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2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

NATO will say yes, they support a ban and acknowledge the need to continue to improve awareness and response to emerging biological threats.

Ion Iftimie COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 9 May 2020 https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1440

As part of its forward-looking reflection process, NATO would be well-advised to pay particular attention to the growing bioterrorist threat in the post-COVID-19 security environment. This implies to continue to improve NATO’s situational awareness of the bioterrorist threat, its capabilities to address it and its international engagements, in line with the 2012 Chicago Summit decisions. As seen above, NATO can complement national situational awareness through surveillance, intelligence-sharing and risk assessments that are vital for NATO biodefence. Initial dysfunctional and uncoordinated responses of the Allies to the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted, however, that much more can be done in the areas of cooperation, information sharing and identification of emerging biological threats.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

A ban on human germline genetic engineering is the only option

Darnovsky, Lowthorp and Hasson, 2018 is the executive director of the (CGS). is a program manager at the (CGS). directs the Genetic Justice program at the (CGS). Reproductive gene editing imperils universal human rights ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED: February 15, 2018 https://www.openglobalrights.org/reproductive-gene-editing-imperils-universal-human-rights/

This prospect should make recent attempts to back-pedal on the widespread and longstanding international opposition to human germline modification particularly worrying to human rights advocates. For example, a 2017 by a committee of the US National Academies of Sciences and Medicine recommended that gene editing for human reproduction be permitted in certain circumstances, leaving open the possibility of expanding those circumstances in the future. But in the real world of commercial pressures and regulatory inadequacy, such limits would simply not hold. If the door to the use of human germline modification is cracked open, it will be impossible to limit its spread and applications. At this critical juncture, it’s important to remind ourselves why key human rights documents specifically prohibited these practices, long before they were technically feasible. The medical justifications for human germline modification fall short, and the temptation to “enhance” future generations is profoundly dangerous. Down that road, our scientific achievements would all too likely become not instruments of enlightenment and emancipation, but mechanisms for exacerbating inequality. And our desire to improve the human condition would lead us away from the realization of the human rights that we know are needed for individuals, societies, and humanity to thrive. The rapid pace of these developments creates an urgent need for the global community—perhaps gathering under UN auspices—to reaffirm existing agreements and clearly prohibit the dangerous and unethical use of reproductive gene-editing.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Economic inequality spurs political gridlock- manifests every extinction scenario

Julian Cribb, 2017 -- Australian National University Emeritus Faculty Surviving The 21st Century: Humanity’s Ten Great Challenges and How We Can Overcome Them, Switzerland: Springer International, 2017, p. 166-167

The argument that income inequality leads to legislative stalemate and government indecision was advanced by Mian and colleagues in a study of the political outcomes of the 2008–2009 Global Economic Recession (Mian et al. 2012 ), stating “…politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms.” It also affects intergenerational cohesion, explains Nobel economics laureate Joseph Stiglitz: “These three realities – social injustice on an unprecedented scale, massive inequities, and a loss of trust in elites – define our political moment, and rightly so…. But we won’t be able to fix the problem if we don’t recognize it. Our young do. They perceive the absence of intergenerational justice, and they are right to be angry” (Stiglitz 2016). From the perspective of the survival of civilization and the human species, financial inequality does not represent a direct threat—indeed most societies have long managed with varying degrees of income disparity. Where it is of concern to a human race, whose numbers and demands have already exceeded the finite boundaries of its shared planet, is in the capacity of inequality to wreck social cohesion and hence, to undermine the prospects for a collaborative effort by the whole of humanity to tackle the multiple existential threats we face. Rich-against-poor is a good way to divert the argument and so de-rail climate action, disarmament, planetary clean-up or food security, for instance. Disunity spells electoral loss in politics, rifts between commanders and their troops breed military defeat, lack of team spirit yields failure in sport, disharmony means a poor orchestra or business performance, family disagreements often lead to dysfunction and violence. These lessons are well-known and attested, from every walk of life. Yet humans persistently overlook the cost of socioeconomic disunity and grievances when it comes to dealing with our common perils as a species. For civilisation and our species to survive and prosper sustainably in the long run, common understandings and co-operation are essential, across all the gulfs that divide us—political, ethnic, religious and economic. A sustainable world, and a viable human species, will not be possible unless the poverty and inequity gaps can be reduced, if not closed. This is not a matter of politics or ideology, as many may argue: it is the same lesson in collective wisdom and collaboration which those earliest humans first learned on the African savannah a million and a half years ago: together we stand, divided we fall. It is purely an issue of co-existence and co-survival. Neither rich nor poor are advantaged by a state of civilisation in collapse. An unsustainable world will kill the affluent as surely as the deprived.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Tackling inequality is key to global cooperation

Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz 2021 – Georgetown University international affairs professor and professor at London School of Economics “The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021

