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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AI Subs › Neg › 2NC – L – Unpopular

Democrats and republicans both hate the plan

Cohen 22 [Steve Cohen, Mr. Cohen is an attorney at Pollock Cohen in New York. He is a former member of the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Institute., 4-2-2022, accessed on 7-5-2022, New York The Sun, "Don’t Sink the Navy To Save It", https://www.nysun.com/article/dont-sink-the-navy-to-save-it mimou]

The Navy just  its Fiscal Year 2023 budget request. It calls for decommissioning 24 active warships, ostensibly to save $3.6 billion over the next five years — in order to use the savings to start building a mere nine new ships. The first problem is that both the Navy’s top officer and two successive civilian administrations have repeatedly  that the Navy must grow to 500 ships, up from 298 vessels today. Otherwise, the Navy will simply not be equipped to do the jobs demanded of it.  

The logic of cutting the fleet size today in order to fund its future growth is not finding traction among knowledgeable observers on either side of the aisle. It simply doesn't make any sense. “HINT: If you want to grow the Navy, stop decommissioning more ships than you build,” tweeted Representative Elaine Luria, a Democrat from Virginia who serves as Vice Chair of the House Arms Services Committee.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AI Subs › Neg › 1NC – L – Unpopular

Congress hates increasing funding for submarines

Larter 19 [David Larter, David B. Larter was the naval warfare reporter for Defense News. Before that, he reported for Navy Times., 12-19-2019, accessed on 7-5-2022, Defense News, "Congress slashes funding for the Navy’s LCS sensors — again", mimou]

WASHINGTON — Congress again ’s mission modules in this year’s defense appropriations bill, which will likely create further delays in fielding capabilities designed to plug into the hulls that would enable the ships to hunt submarines or destroy mines — the missions they were built to perform in the first place.

With 35 ships funded, Congress has every year since at least 2015 cut funding to the long-delayed . As the program is currently structured, each ship is either a mine sweeper, submarine hunter or small anti-surface combatant, all made possible by mission modules still under development.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Autonomous Weapons › Neg › Bans

Outright ban lacks support and is time consuming

Newstex Blogs, 10/4/2020 "A Partial Ban on Autonomous Weapons Would Make Everyone Safer". .

Oct 14, 2020( Foreign Policy: / Delivered by Newstex) The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts met late last month to discuss lethal, autonomous weapons. The semiannual meetings are the first serious effort by global governments to control autonomous weapons. And the weapons pose serious risks to global security: Even the best artificial intelligence isn't well suited to distinguishing farmers from soldiers and may be trained only on laboratory data[1] that is a poor substitute for real battlefields. As U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres[2] wrote on Twitter, 'Autonomous machines with the power and discretion to select targets and take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.'

Organizations such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots[3], the International Committee for Robot Arms Control[4], and Human Rights Watch[5] advocate for a comprehensive ban on all autonomous weapons, but such a ban is unlikely to succeed. The military potential of autonomous weapons is too great. Autonomous weapons guard ships[6] against small boat attacks, search for terrorists[7], stand sentry[8], and destroy adversary air defenses[9]. Just a few weeks ago, an AI simulation[10] defeated a living, breathing F-16 pilot five to zero in a simulated dogfight. Such an AI system could conceivably command a future aerial drone. No doubt the technology will grow and mature. No serious military power would give up such potential—especially when concerns are theoretical and adversaries may not follow suit. Russia didn't even show up to the experts' meeting. Instead of a broad ban on all autonomous weapons, the international community should identify and focus restrictions on the highest-risk weapons: drone swarms and autonomous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, known as CBRN weapons. A narrower focus would increase the likelihood of global agreement, while providing a normative foundation for broader restrictions. In 2018, the tech company Intel[11] flew 2,018 drones at once in a Guinness World Record-breaking light show in Folsom, California. Earlier this year, Russia[12] and China[13] flew light shows of more than 2,000 drones too. The drones carried flashy lights and were meant as modern fireworks, but similar drones could be designed for war with thousands of guns, bombs, and missiles.A thousand-drone swarm has a thousand points of potential error. And because drones in a true swarm communicate with one another, errors may propagate throughout the swarm. For example, one drone may misidentify a cruise ship as an aircraft carrier, then unleash the full might of the swarm on a few thousand civilians. The same may occur if the drone correctly identifies the cruise ship as not a target, but the word not is lost, due to simple accident or adversary jamming. Swarm communication also leads to emergent behavior—collective behaviors of the swarm that do not depend on the individual parts—that further reduces both the predictability and understandability[14] of the weapon. As P.W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, wrote in his book Wired for War[15], 'a swarm takes the action on its own, which may not always be exactly where and when the commander wants it. Nothing happens in a swarm directly, but rather through the complex relationships among the parts.' Drone swarms pose a greater threat to powerful militaries, because cheap drones[16] can be flung one after another against expensive platforms until they fall. In 2018, a group calling itself the Free Alawites Movement claimed responsibility for launching 13 drones[17] made largely of plywood, duct tape, and lawnmower engines that attacked Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. The movement claimed the successful destruction of a $300 million S-400 surface-to-air missile system. (The exact identity of the 'Free Alawites Movement' is unclear. The only attacks it has claimed are the Khmeimim attacks and another drone attack on a Russian naval base[18] in Syria on the same day. Sources[19] have also attributed the attacks to the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham.) Russian officials acknowledged the drones flew autonomously and were preprogrammed to drop bombs on the base but claim no damage was done. (The Russian officials did not comment on whether the drones communicated with one another to make a true drone swarm.) However, in Libya, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones[20] disabled at least nine[21] Russian air defense systems. The Bayraktar drones are considerably more advanced than those used in Syria, but they illustrate the same principle: Drones pose major threats to air defenses and other expensive systems. An adversary could fling tons of drones[22] against a $1.8 billion USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in an attempt to disable or destroy it and still have a cost advantage. Facing such a threat, great powers should choose to lead—rather than resist—the arms control charge for certain weapons. Yes, great powers would give up the potential to unleash their own massive swarms, but swarms are likely to favor weaker powers. If swarms are most effective when used en masse[23]against big, expensive platforms, then major powers that possess such expensive equipment stand to lose the most. Swarms might also be easier to control. A key arms control challenge for autonomous weapons is knowing if a weapon is actually autonomous. At root, autonomy is just a matter of programming the weapon to fire under given conditions, however simple or complex. A simple landmine[24] explodes when enough weight is put upon it; an autonomous turret fires based on analyzed information collected from sensors and any design constraints. With autonomous weapons, an outside observer cannot tell whether the weapon operates under predesigned rules or is being controlled remotely. However, no human can reasonably control a swarm of thousands of drones. The complexity is simply too much. They must monitor hundreds of video, infrared, or other feeds, while planning the swarm's actions and deciding who to kill. Such a massive swarm must be autonomous, may be a weapon of mass destruction[25] in its own right, and could carry[26] traditional weapons of mass destruction. Discussion of autonomous weapons takes place under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, assuming the weapon fires bullets, bombs, or missiles. But an autonomous weapon could just as readily be armed with CBRN agents.Autonomous vehicles are a great way to deliver chemical, radiological, and biological weapons. An autonomous vehicle cannot get sick with anthrax, nor choke on chlorine. Drones can more directly target enemies, while adjusting trajectories based on local wind and humidity conditions. Plus, small drones can take to the air, fly indoors[27], and work together[28] to carry out attacks. Operatives from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria[29] were reportedly quite interested in using drones to carry out radiological and potentially chemical attacks. North Korea also has an arsenal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and a thousand-drone fleet[30]. When robots make decisions on nuclear weapons, the fate of humanity is at stake. In 1983[31], at the height of the Cold War, a Soviet early warning system concluded the United States had launched five nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union. The computer expressed the highest degree of confidence in the conclusion. The likely response: immediate nuclear retaliation to level U.S. cities and kill millions of American civilians. Fortunately, Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer in charge of the warning system, concluded the computer was wrong. Petrov was correct. Without him, millions of people would be dead. New restrictions on autonomous CBRN weapons should be a relatively easy avenue for new restrictions. A wide range of treaties already restrict production, export, and use of CBRN weapons from the Geneva Convention to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. At minimum, governments could collectively agree to incorporate autonomous weapons in all applicable CBRN weapons treaties. This would signal a greater willingness to adopt restrictions on autonomous weapons without a requirement to resolve the question of autonomous weapons with conventional payloads. Of course, a ban may require giving up capabilities like a nuclear 'dead hand[32]'—in the words of proponents, 'an automated strategic response system based on artificial intelligence'—but nuclear weapons experts[33] are overwhelmingly[34] against[35] the idea. The risks to great powers of increased CBRN weapons proliferation and accidental nuclear war are far greater than any deterrent advantage already gained with a robust conventional and nuclear force. Placing autonomous weapons on the global agenda in the first place is a definite success—a global treaty can never be made if no one cares enough to even talk about it—but the question is what happens next. Do government experts simply keep talking or do these meetings lead to actionable treaties? What combination of inducements, export controls, transparency measures, sanctions, and, in extreme events, the use of force are best suited to preventing the threat? Historically, comprehensive bans took decades—the global community took about 70 years to go from the Geneva Protocols against chemical weapons usage to states giving up the weapons—but autonomous weapons are growing and proliferating rapidly. Countries might not be willing to ban the weapons outright, but banning the highest-risk autonomous weapons—drone swarms and autonomous weapons armed with CBRN agents—could provide a foundation for reducing autonomous weapons risks. Great powers would give up little, while improving their own security.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – at: Fem IR › PDB – socialism aff

