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2022 SDI Topicality
MSDI Topicality › Topic Specific Terms › Artificial Intelligence

AI excludes robots – it supplements humans, not replaces us

Nirmal Narayanan, 2-19-2019, https://www.ibtimes.co.in/will-artificial-intelligence-take-away-jobs-humans-792246, "Will Artificial Intelligence take away jobs from humans?," IBTimes India (ermo/sms, Acc:6-27-2022)

As panic surrounding job loss due to artificial intelligence reaches new levels, experts have clarified that AI will not take away jobs from humans. Experts revealed that artificial intelligence is actually supplementing human intelligence all across the spectrum, and it will actually make the life of humans easy.

In a recent post written on Science Focus, Dr Peter Bentley, a British author and computer scientist based at University College London revealed that artificial intelligence is not the same as factory automation or robots. Bentley believes that AI is very similar to the internet, and it is basically an enabling technology which creates new jobs in various industries.

2022 SDI Topicality
MSDI Topicality › Topic Specific Terms › Artificial Intelligence

AI excludes machine learning

William Stanton, 2-24-2016, https://www.alphr.com/artificial-intelligence/1002792/what-is-ai-ten-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-future-of/, "What is AI? Ten things you need to know about the future of artificial intelligence," Alphr (ermo/sms, Acc:6-27-2022)

To truly understand what AI is, though, you need to appreciate the jargon that’s thrown around out there right now. For instance, you need to know that artificial intelligence is not the same as machine learning, despite the fact it’s regularly used as a synonym for it. The chief difference to remember is that machine learning is simply a process by which a computer can learn a skill, whereas artificial intelligence refers to a computer that can “think” for itself without being programmed to do so.

2022 SDI Topicality
MSDI Topicality › Topic Specific Terms › Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence

Ed Burns “What is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?” Tech Target Accessed 23 June 2022 (jshock)

Artificial intelligence is the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, especially computer systems. Specific applications of AI include , natural language processing, speech recognition and .

and deep learning artificial intelligence technologies are quickly evolving, primarily because AI processes large amounts of data much faster and makes predictions more accurately than humanly possible.

2022 SDI Topicality
MSDI Topicality › Topic Specific Terms › Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence

Cambridge Dictionary “Artificial Intelligence” Accessed 10 June 2022 (jshock)

the of how to that have some of the that the has, such as the to , , , and

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Cyber Impact

Attacks are too risky and patching vulnerabilities solve

Valeriano et al. 18 – Brandon, PhD, Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Benjamin Jensen, Associate Professor at Marine Corps University and a Scholar-in-Residence at American University, School of International Service. Ryan Maness, an American cybersecurity expert, Defense Analysis Professor at Naval Postgraduate School. “Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion”, Oxford University Press, pg. 211-214, xx-xx-2018

What do the insights in this book tell us about the future of cyber exchanges between rivals? To paraphrase the acclaimed science fiction writer William Gibson, the future is already here, it is just not evenly distributed. The next 10 years will likely see an acceleration in the use of what Soviet thinkers called active measures and what George Kennan called political warfare. We are not optimistic that the current US administration will be able to sustain, much less lead, a multilateral cyber order that constrains the worst tendencies of rivals engaged in strategic competition. Yet, given the unique nature of cyber operations, we still assess minimal risks to covert action in cyberspace unleashing inadvertent escalation in the military domain. The world is witnessing the reawakening of an old strategic practice: political warfare. The connectivity of the modern world puts a premium on coercive diplomacy in the shadows. From election tampering and fake news disseminated across multimedia in Ukraine (2014), the United States (2016), and France (2017), states such as Russia use cyber operations to enable covert influence campaigns short of war. These operations extend beyond undermining democracies, and are also creating rifts among autocratic allies. In June 2017, an APT group linked to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) triggered a diplomatic crisis in the Persian Gulf by taking control of a Qatari news website. After hacking the online news feed, the group planted false information showing the emir praising Iran and calling for good relations with Israel while (contradictorily) backing Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (Bing 2017a). The intrusion was followed by a massive DDoS attack on Al-Jazeera, the Qatari owned media outlet (Kirkpatrick and Frankel 2017). In effect, UAE operatives conducted a classic psychological warfare operation that undermined the integrity of an alliance network. The news agencies in multiple Gulf States ran with the false story, leading to a diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. Cyber incidents like these show how states are mixing the old with the new. Much like the early Cold War, emerging cyber operations combine espionage, propaganda, economic warfare, and sabotage in an effort to signal resolve and shape adversary foreign policy (Valeriano, Maness, and Jensen 2017). The character of war and strategic competition is changing. The new Cold War is online. The connectivity of the digital domain amplifies the effects of political warfare. Social media helps rival states reach key constituencies in their competitor’s domestic populations, a phenomenon on display in the Russian purchases of ads on Facebook and Twitter during the 2016 US election. The extension of commerce and governance online creates vulnerabilities for states. Rivals can target economic capacity in a manner that used to require states to wage open, economic warfare. They can conduct sabotage through malicious code, as opposed to explosive satchel charges. The question that remains is, why are we not seeing more concessions as a result of cyber coercion? The answer lies in the unique character of cyber operations. Cyber instruments are a use-it-and-lose-it coercive instrument that come with an inherent amount of risk. To gain network access for higher-cost and compellence-producing degradations, states must first infiltrate and map their rival’s networks. This access gives them a position of advantage. They can extract information and monitor their rival, even if imperfectly. The decision on whether or not to execute a follow-up attack has to be balanced with the costs of losing network access. Once you convert your initial infiltration into an attack vector, you lose the access. In theory, this additional cost shifts the cost-benefit calculus associated with cyber operations in favor of restraint or using lower-level cyber disruptions that do not burn exploits because to do otherwise is quite risky. This “use it and lose it” dynamic is amplified by the shadow of the future unique to political warfare in the digital domain. For leading powers such as United States that have multiple cyber rivals (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea), the cost associated with burning a vulnerability is increased. Once a cyber operation is outed, states and the private sector move to patch the vulnerability. There are not an infinite number of vulnerabilities. Therefore, every attack, in theory, decreases the number of future attacks you can launch against a rival. For the United States, this condition means that if it chooses to launch a cyber degradation action against China, that specific attack vector will likely be lost in exchanges with Russia. Therefore, while the world is likely to see an increase in election hacking, false flag operations, DDoS attacks targeting key companies, and ransomware, there is unlikely to be an increase in political concessions. The risk of 21st-century cyber disruption and intrigue lies more in proliferation risks. A further constraining feature on launching cyber operations is the fact that, unlike a limited missile strike, the rival can copy the code and increase its own cyber capabilities. Rivals learn from and can emulate cyber coercive instruments at a faster rate than they can from military competition. States find it is easier to replicate code associated with a rival’s cyber offensive operation than they do building a fifth-generation aircraft based on stolen plans.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Cyber Impact

Cyber weapons haven’t killed anyone in 30 years – Reversible consequences mean attacks don’t provoke war.

