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2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Warming

Discourse analysis is a prior question – if we win a link argument that proves the aff is based on a production of knowledge which favors certain understandings of reality while marginalizing others - their global environment scenario ensures extinction and a diversion from real science

Karin Bäckstrand, Wallenberg Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, and Eva Lövbrand, Department of Environmental Science at Kalmar University, 2006, Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 6 No. 1, pg 50-75

Discourses of Environmental Governance Discourse analysis has gained ground and proliferated in the analysis of global environmental change in sociology, political ecology and policy studies. A central insight of this disparate work is to identify power relationships associated with dominant narratives surrounding "environment" and "sustainable development." Four dimensions of discourse analysis that are prominent in the literature and relevant for our study are highlighted. First, discourses are conceived of as a shared meaning of phenomena. Global environmental change in general and the role of terrestrial carbon sinks in particular are permeated by a struggle over meaning and symbolic representation. In line with Hajer we understand discourses as "specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices." Secondly, the exercise of power is closely tied to the production of knowledge, [End Page 51] which in turn can sustain a discourse. Hence, discourses are embedded in power relations, "as historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth--what is possible to speak at a given moment." Discourses as "knowledge regimes" bring us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven global environmental change research especially, modern scientific knowledge, techniques, practices and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses. Thirdly, in line with argumentative discourse analysis, we subscribe to a conception of discourse that bridges the gap between the linguistic aspects and institutional dimensions of policy-making. In this vein discourse analysis can be brought to the forefront of the analysis of power and policy. Policies are not neutral tools but rather a product of discursive struggles. Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others. The concept of discourse institutionalization is useful as it refers to the transformation of discourse into institutional phenomena. Fourthly, we align ourselves with a discourse analysis that includes a notion of agency. Recent studies have advanced concepts such as "discourse coalition" and "knowledge broker" to highlight how agents are embedded in discourses. In this perspective, discourses are inconceivable without discoursing subjects or agents that interpret, articulate and reproduce storylines congruent with certain discourses. We use the concept of discursive agent and argue that political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the term for the discourse.To conclude, we employ a discourse-analytic framework that sheds light on how discourses are deeply embedded in scientific practices and techniques, institutionalized in global policy arenas and articulated by agents spanning the public-private and local-global divide. In the sections below we present each of the three discourses that arguably underpin policy practice and academic debates of environmental governance. They provide rough maps for understanding the discursive framing of contemporary global environmental politics. However, as will be demonstrated, each discourse is heterogeneous and thus in a constant change and redefinition. Consequently, there are overlaps and conflicts between the discourses when making sense of environmental governance.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Warming

That destroys movements which are key to solving warming in the real world

Brinsmead, 98 [Robert D. – Hall of Fame Winner of the Tweed Business Excellence Award, “APOCALYPTIC AND CLIMATE CHANGE”]

APOCALYPTIC AND CLIMATE CHANGE: Apocalyptic has a 100% failure rate. Yet the question is raised whether climate change apocalyptic might be the one awful instance when apocalyptic proves to be right - like the boy who repeatedly cried “Wolf!” Apocalyptic takes its name from an aberrant form of Judaism that developed around 200 B.C. It prevailed until the bar Cochba revolt in 135 C.E. That was when it finally managed to destroy itself in an ill-conceived “end-time” conflict with the Romans. After this, Rabbinic Judaism pronounced a curse on any Jew who persisted with apocalyptic. Scholars of apocalyptic literature and apocalyptic movements recognize that this development within Judaism was the classical form of apocalyptic, providing a kind of paradigm for other apocalyptic movements right down to our day, including especially America’s religious Right, Marxism and Environmentalism. Apocalyptic has been called “a theology [or a world view] of despair,” meaning that it is an outlook that has lost faith in the historical process. After Judaism had been ruled by one great power after another (Babylon, Persia, Greece and Syria), it lost faith that its aspirations for independent statehood under its own Davidic king would take place within the ordinary historical process. It therefore focused on a very bloody “end-time” solution that would terminate the ordinary historical process. The hallmark of apocalyptic is to see the world getting worse and worse – whether that is the ruling powers getting worse and worse (Jewish apocalyptic), humanity getting worse and worse (Christian apocalyptic), capitalist society getting worse and worse (Marxist apocalyptic), or the environment getting worse and worse (Greenpeace-style apocalyptic). In the case of the apocalyptic Zealots within Judaism, (if I may borrow some striking imagery from Albert Schweitzer) they threw themselves on the wheel of history in a last desperate effort to make it turn. The wheel turned, but it crushed them rather than ending Greco-Roman civilization and the historical process. With its 100% failure rate, apocalyptic movements illustrate one thing that apocalyptic environmentalism is yet to learn: it is people who are fragile, not the world with its historical process. Its climate change alarmism is just another form of Salvationism - in this case the salvation of a supposedly fragile earth that is about to be destroyed by human activity. When even school children are being conscripted to play a role in “saving the planet” by doing good little deeds like cutting back on water and energy consumption, planting trees and riding bikes instead of using cars, we may see how far this apocalyptic salvationism has penetrated the popular culture. Suppose we ask a good geologist such as Professor Ian Plimer to tell us, especially in the context of the current global warming panic, whether the earth is so fragile that it calls for human efforts to save it. Plimer has already given his published answer, and it is almost like a snort of derision. In The Past is the Key to the Present, Plimer says: “For at least the last 2500 Ma, the continents have been pulled apart and stitched back together. Every time the continents are pulled apart, huge quantities of volcanic H2O, CO2 and CH4 are released into the atmosphere and greenhouse conditions prevail. When continents stitch together, mountain ranges form. Mountains are stripped of soils, new soils form and remove CO2 from the atmosphere, these soils are stripped from the land and the CO2 becomes locked in sediments on the ocean floor. When atmospheric CO2 is low, glaciation occurs. Large climate cycles can be related to plate tectonics.” (The full paper may be viewed at www.climatechangeissues.com/files/science/Plimer.doc ) Plimer goes on like this for page after page, portraying planet earth being pelted and pummeled with asteroids, intense global volcanism, mass extinctions, great ice ages, inter-glacial periods much warmer than our present “five minutes” of global warming, enormous sea-level changes, variations in atmospheric carbon dioxide from 6% to our present 0.037% and lower. In short, a planet that has survived what planet earth has survived for 4.5 billion years is anything but fragile. Plimer has also said that he wrote A Short History of Planet Earth because he “was inspired by a Greenpeace banner which read ‘Stop Climate Change.’ To stop climate change, one must stop supernova eruptions, solar flaring, sunspots, orbital wobbles, meteorites, comets, life, mountain building, erosion, weathering, sedimentation, continental drift, volcanoes, ocean currents, tides and ice armadas – no mean feat, even for Greenpeace!” www.smedg.org.au/plimer0701.html Whether the earth, including its climate system, is fragile or resilient goes to the heart of the climate change debate. The kind of world view that we bring to the debate determines how the facts about C02 and the climate are interpreted. For instance, if in discussion with a climate alarmist you point out that CO2 represents only 3.6% of all greenhouse gases, and that humans produce only about 3% of all CO2 emissions, you may then make the point that the human contribution is only 0. l8% - not much more than 1 part in a 1000 of all greenhouse gases. If anyone quibbles on the exact percentages here, you can double the human contribution and it is still comes out a very tiny number in the whole greenhouse equation. When the warming alarmists are confronted with these facts, they must resort to the argument that the climate is so finely tuned and earth’s systems are so fragile that this small human contribution – a human burp in a thunderstorm when compared with the vast natural greenhouse emitters - will cause a catastrophic tipping point in the earth’s fragile climate system. There is no danger that this super-tough, resilient old planet will not be able to take a bit of extra CO2 in its stride as it has repeatedly done in its past history anyway. So much for the myth of the fragile earth! It is also a dangerous myth because like all apocalyptic myths it has the capacity to hurt people. The policies being advocated by the climate change alarmists call for drastic economic and social changes, and they won’t be satisfied until they have destroyed civilization as we know it. If climate apocalyptic goes the way of all apocalyptic in being impatient and intolerant, no changes are going to be rapid enough or severe enough to inaugurate its post-industrial age. It will therefore throw itself on the wheel of history to force it to turn. We should already know the outcome.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Warming

Warming rhetoric gets co-opted by the military furthering militarism - that turns the case

Marntinot, 07 [Steve – Instructor at the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs at San Francisco State University, “Militarism and Global Warming”]

In other words, war is the factor that renders the military a self-generating cyclic producer of global warming. Wars add untold and inestimable damage to the ecology on all levels, while fulfilling their major function of producing mass murder. War is the essential logic of a military machine, and of an ethic and a politics of militarism. Its fundamental purpose is to guarantee access to resources, and in particular petroleum, for its constituency. Its constituency is the US economy, and US industry. As the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world, its role is to guarantee the continued consumption of petroleum by the US economy, the largest national consumer of petroleum in the world. In addition, the military has become a major industrial factor in the US itself, as part of a greater economic cycle. This is a result of an ancillary economic process, the movement of runaway shops and of whole industries relocating to lower wage areas. Some industries moved south, others to Latin America, others to Asia or wherever on the globe they could be more exploitative. The US government, from the Reagan administration on, has provided subsidies to major industries to move to low-wage areas, and produced agreements in many countries for establishing export production zones — that is, zones in which production is only for export; they add little to the local host economies, and create international assembly lines whose only coherence is the multinational corporate structure that controls it. The effect of this process has been to gut the industrial base of the US economy. The subsidiary internal effect was that the military, the one industry that could not run away because it was strategic, gained economic hegemony by default. The US economy fell into the hands of the military-industrial complex. This brings us to the third dimension of militarist self-generation as a global warming factor. In the face of runaway industries, the US economy has become dominated by military production. The military is now connected and conjoined to roughly 50% of all economic activity in the US. This doesn’t mean that 50% of all production is military production; it means that 50% of all economic activity is associated with the military, either in the production of military hardware, the running of bases, or in ancillary industries whose major customer is the military, and who thus owe their existence and functions to that major customer. Military appropriations by Congress may be 25% of the budget, but there are ripple and multiplier effects that expand the economic involvement of the military to far beyond that 25%. 
… the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Here is how corporate control of the economy, a history of militarism, and corporate globalization all come together. The US military is what facilitated the acquisition of exploitation rights in other countries by US corporations, leaving the US economy essentially a military-oriented economy. That is, militarism has engendered a military economy. Second, it fosters a situation in which a transnational corporate structure becomes the predominant political force in the world; and the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Its ethics are governed by the maintenance of its stock value on the stock markets of the world. Thus, resource exploitation is its food, and resource consumption is its metabolism. Militarism is the way corporations maintain their access to their food supply — the planet. Because the military economy is by nature a monopoly, owing to government control, security clearances, national security considerations, etc., all military industries fall into a culture of corruption that is far beyond that of ordinary industries. This corruption is a cultural phenomenon that makes health and longevity an ancillary concern. In the interests of that corruption, beyond profit or stock price levels, the military drives the political processes and thinking of this society to ideologically ignore or deny the problem of global warming. The profit picture is important, of course, and it leads the oil and coal interests to buy prostituted scientists to help them promulgate that denial. But the real opposition to recognition of global warming is more immediately the corruption that exudes from the military and its militarism. In order to seriously address the problem, the movements (ecology, environmentalist, anti-consumption, alternative energy) will have to be anti-militarist. The military is key to the cycle of self-generation of global warming at the human (initiatory) end of the spectrum of factors. The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology in the world. It has to be seen as lying at the heart of the offense itself. 
The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology …It is not possible for the environmental movement to take a step toward preserving the environment unless two things are brought to an end — the existence of the US military machine and the existence of the corporate structure.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Terror