Radical feminism and socialism both agree women are oppressed by capitalist society. The ultimate goal for feminism is to embrace socialism.

Aschoff 18- (Nicole, PhD in sociology, senior editor for Verso Book, Feminism Againist Capitalism, Publisher: JACOBIN)

So while itis certainly necessary to recognize how gendered contemporary society remains, it is also necessary to be clear-eyed about how to overcome these divides and, equally important,to recognize the limitations of a feminism that doesn’t challenge capitalism. 

Capital feeds on existing norms of sexism, compounding the exploitative nature of wage work. When women’s ambitions and desires are silenced or undervalued,they are easier to take advantage of. Sexism is part of the company toolkit, enabling firms to pay women less— particularly women of color— and otherwise discriminate against them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – Fem IR/Gender › At: Cap K › Perm

The future of labor is women and that entails that women are treated equally throughout the workplace, history shows us the journey that was made for moder women to be in the workforce at all

and Eileen Boris: Hull Professor, Graduate Director, Specialization: Labor Studies, Gender, Race, Class, Women's History, Social Politics, Areas of study: gender, race, and class, feminist theory, labor studies, social politics, women, work, and welfare, women's and gender history . Annelise Orleck: U.S. history since 1877 /U.S. political history /U.S. women /women and American radicalism /race, ethnicity and immigration /Jewish immigration, gay and lesbian studies .

A century after the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, women have become nearly half of the unionized labor force. They work in the growing service and public employment sectors as nurses, home attendants, teachers, and clerks. Previously labeled women’s issues—maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and work-family balance—have become union issues. Women hold leadership positions in the AFL-CIO and Change to Win. With the disappearance of manufacturing and the growth of service labor, women of color—both immigrant- and U.S.- born—have become the driving force in the labor movement for safe jobs, living wages, and dignity at work, leading women-dominated unions and worker associations. It is not an overstatement to say that the future of the labor movement appears up to the women. 1.It hasn’t always been this way. For at least a century, labor feminists have fought for the interests of wage-earning women and workingclass housewives, both within the feminist and the labor movements. Still, the priorities of the women’s movement for sex-based rights and those of the labor movement for class solidarity often diverged during the twentieth century. Working-class feminists struggled against middle-class feminists who focused primarily on achieving equality with male professionals and executives. They also battled men who sought to exclude women from unionized jobs and who denied organized women workers a full share of power in the labor movement.

Highlighting key moments when feminists and unionists came together over the last century, this essay offers a usable past drawn from the fraught—but often productive—relationship between feminism and labor. An examination of the contact between organized women’s groups and organized labor, women’s organizations within the labor movement, and feminist labor organizing shows that when feminists and unions worked together, both benefited. Labor gained when it understood women’s issues as crucial for the advancement of the working class. The women’s movement was at its strongest when its membership and agenda crossed class lines. Recognition of this history may help to revitalize feminism as much as organized labor.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – Fem IR/Gender › At: Cap K › Perm

Socialism and feminism are interconnected and there is still progress to be made on the basis of equality

Simone Morgen 14 Simone Morgen is an officer of Democratic Socialists of Central Ohio, a branch of Democratic Socialists of America. She is a long-time volunteer and activist with Jobs with Justice and numerous other groups, including more recently and immigrant support groupsIn 2012, she was Constituent Liaison at the State of Ohio - AG office.

Why, indeed? Isn’t Rosa Luxemburg a socialist icon? Don’t socialism’s core values of equal treatment of all persons, without prejudice or disparate treatment, address feminist concerns?

Formally, yes – but a cursory examination of the ways in which issues are addressed even within socialist circles brings this into question. Even in these more favorable environs, the need for an explicitly feminist view remains. After all, patriarchy as a sex/gender system of organizing society existed long before the capitalist mode of production revolutionized society and colored its directives. How would feminism change our common vision? Most obviously, feminist socialism recognizes that work and economics are different for men and women and takes that into account. Too often, socialists overlook the fact that women’s earnings trail men’s for many reasons. These include 1) their greater representation in low-wage jobs; 2) greater numbers in government jobs, which have been getting cut due to the recession and attacks on public sector workers; and 3) lifetime lower earnings, due to a pay differential that has hardly moved in the past 10 years. Outside the formal economy, women also do the vast majority of un-waged work, whether in the home or the informal economy. A feminist socialist vision recognizes the immense unpaid labor that sustains the capitalist economy and the need to address it when developing an alternative, so that the burden of holding up family and community doesn’t fall disproportionately on women yet again. Why is this critical fact so often overlooked by socialists who lack a feminist analysis? 

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – at: Fem IR › PDB – socialism aff

Radical feminism and socialism both agree women are oppressed by capitalist society. The ultimate goal for feminism is to embrace socialism.

Aschoff 18- (Nicole, PhD in sociology, senior editor for Verso Book, Feminism Againist Capitalism, Publisher: JACOBIN)

So while itis certainly necessary to recognize how gendered contemporary society remains, it is also necessary to be clear-eyed about how to overcome these divides and, equally important,to recognize the limitations of a feminism that doesn’t challenge capitalism. 

Capital feeds on existing norms of sexism, compounding the exploitative nature of wage work. When women’s ambitions and desires are silenced or undervalued,they are easier to take advantage of. Sexism is part of the company toolkit, enabling firms to pay women less— particularly women of color— and otherwise discriminate against them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – Fem IR/Gender › At: Cap K › Perm

The future of labor is women and that entails that women are treated equally throughout the workplace, history shows us the journey that was made for moder women to be in the workforce at all

and Eileen Boris: Hull Professor, Graduate Director, Specialization: Labor Studies, Gender, Race, Class, Women's History, Social Politics, Areas of study: gender, race, and class, feminist theory, labor studies, social politics, women, work, and welfare, women's and gender history . Annelise Orleck: U.S. history since 1877 /U.S. political history /U.S. women /women and American radicalism /race, ethnicity and immigration /Jewish immigration, gay and lesbian studies .