The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation U.S. President Joe Biden has declared that under his leadership, “America is back” and once again “ready to lead the world.” Biden wants to return the country to its traditional role of catalyzing international cooperation and staunchly defending liberal values abroad. His challenge, however, is primarily one of politics, not policy. Despite Biden’s victory in last year’s presidential election, his internationalist vision faces a deeply skeptical American public. The political foundations of U.S. internationalism have collapsed. The domestic consensus that long supported U.S. engagement abroad has come apart in the face of mounting partisan discord and a deepening rift between urban and rural Americans. An inward turn has accompanied these growing divides. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism, neo-isolationism, protectionism, and nativism were anathema to most of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. But Trump’s approach to statecraft tapped into public misgivings about American overreach, contributing to his victory in 2016 and helping him win the backing of 74 million voters in 2020. An “America first” approach to the world sells well when many Americans experience economic insecurity and feel that they have been on the losing end of globalization. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that roughly half the U.S. public believes that the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on fixing problems at home. Redressing the hardships facing many working Americans is essential to inoculating the country against “America first” and Trump’s illiberal politics of grievance. That task begins with economic renewal. Restoring popular support for the country’s internationalist calling will entail sustained investment in pandemic recovery, health care, infrastructure, green technology and jobs, and other domestic programs. Those steps will require structural political reforms to ease gridlock and ensure that U.S. foreign policy serves the interests of working Americans. What Biden needs is an “inside out” approach that will link imperatives at home to objectives abroad. Much will depend on his willingness and ability to take bold action to rebuild broad popular support for internationalism from the ground up. Success would significantly reduce the chances that the president who follows Biden, even if he or she is a Republican, would return to Trump’s self-defeating foreign policy. Such future-proofing is critical to restoring international confidence in the United States. In light of the dysfunction and polarization plaguing U.S. politics, leaders and people around the world are justifiably questioning whether Biden represents a new normal or just a fleeting reprieve from “America first.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Warming outweighs ---it causes extinction, is irreversible, and exacerbates every other impact

Torres 16 (Phil Torres; author, Affiliate Scholar @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, founder of the X-Risks Institute, published articles for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology; 7-22-2016, "Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk," FLI - Future of Life Institute, http://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/, accessed 8-9-2016)

For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the effects of climate change will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible.” Or, as published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for environmental degradation to elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an , it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Inequality causes warming and turns every other impact

Luke Kemp 2019, Researcher based at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) at the University of Cambridge, “Are we on the road to civilization collapse?” 02/19/19, http://www.st-stanislaus-gy.com/Academics/Topics/CollapseOfCivilization.pdf

