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2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---AT: Russia War

No Russia war – they won’t risk it

Woolf 21 – Amy F, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, received a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1983. “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization”, CRS, , 09-13-2021

One analyst has postulated that Russia may actually raise its nuclear threshold as it bolsters its conventional forces. According to this analyst, “It is difficult to understand why Russia would want to pursue military adventurism that would risk all-out confrontation with a technologically advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal.” 144 As a study from the RAND Corporation noted, Russia has “invested considerable sums in developing and fielding long-range conventional strike weapons since the mid-2000s to provide Russian leadership with a buffer against reaching the nuclear threshold—a set of conventional escalatory options that can achieve strategic effects without resorting to nuclear weapons.”145 Others note, however, that Russia has integrated these “conventional precision weapons and nuclear weapons into a single strategic weapon set,” lending credence to the view that Russia may be prepared to employ, or threaten to employ, nuclear weapons during a regional conflict.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Inevitable

OCOs won’t escalate uncontrollably.

Sørensen ’19 [Heine; March; Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College, and Dorthe Bach Nyemann, Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, Represented Denmark in the Research Project Entitled “Countering Hybrid Warfare I-II” Within the Framework of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC), US Joint Forces Command, “Deterrence by Punishment as a Way of Countering Hybrid Threats – Why We Need To Go ‘Beyond Resilience’ in the Gray Zone”, Multinational Capability Development Campaign, Mhttps://tinyurl.com/y6cko3at]

One of the greatest reservations against communicating a willingness to take punitive actions concerns the risk of escalation and increased tension due to a more assertive or offensive posture. Yet when looking into possible responses – retaliation in cyberspace, for example – a number of “self-dampening” mechanisms appear to be in place that may be applicable to many types of responses.30 One example is the requirement to establish some level of attribution of aggression on which to base a response. As discussed above, while attribution is rarely impossible, it can be a time-consuming and technically-challenging endeavor. In a high-stakes scenario the time taken to get attribution as right as possible means there will be plenty of time to think twice about actions and consequences, and to lean on diplomatic measures in parallel. An example of a self-dampening mechanism related to the cyber domain is the large investment required to develop credible offensive capabilities. Moreover, an offensive cyber capability is a transitory tool31. The ability to access a computer system or network to cause harm or damage is only temporary and dependent on a very rapid and ongoing patching of vulnerabilities. At the same time, wielding the cyber instrument despite the downside of “burning” the capacity might have a de-escalatory effect by communicating capability and credibility to the opponent with a view to discouraging future hostile attacks. Targeting in any domain – including cyberspace – must also follow relevant rules, law and due-process which will self-limit the range of targets and actions available. A final “escalatory showstopper” is related to the challenge of identifying and developing targets of adequate strategic significance – not too much, not too little – to achieve the desired effect. Responding to hybrid aggression by applying “middle range” punitive actions that are proportionate to the aggression threatened or suffered will also self-limit the escalatory potential. It is unlikely to be in the interest of any hybrid aggressor to pursue an escalatory spiral above and beyond where they were looking to compete in the first place: on the hybrid level. Nevertheless, one way to mitigate the risk of escalation – while enhancing civilian oversight and interagency coordination – would be to establish rules of engagement for punitive actions on the hybrid level32 . This would provide decision-makers with common guidelines to pursue punitive actions that fall below the “use of force threshold”. Moreover, this could actually bolster the credibility of punitive actions by signaling to hybrid aggressors the intent to take pre-prepared punitive actions when deemed necessary: in other words, a “playbook” for countering hybrid threats.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Inevitable

The only question is whether they’re unilateral or collectively integrated---unilateral OCOs cause cyber fratricide

Iftimie ’20 [Ion A.; May; PhD, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business; NDC Policy Brief, “NATO's needed offensive cyber capabilities,” no. 10]

The lack of integrated offensive cyber A2/AD capabilities undermines both the unity of the Alliance and its mandate of defence and deterrence. On the former, the lack of coordination between Allies during unilateral cyber operations could lead to friction when resulting effects infringe on Allied cyber-physical infrastructures. It could also lead to cyber fratricide, when failure to properly attribute Allied digital personas occurs during these military operations. On the latter, while most Allies are developing offensive cyber capabilities, some remain unable to face the growing number of cyber threats unilaterally.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Inevitable

Allied OCOs are inevitable

Iftimie ’20 [Ion A.; May; PhD, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business; NDC Policy Brief, “NATO's needed offensive cyber capabilities,” no. 10]

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, cyberspace was recognized as an operational domain in which NATO military forces must be able to maneuver as effectively as they do on land, at sea and in the air. Since then, Allies have conducted several successful offensive cyber operations1 against non-state adversaries, such as Daesh. Due to technological transformations in recent years, cyber is no longer viewed by NATO and its member states only as a hybrid threat, but also as a weapon in its own right and as a force multiplier2 in current military operations. Over the next two decades, NATO will look for new ways to integrate cyber weapons (or offensive cyber capabilities) into its operations and missions.3

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC - A2: OCOs escalate

OCOs don’t escalate – can be scaled back at any time

Christian Leuprecht, 19, (Christian Leuprecht, He is Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, 3-27-2019, Taylor & Francis, The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2019.1590960?journalCode=fcsp20, 6-26-2022) SCade

To date, no direct use of OCO capabilities has resulted in the outbreak of traditional conflict, perhaps owing to uncertainties in the novelty of the attacks, the difficulty of attribution, and the reluctance of national cyber actors to retaliate when the path of escalation is unclear (Rid & Buchanan, 2015). Most importantly, however, the actions of armed forces in democratic countries are constrained by the rule of law, which translates into multiple authorities to ensure responsible and acceptable use, and safeguard against escalation. The fine-grained control of OCOs compared to conventional military force provides a way to manage escalation without the direct use of physical or military assets, whose effect in sparking conflict is much better known. In other words, instead of reacting to an escalating conflict by deploying physical military assets to a region, an OCO can be employed covertly to incur more controllable costs on the adversary, with the benefit of plausible deniability (Hare, 2018). Depending on the type of OCO employed, if there is a reduction in tension, the effects of the OCO can be reversed or scaled back