Borghard and Lonergan 19 – Erica, Assistant Professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a research fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, PhD in political science from Columbia University. Shawn, Research affiliate of the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a cyber officer in the US Army Reserve currently assigned to 75th Innovation Command, PhD in political science from Columbia University. “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, pg. 122-145, , xx-xx-2019

Limited Costliness of Offensive Cyber Effects Even under circumstances in which a state may possess the right cyber response capabilities at the desired time, its response may not generate sufficient costs against the target to be perceived as escalatory.41 Fundamental limits on the cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations stem from the fact that cyber capabilities lack the physical violence of conventional and nuclear ones. Cyber weapons target data; they disrupt, manipulate, degrade, or destroy data resident on networks and systems or in transit.42 Moreover, aside from those cyber capabilities that permanently destroy data and for which there are no backups to which a target can revert, cyber effects are temporary and often reversible. The utility of military instruments of power for the purposes of coercion or brute force inheres in their abilities to inflict—or credibly threaten to inflict—significant damage and harm against a target state (its civilian population or its military forces) to achieve a political objective.43 Cyber weapons could be (and have been) used to disrupt an adversary’s networks and systems—overwhelming them such that they temporarily lose the ability to function or the target loses confidence in their reliability—or even to produce destructive effects by destroying data resident on these systems or, in rarer circumstances, producing effects in the physical realm.44 While conducting multiple cyberattacks against a targeted state’s critical national infrastructure, for example, could in theory generate significant economic and national security consequences, the temporal aspects of offensive cyber operations as described above limit the ability of even the most capable states to sustain persistent, high-cost effects against multiple strategic targets over time. There is simply no guarantee that a state can generate significant costs against a target in the context of an unfolding crisis. This reality starkly contrasts with the relative predictability and reliability of conventional effects. Indeed, the empirical record has largely validated this claim; “the vast majority of malicious cyber activity has taken place far below the threshold of armed conflict between states, and has not risen to the level that would trigger such a conflict.”45 This is why, in Lin’s parlance, “going cyber is pre-escalatory” and countervalue cyberattacks (those that target civilian, rather than military, assets) occur “all the time now and are at the BOTTOM of the escalation ladder” [emphasis in original].46 Rather than their ability to wreak permanent, destructive effects, cyber operations are often prized for their temporary and reversible nature.47 One metric to assess the cost-generation potential of offensive cyber is in terms of loss of life. By this measure, cyber operations are unlikely to inflict significant harm. While theoretically possible that cyber operations could lead directly to a loss of life, no one has reportedly died to date as a direct result of a cyberattack despite over 30 years of recorded cyber operations.48 Even in hypothetical catastrophic scenarios, the cost in terms of human casualties is minimal. For instance, common worst-case scenarios of cyberattacks revolve around the loss of power stemming from a cyberattack on an electric grid.49 However, even in this instance, the conceivable damage from the loss of power over an extended period is far less than that which could be wreaked using basic, limited conventional capabilities. To draw a comparison, when Hurricane Sandy hit the United States’ eastern seaboard in late October 2012, over 8.5 million people were left without power—with many going weeks and even months before it was brought back online.50 Yet a US National Hurricane Center postmortem of Hurricane Sandy reported that of the 159 people in the United States killed either directly or indirectly, only “about 50 of these deaths were the result of extended power outages during cold weather, which led to deaths from hypothermia, falls in the dark by senior citizens, or carbon monoxide poisoning from improperly placed generators or cooking devices.”51 If a cyberattack took out power of a similar magnitude and duration of Hurricane Sandy, it is conceivable that an equivalent number of casualties would result. The 2015 synchronized cyberattacks against Ukrainian power companies, attributed to Russia, was the first known example of an offensive cyber operation targeting a state’s power grid. Its cost was ultimately low—service was temporarily disrupted to 225,000 customers for several hours, and energy providers operated at a limited capacity for some time after service was restored.52 There were no reported casualties from this power outage. While any casualty resulting from a cyberattack would certainly be lamentable, even worst-case scenario figures are minor in comparison to the cost in human lives stemming from other, even limited, kinetic military operations.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Cyber Impact

Prefer statistics

Valeriano and Maness 18 – Brandon, PhD, Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, Cyber Security Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Ryan, an American cybersecurity expert, Defense Analysis Professor at Naval Postgraduate School. “How We Stopped Worrying about Cyber Doom and Started Collecting Data”, Global Cybersecurity, Vol. 6, No. 2, , 06-11-2018

6. Expanding Cyber Security Data Our team has been coding cyber incident data since 2010 and serves as a unique example of how the process of collecting cyber security data and evidence can be done. Our first peer reviewed published work appeared in 2014 in Journal of Peace Research (Valeriano & Maness, 2014). In this article we note that cyber conflict is much more restrained than generally understood by popular discourse. Threat inflation is ripe in cyber security, and the real use of cyber tools seems to be to enhance the power of strong states. The data that Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015) have built challenges the cyber revolution perspective and does so with the tools of social science, and is a necessary turn given the general tone of the debate. We first determine that a viable data collection method in light of limited resources was to focus on states that are committed interstate rivals (Diehl & Goertz, 2001). This allows us to focus on those actors with an intense history of recent hostilities that should be the most likely users of cyber technology on the battlefield (Maness & Valeriano, 2018). In our research (Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Maness, Valeriano, & Jensen, 2017; Valeriano & Maness, 2014, 2015), we have been able to marshal a massive amount of evidence that is useful in dissecting the actual trends on the cyber battlefield in a geopolitical context. We demonstrate that while cyber-attacks are increasing in frequency, they are limited in severity, are directly connected to traditional territorial disagreements, and mostly take the shape of espionage and low-level disruptive campaigns rather than outright warfare. Given this data-based perspective, we question the dynamics of the cyber security debate and offer a countering theory where states are restrained from using more malicious cyber actions due to the limited nature of the weapons, the possibly of blowback, the connection between the digital world and civilian infrastructure, and the reality that any cyber weapon launched can be replicated and used right back against the attacker. Given all of these perspectives gleamed from the data, we must moderate our views about the transformation that is offered by cyber strategists who stress a more revolutionist tone (Lango, 2016). Social science clearly matters for contemporary technological policy debates. Absent rigorous methods, much of what is in the field is basically guesswork. Our work really owes an intellectual debt to J. David Singer, who started the effort to quantify war at the University of Michigan with the Correlates of War (COW) project (Small & Singer, 1982). Our project builds on this methodology and uses many of the same coding strategies. We recognize that data is a work in progress and seek to build more and more knowledge through subsequent updates. By gathering the full picture, we can gain the perspective that really matters in these emerging policy debates regarding the cyber battlefield.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Cyber Impact

Self-dampening checks escalation

Sørensen and Nyemann 19 – Heine, Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. Dorthe Bach, Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, US Joint Forces Command. “Deterrence by Punishment as a Way of Countering Hybrid Threats – Why We Need To Go ‘Beyond Resilience’ in the Gray Zone”, Multinational Capability Development Campaign, , 03-xx-2019

The Flipside of Deterrence by Punishment – the Fear of Escalation One of the greatest reservations against communicating a willingness to take punitive actions concerns the risk of escalation and increased tension due to a more assertive or offensive posture. Yet when looking into possible responses – retaliation in cyberspace, for example – a number of “self-dampening” mechanisms appear to be in place that may be applicable to many types of responses.30 One example is the requirement to establish some level of attribution of aggression on which to base a response. As discussed above, while attribution is rarely impossible, it can be a time-consuming and technically-challenging endeavor. In a high-stakes scenario the time taken to get attribution as right as possible means there will be plenty of time to think twice about actions and consequences, and to lean on diplomatic measures in parallel. An example of a self-dampening mechanism related to the cyber domain is the large investment required to develop credible offensive capabilities. Moreover, an offensive cyber capability is a transitory tool31. The ability to access a computer system or network to cause harm or damage is only temporary and dependent on a very rapid and ongoing patching of vulnerabilities. At the same time, wielding the cyber instrument despite the downside of “burning” the capacity might have a de-escalatory effect by communicating capability and credibility to the opponent with a view to discouraging future hostile attacks. Targeting in any domain – including cyberspace – must also follow relevant rules, law and due-process which will self-limit the range of targets and actions available. A final “escalatory showstopper” is related to the challenge of identifying and developing targets of adequate strategic significance – not too much, not too little – to achieve the desired effect. Responding to hybrid aggression by applying “middle range” punitive actions that are proportionate to the aggression threatened or suffered will also self-limit the escalatory potential. It is unlikely to be in the interest of any hybrid aggressor to pursue an escalatory spiral above and beyond where they were looking to compete in the first place: on the hybrid level. Nevertheless, one way to mitigate the risk of escalation – while enhancing civilian oversight and interagency coordination – would be to establish rules of engagement for punitive actions on the hybrid level32 . This would provide decision-makers with common guidelines to pursue punitive actions that fall below the “use of force threshold”. Moreover, this could actually bolster the credibility of punitive actions by signaling to hybrid aggressors the intent to take pre-prepared punitive actions when deemed necessary: in other words, a “playbook” for countering hybrid threats.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Cyber Impact