Our deep past is marked by recurring failure. As part of my research at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge, I am attempting to find out why collapse occurs through a historical autopsy. What can the rise and fall of historic civilisations tell us about our own? What are the forces that precipitate or delay a collapse? And do we see similar patterns today? The first way to look at past civilisations is to compare their longevity. This can be difficult, because there is no strict definition of civilisation, nor an overarching database of their births and deaths. In the graphic below, I have compared the lifespan of various civilisations, which I define as a society with agriculture, multiple cities, military dominance in its geographical region and a continuous political structure. Given this definition, all empires are civilisations, but not all civilisations are empires. The data is drawn from two studies on the growth and decline of empires (for 3000-600BC and 600BC-600), and an informal, crowdsourced survey of ancient civilisations (which I have amended). Collapse can be defined as a rapid and enduring loss of population, identity and socioeconomic complexity. Public services crumble and disorder ensues as government loses control of its monopoly on violence. Virtually all past civilisations have faced this fate. Some recovered or transformed, such as the Chinese and Egyptian. Other collapses were permanent, as was the case of Easter Island. Sometimes the cities at the epicentre of collapse are revived, as was the case with Rome. In other cases, such as the Mayan ruins, they are left abandoned as a mausoleum for future tourists. What can this tell us about the future of global modern civilisation? Are the lessons of agrarian empires applicable to our post-18th Century period of industrial capitalism? I would argue that they are. Societies of the past and present are just complex systems composed of people and technology. The theory of “normal accidents” suggests that complex technological systems regularly give way to failure. So collapse may be a normal phenomenon for civilisations, regardless of their size and stage. We may be more technologically advanced now. But this gives little ground to believe that we are immune to the threats that undid our ancestors. Our newfound technological abilities even bring new, unprecedented challenges to the mix. And while our scale may now be global, collapse appears to happen to both sprawling empires and fledgling kingdoms alike. There is no reason to believe that greater size is armour against societal dissolution. Our tightly-coupled, globalised economic system is, if anything, more likely to make crisis spread. If the fate of previous civilisations can be a roadmap to our future, what does it say? One method is to examine the trends that preceded historic collapses and see how they are unfolding today. While there is no single accepted theory for why collapses happen, historians, anthropologists and others have proposed various explanations, including: CLIMATIC CHANGE: When climatic stability changes, the results can be disastrous, resulting in crop failure, starvation and desertification. The collapse of the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku civilisation, the Akkadians, the Mayan, the Roman Empire, and many others have all coincided with abrupt climatic changes, usually droughts. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: Collapse can occur when societies overshoot the carrying capacity of their environment. This ecological collapse theory, which has been the subject of bestselling books, points to excessive deforestation, water pollution, soil degradation and the loss of biodiversity as precipitating causes. INEQUALITY AND OLIGARCHY: Wealth and political inequality can be central drivers of social disintegration, as can oligarchy and centralisation of power among leaders. This not only causes social distress, but handicaps a society’s ability to respond to ecological, social and economic problems. The field of cliodynamics models how factors such as equality and demography correlate with political violence. Statistical analysis of previous societies suggests that this happens in cycles. As population increases, the supply of labour outstrips demand, workers become cheap and society becomes top-heavy. This inequality undermines collective solidarity and political turbulence follows. COMPLEXITY: Collapse expert and historian Joseph Tainter has proposed that societies eventually collapse under the weight of their own accumulated complexity and bureaucracy. Societies are problem-solving collectives that grow in complexity in order to overcome new issues. However, the returns from complexity eventually reach a point of diminishing returns. After this point, collapse will eventually ensue. Another measure of increasing complexity is called Energy Return on Investment (EROI). This refers to the ratio between the amount of energy produced by a resource relative to the energy needed to obtain it. Like complexity, EROI appears to have a point of diminishing returns. In his book The Upside of Down, the political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon observed that environmental degradation throughout the Roman Empire led to falling EROI from their staple energy source: crops of wheat and alfalfa. The empire fell alongside their EROI. Tainter also blames it as a chief culprit of collapse, including for the Mayan. EXTERNAL SHOCKS: In other words, the “four horsemen”: war, natural disasters, famine and plagues. The Aztec Empire, for example, was brought to an end by Spanish invaders. Most early agrarian states were fleeting due to deadly epidemics. The concentration of humans and cattle in walled settlements with poor hygiene made disease outbreaks unavoidable and catastrophic. Sometimes disasters combined, as was the case with the Spanish introducing salmonella to the Americas. RANDOMNESS/BAD LUCK: Statistical analysis on empiressuggests that collapse is random and independent of age. Evolutionary biologist and data scientist Indre Zliobaite and her colleagues have observed a similar pattern in the evolutionary record of species. A common explanation of this apparent randomness is the “Red Queen Effect”: if species are constantly fighting for survival in a changing environment with numerous competitors, extinction is a consistent possibility. Despite the abundance of books and articles, we don’t have a conclusive explanation as to why civilisations collapse. What we do know is this: the factors highlighted above can all contribute. Collapse is a tipping point phenomena, when compounding stressors overrun societal coping capacity. We can examine these indicators of danger to see if our chance of collapse is falling or rising. Here are four of those possible metrics, measured over the past few decades: Temperature is a clear metric for climate change, GDP is a proxy for complexity and the ecological footprint is an indicator for environmental degradation. Each of these has been trending steeply upwards. Inequality is more difficult to calculate. The typical measurement of the Gini Index suggests that inequality has decreased slightly globally (although it is increasing within countries). However, the Gini Index can be misleading as it only measures relative changes in income. In other words, if two individuals earning $1 and $100,000 both doubled their income, the Gini would show no change. But the gap between the two would have jumped from $99,999 to $198,000. Because of this, I have also depicted the income share of the global top 1%. The 1% have increased in their share of global income from approximately 16% in 1980 to over 20% today. Importantly, wealth inequality is even worse. The share of global wealth from the 1% has swelled from 25-30% in the 1980s to approximately 40% in 2016. The reality is likely to be starker as these numbers do not capture wealth and income siphoned into overseas tax havens. Studies suggest that the EROI for fossil fuels has been steadily decreasing over time as the easiest to reach and richest reserves are depleted. Unfortunately, most renewable replacements, such as solar, have a markedly lower EROI, largely due to their energy density and the rare earth metals and manufacturing required to produce them. This has led much of the literature to discuss the possibility of an “energy cliff” as EROI declines to a point where current societal levels of affluence can no longer be maintained. The energy cliff need not be terminal if renewable technologies continue to improve and energy efficiency measures are speedily implemented. Measures of resilience The somewhat reassuring news is that collapse metrics are not the entire picture. Societal resilience may be able to delay or prevent collapse. For example, globally “economic diversity” – a measurement of the diversity and sophistication of country exports – is greater today than it was in the 1960s and 1970s, as measured by the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). Nations are, on average, less reliant on single types of exports than they once were. For example, a nation that had diversified beyond only exporting agricultural products would be more likely to weather ecological degradation or the loss of trading partners. The ECI also measures the knowledge-intensity of exports. More skilled populations may have a greater capacity to respond to crises as they arise. Similarly, innovation – as measured by per capita patent applications– is also rising. In theory, a civilisation might be less vulnerable to collapse if new technologies can mitigate against pressures such as climate change. It’s also possible that “collapse” can happen without violent catastrophe. As Rachel Nuwer wrote on BBC Future in 2017, “in some cases, civilisations simply fade out of existence – becoming the stuff of history not with a bang but a whimper”. Still, when we look at all these collapse and resilience indicators as a whole, the message is clear that we should not be complacent. There are some reasons to be optimistic, thanks to our ability to innovate and diversify away from disaster. Yet the world is worsening in areas that have contributed to the collapse of previous societies. The climate is changing, the gap between the rich and poor is widening, the world is becoming increasingly complex, and our demands on the environment are outstripping planetary carrying capacity. The rungless ladder That's not all. Worryingly, the world is now deeply interconnected and interdependent. In the past, collapse was confined to regions – it was a temporary setback, and people often could easily return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles. For many, it was even a welcome reprieve from the oppression of early states. Moreover, the weapons available during social disorder were rudimentary: swords, arrows and occasionally guns. Today, societal collapse is a more treacherous prospect. The weapons available to a state, and sometimes even groups, during a breakdown now range from biological agents to nuclear weapons. New instruments of violence, such as lethal autonomous weapons, may be available in the near future. People are increasingly specialised and disconnected from the production of food and basic goods. And a changing climate may irreparably damage our ability to return to simple farming practices. Think of civilisation as a poorly-built ladder. As you climb, each step that you used falls away. A fall from a height of just a few rungs is fine. Yet the higher you climb, the larger the fall. Eventually, once you reach a sufficient height, any drop from the ladder is fatal. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we may have already reached this point of civilisational “terminal velocity”. Any collapse – any fall from the ladder – risks being permanent. Nuclear war in itself could result in an existential risk: either the extinction of our species, or a permanent catapult back to the Stone Age. While we are becoming more economically powerful and resilient, our technological capabilities also present unprecedented threats that no civilisation has had to contend with. For example, the climatic changes we face are of a different nature to what undid the Maya or Anazasi. They are global, human-driven, quicker, and more severe.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Human germline genetic engineering will make income inequality much worse.