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC / 2NC---OCOs Good – Nuke Terror

Terrorism causes nuclear war

Arguello 18—Founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network, degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security, previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Materials Working Group, and a Chatham House Associate Fellow. Since 2010, she has participated in all the official non-governmental events at the Nuclear Security Summits [Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis (a lawyer specializing in international law. He holds a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), a Master’s in Human and Social Sciences from the University of Paris/Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a postgraduate diploma in national defense from the National Defense School. Currently he is a professor in international law at UBA, and co-director of the UNICEN Center for Human Rights in Azul. He is also a researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation), February 2018, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:2, 114-119

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC / 2NC---OCOs Good – Nuke Terror

OCOs are critical to intelligence gathering – stops nuclear terrorism

Dr. Chris Bronk and Gregory S. Anderson, 17, (Dr. Chris Bronk and Gregory S. Anderson, Dr. Chris Bronk is an Assistant Professor of computer and information systems at the University of Houston’s College of Technology. He holds or has previously held appointments in Rice University's computer science department and Baker Institute for Public Policy and at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs. Until 2006, he served as a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State on assignments both overseas and in Washington, D.C. He recently published the book, Cyber Threat: The Rise of Information Geopolitics in U.S. National Security Gregory Anderson is a master’s candidate for the Information Systems Security program at the University of Houston and is currently a research assistant under Dr. Chris Bronk and Dr. Arthur Conklin. He earned his bachelor’s degree in Business Computer Information Systems from the University of North Texas., 2017, Published by Army Cyber Institute, The Cyber Defense Review , Vol. 2, No. 1 (WINTER 2017), pp. 93-108, “Engaging ISIL in Cyberspace” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26267403.pdf, 6-26-2022) SCade

There will no doubt be difficulties incorporating cyber operations components into overall US strategy countering ISIL and other non-state adversaries; however, it is clear national security leadership in Washington will leverage cyber capabilities more significantly. One issue that will continue to dog offensive cyber operations and intelligence activities is the equities question—should the US government turn over knowledge it accrues regarding cyber vulnerabilities to the technology industry so that they may be repaired. For instance, is it more desirable for USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA) to keep information regarding broken encryption implementations or software as was alleged in the Heartbleed bug in the OpenSSL software libraries? Issues such as this will be a major policy question to consider.

Ultimately, the cyber conflict against ISIL will serve as a template for future cyber action against terror groups, insurgents, and violent transnational criminal syndicates. Looking backward, we can see the effective application of robust signals intelligence capabilities have been. Consider US support of Colombian operations against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). There can be little doubt that the Colombian military and police were made significantly more effective with the addition of US intelligence capabilities. Policymakers are keen to eradicate or at least damage ISIL but will need to ask how cyber weapons can frustrate it as much as anything else can. The more cyber tactics can short-circuit ISIL’s operational capabilities, the better. What is necessary for US cyber operators are clear objectives from senior leadership on what they want to produce. The engineers that build USCYBERCOM’s tools and the hackers that serve as its operational forces can easily enough push back on what they believe is the art of the possible.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

Norms solves the DA

Aidan Simardone 18, junior research fellow at the NATO Association of Canada, “More than Security: NATO and the Rules-Based International Order in the Post-Cold War Era,” NATO Association of Canada, 5/23/18, http://natoassociation.ca/more-than-security-nato-and-the-rules-based-international-order-in-the-post-cold-war-era/

NATO’s increasing role in supporting the rules-based international order is tremendously valuable. Nevertheless, the Alliance’s record has not been perfect. Questions remain over the legality of its intervention in the Balkans, which did not receive approval from the U.N. Security Council, as airstrikes in Serbia and Libya contradicted international laws on excessive force. Double standards, such as the decision to intervene in Libya but not Syria, are numerous. While these cases may be exceptional, they can give the impression to other states that NATO only values the rules-based international order when it works in its interest. Were states to emulate this perceived self-interest, NATO actions would effectively help to undermine rather than protect the rules-based international order. As NATO moves forward, it must be conscientious of past mistakes and ongoing challenges. Tradeoffs are sometimes unavoidable, such as intervening to stop genocide without U.N. Security Council approval. However, in other cases NATO can take actions that fall closer in line with international laws and norms. Doing so will bolster NATO’s role in supporting the rules-based international order—a role that is becoming more central to NATO and gives vitality to the Alliance.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

Balance of tech favors offensively disarming adversaries.

Davis '19 [Susan; 4/18/19; General Rapporteur to the NATO parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee; "NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defense, Stabilizing Deterrence," https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/087_STC_19_E%20-%20NATO.pdf]

27. Although cyber security and defence capabilities continue to improve, most experts argue that the offence has the advantage in cyber space and that this is unlikely to change soon. Given sufficient time, skills, and resources, attackers could easily perpetrate a cyber attack, finding the targeted system’s vulnerabilities, gaining access, and delivering their payload. This is a key reason why the Alliance must complement dissuasion with strategies of deterrence by punishment. In other words, they must try “to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that in the attacker’s cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not to attack” (Morgan, 2009; italicised in original). It should be noted some experts would argue that the offence is not as dominant. For example, the more sophisticated cyber weapons are, the more opportunities the defender has to stop an attacker and the more errors the attacker is likely to make. Additionally, continued organisational deficiencies could be a key reason why the attackers have had the advantage thus far (Slayton, 2017).

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

The best cyber defense is day-to-day cyber offense.