A century after the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, women have become nearly half of the unionized labor force. They work in the growing service and public employment sectors as nurses, home attendants, teachers, and clerks. Previously labeled women’s issues—maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and work-family balance—have become union issues. Women hold leadership positions in the AFL-CIO and Change to Win. With the disappearance of manufacturing and the growth of service labor, women of color—both immigrant- and U.S.- born—have become the driving force in the labor movement for safe jobs, living wages, and dignity at work, leading women-dominated unions and worker associations. It is not an overstatement to say that the future of the labor movement appears up to the women. 1.It hasn’t always been this way. For at least a century, labor feminists have fought for the interests of wage-earning women and workingclass housewives, both within the feminist and the labor movements. Still, the priorities of the women’s movement for sex-based rights and those of the labor movement for class solidarity often diverged during the twentieth century. Working-class feminists struggled against middle-class feminists who focused primarily on achieving equality with male professionals and executives. They also battled men who sought to exclude women from unionized jobs and who denied organized women workers a full share of power in the labor movement.

Highlighting key moments when feminists and unionists came together over the last century, this essay offers a usable past drawn from the fraught—but often productive—relationship between feminism and labor. An examination of the contact between organized women’s groups and organized labor, women’s organizations within the labor movement, and feminist labor organizing shows that when feminists and unions worked together, both benefited. Labor gained when it understood women’s issues as crucial for the advancement of the working class. The women’s movement was at its strongest when its membership and agenda crossed class lines. Recognition of this history may help to revitalize feminism as much as organized labor.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***AFF – Fem IR/Gender › At: Cap K › Perm

Socialism and feminism are interconnected and there is still progress to be made on the basis of equality

Simone Morgen 14 Simone Morgen is an officer of Democratic Socialists of Central Ohio, a branch of Democratic Socialists of America. She is a long-time volunteer and activist with Jobs with Justice and numerous other groups, including more recently and immigrant support groupsIn 2012, she was Constituent Liaison at the State of Ohio - AG office.

Why, indeed? Isn’t Rosa Luxemburg a socialist icon? Don’t socialism’s core values of equal treatment of all persons, without prejudice or disparate treatment, address feminist concerns?

Formally, yes – but a cursory examination of the ways in which issues are addressed even within socialist circles brings this into question. Even in these more favorable environs, the need for an explicitly feminist view remains. After all, patriarchy as a sex/gender system of organizing society existed long before the capitalist mode of production revolutionized society and colored its directives. How would feminism change our common vision? Most obviously, feminist socialism recognizes that work and economics are different for men and women and takes that into account. Too often, socialists overlook the fact that women’s earnings trail men’s for many reasons. These include 1) their greater representation in low-wage jobs; 2) greater numbers in government jobs, which have been getting cut due to the recession and attacks on public sector workers; and 3) lifetime lower earnings, due to a pay differential that has hardly moved in the past 10 years. Outside the formal economy, women also do the vast majority of un-waged work, whether in the home or the informal economy. A feminist socialist vision recognizes the immense unpaid labor that sustains the capitalist economy and the need to address it when developing an alternative, so that the burden of holding up family and community doesn’t fall disproportionately on women yet again. Why is this critical fact so often overlooked by socialists who lack a feminist analysis? 

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › At: Perm

Embracing a feminist method that rejects liberal assumptions key to solve fascism and war

Quinn 19- (Erin, Graduate student at University of London,  Why Our Feminism Must be Anti-Facist, Publisher: Centre for Gender Studies.)

SOAS’ Centre for Gender Studies concluded its seminar series for the term on Thursday, December 13th, with a discussion of the relationship between feminism and anti-fascism with activists from Sisters Uncut, a feminist direct action group fighting in solidarity with survivors of domestic, sexual, and state violence, and Brazilian Women Against Fascism UK.

The panel discussed the rise of fascism in the UK and around the globe, connected solidarity against oppression and state violence, and highlighted the challenges facing feminist activists. The rise of figures like new president-elect of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and Boris Johnson fuel normalize fascist discourse, expanding violence. Within this context, the panel was a poignant and timely reminder that feminism must be grounded in anti-fascism, and anti-fascism must be grounded in feminism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › FW

Politicians valorize masculinity in politics and oppress women and feminism. Politics are always seen as masculine.

Löffler et al. 20 [Marion, Department of Political Science University of Vienna, “Political Masculinities and Populism”, NORMA]