Erik Sherman Senior Contributor Genetic Engineering Will Make Income Inequality Much Worse Aug 20, 2017, 08:06am EDT https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2017/08/20/genetic-engineering-will-make-income-inequality-much-worse/?sh=2fdb4ed93d75

Early this month, scientists announced that they had edited genes in a human embryo to remove a disease-causing mutation. The work was astounding and the answer to prayers of many parents. Who wouldn't want a chance to prevent what would now be needless suffering by their children? But that wouldn't be the end of it. Many parents would want to ensure their children had the best of advantages through genetic improvement. Those with means could obtain them. With the ability comes ethical questions beyond the ultimate safety of such techniques. Expense of procedures will produce scarcity and aggravate income inequality that already continues to grow. Such improvements would certainly include physical characteristics because they can affect success. For example, taller people tend to be more financially successful in life, with one study showing that over a 30-year career, a six-foot tall person would make $166,000 more than someone five-foot five-inches. Almost all Fortune 500 CEOs are at least six-foot two-inches tall, even though that is true of only 3.9% of the population. Studies have shown that physical beauty translates into higher earnings than people who are less attractive by cultural norms. The gap is as large as those due to gender or racial factors. People wrongly assume that physical attractiveness has a strong correlation with competence and ability. Intelligence could also become an engineered trait in time. Intelligence is more than genetics, but what you inherit is an enormous part of what you can eventually develop. So, you could, in theory, make it easier for kids to whip through school, standardized tests, and the other hurdles that surround academic achievement. However, intelligence may not strongly correlate with lifetime income. (The question brings to mind an old Dilbert comic in which Dilbert asks a genius co-worker why he is also at the backward corporate employer. The genius questions whether intelligence is a Darwinian survival trait.) Genetic engineering of humans will happen as certainly as the atomic bomb would be developed once physics proved that such a device was possible in theory. Parents who can afford to already run children through enrichment programs and get them tutoring in how to take important standardized tests. What separates such kids from the majority is that their parents can afford these paths to a higher percentage of achievement. Genetic engineering will be no different, particularly in who benefits from it. Undoubtedly someone will make the claim that the technology will free everyone. That will not happen anymore than early automation and the replacement of human workers led to more leisure time to learn and be creative. Families far from the upper cast are unlikely to have the funds to indulge in such treatments. It will be the wealthiest who do, just as they already do. And be sure that some scientists and technicians who could perform such services will do so when enough money is offered. The result could become a Huxley-like dystopia with a class structure even more rigid than today. In Brave New World, is was the intentional reduction in mental and physical abilities that created the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and epsilon categories of humans. We already countenance wide disparities in educational and cultural resources based on income, which makes it more difficult for people to move out of a lower economic background. Manipulating the innate abilities of those with the most would additionally extend the differentiation and the advantage.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Great power war is obsolete – cooperation is more likely than competition

Deudney, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, and Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 9

(Daniel, John, Jan/Feb, Foreign Affairs, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival :Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail,” proquest

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Future generations should be your urgent ethical priority—flip the script on the negative’s flawed decision calculus

Elizabeth Olson, professor in the Department of Geography at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, August 2015 “Geography and ethics I: Waiting and urgency”, Progress in Human Geography 2015, Vol. 39(4)

Waiting and urgency are likely to be familiar experiences for the readers of this journal. We wait for green lights, phone calls, food, and test results. We teach our children socially appropriate ways to wait their turn. Daily we face urgent deadlines, urgent paperwork and urgent calls for our attention. Waiting and urgency can therefore feel banal and ubiquitous, and hardly of great ethical or moral consequence. Yet in the context of late liberalism and capitalism in crisis, geographers are drawing our attention to the ways that space and waiting come together to produce and maintain potentially abusive and harmful arrangements of power and inequality. Lines, lists, rooms and rosters dictate an order of being received, and in doing so they may also influence the dignity and safety of those who are required to wait for jobs, housing, asylum or security from intimate terrorism. Potentially unruly bodies are managed through increasingly sophisticated technologies that make some people wait longer, and in worse conditions, than others. How a person waits can also produce judgments about both her culture and her character. As it organizes the routines of our daily lives, waiting can serve – rightly or wrongly – as a measure of lawfulness or civility, and potentially as a justification for the removal or denial of rights. A worthy citizen waits appropriately or faces consequences. Martin Luther King wrote about this ethical dimension of waiting in relation to civil rights and the US military involvement in Vietnam, clarifying that a demand to wait can be immoral and therefore requires an apposite counterforce, what he called ‘the fierce urgency of now’ ([ ] , [ ] ).

In this report, I consider the work of urgency and waiting as often unacknowledged ethical concepts. Both the conditions and the significance of waiting have shifted in response to the development of liberalized economies, global expertise and the institutionalization of chronological time ([ ] ; [ ] , [ ] ). Within these conditions, things look increasingly urgent for humans and non-humans who are surplus to this system. Indeed, we have only to look towards ever more precise language developed to describe the extreme urgency of human conditions. [ ] bare life, [ ] expulsions and [ ] abandonment and endurance are but a few examples of the intertwining of waiting and suffering as an expected consequence of late modernity, often in the form of the tortured, excluded, or indefinitely and obscurely detained body.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

Frame the debate using the precautionary principle – vote so the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of an authentically humane life on Earth. We have an obligation to not risk the future of humanity.

