of Vermont, and Ph.D. in Renewable Resources from McGill University, B.A. in Economics and Political Science from UPenn, MA in Sustainable Business and Communities from Goddard College, 7-1-2022, accessed on 7-13-2022, Cham Palgrave Macmillan, "Demilitarize for a Just Transition", https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8_11)

Implementing these steps of fiscal shift, economic conversion, and retraining and transition would have a profound benefit for workers and communities, while greatly reducing the additional risks and already occurring impacts of social and ecological catastrophe. A just transition approach brings this necessary focus to the process of demilitarization. The demographic profile of the U.S. military has dramatically diversified over the last half century, demonstrating the opportunities here for the many BIPOC people now doing this work. It is also recognized that veterans, BIPOC people, and people of Latin American descent often hold high levels of concern for climate change (Leiserowitz and Akerlof, 2010; Motta et al., 2021). Yet for many communities, military service provides a rare path out of inequitable conditions at home, while military recruitment is known to target low-to-middle income and poor communities (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). This repurposing would dramatically broaden the opportunities for high-quality, safe, and meaningful work among these communities and beyond. Meanwhile, military personnel, bases, and their communities often suffer disproportionate levels of pollution, domestic violence, mental and physical health problems, alcohol and drug use, suicide, and other social and economic disparities. Contamination and pollution from military testing sites and weapons manufacturing hit local communities hardest, too often involving inadequate compensation. A repurposing would reduce these vulnerabilities by directly remedying and improving conditions for these communities. This work would start by cleaning up the many contaminated sites worldwide, and extend to a permanent peace economy that avoids the multi-generational and multi-dimensional harms and trauma of militarism. As the U.S. military extends globally, so too would the effects of demilitarization through a just transition. Shifting from a role of securing fossil-fuel and energy dominance, a repurposed military under civilian control could activate a wave of global cooperation and solidarity, moving funding and personnel to support international aid and climate change adaptation and mitigation. Global agreements for nuclear weapon and fossil-fuel non-proliferation, poverty reduction, and ecological restoration may then receive the attention and support needed to make a real difference for people and planet. This approach is based on a radically different view of “national security” in recognizing the impossibility, immorality, and recklessness of the “fortress” response to climate change. Global climate change by definition is a global issue, not a national security one. Implementing a just transition urges a world view of collective solidarity and mutual interdependence. Demilitarization can enable support for displaced refugees and climate migrants, reduce tensions and military build-up in other nations, and ripple out to improving the lives of poor people worldwide (Siddique, 2021). The obstacles and challenges of demilitarization are many. For one, we must stay critically engaged, lest this process be coopted as yet another opportunity to exert further military control over civilian life. The nonnegotiable goal is rather to reclaim the assets of the military and reposition them under strict civilian control for non-military purposes. There are also the cultural biases and identities, and myths of the glory of war and militarism that require a committed, multi-faceted response to shift these narratives and develop real alternatives for achieving lasting security (Shifferd and Hiller, 2020). The vested interests, from fossil-fuel corporations, military contractors, Pentagon elites, and DoD officials, to federal, state, and local politicians will do all in their substantial power to resist cuts and downsizing. Yet no real transition to a peaceful and ecological future is possible without demilitarization. A significant leverage point is whether and how workers and their communities can be effectively and consistently engaged and help lead this just transition (Eisenscher, 2014).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW – flawed policy

Policymaking – systematic thinking beyond individual case studies key to a recalibrated vision of good governance – AND that’s only achievable thru debating the best approach to the shifting international order

--yes this card cites people like Brands but the reason it’s good is because it says that we need to figure out what our strategic thinking principles ought to be, which includes the possibility that the US strategy of liberal hegemony is BAD

Andrew Ehrhardt & Maeve Ryan 20, Postdoctoral fellow with the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London; History and Grand Strategy and Co-Director of the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London, “GRAND STRATEGY IS NO SILVER BULLET, BUT IT IS INDISPENSABLE,” War on the Rocks, 05/19/2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/grand-strategy-is-no-silver-bullet-but-it-is-indispensable/

Towards a Humbler Conception

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW – flawed policy

Negation – the AFF’s terms of debate present an all or nothing approach that equates disinvestment to fatalism – entrenching the status quo

Aziz Rana 22, Professor at Cornell Law School and is a fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Left Internationalism in the Heart of Empire,” Dissent Magazine, 05/23/2022, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/left-internationalism-in-the-heart-of-empire

These two tendencies pose real dilemmas for left internationalists. Precisely because of the potential traps, it is incumbent on American leftists to develop the type of internationalist vision and politics that universally and effectively joins anti-imperial and anti-authoritarian ethics.

For starters, this requires having a coherent response to ongoing crises, especially given the role of these crises in retrenching the seeming inevitability of the national security establishment. The terms of foreign policy debate in the United States present each new emergency as a series of either/or choices, with the left at a decided disadvantage. This dynamic is further reinforced by the fact that U.S. officials huddle with allied state actors like Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson to devise their agenda. Without political power and with limited transnational institutions, global left voices are instead largely isolated even from one another. There is no mechanism for developing anything like a common alternative proposal, and so, unsurprisingly, left discourse in the United States can read as fractured and discordant. All of this promotes an environment in which “doing something” means supporting the security state’s approach, while questioning that approach amounts to “doing nothing.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW – Language

Security Cooperation enforces a culture of dependence of militarism, but society can choose to reject this paradigm – only the alt solves

Jackson 11 (Susan Jackson, 8-25-2011, accessed on 7-13-2022, The Market of War in the Age of Militarism, "The National Security Exception, the Global Political Economy", )