Politics is most often conceived of as a gender-neutral practice guided by rationality. Yet, as is the case more generally in society, masculinity operates as a hidden (human) norm structuring politics. As the ‘unmarked’ gender category, its influence has remained hidden from critical enquiry. However, since the early 1990s, a growing body of literature in masculinity studies generally, and masculinities in politics in particular, has debunked the myth of the gender-neutrality of politics and made masculinity visible (see Starck & Sauer, 2014). As is the case in masculinity studies, right-wing populist discourse currently refutes the rational and gender-neutral image of politics. Yet unlike masculinity studies, masculinity is not open to critical enquiry among right-wing populists. Rather, populist politicians such as Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin promote and valorize the relationship between masculinity and politics (Boatright & Sperling, 2020; Sperling, 2015). Newly emerging versions of right-wing populism have been described as being misogynist and sexist: they oppose feminism and gender-equality measures, same-sex marriage and gender studies; they seek to re-instantiate traditional family and associated gender roles; and they pursue a strong-man style of political leadership (Dietze, 2018, p. 34; Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 7; Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic, & Sauer, 2018; Mayer, Sori, & Sauer, 2016; Norocel, 2013, p. 5). At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the seeming ‘gender traditionalism’ of populism (Sauer, Kuhar, Ajanovic, & Saarinen, 2016) is undercut by the existence of female leaders of populist parties and populists’ appeals to European values of gender-equality and emancipation (Akkerman, 2015; Dietze, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic, & Sauer, 2014). This special issue contributes to the debate on gender and populism by focusing on the relationship between the concepts of political masculinities and populism. It developed from a conference on Political Masculinities and Populism, hosted by the Political Masculinities Network in December 2017, and based at the University of Koblenz-Landau. The research network was established in 2012. It aimed to bring scholars together, from different disciplines, who hold a common interest in the political dimensions of masculinities. The Political Masculinities Network merged with the Uppsala network on Men in Politics in 2018. This research network is committed to critical research on political masculinities and seeks to encourage a broad church of cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary debate with the aim of comparing, contrasting, and where possible integrating different modes of understanding and related findings from across academic disciplines. The special issue contributes toward this project. We provide a brief overview to this topic in this introductory paper. The concept of populism Populism is a contested concept (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). It is frequently used in media and political debate but difficult to define as an analytical concept. The term refers to different and conflicting political groups and projects. Whilst in Europe it is most often associated with the (radical) political right, the United States have a tradition of ‘liberal populism’, an expression, which in Europe would be ‘a blatant contradiction’ (Müller, 2016, p. 9). Populism has also been linked with left-wing politics, especially in South American and southern European countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), whereas some populist movements are best described as hybrid in combining elements of left and right (Brubaker, 2017, p. 358f.). Moreover, their social basis may be agrarian or urban; their economic policies protectionist and state-centred or neoliberal and market-centred; they may be secular or religious; and they may celebrate cultural liberalism or attack it. Populist politicians may be challengers or incumbents seeking to mobilize or demobilize. Consequently, scholars from different backgrounds use the term to describe different phenomena, which in turn have inspired different analytical approaches. For instance, the study of populism in Latin America focuses predominantly on economic and organizational aspects of populism, while European scholars use to stress the political and ideological aspects (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17f.) In seeking to define the concept of populism, the only common basis for doing so is that all populist movements, parties, figures, and regimes claim to speak in the name of ‘the people’ against various ‘elites’ (Brubaker, 2017, p. 359; Müller, 2016, p. 20). However, speaking in the name of the people is assumed in modern democracies, and not confined to populists. Further disagreements in definition ensue where some scholars see populism as an ideology of democracy (Canovan, 2002), while others view it as intrinsically anti-democratic, as ‘a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures of [electoral-representative] democracy’ (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 265). Yet others see its effect as enabling democratization processes or contributing to the dismantling of democracy, depending on the type of populism and on the political system in which it occurs (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 86). This reveals the ambiguity of the concept of democracy and its defining notion of ‘the people’ shifting between meanings of them as ordinary (plebs), as sovereign (demos), and as culturally or ethnically distinct (nation or ethnos). Therefore, ‘the people’, though crucial for democracy, is essentially an empty signifier (Laclau, 2007), which comes to represent something different across cultural, historical, political and regional contexts. Although populism as an analytical concept is contested, we agree with Rogers Brubaker (2017, p. 358) that it is indispensable in understanding the current ‘populist moment’. Moreover, many scholars on populism agree that a key feature of populists is their claim to be the ‘true democrats’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4) by not only claiming to speak in the name of ‘the people’, but the whole people, following ‘the idea that it’s possible for the people to be one and – all of them – to have one true representative’ (Müller, 2016, p. 20). Populists combine this with a further claim that the current political establishment fails to represent ‘the people’, or more specifically, the general will of ‘the people’ (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p. 61). Central to the populist claim is the notion that ‘the people’ does not equate with the citizenry of a country, but refers to an imagined ‘heartland’ of a virtuous, pure and uncorrupted population (Taggart, 2000, p. 95). These notions are in line with the definition of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544), which considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2014; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 18). In understanding populism (‘us vs. them’) as ‘thin-centred’, it cannot stand alone, but is always in need of a host ideology, which can be either right- or left-wing. This minimal definition of populism is consistent with the analytical approaches that are applied in the papers included in this special issue. They study populism, for example, as a political style (see Löffler) or as discourse generating heterogeneous and inconsistent messages (see Wiedlack). They analyse the persona of a populist leader (see Starck) or emphasis on how Weber’s notion of charisma contains populist claims to being against elites (see Geva). And finally, they problematize the relationship between right-wing populism and minority groups (see Lobban et al.). Populism and gender There is an extensive literature discussing gender and populism. The following overview is not intended to be exhaustive, but to illustrate the research perspectives of this still growing field of research. Recent research on populism and gender focuses on a wide range of individual, political and social processes including, for example, the representation of women in populist parties (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), their performance (e.g. Norocel, 2018) and leadership (e.g. Meret, Siim, & Pingaud, 2017); on the gender and the psychological characteristics of populist supporters (e.g. Coffé, 2018) as well as gendered voting behaviour (e.g. Spierings & Zaslove, 2015, 2017); on the (anti-feminist) gender ideologies of right-wing populist actors (e.g. Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Kováts, 2018) and their conservative gender (family) policies (e.g. Akkerman, 2015). With regard to the prominence afforded women in left- and right-wing populist parties, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) challenge the Männerparteien thesis (‘men’s parties’) formulated by Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002). They argue that while right-wing populist parties in Northern Europe perform on average worse than other political parties, even if they have a female leader, left-wing populist parties in South America seem to be progressive. However, the difference relates to the cultural context, a highly emancipated society in Northern Europe and strongly patriarchal societies in South America (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17). Yet the degree to which a party may be considered progressive may not necessarily be determined by women’s political prominence (Caravantes, 2019; Norocel, 2018). The cult of personality around populist leaders contributes to the masculinization of politics. The charismatic leader is frequently seen as a feature of populism (e.g. Taggart, 2000); though gender neutral, the descriptions of charisma often reveal framings that feature predominantly masculine attributes (Meret, 2015, p. 83). This leader is usually portrayed as a masculine and potentially violent ‘strongman’, ruling on the basis of ‘a cult of a leader’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 63). Thus, there is an emphasis on action and the courage to take difficult decisions, which relies on anti- intellectualism and urgency and exemplified by the leader’s virility, the use of simple and vulgar language, and, of course, the leader’s charisma (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 64–68). As noted above, research has pointed to a gender paradox, namely the existence of populist ‘men’s parties with women leaders’ (Meret et al., 2017). Female populist leaders such as Eva Peron (Argentina), Pia Kjærsgaard (Denmark), Marine LePen (France), Sarah Palin (United States) or Alice Weidel (Germany) question the taken-for-granted masculine qualities of populist leaders and populism as well as, indeed, masculinities themselves. Gender research on (Northern and Central) Europe often focuses on the populist radical right parties (Akkerman, 2015; de Lange & Mügge, 2015; Mayer et al., 2018; Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015) that emerged as a political force since the 1980s (Mudde, 2004). Populist radical right parties are characterized by their opposition to immigration as their most salient and most successfully exploited issue. Consequently, they do not only construct an ideological difference between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, but also between ‘the people’ as insiders and ‘others’ (outsiders) who pose a threat to ‘the people’. Since 2001, Islam has been singled out as the main threat. Examining the vote for populist radical right parties, a gender gap has been observed where more men than women are supportive of them (Harteveld, Van Der Brug, Dahlberg, & Kokkonen, 2015). However, the most important reason reported in individuals supporting populist radical right parties remains the same for men and women – namely their opposition to immigration (Spierings et al., 2015). The gender gap in voting for right-wing populists is often overemphasized (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015) and reproduces the notion of tolerant women vs. intolerant men. Yet we witnessed a large proportion of women voting for the 45th President of the United States. Moreover, there have been other minority group movements who espouse support for right-wing populists such as ‘Gays for Trump’ and ‘Alternative Homosexuals’ who are part of the German right populist AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). Populist radical right parties often hold contradictory gender ideological views (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Dietze, 2018). They typically emphasize the traditional family and gender roles as core institutions of society and oppose same-sex marriage as well as abortion. But in debates concerning immigration, in contrast, populist radical right parties have adopted more liberal views of gender relations by emphasizing gender equality, women’s rights and freedom of choice (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40; Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). This apparent contradiction, between the ‘liberal’ defence of gender equality in debates on immigration on the one hand, and the ‘conservative’ defence of the traditional family and gender roles on the other, has been explained by discursive shifts in populist rhetoric when constructing ‘others’ – ‘those up there’ (the elite) or ‘not us’ (Muslim immigrants) (Mayer et al., 2014). Many right-wing populists support movements against gender equality, which have been understood as a conservative backlash against levels of equality achieved between women and men and/or LGBTQ rights (Kováts, 2018, p. 529). Most right-wing populist parties do not only support traditional gender norms, but hold essentialist notions of gender as determined by sex. They conceive of feminism as a threat to the ‘natural’ division of the sexes, and hence, oppose policies that promote gender equality. This is seen, for example, in their frequent demand to have gender studies removed from university curricula (Küpper, 2018; Mayer et al., 2018). However, ‘gender’ also stands in as a placeholder or empty signifier. As discussed at the European Conference of Gender and Politics in 2019, in Poland and other post-communist European countries, gender equality is sometimes framed as ‘communist’ and therefore ‘anti-democratic’. This perspective fuels the populist claim that gender equality measures are an elitist ideology working against ‘the people’. In right-wing populist discourse ‘the people’ is constructed in terms of biological essentialism (Mayer et al., 2016), based on the idea of the traditional conjugal family as the natural cornerstone to society, as well as the pre-eminence of men and masculinities in politics (Kreisky, 2014). Political masculinities In contrast to the construction of men and masculinity in populist political discourse, we suggest elaborating a concept of ‘political masculinities’ that can inform critical gender research. In order to facilitate cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary dialogue, Kathleen Starck and Birgit Sauer propose a broad definition of political masculinity, which encompasses any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by ‘political players’. These shall be individuals or groups of persons who are part of or associated with the ‘political domain’, i.e. professional politicians, party members, members of the military as well as citizens and members of political movements claiming or gaining political rights. (Starck & Sauer, 2014, p. 6). This broad definition of political masculinity has served as a foundation for a growing body of work, fostering dialogue between a wide range of disciplines, on topics as diverse as political masculinities’ involvement with, and associated tensions in, prevention of violence against women initiatives in the United Kingdom (Burrell, 2020); political masculinities in parliamentary debates during Austria’s period of postwar nation-building (Löffler, 2019); the Indian state’s intervention, along with the role played by both state and non-state political masculinities, in practices of sex selection (Rahm, 2019); and the political masculinities of pro-feminist men involved in an Israeli high school gender equality intervention programme (Schwartz, 2020). These, and other studies, have contributed toward developing the concept of political masculinity/ies. A few key observations are useful in this respect. Starck and Luyt (2019) recognize that the original definition particularly speaks to masculinities that are more overtly, or easily recognized, as political (e.g. professional politicians). Yet they stress the importance of including individuals, groups, practices or representations of those whose impact on or within the political sphere is less easily identified (e.g. citizens, media tycoons, global businessmen/women). This allows us to scrutinize the dynamics of interactions between a wide range of ‘political players’ and masculinities, an indispensable focus for analysing change in gender relations. Political masculinities are crucial in the reproduction of power relations. However, the concepts of gender and masculinities include dimensions of power. Masculinity is therefore always political. While gender and masculinities are inextricably political concepts in the production and reproduction of power, it is argued that the concept of political masculinities holds particular use in ‘instances in which power is explicitly either being (re)produced or challenged’ (Starck & Luyt, 2019, p. 435). We see the reproduction of power through political masculinities clearly in the contributions toward this special issue. For example, Dorit Geva describes how Marine Le Pen draws on charisma, as a characteristic of political masculinity that is not in conflict with notions of political femininity in France, in order to further her political influence; Marion Löffler demonstrates that masculinities exist as a symbolic resource that is flexibly drawn upon by political actors in Austria to further their political advantage; whilst Kathleen Starck similarly identifies Nigel Farage’s (United Kingdom) active construction of his persona to incorporate different representations of masculinity in order to appeal to a wide national audience.