Francois Ewald, Director of Reasarch and Strategy, Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurances., 2000 “Risk in contemporary society”, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 6 Conn. Ins. L.J. 47, 1999/2000, Hein Online

The powers of modern man confer upon him an infinite responsibility. His nature is revealed in fear, a feeling that makes man aware of the power of his new capacities. On one hand temporality, within which is situated his action, dilates to encompass the whole history of humanity, past and future, but it must be acknowledged that his powers are such that they threaten the existence of life itself. Contemporary man is becoming aware of himself in the feeling of anguish before the possibilities of annihilation that he bears in himself: for the first time, he is discovering in himself the power to commit suicide as a species. Faced with this possibility, and in order to [*71] overcome his anguish, modern man is on a quest to find the rules of a morality that will limit his powers: the ethics of responsibility. His enormous power needs holding. The ethics of responsibility contain the risk and uncertainty to the extent that modern man must take account in his actions, both their long term consequences and their possibility of sweeping along with them, at least in certain cases, the worst, the catastrophe. Instead of the categorical Kantian imperative, there should be substituted an imperative adapted to the new type of human action: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of an authentically humane life on earth." 35 For while we have the right to risk our own lives, we do not have the right to risk that of humanity. This imperative is the basis of the precautionary principle: it invites us to measure each of our actions against the principle of the worst scenario. Morality becomes a sort of negative morality: it is not so much turned towards the positive quest for the best as towards the avoidance of the worst. The uncertainty of long term prognostics confers the nature of a wager on human action, which leads to questions such as: do I have the right to endanger the interests of others in my wager?

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

4 Eugenics

Darnovsky, Lowthorp and Hasson, 2018 is the executive director of the (CGS). is a program manager at the (CGS). directs the Genetic Justice program at the (CGS). Reproductive gene editing imperils universal human rights ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED: February 15, 2018 https://www.openglobalrights.org/reproductive-gene-editing-imperils-universal-human-rights/

What do recent advances in molecular genetics have to do with human rights? Quite a lot, it turns out. And key human rights documents have recognized this for some time. Over the past few years, new “gene editing” tools that are cheaper, easier to use, and more accurate than previous ways to change living organisms’ DNA have rapidly spread to labs around the world. Scenarios that previously seemed far-fetched or far off now confront us, including the prospect of directly controlling the genes and traits that are passed down to future children and generations. Since 2015, a half dozen research teams, in China, the UK, and the United States, have separately reported efforts to modify specific genes in human embryos. These developments have brought us to a critical juncture: human reproductive gene editing now poses a threat to the human rights of future generations. Gene editing for human reproduction carries huge social risks. It has the potential to threaten the health and autonomy of future generations, to exacerbate existing social disparities, and to lay the basis for a new market-based eugenics that would fuel discrimination and conflict. A about whether to risk these outcomes is now raging, though mostly in the publications and meetings of scientific and professional organizations, far away from public view and civil society attention. It is essential that human rights advocates make their voices heard in this debate. Imagine a world where wealthy parents could purchase genetic enhancements to give their children real or alleged advantages, where children’s futures were thought to be determined by their genes, and where babies were labeled at birth as “good” or “bad” based on their DNA. What would be the implications for human rights, and for the right of children to decide their own futures? Gene editing for human reproduction, also known as human inheritable or germline modification, involves making changes to the DNA of human sperm, eggs, or embryos. It is distinct from efforts , which target the somatic or non-reproductive cells of existing patients. While somatic gene editing, or “gene therapy,” aims to treat or cure disease in living people, reproductive gene editing is not a medical treatment. It would create a new person with a pre-determined genetic make-up that would be inherited by all of their descendants. Gene therapy, if it can be made safe, effective, and broadly affordable, will be a welcome addition to modern medicine. Germline gene editing, by contrast, doesn’t treat anyone. It creates future children, and deprives them and future generations of the choice to consent to modifications made to their DNA. And if the goal is to avoid the transmission of inheritable disease, it is unnecessary. Where there is risk of passing on a serious genetic mutation, an existing embryo screening technique (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or PGD), can in almost all cases eliminate the unwanted gene variant from the family’s lineage. To be sure, embryo screening for PGD raises challenging ethical questions about what conditions are considered “unworthy of life.” But it is far safer and less socially and ethically fraught than manipulating the human germline. Around twenty years ago, an earlier wave of concern about human germline modification swept through scientific and policy circles, and popular culture. The 1997 dystopian film depicted a brutal society that privileged the genetically enhanced over the unenhanced. Similarly, Princeton University molecular biologist Lee Silver made news with his vision of a genetically stratified society, that “the already wide gap between wealthy and poor nations could widen further and further with each generation until all common heritage is gone.” During the same period, concerns about safety, human rights, and the potential for a high-tech, market-based eugenics prompted more than 40 countries—including nearly every nation with a significant biotech sector—to prohibit the modification of genes passed down to subsequent generations. Several important international human rights instruments also concluded that human germline modification would violate human dignity, a concept at the core of human rights. One of these, the Council of Europe’s 1997 European (also known as the Oviedo Convention), is a binding international treaty. Its Article 13 explicitly prohibits interventions “seeking to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants.” Another, UNESCO’s 1997 , asserts that “the human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity,” concluding in Article 24 that “germ-line interventions” could be “contrary to human dignity.” In fact, an important for the was an abhorrence of the eugenic abuses perpetrated by Nazis during World War II. The same logic provides the foundation for the consumer-based eugenics that would result if germline modification were allowed, where people’s life chances would be limited if their unmodified genes were considered from birth to be inferior.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