In addition to militarism, several concepts are central to this study: militarization, the neo-liberal economic agenda and the NSE. Militarism is characterized as “the excessive influence of armed forces over civilian life” (Kaldor 2001). This influence can be an explicit factor in political life, with the military either directly running the government or having a strong impact on policymaking from ‘behind the scenes.’ At the other end of the spectrum, militarism can be less obvious, with societal factors generating overall acceptance (if not overt support) of high levels of military spending and general military readiness. In either case, the military is considered integral to society because of the role it is assumed to play in protecting society. In general, “[v]irtually all nations make huge economic, political, and ideological investments in militaries and militarism— a broad system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures that take their meaning and value from war” (Kirk 2008, 34). These investments become apparent in the NSE. In the context of the intersection of the GPE and national security, militarism is the idea that national security and military security are one in the same— the heightened role the military plays in state-level security issues is based on the assumption that national security is achieved via military capabilities. This militarism becomes apparent when we examine the assumptions that motivate the pursuit of national security through military means and the rules we put in place to ensure this type of national security. Of particular interest here is how the global business rules privilege. business when it is in connection with national security by employing the NSE in the GPE. Militarization is the underlying process that maintains the manifestation of militarism in societal outputs (e.g., arms production and military spending). It is the process that entails what societies do to prepare for war even when war is not imminent (see e.g., Bowman 2002; Enloe 1989; Regan 1994), such that it is the “contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Gillis 1989, 1). This categorization of militarization moves beyond the standard definition of militarization as the “expansion or relative size of some integral part, scope, or mission of the armed forces” (Bowman 2002, 19)—which is usually observed through budgets, number of soldiers and so on— to a defi nition in which the role of the military is a part of societal institutions. In basic terms, militarization is a process in which a person or thing gradually becomes dependent for its well-being on militaristic ideas, and military needs are considered valuable and normal (Enloe 1989). It is this process through which states maintain or increase their general preparations for war even in peacetime (Regan 1994). The common perception remains, however, that security is necessarily military, and arms-producing and military services business happens because it is supposed to happen rather than because people have chosen to fund their militaries and thereby purchase weapons and services for these militaries. In reality, people could have chosen, and still can choose, otherwise. Militarization is not simply a given; it does not just happen but occurs because of the actions and inactions of real people and their interactions with real institutions or structures. Rather, this process rests on deliberate decisions (Enloe 2000). In this way, militarization is not just about those directly involved in the military and in arms-producing and military services companies, but also about wider society and those who either outright bolster or more passively fail to argue against the view the military is unquestioningly good, natural and necessary. 2 Relevant for this project, militarization is the process through which societies decide to allow arms-producing and military services business to operate under different rules when the regular rules become cumbersome.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW – Language

The affirmative’s framework imposes language of war that standardizes militarization within debate and enforces a ceaseless cycle of violence

Marcinkevičienė 2011 (Rūta Marcinkevičienė, 8-25-2011, accessed on 7-13-2022, The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism, "A Dangerous Language", )

Present-day authors continue talking about dehumanizing people and euphemising war along the same lines (i.e., focusing on indirectness and warning about the destructive power of such language). The author of The Language of War , Steve Thorn (2006), among other things, discusses how military discourse has entered mainstream language use. He also focuses on how language is used to construct opposing sides during armed conflict (Thorn 2006). A number of other authors such as linguists, discourse analysts and columnists mostly deal with two issues while talking about LW (i.e., its indirectness [cl. A twisted language of war ] and its influence on human minds and behavior). A natural question arises as to whether a direct LW exists. The most probable type of disourse would be military jargon reflecting the everyday reality of war. However, the experience provided by observers reveals the opposite. Military jargon is even more indirect than political discourse. The abundance of acronyms and abbreviations that hide full and direct names of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear weapons are called ABMs, SLCMs and MIRYs) (Bosmajian 1984) and euphemistic expressions with meaning hardly comprehensible for a lay outsider (e.g . , comic books : military maps, cracker box: field ambulance, chicken plate: chest protector [body armor] worn by helicopter gunners) (Bob Hersey’s K Troop 2009) as well as abstract nouns are prevailing features of military people’s language. “One hardly senses that war and killing are being discussed. The destruction of human life has been euphemized through using abstractions” (Bosmajian 1984). Thus, the specific disourse that could be sufficiently direct is reported to be indirect. Its negative effects are made explicit by Haig Bosmajian (1984): “Dehumanizing the enemy and euphemizing the weapons of war and war itself is a deadly combination that, unfortunately, has historically been successful in defending the indefensible.” He continues to explain that these two language behaviors together have the effect of a) making the reality of genuine violence invisible and b) making violence acceptable and even desirable when military terminology is metaphorically applied to everyday matters. The paradox of LW is that: “We have wars on everything now: poverty, child hunger, famine, debt, drugs, and even war. The only times we don’t seem to have war anymore is when we are actually involved in armed conflict. We have police actions, military interventions, occupying forces, peacekeepers, and peacemakers. They all involve the movement of troops, the firing of weapons, the destruction of property, and the loss of life the same as war does, but technically speaking, none of them are a state of war.” (Marcus 2006) In their famous book on metaphors, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) reveal how a concept of argument is verbalized in terms of war ( indefensible claims , to attack weak points , to shoot down somebody’s arguments ) and how the structure of an argument reflects this. They claim that the ‘argument is war’ metaphor “structures the actions we perform in arguing” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4). Moreover, they suggest “to imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently.” They elaborate on the essense of conceptual metaphor that is “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakofff and Johnson 1980, 5). Some other authors, like Hardman (2002), go further and recognize the power of language for users of the war metaphor. The power manifests itself not only in understanding and experiencing reality, as stated by cognitive linguists, but also in accepting appropriateness of war: We clearly recognize the power of language. Nevertheless, we use a great deal of violent language in ordinary everyday speech quite oblivious of the way in which we are constructing our language to glorify war and violence and in that way make such violence appear appropriate even acceptable when it appears in reality. (Hardman 2002) He claims that the war metaphor plants seeds of violence and teaches the appropriateness of war. Authors who pursuade to drop the war metaphor (and not to fight against it) talk specifically about the ‘War on Terror’ metaphor. The metaphor appeared in the post-9/11 American-led narrative. As George Lakoff and Evan Frisch (2006) observe, the War on Terror metaphor was chosen by the Bush administration even though for a few hours after the towers fell on 9/11, administration spokesmen referred to the event as a crime . The authors argue that the frame of crime “would have involved international crime-fighting techniques” (Lakoff and Frisch, 2006). Once the war metaphor took hold, the real war started. According to Lakoff and Frish, “the war metaphor created a new reality that reinforced the metaphor.” That is fi nely tuned with Julie Redstone’s (2001) article about the new rhethorics and the labeling of national policy toward terrorism as ‘America’s New War.’ She further elaborates on the power of the war metaphor: “And it involves the choice of a particular language which shapes public opinion. The language of war is created long before the first plane takes off, long before the first missile is fired, long before the first soldier sets foot on foreign soil. It is created by a consciousness, whether individual or collective, that chooses war as the most effective response to threat. This choice, in turn, shapes the consciousness of a nation” (Redstone 2001). Cognitive linguists or any authors sensitive to language and its possible effects on human minds discourage against LW: “Locked in the language of war, it’s impossible to find another way out”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW/! – Structural

Militarism contributes structural violence internationally.