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Sexism or hegemonic masculinity dominates politics and devalues both femininity's values and international relationship in order to sustain gender hierarchical politics. A reformation to politics is needed for liberating females from gender opposition.

Tickner 92   - (J.Ann, Distinguished Scholar in Residence School of International Service,“Engendered Insecurities Feminist Perspectives on International Relations,” Gender in International Politics,  New York: Columbia)                  

           Hegemonic masculinity is sustained through its opposition to various subordinated and devalued masculinities, such as homosexuality, and, more important, through its relation to various devalued femininities. Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men's stated superiority. Nowhere in the public realm are these stereotypical gender images more apparent than in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy. 

          Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity depends on its opposition to an unequal relationship with various subordinated femininities. Many contemporary feminists draw on similarly socially constructed, or engendered, relationships in their definition of gender difference. Historically, differences between men and women have usually been ascribed to biology. But when feminists use the term gender today, they are not generally referring to biological differences between males and females, but to a set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. These characteristics can and do vary across time and place. In this view, biology may constrain behavior, but it should not be used "deterministically" or "naturally" to justify practices, institutions, or choices that could be other than they are. While what it means to be a man or a woman varies across cultures and history, in most cultures gender differences signify relationships of inequality and the domination of women by men. 

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Framework: Equality is not achieved purely by an increase in women in power but with a change in the system itself. Instead of focusing on individual’s positions the neg focuses on the bigger picture and calls out institutions. A feminist lens provides the ability to cause a structural change in an inherently masculine system. The alt solves hierarchies of hegemonic masculinity

Tickner 92’ – [J. Ann, theorist distinguished scholar in residence at the School of International Services, “Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security”, Columbia University Press] 

Since, as I have suggested, the world of international politics is a masculine domain, how could feminist perspectives contribute anything new to its academic discourses? Many male scholars have already noted that, given our current technologies of destruction and the high degree of economic inequality and environmental degradation that now exists, we are desperately in need of changes in the way world politics is conducted; many of them are attempting to prescribe such changes. For the most part, however, these critics have ignored the extent to which the values and assumptions that drive our contemporary international system are intrinsically related to concepts of masculinity; privileging these values constrains the options available to states and their policymakers. All knowledge is partial and is a function of the knower's lived experience in the world. Since knowledge about the behavior of states in the international system depends on assumptions that come out of men's experiences, it ignores a large body of human experience that has the potential for increasing the range of options and opening up new ways of thinking about interstate practices. Theoretical perspectives that depend on a broader range of human experience are important for women and men alike, as we seek new ways of thinking about our contemporary dilemmas. Conventional international relations theory has concentrated on the activities of the great powers at the center of the system. Feminist theories, which speak out of the various experiences of women-- who are usually on the margins of society and interstate politics-- can offer us some new insights on the behavior of states and the needs of individuals, particularly those on the peripheries of the international system. Feminist perspectives, constructed out of the experiences of women, can add a new dimension to our understanding of the world economy; since women are frequently the first casualties in times of economic hardship, we might also gain some new insight into the relationship between militarism and structural violence. However, feminist theories must go beyond injecting women's experiences into different disciplines and attempt to challenge the core concepts of the disciplines themselves. Concepts central to international relations theory and practice, such as power, sovereignty, and security, have been framed in terms that we associate with masculinity. Drawing on feminist theories to examine and critique the meaning of these and other concepts fundamental to international politics could help us to reformulate these concepts in ways that might allow us to see new possibilities for solving our current insecurities. Suggesting that the personal is political, feminist scholars have brought to our attention distinctions between public and private in the domestic polity: examining these artificial boundary distinctions in the domestic polity could shed new light on international boundaries, such as those between anarchy and order, which are so fundamental to the conceptual framework of realist discourse. Most contemporary feminist perspectives take the gender inequalities that I have described above as a basic assumption. Feminists in various disciplines claim that feminist theories, by revealing and challenging these gender hierarchies, have the potential to transform disciplinary paradigms. By introducing gender into the discipline of International Relations, I hope to challenge the way in which the field has traditionally been constructed and to examine the extent to which the practices of international politics are related to these gender inequalities. The construction of hierarchical binary oppositions has been central to theorizing about international relations. 29 Distinctions between domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, and center and periphery have served as important assumptions in theory construction and as organizing principles for the way we view the world. Just as realists center their explanations on the hierarchical relations between states and Marxists on unequal class relations, feminists can bring to light gender hierarchies embedded in the theories and practices of world politics and allow us to see the extent to which all these systems of domination are interrelated. As Sarah Brown argues, a feminist theory of international relations is an act of political commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated. "There is the need to identify the as yet unspecified relation between the construction of power and the construction of gender in international relations." 30 Acknowledging, as most feminist theories do, that these hierarchies are socially constructed, also allows us to envisage conditions necessary for their transcendence.

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Hegemonic masculinity sustains historical inequality

DiGioia, Amanda, 12 October 2020 “Duelling, the Russian Cultural Imagination, and Masculinity in Crisis”

Traditionally, the study of men has been called ‘history’, but there are also intersections between studying men and studying gender. For over thirty years, the study of gender has encompassed the study of both men and masculinities. Men and masculinities are shaped by differences of age, class, and ethnicity, and exist among other social differences (Kimmel et al., 2005, p. 3). There is also evidence that masculinity can be transgressed (Beasley, 2015; McGuffey & Rich, 1999; Surkis, 1996; Tsirigotis, 2017). However, toxic masculinity (and, by extension, duelling) is not transgressive; instead, it adheres to and upholds those norms.

Masculinity has been the subject of much previous scholarship, and contemporary masculinity scholarship is heavily influenced by a single theoretical framework established by Raewyn Connell. Connell’s theory acknowledges that while masculinities vary across time, culture, and individuals, there has been a practice (hegemonic masculinity) that legitimises men’s position as dominant in society (androcentrism), while subordinating women and men from marginalised groups (Connell, 1995). Hegemonic masculinity may explain why men maintain positions of power, because women, marginalised men (those in the LGBTIQA+ community, people of colour, Jewish men, etc.), and those of other genders are subsequently coded as female or women (Connell, 1995). An integral part of the continuing appeal of Connell’s theory is that the theory itself provides a critical feminist analysis of historically specific masculinities while at the same time recognising the various extents to which individual men contribute to its propagation. Finally, Connell notes that hegemonic masculinity is the currently accepted strategy in human societies, acknowledging that hegemonic masculinity can be challenged, changed, and usurped (Connell, 1995).