No large-scale cyber-attacks or retaliation

Nye 19 – Dr. Joseph S, University Distinguished Service Professor and Former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. “Can cyberwarfare be regulated?”, The Strategist, , 10-03-2019

Cyber technology, of course, lacks the clear devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and that poses a different set of problems, because there is no crystal ball. During the Cold War, the great powers avoided direct engagement, but that is not true of cyber conflict. And yet the threat of cyber Pearl Harbors has been exaggerated. Most cyber conflicts occur below the threshold established by the rules of armed conflict. They are economic and political, rather than lethal. It is not credible to threaten a nuclear response to cyber theft of intellectual property by China or cyber meddling in elections by Russia. According to American doctrine, deterrence is not limited to a cyber response (though that is possible). The US will respond to cyberattacks across domains or sectors, with any weapons of its choice, proportional to the damage that has been done. That can range from naming and shaming to economic sanctions to kinetic weapons. Earlier this year, a new doctrine of “persistent engagement” was described as not only disrupting attacks, but also helping to reinforce deterrence. But the technical overlap between intrusion into networks to gather intelligence or disrupt attacks and to carry out offensive operations often makes it difficult to distinguish between escalation and de-escalation. Rather than relying on tacit bargaining, as proponents of “persistent engagement” sometimes emphasize, explicit communication may be necessary to limit escalation.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

Status quo solves NATO cyber ambiguity

Khatuna Burkadze, 2018, (Khatuna Burkadze is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Professor Burkadze has been a Fulbright scholar at the MIT Center for International Studies as well as a visiting professor at Columbia University, Bard College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She has successfully completed programs on negotiations and security studies at Harvard University and George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies. Dr. Khatuna Burkadze has also implemented projects sponsored by NATO and the European Union which sought to increase awareness of both organizations inside Georgia. Dr. Khatuna Burkadze is an alumnus of the U.S. Department of State’s Program on American Foreign Policy as well as the author of dozens of articles and book chapters.), “A Shift in NATO's Article 5 in the Cyber Era?”, 42 Fletcher F. World Aff. 215 (2018), https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/forwa42&div=32&id=&page=/ceng

NATO'S CYBER DEFENSE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW The U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty (the founding treaty of NATO) were adopted in 1945 and 1949 when the creation of cyberspace was a matter of the future rather than a consideration of the times. Currently, it is clear that information and communication technologies have transformed the nature of war and changed historical understanding of armed attacks. Traditional applications of the use of force prohibition fail to adequately safeguard shared community values threatened by Computer NetworkAttacks (CNA)." The use of force is strictly limited in international law according to the U.N. Charter. Consequently, the central questions are the following: Could a cyberattack be equated to an armed attack according to international law? If a cyberattack equates to an armed attack, how should the principle of collective defense of NATO be interpreted to give member states legal guidance on the concept of a cyberattack? Do we need amendments in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to clearly define what constitutes a cyberattack? Answers to these questions can provide insights for defining rules of cyber operations in case of cyberattacks. The definitions of the use of force and armed attack are not provided in the U.N. Charter. In this regard, in its argument on a case concerning Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice rejected a narrow interpretation of "use of force" that limits the term to the employment of either kinetic force or non-kinetic operations generating comparable effects. The Court held that a state's arming and training of guerrilla forces engaged in hostilities against another state qualified as a use of force, a position that has since become widely accepted.'" The logic of the holding leads to the conclusion that non-destructive cyber operations may amount to a use of force. For example, providing malware to a rebel group and training its members to employ that malware in a destructive manner would seemingly qualify.20 However, every unfriendly act does not cross the use of force threshold. The International Court of Justice held that financing guerrillas, albeit an unlawful "intervention," did not fall into the same category. Therefore, cyber operations intended to economically coerce another state to engage in, or desist from, a particular course of action would not amount to a use of force; nor would financing a rebel group's cyber operations. Beyond these directly parallel examples, uncertainty remains as to where the threshold lies.2 1 The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence launched a major research project in late 2009 to examine the public international law governing cyber warfare2 2 and cyber operations, resulting in the Tallinn Manual 1.0 and Tallinn Manual 2.0. These two documents provide international experts' analysis on how existing international law applies to cyber warfare and cyber operations. Through Tallinn Manual 1.0, the International Group of Experts developed a nonexclusive list of factors that would likely influence the characterization of cyber operations by a state as a use of force: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, military character, state involvement, and presumptive legality. Additional factors found meaningful by the Experts included, inter alia, the prevailing political environment, the nexus of an operation to prospective military force, the attacker's identity, the attacker's track record with respect to cyber operations, and the nature of the target. These and other factors operate in concert as states make case-by-case determinations. Of them, severity alone can qualify a cyber operation as a use of force.23 In this regard, the Group unanimously agreed that any cyber operation causing greater than de minimis damage or injury suffices. For instance, they concurred that the damage to Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 resulting from the Stuxnet virus crossed the threshold.24 As for the concept of cyberattacks and cyberwarfare, there are no widely accepted definitions. The U.S. Department of Defense defines "computer network attacks" as "actions taken by using computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves."2 5 Yale Law Professor Oona Hathaway and her colleagues have devised a broader definition of a "cyberattack." In a 2012 article, they wrote: "A cyberattack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose." The article goes on to say that "any action" includes "hacking, bombing, cutting, inflecting, and so forth," as long as the action has the objective of undermining or disrupting a computer network. The word "purpose" seems to apply to the intent of the attacking party.26 According to the Tallinn Manual's Rule 30. "A cyberattack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects."27 In this regard, Professor Antonia Chayes, in an article titled, "Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks," highlights that a cyber operation can constitute an attack even before the damaging consequences of such an operation become evident, citing the example of implanting malware that will be activated at a later time, but for which the intended consequences meet the requisite threshold of harm as an event that could be defined as an attack "irrespective of whether the malware is activated" this is a direct parallel to implanting. In a similar vein, a cyberattack that has been launched but defeated still amounts to an attack. The Manual does warn that great care should be exercised when identifying the perpetrator of the attack.28 Professor Chayes emphasizes that these definitional iterations help to refine the issues, although they cannot be expected to answer all questions. They do serve to narrow differences in approach somewhat and to begin to assure that officials are addressing common issues. However, the lack of internationally accepted distinctions among "cybercrime," "cyberattack," and "cyber war" make concerted international action more difficult to achieve. The definitions alone do not delineate civilian and military roles, nor do they designate a legal framework under which to operate, since the issue of whether an attack warrants a military response-even in the military domain-remains ambiguous. Economic attacks may be handled through a variety of international means, judicial and diplomatic. But crippling economic attacks without serious casualties might not be sufficient to warrant acts in selfdefense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter nor, as in the case of Estonia, a collective response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As for NATO's official position on interconnection between the existing international legal regulations and cyberspace, the Wales Summit Declaration (issued by the Allies in Wales on 4-5 September 2014) emphasizes: "Our policy recognizes that international law, including international humanitarian law and the U.N. Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyberattacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defense is part of NATO's core task of collective defense. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis."30 This means that, on the one hand, member states of the Alliance agreed that international law applies to cyberspace but, on the other hand, in the case of a cyberattack, a decision about invoking Article 5 will be made by the members of NATO based on the particular criteria. Therefore, the principle of collective defense is not an automatic mechanism. The exact criteria by which cyber incidents may trigger an Article 5 invocation of collective defense have not been determined. However, the North Atlantic Council is very likely to consider the following elements in its deliberations. " Scope: Is the incident widespread across a geographic area or industrial sectors? The wider the attack is, the more likely NATO action will be; " Duration: Is the incident a single event or does it last over time as part of a longer campaign? NATO is more likely to act for extended incidents; " Intensity/Scale: Has the incident caused death or substantial property destruction? If not, NATO is unlikely to declare collective defense; " External Actor: Is the incident directed from a foreign or domestic adversary? NATO is unlikely to act against a purely domestic foe.31