Bigelow '19 [Brad; June 2019; Principal advisor to Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, Information Services and Cyber Defence for planning, delivery and operation of CIS and CD capabilities throughout Allied Command Operations and NATO Crisis Response Operations, MS in Space Systems Engineering from the US Air Force Institute of Technology; "What are Military Cyberspace Operations Other Than War?” https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_10_What-Are-Military-Cyberspace-OperationsOther-Than-War.pdf]

Some have argued that military operations in cyberspace outside the context of armed conflict should be limited to the protection of military networks and information systems. Miriam Dunn Cavelty has flatly stated that “Militaries cannot defend the cyberspace of their country – it is no space where troops and tanks can be deployed because the logic of national boundaries does not apply” (Dunn Cavelty, 2012). Stephen J. Anderson agrees, writing that traditional concepts of national defense cannot be applied in cyberspace: “The US Navy defends the littoral territorial boundaries; air defenses, either through missile defense initiatives or alert aircraft, define airspace boundaries. Those lines are not readily identifiable in cyberspace” (Anderson, 2016). Some go even further, arguing that an active military role in peacetime cyber security undermines investment in alternative mechanisms. In a 2013 post for the Lowy Institute, Ian Wallace wrote that such efforts disincentivized “other longer-term and more sustainable efforts to address the new challenges that cyber brings to security systems” (Wallace, 2013). Yet this debate has evolved significantly in recent years, in large part thanks to increasing evidence of state-sponsored attacks on civilian cyberspace infrastructure. In a recent paper entitled Rethinking Cyber Security, James Lewis has stated that “The primary source of risk in cybersecurity comes from conflict between states” (Lewis, 2018). This assessment is echoed by the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centrum, which concluded in its 2018 assessment that “The most significant threats are sabotage and disruption by nation-states” (National Cyber Security Centrum, 2018). As consensus on the state actor threat in cyberspace has grown, so have calls for the military to take a more active role in the defense of cyberspace. In the 2017 U.S. Senate deliberations on increasing the Secretary of Defense’s authority to conduct clandestine military cyberspace operations, Senator John McCain asserted that the need for a strong military role in peacetime was self-explanatory: “It’s the Department of Defense’s job to defend this nation: that’s why it’s called the Department of Defense” (Pomerleau, 2017). This more active role— sometimes referred to as defending forward—is reflected in recent updates to military cyber strategies. The 2018 U.S. Defense Department Cyber Strategy, for example, states explicitly: “We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia” and declares that this requires (and justifies) “action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition to preserve U.S. military advantages and to defend U.S. interests” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Similarly, the Netherlands’ Defence Cyber Strategy 2018, subtitled Investing in cyber striking power for the Netherlands, concludes that the current security environment demonstrates that “a more active contribution from Defence within the existing structures is required” (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2018). Jan Kallberg and Thomas S. Cook have gone even further, stating that nations should be prepared not only to use military cyberspace forces in peacetime but to actively foster these capabilities as an alternative to armed conflict: “Cyber is no longer a mere enabler of joint operations, but instead a viable strategic option for confronting adversarial societies” (Kallberg & Cook, 2017).

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

Less cyber offense is the worst possible outcome.

Scott '18 [Tennille; 5/25/18; MS in Information Technology from the University of Maryland, MA in Military Operations from the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Cyber Operations Officer for the US Army; "The Art of the Cyber Jab: Using Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Action at Corps and Below," https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1071483.pdf]

Russian aggression in the cyber domain over the past decade show that mere passive response to cyber attack is not sufficient to prevail against a well-rehearsed adversary that combines offensive cyberspace operations with combat operations. Fear of the unknown cannot be an excuse for idleness, and the US cannot afford to be “cyber punching bags” in combat.103 Inactivity is not an option. Lieutenant General Nakasone told senators in a confirmation hearing March 1, 2018 “As cyberspace develops, the longer that we have inactivity, the longer our adversaries are able to establish their own norms – and I think that is very, very important that we realize that.” 104 This sentiment resonates with Moltke in his statement that “omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient.”105 While DCO-RA may not be a perfect solution, as its analogies in the physical domain demonstrate, perfection is not always necessary. Overcoming an adversary is the art of combining what is possible with what is necessary to achieve defense. At some point the US must stop being the world’s cyber punching bag and counter its adversaries with a few cyber jabs of its own. This research demonstrates that DCO-RA, when fully and properly enabled, is capable of doing just that.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

Offensive capabilities are necessary to adapt to changing adversary capabilities – the aff just establishes a cyber Maginot Line that is begging to be pushed back

Lewis 15 – James A. Lewis, senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defence,” 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/TP_08_2015_0.pdf

The nature of warfare is changing as opponents seek to circumvent Western military power by using a blend of political action, special forces, proxies and irregular units, unconventional tactics and cyber techniques to find a different way of applying force to gain their ends. What Russia sometimes call “hybrid warfare” will challenge NATO defence planning. A cyber defensive orientation is, however, the equivalent of a static defence, defending fixed positions rather than manoeuvring, and conceding initiative to opponents. The next public iteration of NATO cyber policy should describe how NATO members with offensive cyber capabilities would retain national control, but make these capabilities available to NATO in the event of aggression. NATO should be more explicit in how offensive cyber operations fit into its defensive and deterrent strategy. Finally, it needs to identify and describe a regular coordinating process to be established (similar to the Nuclear Planning Group) in NATO’s Cyber Defence Committee (CDC). NATO would never refrain from using fighter aircraft because they can serve offensive purposes, and say it would rely solely on air defence missiles and damage control to deal with the threat of air attack. Nor would NATO renounce armoured vehicles and rely only on static defence. A defensive approach that forsakes the possibility of offensive action is essentially a cyber Maginot Line. This defensive orientation serves no one’s interest except that of our opponents. Offensive cyber operations are similarly a part of warfare that advanced militaries cannot ignore. The mechanisms for incorporating offensive cyber into NATO will be complicated by national sensitivities, and public presentation will need to be carefully crafted to reinforce a deterrent message; but the next step, however politically difficult, for NATO transformation is to publicly embrace offensive cyber capabilities in planning and exercises. Warfare is evolving as technological and political developments change the requirements for effective operations. Military innovations create a new dynamic for calculating risk among potential adversaries. Forces and concepts that once seemed adequate for stability are called into question. It will be neither easy nor quick for NATO to discuss publicly the role of offensive cyber operations, but it is ultimately unavoidable.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---OCOs Good

Sustained, preemptive offense against the initial cyber threat is necessary against armed attack and armed force.