3 Human dignity

Scott J. Schweikart, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6

The larger question thus becomes: what constitutes “human dignity?” One answer is that human dignity is “respect derived automatically from one’s status as a human being.”75 Therefore, some scholars argue that alterations to the genome for “enhancement” purposes is a type of transhumanism that violates human dignity.76 Indeed, this line of thinking supports the declaration as an ethical tool that can be used to protect against violations of “human dignity” conducted via genetic alterations meant to enhance a human being.77 As some scholars argue, violations of human dignity via enhancement genome editing calls into question the personhood status of individuals with an altered genome, thus yielding profound implications on the rights and status of such individuals.78 This is particularly acute under a theory of “personhood” that emphasizes biology and genetics as determinative. Such a worldview that “implicitly assumes that the totality of human DNA is the source of a human essence” will invariably harm “the biological legacy” of children with germline modifications and risk “their entitlement to human rights and legal protections.”79 In other words, human rights protections may be in doubt because germline modified individuals could potentially be deemed as possessing a trans-altered personhood status, thus removing them from the normative status entitled to such protections.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

2 The gene drive

WESLEY W. CHEN June 30 2019 HUMAN GERMLINE GENE EDITING: ENGINEERING AN UNSTOPPABLE TRAIN https://mylaw2.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/28-2-Chen.pdf

One practical application of gene editing in eugenics is the idea of the gene drive.119 The gene drive is a genetic phenomenon whereby certain genes with “‘selfish’ genetic elements”—which provide hereditary advantages— increase the inheritance of the gene in subsequent generations within a population.120 The idea is that by using gene drives for advantageous characteristics, scientists can utilize a longitudinal system to address “major biological problems related to public and environmental health.” 121 In practice, a gene drive involves engineering specific genetic traits in a few individuals and propagating the traits throughout the local population through generations of reproduction.122 Due to difficulties surrounding engineering an effective gene drive system, gene drives have only been used in a handful of organisms, including yeast,123 fruitflies,124 and mosquitoes.125 With the evolution of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, however, development of gene drives are becoming increasingly viable. For example, historically it has been extremely difficult to create transgenes in mosquitoes that would be passed on to subsequent generations.126 But in November 2015, scientists reported that they had successfully engineered a gene drive in mosquitoes using CRISPR-Cas9, which resulted in inheritance of the mutant gene in 99% of all offspring.127 CRISPR-Cas9 technology has been subsequently used to engineer other mosquito gene drives to combat the spread of malaria.128 While the idea of using gene drives to eliminate malaria in wild mosquito populations seems promising, the application of gene drives in humans is not so straightforward. One of the gene drive’s greatest advantages is also one of its greatest weaknesses—its power to change an entire ecosystem.129 Theoretically, once a dominant gene drive has been introduced to favorably bias its inheritance, it will inevitably spread throughout the population unless an accessible off switch is programmed into the gene drive. In mosquitoes, an organism much simpler and more laboratory-tested than humans, such a dramatic genetic change would still have unforeseeable impacts on the ecosystem and the mosquito’s long-term survival in the wild. This illustrates both the causal uncertainties and the moral-conceptual “is this a benefit or risk” uncertainties in this field. Even the causal uncertainties aren’t purely empirical but have value components (as in proximate cause). In humans, these issues are further complicated in that it would be impossible to test the effects of gene drives on human adults in a laboratory setting. In a perfect scenario, a gene drive without any adverse or off-target effects could be introduced into the human population to battle disease and ubiquitously enhance the human race. Even in such cases, however, would it really be a good idea to drive the same genetic characteristic throughout society? One of nature’s best survival tools is genetic diversity.130 An advantageous trait one day may be a weakness another day when there are new diseases or different environments. The tug-and-pull between whether a genetic modification is helpful in the short-term or detrimental in the unforeseeable future highlights the blurred “line between diversity and disability.”

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › 1AC

1 Mosaicism & Autonomy

Krizia Rivera 2020 Genetic Engineering, Lack of Regulation in the United States of America and its Potentially Problematic Applications

The ethical concerns would probably be best understood under bioethical standards. Central to the practice of medicine and biological sciences are “The Four Principles of Bioethics, 75 ” also known as the four-principles approach. 76 This approach was developed by two American philosophers, Tom Beauchamp77 and James Childress. 78 This approach has long held that at the root of biomedical ethics are the following four principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. These principles will lay the fundamental groundwork for each foreseeable potential human rights violation I state below. Personal autonomy means the right to make his or her own choice79. This principle will be violated if germline editing is allowed, mainly because it affects future generations as discussed above, given their obvious lack of consent as to inherited modified genes. The creation of a heritable modified genes has unpredictable implications on humankind and evolution80. In a 2018 commentary article authored by professors and research scholars noted there may be unintended consequences to editing out harmful mutations in humans: Here we simply emphasize to express that it may have effect modification of mutations in germ cell will ultimately eliminate that mutation in the next generation, which will deter the on-going human evolution. Mutations are an essential part of evolution, whose pros and cons cannot be judged instantly. The mutations, which seem deleterious today, may have inclusive fitness tomorrow. Mutations, which seem harmful today, may be the nature’s preparation for tomorrow. The somatic cell modifications in humans whereas provide answer to many ailments, the germ line changes until outcomes of such modifications are uncontrolled would continue to raise ethical concerns. Thus, the researchers need to be doubly cautious and some stringent regulations should be framed regarding the various aspects of germ line gene modifications and any potential conflict with nature for future outcome.81 Moreover, the elimination of a gene or modification of a gene could affect the genetic diversity of the human population82. The United Nations has defined genetic diversity as, “[t]he variation in the amount of genetic information within and among individuals of a population, a species, an assemblage, or a community.” 83 Genetic diversity is our inherited toolkit, and the more varied the genes are in our toolkit as a population, the higher our survivability will and continue to be. “Genetic diversity has a direct relation to the fitness and survivability of various species and populations; as genetic diversity decreases within a population, so does the fitness and survivability of that population.” 84 Notably, we do not understand the far-reaching potential of a gene, whether it is consider a harmful mutation today or not, it may serve a purpose tomorrow. Employing such a germline edit that would be inherited by future generations without their consent. The lack of medical consent of future generations is a contravention of human rights as it breaches their physical integrity, their ability to make choices as to their own bodies. Foreseeable issues as to consent have been posed by several scientists. Per legal standards and clinical ethics, it’s long been established that parents are the best and most appropriate decisionmakers over their children until they have reach adulthood. But this presumption is not perfect as individuals who have disagreed with the medical decisions of their parents is well-documented. For example, “wrongful life” suits85 or individuals who have disagreed with their parent’s surgical decisions about sexual assignment or craniofacial disorders.”86 There are also groups of people who resist the idea of having their medical status defined as a “disability,” and published cases of patients who are documented as stating they would not want to correct their medical condition if given the choice.87 The two principles, beneficence and non-maleficence, derives from the well-known Hippocratic Oath, “to help and do no harm. 88” This age-old oath was established in the 4th century BCE by Hippocrates, a physician-philosopher. As with any new scientific discovery, the true long-term effects of CRISPR cannot be realistically gasped. Currently, the known possible negative effects of genetic engineering are off-target mutagenesis 89,90 and mosaicism9192,93 . Applying a benefit-burden analysis, we must rely on alternative safer methods, such as, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, until we can reasonably and reliably predict the true effects of CRISPR. Lastly justice, is a concept concerning fairness and equality. The more pragmatic concern involves a lack of accessibility, where “therapies,” may be developed using this technology, but may only be accessible to the wealthy would add to the already great wedge between socioeconomic classes.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative

Definition of germline gene editing

, and , CNN The scientist, the twins and the experiment that geneticists say went too far Updated 7:04 AM EST, Sat December 1, 2018 https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/30/health/gene-edited-babies-he-jiankui-intl/index.html

Germline gene-editing refers to genetic changes in every cell, that will be passed on to future generations. This is different to somatic (body) cell gene-editing, whereby only existing cells are targeted and the changes made are not passed on to future offspring.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative › 2AC › 2AC – Russian Deterrence Disad Answers (Impact Defense)

No risk of meltdowns.

ALEXANDER SAMMON, DECEMBER 5, 2019, [Alexander Sammon is a staff writer at The American Prospect.], “The Tantalizing Nuclear Mirage”, The American Prospect, , Xoxo 6/4/2020.

To hear Booker tell it, his evolution on the subject was the product of scientific rigor and anti-ideological clarity on decarbonization. He related this narrative during a media blitz, comparing anti-nuclear Democrats to Republican climate deniers over their rejection of an incontrovertible science, while pledging to usher in a nuclear future that no right-minded person could deny. “Where the science is going, to me, at first sounded like science fiction … new nuclear actually portends of exciting things where you have no risk of the kinds of meltdowns we’re seeing,” he proclaimed at CNN’s climate town hall. Grandiosity aside, Booker isn’t alone in his nuclear embrace. He’s part of an unlikely pro-nuclear political alliance, an emergent accord that spans the centrist think tank Third Way, Andrew Yang, Jay Inslee, environmental activists, and progressive commentators alike. “The left should stop worrying and learn to love existing nuclear power plants,” wrote New York’s Eric Levitz in a subsequent send-up of Bernie Sanders’s and Elizabeth Warren’s twin commitments to phase out the technology. In a world where the rapid deployment of zero-carbon energy production is urgent, nuclear power, the argument goes, represents the only proven bet. As it stands, nuclear is currently the largest single source of near-zero-carbon energy generation in the United States, providing 20 percent of our total energy mix. And while the waste may be dangerous, and the risks associated with meltdowns cinematically seared into our collective memory, the technology is actually safer than burning fossil fuels—one study found that per unit of electricity generated, oil is 263 times more deadly than nuclear, on account of air pollution alone. With 11 years, per the U.N.’s 2018 IPCC report, to overhaul our energy system, to be serious about decarbonization is to find a place at the table for nuclear. It’s an alluring idea. Already, this logic has been embraced in states like Ohio and Booker’s New Jersey, which have been allocating green tax subsidies to nuclear projects. And while it’s largely played out in the background, the question of what to do about nuclear has vexed Green New Dealers since the rollout of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s framework in February. While plane travel and hamburgers raised hackles in the press, one of the first clauses to be deleted from the initial proposal pledged to phase out the technology altogether. So does the Green New Deal need nuclear to achieve its lofty goals? Does zero-carbon energy infrastructure necessitate a nuclear buildout, or at least an embrace of already-existing nuclear as a bridge fuel, as countries like Sweden have done? Unfortunately, the case for nuclear as a green technology is not so simple—the technology faces a spate of environmental and economic challenges, while its track record as a bridge fuel shows it may be more rivalrous than concomitant with renewables. In fact, it may be the nuclear industry that needs the Green New Deal, not the other way around. DESPITE THE NEWFOUND exigency of overhauling the country’s energy mix, this is not the first time America’s energy system has arrived at a crossroads in the last ten years, nor is it the first time nuclear has been trotted out as its last, best hope. In the late aughts, with oil prices soaring and production stagnant, policymakers made a commitment to expanding American nuclear generation. An era of so-called “nuclear renaissance” began, with four next-generation reactors commissioned at two plants, one in Georgia and the other in South Carolina. Since nuclear energy was first announced as a civilian project in 1953, its promises of worldwide abundance have far outpaced its production. Now, over a decade later, that project managed to bankrupt its construction company, Westinghouse, nearly taking down the entire Toshiba conglomerate, Westinghouse’s parent company, with it. The two reactors in South Carolina were abandoned, while the Southern Nuclear and Georgia Power utility companies assumed control of the remaining two reactors in Georgia, the Vogtle 3 and 4. But even a cash infusion from Georgia ratepayers, who began subsidizing the completion of the project in 2011, was not enough to keep the project close to its budget or timeline. Initially expected to come online in 2016-2017, the Vogtle plant has run some $14 billion over budget. Its completion dates have been deferred to 2021-2022. There’s currently no other active nuclear development in the United States. That timeline should be particularly alarming for nuclear enthusiasts. If it’s going to take 10 to 15 years to see a plant through to completion, even with massive financial backing, that’s seemingly impossible to square with the 11 years to decarbonize. At the very least, we’d need hundreds, if not thousands of plants already under construction just to make a dent. Booker, Yang, and other advocates are betting that R&D might accelerate that process, but in a real sense it’s already too late. So if new construction can’t be counted on, and the window for adding new nuclear to the fleet has already shut, what about the reactors we currently have? Has their environmental potential gotten short shrift? While nuclear fission emits far less carbon dioxide than energy production by oil and gas, the process of getting to that energy generation complicates nuclear’s claim to zero-carbon status. Uranium mining, processing, and transport are all carbon-intensive procedures done by diesel-powered heavy machinery. Instead of carbon, the plants themselves emit heat, often in great quantities, which can warm nearby air and water dramatically, killing fish and wildlife and afflicting neighboring habitats. And while nuclear may maintain a cleaner sheet than fossil fuels when it comes to CO2, its record on H2O is less rosy. An American nuclear plant can require between 19 million and 1.4 billion gallons of water a day, just for purposes of cooling. Because of that implacable thirst, it’s imperative that nuclear plants are constructed near major water sources. Thus, nuclear plants dot our rivers and coastline, each of which carries with it its own climate-specific challenges. Plants built near abundant freshwater—rivers and lakes—have been forced to contend with the twin challenges of too much water and not enough. In recent years, nuclear reactors, like those on the Great Lakes, have been forced to shut down when droughts have plagued rivers and lakes, reducing water levels to perilous lows. Meanwhile, in places like Nebraska, flood risks have necessitated shutdowns. And in France, which sports one of the most robust nuclear programs in the world, heat waves have caused water temperatures to surge to the point of shutdowns multiple summers in a row.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative › 2AC › 2AC – Russian Deterrence Disad Answers (Impact Defense)