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

Ukraine proves

John Mueller, 03-22-2022, (John Mueller is a Political Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. His most recent book is The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency.), “The Cyber-Delusion”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-22/cyber-delusion/ceng

When Russian forces launched their invasion of Ukraine last month, governments and experts worldwide warned about the danger of catastrophic cyberattacks. Indeed, in the days leading up to Moscow’s invasion, hackers defaced Ukrainian websites, unleashed malware on government systems, and targeted the country’s banking system—albeit with limited effect. Although no cyber-Armageddon has materialized, officials increasingly fear that Russia might eventually step up its efforts and even target the United States. Russia’s invasion is no doubt catastrophic. But in reacting to it and preparing for what comes next, leaders in Washington and elsewhere should eschew the alarmism that has long warped cybersecurity policy. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed in 2011 that “the single biggest existential threat out there, I think, is cyber.” The following year, his successor, Martin Dempsey, noted that “a cyberattack could stop our society in its tracks.” Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta sternly warned in 2012 of an impending “digital Pearl Harbor.” Nicole Perlroth, a cybersecurity reporter at The New York Times, has routinely asked insiders when “a cyber-enabled cataclysmic boom will take us down” and has always been told “18 to 24 months.” She began her survey well over 100 months ago. This contemporary approach to cyberthreats resembles the aftermath of 9/11, when almost all experts believed an even larger terrorist attack would soon take place. Then, as now, the threat is overblown. Although occasionally dramatic, cyberattacks have turned out to be a comparatively minor and manageable threat. Far too much discussion around the issue focuses on worst-case scenarios, fails to contextualize the problem, and neglects to weigh the costs of cyberattacks against the enormous value of the Internet and artificial intelligence. Most commentary, moreover, does not fully appreciate the ability of the business sector—by far the most tempting of targets for malevolent hackers—to develop effective countermeasures. Over the past decade, the global obsession with digital threats has taken various forms, with a particular focus on the potential military implications of emerging cyber-capabilities. To be sure, the military needs to worry about keeping its communications and command and control operations secure from hostile attackers. Any disruptions, however, are more likely to be instrumental or tactical than strategic. Despite statements to the contrary, the U.S. military itself seems to have recognized this reality. When Panetta proclaimed in 2013 that cyber was “without question, the battlefield for the future,” political scientist Micah Zenko observed at the time that the Pentagon was spending less than one percent of its budget on cybersecurity, and an assessment from 2019 suggests it may be more like one-tenth of one percent. If those funds prove adequate for the challenge, it would be something of a bargain. Cyber also supposedly enhances a state’s ability to carry out such ancient endeavors as espionage, propaganda dissemination, and sabotage. Analysts have even coined a new term, “hybrid warfare,” that usually includes these three enterprises—although, since the term does not include direct armed conflict, it might more plausibly be called “denatured warfare.” Cyber’s contribution to these three areas, however, is relatively limited. Should invading hackers engage in digital espionage against the United States, for instance, they are likely to find that most of what they come across is already well known, and that much of the rest is not worth knowing in the first place. Wikileaks’ 2010 publication of thousands of classified U.S. government documents demonstrated the degree to which governments worldwide have fallen victim to over-classification. When Bill Keller, the editor in charge of poring over the documents at The New York Times, was asked whether the reporting team found anything they didn’t already know, he responded “no” without hesitation. Much the same holds for concerns over the theft of intellectual property. Not only is this practice centuries old, but systematic stealing has often proved unwise because it distracts governments from homegrown innovation. Cyber-propaganda efforts, in turn, are more likely to increase the overall amount of available information and disinformation—an age-old problem in warfare—than to provide a decisive advantage. The achievements of cyber-sabotage have also been quite modest. The United States and Israel famously used a computer virus known as Stuxnet to hamper Iran’s progress toward developing a nuclear weapon. Although observers hailed the operation as a dangerous new development in modern conflict, the damage proved temporary. Iran quickly rebuilt its centrifuges, and the attack actually proved counterproductive, as it encouraged Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program. There have also been efforts by the United States to physically interfere with missile development in North Korea. Yet, much like the Iranians, Pyongyang eventually solved whatever the problem was, and the attacks had little long-term effect on their program. Cyber-alarmists have also warned about hackers disabling major infrastructure such as power grids—potentially crippling entire countries. Grids do go down occasionally, but the culprits are typically squirrels and lightning. Regardless of the source, such disruptions are usually brief and bearable, and engineers are increasingly designing systems that are resilient to such threats. Estonia, for instance, the victim of a major and oft-discussed cyberattack in 2007, is now the home of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

Cyberwar falls short of kinetic attacks---stabilizing

Erica D. Lonergan, 04-15-2022, (Erica D. Lonergan is Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Previously, she served as Senior Director on the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission.), “The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-04-15/cyber-escalation-fallacy/ceng

A third lesson of cyber-operations over the past decade is that U.S. officials should adopt a more flexible mindset in their response to them. Rather than focusing on retaliatory action, the United States should devote more resources to enhancing resilience—the ability to absorb and rapidly recover from disruptive occurrences. Embracing this type of approach means accepting that cyberattacks are likely to take place and, more important, that the overwhelming majority of them will not have cataclysmic effects. Over the past several years, the United States has improved its resilience to such attacks, expanding the agencies responsible for working with and maintaining critical infrastructure, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The U.S. government has also created the Office of the National Cyber Director to harmonize its cybersecurity efforts and collaborate with the private sector. But these entities are still relatively new, and efforts to implement meaningful regulation of the private sector to promote resilience still have a long way to go. A CYBER ESCAPE VALVE? Just because cyber-operations have not yet caused escalation does not mean that they will never do so. If conflicts such as the war in Ukraine lead to greater instability in the international system and increased great-power competition, the risks of cyber-escalation may grow. The opposite is also possible, however: in a more unstable world, cyber-operations may provide an important outlet for recurring tensions, given their lack of physical violence and relatively limited effects. As international politics become more dangerous, cyberspace can offer a way for states to respond to perceived aggressions without causing physical destruction or loss of life, thus providing a kind of stability in itself. Ultimately, escalation is in the eye of the beholder—it depends as much on the target’s perception of an event as on the perpetrator’s intent or the reality of the strategic context. Therefore, a further priority of U.S. policymakers should be to improve their understanding of how adversaries interpret Washington’s activities in cyberspace and leverage that knowledge to conduct cyber-operations that minimize the risk of escalation. During a crisis, for instance, the United States may want to avoid conducting cyber-operations in a manner that an adversary might perceive as a precursor to conflict or to a military strike, especially if that is not the intent. If there is a pressing strategic or military imperative to conduct these types of operations, they should occur in tandem with efforts to communicate their purpose to avoid misunderstandings. For too long, policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons from cyber-operations. The absence of escalation across decades of strategic interaction in cyberspace—a record that has only been reinforced in the conflict in Ukraine—should cause policymakers to reevaluate long-standing assumptions about the cyber-domain. In doing so, they may be able to see how cyber-actions are but one of a number of strategic tools that, properly understood, can limit the risk of conflict as much as increase it. Of course, the potential for cyberattacks to temporarily paralyze large information networks or even whole sectors of an economy should not be discounted. But in a world in which armed conflict continues to destroy entire cities and wreak terrible human costs, both civilian and military, cyber-operations should be regarded less as another form of hard power than as a way for states to pursue strategic goals by other means.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