Bigelow '19 [Brad; June 2019; Principal advisor to Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, Information Services and Cyber Defence for planning, delivery and operation of CIS and CD capabilities throughout Allied Command Operations and NATO Crisis Response Operations, MS in Space Systems Engineering from the US Air Force Institute of Technology; "What are Military Cyberspace Operations Other Than War?” https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_10_What-Are-Military-Cyberspace-OperationsOther-Than-War.pdf]

In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Michael Sulmeyer proposed “two necessary conditions of posture” for U.S. military cyber mission forces to be better prepared to defend the U.S. against foreign attempts to interfere with elections. First, “Our cyber mission forces should be constantly conducting reconnaissance missions abroad to discover election-related threats to the United States and provide indicators and warnings to our forces and decision-makers.” Second, “Our cyber mission forces must be sufficiently ready to strike against targets abroad identified by reconnaissance as threats to our election” (Sulmeyer, 2018). Although Sulmeyer’s proposal was in the specific context of reactions to Russian meddling in U.S. elections in 2016, at a more general level these two conditions apply to any application of military OCO capabilities: first, they are highly dependent upon sustained reconnaissance of potential adversaries and their systems; and second, they need to be maintained at a high level of readiness because there may be little or no warning before they need to be engaged. If a nation intends to use offensive cyberspace capabilities to precede or pre-empt kinetic operations, then operational preparation of the cyber battlefield must become “as routine as reconnaissance or surveillance of potential adversary activity” (Kehler, Lin & Sulmeyer, 2017). What does “operational preparation of the cyber battlefield” involve? Robert Chesney spells it out clearly in his analysis of the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy: “Intrusions into the systems of potential adversaries in order to secure access of a kind that can be exploited for disruptive or destructive effect if and when the need later arises” (Chesney, 2018).

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Elections Turn

OCOs well in advance of threats secures elections.

Sulmeyer '18 [Michael; 2/13/18; Director of the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Harvard Kennedy School; "Testimony of Michael Sulmeyer," https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sulmeyer_02-13-18.pdf]

In addition to improving defenses and becoming more resilient, we should also consider how best to counter threats abroad before they hit us at home. To that end, let me transition to how I see some potential roles for the military in protecting our elections. I will focus my remarks on roles that the military could play outside of the United States. There are two necessary conditions of posture that I see as critical: 1. Reconnaissance Posture: Our cyber mission forces should be constantly conducting reconnaissance missions abroad to discover election-related threats to the United States and provide indicators and warnings to our forces and decision-makers. There will never be sufficient resources to prioritize all threats equally, so prioritizing threats to our elections and our democratic processes is crucial. If we do not prioritize collecting information abroad about election-related threats, than we cannot hope to disrupt them. 2. Force Posture: Our cyber mission forces must be sufficiently ready to strike against targets abroad identified by reconnaissance as threats to our election. Readiness is a critical issue for our armed forces today, and I would encourage the Senators on this committee to ensure they are asking tough questions about the readiness of our cyber mission forces just as they would about any other area of our military. Our forces must be ready to create different effects against a range of targets. Sometimes, they will not have much notice, so developing tactics that can be employed on the fly is important. If the military’s reconnaissance and forces are postured to focus on threats to our elections from abroad, there are four objectives that our forces should be prepared to pursue. It should go without saying that undertaking these actions would need to be consistent with international law and other relevant U.S. commitments. 1. Preventing Attacks from Materializing: Based on election-focused reconnaissance, U.S. cyber mission forces should develop options to disrupt the activities of those planning to meddle in our elections, and those who are in the early steps of doing so. Because these would be actions conducted by U.S. forces with a relatively long lead time, scenario-based plans should be developed and socialized with decision-makers so they are aware of the viability, risks, and benefits of different options. 2. Preempting Imminent Attacks: Reconnaissance abroad may provide indicators and warnings of an imminent cyber attack against election-related infrastructure, campaigns, and media and social media platforms. Our forces can prepare to neuter those attacks before they commence. Such actions would need to be undertaken rapidly as opportunities to strike may be fleeting, so developing options in advance to deliver effects promptly when so ordered is essential.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---OCOs Good

Offensive capabilities allow iterative training that increases coordination

Lewis 15 – James A. Lewis, senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defence,” 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/TP_08_2015_0.pdf

It could be argued, given NATO’s defensive orientation ( pace Russian fears of diabolic plots), that a purely defensive and technical focus for cyber operations is appropriate. The question, however, is whether NATO can field a credible military force without some public linkage to an offensive cyber capability. Here again, the nuclear precedent offers some suggestions for a way forward. In the NATO phonetic alphabet, “whiskey” (“W”) and “romeo” (“R”) were used by NATO’s command structure in conflict to “warn” capitals that with a deteriorating situation on the ground it would be sending a request to release nuclear weapons for NATO use. Romeo was the actual request for release of nuclear weapons to NATO control. This terminology prepared nuclear capitals to make the decision on release. Just as nuclear weapons remain under national control but senior NATO commanders can request their release, the US and UK could retain control of offensive cyber capabilities but be prepared to make them available to NATO commanders upon request. In practice, national teams could be assigned to support NATO commanders in theatre or could carry out some operations against targets selected by NATO commanders form their national duty station. Such an arrangement needs more than ad hoc coordination. It requires an identified structure for request and release that is regularly practised. It demands offensive cyber operations used for defence purposes to be included in planning and exercises. It would also be beneficial for NATO’s defence mission if the exercise of systems for the use of offensive cyber capabilities in support of defensive operations was made public. Cyber operations necessitate advance planning and practice, particularly for multinational operations that are already inherently complex in their coordination and de-confliction requirements. Offensive cyber operations create conflicts between goals and missions for the use of cyber techniques. The fundamental decision is whether to collect intelligence or to engage in military operations. This creates an immediate problem for NATO, because decisions on intelligence collection will be taken at the national level whereas military operations are in the purview of the NATO military command structure. This consideration would necessarily be part of the decision process in national capitals, which would likely be an iterative process to allow for additional input from the theatre of operations.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---OCOs Good

The best outcome is adversary perception of NATO willingness to use OCOs aggressively.