The case is a lie – terrorism truths are produced by fearmongering and faulty knowledge of the Other

Spencer, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich (Alexander, and Rainer Hülsse, Assistant Professor of International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, “The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn,” Security Dialogue vol. 39, no. 6, December)

In any case, most of what has been written on Al-Qaeda is based neither on interviews nor on field research conducted inside the organization. Rather, it builds on less-direct information – it is ‘veranda terrorism research’. Among the sources used are already existing studies of Al-Qaeda, media information and intelligence reports. Obviously, this leads to a rather incestuous field of knowledge, where one scholar reproduces the unverified views of another and thus contributes to the circulation of the ever-same ‘facts’ (Reid, 1993). This is hardly a new insight about terrorism research, however. Back in 1988, one review found that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research’ (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 177). Another remarked that ‘with a few clusters of exception there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism’ (Gurr, 1988: 2). These findings have been subsequently confirmed – and deplored – on numerous occasions (e.g. Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001, 2004; Horgan, 2004; Schulze, 2004; Ranstorp, 2007). Obviously, this lack of primary research further aggravates the problem identified above, as it adds another layer of interpretation. Studies of this kind which predominantly use secondary information are interpretations of how others (e.g. intelligence staff or field-researching terrorism scholars) have interpreted Al- Qaeda members’ self-interpretation. And yet, despite these various filters, information in such studies is presented as though it provided objective accounts of the reality about Al-Qaeda. This is particularly true for work that draws on intelligence reports and treats them as though they were primary sources (e.g. Burke, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002; Jacquard, 2001; Koch, 2005; Reeve, 1999). Yet, even if an intelligence report is based on successful infiltration, it provides not a description but an interpretation of Al-Qaeda.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Terror

Framing of terrorism is based on irrational thoughts that create endless war and state control

James Der Derian, leading IR theorist, respected professor, Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts, 12/19/2008, Critical Practices in International Theory, pg. 70-72

For some, this kind of intellectual activity might be considered subversive. Indeed, former Secretary of State George Shultz in a major policy address on terrorism stated that the US cannot effectively respond to terrorism unless Americans are of  one mind on the subject: "Our nation cannot summon the will to act without firm public understanding and support." Without such a consensus we risk becoming, in Shultz's words, "the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond." I believe, however, that it is time to take up a position of detachment towards terrorism that Hedley Bull approvingly referred to as "political nihilism". After all, "when times are out of joint," as they were for Hamlet and as they to be for the USA as the 1980s took a radical turn, we might find in Hamlet-who through his passionate yet intellectual introspection discovered just how rotten the declining state could be-a better guide than, say, Henry V-who "because he did not know how to govern his own kingdom, determined to make war upon his neighbors." We might also discover that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the official terrorist discourse, perhaps even uncomfortable truth that there is some of the terrorist in us, and some of us in the terrorist. My response, then, to Shultz is more diplomatic than politic:the new antidiplomatic estrangement of international relations requires that we endlessly mediate the terrorist act and the response to it with a deeper and broader knowledge of all practices of global political violence. Otherwise, the will to act becomes inseparable from the will to know, and terrorism becomes indistinguishable from counter-terrorism. Moreover, an alternative approach is needed because the problem of terrorism is implicated by a profound predicament that now confronts advanced societies. Call it late capitalism, post-modernism, post-warring, or as I prefer, neo-medievalism, it is a disturbing anxiety-inducing condition in which traditional modes of knowledge and formations of identity no longer seem up to the task of representing, let alone managing international relations. Nation-states never enjoyed a true monopoly on the use of force, but now more than in any other post-Westphalian time- and certainly at the accelerated pace-the legitimacy of that monopoly has come under serious challenges from social, economic, technical, and military changes. Interdependent economies, global ecological concerns penetration by surveillance and media technologies, the three dimensionality and nuclearization- they have all been recognized as growing antidiplomatic forces undermining the sovereign privileges and obligations of the territorial state. Less noticed and understood is the emergence of a terrorist discourse, by which I refer to a global semiotic activity where violent powers and insurgent  meanings clash. WIth a nuclear statement curtailing superpower and a global information economy boosting sign-power, it is increasingly in the discursive realm of terrorism that the "crises" of political legitimacy, national identity, and practical knowledge are being played out. Simultaneously brutalizing, repugnant, and fascinating, the terrorist repertoire-kidnapping, hijackings, and assassination- cannot alone account for its rise to the singular status of international crisis. In terrorist discourse a less visible battle is being fought-most desperately between the vanguards of aspiring powers and the rearguards of great powers-to reinscribe the boundaries of legitimacy in international relations. In short, four important yet neglected theoretical points are being made here. In the study of terrorism, method matters: but very little critical consciousness of just how much it matters has been demonstrated in the field. Second, method is matter given the symbolic practices of terrorism, limitations of physical anti-terrorism, and the simulacral projection of terrorism by the media, the representations of terrorism have taken o n a powerful materiality. Third, because of changing configurations of power that rival traditional claims of international legitimacy, new critical methods are called for. Fourth, method alone cannot substitute for an ontological step that anyone seriously seeking truths about terrorism must take: questioning how our own identity is implicated and constituted by the terrorist discourse must precede any study of terrorism. These critical considerations inform the analysis of modern forms of terrorism that follows. Taking into account the sheer volume of terrorist archive, I can make no claims for comprehensiveness. My strategy is deconstructive and reconstructive: to provide a method which might displace, critique, and historicize received accounts of terrorism and, simultaneously, to present an alternative primer for reading terrorism in its multiple, de-terroitoralized forms. What I wish to avoid is the subtextual ploy found in much of the terrorism literature where the theoretical organization of an inchoate body of thought pretends to reconcile the differences and contradictions of the terrorism, thus "taming" rather than interpreting a heavily conflicted field. At best, I hope to leave the reader with a critical method and the minimal amount of historical knowledge necessary to distinguish the politically dispossessed from the violently possessed, and to imagine possible forms of coexistence with the former, while galivanting collective action against the latter.  

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Russia

Cold War perceptions of Russian decision making perpetuates conflict – casual relations spur escalation

RICHARD SAKWA, expert in the field of and Eastern European and politics, Professor of Russian and European politics at the , 2008, “‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics” International Affairs, PDF , KENTUCKY