No nuclear retal

Tucker 18 – Patrick, Technology Editor for Defense One, MA from Johns Hopkins University, BA from Sarah Lawrence College, Former Deputy Editor for The Futurist. “No, the US Won’t Respond to A Cyber Attack with Nukes”, Defense One, , 02-02-2018

No, the US Won’t Respond to A Cyber Attack with Nukes Defense leaders won’t completely rule out the possibility. But it’s a very, very, very remote possibility. The idea that the U.S. is building new low-yield nuclear weapons to respond to a cyber attack is “not true,” military leaders told reporters in the runup to the Friday release of the new Nuclear Posture Review. “The people who say we lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons are saying, ‘but we want these low-yield nuclear weapons so that we can answer a cyber attack because we’re so bad at cyber security.’ That’s just fundamentally not true,” Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday at a meeting with reporters. It’s an idea that military leaders have been pushing back against since the New York Times ran a Jan. 16 story headlined, “Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks With Nuclear Arms.” When would the U.S. launch a nuclear attack in response to a non-nuclear event? The Defense Department says the threshold hasn’t changed since the Obama administration’s own nuclear posture review in 2010, but a draft of the new review that leaked online caused a bit of drama in its attempts to dispel “ambiguity.” The new review gives examples of “non-nuclear strategic attacks,” Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy, told reporters on Thursday. “It could be catastrophic attacks against civilian populations, against infrastructure. It could be an attack using a non-nuclear weapon against our nuclear command-and-control [or] early-warning satellites. But we don’t talk about cyber.” In his own conversation with reporters, Selva broadened “early warning” systems to include ones that provide “indications of warning that are important to our detection of an attack.” He also emphasized, “We never said ‘cyber.’” There’s a reason for that. While cyber attacks on physical infrastructure can be very dangerous, they are unlikely to kill enough people to provoke a U.S. nuclear response. An National Academies of Science and Engineering analysis of the vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure makes that point. A major cyber attack could cut off electrical power, resulting in “people dying from heat or cold exposure, etc.,” said Granger Morgan, co-director of the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center and one of the chairs of the report. “A large outage of long duration could cover many states and last for weeks or longer. Whether and how many casualties there could be would depend on things like what the weather was during the outage.” It’s a huge problem but not an event resulting in tens of thousands of immediate deaths. Contrast that with a nuclear attack on a city like Moscow, even one using a device of 6 kilotons, much smaller than the ones the United States used against Japanese targets in World War II. The immediate result: there would be 40,000 deaths, according to the online nuclear simulation tool NukeMap. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to take down power services with cyber attacks, as they did in Ukraine on Christmas Eve 2015. But these attacks were brief and occured in the context of actual fighting. In other words, the worst cyber physical attack that top experts believe credible likely does not meet the threshold that the Defense Department has set out for deploying a nuclear weapon.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

No cyber war or retaliation

Rodet 18 – Jasmine, Master’s Degree in Cyber Security, Strategy, and Diplomacy from the University of New South Wales, Cyber Security Program Manager at Fortescue Metals Group. “The Threat of Cyber War is Exaggerated”, linkedin.com/pulse/threat-cyber-war-exaggerated-jasmine-rodet/, 11-11-2018

For the regular person on the street, the term ‘cyber war’ is more likely to bring to mind the 1983 movie “WarGames” and the doomsday articles that appear regularly in the media about the ‘cyber battlefield’ and an impending World War III. This essay argues that the threat of cyber war is exaggerated and although it can, by definition, be stated that we are already in a state of cyber war, the impact on states is negligible compared to conventional war domains. The argument is presented in 3 steps. The first step is to define cyber war and cyber weapons, referencing scholars and experts in the area of conventional war and the cyber domain. The second step is to explore who has been exaggerating the threat of cyber war and what their motivations might be. The third is to explore the evidence and quantify the probability and impact that cyberwar has had on states to date. ‘Cyber war’ is a term often used interchangeably in media with cyber-crime, cyber-attacks, cyber-conflict and cyber-incidents, creating confusion amongst the public and scholars alike. Clausewitz (1989, 75), in his book, On War, defines war as ‘an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’. Rid (2012, 7) on the other interprets Clausewitz use of ‘force’ as meaning ‘violent’ force. According to Rid, if an act is not potentially violent, it is not an act of war. However, Stone (2013, 107) describes ‘cyber war’ as a politically motivated act of force, not necessarily lethal and not necessarily attributable. The definition by Powers and Jablonski states more simply that cyber war is the utilisation of digital networks for geopolitical purposes (Nocetti 2016, 464). Neither of the latter two definitions requires violence to qualify as cyber war. Under these definitions, the Stuxnet cyber-incident in 2010 and the Estonia incident in 2007 would constitute an act of cyber war, and as such we could say that nations have been at cyber war in the past and are likely to continue to engage in cyber war in years to come. For this essay, I will use Stones definition to argue that even though states may engage in cyber war, the concept of cyber war is exaggerated. It seems that cyber war is deliberately exaggerated in the media and by politicians for financial and political gains. There are countless examples in the media and in politics of the exaggeration of the threat of cyber war and the language used plays a big factor in creating a sense of fear in the community. The Four Corners report, Hacked, is a classic example where the reporter, Andrew Fowler describes the current situation in Australia as ‘… a secret war where the body count is climbing every day’ (Fowler 2013). The documentary reveals nothing violent or lethal about cyber incidents. The documentary is actually about hackers working from locations overseas, having targeted key Federal Government departments and major corporations in Australia. In another example, NATO may be interpreted as exaggerating the threat of Cyber War when they invited Charlie Millar to present at their Conference for Cyber Conflict at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2017. Millar is an independent security evaluator, and his presentation was titled ‘Kim Jong-il and me: How to build a cyber army to attack the US’. He later presented similar content at Def Con 2018. His presentation described the steps he would take to mount a cyber war, including the types of people he would engage, how much he would pay them, what his strategy would be and how much it would cost in total. Who stands to gain from the exaggeration and hype? Logically, one group would be those that gain financially from the sale of cyber protective services and software. According to Valerino, 57% of technical experts surveyed said that we are currently in a cyber arms race and 43% said that the worst-case scenarios are inevitable (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). Translate this into sales and Gartner projects worldwide security spending will reach $96 Billion in 2018, up 8 Percent from 2017 and to top $113 billion by 2020 (Gartner 2017). Additionally, there may be political motivations to exaggerate the threat of cyber war. Cyberspace is not well understood by the general public and fear is natural. In the US’s cyber security debate, observers have noted there is a tendency for policymakers, military leaders, and media, among others, to use frightening ‘cyber-doom scenarios’ when making a case for action on cyber security (Dunn 2008, 2). There is some evidence to suggest that more recently in the political arena; we may be maturing in our understanding of the real threat of cyber war. The Tallinn Manual, an academic, non-binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare, was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It was first published in 2013 with the title ‘The Tallinn Manual on the International Law of Cyber War’. In 2017, it was re-released with the revised title ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations’. The change in title from ‘war’ to ‘operations’ signifies a more moderate use of language from NATO and is an acknowledgement that cyber incidents generally fall below the threshold at which International Law would declare them to be a formal act of war. Experience over the 4 short years from 2013 to 2017 has demonstrated that cyber incidents tend to have a low-level impact on the target state. As the book’s authors put it ‘the focus of the original Manual was on the most severe cyber operations, those that violate the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, entitle states to exercise the right of self-defence, and/or occur during armed conflict’ while the new version ‘adds a legal analysis of the more common cyber incidents that states encounter on a day-to-day basis and that fall below the thresholds of the use of force or armed conflict’ (Leetaru 2017). To get a better sense if cyber war is exaggerated, we must also consider the probability of cyber war in the future. The probability of cyber war should be weighed up against the probability of conventional war. Where tensions are already high, for example, between North Korea and the US or Russia and Estonia, I would argue that cyber war is more likely than conventional war. This is due to factors including; cyber warfare is less costly than conventional warfare, states are less rational in their decision space in the cyber realm, states find cyber attribution very difficult to achieve so attacks can be undertaken covertly and cyber war is considered ‘a challenge’ and central to the hackers’ ethos (Junio 2013, 128). Further, Sanger describes in his book, The Perfect Weapon, cyber weapons (such as cyber vandalism, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), intrusions and advanced persistent threat (APT)) as the ‘perfect weapons’ for the following reasons; They are cheap: When compared to Nuclear weapons, there are only a handful of nations globally that can afford the technology to create a nuclear weapon. They are easily accessible: Unlike a Nuclear bomb that requires uranium, a highly protected metal, in the production process, a cyber weapon can be created with minimal investment and highly available IT infrastructure. They can be dialled-up or dialled-down relatively easily. A ballistic missile, the force of the explosion cannot be adjusted as easily as a DDOS attack. A DDOS attack can be adjusted to last an hour, a few days or a few weeks. They have a huge range in how they are used: Sabotage as with Stuxnet, Espionage as with the Chinese industrial spying on the US, North Korea’s infiltration of Sony, the Iranians attack on Las Vegas Sands Corp. casino operators. The significant factor is that cyber weapons can and are being used every day for discrete, low-level cyber conflicts to undermine and disrupt rivals, but historically it has not progressed to open conflict, nor has it warranted a military response (Sanger 2018). Additionally, massive cyber operations would necessarily impact the civilian population and violate the immunity of non-combatants. The conditions of war dictate that this is “taboo” and to date, rival states have shown restraint in their use of cyber weapons for this reason (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). It appears that the threat that cyber weapons represent to national security is overstated and the threat of cyber war is overstated. The US and likely other highly networked nations appear reticent about using cyber weapons for significant cyber conflict given their vulnerabilities. Ironically, NSA programs such as PRISM have made the US more of a target given the sheer volume of sensitive information stored in one place. Regardless of US defences, there is no way to make this information completely secure from intrusion, and as such, the very act of storing the information makes them more vulnerable. Rid (2012) is among some academics who argue that cyber war has never and will likely never eventuate. The benefits of being on this side of the debate mean that public funding can be allocated away from offensive cyber security initiatives to other, potentially more important initiatives, such as public health and housing. The government is constantly under pressure to prioritise public spending and it is imperative that they have realistic, accurate projections regarding the risk of cyber war, the probability and the impact, to allow them to focus spending on the most important areas.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