2022 Michigan Kritik
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Masculine imagery ensures nuclear priesthood – causes the normalization of nuclear use

Blanchard 14 (Eric M., Adjunct Assistant Professor Columbia University, “Rethinking International Security: Masculinity in World Politics”, Fall/Winter 2014, The Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2014), , pd)

Gender scholars have demonstrated how masculinity affects foreign policy planning and decision making among security elites and small advisory groups as well as sub-state militias. Though it does not explore the group's dynamics, Carol Cohn s classic investigation of Cold War defense intellectuals demonstrates the importance of masculine club mentality. The "nuclear priesthood" of men charged with crafting U.S. nuclear strategy shared a language of abstraction and masculine imagery that normalized, sanitized, and legitimized the discussion of mass killing, leaving them detached from the realities of the potential use of nuclear weapons.39 Relatedly, Robert Dean shows how President Kennedy surrounded himself with elite advisors who were shaped by and drew upon institutionalized ideals of masculinity to form a privileged "brotherhood." These gendered ideals intersected significantly with class: the exclusively male boarding schools these men had attended were seen by parents as paths to help their sons overcome upper-class effeminacy. The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), the elite all-male group of national security advisors Kennedy gathered to manage the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oc tober 1962, was an assembly of warrior-intellectuals credentialed through the process of passing through such boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities, and clubs; validated by voluntary military service; and mentored by men "connected across generations by institutional ties of patronage, class tradition, education, and fraternalism" and "bound together by a common conception of patrician 'manliness' and heroism."4 A focus on the role of masculinity within another type of small group, autonomous nationalist militias such as the ones that participated in sexual violence atrocities committed in Bosnia in the 1990s, or more recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reveals the roles of masculine hierarchies and frustrations related to unachievable and idealized militarized masculinity. Enloe's analysis of interviews conducted with men accused of raping and kill ing Bosnian Muslim women in the 1990s revealed hierarchies among Serbian militia, illustrating how systematic rape during wartime is "fueled" by inter-male relations.41 Members of militia groups in the DRC were asked to explain the way they justified and normalized sexual violence. Their answers relied upon logics derived from discourses of masculinity and femininity, inculcated in part by the institutional promotion of ideals, such as the "(hetero)sexually potent male fighter," that code certain types of rape as inevitable and a result of the sexual needs of the soldiers, while others are seen as less legitimate deviant expressions of frustrations due to wartime circumstances.42 These soldiers "explicitly their rationale for rape with their inabilities (or 'failures') to inhabit certain idealized notions of heterosexual manhood," including that of the eco provider, seen as legitimately dominant in their households.43 Sub-state Bureaucracies and Organizations Militaries are among the most significant domestic-level organizations and have been a prominent focus of gender and masculinity research. Feminist IR scholarship has highlighted "the way the military functions in our societies] as a central guarantor and producer of masculinity."44 The tenuousness of the military's production of official masculine legitimacy is signaled by military efforts to exclude gay and female soldiers using ostensible morale and unit cohesion concerns to camouflage anxieties over "maintaining the institution's heterosexual masculinity."45 The dependence of military organizations and bureaucracies on the con struction of a variety of military masculinities is evident from their recruitment strategies and organizational structures. There is a complex relationship between militarism, masculinity, and military recruitment strategies.46 Melissa T. Brown ™ discusses the variety of masculine constructions underwriting American military recruitment campaigns in the wake of the end of the draft and inception of the all-volunteer force. Brown argues that recruitment materials for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force evoke varied masculinity types, not just traditional war rior masculinity, tailoring their appeals to meet particular recruitment targets depending on the branches' needs for combat-related or technical skills, for women and military careerists, or for larger or smaller numbers of recruits.47 The importance of masculinity extends beyond the recruiting stage to the organization of state militaries, distinct from the smaller, non-state militias - ... . discussed previously. Connell has argued that internal masculine hierarchies, “physically violent but subordinate to orders on the one hand, and dominating and organizationally competent on the other" are foundational to military organization.48 In these organizations, occupational status and career advancement cannot be disentangled from the operation of masculinity. This is seen, for example, in the way U.S. Navy personnel draw upon different elements of a menu of masculine qualities to navigate the branch's competitive atmosphere and advance their careers. Lower-status supply officers (tasked with administration, inventory, and accounting), who are excluded from the risk-taking behavior and autonomy reserved for high-status pilots and Naval aviators, distinguish themselves by emphasizing the professionalized technical rationality, efficiency, and responsibility in their roles.49 Pressure on these officers is attenuated by the Navy's organizational culture of constant evaluation and competitive testing that demands officers continually demonstrate their masculinity and avoid acquiring a reputation for failure. This masculine competition has spillover effects outside the organization. According to the Department of Defenses "Tailhook Report" issued in 1993, Navy members' notorious behavior (including the sexual ha rassment and assault of female naval officers) in a convention hotel was also an outgrowth of competition between units of the Navy.50 At this level, IR scholars typically focus on the impact of the internal workings of the nation-state, including factors such as domestic politics, the character of a state's political-economic system (or regime type such as democratic or authori tarian), culture, nationalism, the role of interest groups, and public opinion. The number of powerful critiques concerning security and the state provided by feminists is too voluminous to summarize.51 Relative to the volume of main stream scholarship on the state level, feminists have paid less attention to the possible relationship between gender and the democratic peace—the influential thesis that democracies rarely fight other democracies but can be quite belligerent in their dealings with non-democracies. Thus, feminists left it to non-feminists such as Francis Fukuyama to speculate, without evidence, that "feminized" de veloped democracies, where women's political participation has expanded, are more peaceful than authoritarian states, and thus vulnerable to prédations of more masculinized states.52 Feminists have, however, problematized both this posited relationship between women and peace and the common link between alleged peacefulness of democratization and women's political participation.53 Like feminists, masculinity theorists have noted that the institutions that make up the state have been subject to male domination and continue to remain so. The link between nationhood and manhood and the centrality of masculinity to nationalism are stressed by masculinity scholars who point to the value nationalist movements place on terms such as honor, bravery, cowardice, duty, and patriotism, which "are hard to distinguish as either nationalistic or mascu linist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness. Furthermore, the way nationalist movements reflect "a masculinist definition of femininity and of women's proper place in the nation" relegates women to the roles of mothers and symbols of national honor." At this level, analysis shows how the operations of masculinity in the domes¬tic political space help account for various types of state behavior. For example, U.S. gender dynamics before the Spanish–American war provide a window into the relationship between gendered domestic political pressures, pre- vailing notions of masculinity and leadership, and the decision to en-gage in war. Masculine political culture is a resource for leaders looking to characterize the threat posed by other states. In the late nineteenth century, a variety of factors combined to pose a threat to champions of a "manly ideal of politics" and martial conceptions of citizenship. Such factors included the U.S. political climate at the time, the depression of 1893, the closing of the Western frontier, and more assertive, activist female political participation (presaging a possible feminization of politics)." For jingos (those advocating for war with Spain) of the 1890s, the answer to these threats was to go to war as a way of "inculcating manhood."" Domestic calls for war to avenge the sinking of the battleship Maine eventually pressured U.S. President William McKinley 72 to declare war on Spain, illustrating the extent to which the president's political authority was—and still is—predicated upon martial masculinity. Masculine imagery in a domestic political culture—including media, fic-tion, and films—also impacts the evolution of alliance formation between states. For example, Michelle Mart historicizes the close ties between the United States and Israel by analyzing cultural constructions of Israel throughout the 1940s and 1950s.57 Once stereotyped as cowards and passive victims of the Holocaust, Israeli Jews were reimaged during the Cold War struggle as masculine insiders worthy of being allies. Enhanced by Israel's military successes, images of Israe¬lis as tough pioneers, gutsy underdogs, and citizen soldiers were posed against increasingly unmasculine representations of Arab outsiders in a manner that enhanced Israel's perceived value as a U.S. ally.