Smeets and Lin '18 [Max and Herb; 11/28/18; senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at Stanford University, PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford; senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; "An Outcome-Based Analysis of U.S. Cyber Strategy of Persistence & Defend Forward," https://www.lawfareblog.com/outcome-based-analysis-us-cyber-strategy-persistence-defend-forward]

From the U.S. standpoint, the optimal outcome is a United States that is more powerful in cyberspace along with a more stable cyberspace. Indeed, from the U.S. standpoint, the former will lead to the latter. A more stable cyberspace will involve norms of acceptable behavior, less conflict and so on. One path towards this rosy outcome is that the strategy does what it is said to do: Creates significant friction and makes it hard for adversaries to operate effectively. Adversaries realize that the U.S. strategy of persistent engagement makes it more difficult to conduct various offensive cyber operations, and they have no strong incentives to escalate as it may trigger a U.S. response in the conventional domain. USCYBERCOM has the advantage from the beginning.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---OCOs Good

Deterrence in cyberspace is possible and sufficient to avoid conflict, but NATO having offensive capabilities is necessary to prevent Russian malfeasance

Maldre 16 – Patrik Maldre, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Moving Toward NATO Deterrence for the Cyber Domain,” May 2016, https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2446

Cyber deterrence clearly warrants more discussion among NATO members than ever, given the threats they now face—particularly from the East. Yet the Cyber Defence Committee doesn’t really cover it, nor will a full-fledged cyber deterrence concept be announced at the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw. The main debate in Brussels and in national capitals centers on whether cyberspace should even be considered a domain of warfare, as many member states have already decide; the fuzzy concept of active cyber defense is only tentatively mentioned. However, senior NATO leaders have espoused deterrence as a potential future direction for the alliance. Importantly, several member states, including the United States, Britain and Estonia, are also publicly exploring such a strategy.20 The moment is not yet right for an alliance-wide declaration on this topic, but with concerted effort at all levels, NATO can and should continue to move toward deterrence for the cyber domain. Deterrence aims to discourage an adversary from taking offensive action. Traditionally, its two pillars have been deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment. The first refers to measures that reduce or eliminate the benefits of a certain aggressive move, while the second seeks to impose additional costs for performing it. NATO’s traditional mandate of defending its own systems fits comfortably into the deterrence-by-denial part of this framework. Deterrence-by-punishment, however, is far more controversial because of the problem of attribution—which refers to the difficulty of identifying the perpetrators of operations. Finally, both concepts also rely on intent, capability and credibility. As it stands, a palpable lack of trust among member states hinders collective action on both fronts. Progress in the denial category will be easier and more visible, but countermeasures should be considered as well. NATO has come a long way in terms of working together to shore up technical defenses in cyberspace. The main barrier to further cooperation, however, is the difference in technical and administrative capacities as well as human and financial resources among member states. This, along with differing national views, remains the main barrier to further integration. The alliance is only as strong as its weakest member. When it comes to deterrence-by-denial, therefore, all member states must have the basics in place: computer security laws, national cyber strategies, a police focus on cybercrime, national CERTs, public-private partnerships and capable intelligence agencies. From there, members should enact effective, actionable information-sharing programs. After that, the next step is to develop joint situational awareness. Typically, adversary espionage campaigns target multiple NATO and memberstate organizations simultaneously. Early warning and shared situational awareness can prevent multiple entities in different countries from being breached by the same operation. The end goal for the denial part of the deterrence strategy is, of course, resilience. If NATO and its members can effectively work together to prevent, detect, respond and recover from cyber attacks, this would significantly decrease the benefits and increase the costs for an adversary. NATO collective action should continue in this direction, and joint efforts can help to promote trust and confidence—a key ingredient in further cooperation in deterrence-by-denial, but even more crucial when it comes to deterrence-by-punishment. Preventing adversaries from benefitting from offensive actions, or at least limiting their gains, can help discourage them from conducting such attacks in the first place. Punishing them after the fact is another. While the term has an aggressive connotation, this part of the strategy is defensive and retaliatory in nature. It can refer to a broad spectrum of actions—from naming-and-shaming to nuclear strikes. In the cyber domain, the problem of attribution hinders the goal of effective deterrence. For this reason, NATO and its member states should invest heavily in the technological and analytical capabilities necessary to discern signs of a particular adversary, including in cooperation with the private sector. As numerous cases of attribution to Russian cyber threat actors demonstrate, this is already taking place. Furthermore, member states should complement technical attribution with political and diplomatic attribution. Currently, months and even years pass before politicians and leaders feel comfortable about ascribing blame. For deterrence to work, however, governments must carry out both high-level and private attribution in conjunction with media and private companies as soon as they have conclusive evidence. Calling out threat actors and their state sponsors in diplomatic forums, public discussions and private meetings can motivate them to conduct less aggressive operations. NATO and its member states should also adopt joint approaches to developing and employing offensive capabilities for collective defense purposes. Laudably, many individual allies have already declared that they possess such capabilities and the doctrines for using them. However, considerable mistrust persists among the allies, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and doubt—which weakens deterrence as a whole. To overcome this hurdle, allies can begin by making political statements about potentially using these capabilities in case of attack, and in accordance with international law as part of a collective defense response. Ultimately, NATO should move toward sharing these capabilities, perhaps by using existing models based on nuclear doctrine. Transparency and straightforwardness in this arena could contribute substantively to deterring adversaries and reinforce collective defense among NATO members. Intent and credibility will play into adversaries’ calculations for any type of countermeasure. For this reason, policy innovations and capability development need to be complemented by effective strategic communication. You cannot achieve deterrence if your adversary doubts that you’ll do what you say— and even less so if it doesn’t think you can do what you say. From this perspective, demonstrations such as the Aurora test in 2007 can be quite useful.21 Other, more subtle means include presentations by top officials at security conferences. Operations against third-party adversaries other than the intended target of deterrence can also deter attacks; few doubt that Russia paid close attention to the Stuxnet case, or that NATO drew conclusions from the Ukraine grid attack. In sum, effective strategic communication— both public and private—can be a key component or complement of a deterrence-by-punishment strategy.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Russia Deterrence DA

It blurs the line of mutually assured destruction cascading in preemptive strikes---it’s the only scenario for nuclear war

Jacquelyn Schneider, 03-07-2022, (Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), “The Biggest Cyber Risk in Ukraine?, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-07/biggest-cyber-risk-ukraine/ceng