Winter and Leighton 99 — Deborah DuNann Winter, a psychology professor at Whitman College, Dana C. Leighton, professor at Texas A&M University, researches in social psychology and peace psychology, 1999 (“Structural violence,” Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century, June 1st, Available Online at , Accessed 07-13-2022) //rjain

Patriarchal values also drive excessive militarism, as Deborah Winter, Marc Pilisuk, Sara Houck and Matthew Lee argue in their chapter, Understanding Militarism: Money, Masculinity, and the Search for the Mystical. The authors illuminate how socieites make soldiering a male rite of passage and proof of manhood, thereby showing the close link between militarism and masculinity. Militarization is also deeply rooted in spiritual motives, as men attempt to experience mystical sacrifice through war. Both masculinism and mysticism drive military expenditures beyond rational ends, and produce great structural violence to those (usually women and children) whose human needs for adequate food, health care, and education go unmet because arms are bought instead. In addition, market forces fuel arms production and distribution throughout the world; half the worlds countries spend more on arms than health and education combined.

The global economy that drives weapons production and excessive militarization produces structural violence on a planetary scale, especially in developing countries, as Marc Pilisuk argues in his chapter Globalism and Structural Violence. As global markets grow, income disparity increases around the world. Relaxed trade regulations and increased communication networks are creating powerful multinational conglomerates that derive huge profits off under-paid laborers in developing countries. The result is horrific structural violence to workers who toil under brutal conditions. Globalism also produces a mono-culture, in which people throughout the world learn that the good life consists of convenience products, western dress, and western values of individuality and consumerism. The seduction of western norms is disintegrating traditional societies which in the past provided meaning and care for its members. Pilisuk argues that nongovernmental organizations at the local level must work to reclaim workers dignity and neighborhoods.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW/! – Structural

Prioritize structural violence — it’s been normalized even though it’s generational and just as dangerous as direct violence.

Winter and Leighton 99 — Deborah DuNann Winter, a psychology professor at Whitman College, Dana C. Leighton, professor at Texas A&M University, researches in social psychology and peace psychology, 1999 (“Structural violence,” Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century, June 1st, Available Online at , Accessed 07-13-2022) //rjain

Direct violence is horrific, but its brutality usually gets our attention: we notice it, and often respond to it. Structural violence, however, is almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things are and always have been. The chapters in this section teach us about some important but invisible forms of structural violence, and alert us to the powerful cultural mechanisms that create and maintain them over generations.

Structured inequities produce suffering and death as often as direct violence does, though the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair. Globally, poverty is correlated with infant mortality, infectious disease, and shortened lifespans. Whenever people are denied access to societys resources, physical and psychological violence exists.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › 2NC – FW General (Long)

Plan focus makes violence inevitable --- mental deputy politics absolve individual complicity

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor – Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, p. 10-11)

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society—which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of collective irresponsibility1, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibilities of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the –well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens- even more so those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › 2NC – FW General (Long)

You can’t win offense – we aren’t policy-makers but policy analysts

Andress ‘02 – MPH, JD, Texas Program for Society and Health, Rice University and Doctoral Candidate, University of Texas School of Public Health. FrameWorks Instistute and the Center for Communications and Community (Lauri, Strategic Frame Analysis & Policy Making: Where Does SFA Fit into our Strategic Plan?, FrameWorks Institute, Issue 18)