Cold war redux? Nearly two decades since the Cold War was transcended by the Soviet Union’s refusal to play the game any more,44 why has the rhetoric of the Cold War resur- faced? Nuclear sabres are once again being rattled, and the lines of a new global struggle for geopolitical advantage are beginning to emerge. This, however, would be a very peculiar new Cold War, since no fundamental interests divide the two former superpowers (one has been reduced to great power status, while the other has become a hyperpower). There are no fundamental ideological contradictions, direct conflicts over resources or major differences over the substantive issues that face the international community. Indeed, in some ways Russia could have become the natural ally of America and the EU on a range of questions. So why have the differences become so sharp, and why has the whole architecture of post-commu- nist security arrangements been brought into question? In a rather schematic manner below I will suggest that there have been four major failures in adjusting policy to the new circumstances: political, strategic, intellectual and cultural. The key question is: How can we find our bearings in what we had assumed would be the post-Cold War era, to ensure that it is indeed the end of this particular global confrontation? The political failure There has been a profound asymmetry in the transcendence of the Cold War. While the structures that fought the Cold War (including the ideological ones) were dismantled on the one side, they were retained on the other. The functions of bodies such as NATO have not been replaced by a common collective security regime, but instead have been strengthened and enlarged. Russia’s early enthu- siasm for the OSCE reflected the aspiration to create a genuine common security regime, but failed to take into account the asymmetrical end to the Cold War. The same applies to the ‘softer’ Cold War structures, including the whole ideological- security apparatus. These are active in Washington and London, but in a different way no less alive in Moscow, and have been the easiest structures to revive in a renewed period of confrontation. The asymmetrical transcendence of the Cold War is accompanied by an internal asymmetry at the heart of Russian politics. Russia renounced its claims to the ideological leadership of an alternative system to the world capitalist order and the geopolitical leadership of an alternative military and political bloc, but it did not renounce its civilizational identity or its aspirations to participate in global leadership. The external asymmetry allowed one side of the old Cold War conflict to claim the right to oversee the transformation of the other; and while this was at first welcomed in Russia, it increasingly came to be resented and exacerbated the tensions within the internal asymmetry. While the neo-conservatives in Washington stressed the imperial and global role that the promotion of democratic values should play, Moscow began to reassert an aggressive autonomy in interna- tional affairs, insisting on the sovereign right of each country, if not to claim a Sonderweg, then at least to choose its own path and to define democracy as it saw fit: the new ideology of ‘sovereign democracy’ that came to the fore after Ukraine’s ‘Orange’ revolution in late 2004.45 The fundamental failure in the post-Cold War era has been to find ways to compensate for the twofold asymmetry. Even the recognition of the problem—that Russia could not easily be categorized as just another ‘post-communist’ country— was a long time coming. The general difficulty of adjusting the international system to the end of the bloc politics and hegemonic aspirations that were characteristic of the Cold War has still not been resolved. The key challenge after the dissolution of communist power in 1989–91, the winding-up of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, was how to insert Russia into the new global order. This would have been relatively easy if Russia had been a defeated power (like Germany and Japan after 1945), but proved much harder to do on its own terms, as an endlessly proclaimed ‘great power’. As early as the December 1992 meeting of what was still the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Kozyrev warned of the onset of a ‘new Cold War’, and such warnings have sounded regularly since then. The legitimacy of Russia’s ambition to be a great power, even a ‘normal’ one, has been questioned, even more than Britain’s and France’s aspirations in this respect. The major difference, of course, is that Russia’s readjusted role has been accompanied by a profound change in its internal political order, a process that is far from over. Grave issues of international politics have become interwoven into a constant regime of inspection over how Russia is doing internally.46 This asymmetry has been effectively exploited by the opposition in Russia. Domestic political actors soon learnt that easy political capital could be made by working the international circuit, condemning the latest alleged malfeasance by Russia’s rulers.47 Some of Russia’s neighbours learned the rules of this game only too well, and fed a constant stream of anti-Russian material to receptive ears on Capitol Hill and elsewhere.48 This then fed back into profoundly misinformed statements about developments in Russia and its policies, which in turn provoked Russian reactions that only deepened distrust and exacerbated suspicions about policy motivations.49 Thus all sides entered into a deeply negative spiral of mutual suspicion that gradually hardened into abuse which in turn gave way to threats and counterthreats. Russian domestic struggles were projected onto interstate rivalries. Indeed, the scholar Dmitry Furman argued that ‘There is only one opposition to Putin at present—other countries.’50 At the same time, America’s ideological wars for and against various abstractions—against terror and authoritarian capitalism, and for ‘global freedom’ and the like—affect specific countries, not least Russia.51 The net result is that the security of Europe and the world today is facing the gravest threat to peace since the end of the bloc politics of the Cold War. In some ways the threat is even greater, since the earlier confrontation had devised rules and stable expectations about how the conflict would be managed. Cold War conflict management procedures have been dismantled, while elements of the conflict have re-emerged in a far more anarchic context. Indeed, the political failure in the early 1990s, and once again in the early 2000s, to build on the evident desire of Russia to move beyond the Cold War, and to create new organizations that could provide common institutional mechanisms to solidify what was by any reckoning an epochal shift in global politics, allowed old institutions and ways of thinking to reassert themselves. Integration within the framework of the EU was not accompanied by an inclusive pan-European unifi- cation process. In Moscow the representatives of the old bloc mentality are now certainly in evidence once again, and their views are encouraged by their counter- parts in the West. Sergei Karaganov, director of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP), argues that this is evidence that a ‘new epoch of confron- tation (NEC)’ is beginning. Even in the 1990s ‘any attempt by Russia to stop the panicked retreat produced by the disintegration of the USSR was declared to be “neo-imperialism”’, to the point that today ‘the oversimplification of criticism on some parameters is even worse than in the Cold War … Any critic or opponent of the Russian president and the Kremlin automatically becomes a democrat and friend of the West.’ Europe’s failure to act as an autonomous power and the inten- sified rivalry between ‘the traditional West and the energy-producing countries for control of energy resources’ mean that Russia ‘has been forced by history into the centre of a new competitive struggle between the liberal-democratic and authoritarian models of capitalism’.52 A report issued to mark the 15th anniversary of the CFDP on 16 March 2007 talked about a global ‘crisis of manageability’, in which no single power centre on its own could manage the crisis engendered by the growing number of failed and failing states.53

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Russia

The painting of Russian threat construction only ensnares the structure into a logic of war via self-fulfilling prophecies

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, April 2001, “Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations,” Strategic Forum, , EUGENE B. RUMER is a Senior Fellow in and Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. RICHARD SOKOLSKY is a Senior Fellow in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program. ZKMSU

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in U.S.-Russian relations have not been realized. The record of the 1990s has left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world’s sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions. The United States is equally disappointed with Russia’s lack of focus, inability to engage effectively abroad, and failure to implement major reforms at home. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. Renewed competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing principles. Russia’s economic, military and political/ideological weakness makes it an unlikely target of either U.S. competition or containment. Not only is Russia no longer a superpower, but its status as a regional power is in doubt. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches: Forget Russia, Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and Russia First. The Forget Russia view holds that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too chaotic to matter. After 10 years of trying to help Russia, the United States should focus its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues. The Enfant Terrible view holds that, although Russia has been an irresponsible and irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore need not be feared in earnest. President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Cuba and North Korea, courtship of Slobodan Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence and thus not worth our attention. This view presupposes the existence of an important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. The Evil Russia view holds that Russian courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet empire. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russia’s diminished capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. Given Russia’s evil purposes, the United States is already on a collision course with it and might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. The Russia First view holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S. partner and ally. Therefore, the United States should actively assist Russia in its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with renewed vigor and creativity. There are shortcomings in all of these approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline, to Forget Russia is clearly not an option: the country’s geographic expanse, nuclear arsenal, and proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers to ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. The Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russia First view is not grounded in reality. After a decade of failure, it should be clear that neither the specter of Russia’s past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Need for Normalcy Russia’s external weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an effective interlocutor, either as partner or competitor. Thus, the United States should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests, in much the same way we deal with most other countries. This path will sometimes lead toward partnership with Russia and at other times toward competition. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues. Given its size, history, strategic nuclear capabilities, and future potential, one is tempted to overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Except for geography and nuclear weapons, however, there is little at this stage to justify making relations with Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone. The prospect of Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian, nationalist regime is remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise attack on the United States are unjustified. Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda, ranging from regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is limited. American investment in Russia is a fraction of what it is in Europe or China, trade rarely exceeds a few billion dollars a year, and political and cultural relations are limited at best. In other words, beyond traditional Cold War issues, the United States has an extremely narrow relationship with Russia, let alone enough of a stake in it to merit a special place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless, while Russia is not a major player in Europe or Northeast Asia, its proximity to Europe, Japan, and China make it a focus of U.S. policy.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Rule of Law

The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online:

Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism.

Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Human Rights

The international human rights regime bolsters the violence of liberalism by demarcating half the world as inhuman

William Rasch, Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Spring 2003, Cultural Critique, Vol. 54, p. 141-144

For Schmitt, to assume that one can derive morally correct political institutions from abstract, universal norms is to put the cart before the horse. The truly important question remains: who decides? What political power representing which political order defines terms like human rights and public reason, defines, in fact, what it means to be properly human? What political power distinguishes between the decent and the indecent, between those who police the world and those who are outlawed from it? Indeed, what political power decides what is and what is not political? Habermas's contention that normative legality neutralizes the moral and the political and that therefore Schmitt "suppresses" the "decisive point," namely, "the legal preconditions of an impartial judicial authority and a neutral system of criminal punishment" (1998, 200), is enough to make even an incurable skeptic a bit nostalgic for the old Frankfurt School distinction between affirmative and critical theory. One could observe, for instance, that the "universality" of human rights has a very particular base. As Habermas says: Asiatic societies cannot participate in capitalistic modernization without taking advantage of the achievements of an individualistic legal order. One cannot desire the one and reject the other. From the perspective of Asian countries, the question is not whether human rights, as part of an individualistic legal order, are compatible with the transmission of one's own culture. Rather, the question is whether the traditional forms of political and societal integration can be reasserted against—or must instead be adapted to—the hard-to-resist imperatives of an economic modernization that has won approval on the whole. (2001, 124) Thus, despite his emphasis on procedure and the universality of his so-called discourse principle, the choice that confronts Asiatic societies or any other people is a choice between cultural identity and economic survival, between, in other words, cultural and physical extermination. As Schmitt said, the old Christian and civilizing distinction between believers and nonbelievers (Gläubigern and Nicht-Gläubigern) has become the modern, economic distinction between "creditors and debtors" (Gläubigern and Schuldnern). But while affirmative theorists like Habermas and Rawls are busy constructing the ideological scaffolding that supports the structure of the status quo, what role is there for the "critical" theorist to play? Despite the sanguine hopes of Hardt and Negri (2000) that "Empire" will all but spontaneously combust as a result of the irrepressible ur-desire of the multitude, can we seriously place our faith in some utopian grand alternative anymore, or in some revolutionary or therapeutic result based on the truth of critique that would allow us all, in the end, to sing in the sunshine and laugh everyday? Do, in fact, such utopian fantasies not lead to the moralizing hubris of a Rawls or a Habermas? In short, it is one thing to recognize the concealed, particular interests that govern the discourse and politics of human rights and quite another to think seriously about how things could be different, to imagine an international system that respected both the equality and the difference of states and/or peoples. Is it possible—and this is Todorov's question—to value 's principle of the "free circulation of men, ideas, and goods" and still also "cherish another principle, that of self-determination and noninterference" (Todorov 1984, 177)? The entire "Vitorian" tradition, from Scott to Habermas and Rawls, thinks not. Habermas, for instance, emphatically endorses the fact that "the erosion of the principle of nonintervention in recent decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights" (1998, 147), a "normative" achievement that is not so incidentally correlated with a positive, economic fact: "In view of the subversive forces and imperatives of the world market and of the increasing density of worldwide networks of communication and commerce, the external sovereignty of states, however it may be grounded, is by now in any case an anachronism" (150). And opposition to this development is not merely anachronistic; it is illegitimate, not to be tolerated. So, for those who sincerely believe in American institutional, cultural, and moral superiority, the times could not be rosier. After all, when push comes to shove, "we" decide—not only about which societies are decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of violence are "terrorist" and which compose the "gentle compulsion" of a "just war." What, however, are those "barbarians" who disagree with the new world order supposed to do? With Agamben, they could wait for a "completely new politics" to come, but the contours of such a politics are unknown and will remain unknown until the time of its arrival. And that time, much like the second coming of Christ, seems infinitely deferrable. While they wait for the Benjaminian "divine violence" to sweep away the residual effects of the demonic rule of law (Benjamin 1996, 248-52), the barbarians might be tempted to entertain Schmitt's rather forlorn fantasy of an egalitarian balance of power. Yet if the old, inner-European balance of power rested on an asymmetrical exclusion of the non-European world, it must be asked: what new exclusion will be necessary for a new balance, and is that new exclusion tolerable? At the moment, there is no answer to this question, only a precondition to an answer. If one wishes to entertain Todorov's challenge of thinking both equality and difference, universal commerce of people and ideas as well as self-determination and nonintervention, then the concept of humanity must once again become the invisible and unsurpassable horizon of discourse, not its positive pole. The word "human," to evoke one final distinction, must once again become descriptive of a "fact" and not a "value." Otherwise, whatever else it may be, the search for "human" rights will always also be the negative image of the relentless search for the "inhuman" other.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Hegemony

Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---the strategy omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence---you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

McClintock 9—chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Hegemony

The discourse of legitimacy masks the violence of hegemony---the affirmative’s commitment to US leadership recreates gendered national identity that codes the US as a the masculine shepherd of the global-liberal architecture---turns the case

John Landreau 11, associate professor of womenâs and gender studies at The College of New Jersey., Obamas My Dad: Mixed Race Suspects, Political Anxiety and the New Imperialism, www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408

Both during his campaign, and in his presidential inauguration speech, Barack Obama promised a "new beginning" in American foreign and national security policy (especially in relation to the Middle East) that would both keep us safe from enemies and "restore our moral standing" (Obama, Acceptance). In particular, this new beginning promised to distance U.S. foreign policy from the grim (and largely illegal) features of the Bush administration's "war on terror" such as the executive sanctioning of the torture of prisoners, the maintenance of a gulag of foreign detention centres where prisoners could be treated outside the guidelines of U.S. and international law, and illegal secret initiatives such as the program to assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives directed by Vice President Cheney (Mazzetti and Shane). In his first day in the White House, on January 22, 2009, Obama issued three executive orders that followed through on this promise.[2] In addition to these early executive orders, in the days and months following his election Obama showed great rhetorical sensitivity to the wide-spread negative perception in the Middle East of U.S. imperial behavior and designs, its uncritical support of Israel, and its disregard for civilian casualties and for the civil rights of prisoners. In an effort to reverse the tide of anti-American feeling, Obama's first post-inaugural interview was given to Hisham Melhem of Al Arabiya TV news (Interview). This was followed in April and May by major addresses in Ankara and Cairo whose primary intended audience was Middle Eastern and, more broadly, Islamic. Both of these speeches articulate a new rhetoric of hope for U.S.-Middle Eastern relations. In the speech to the Turkish parliament, for example, Obama declares: I [...] want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree [...]. (para. 38) Hope for a new era of U.S Middle East relations is here embodied by an attitude of respect, by a willingness to negotiate differences and find areas of mutual interest, and by an explicit criticism of the unilateral and monologic focus of the Bush administration on the 'war on terror'. This apparent change in direction in national security and foreign policy seems to be characterized by an alternate version of presidential masculinity and by an alternate telling of the myth of American exceptionalism. Many have commented on the muscular character of George W. Bush's rhetoric of war and national security. Indeed, his policies in what he called the 'war on terror' depended almost exclusively on what Joseph Nye famously called "hard power", and were justified rhetorically by a conspicuously militarist and masculinist narrative about America's role in world history and politics.[3] In contrast to the "[...] stern projection of a tough national persona" (Ivie and Giner 288) in Bush's rhetoric and policies, Obama seems to articulate a gentler, more reasoned approach to national security and terrorism that includes the use of 'hard' military power but also depends importantly on 'soft' power in the form of diplomacy, international cooperation, and an emphasis on human rights, economic stability and political freedom. Ivie and Giner argue that the success of Obama's rhetorical appeal to 'soft' power during the 2008 presidential campaign was due to his ability to harness and resignify the deeply-resonant myth of American exceptionalism for a more democratic and community-minded projection of America's role in world affairs. In Obama's version of national security, they write: A less tragic sense of order mandated a reduced sense of guilt and thereby decreased the need for redemption via the cult of killing. This expression of national mission in more democratic and practical terms indicated, at least "logologically," the possibility of aligning public culture with a more global and constructive perspective on matters of national security. It revealed the possibility of a founding myth reformed to relax the lethal grip of the Evil One on the conscience of a nation that might do more good in the world if it were burdened less by tragic guilt.[4] (296) This conclusion requires a retrospective reassessment in the light of Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly dramatic shift from progressive presidential candidate who was proud to have opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning, and who abolished the use of torture and illegal detention in his first day in office, to the president who in December 2009 made the decision to pursue and significantly escalate military violence in Afghanistan? How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly contradictory use of both the soft rhetoric of hope and diplomacy and the hard rhetoric of fear and military violence in his national security statements and speeches? In the analysis that follows I argue that while Obama at times articulates a softer version of foreign policy, and seems to perform a softer, more inclusive presidential masculinity in the area of global politics and terrorism, this does not fundamentally signify a different orientation to national security as some have argued. I emphasize how Obama's rhetoric and policies fall within the standard rhetorical oscillations that constitute the myth of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity, and that those oscillations are principally and most significantly oriented by the more militarist and conventionally masculinist versions of the myth. Presidential Masculinity in the Democratic Nomination Speech Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in August 2008 marks the formal shift of his campaign focus from Democratic Party voters towards a national audience, and from his rivalry with Hillary Clinton to a campaign against John McCain. In terms of Obama's national security rhetoric, this is a fascinating moment because, in this new broader context, he makes an attitudinal shift to a more militarized and masculinized mode of speech. In fact, Obama's performance of soft masculinity on issues of national security during the primary campaign was an opportune product of the moment that did not reflect the principal orientation of his thinking.[5] This is quite clear in the nomination speech as he shifts his campaign towards a more conservative national audience, and directs his attention from a female rival to a male rival with military credentials. Obama's first sentence about foreign policy in the nomination speech concerns his own stature and ability to lead American troops into battle, and to battle John McCain for the position of commander in chief. "If John McCain wants to have a debate about who has the temperament and judgment to serve as the next commander-in-chief, that's a debate I'm ready to have." (para. 79) What is most interesting about this lead-in to the topic of national security, terrorism, and foreign policy is that its main rhetorical function is to emphasize Obama's masculine capability. It does this by declaring his presidential mettle, but also through the performance of an 'I dare you' challenge to his political adversary. It seems to say, 'if you want to fight, then let's fight. Bring it on!' Why does Obama begin this section of the speech with a flexing of muscle? In part, it has to do with the histrionics of presidential campaigns, and in this particular campaign with the anticipated challenge to Obama's military masculinity from John McCain, a candidate with a powerful story of military bravery and heroism to his credit. At the same time, the foregrounding of presidential masculinity in terms of the resolve and capacity to lead the armed forces into battle is nothing unusual. The most significant human protagonist in the narrative of American exceptionalism is almost always the figure of the president. This is especially true in times of danger, crisis or war. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. To him goes the job of protecting the national family from outside threats and danger. To do this effectively, he must be brave, decisive and rational. He cannot afford to be feminized by being overly emotional or sympathetic to others; he cannot succumb to doubts, or become scared to act (Cohn, Cuordileone, Hopper, Lakoff, Sylvester, Tickner, Young). It is to this mythos that Obama's beginning performance of masculinity in the speech belongs. In the new context of a national audience, it stands out as a deeply-felt and vigorously articulated orientation towards national security. After this initial show of male plumage, Obama continues the foreign policy section of the nomination speech by contrasting his youthful masculinity to McCain's elderly, bumbling masculinity. For -- for while -- while Senator McCain was turning his sights to Iraq just days after 9/11, I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that it would distract us from the real threats that we face. When John McCain said we could just muddle through in Afghanistan, I argued for more resources and more troops to finish the fight against the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and made clear that we must take out Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if we have them in our sights. (para. 80-81) While McCain turns his sights away from the target, Obama stands up. While McCain muddles, Obama works to finish the fight and "take out" bin Laden if he's "in our sights." In the subtly crafted metaphor of aiming a gun at an enemy that organizes the passage, McCain appears as a distracted old soldier who aims at the wrong target and is generally confused. In contrast, vigorous and youthful, Obama stands up purposely, aims at the target, and fires. These metaphors all work to highlight the differences between McCain and Obama in terms of their embodiment of a properly militarized masculinity: which candidate can stand up, correctly identify the enemy, and fire the necessary shots to kill him. Obama criticizes McCain for standing alone in "stubborn refusal" to recognize the realities of the conflict (that it is with al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Iraq), and therefore for lacking judgment. This lack of judgment is also narrated in terms of a contrast between a youthful and an aging masculinity: "We need a president who can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past." (para. 84) Obama declares. The contrast between a man who grasps at the past and one who "faces" the future is coded with messages about age and masculinity: youthful, confident stepping forward into the future versus old, unsteady back-stepping towards the past. At stake in this contrast is which strategy will "defeat" the enemy. "You don't defeat -- you don't defeat a terrorist network that operates in 80 countries by occupying Iraq", (para. 85) Obama argues. These are enemies who must be killed in order to protect the nation. To do this requires a commander-in-chief with masculine resolve and courage who can lead us into battle. This is not work for touchy-feely idealists who want to understand, communicate, and negotiate. And Republicans, Obama points out proudly, are not the only ones with the proper testicular size to lead the army into battle: "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (para. 87) As in his opening statement, part of the effectiveness of these lines is their performance of a kind of "I'm up to the challenge masculinity" that talks tough, is aggressive with challengers ("don't tell me"), and does not back down. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity foregrounded here in the nomination clearly constitutes the dominant note of continuity in Obama's national security thinking. This is most evident in his two speeches from December 2009 in which he justifies his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan as the following discussion will show. Reasons for War: the December 1, 2009 Speech at West Point Obama's December 2009 speech at West Point argues for the strategic necessity and ethical correctness of increased war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of history. The history begins with the 19 Al Qaeda operatives who committed the terrorist atrocities on 9/11 and moves quickly to focus on the Taliban who provided them with a secure base from which to operate. After 9/11, as Obama tells the story, we made great military inroads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then mistakenly turned our attention to Iraq. This provided an opening for the Taliban, and for Al Qaeda, who are now coming back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Afghan government cannot fight them off and therefore, he says, summing it all up: "In short, the status quo is not sustainable" (para. 12). How does a rudimentary history like this serve as an explanation or justification for war? What is the mediating logic? The over-simplification of contemporary U.S and Afghan history entailed in this schematic narrative is head-spinning.[6] But, even putting that aside, if one accepts the history at face value, it is still the case that our commitment to war is left unexplained and unjustified by the narrative. The history begins with 19 terrorists, and ends with the large-scale military action on the part of the United States. Should it not take a lot more than saying, 'well, the Taliban are gaining momentum and, remember, they are best friends with Al Qaeda' to justify the deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops, predator drones strikes all over northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, full involvement of the CIA, major flows of capital and materiel, and huge contracts with private military contractors like XE Services (aka Blackwater)? Obama's historical narrative simply does not add up to a political argument for this kind of war, and for this kind of outlay of capital. As a justification for war, it seems, rather, to be structured like a myth in the sense that Roland Barthes gave the word. Myth, according to Barthes, is paradoxically effective because, formally, it works like an alibi. It is an explanation based on an absence of evidence and meaning rather than its presence. In an alibi (the accused was absent not present at the scene) the meaning and the evidence are always elsewhere (121-127). Obama's narrative amounts to a mythological explanation for war in the sense that its significance lies not in the history itself but in the formal seriousness of a president telling a story to justify war. That is, its significance lies in the rhetorical gesture that serves to remind the audience of the president's authority as commander in chief and of his role to defend the nation from harm. By telling this story the president in effect quotes an array of motives, intentions, plot sequences and characters that are formally full even if their content in this instance is misleading or empty. To paraphrase Hayden White, in this case the content is the form. Here, the details of the story of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are significant to the extent that they play a role in a larger narrative already familiar to the American audience: the Unites States stands for peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy but sometimes it is attacked by evil enemies whose irrational desire is to destroy all that is good. In that circumstance, the president must protect the national family through the use of military violence. War is the best and, in fact, the only way to make ourselves secure. Following this schematic historical narrative with which he begins the West Point speech, Obama reassures the audience that his final decision to escalate the war was taken only after a serious and difficult deliberative process. This process, he says, "has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less." (para. 13) The image of the president very seriously asking questions, exploring options, and consulting experts is one intended to produce a sense of citizen confidence both in the decision and in the decider (as George W. Bush famously called himself) again without revealing any of the details or particulars that constitute the decision. The rhetorical appeal here is essentially charismatic and depends on thick cultural associations with the president as benevolent paternal authority, and as rational but determined protector of the nation. The tone of the passage is that of a father reassuring his family that the big decision he has made today was made with great care, and with their communal welfare in mind. Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism. As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity. This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[7] After the scant historical review, and a summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests." (para. 37).As feminist International Relations scholars have argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of war "abstracted from bodies"

(Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly from civilians not soldiers.[8] As a rhetorical performance, the description of war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn). Obama ends his speech with the conclusion that presidential war speeches commonly have: an eloquent and solemn call to unity and patriotism. "Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world." (para. 41) The logic of a bond between our free society and our leadership in the world is presupposed rather than described or explained. Like all heroes, the hero of the exceptionalist narrative faces a test. In this instance, he is us, and our essential quality of being a free society is linked to our dominance in the world. Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies.We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty. For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations.We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours.What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity (para. 47-49). Unlike other world powers, we are benevolent, seeking only that which will make the world a better place. We are, that is to say, a world power but not a world empire. Our history shows this: our military violence and our leadership have underwritten global security for over sixty years. Strangely, though, our fatherly sacrifice to protect the world from harm is sometimes misunderstood, and "we have not always been thanked for our efforts." Who are the unthankful and what is their story? In the standard-issue exceptionalist narrative, they are the enemies of freedom, the sowers of chaos, and the ideologically possessed. Obama certainly believes this. At the same time, the statement that "we have not always been thanked for our efforts" also expresses a deep anxiety about the details and the stories that are erased by the great father's version of history. Making War, Talking Peace: The Nobel Peace Prize Speech The Nobel Prize acceptance speech, given just nine days after Obama's announcement of the escalation of the war in Afghanistan, provides a fascinating expansion of the plot of "American as good vs. foreign as evil" that informs the narrative justification for war in the West Point speech. In this speech, Obama contextualizes both American exceptionalism in general, and his specific decision to expand the war in Afghanistan, in a sweeping historical narrative of global progress. "At the dawn of history," Obama declares, "war was routinely pursued between tribes and peoples quite simply as a way of 'seeking power and settling disputes." (para. 6) Later, as "man" progressed, legal and diplomatic efforts were made in an attempt to regulate war and the way it was pursued. Obama invokes just war theory citing it as one of the principle ways in which humans have tried to regulate and civilize war. In Obama's narrative, the United States is located at the upper end of this historical progression because it is the United States that has provided the leadership to produce the global "architecture" of peace in the form of the United Nations, support for human rights, nuclear arms reductions, and so on. Elaborating on the schematic history of the United States that appeared in the West Point speech, Obama says The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans.We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will.We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity (para. 18). J. Ann Tickner argues that the idea of enlightened self interest corresponds to a masculinist model of international relations in which states are systematic and instrumental they are competitive "profit maximizers that pursue power and autonomy in an anarchic world system."(52) In this context, if international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community or an interdependent notion of security and welfare, but rather in terms of rational choice and enlightened self-interest. Here, in Obama's version, we shoulder the burden of world peace and prosperity both heroically (with American blood and military power) but also as rational actors. We act not as an imperial power, but as a benign power exercising rational choices in a dangerous world in order to protect our interests. By virtue of the incantatory power of the exceptionalist narrative, our interests are identical with democratic values and the cause of economic justice. The awkward context of the Nobel Prize speech both clarifies and complicates Obama's justification of war. While acknowledging the "moral force" of the theory of non-violence, he also argues that "evil does exist in the world" and that a realist assessment of the world "as it is" sometimes requires violence. This part of the speech is quite subtle, shuttling back and forth between the recognition that war is terrible and the insistence that it is sometimes necessary. The notion that war is sometimes just and sometimes necessary for building peace is modified throughout with an appeal to "responsibility" and to the rational, measured use of military violence. Obama argues that "all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." (para. 26) The rationalist tone of responsibility and militaries with clear mandates is matched by Obama's framing of the philosophical question of war and peace as a matter of human imperfection. The ideals of peace are beautiful, but in the world as it is human beings are not perfect. They sometimes act unaccountably and irresponsibly. And sometimes they must be stopped from perpetrating evil. At the end of the speech, Obama signals what for him is the chief human imperfection that is at the root of so much of the world's violence. He says, As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish in their particular identities -- their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict.At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards.We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden.We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines. And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan.T hese extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war (para. 47-49). In the context of globalization, what jams the machine is fear of loss of identity. This fear also gets in the way of our universal human aspirations for peace and prosperity. The most notable example of this kind of fear is, of course, the terrorism practiced by al Qaeda. This is a fear underwritten by megalomania: the idea that violence is mandated by God. What is striking about this passage is that it plots opposition to globalization as fear of change, almost as a kind of primitive or childish clinging to identity in a world whose universal characteristics are evident. But can this be the whole story? Can one explain the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Obama appears to do here, as irrational fear of loss of identity? Is opposition to capitalist globalization American-style, and under the paternal arm of American power, always and everywhere a form of childishness or partial vision? In his concluding comments, Obama quotes Martin Luther King's 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which he talks about the moral necessity of striving for what ought to be rather than accepting things as they are. This is an eloquent but highly impertinent frame for the speech. In his Nobel address, King soundly rejects those versions of history organized around notions of necessary violence. Accepting the prize on behalf of the entire civil rights movement, King says: After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is a profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time - the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that nonviolence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation. Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (para. 4). King clearly rejects the idea that civilization sometimes requires violence, or that violence can sometimes be just or moral. Love, in King's terms, is antithetical to the discourse of innocence, guilt, power and violence that constitutes the narrative of American exceptionalism. Instead, King's ethic of love is consonant with Judith Butler's critique of violence: The violent response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, their contingency, their malleability. The nonviolent response lives with its unknowingness about the Other in the face of the Other, since sustaining the bond that the question opens is finally more valuable than knowing in advance what holds us in common, as if we already have all the resources we need to know what defines the human, what its future life might be (35). This is precisely what is wrong with the narrative of American exceptionalism, and with Obama's obligation to it. A story whose plot is organized entirely around the character of its hero does not seek to know. It is narcissistic. It shores up what it knows in fear of the Other, and in this gesture reconfirms that its view of the world is the truth. Obama seems oblivious to the contradictions in his assertion of American power as he struggles here to articulate the oxymoron of peace through war. In the end, what "makes sense" in his justification for war is the cultural and political sense that adheres to the image of embodied presidential masculinity, and to his military leadership performed in patriotic service to America's heroic global mission. Conclusion Obama's national security policies and rhetoric are, to be fair, significantly different in many ways than Bush's. Nonetheless, he steeps his rhetoric of hope for a new foreign policy in the old, familiar language of American exceptionalism. This illustrates how the political logic of a militarized and masculinized nation, presidency and citizenry has proved to be more enduring, significant and powerful than the strategy differences that have divided Democrats and Republicans over the last 60 years. It is important also because the cultural logic of American exceptionalism guaranteed by military power makes so many questions difficult to ask because the questions themselves seem absurd, effeminately nave, or simply out of rhetorical limits. These are unasked questions such as what violence was required to achieve our affluence and power? How can that violence be justified? Are there models for world peace, prosperity and freedom other than America's dominance and "leadership?" Does military power and violence produce security? What constitutes security? Is invulnerability a legitimate security goal? Is the authority of Commander-in-chief one that automatically adheres to the presidency at all times, or should the executive be more limited in its power as originally envisioned in the Constitution? Is citizenship best characterized in terms of a militarized and masculinized patriotism? Can terrorism be fought with large-scale military tactics? Of course, it is impossible to know all the ins and outs of how Obama and his advisors reached the decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. For those who voted for Obama over Clinton during the Democratic primary campaign because of his clear-spoken commitment to a different kind of foreign policy, the decision is disappointing to say the least. In the final analysis, when the decision was made, and its justification needed to be formulated into public rhetoric, what is clear is that the Obama administration felt at home in and oriented by - the old language of American exceptionalism. Familiar orientations, as Sara Ahmed argues, are an "effect of inhabitance." That is, their sense, their familiarity and their surety are products of their alignment with an already aligned world (7). My argument here is that the sense Obama makes of war is indebted to and made possible by - the familiarity and common-sense orientation of American exceptionalism. If the militarism and masculinism of his national security logic seem sensible or reassuring, it is because they are oriented in deeply familiar ways. The rhetoric of war and national security also works, of course, to recreate the familiar orientation from which it emerges. As Susan Jeffords argues, in the post-Vietnam context, heroic narratives about the war had the decisive (but indirectly manifested) effect of "remasculinizing American culture." This is why the work of disorientation that is proposed by feminist International Relations scholars and activists with its specific focus on the hidden injuries of gender in the familiar discourses of war and security is so important. It is also why it is so difficult. I have argued that Obama's war logic is oriented by, and serves to reorient us towards, a national mythology grounded in narratives of glorified violence and masculinity. The difficulty of challenging and disorienting that prevailing narrative is eloquently described by Jorge Luis Borges in his story "The South." The story serves as an apt allegory of the mythology of American exceptionalism with its multiple commitments to masculinity and violence, and for the ways this mythology works to make military violence the seemingly inevitable and sensible locus where the national story is both resolved and reinvigorated. The main character in "The South" is named Juan Dahlmann. Dahlmann feels "deeply Argentine" despite the fact that his paternal grandfather was a northern European immigrant. Dahlmann's patriotic sense of identity involves, among other things, having purchased a little ranch in the south that had once been in his mother's family. Dahlmann lives in Buenos Aires, and for him the south has tremendous symbolic resonance as that place that retains the masculinist features of national mythology: the pampa, the gaucho, the singing bard, the tavern, the duel. Dahlmann dreams about the ranch and its old house, and takes comfort in imagining it waiting for him on the pampa, even though he never really gets a chance to actually go there. One day, Dahlmann is struck gravely ill with a terrible infection and is hospitalized with high fever. As is typical of so many of Borges' stories, it is impossible to tell if the subsequent narrated events are products of his hallucinatory state or are really happening to him. In any event, after some days of medical intervention, he is released and boards a train towards the south to convalesce at his ranch. He arrives, enters a tavern where he eats barbeque and drinks wine, and then is taunted by some young men who have been drinking too much. Although the bar owner tells him to pay them no mind, Dahlmann confronts them as any traditional male character in a gaucho story would be required to do. In seeming recognition of his decisive entrance into one of the enduring storylines of nationalist mythology (the knife fight between men at a watering hole on the pampa), the ancient gaucho in the corner of the bar who until now has remained motionless as if frozen in time, becomes "ecstatic" and throws him a dagger. The rest is preordained: Dahlmann will walk out of the tavern with a knife in his hand, he will fight bravely, and then die with the stranger's blade in his gut. It is, the narrator says, "as if the South had decided that Dahlmann should agree to the duel." (203) When he picks up the dagger, he feels two things: first, "that this almost instinctive act committed him to fighting" and, second, "that, in his clumsy hand, the weapon would not serve to defend him, but rather to justify their killing of him" (Borges, 203 translations mine). For me, "The South" is a story about the masculinist mythology of national identity and violence. Intricate and contradictory is it dream or reality? the myth exercises its force both from within on Dahlmann's imagination and from without on his body. The logic of a militarized and masculinized rhetoric of national security, in concert with the economic logic of our military budget and the imperial logic of our global ambition, serves as our "south" leading us onward towards the use of large-scale military violence as if in a dream from which we cannot wake. We cannot hear the warnings of the barkeep who tries to tell us that we do not have to kill or be killed in this instance. Like Dahlmann, our politicians even the less bellicose among them when faced with security threats simply cannot imagine any alternative to masculinist bravado and the duel to the death. "The South", then, is a cautionary tale. As long as presidents and politicians dare not challenge the role of the military budget as the primary organizing principle of our economy, and as long as the militarized and masculinized ideology of American exceptionalism remains the almost unitary language with which we speak of national security and foreign policy, there should be no surprise when ostensible doves from the Democratic Party such as Barack Obama pursue large-scale military campaigns in places like Afghanistan, and seem to do so as readily as their reputedly hawkish counterparts in the Republican Party. Alternate strategies to large-scale military violence require new story-lines of national identity and national security. We need to give ourselves a choice about whether taking up the knife is what the situation calls for. We need to ask questions about how we got into such a situation in the first place. We need to create alternatives to the logic that defines security as killing or being killed. Clearly, rhetoric plays a significant role in preparing these choices. But, as Obama's performance indicates, it is unlikely that our presidents and our politicians will do the rhetorical work necessary to disorient the prevailing exceptionalist narrative and reorient the debate towards the ethos of human security. It falls to us - citizens, activists and intellectuals - to turn our political rhetoric away from antagonisms that require violence towards the democratic task of contending with opponents with whom we share the world.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Hegemony