Why the apparent restraint? It is almost impossible to know exactly why (or if) the Russians have indeed held back. Perhaps cyber-operations have been attempted and failed; perhaps Russian President Vladimir Putin has held his cyber-capabilities in reserve, saving them for later. Or maybe cyber-operations have taken place, but their effect—which is often virtual and not clearly attributed—will take longer to materialize. What is known is that the conflict is far from over, and the next question becomes whether cyber-operations could play a larger role as the war turns more violent. It is likely that the next stage of conflict will more than ever be defined by planes, tanks, artillery, and soldiers. It seems unlikely, given the amount of indiscriminate damage currently being inflicted by Russia, that cyber-operations will escalate the violence of the campaign within Ukraine. That said, could cyber-operations lead to horizontal escalation, drawing NATO into the fight, for example? Or, given that the United States and Russia are the world’s largest nuclear powers, could cyber-operations escalate to the worst possible outcome—nuclear war? Recent wargaming research suggests that cyber-exploits into nuclear command and control may be enticing for states looking to neutralize a nuclear escalation threat in the midst of a conventional war, and that actors may underestimate the danger of these exploits and vulnerabilities to nuclear stability. GETTING PULLED IN One way cyber-operations could lead to escalation is by pulling the United States or NATO into the conflict. Mark Warner, the Democratic senator from Virginia, warned in late February that potential Russian cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine could have accidental spillover effects on NATO countries—for instance if a Russian cyberattack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused an outage in a NATO neighbor like Poland. This could inadvertently trip Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, which states that an armed attack against one member state will be considered an attack against them all. This would be uncharted waters for NATO, which only recently publicly stated that cyberattacks might invoke Article 5 and is still ambiguous about what types of cyberattack—which range from virtual outages to data manipulations to physical damage (in extremely rare circumstances)—might be serious enough for NATO to respond with conventional retaliation. The Biden administration has warned that the United States would respond to cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure, such as the country’s electrical grid or water supply (although officials stopped short of saying how the United States would respond). So far, the United States has answered previous cyberattacks with either sanctions, law enforcement actions, or the confiscation of cryptoassets. None of these options seem likely to deter Putin at this point, and so the Biden administration may find itself in an unprecedented position of having few credible options to threaten Russia. It is certainly possible that Putin, facing a conventional war that he thinks he might lose, could attack critical infrastructure in the United States or other NATO countries in the hope that their citizens will push their governments to abandon Ukraine. The financial sector, in particular, would seem to be a logical target for Russian cyberattacks, given the damage that Western economic actions have already done to the Russian economy. It is difficult to create widespread and long-lasting effects with cyberattacks, however, and the financial sector is the best equipped and most advanced cyber-defender in the world. Plus, research I’ve conducted with Sarah Kreps, director of the Cornell Tech Policy Lab, finds that the American public views cyberattacks as qualitatively different from conventional means of warfare—more akin to economic sanctions than bombs. Thus, cyberattacks are unlikely to provoke the kind of retaliation or emotional response that would pull the United States or its NATO allies into a war with Russia. What’s more, the United States can probably withstand the short-term damage to critical infrastructure that a Russian cyberattack might create, and such attacks might actually increase resolve to support Ukraine. This means a deliberate choice by Russia to use cyberattacks against the United States or NATO to “escalate to dominate”—deliberately ratcheting up the pressure to force Washington to back off—would likely fail. A more troubling scenario involves accidental escalation from cyber-operations—that is, when critical infrastructure is unintentionally damaged by a cyberattack or when a cyberattack is misattributed to Russia (or the United States). This is especially dangerous for civilian infrastructure that also serves military or security purposes—for example, harming a refugee train by using a cyberattack targeting railroads also used to move troops and supplies to the front. Plus, a jumble of actors has jumped into this space, from criminal syndicates to cyber-militias to hacker collectives such as Anonymous. That increases the chances that one of these players will target civilian infrastructure, and misattribution to either Russia or the United States could needlessly trigger retaliation. WHEN CYBER GOES NUCLEAR By far the most dangerous form of escalation is the possibility that a cyber-operation increases the likelihood of nuclear war. How likely is such a scenario? No one may know if Russia has a cyberweapon that can target nuclear weapons (or, for that matter, whether the United States does), but there are theories and some data about how the cyber-realm might affect nuclear stability. American policymakers have generally recognized that attempting to interfere with nuclear command, control, and communications could lead to dangerous incentives for states to launch nuclear weapons preemptively. Threats to nuclear command and control, for example, could leave states so fearful about their second-strike capability (the ability to launch a nuclear weapon in retaliation against an attacker) that in the midst of a conflict they would feel compelled to use nuclear weapons preemptively. Some scholars have warned that attacks against nuclear command-and-control systems could make it impossible to control nuclear war and keep it limited, leading to inadvertent nuclear Armageddon. Despite these fears about the dangers of attacking nuclear command and control, there was never an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) to not attack each other’s nuclear command, control, and communications. Would Russia, or even the United States and its allies, launch a cyberattack against an enemy’s nuclear command-and-control system if they could? And how might that capability affect nuclear instability? Beginning in 2017, my team at the Naval War College and the Hoover Institution ran a wargame that explored this very question. It took place over three years and included 580 players from across the world—predominantly nuclear, cyber, and military experts ranging from former heads of state to military officers to industry leaders. In our simulations, we found that teams who were told they possessed cyber-exploits against nuclear command-and-control systems overwhelmingly used them. Because cyber-operations can be denied and are covert and virtual, players appeared to believe that they did not pose too great a risk of escalation. The tools seemed too valuable not to use, especially because they have a quick expiration date, with vulnerabilities quickly patched once discovered.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 2NC---Russia Deterrence DA

Russian cyberattacks cause NC3 entanglement

Whyte ’22 [Christopher; March 31; assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University; World Politics Review, “Cyber and Nuclear Threats Make for a Dangerous Mix in Ukraine,” /ceng