From time-to-time after a presentation on strategic frame analysis, a group will ask how to apply this information to achieve their primary task of passing legislation, advancing a policy at the legislative level, convincing a targeted group of the public that a policy position should be supported, or creating a communications campaign to promote a specific policy position. This section is presented in an effort to ground the art and science of framing a message in the larger strategy and tactics that your organization must undertake to advance its public policy resolutions. The key point we hope to advance is that Strategic Frame Analysis (SFA) is a key building block in the policy making process and every activity that you undertake in pursuit of policy-making. Used effectively, SFA can become the foundation upon which your organization builds its policy advocacy strategy. In order to not distract us from our primary goal we will use a simplified model of the public policy process. This will allow us to more clearly demonstrate the benefits of SFA. In this case it is not the steps of the policy process or the model that we want to emphasize but the role of SFA in the process. Accordingly, the use of a standard model of policy making allows us to deconstruct the process indicating where SFA fits in each step of the policy model. Let's look at the phases of the policy making process as traditionally identified in the policy literature. Problem identification/gaining agenda status Policy Formulation and adoption Policy Implementation Policy Evaluation/adjustment/termination In order to illuminate the contribution of SFA to policymaking, we will first discuss policy making in general, presenting a normative view of the process. We will then shift to a definition that more closely matches the objectives of SFA. Next we will quickly review each policy making phase, culminating with an emphasis on the first phase, where SFA plays such a vital role. We will use examples from public health throughout this analysis. We do this for the following reason. Health outcomes are determined by a wide variety of factors that range in nature from individual behavior to medical care to socioeconomic factors. Accordingly, the decision making process involved in naming the health problem, and selecting a policy solution and intervention provides us with excellent examples to use in exploring how SFA interacts with the public policy process. Thus, it is by focusing on public health issues, we believe, that this analysis can best realize its' goal of helping you discern why SFA needs to be interlaced into your policy efforts. Policy Making Typically, policy making is described as an assembly line of the elements required to make policy: first the issue is placed on the agenda and the problem is defined; next the executive branches of government objectively examine alternative solutions based upon factual data, then select and refine them; then the executive agencies implement the solutions while interest groups often challenge the actions through the judicial branch; and sometimes the policy is evaluated and revised or scrapped. However, scholars of the policy process such as Deborah Stone say that this model fails to portray the essence of policy making which she describes as "the struggle over ideas" [2002]. Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money, votes and guns. Shared meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action. Ideas are at the center of all political conflict. Policymaking, in turn, is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification; the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide the way people behave [Stone, 2002, 11]. Using Stone's image of policymaking matched against the purpose and objectives of SFA, we can begin to see the importance of framing and how it applies broadly at every level of the policy making process. We have said that framing is a communications tool that transmits conceptual constructs able to tap into people's deeply held values and beliefs. We have also tried to indicate that behind policymaking there is a contest over conflicting conceptions of the policy based on equally plausible values or ideas. The question at each step of the process then becomes: what frame transmits the policy with concepts that represent the values and worldviews of the public, policymakers and other key groups that you need to persuade? Accordingly, framing is the key mechanism that animates the policy process. For example, the second step in policymaking is policy formulation and adoption. In this step, elected officials, house or senate committees, or the President's cabinet identify, evaluate and select from among alternative policy solutions. A rational, generally accepted view of decision-making based on reason requires the identification of objectives, the prediction of the consequences of alternative courses of action, and finally the evaluation of the possible consequences of each alternative. However, adhering to the definition of policymaking as a struggle over values and ideas, we can see that a rational step-by-step method for policy formulation based on objectivity, facts and reason is not accurate. Humans use models, metaphors and other techniques to impose structure on the world and to reduce considerations. We use stories and exclude stories as we seek order. Policy formulation as a part of policy making is, once again, nothing more than reasoning by analogy, category and metaphor where those involved, based on their values and views, strategically select the data, facts and information that will be most persuasive in getting others to see a situation as one thing rather than another. A good example of framing in relation to the description of health problems and the formulation of public health policy is Nurit Guttman's [2000] explanation of the role of values that underlie various health interventions. Guttman explains that public health interventions are not always chosen because they are effective but because they have a stronger link to certain social values over others [2000]. Health education strategies targeting individuals with persuasive techniques raise the issue of individual autonomy and privacy because they reduce the ability of individuals to freely choose among options [Guttman, 2000]. On the other hand, regulatory strategies restricting the marketplace or protecting the environment draw on the values of justice and equity and the requirement to provide people an opportunity to live in environments that promote health and minimize risk [Guttman, 2000]. Thus the regulatory restrictive health intervention is inherently associated with the values of self-actualization and the promotion of the public good [Guttman, 2000]. Various methods or strategies can be employed for the purpose of achieving the goals of a public health communication intervention. Strategies may include the use of fear arousal appeals, asking individuals to put social pressure on others, or teaching people skills such as the use of self-monitoring devices…Values clearly play a central role in the choice and application of such strategies…Questions about the morality of coercion, manipulation, deception, persuasion… typically involve a conflict between the values of individual freedom and self-determination, on the one hand and such values as social welfare, economic progress, or equal opportunity on the other hand [p. 80]. Milio, [1981] explains another frame and related underlying values to describe the selection and use of particular public health strategies and policies. The obligation of health policy, if it is to serve the health interests of the public, does not extend to assuring every individual the attainment of personally defined "health". In a democratic society that seeks at least internal equanimity, if not humanness and social justice, the responsibility of government is to establish environments that make possible an attainable level of health for the total population. This responsibility includes the assurance of environmental circumstances that do not impose more risks to health for some segments of the population than for others, for such inequality of risk would doom some groups of people- regardless of their choice- to a reduction in opportunities to develop their capacities [Milio, 1981, p.5]. The key point is that, while policymaking is a process, it is also a human endeavor and as such it is not based on objective and neutral standards. Behind every step in the policy process there is a contest over equally plausible conceptions of the same abstract goal or value [Stone, 2002]. Remember, those participating in policymaking are also driven by their belief systems, and ideology. These values and ideologies precede and shape the decisions along every step of the policy process. Steps in Policymaking Now let's take a look at how framing plays a role in each step of the process. We will begin with step two in the policy making process, leaving the first step for closer examination later. Policy Formulation and adoption occurs if an issue achieves agenda status. Policy formulation involves analyzing policy goals and solutions, the creation or identification of alternative recommendations to resolve or address the identified public problem, and the final selection of a policy. The U.S. Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and most public health experts support exchanging clean needles for used ones as a way to reduce the spread of H.I.V. infections. New Jersey- a state with more than 9,000 orphans who lost their mothers to AIDS, 26,000 people with AIDS, the nation's third highest rate of intravenous HIV infection and the nation's highest rate of infection among women and children- not only refuses to pay for needles, it used under cover police to arrest those distributing clean needles to prevent AIDS activists from violating the state ban on distributing syringes [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. Former Governor Christine Todd Whitman (R) was adamantly opposed to needle giveaways, claiming it sent the wrong message to children about drug use. Former President Bill Clinton (D) who admitted the benefits of a needle exchange program -also failed to support the effort due to pressure from the then Republican majority in Congress. [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. AIDS activist lost this war of ideas that occurred at the policy formulation stage of the process. Possible policy solutions considered were increased sex education in schools; education about and free distribution of condoms; and the distribution of needles to IV drug users [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. Facts, reason and objectivity should have induced the elected officials to select a policy of needle exchange. However, these policies invoked a series of images and ideas antithetical to the values of powerful groups in the country such as the religious right [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. These same groups then framed the policy solutions in such a manner as to make them "about" the behaviors they recognize - illegal drug use, illicit sex, and addiction -as opposed to the prevention of HIV and the death of women and children. The framing of the problem limited the policy options. Policy Implementation occurs within organizations, typically administrative bureaucracies, directed to carry out adopted polices. Occurring at the national, state and local levels, implementation begins once a policy has been legalized through a legislative act or a mandate from an official with authority to set policy. Administrators make decisions about how to deploy resources, human and financial, to actualize a policy. The war of ideas and values continues to play out even at this level because administrators must define and put into operation key terms and ideas in the legislative policy. There is often great disparity between the intentions of a policy and how it is carried out. The outcome will be affected by how the policy is interpreted, the values, ideologies, and views of the administrators, and the resources available and selected to implement the policy. Consider the national policy that over hauled the welfare program during the Clinton administration. The phrase "welfare-to-work" was termed. The President's administration made a great effort to frame the legislation as a means to transition from welfare into jobs that allowed the recipient to establish a means of livelihood. Values expressed in this case might have been "doing-no-harm", or self-actualization. But later, in the execution of the legislation, some states emphasized the transition off of welfare to jobs, while others chose to see the policy simply as a call to decrease welfare rolls. The values invoked in these kinds of programs might be described as market autonomy, utility, or efficiency. Let us also reflect on the public health mandate to decrease smoking as enunciated by the Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in Healthy People 2010. The goal is to reduce the number of adults over age 18 who smoke by 12% by the year 2010. The Healthy People 2010 website provides information for individuals on how to stop using tobacco. The federal agency also invested in public service announcements featuring Bill Cosby on a variety of topics including the tobacco issue admonishing individuals about the dangers of smoking. No mention is made in the strategies on the website regarding market place regulations or structural remedies such as the tobacco lawsuits, banning smoking in public places, or the marketing of cigarettes. Guttman [2000] says that, consciously or unconsciously, the implementation of public health communication interventions involves the application of values. For instance, the execution of stop smoking programs at the individual level assumes that individuals should be responsible for the solution to health problems and simply need to have their refusal skills improved. On the other hand, the decision to implement a program at a societal-structural level identifies the locus of solution as external to the individual. Social problems are time, place and context bound. The way the health issue is framed as a problem (or not) is likely to reflect certain priorities or ideologies of the more dominant stakeholders. The mere identification of the problem itself presents a value judgment: the particular view of the ideal state is what determines what is considered problematic, thus requiring action. Is the problem conceived as poor motivation on the part of individuals who do not adopt recommended practices? Perhaps the problem is a result of structural socioeconomic conditions such as limited access of smokers to smoking cessation programs. …The locus problem can be identified at different levels, as a lifestyle issue versus an issue mainly associated with societal structures and distribution of resources [p.74]. Policy Evaluation The final stage of the policy process determines what occurred as a result of the selection of a policy and makes corrections in the current policy or program as needed. Essentially, the final stage of the policy process assesses what has occurred as a result of the implementation of the legislative policy. Just as there is no escape from values into an objective, fact-based mode for selecting one policy in lieu of another, there is also no neutral, rational, objective way to measure and calculate the benefits or harms resulting from a policy. All the same considerations of values-based framing come into play in this seemingly "objective" phase as well. To begin to evaluate a policy, several pieces of information must be established: the goals or original objectives of the policy; a means by which to measure the extent to which goals have been met; and the target of the program or who the program was intended to affect. Assembling this information involves value laden decision-making including the views, and values of the organizations involved, the analysts, clients or the target population, and the general public who may be paying for the program with their tax dollars. When assembling the indicators of success for a policy evaluation, priorities and values become important. A particular indicator that may gauge success by one value-laden goal [efficiency] may not capture the success of the policy for another goal [community solidarity] [Guttman, 2000]. An example provided by Deborah Stone shows us how a value laden evaluative criterion figures in something as seemingly straight-forward as measuring the efficiency of a library [Stone, 2002]. Scholars agree that an efficiently run library is one that builds up a good collection of books and that a particular library in California might be more efficient if it replaced some highly paid professionals and spent the money on building the collection of books [Stone, 2002]. It is possible to imagine several challenges to the evaluative criterion of efficiency. Some citizens may value the resources available in the library in the form of storytelling for children, or jobs for teenagers [Stone, 2002]. Some might debate what a "good book collection might include [Stone, 2002]. Finally, others might say an efficient library is one that would save the users time by providing the maximum amount of assistance while the patron is using the services [Stone, 2002]. On the use of efficiency as an evaluative criterion, Stone says it "is always a contestable concept…to go beyond the vague slogans and apply the concept to a concrete policy choice requires making assumptions about who and what counts as important…The answers built into supposedly technical analyses of efficiency are nothing more that political claims" [p. 65]. "By offering different assumptions, sides in a conflict can portray their preferred outcomes as being most efficient" [Stone, 2002 p.66]. Ultimately, evaluation of a policy becomes nothing more than a selection among criterion based on values and ideologies. In the example below, one can see clearly how the selection of the evaluation criterion extricates different values. [In] ... an intervention to prevent adolescent pregnancy that chose the strategy of persuading adolescent girls to use a contraceptive implant, a likely evaluation criterion would be the relative frequency of pregnancies before and after the intervention in the target population. For stakeholders who define the problem as based on sexual promiscuity or for those who believe the girls engage in abusive sexual relationships because of low self-esteem however, this criterion would be irrelevant because these adolescent girls may continue to engage in premarital sex and may have simply adopted enhanced contraceptive practices. Stakeholders who are interested in preventing youth from being infected with sexually transmitted diseases are not likely to find this criterion satisfactory. The contraceptive implant may protect the adolescents from pregnancy, but they may continue to be exposed to infection [Guttman, 2000]. Problem identification/gaining agenda status We saved the first step in the policy process for last because it is here, more than at any other stage, that framing becomes critical. The first step involves getting a problem onto the radar screen of the legislative body that must deal with that issue [Clemons & McBeth, 2001]. Problems gain legislative attention in many ways, but typically gaining agenda status happens once there has been a value -driven, subjective determination that an issue is now a "public problem". The question then becomes: why do some issues become public problems reaching agenda status and others do not? The answer to this question has to do with frame construction in the sense that an issue must be constructed so that it is perceived as qualifying as a social problem (Best, 1995). This is a key objective in getting the attention of the legislative body in charge. This assertion is derived from the notion that issues get attention when they are labeled as social or public problems (Best, 1995). How an issue becomes a social problem is not based entirely on objective measures of the severity of the condition but rather on a host of factors related to how society perceives or constructs the information presented regarding the issue (Best, 1995). Accordingly, SFA is used to help determine the organizing constructs or values that may be used to frame an issue in order to convert it into a social problem that then captures the minds and concerns of the public and its elected officials. First, a few ideas on why a social condition is not automatically a social problem and why it must become one before it can become a priority with the legislature. Joel Best (1995) asserts that until something is labeled a "social problem" it does not rise to a level of importance sufficient to attract the attention of the public and policymakers. His view is called the subjective, constructionist perspective in that it says a social condition is a product of something defined or constructed by society through social activities (Best, 1995). For example, when a news conference is held on crack houses or a demonstration on litter, or investigative reporters publish stories, or when advocacy groups publish a report, they are constructing or framing the issue using claims that help build the issue into a social problem. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse [1977] use the term "claims making" to define the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions that result in social problems. According to all of these definitions, it does not matter if the objective condition exists or even that it may be severe. It only matters that people make claims about it in such a way that it invokes the subjective mental construct that will frame the issue in such a manner that it is believed to be a public problem of magnitude and worthy of attention. In other words, social problems are the result of claims making activities that frame the issue so that it triggers organizing principles attached to an individual's deeply held worldviews and values (Best, 1995). Claims making activities draw attention to social conditions and shape our sense of the nature of the problem (Best, 1995). Through rhetoric, every social condition can be constructed as many different social problems. A claims makers' success [or framing] depends in part upon whether their claims persuade others that X is a social problem or that Y offers the solution (Best, 1995). In the area of public health, the construction of a problem explicates embedded values and ideals of those who made the health problem in the first place [Guttman, 2000]. The results of that construction further determine whether the problem gets on the agenda as well as the range of policy solutions that appear natural or appropriate. For instance, using claims that frame the problem at the organizational level assumes a major cause of the problem is based in organizational arrangements or practices [Guttman, 2000]. The problem of an overweight America is defined as people's lack of time or facilities at work to exercise or food at work that is high in nutritional value [Guttman, 2002]. Identifying the problem of overweight adults at this marketplace level may involve a frame that links the problem to the industry's quest for profits through the marketing of inexpensive food products high in calories instead of nutritious products that are more expensive and thus made less accessible [Guttman, 2002]. In this instance, the description of the problem involves a frame and claims that value the public good over market autonomy. In order to evaluate the relative merits of different frames applied to the social problems we wish to take into the policy process, we need to ask the following kinds of questions: Would such a frame make this problem a public issue that gets the attention of the legislature? In the instance above involving the problem of obesity, we would ask: Framed in this way, would the legislature then consider marketplace restrictions on advertising or regulations on food content? This presentation was meant to leave you with two "take home" lessons. Strategic frame analysis [SFA] is a critical tool in the larger public policy strategy that your organization must implement in order to eventually win approval for your policies. The use of SFA animates the public policy process because policy making, like SFA, is driven by subjective value systems, worldviews, and ideas.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Framework › 2NC – FW General (Long)