Russia demonstrating restraint---no cyberattack

Marie Baezner and Patrice Robin, June 2017, (Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich), “Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia”, CSS Cyber Defence Hotspot Analysis, ETH Zurich, Page 13, https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/184547/Cyber-Reports-2017-02.pdf?sequence=1/ceng

On the other hand, both states might not desire further escalation, preferring to restrain the conflict to cyberspace. Each would follow the “tit-for-tat” logic and accuse each other while never reaching a tipping point where the conflict spills over to a conventional war. Such a tipping point would be linked to the intensity of the attack or the nature of the targets. Both nations would keep the cyberattacks small enough not to trigger a bigger reaction. The same would be observed on the choice of targets, with both avoiding certain critical or sensitive targets, for instance critical infrastructures. In order to contain the conflict in cyberspace, both states would have to demonstrate their restraint by selecting options with low risk of miscalculation (Lin, 2012, pp. 64–66). In the future, it might also be possible to see a deescalation in the form of the emergence of an international treaty or at least further bilateral treaties between the USA and Russia on cyberattacks. For example, during the last few years, businesses in the USA were often hacked and spied on by the Chinese military. These intrusions were mostly cyber-economic-espionage and were said to have supported the theft of billions of dollars’ worth of intellectual property (Bamford, 2016). In September 2015, the USA and China signed an agreement engaging both countries not to support or conduct cyber-theft of intellectual property. Moreover, the parties have made the commitment not to use cyberattacks against each other’s critical infrastructures in peace-time and to support the establishment of international behavioral norms in cyberspace (Rosenfeld, 2015). Both states also highlighted the fact that they could not control each individual in their country and therefore could not be held responsible for individual acts. Since then it seems that the number of attacks on commercial targets has diminished (Timm, 2016). Former President Obama suggested the creation of a position of cybersecurity ambassador to deal with bilateral or multilateral treaties concerning cyber-norms (Lee, 2016). For this kind of de-escalation to take effect, the termination of the conflict at hand must be the stated aim of both parties. A clear common understanding of the terms of agreement is required and must be based on trust-building efforts, as well as the assurance of mutual adherence. The difficulty of tracking the implementation of such agreements in cyberspace has been an obstacle preventing more states consenting to such solutions (Lin, 2012, pp. 62–64). Nevertheless, a dialogue on cyberspace already exists between the USA and Russia since July 2013. This cooperation includes Confidence Building Measures (CBM) such as the creation of working groups on the issue of ICT security, exchange of information between the two national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and the creation of a direct communication line to directly manage ICT incidents (Segal, 2016; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). In October 2016, former President Obama used the latter to inform Russian President Putin that the USA was accusing Russia of interference in the election process (Ignatius, 2016). Furthermore, Russia and the USA take part in the UN GGE supporting the future establishment of international norms on actions in cyberspace. They stated that international law can be applied in cyberspace and therefore, the rules of proportionality and limited collateral damage should also be respected in cyberattacks (Ignatius, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2015). These examples demonstrate that even though the two states are involved in a “tit-for-tat” logic in their relations on a tactical level, there was still a dialogue on the strategic level, at least until 2015. The recent cyberattacks in USA and the election of Donald Trump as US President, bring new uncertainties.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Cyber Impact

No catastrophic cyberattacks – 25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory

Lewis 20 – James Andrew, senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, , 08-17-2020

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1 This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often? Some of the explanation for the emphasis on cyber catastrophe is hortatory. When the author of one of the first reports (in the 1990s) to sound the alarm over cyber catastrophe was asked later why he had warned of a cyber Pearl Harbor when it was clear this was not going to happen, his reply was that he hoped to scare people into action. "Catastrophe is nigh; we must act" was possibly a reasonable strategy 22 years ago, but no longer. The resilience of historical events to remain culturally significant must be taken into account for an objective assessment of cyber warfare, and this will require the United States to discard some hypothetical scenarios. The long experience of living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes American thinking and conditions the United States to expect extreme outcomes. American thinking is also shaped by the experience of 9/11, a wrenching attack that caught the United States by surprise. Fears of another 9/11 reinforce the memory of nuclear war in driving the catastrophe trope, but when applied to cyberattack, these scenarios do not track with operational requirements or the nature of opponent strategy and planning. The contours of cyber warfare are emerging, but they are not always what we discuss. Better policy will require greater objectivity.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---AT: Russia War

Russia war never escalates—empirics

Zeeberg 18 – Amos, freelance science journalist based in Tokyo, “Why Hasn’t the World Been Destroyed in a Nuclear War Yet?”, Nautilus (not the league champ), http://nautil.us/blog/-why-hasnt-the-world-been-destroyed-in-a-nuclear-war-yet, 01-15-2018

But after all these nuclear near-misses, one starts to wonder if it really is plain dumb luck. The Nash equilibrium accurately describes a certain kind of rational, perfectly logical approach to choices under conflict. And exactly in keeping with game theorists’ advice, the USSR and U.S. went to great lengths to make sure their arsenals would be feared as legitimate threats. Yet each time they had an opportunity to make good on those threats—to launch a crushing response to an apparent attack or mercilessly exploit a weakness, as many armchair analysts recommended—something held them back: a disobedient soldier, a circumspect engineer, an optimistic leader. The two nations were engaged in a battle of wills, staring each other in the eyes, and they both blinked. Repeatedly. Maybe, when millions of lives hang in the balance, people are not so rationally cold-hearted as those old game-theory models imply. Or maybe they’re using a different kind of rationality.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---AT: Russia War

No conventional invasion NOR escalation

Veebel 19 – Viljar, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. “Researching Baltic security challenges after the annexation of Crimea”, Journal on Baltic Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, Pg. 41-52, , 04-30-2019

3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios The question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016). Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis. Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017). A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---AT: Russia War

No Russia impact – too many constraints AND neither side risks war.