To say that the world is closer to the brink of nuclear war today than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 feels less controversial by the day. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently told media representatives that the “prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility.” Certainly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been signaling a willingness to at least consider the nuclear option. In late February, he raised the readiness level of Russia’s nuclear response force, stating that Western interference in the ongoing war in Ukraine will result in “consequences greater than any you have faced in history.” And despite calming messaging from the Biden administration, further Russian mobilizations—including the deployment of nuclear missile launchers to Siberia and nuclear submarines to the Barents Sea for supposed “drills”—have continued to stoke public fears over nuclear weapons’ use. Even Russia’s recent pledge not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine has done little to calm fears about the potential use of tactical nuclear devices, with many claiming the statement is nothing more than an attempt to bolster Moscow’s negotiating position. Amid these rising nuclear tensions, there is one dimension of potential escalation that has not yet received much public attention: that of a cyber-enabled nuclear event. It’s time for policymakers to consider whether cyber operations affecting elements of nuclear command, control and communications, or NC3, systems could prompt nuclear escalation in the current crisis. Experts across the West have been scrambling to place Putin’s threats, both tacit and explicit, in strategic and political context in order to gauge the possibility of a nuclear escalation leading to nuclear war. Others still have more narrowly—and perhaps more realistically—focused their analysis on what strong nuclear threats mean for fraught international engagement with Russia, and on whether Putin is likely to authorize the use of any nuclear weapons at all. On the digital side of things, experts on cyber conflict have thus far narrowly focused their attention on the non-nuclear aspects of tactics being employed in the war. Scholars rightly predicted that the “cyber blitzkrieg” anticipated by many pundits was unlikely, pointing out that, contrary to popular portrayals, cyber instruments actually make for poor tools of coercion and battlefield augmentation. By contrast, the entry of so many nonstate and semi-state cyber forces into the conflict on both sides, including nearly 300,000 volunteers coordinated by the Ukrainian government and a pro-Russia equivalent calling itself “Killnet,” was less expected. Even given so much robust analysis of the ongoing war, the nuclear tie-in has remained curiously underexamined. This is particularly concerning given the manner in which scholars have in recent years suggested that the logic of cyber warfare could undermine the logic of nuclear deterrence under highly specific circumstances. Overall, experts are right to dismiss the threat of a so-called “cyberwar,” a fantastical scenario that contradicts what we know about the strategic and operational functions of cyber instruments. But could cyber operations affecting elements of NC3 prompt nuclear escalation in the current crisis? Perhaps. The conflicting logics of cyber and nuclear warfare, when considered in the context of the present crisis, suggest real reasons to be concerned about the possibility of a cyber-enabled nuclear escalation. Off the bat, it’s important to remember that several elements involved in that question could present themselves in a range of ways. Nuclear escalation itself could take a number of forms, from additional escalatory rhetoric or mobilization to the actual use of a nuclear weapon. Likewise, a cyber operation impacting NC3 systems—which essentially comprise the networks of intelligence sensors, communications systems, other early warning assets and arms control mechanisms that underlie a country’s nuclear deterrent forces—could be an actual attempt to interfere with a nation’s deterrent capability by means of disrupting or taking over an element of its command system. That could be perceived by the targeted party as a prelude to a preemptive strike. But it could also be something as simple as an exploratory probe not intended to subvert system functions. Significantly, these different attacks could be hard to differentiate from the defensive perspective and so misinterpretation is entirely possible. While countries like Russia and the United States have historically reacted with caution to nuclear provocations, uncertainties borne of the current crisis might diminish that inclination. Such uncertainties could also encourage Russian leaders to lend less weight to the cyber attribution problem—that is, the difficulty inherent in identifying the party responsible for a cyber-attack that, even under ordinary circumstances, complicates efforts to organize an appropriate response. Even more concerning than the uncertainties bound up in interpreting certain cyber actions is the oft-cited and well-documented vulnerabilities of most states’ NC3 systems. Scholars have noted that NC3 weaknesses are widespread and, at times, quite glaring. There’s little doubt that American or Russian second-strike capabilities could be made to function effectively in the event of a nuclear war. But both sides’ reliance on a blend of new and legacy technologies to coordinate a complex detection, analysis and strike apparatus for nuclear weapons virtually guarantees errors in how these systems function as a whole. For example, in the past, American forces have lost contact with launch systems for hours due to faulty circuitry. At other times, they have detected false launches because legacy machinery was mishandled by operators. These base conditions are cause for at least minimal concern. Both the probability of either side’s NC3 systems being vulnerable to some form of cyber compromise and the possibility that either side might mistakenly believe its NC3 is being targeted by hostile foreign cyber operations clearly create the potential for a cyber-enabled nuclear event where perceived cyber-preemption against NC3 leads directly to either coercive or real military escalation. Admittedly, the stakes of nuclear weapons’ use suggest that escalation is not an especially likely outcome most of the time, even given these known issues. But unique circumstances might change this calculus. In particular, the conflicting logics of cyber and nuclear warfare, when considered in the context of the present crisis, suggest real reasons to be concerned. Nuclear and cyber forces are polar opposites with regard to their operational features. The former relies on open signaling to “warn” adversaries about potential consequences in order to generate a deterrent effect. The latter typically banks on secrecy, exploiting the element of surprise to avoid giving an opponent the opportunity to upgrade their defenses. The combination of the two creates unusual commitment problems, where the coercive brinksmanship usually on display in nuclear contests might be absent as one side tries to use cyber instruments to neutralize the other’s NC3. Importantly, with cyber in the mix, the side that detects cyber activity targeting NC3 will likely also notice that the attempted breach was done in secret, creating new uncertainties over how they might respond to such an attack. In addition to the potential weaknesses of NC3 systems, the unique political dynamics currently on display in Moscow, where Putin seems to be both isolated and dependent on politicized intelligence that has effectively undermined his decision-making, complicates this game of nuclear chicken. Given the difficult intelligence assessments and operational decisions that any government trying to reconcile cyber and nuclear logics in real-time will be required to make, this is worrisome to say the least. And Russia’s many obvious logistical failures in launching its invasion are cause for further concern. After all, objectively assessing the risks of cyber-enabled nuclear interference requires having the ability to locate potential NC3 compromises and to mitigate any that are found. This means robust intra-service communication and deployment of expertise, neither of which has been on prominent display in Moscow when it comes to the invasion of Ukraine. The range of cyber forces arrayed against Putin’s government in the current crisis also represents a potential source of further uncertainty that could produce cyber-prompted nuclear escalation. In addition to Ukraine’s cyber forces, which are active against Russian targets of all stripes, Kyiv has benefited from massive Western support for its operations in cyberspace, including from hacktivist elements to hundreds of thousands of volunteers that are being coordinated by Ukrainian state auspices. Added to this is the fact that, in addition to military equipment, Kyiv has been receiving non-battlefield aid from NATO member states, particularly those that are most geographically proximate, including Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. There is clearly a narrow situation here in which Russian leadership, under the current internal political conditions, may see possible Western intention in cyber events involving NC3 or related systems.