Hegemony is based on an ideological fantasy of US exceptionalism which necessitates permanent war-making---you should look at the benefits of hegemony from the outside-looking-in---their theoretically scary impacts obscure the real consequences of hegemony which have been untold suffering

Richard Jackson 11, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, The World’s Most Warring Nation, www.e-ir.info/2011/07/02/the-world’s-most-warring-nation/

The history of US foreign policy is a violent and bloody one, although this is not necessarily the dominant perception of most Americans. From the frontier wars of subjugation against Native Peoples to colonial wars against Mexico, Spain and the Philippines, the Cold War interventions in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya and elsewhere, the post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya today, the US has an unrivaled record of war and foreign military intervention. There are in fact, few periods in its history when the US has not been engaged in war or military attacks on other countries. In addition, the US is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of military weapons, and has a military budget several times greater than all its nearest rivals combined. It is in fact, the most warring nation in modern history. It is in this historical context that we have to try and understand its current military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Libya.

Although it is sometimes argued by apologists that these military actions are always defensive in nature rather than proactive and expansionist, and are the result of real and serious threats to US security or the wider international system, the virtually impregnable security position of the US, notwithstanding the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, makes this argument unconvincing. The reality is that the size of the US landmass and population, the vast oceans to its eastern and western borders and the friendly countries to its north and south, and the extent of its economic and military power, means that there are no serious obstacles to the adoption of an isolationist foreign policy or even the adoption of a pacifist role in international affairs. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about its long record of war and intervention. Explaining the historical record of US foreign intervention requires a careful evaluation of both its strategic interests and its ideological system, as it is the almost unique combination of these factors and the way in which they underpin and interact with each other which helps to explain why the US continues to be the most violent state in the international system today.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Hegemony

The historical record proves.

Gray 11—John Gray is a Canadian journalist and author whose work includes Paul Martin: The Power of Ambition, a biography with an emphasis on Martin's lifelong quest to be Prime Minister. A former journalist with the Ottawa Citizen, Gray also had many roles in 20 years of work for The Globe and Mail, including writer, editor, foreign correspondent, and Ottawa bureau chief. He won three National Newspaper Awards [September 21, 2011, “Delusions of Peace,” Prospect, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/]

“Today we take it for granted that war happens in smaller, poorer and more backward countries,” Steven Pinker writes in his new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: the Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes. The celebrated Harvard professor of psychology is discussing what he calls “the Long Peace”: the period since the end of the second world war in which “the great powers, and developed states in general, have stopped waging war on one another.” As a result of “this blessed state of affairs,” he notes, “two entire categories of war—the imperial war to acquire colonies, and the colonial war to keep them—no longer exist.” Now and then there have been minor conflicts. “To be sure, [the super-powers] occasionally fought each other’s smaller allies and stoked proxy wars among their client states.” But these episodes do not diminish Pinker’s enthusiasm about the Long Peace. Chronic warfare is only to be expected in backward parts of the world. “Tribal, civil, private, slave-raiding, imperial, and colonial wars have inflamed the territories of the developing world for millennia.” In more civilised zones, war has all but disappeared. There is nothing inevitable in the process; major wars could break out again, even among the great powers. But the change in human affairs that has occurred is fundamental. “An underlying shift that supports predictions about the future,” the Long Peace points to a world in which violence is in steady decline.

A sceptical reader might wonder whether the outbreak of peace in developed countries and endemic conflict in less fortunate lands might not be somehow connected. Was the immense violence that ravaged southeast Asia after 1945 a result of immemorial backwardness in the region? Or was a subtle and refined civilisation wrecked by world war and the aftermath of decades of neo-colonial conflict—as Norman Lewis intimated would happen in his prophetic account of his travels in the region, A Dragon Apparent (1951)? It is true that the second world war was followed by over 40 years of peace in North America and Europe—even if for the eastern half of the continent it was a peace that rested on Soviet conquest. But there was no peace between the powers that had emerged as rivals from the global conflict.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Food Security

Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance

Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)

Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Economy

Securitizing western economic measures as a solution to impoverishment is a smokescreen for the neo liberal land management paradigm that makes exploitation and poverty inevitable

Tuck and McKenzie 15(Eve Tuck is an associate professor of educational foundations and¶ coordinator of Native American Studies at State University of New¶ York at New Paltz. Her publications are concerned with the ethics¶ of social science research and educational research, Indigenous¶ social and political thought, decolonizing research methodologies¶ and theories of change, and the lived and placed consequences of¶ settler colonialism and neoliberalism. She is an enrolled member of¶ the Tribal Government of St. Paul Island, Alaska.¶ Marcia McKenzie is an associate professor in the Department of¶ Educational Foundations and director of the Sustainability¶ Education Research Institute at the University of Saskatchewan¶ (www.seri.usask.ca). She is principal investigator on two SSHRCfunded¶ projects: the Sustainability and Education Policy Network¶ (www.sepn.ca) and the Digital Media Project: Youth Making¶ Place. Her interdisciplinary research focuses on the intersections¶ of environment and critical education, educational policy and¶ practice, youth identity and place, and the politics of social science¶ research."Relational Validity and the “Where” of Inquiry: Place and Land in Qualitative Research," 2015 , RLA)