A) Reps first – failure to analyze their discursive constructions of the opposition between self and Other guarantee error replications and policy failure

Turner ’16 – Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh

Oliver Turner, “China, India and the US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The Geopolitics of Rising Identities,” Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (2016): 922-944. Taylor and Francis.

A Genealogy of the Rebalance: Geopolitics, Postcolonialism, and the Politics of Identity

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT War and Police Are Separate

War and police power are intricately connected to preserve the State’s order

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

In an interview, South African police commander, Jeremy Vearey (), responded to a question on the apparent ‘remilitarization’ of the police by arguing that

Firstly let me just demythologise for you. The police never demilitarised and remilitarised through the sloganeering of someone. Never. Never. The structure in terms of the military tradition of instruction was always there. A militaristic way of doing tactical planning was always there. Do you understand the military way of planning? You firstly see those on the other side as an adversary.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT Perm / Alt = Abolish Police / Military

Militarism is entrenched in the Liberal Order, we must abolish the military industrial complex and the police institution

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

Despite the different political orientations which converge on the idea of militarization, it is notable how they all rely on a particular narrative about the nostalgic image of the ‘bobby on the beat’ or ‘ Officer Friendly’ being replaced by camouflage wearing brutes. Such imagery suggests that militarization is a problem because of its excessiveness (doors kicked in, armoured vehicles on the streets, officers faces hidden behind threatening helmets) – the implication being that more ‘ordinary forms’ of policing are warranted as long as it does not become excessive (). But what is often absent is that the ‘ordinary’ history of modern police institutions is itself a history of state repression, economic exploitation and structural racism. But even more importantly, police power’s intimate links with military power is in no way new or aberrational. As this article will stress, war and policing continually overlap and intertwine. This crucial relationship is often downplayed or completely omitted within much of the militarization literature. For example, much of the coverage of Ferguson focused on the newness of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams and no-knock warrants, frequently neglecting how these have historically been used against people of colour – ‘for blacks, the war on terror hasn’t come home. It’s always been here’ (). Correspondingly, tactics and expertise from imperial warfare have long fed into domestic policing in the United States – for instance, August Vollmer drew extensively on first-hand experience in brutal counter-insurgency in the Philippines, while ‘modernising’ police work in the early 20th century ().

But the problem with the militarization concept is not just conceptual, but political. The constant reiteration of a narrative in which the norms of policing are being superseded by aggressive new tactics and technologies rests on the assumption that there is a politically neutral and sociologically unbiased ideal of police which must be returned too. This is obvious in the case of some commentary: While focusing on the evils of the state, right libertarian commentaries avoid the central role of police power and violence in the fabrication of capitalist social relations – a gymnastics to be expected of a political ideology, which is based on critiquing state power while promoting unrestricted power for capital and private property (social relations that have historically been forged and protected by police power). But even more centrist liberal positions criticize excessiveness while nonetheless accepting the police as a fundamentally beneficent institution – such as the  report which suggests that the problem with militarization is that it distracts the police from their proper job. Even many radicals have problematically accepted the police mandate as one of ‘protecting and serving’; hence, the institution itself must be extricated from the bad elements of violence and abuse. When left of centre and even radical scholarly critique and alternative media accounts start to mirror critiques coming from mainstream media, state officials, and right-wing think tanks, then perhaps it is time to revisit the utility and force of normalized scholarly concepts. The fact that the mainstream media echoes the ‘militarization of the police’ mantra so easily and frequently should be a cause of concern for critical theory. In particular, the prominence of right libertarians highlights how the police militarization concept doesn’t entail an accompanying critique of the relation between capital and the police institution.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT 1033 Makes Communities Safer

1033 doesn’t make community safer – multiple studies prove

Lawrence and O’Brien 21 (Charlotte and Cyrus, special assistance for Digital, Tech, and Analytics at ACLU; ACLU Research Fellow and ACLS Public Fellow; ACLU, “Federal Militarization of Law Enforcement Must End”, May 12 2021, https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/federal-militarization-of-law-enforcement-must-end)

In addition to our examination of the potential impact of the Obama reforms on the actual equipment provided to law enforcement agencies, we also reviewed the existing empirical research on the stated value of providing such equipment through the 1033 program. Defenses of 1033 typically put forth the arguments that the program makes   and .

Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, for instance, , “Studies have shown this equipment reduces crime rates, reduces the number of assaults against police officers, and reduces the number of complaints against police officers.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT Perm Do Both

Perm fails – aff diverts the discussion from the demilitarization of the police and coops the movement

Phillips 18 (Scott, Professor at the State University of New York College at Buffalo in the department of criminal justice, Police Militarization: Understanding the Perspectives of Police Chiefs, Administrators, and Tactical Officers (1st ed), Routledge, published in New York, May 30 2018)

The extensive media coverage over several days of the police tactical operation in Ferguson, and the Senate hearings examining the federal governments funding programs for police agencies, might portend substantive changes in policing and how they are organized. At the very least changes in tactical units, and how or when they are deployed, would be expected. Past research indicated, however, that unless this policing issue consistently remained in the spotlight for a period of time, the images of militarized police officers would simply fade from the public’s memory. The police might still enact minor symbolic adjustments in their policies or procedures, but whatever institutional status quo exists in policing would be maintained. The disruption in society between the public and the police would eventually return to its usual condition of quasi-stable equilibrium. The results of the survey data collected at the National Academy in 2015 demonstrated that, for the most part, this occurred in many American police agencies. Respondents reported that their agency continue to utilize tactical units as they have in the past. While there were some minor modifications in how these units are used, or the policies associated with them, the police chief and tactical officer interviews showed that these changes may occur for reasons contrary to the “organizational survival” that is characteristic of some organizational change (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The chiefs and tactical officers argued that the components of militarization are merely tools that are occasionally required as part of policing’s role in society. Policing sees the existence of tactical units in law enforcement as perfectly reasonable. It was illuminating, however, to hear many of these chiefs and tactical officers articulate that sometimes “we are our own worst enemy.” They are aware that appearances matter, and that tactical units should be used in a judicious manner. These are the areas of change that were found in the surveys and interviews: a reduction in the use of tactical units for some types of warrants, keeping armored vehicles out of sight when they are not needed, doing a better job with transparency, and questioning the need for tactical units in some police agencies. The chiefs and tactical officers are unwilling, however, to expose themselves, their officers, or citizens to danger when handling the tasks expected of the public