Mueller 21 – John, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 6: The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran”, Cambridge University Press, pg. 150-157, 03-04-2021

Russian Assertiveness The notion that a major war among developed countries is wildly unlikely has frequently been taken to have been challenged by the experience of the armed dispute between Russia and neighboring Ukraine that began in 2014. It resulted in the peaceful, if extortionary, transfer of Crimea, a large peninsular chunk of Ukraine, to Russia, and then in a sporadic, and ultimately stalemated, civil war in Ukraine in which ethnic Russian secessionist groups in a portion of Ukraine’s east were supported by Russia. The fear, in particular, is that Russia’s successful expansion – justified, it says, in part by the desire to protect persecuted ethnic Russians in a neighboring land – will cause, or tempt, it to expand elsewhere reflecting the manner in which Hitler expanded in order, he said, to protect ethnic Germans from persecution particularly in areas to his east. Indeed, NATO planners busily check roads in Western Europe to see if they are suitable for military transport in the event that Russia launches a full-scale invasion of the continent.50 And in 2018, at the badgering of President Donald Trump, NATO countries all agreed to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024, something he implied was a triumph although it merely reaffirmed a commitment they had made at the time of the Crimean takeover in 2014. 51 In the settlement that led to the unification of Germany in 1990, the United States verbally promised that, although East Germany would now become part of a NATO country, there would be no further expansion of the alliance to the east.52 A few years later, however, NATO began just such an expansion very much against many agitated concerns by specialists. Among these was George Kennan who warned that “the Russians will react quite adversely” and called the policy “a tragic mistake,” pointing out that “there was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”53 The expansion was carried out with good intentions. and there were many statements seeking to mollify Russian concerns including offering it a sort of adjunct position in the alliance with the possible further prospect of actual membership.54 Nevertheless, although the Russians were powerless to stop the expansion, they greeted it with considerable dismay and opposition, voiced not just by Communists and by ultra-nationalists, but by very many in the Western-oriented elite. This should have been a warning. But it wasn’t. As Christopher Fettweis observes, “In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion – although nearly universal – were not taken seriously, since U.S. planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all.”55 The situation was strained further in 1999 when NATO bombed Serbia, a country with considerable historical links to Russia, securing the secession of the Kosovo province as Russia stood by helplessly, a development discussed in Chapter 3. Russia sometimes sees this as precedent for its Crimean seizure. As he was taking office as president of Russia in 2000, Vladimir Putin did tell a British interviewer, “Russia is part of European culture and I can’t imagine my country cut off from what we often refer to as the ‘civilized world’.”56 However, the strains from NATO expansion and from the Kosovo experience were already in place, and they gradually escalated in the new century as Putin’s regime became increasingly autocratic and as the United States, and particularly Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, together with its West European allies issued strong support for anti-Putin protests that took place in Russia in 2011–12. 57 Russia’s concern about NATO enlargement focused especially on the possible Westernization of Ukraine, the large new country to its west that had previously been part of the Soviet Union. One American observer who had served in the Obama administration supplies an arresting parallel: “The United States would hardly sit by idly if Russia formed an alliance with Mexico and Canada and started building military installations along the US border.”58 Unlike the neighboring countries to its west in what had previously been known as “East Europe,” Ukraine, although fairly open and democratic, had become a basket case economically despite an enormous potential. A few statistics may serve. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine’s per capita GDP was higher than Poland’s; 25 years later, it was less than onethird that of Poland.59 In a study comparing 25 post-Communist countries, Ukraine comes out dead last in economic growth.60 Ukraine is now the poorest country in Europe.61 In this, it was like other, smaller counties that essentially lie between Russia and Western Europe: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. These countries have been characterized not by the substantial political liberalization and economic development that has variously taken place in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Romania, and in countries that emerged out of Yugoslavia after its breakup in 1991. Rather, the “in-between” countries, led by the most important, Ukraine, suffer from a set of what Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton call “post-Soviet pathologies”: dysfunctional governmental institutions, economies lacking functioning markets, a rule of law that is weak or absent, patronal politics, close links between political power and control of major economic assets, and “pervasive corruption.”62 In the case of Ukraine, this phenomenon has been exacerbated by outside efforts from Russia and from Europe to influence the country. These have made it easier for Ukraine to avoid desperately-needed reforms.63 Among these are huge economic distortions concerning energy. The world average for energy consumption per dollar of GDP is 10 British thermal units. For the US it is 7.5, for the UK 3.8, for Ukraine 56.3. 64 Things came to a head when mass protests by Western-oriented Ukrainians broke out in the capital city, Kiev. Their duly elected president, who was perhaps even more corrupt than his equally duly elected predecessors, had been juggling various opposing aid offers from the West and from Russia. When he more or less accepted the (higher) Russian bid, protests broke out, and these endured through the cold and snowy winter of 2013–14 heightened by sporadic violence by security forces and by elements within the protest movement, particularly those from the highly anti-Russian far right.65 In February 2014, Ukraine’s president fled to Russia abruptly leaving the extravagant private zoo he had created behind.66 In the subsequent chaos, parliament removed provisions that had previously allowed the use of Russian as an official language under some conditions.67 Largely ignored in these development were the interests of Russian speakers in the country, some 30 percent of the population, who are concentrated in the east and south and were decidedly unsympathetic to the Kiev protests.68 This was particularly the case in the large Crimea peninsula to the south where Russia, by an agreement brokered when the Soviet Union split up in 1991, maintains a substantial naval base for its Black Sea Fleet. Putin was alarmed at the developments in Kiev where anti-Russian ideologues now occupied one-third of the cabinet seats. He was also deeply concerned that the new government might abrogate or fail to renew the lease on the naval base, seen to be vital national asset.69 And he was doubtless miffed that Western leaders had boycotted the winter Olympics he had hosted a few months earlier.70 He bolstered troop strength at the naval base, and soon men in green uniforms without insignia (known as “little green men”) were fanning out in Crimea occupying military and government facilities.71 Crimean Russians often felt neglected over the years by government in Kiev, and they feared after the fall of the president that they would be violently persecuted.72 The local Crimean authorities organized a referendum on secession and on March 16, 2014, a vote, boycotted by many, was held in which 97 percent of those who voted supposedly supported leaving Ukraine and joining Russia. Backed enthusiastically by his parliament and by the citizenry of Russia, Putin graciously accepted the request. Meanwhile, in Donbas – areas abutting Russia in eastern Ukraine – local Russians, emboldened by the events in Crimea, organized a secession movement, setting up their own ad hoc governments. Ukrainian armed forces, led initially mainly by volunteer paramilitaries, were sent to put them down.73 Aided by infiltrators from Russia, the secessionists were able to hold them to a stalemate. Over 10,000 were killed in the violence.74 Ukraine cut off financial subsidies, electricity, and water supplies to Crimea, and tourism, an important Crimean industry, dropped precipitously. But Russia, at considerable cost, worked to alleviate these problems, and in 2018 a 12-mile $3 billion bridge – the contract went to one of Putin’s buddies, a former judo partner – had been constructed to link Crimea with Russia, a country that, otherwise, ranks ninety-fourth in the world in infrastructure. Putin drove the first truck across the span himself.75 Efforts to integrate Crimea into Russia have been extensive, and Russian retirees (especially military ones) are encouraged to move there even as those opposed to the Russian takeover often emigrate to Ukraine. If the goal of Russia was to keep Ukraine from seeking to embrace the West while, in Robert Person’s words, “establishing a pliant pro-Russian regime in Kiev,” its efforts failed miserably.76 As one observer predicted at the time, “Far from dissuading Ukrainians from seeking a future in Europe, Moscow’s moves will only foster a greater sense of nationalism in all