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Traits associated with masculinity are glorified and encouraged in military institutions, specifically violence

Henry 17 – Marsha, Associate Professor in the Department of Gender Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, “Problematizing military masculinity, intersectionality and male vulnerability in feminist critical military studies”, 2017, Informa UK limited, “http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/79648/1/Henry_Problematizing%20military%20masculinity_2017.pdf”

First, two key works have influenced the development of the concept of militarised masculinity and masculinities, and I acknowledge the specific contribution of two scholars. First Enloe has encouraged scholars to pay attention to the process of militarisation rather than focus narrowly on the ideology of militarism in her ground-breaking work on gender and international relations (Enloe 1991). In this work, Enloe develops further her concept of military masculinity when thinking about the ways in which military institutions are sites of the production of both culture and gender. Here she suggests that gender roles are given opportunity and space to play out, as well as to produce extremes---hyper military masculinity being one example. She also points to the ways in which certain forms of martiality (exclusively associated with men) is hyper-valued within most societies and how this contributes to the glorification of men’s participation in violence and war. In thinking about military masculinity, it is not surprising then that feminist scholars such as Enloe, began to think about the process of socialising that takes place in militarised settings (Enloe 1983, 2000). Thus the social, constructed, contingent, fluid and multiple ways in which individuals are produced as gendered subjects, given a prescribed set of gendered roles, and how those individuals identify themselves, and perform gender within military institutions and settings has been afforded critical attention (Enloe 2000, Whitworth 2004, Higate 2003; Parpart 2015; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Belkin 2012). Early conceptualisations of military masculinity focussed almost exclusively on formal military settings---that is on national and state militaries. In general, military masculinity tends to be utilised in a range of feminist scholarship as a ‘thing’ that is carried, possessed or produced as an object through military socialisation and found within military culture (except Enloe 2003). As such, it was seen, in the early inception, as a singular form of gendered practice---following on from Connell’s early conceptualisations of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995, 2005). Of course the ways in which military masculinity has evolved as a conceptual lens and a site for empirical research means that there is no single definition, nor is it confined to feminist theorists alone. Military institutions now consistently analyse their own gendered and racialised cultures---although very often this is for improving efficiency and effectiveness in military operations. Further theorisations include that of Dudink, Hagemann and Tosh (2004) Parpart and Zalewski (2008) Belkin (2012), Whitworth (2004); Masters (2005); and Duncanson (2009, 2013, 2015). However, it was Paul Higate’s edited collection (2003) that took up the challenge of further theorising military masculinity. In particular the work engages with Connell and other masculinity scholars and succeeded in pluralising militarised masculinity. This work expanded the concept in such a way that scholars no longer talked about masculinity within military settings as something culturally specific, socially entrenched, pathological, or always already there in the same form--- rather Higate’s collection emphasises at how men [sic] become ‘manly’ warriors through twin processes of gender and military socialisation (ed. Higate 2003). The 2003 collection suggests that it is difficult to simply place the military and masculinity (in an additive way) together---rather both are mutually constituting. At times, in analyses it is difficult to pinpoint which is more influential--- military culture or gender culture! Importantly, Higate’s collection began to pave the way for thinking about militarised masculinities in non-traditional contexts. Thus, work on masculinity amongst rebel groups, militias, gangs, thugs, terrorists and jihadis began to be developed within this sub-field (Amar 2013; Rommell 2016). This challenged the idea that military values only belonged to fields where there was a formal military setting. More contemporary work is concerned with the drone operator, the military lawyer, the conscious objector and so on (Tidy 2015, 2015a). These two tracks of argument have been absolutely crucial to the conceptualisation and use of the term militarised masculinity/masculinities. This is because militarised masculinities mean that the fluid nature of militarisation and masculine socialisation in these frames allows scholars to focus on masculinities in practice and discourse. Rather than using militarised masculinity as an explanation for various negative developments within military settings, scholars are encouraged to probe deeper into what militarised masculinities look like and how they come into being. For example, in Stern and Ericsson-Baaz’s study of perpetrators of sexual violence, they focus on the discourses of perpetrators of sexual violence in the DRC construct as to their different motivations for such acts of brutality (Ericsson-Baaz and Stern 2012). In their research, they pay attention to the narrative strategies used by men to construct and produce themselves as fearsome and honourable military men despite admitting to being part of the perpetration of violence. Similarly, Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport in their work on models of masculinity in the Israeli context demonstrate the influence of nation on men’s different constructions of masculinity (Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport 2003). Lomsky-Feder and Rappoport view masculinities as being produced hierarchically in one military context, and as being influenced by very different military experiences (Russia and Israel). Both of these scholars’ use of militarised masculinity provide us with a more complex account of what motivates men to commit violence (organised or otherwise) in certain contexts, rather than assuming that it is merely an unintended consequence or unintentional by product of male embodiment or male sex roles and military culture. Thus the work of Cynthia Enloe in challenging understandings of militarisation, and Higate’s edited collection on militarised masculinities was a catalyst for rethinking military masculinities and masculinities in conflict (Kirby and Henry 2012). This is turn led to the development of work examining a range of masculinities within militarised (and not only military) settings—in particular Belkin’s work Bring Me Men, was seminal in challenging the idea that military masculinity is a singular and homogenous outcome of military socialisation and/or military culture and that it is always constructed in opposition to femininity and/or heteronormativity. Titinuk’s challenge to narrow definitions of military masculinity (2012) went some way to challenge any tendency towards simplistic or pathological definitions by demonstrating that military organisations also revere various personal characteristics traditionally associated with femininity such as sacrifice, compassion and cooperation. Thus militarised masculinities are not constructed purely on the disavowal of all that is feminine or associated with women. This led to two further developments. The first was a minor interest in female military masculinities (Tasker 2011). Tasker used the portrayal of female soldiers in Hollywood films to reconceptualise military masculinity without the male body---influenced by Halberstam’s work on female masculinities more generally (Halberstam 1998). Tasker takes Halberstam’s conceptualisation of non-normative gender and sexuality is applied to female soldiers who are depicted as occupying a parodic, mimicking or inauthentic military masculinity. In the films Courage Under Fire and GI Jane, Tasker finds evidence of military masculine space where women are able to perform gender in both conventional and unconventional ways. Actress Demi Moore, for example, labours to shed her ‘femininity’ by shaving her head and wearing an undershirt traditionally seen as men’s attire, in order to be accepted as a legitimate soldier. Moore’s character is finally accepted as a legitimate man amongst her male military peers, after she demonstrates her ability to be ‘just like the men’ in her squad. This work contests the scope of military masculinities by insisting not only on their plurality, but by questioning the very constitution and production of masculinity as a social expression of gender. The other development is found in work examining both military femininity (Ombati 2015) and masculinity, as Dietrich does in her 2012 piece on militarisation in Peru, El Salvador and Colombia. This work, along with that of scholars such Myrttinen (2013); Parpart (2016); Maringira (2015) and Stachowitsch (2015) begins to pay attention to internal differences and inequalities amongst men. What these more recent works suggest is that the study of militarised masculinities has expanded considerably and draws on a range of concepts and theories. This is why it is unsurprising that intersectionality has appeared in the literature. Masculinity scholars have looked towards feminist theory for some time now, and in order to understand the complex theoretical terrain of military and militarised masculinities, scholars have turned to ‘classic’ texts, including that by Crenshaw and other intersectional theorists. As such, it is not surprising that the intersectional ‘turn’ should now make headway within the study of men, masculinities and the military

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Impact

US geopolitics uses hegemonic masculinity to justify violence and hatred of femininity.