2022 SDI Negative
Ban OCO - Case Neg › 1NC---Russia Deterrence DA

Grid collapse causes extinction

Friedemann 16 (Alice, transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com and author of “When Trucks Stop Running, Energy and the Future of Transportation,” worked at American Presidential Lines for 22 years, where she developed computer systems to coordinate the transit of cargo between ships, rail, trucks, and consumers, citing Dr. Peter Vincent Pry. Pry is executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to Congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1-24-16, “Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings)” http://energyskeptic.com/2016/the-scariest-u-s-house-session-ever-electromagnetic-pulse-and-the-fall-of-civilization/)

Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government and Industry also need electricity in order to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse. Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense, working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on unclassified design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers— and perhaps the National economy. Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground. Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an ‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a major metropolitan area, could—armed with the ‘‘EMP Suitcase’’— black out a major city. A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. An EMP weapon can be used by state actors who wish to level the battlefield by neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal means, the only means, whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear weapon to destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that states or terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability to EMP attack for coercion or blackmail: ‘‘Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.’’ The EMP Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the United States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly in response to a Russian nuclear EMP threat made to an official Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the midst of the Balkans crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former Ambassador to the United States, warned: ‘‘Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire an SLBM and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting EMP would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.’’ China’s military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the very technology that is the basis of U.S. power. Where EMP is concerned, ‘‘The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world’’: ‘‘Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st Century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as… electromagnetic pulse weapons… Even a superpower like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity…In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks… When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically…it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems… The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.’’ Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ‘‘If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years… American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’ The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon—specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the Shahab–III, fuzing for high- altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the world’s most common missile—possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice for a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ‘‘fingerprints.’’ Under present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely limited, restricted mainly to those few military communications networks that are hardened against EMP. Today’s microelectronics are the foundation of our modern civilization, but are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of that era. Tests conducted by the EMP Commission confirmed empirically the theory that, as modern microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable, and can be destroyed or disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths. Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical infrastructures that sustain the economy of the United States, and the lives of 310 million Americans, depend, directly or indirectly, upon electricity and electronic systems. Of special concern is the vulnerability to EMP of the Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long distances, from the point of generation to consumers (from the Niagara Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers—which could be destroyed by an EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas, from Germany or South Korea, the only two nations in the world that manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be custom-made for its unique role in the grid. A single EHV transformer typically requires 18 months to manufacture. The loss of large numbers of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the United States into a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of eventual recovery, as the society and population probably could not survive for even 1 year without electricity. Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADAs). SCADAs essentially are small computers, numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical infrastructures, that perform jobs previously performed by hundreds of thousands of human technicians during the 1960s and before, in the era prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do things like regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the flow of gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights. SCADAs enable a few dozen people to run the critical infrastructures for an entire city, whereas previously hundreds or even thousands of technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs are especially vulnerable to EMP. EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities to EMP, but are by no means the only vulnerabilities. Each of the critical infrastructures has their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP: The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators and electronic controls and thousands of miles of power lines, is a vast electronic machine—more vulnerable to EMP than any other critical infrastructure. Yet the electric grid is the most important of all critical infrastructures, and is in fact the keystone supporting modern civilization, as it powers all the other critical infrastructures. As of now it is our technological Achilles Heel. The EMP Commission found that, if the electric grid collapses, so too will collapse all the other critical infrastructures. But, if the electric grid can be protected and recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures can also be restored. Transportation is a critical infrastructure because modern civilization cannot exist without the goods and services moved by road, rail, ship, and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all have electronic components, motors, and controls that are potentially vulnerable to EMP. Gas stations, fuel pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products depend upon electronic components and cannot operate without electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event, transportation systems would be paralyzed. Traffic control systems that avert traffic jams and collisions for road, rail, and air depend upon electronic systems, that the EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP. Communications is a critical infrastructure because modern economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies depend to a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of information—accomplished today mostly by electronic means. Telephones, cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather, scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to collateral effects from an EMP attack. Within weeks of an EMP event, the LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, would probably be inoperable. Banking and finance are the critical infrastructure that sustain modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records of a multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual—financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro- and micro-level upon computers and electronic automated systems. Many of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can operate without electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could transform the modern electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter. Food has always been vital to every person and every civilization. The critical infrastructure for producing, delivering, and storing food depends upon a complex web of technology, including machines for planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-haul transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern technology enables over 98 percent of the U.S. National population to be fed by less than 2 percent of the population. Huge regional warehouses that resupply supermarkets constitute the National food reserves, enough food to feed the Nation for 30–60 days at normal consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and temperature control systems that typically have enough emergency electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an average of 3 days. Experience with storm-induced blackouts proves that when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical power, most of the food supply will rapidly spoil. Farmers, less than 2 percent of the population as noted above, cannot feed 310 million Americans if deprived of the means that currently makes possible this technological miracle. Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and civilization, even more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and sprayers to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat waste water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is directly vulnerable to EMP. The system cannot operate without vast amounts of electricity supplied by the power grid. A natural or nuclear EMP event would immediately deprive most of the U.S. National population of running water. Many natural sources of water—lakes, streams, and rivers—would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from sewage, industry, and hospitals that would backflow from or bypass wastewater treatment plants, that could no longer intake and treat pollutants without electric power. Many natural water sources that would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP event, would be polluted with human wastes including feces, industrial wastes including arsenic and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens. Emergency services such as police, fire, and hospitals are the critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of government and society—preserving law and order, protecting property and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown, for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, that when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is no gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and ambulances, the worst elements of society and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover. The EMP Commission found that, given our current state of unpreparedness, a natural or nuclear EMP event could create anarchic conditions that would profoundly challenge the existence of social order.