In our own work (Tuck & McKenzie, 2015), we have set about describing relational validity—a set of precepts and implications for critical place inquiry which share a filial relationship with Koro-Ljungberg’s (2010) “responsibility,” Lather’s (1984, 1991) catalytic validity, and Fine’s (2008) provocative validity. Relational validity is based on paradigmatic understandings of the relationality of life. Discussing the words of his father Stan Wilson (2001), Opaskwayak Cree scholar Shawn Wilson (2008) discusses the concept of Self as relationship in Indigenous research. He writes, Identity for Indigenous peoples is grounded in their relationships with the land, with their ancestors who have returned to the land and with future generations who will come into being on the land. Rather than viewing ourselves as being in relationship with other people or things, we are the relationships that we hold and are part of. (p. 80) Relational validity prioritizes the reality that human life is connected to and dependent on other species and the land. Thus, relational validity is based on the understanding that the prioritization of “economic validity” is harmful for people, other forms of life, and places. While only a few years ago a discourse of climate change denial was prevalent and growing (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, &Hmielowski, 2012), we have entered a new stage in which human extinction from the planet is a realistic and very probable concern (Sarmiento, Sean, Tola, & Hantel, 2014).The economic, individualist, and anthropocentric paradigm of Western (post)modernism continues to expand in its current globalizing and neoliberal forms (Peck, 2013). In its global reach, it binds increasing numbers of governance practices to the support of fossil fuel and other extractive industries, resulting in the neglect of a fiduciary responsibility to ensure the fulfillment of the right to clean water, air, and land. As a result, “the tensions of capitalism are being played out on a global, biospheric scale and thus implicate the future of life on earth” (Cooper, 2008, p. 49, in Pierce, 2012, p. 24). This is an economic paradigm that banks its future on scientific and technological advances designed to capitalize on forms of life (Pierce, 2012) Thus, relational validity implies that research is not only about understanding or chronicling the relationality of life and the inadequacy of economic validity but also that research necessarily influences these conditions in small or significant ways; it thus impels action and increased accountability to people and place. Because no action is an action, and because not acting has implications, a more adequate response is required for current and future injustices (McKenzie, 2009). The legacies of the spatial practices of European colonization over the past 500 years in many parts of the globe continue to be supported by governments but also social practices more generally, which also establish and reify hierarchies of settler over Indigenous. DoreenMassey (2005) expresses the urgency of place this way:What is special about place is not some romance of a pre-givencollective identity or of the eternity of the hills. Rather, what is special about place is precisely that throwntogetherness, the unavoidable challenge of negotiating a here-and-now (itself drawing on a history and a geography of thens and theres); and a negotiation which must take place within and between both human and nonhuman. This is no way denies a sense of wonder: what could be more stirring than walking the high fells in the knowledge of the history and the geography that has made them here today. This is the event of place. (p. 140)

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Links › Link---Economy

Economic collapse scenarios further societal militarization by connecting it to national security – that turns the case and perpetuates the international capitalist order

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 101-102. )

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

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The negatives of securitization of disease far out weight the positives-it is grounded in a racist discourse that has empirically been used for genocide

Stefan Elbe, Paper Presented to the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004, on the panel ‘Activism and Practices of Dissent in Global Politics: Interdisciplinary and Critical Perspectives’, “The Futility of Protest? – Biopower and Biopolitics in the Securitization of HIV/AIDS”, , It was approved “On 10/09/2010 05:04, kentucky morrow wrote: Dear,  Dr. Stefan Elbe, First sorry for our last message, we were having some email trouble, but now have it all figured out Second, hello, we am writing to you today because, we  am a fifteen year old high-school student in the United States, and we have recently read one of your pieces of work, "The Futility of Protest? – Biopower and Biopolitics in the Securitization of HIV/AIDS”. we were very impressed by your piece ofwork and would like to cite it, for use in a high school debate round. We have long been a fan of critical securitization work, and  believe that your article would be very helpful to advancing its cause. Thanks again, we really enjoyed your articles and hope that I will be able to cite it for usein debate rounds. That's fine. Thanks for asking ... and good luck with the debate.Stefan Elbe”

3. The Ethical Dangers of Biopolitics Many of those advocating the securitization of AIDS hope that their actions will bring about a plethora of important, long-term normative benefits. These advantages include (i) mobilising more political support and economic resources for addressing the AIDS pandemic at global and local levels, (ii) breaking the silence and stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, (iii) politicising the central role of the security sector as a vector of the virus, and (iv) helping to override the legal constraints bearing on the production of affordable life-saving AIDS medicines – especially those imposed by the international regime protecting intellectual property rights (TRIPS), the provisions of which do not apply to cases of national security crises.55 These goals do seem worth striving for, but they must also be reassessed in light of the biopolitical dimension to the securitization of AIDS identified above. Foucault, after all, had been able to detect at least two serious ethical dangers historically accompanying the deployment of biopolitical strategies, and both of these concerns can, to some extent, be shown to apply to the current securitization of HIV/AIDS as well. 3.1. Biological Racism One such danger is that historically biopolitical strategies have given rise to new instances of mass death heralded on the basis of biological criteria. With hindsight it seems profoundly ironic that the European era of biopower – advanced in the name of ‘life’ – coexisted with political strategies demanding the deaths of millions. Foucault later came to understand this bizarre confluence on the basis of a new racism – a racism of biology rather than of culture.56 ‘Racism’, he contended from a biopolitical perspective, ‘is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.’57 The Nazi movement demonstrated this darker side of biopolitics in a particularly stark manner when it carved up the European continent using the dubious criterion of ‘blood’ for deciding which populations could be usefully ‘Germanized’ and thus spared, and which ones could not.58 This biological racism was also projected internally to the Jewish population of the German Reich; Jews were no longer prosecuted solely because of their Judaism, but because of their ‘Jewishness’, which prompted Hannah Arendt to point out in her memorable phrase that whereas in the past ‘Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape.’59 A biopolitical society, in short, may still make decisions about whose life is worth preserving and whose life will be allowed to perish, and the function of racism in a biopolitical age is to make this very distinction. Indeed, biological racism may even prove to be more pernicious than the traditional cultural racism precisely in that there is no escape from one’s biological makeup. In either case, such biological racism can explain the historical irony that it was ‘as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed’.60 This darker side of the twentieth century European biopolitics, moreover, must give pause for thought regarding ongoing attempts to the frame the AIDS pandemic as an international security issue. Is there any evidence of racism operating in the international debate on HIV/AIDS? There is certainly evidence that the older, cultural racism is present in this debate, especially regarding the question of which peoples are allowed to live and which ones are left to die. Given the existence of life-prolonging medicines, the pandemic could be significantly curtailed with sufficient international political will and resources. Yet Africans’ claims to these medicines are not being satisfied; the survival of these populations is being given much less priority internationally than say

the less than 3,000 U.S. citizens who died on September 11, 2001, prompting the head of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, to remind his listeners that ‘if this would have happened in the Balkans, or in Eastern Europe, or in Mexico, with white people, the reaction would have been different.’61 It is indeed hard to imagine that this pandemic would have been allowed to rage out of control on any continent other than Africa. Of course, this kind of racism is different from the racism deployed by Germany’s National- socialists in that people are not being killed either deliberately or on biologically- defined grounds, but its effects are much the same; HIV-positive populations are being allowed to die in vast numbers despite the availability of life-prolonging medicines, thus highlighting an implicit racism between different populations at the global level. Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, it is also precisely this kind of cultural racism that the ongoing securitization of AIDS is attempting to resist; the securitization of AIDS is being driven by the desire to make more resources available internationally for addressing the pandemic, and thus it does not seem ethically culpable with regard to furthering this kind of cultural racism. Indeed, the hope of combating such cultural racism forms a considerable part of its rhetorical force. There is, however, also evidence of a second and more subtle form of biological racism operating in the international AIDS debate. This racism is not so much concerned with the traditional war between races, as with more modern attempts to guard the biological health and fitness of the whole population or race vis- à-vis specific ‘diseased’ or ‘degenerate’ threats. Nazi eugenics, it is worth recalling, began in precisely such a vein – by first attempting to eradicate diseased people for the benefit of the health of the German population as a whole. Foucault thus noted how biopolitical (as opposed to cultural) racism appeals to the principle ‘that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population.’62 This biological racism serving the population as a whole also occasionally surfaces in the debate on HIV/AIDS. In 1999, for example, one former UN Population Fund (UNFPA) official reportedly joked that AIDS would be one way of controlling population growth in Africa. Increased mortality, the official jibed, was one of three ways of controlling population growth, implying that this would be beneficial for those surviving the pandemic.63 Nor is this an isolated incident. The initial reaction of one official at the National Intelligence Council in the mid 1990s, responding to the early demand for a project on the security implications of AIDS, was reportedly: ‘Oh, it will be good, because Africa is overpopulated anyway.’64 Some have even committed such thoughts to paper. In a report by the World Bank from 1992 one can read that ‘[i]f the only effect of the AIDS epidemic were to reduce the population growth rate, it would increase the growth rate of per capita income in any plausible economic model’.65 Underlying such thinking is not a cultural racism, but a more subtle biological racism that pits the population or ‘race’ as a whole against HIV-positive persons by implying, however erroneously, that the former would be better off without the latter. Again, however, the securitization of AIDS is, at least on the surface of it, trying to combat this form of racism by calling for a more global and comprehensive response to the AIDS pandemic, and consequently does not appear ethically culpable with regard to furthering this kind of racism either. Where then, one might ask, is the evidence of the securitization of AIDS, as a biopolitical gesture, giving rise to new forms of racism in the way Foucault had warned? The extent to which novel forms of racism may emerge in the securitization of AIDS depends very much on exactly how HIV/AIDS is securitized. The tactical dilemma faced by all advocates and adherents of the securitization of AIDS is whether this securitization is to be achieved primarily on the basis of a national security or a human security framework. On the one hand, advocates of the securitization of AIDS clearly want this securitization to be successful in order for the normative benefits they envision to accrue as quickly as possible. This means casting HIV/AIDS as a security threat within the framework of national and international security, i.e. in terms that will appear most plausible and persuasive to the Security Council and the traditional security sector. This, in turn, would entail highlighting the effects of HIV/AIDS on the armed forces, on peacekeepers, and on state capacity. A human security framework, by contrast, is less likely to persuade the Security Council and the more traditionally oriented security sector to take the issue seriously at the highest levels, and is hence unlikely to achieve the same degree of political impact. So the tactical advantages of drawing on national and international security frameworks initially appear very compelling. Yet if the securitization of AIDS is to proceed solely or even primarily on the basis of national and international security, then it also inadvertently risks simply substituting the cultural racism it eagerly seeks to combat with a new strategic form of racism. Put differently, securitizing the illness in this manner could encourage an international response whereby medicines are provided not democratically and comprehensively to all who need them, but only to those populations who play a crucial role in maintaining national and international security, i.e. the armed forces and state elites. Securitizing AIDS with reference to national and international security may thus come to benefit those elites in question, but not the wider population. There is consequently a danger of the securitization of AIDS introducing a subtle put potentially disastrous new criterion for deciding who is allowed to live and who will be left to die; a criterion that assesses human beings not in terms of any intrinsic value, but on the basis of their strategic value. In this way the securitization of AIDS risks substituting a cultural racism with a new strategic racism that, from a biopolitical perspective, is still a racism because it would provide the crucial biopolitical function of deciding who must live and who must die. What is more, framing HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security also risks further fuelling the aforementioned biological racism that advocates of the securitization of AIDS are trying to combat. It does so by inadvertently construing persons living with HIV/AIDS as security threats. A characteristic headline from the British Daily Telegraph reads ‘African AIDS: Deadly Threat to Britain’.66 Nor is this an isolated incident; the portrayal of AIDS as being a disease that comes from foreigners, from outsiders, and especially from ‘black’ Africans, is a perennial feature of the discourse on AIDS ever since the illness was first discovered. Calls for quarantining people with HIV/AIDS not because of their skin colour but because of their biological characteristics, subjecting them to various forms of violence, attempting to bar such persons from serving in state institutions, and the refusal to issue visas to foreigners living with HIV, are only a few of the examples in which persons living with HIV/AIDS have been ostracized and even persecuted by some states for their illness. Nor are these examples confined to the dustbin of history. As recently as February 2003 the British government considered implementing compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants amid alleged worries that HIV-positive foreigners are traveling to the United Kingdom to seek treatment.67 Within the armed forces around the world, moreover, there has already been growing pressure to exclude soldiers living with HIV because the illness is being perceived as a security threat. As with Arendt’s aforementioned observations about ‘Jewishness’, there seems to be no escape from one’s HIV-status. Although the securitization of AIDS tries to remedy the cultural racism evident in the unequal global access to medicines, if it is conducted primarily on the grounds of national and international security it risks – contrary to its own intensions – furthering both a strategic racism that will save elites but not ordinary people, and a biological racism that fuels exclusionary practices regarding persons living with HIV. It is only by first acknowledging the biopolitical nature of the securitization of AIDS, that these novel ethical dangers can be identified.