Gökarıksel et al. 19 [Banu, Professor of Geography, studies of Feminist Political Geography and Geopolitics, Demographic Fever Dreams: Fragile Masculinity and Population Politics in the Rise of the Global Right, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society Vol. 44, Issue 3]

We turn to feminist geopolitics to understand the embodied and everyday workings of the state, borders, and political ideology, and how bodies and the most intimate aspects of life are deeply geopolitical.1 Recent research has analyzed, for instance, the ways that differently valued bodies are counted or uncounted (Hyndman 2007), violence of war spills into domestic violence (Pain 2015), the idea of the nation impinges on the bodies of ordinary people traveling through their daily lives (Fluri 2011), and the “war on drugs” comes home (Massaro 2015). This scholarship builds on well-established work on embodied nationalism that demonstrates how the nation is racialized and gendered to justify violent masculinity in its defense.2 Its focus on the political emergence of a violent masculinity as dominant complements theories of masculinity, specifically R. W. Connell’s (1987) conceptualization of hegemonic masculinity as an idealized form that regulates and shapes the range of masculinities possible within a society (see also Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Linking embodied nationalism to emergent hegemonic forms of violent masculinity deepens the analysis provided by ethnographies and oral histories that center the lived and gendered experience of such violence.3 At the same time, this research contributes to geographies of masculinities that emphasize multiple, fluid, and relational production of masculinities that are influenced by the political, racial, gendered, religious, and class dynamics of specific localities, as well as global discourses and geopolitical strategies.4 Peter Hopkins’s (2008) work, for example, shows how the US-led war on terror has deeply impacted the formation of youthful Muslim masculinities and their everyday lives in Scotland, while Claire Dwyer, Bindi Shah, and Gurchathen Sanghera (2008) analyze the effects of the transformation of South Asian Muslim men’s image, from “cricket lover” to “terror suspect” in in the post–September 11 United Kingdom. Feminist political geography has been especially effective in noting theways that a national sense of insecurity is generated by political actors to shore up agendas, while human security is simultaneously undermined.5 Here, we train our eyes on embodied life as the site where nationalist and geopolitical conflicts are constituted through webs of affective relationships and mark certain bodies as threatening and fearsome. Barbara Spackman’s (1996) work on fascist virilities and Klaus Theweleit’s (1987) work on male fantasies point to a relationship between the politics of strongmen and gendered narratives around the creation of masculinity and the risks of the feminine. Theweleit connects military masculinity with violence, specifically fear-based hatred of women and femininity in the fantasies of the Freikorps, a volunteer army that fought internal revolution in interwar Germany. Many of the Freikorps would go on to Nazi leadership. In their narratives, Theweleit finds that female figures are the object of violence but violence that is imagined to be self-defense and linked to fears of dissolution—of society, of one’s own masculinity, and of the prospect of being overwhelmed, softened, dissolved. It is a masculinity that is both hard and violent but also quite fragile8. As Sara Ahmed (2004, 33) suggests, “the normative subject is often secured through narratives of injury: the white male subject, for example, has become an injured party in national discourses, ... as the one who has been hurt by the opening up of the nation to others.” The spread of this discourse is facilitated by the majority male subject’s access to resources and thus access to “the capacity to mobilise narratives of injury within the public domain” (33). The need for both the strong masculine figure and the victim narrative means that the figures to be protected are majority women; this enables men to both claim injury (to “their” women) but also claim the position of the strong though embattled savior. In these rhetorical moves, demographic fever dreams provide a similar fantasy world to fulfill the logics critiqued by scholars above, by rewriting histories and futures with majority figures centered as the true protagonists of history. The stories told by white nationalists in the United States and Europe, by Hindu nationalists in India, and by Erdoğan’s espousal of a vigorous and modern Sunni youth are stories in which the chaotic diversity of a multicultural world and the messiness of women and femininity are both backdrop and adversary in a story line centering strength and the masculine hero as the true protagonists of all stories. Here, the centering of one man as savior is not a fluke, a distraction, or a sideshow but is critical to the functioning of the dream.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Impact

Hegemonic masculinity leads to militarization, dehumanization, and expansion. These cause war and mass violence.

Wojnicka 22- (Katarzyna, Associate Professor of Sociology, Editor-in-chief for NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies, “NORMA, Volume 17, Issue 2 (2022), Publisher: Taylor & Francis Online)

Ukrainians awoke on the 24th of February 2022 to find themselves in a conflict over which many had been dreading but which almost as many had also thought impossible. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has also meant that we, non-Ukrainian Europeans, find ourselves in a time in which the term ‘crisis’ has taken on a much more direct presence. After over 20 years in which the so-called ‘War on Terror’ wrought death and destruction ‘elsewhere’, the actual conflict between sovereign nation-states, with the prospect of spilling over into yet another European war involving multiple nation-states is now a reality. The horrors of war are happening closer to our own countries than many of us have experienced in our lifetimes.

The gender dynamics of the invasion of Ukraine are impossible to ignore. War re-installs gendered demarcation lines that many of us, naively, thought was a relic from the past. Masculinity is mobilized as a rhetorical figure and symbolic resource in the brutal reality for all these young men and women that have to go into a war declared by older men. In the character of the fascist strongman who has become a cult figure in the global far-right, we can see someone who has been valued at home and abroad precisely for his compensatory masculinism (Löffler, Luyt, & Starck, ) as well as ridiculed in Western media (Wiedlack, ). Then there is the resilient, David-esque figure who has been championed for his intransigence and refusal to give up in the face of insurmountable odds. Caught in-between these political leaders are the military conscripts of all genders who are putting their lives at risk, as well as women and children who are being forced to flee as a result of imperialist aggression. On social media, people are celebrating the loss of human life and glorifying militarist responses from political leaders whilst those of us in Finland and Sweden find ourselves closer to NATO membership than at any point during our intertwined histories. It is a new formative moment that most of us wish could have been avoided.

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Alternative

Communication strategies of the cyberfeminist virtual community with the most popular feminist groups.

Martyanov Denis 2019 “Communication Strategies of Networked Feminism in Russia” Department of Political Institutions and Applied Political Research Saint Petersburg State University St. Petersburg, Russia

Changes in Internet technologies, significant shifts in political discourse, the transformation of feminism itself will force to take a fresh look at cyberfeminism. Donna Haraway’s classic “cyborg feminism” was criticized and even considered an “antifeminist” direction [9]. 

The modern cyberfeminism is no longer a monolithic movement on western society. J. Danilels says that more accurate to refer to the plural, “cyberfeminism(s)” [1]. Old cyberfeminism gives way to new cyberfeminism(s) and networked feminism(s). 

2022 Michigan Kritik
***NEG › Alternative

We solve the Aff’s impacts -- the core value of feminism is pacifism and the end of war. Hegemonic masculinity is key to violence.

Rodríguez-Galán 11 (Marta B, Associate Professor of Sociology/Anthropology & Public Health, Director Gerontology, Hegemonic Masculinity and Counter-hegemonic Feminist Discourses for Peace, Publish: St. John Fisher College.) JYC

The position of women condemning war as mothers has been the subject of much debate among feminists, a debate that probably traces its roots to old discussions of equality and difference feminism and interpretations of the roles of women within the family. Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain are among the pro-family feminists who have theorized about pacifist feminism (Elshtain, 1985; Ruddick, 1983). Ruddick proposed that “maternal thinking,” a way of being in the world based on the concept of “preservative love,” could present a counter ideology to a male dominated culture. Moreover, maternal thinking is not unique to women, nor to mothers, as both men and women and those without children can adopt a nurturing disposition and be socialized into maternal thinking (Ruddick, 1983). For this pacifist feminist, maternal thinking would represent the antithesis of violent masculinity. While opposed to war, Ruddick believes that there is no contradiction between being a feminist and defending the right of women to participate in the military, while at the same adopting a pacifist philosophy. In fact, the incorporation of women in the military as conscripts—not volunteers—could help to “pacify the forces,” as long as many of these women would help introduce maternal thinking. Moreover:

We acknowledge the existence of good causes and the necessity of some battles but claim that there are entirely or principally nonviolent ways of fighting them that are at least as effective as violence (the effectiveness of which is always exaggerated) and that these nonviolent solutions cost less morally, physically, and psychologically.2