parts of the country and turn Ukrainian elites against Russia, probably for a generation.”77 Or as Daniel Treisman observed in the aftermath, “If Putin’s goal was to prevent Russia’s military encirclement, his aggression in Ukraine has been a tremendous failure, since it has produced the exact opposite.”78 In addition, Russia’s experience in the 2014 conflict and crisis in Ukraine suggests that countries cannot engage in such enterprises without automatically paying a substantial economic price – it is something like an economic doomsday machine. Because of its antics, Russia suffered a decline in the value of its currency, capital flight, a drop in its stock market, and a decline in foreign investment. And, perhaps most importantly, there was a very substantial drop in confidence by investors, buyers, and sellers throughout the world, a condition that is likely to last for years, even decades.79 As Charap and Colton stress, “Moscow is at serious risk of permanently alienating the entire EU, which as a bloc has long been Russia’s largest trading partner and direct investor.”80 One prominent British observer puts it even more starkly, suggesting that the events “mark the end of an era, the end of the hope that Russia could be incorporated into a united and peaceful Europe.”81 As part of this, Russia’s behavior has set off a determined effort by Europeans to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies – a change that could be permanent. And the costs of the conflict and of supporting its new distant dependencies have been visited by Russia on itself. Crimea was less well off economically than most of Ukraine and required subsidies from Kiev.82 And the Donbas region was heavily subsidized by Ukraine as well.83 These burdens have now shifted to Russia. There have been other economic costs as well. Economic sanctions have been visited on Russia by other states. Although especially costly to Europe, they were embraced after rebels in eastern Ukraine (perhaps accidentally) shot down a civilian airliner with a missile presumably supplied by Russia.84 Unrelated to the crisis, there was a severe drop in prices for oil on the international market, a development that is especially harmful to Russia: for every decline of $25 in the price of oil, Russia experiences a nearly 2 percent decline in GNP, and oil and gas sales fund about 36 percent of the Russian annual budget. The economic pain inflicted by the oil price drop has been much greater – perhaps four times greater – than that of the sanctions.85 There is likely as well to be a special political cost for Putin. Since he came to power in 2000, there has been a steady improvement in Russia each year in GDP per capita. That process was reversed in 2014. From 2014–17, real disposable income fell by 15 percent.86 Aspirational purchases as for homes and cars have shifted to ones devoted to daily needs.87 And Russia’s Stabilization Fund, built up when oil prices were high and meant to fund pension payments and to support the ruble, was significantly depleted and may run out of money entirely. Over time, some may see this as a break with his promise to provide the stability and order necessary to allow economic progress to take place.88 The developments in Ukraine in 2014 were unsettling, of course. However, it is impressive that the United States and Western Europe never even came close to seriously considering the use of direct force to deal with the issue. Although the crisis created, as Steven Pinker notes, “just the kinds of tensions that in the past had led to great-power wars,” nothing like that took place.89 In fact, the West behaved in much the same way it would have behaved if it had not possessed a great and expensive military capacity. Indeed, President Barack Obama, who presided over the episode, was given to taunting his hawkish critics: “Now, if there is somebody in this town that would claim that we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, they should speak up and be very clear about it.”90 The events inspired concerns that Putin had or has wider intentions.91 The natural next step, suggest some, would be some sort of invasion of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and/or Estonia. Each, like Ukraine, has a Russian minority which, in many cases, has not blended in well with the majority culture and might even consider itself to be persecuted. West Point’s Robert Person has looked at the parallels and finds them wanting.92 To begin with, Ukraine has what Person calls “a deep symbolic meaning for Russia.” It had been part of the Russian empire since the sixteenth century and is often considered to be “the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization.” Moreover, Crimea did not become part of Ukraine until it was “gifted” to that Soviet republic in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev in a process that was quixotic and arbitrary and never actually made official even by the regulations of Soviet or Communist law.93 And, of course, Crimea’s Russian naval base added special significance. By contrast, continues Person, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, unlike Ukraine, have frequently enjoyed an independent status, and Russians “have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically different from Russia.” Moreover, Russians in the Baltics do not seem to have separatist interests not least in part because they have much higher standards of living than do their counterparts on the other side of the border. And because the Baltic states are members of the European Union and its associated Schengen zone, their citizens would no longer enjoy the associated ease of travel to the continent if they became part of Russia.94 In all, then, the notion that Putin’s Russia is on an expansionary mission, so commonly voiced at the time of the 2014 events, seems to have little substance.95 It has not even sought to officially annex separatist areas in eastern Ukraine. A special issue of the journal Daedalus, published in 2017, ran a series of essays dealing with Russia’s future. None envisioned territorial expansion.96 Definitions of superpower status common during the Cold War generally stressed the possession of stocks of nuclear weapons. If that criterion continued to be embraced, Russia should still probably be considered a superpower. However, as Dmitri Trenin points out, Russia “has few formal allies, no satellite states, and ... no ideology to compare with the comprehensive dogma of Marxism-Leninism.” Moreover, “although it is still a nuclear superpower, it lags far behind the United States in non-nuclear military capabilities. Economically, Russia – with its estimated 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product – is a dwarf.”97 Its GDP ranks twelfth in the world, but is only one-fifteenth that of the United States and about half that of California. Moreover, GDP growth in Russia has been weak with recent figures at about 1.8 percent per year, and it relies heavily on selling energy abroad: nearly 50 percent of its exports are in oil and gas. Its population is shrinking and may, according to medium-term projections, be reduced to 125 million by 2094 from the current level of about 148 million. For an economy that is more people-intensive than other advanced economies, this spells trouble. As Barack Obama pointed out derisively, if undiplomatically, in his final news conference as president, “Their economy doesn’t produce anything that anybody wants to buy, except oil and gas and arms. They don’t innovate.”98 The (rather bizarre) Russia suffers from the same problems as the “in-between” counties as discussed above while being burdened in addition by a much larger military budget – although weak GDP growth has also been reflected in a shrinking military budget, down about 5 percent in 2018 from 2017. Like China, it has devolved into a form of crony capitalism where property rights are insecure, capital flight is common, corruption is rampant, and economic stagnation is likely. As Anders Aslund concludes, the state has been captured by a small group of top officials with the topmost being Vladimir Putin, who has 20 palaces, four yachts, 58 aircraft, and a collection of watches worth $600,000. 99 Ukraine episode of 2014 seems, like the Korean invasion of 1950, to be a one-off – a unique, opportunistic, and probably under-considered escapade that proved to be unexpectedly costly to the perpetrators. As with the Korean case, massive extrapolation is unjustified and ill-advised. That is, the Ukrainian venture, contrary to much initial speculation, does not seem to be a game-changer.100 As Trenin points out, Moscow’s most important objective is to reassert its role as a great power with a global reach. However, it does not seek to impose its own model on the world. In all this, neither side envisions a real shooting war against its adversary and neither wants to allow the situation to become uncontrollable.101

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---AT: Russia War

Their impact starts at 0.38%

Rodriguez 19 – Lusia, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, she also researched nuclear war at Rethink Priorities and as a visiting researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute, holds an M.A. from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. “How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?”, Effective Altruism Forum, , 06-19-2019

My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see , and ), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange unfold in the first place. In this post, I get a rough sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence, the views of experts, and predictions made by forecasters. I find that, if we aggregate those perspectives, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and that the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, in particular, are around 0.38% per year.