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT Weapons Go To EDA or Ukraine, That’s Good

Even if some weapons goes to Ukraine, it will go to hands of terrorists, that’s an external impact for the neg

Fan and Lin 22 (Lingzhi and Xiaoy, Journalist for Global Times; Journalist for Global Times, People’s Daily, and Yerepouni Daily News) “Weapons sent by US and NATO may fall into dark net and even to terrorists, leading widespread and unbearable cost,” Global Times, June 9 2022

Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries, weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big, horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.  Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle told German media in late May that they were very concerned that the military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and in the hands of terrorists and criminals.  Previous reports show that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups, including extremist organizations, as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces. After US President Joe Biden formally signed the $40 billion aid package to Ukraine, this worry became more pressing. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back? Several experts told the Global Times that it is difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield. They noted that not only Europe, which has been deprived of its security autonomy by the US and NATO, but also the third world countries, will suffer the costs.  Those who prefer to live by the sword will fall by the sword. While the military-industrial complex profiteers, it is only a matter of time before this backfires, experts noted.

Flow of illegal weapons Jürgen Stock, the head of Interpol, warned that once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, guns and heavy arms will flood the international market, according to a Guardian report.  "Once the guns fall silent [in Ukraine], illegal weapons will come. We know this from many other instances of conflict. Criminals are even now, as we speak, focusing on them," said Stock, stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge.  Several days ago, De Bolle expressed the same concern in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt am Sonntag. She said the arms delivered from the EU to Ukraine could easily fall into the hands of criminals which would imperil the internal security landscape of the EU.  Along with weapons are bloodthirsty criminals. According to the SVR, in April about 60 ISIS militants, aged 20 to 25, were released from prisons controlled by Syrian Kurds with the intervention of American intelligence services.  They were "transferred to the US military base of Al-Tanf, located in Syria near the border with Jordan and Iraq, for combat training with the aim of a subsequent deployment to Ukraine," according to a statement from the SVR. Analysts pointed out that the frantic fascist "dream" of killing is the same on both sides of the Atlantic.  The far-right "white supremacists" in the US now also threaten ordinary people's lives. The recent spate of mass shootings in the US has made the possible influx of illegal weapons from Ukraine more even frightening.  What would it look like, on both sides of the Atlantic, if a large amount of unregulated weapons flows from Ukraine to extremists around the world? Regardless of this question, it seems that the US does not care.  On May 21, during his visit to South Korea, Biden signed into law a $40 billion aid package for Ukraine.  Previously, the US Senate and House of Representatives had quickly passed the bill with unusual "efficiency."

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › AT Weapons Go To EDA or Ukraine, That’s Good

Even if some goes to the EDA, Iraq war proves that most of the weaponry still lands in the hand of domestic police.

Lazare 13 (Sarah, Reported for In These Times and writer for Common Dreams, “’It’s Intimidating. And it’s Free’: Iraq War Surplus Militarizing US Police”, November 25 2013, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/11/25/its-intimidating-and-its-free-iraq-war-surplus-militarizing-us-police)

Weapons of occupation are coming to cities and towns across the United States after the Department of Defense handed 165 military fighting vehicles formerly used in Iraq to local law enforcement as part of a military surplus program.

This transfer of military weaponry, reported in an Associated Press  on Monday, will send mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, or MRAPs—which weigh 18 tons each and include gun turrets and bulletproof glass—to urban and rural areas, some of which don't even have the physical infrastructure to support such heavy and large vehicles.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – Nuclear War

Affs support of binaries is what causes nuclear impacts – viewpoint promotes separation

Falk ND – (Richard Falk is an international law and relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for 40 years. “The Nuclear Challenge: Seventy Years After Hiroshima & Nagasaki: Against Binaries”, Richardfalk.org, September 10, https://richardfalk.org/2015/09/10/the-nuclear-challenge-10-seventy-years-after-hiroshima-nagasaki-against-binaries/) // TMBL

Perhaps, the most blatant of all binaries bearing on nuclear weapons is between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ nuclear weapons states, which immediately reminds us of Mahmood Mamdani’s devastating critique of the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. [See Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (2005)] The United States and its allies regard themselves as ‘good’ nuclear weapons states that the world has no reason to worry about while Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are ‘evil,’ or at best ‘irresponsible’ or ‘insecure’ states that should if at all possible be disallowed to acquire nuclear weapons. It is this primary binary that provides the moral/political disguised infrastructure of NPT treaty regime, which when established was confined to the P5 of the UN Security Council, which while not conceived of as ‘good’ by the West were at least not part of ‘the axis of evil’ depicted by George W. Bush during his presidency. In this series on the nuclear challenge as of 2015, I have myself succumbed to the ‘binary temptation’ in at least two respects—distinguishing arms control from disarmament, and separating nuclear disarmament from conventional disarmament. Relying on binaries can contribute to a certain clarity of analysis, leading I believe to useful political discourse, but it is also misleading unless qualified and transcended. Dichotomizing choice and consequences in these ways can be especially useful in pointing out weaknesses and pitfalls in ‘politically correct’ methods of solving societal problems. In this spirit, I continue to believe it is illuminating to insist on the critical difference between complete nuclear disarmament as transformative of the security scene as now embedded in world order and arms control as a series of more or less helpful reformist moves that stabilize and manage the role of nuclear weaponry in contemporary security structures. These arms control moves are made without posing any challenge to the fundamental distribution of power and authority in the world, and tend to make such a challenge appear less urgent, and even of questionable benefit. From this perspective, then, a critique of the NPT regime as the preeminent stabilizing structure in relation to nuclearism seems justified. It provides the basis for setting forth an argument that the NPT approach is antagonistic, rather than complementary to denuclearization and disarmament. This is contrary to the way the NPT regime is generally explained and affirmed, which is as step toward achieving nuclear disarmament, and an indispensable place holding measure to reduce the risks of nuclear war. It is true that inhibiting the spread of nuclear weaponry seems to be in the spirit of what might be described as horizontal denuclearization, although even this limited assertion is not without controversy. The recently deceased Kenneth Waltz with impeccable logical consistency seemed to believe so deeply in rational decision making as embedded in the doctrine of deterrence that he favored the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries because it would tend to make governments more cautious, and hence nuclear war less likely. Others, including myself, are more ambivalent about such an out of the box position, worrying about any further spread of the bomb, but thinking that only when there is a sense of a loss of control in the capitals of the nuclear nine will there arise a sufficient interest in denuclearization as a genuine political project (as distinct from more or less sincere rhetorical posturing). Obama’s Prague speech in 2009 still seems sincere as of the time of its delivery, but we need to notice that it lived and died as rhetoric because it lacked legs, that is, the rhetoric was never converted into a political project. In contrast, the NPT is definitely a political project and enjoys strong geopolitical support.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – DPT