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The discourse of disease relies on biopolitical securitization of the military industrial complex – that causes perpetual war

Michael Dillon, Lancaster University, and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Keele University, A final version of this paper has been published as: (2008) 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century' (with Michael Dillon), Review of International Studies, April 2008, 34:2,http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo_Biopolitics_of_Security_21stCentury.pdf

Western societies entered the 20 century in an era of infectious disease. In the United States, for example, tuberculosis was the number one killer while small pox, diphtheria, tetanus and other infectious diseases were prevalent. Curative medicine, allied to other biopolitical ‘social’ security strategies, transformed the morbidity of western populations, however, by virtually eliminating such diseases. Consequently, an entirely different demographic of morbidity has emerged. This new landscape is characterised by chronic rather than infectious diseases. Chronic diseases are in turn distinguished by a variety of significantly different features from those which characterised infectious disease. These features include the following. 1. First, susceptibility to chronic illness is a universal among western populations. 2. Second, chronic illnesses are characterised by early onset. 3. Third, chronic illnesses are progressive. 4. Fourth, such illnesses become clinical explicit only at certain symptom thresholds; angina or heart attack signalling the presence, for example, of heart disease that has been developing for many years. 5. Fifth, chronic illnesses are multifactorial. 6. Sixth, differences between individuals are manifested by the rate at which such diseases progress rather than the bald presence or absence of the disease. 7. Seventh, the onset and rate of progress of chronic illness is a direct function of exposure to risk factors. These in turn are very much a function of how lives are lived; ‘life styles’. Whereas infectious disease invited drug cures, chronic illnesses invite pre-emption and prevention together with medical campaigns aimed at changing life-styles, backed by widespread use of surveillance (or ‘screening’ in medical terms) and the statistical documentation of the incidence of disease distribution spatially as well as temporally. All these developments have in turn begun to be combined with the pervasive regulation and management of risk, and the astonishingly greater resolution given to the analytic of risk which resonates throughout all aspects of western society. Closely allied with the concern for risk factors arising from life-styles, is an intense individualisation and personalisation of medicine as well. Whereas Foucault spoke of the ways in which liberal biopolitical governmentality encouraged the development of the entrepreneurial self, 53 the compression of morbidity witnesses the emergence of a self entrepreneurially responsibilised to secure its own health care. Such developments similarly also reflect the intense preoccupation in military corporate and homeland security domains with the same kinds of preoccupations and analytical devices allying screening and surveillance with distribution-patterning and risk analysis across mass populations locally as well as globally. The biopoliticisation of security discourse in these more traditional areas of security analysis also reflects amassive shift to pre-emptive and preventative strategies. While we do not have the space to trace the connections, the correlation is no mere accident. Granted that both military and corporate strategies are driven by their own local and global dynamics, their informationalisation and biologisation nonetheless also directly reflects these developments as well. The reason we maintain is that they not only borrow from, and leach into, one another. They share a similar if diffuse account of the ‘real’.

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The fundamental assumptions of liberalism ignore other more vital causes of war—the properties that make a democratic nation peaceful aren’t democratic

Buchan 02 Bruce Buchan B Arts (Hons), M Arts, PhD winner of B Arts (Hons), M Arts, PhD Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” Alternatives v. 27

This sort of argument strips bare the assumption behind much liberal IR theory, that liberalism, and in particular the creation of civil society, is held to be the key to domestic and international peace. The "liberal" states that surround and protect their own civil societies are thus taken to be "morally complete" and nonviolent because they embody the normative superiority of liberalism. (51) In theorizing the development of a zone of interstate peace, therefore, liberal IR theorists assume that liberal states are not the source of war; they may engage in war, but only because illiberal or uncivilized states pose a threat. More importantly, however, the second consequence is that liberal IR theorists seem insensible to the domestic, "civil" roots of violence, its control and intensification, alongside liberal norms and within liberal and representative institutions, nurtured and sustained in the crucible of civil society, and driven by a process of civilization. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the work of Kant, on whom many contemporary liberal democratic-peace theorists unwisely rely. (52) When they do so, the claim to the normative superiority of liberal-democratic norms collapses since it soon becomes clear that Kant's arguments for a "pacific federation" of states were based in part on military competition, and his principles of representation turn out to be anything but democratic. (53) If, as Cederman suggests, "it is our duty" to take Kant's "ethical reasoning" seriously, then we may find, contrary to Cederman's expectations, that Kant was neither a democrat nor a liberal, and certainly not a theorist of "interdemocratic peace." (54)

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The affirmatives democratic rhetoric gives the false illusion of peace - it causes mobilization against anything as long as it is labeled totalitarian

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy @ Brunel University (UK), editorial of , 2008 (“Critique of Security.” PG(s). (115-117)

One of the ways this fear was put to work and the citizenry ‘aroused’ was through the elision of the differences between war and peace. The movers and shakers in the US state claimed that, in theory at least, democracies generally separate peace from war as distinct periods and processes, and that this distinction tends to be obliterated but ‘totalitarian’ regimes. And yet they also claimed that since we lived in an age of ‘permanent antagonism and conflict’ (with ‘no lasting abatement of the crisis’), as the NSC-68 put it-‘the smaller the gap between peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater [is] the likely-hood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well’. NSC-20/1 noted that ‘a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and war time objectives’, but nonetheless suggested that the US needed to ‘reduce as far as possible the gap between them’. Indeed, one Policy Planning Staff Memo of May 1948 suggested that liberal democracies had been ‘handicapped’ by ‘attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war’ and claimed that what was needed was the idea of ‘political warfare’ as ‘the logical application Clausewitz in time of peace’. NSC-20/1 thus cited Clausewitz’s claim that ‘war is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means’. The intent was clar: ‘the basic objective outlines…is one which would be valid for peace as well as fro war’. Or as NSC-68 put it: the objectives of a society are equally valid and necessary for peace as well as for war’, and they are so because the challenge of security is one ‘whicch encompasses noth peace and war’. Hence it is ‘essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in times of peace and in the event of war’. In other words, since the enemy is as much within as without, and since the objectives, fears, and insecurities running through the body politic are present in times of both peace and war, the distinction between the two is, in essence obliterated. War and politics become a unity, and ‘political warfare’ is set in place mobilizing ‘all the means at a nation’s command’. In this sense, the national security state sought to legitimize the exercise of war powers during periods of peace by transforming the concept of ‘peace’ as applied to liberal democracy. ‘Such as peace as the United States is experiencing is not a peace; it is in fact a war’. This transformation was effected through the notion of security, especially in its ideological circuit with emergency. Herein lies a further reason to explain the emergence of ‘national security’ rather than ‘national defense’ beyond that discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3. As Eyal Weizman has noted, the logic of ‘defence’ deals with war and seeks to constitute with borders and barriers a clear distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, between the territory within the state and that which is exterior to it. The logic of ‘security’, on the other hand , presupposes that the danger is already inside, presented by a population in which the subverive elements exist…If defence engages directly with the concept of war, security engages with the temporarily ill-defined and spatially amorphous ‘conflict’ not only between societies, but within them as well. Eliding the distinction between military practice and the everyday political administration of civil society thereby helps in ‘securing’ a general willingness among the citizenry to submit to wartime disciline and emergency powers on a permanent basis.