Democratic Peace Theory is empirically false and attempts by “Liberal Democracies” in justifying warfare against non-democratic/Europeans prove that Western dominance and discrimination are inherent in the thesis

Rosato, Sebastian. no. 4, 2003 “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, pp. 585–602,

The historical record indicates that democracies have failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context. This claim rests, first, on determining what democratic norms say about the international use of force and, second, on establishing whether democracies have generally adhered to these prescriptions. Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the range of situations in which democracies can justify the use of force. As Doyle (1997,25) notes, “Liberal wars are only fought for popular liberal purposes.” This does not mean that they will go to war less often than other kinds of states; it only means that there are fewer reasons availible to them for waging war. Democracies are certainly justified in fighting wars of self-defense. Locke (1690 1988), for example, argues that states, like men in the state of nature, have a right to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty, and property (269 – 72). There is considerable disagreement among liberal theorists regarding precisely what kinds of actions constitute self-defense, but repulsing an invasion, preempting an impending military attack, and fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly fall under this heading. Waging war when the other party is not engaged in threatening behavior does not. In short, democracies should only go to war when “their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states” (Rawls 1999, 90–91). Another justification for the use force is intervention in the affairs of other states or peoples, either to prevent blatant human rights violations or to bring about conditions in which liberal values can take root. For Rawls (1999, 81), as for many liberals, human rights violators are “to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention” (see also Doyle 1997, 31–32, and Owen 1997, 34–35). Mill (1859) (1984) extends the scope of intervention, arguing that “barbarous’ nations can be conquered to civilize them for their own benefit (see also Mehta 1990). However, if external rule does not ensure freedom and equality, it will be as illiberal as the system it seeks to replace. Consequently, intervention can only of conditions in which appropriate principles of justice can be satisfied” (Beitz 1979, 90). The imperialism of Europe’s Great Powers between 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal democracies have often waged war for reasons other than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values. Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies in the international system during this period, they were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Corelates of War (COW) dataset of extra systemic wars (Singer and Small 1994). OF these 66 wars, 33 were “imperials,” fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were colonial,” waged against existing colonies. It is hard to justify the “imperial” wars in terms of self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy faced no immediate threat and conquered simply for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered non-European peoples in order to create buffer states against other empires or to establish control over them before another imperial power could move in. Thus, Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order to create a buffer state against Russia, and France invaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation. Some commendations describe these wars as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of the expense of other European powers. There are three reasons to dispute this assessment. First, there wars were often preventive rather than defensive. Second, there was frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could have offered non-European peoples military assistance in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive occupations were a product of competition between Britain and France, two liberal democracies that should have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if democratic peace theory is correct.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Links › Link – DPT

Democratic Peace Theory reinforces western ideals of Democracy being an avenue to peace – provides idealistic justification for violent actions

Robert Skidelsky, 4-19-2022, "The False Promise of Democratic Peace," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/democratic-peace-theory-is-wrong-by-robert-skidelsky-2022-04//CDMoney

According to democratic peace theory, democracies do not start wars; only dictatorships do. A wholly democratic world thus would be a world without war. This was the hope that emerged in the 1990s. With the end of communism, the expectation, famously expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article, “The End of History?,” was that the most important parts of the world would become democratic.2 US supremacy was supposed to ensure that democracy became the universal political norm. But Russia and China, the leading communist states of the Cold War era, have not embraced it; nor have many other centers of world affairs, especially in the Middle East. Hence, Fukuyama has recently acknowledged that if Russia and China were driven together, “then you would really be living in a world that was being dominated by these non-democratic powers…[which] really is the end of the end of history.” The argument that democracy is inherently “peaceful,” and dictatorship or autocracy “warlike,” is intuitively attractive. It does not deny that states pursue their own interests; but it assumes that the interests of democratic states will reflect common values like human rights, and that those interests will be pursued in a less bellicose manner (since democratic processes require negotiation of differences). Democratic governments are accountable to their people, and the people have an interest in peace, not war. By contrast, according to this view, rulers and elites in dictatorships are illegitimate and therefore insecure, which leads them to seek popular support by whipping up animosity toward foreigners. If democracy replaced dictatorship everywhere, world peace would follow automatically. This belief rests on two propositions that have been extremely influential in international relations theory, even though they are poorly grounded theoretically and empirically. The first is the notion that a state’s external behavior is determined by its domestic constitution – a view that ignores the influence the international system can have on a country’s domestic politics. As the American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued in his 1979 book, The Theory of International Politics, “international anarchy” conditions the behavior of states more than the behavior of states creates international anarchy. Waltz’s “world-systems theory” perspective is particularly useful in an age of globalization. One must look to the structure of the international system to “predict” how individual states will behave, regardless of their domestic constitutions. “If each state, being stable, strove only for security, and had no designs on its neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure,” he observed, “for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.” Waltz offered a bracing antidote to the facile assumption that democratic habits are easily transferable from one location to another. Rather than trying to spread democracy, he suggested that it would be better to try to reduce global insecurity. Though there is undeniably some correlation between democratic institutions and peaceful habits, the direction of causation is disputable. Was it democracy that made Europe peaceful after 1945? Or did the US nuclear umbrella, the fixing of borders by the victors, and Marshall Plan-fueled economic growth finally make it possible for non-communist Europe to accept democracy as its political norm? The political scientist Mark E. Pietrzyk contends that, “Only states which are relatively secure – politically, militarily, economically – can afford to have free, pluralistic societies; in the absence of this security, states are much more likely to adopt, maintain, or revert to centralized, coercive authority structures.” The second proposition is that democracy is the natural form of the state, which people everywhere will spontaneously adopt if allowed to. This dubious assumption makes regime change seem easy, because the sanctioning powers can rely on the welcoming support of those whose freedom has been repressed and whose rights have been trampled underfoot. By drawing superficial comparisons with postwar Germany and Japan, the apostles of democratization grossly underestimate the difficulties of installing democracies in societies that lack Western constitutional traditions. The results of their handiwork can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and many African countries. Democratic peace theory is, above all, lazy. It provides an easy explanation for “warlike” behavior without considering the location and history of the states involved. This shallowness lends itself to overconfidence that a quick dose of economic sanctions or bombing is all that is needed to cure a dictatorship of its unfortunate affliction. In short, the idea that democracy is “portable” leads to a gross underestimation of the military, economic, and humanitarian costs of trying to spread democracy to troubled parts of the world. The West has paid a terrible price for such thinking – and it may be about to pay again.