No meltdowns impact

Shellenberger 19 – Michael, author, environmental policy writer, cofounder of Breakthrough Institute and founder of Environmental Progress, Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment”. “It Sounds Crazy, But Fukushima, Chernobyl, And Three Mile Island Show Why Nuclear Is Inherently Safe”, Forbes, , 03-11-2019

In other words, the main lesson that should be drawn from the worst nuclear accidents is that nuclear energy has always been inherently safe. The truth about nuclear power’s safety is so shocking that it’s worth taking a closer look at the worst accidents, starting with the worst of the worst: Chernobyl. The nuclear plant is in Ukraine which, in 1986, the year of the accident, was a Soviet Republic. Operators lost control of an unauthorized experiment that resulted in the reactor catching fire. There was no containment dome, and the fire spewed out radioactive particulate matter, which went all over the world, leading many to conclude that Chernobyl is not just the worst nuclear accident in history but is also the worst nuclear accident possible. Twenty-eight firefighters died after putting out the Chernobyl fire. While the death of any firefighter is tragic, it’s worth putting that number in perspective. Eighty-six firefighters died in the U.S. in 2018, and 343 firefighters died during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since the Chernobyl accident, 19 first responders have died, according to the United Nations, for ”various reasons” including tuberculosis, cirrhosis of the liver, heart attacks, and trauma. The U.N. concluded that “the assignment of radiation as the cause of death has become less clear.” What about cancer? By 2065 there may be 16,000 thyroid cancers; to date there have been 6,000. Since thyroid cancer has a mortality rate of just one percent — it is an easy cancer to treat — expected deaths may be 160. The World Health Organization claims on its web site that Chernobyl could result in the premature deaths of 4,000 people, but according to Dr. Geraldine Thomas, who started and runs the Chernobyl Tissue Bank, that number is based on a disproven methodology. “That WHO number is based on LNT,” she explained, using the acronym for the “linear no-threshold” method of extrapolating deaths from radiation. LNT assumes that there is no threshold below which radiation is safe, but that assumption has been discredited over recent decades by multiple sources of data. Support for the idea that radiation is harmless at low levels comes from the fact that people who live in places with higher background radiation, like Colorado, do not suffer elevated rates of cancer. In fact, residents of Colorado, where radiation is higher because of high concentrations of uranium in the ground, enjoy some of the lowest cancer rates in the U.S. Even relatively high doses of radiation cause far less harm than most people think. Careful, large, and long-term studies of survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer compelling demonstration. Cancer rates were just 10 percent higher among atomic blast survivors, most of whom never got cancer. Even those who received a dose 1,000 times higher than today’s safety limit saw their lives cut short by an average of 16 months. But didn’t the Japanese government recently award a financial settlement to the family of a Fukushima worker who claimed his cancer was from the accident? It did, but for reasons that were clearly political, and having to do with the Japanese government’s consensus-based, conflict-averse style, as well as lingering guilt felt by elite policymakers toward Fukushima workers and residents, who felt doubly aggrieved by the tsunami and meltdowns. The worker’s cancer was highly unlikely to have come from Fukushima because, once again, the level of radiation workers received was far lower than the ones received by the Hiroshima/Nagasaki cohort that saw (modestly) higher cancer rates. What about Three Mile Island? After the accident in 1979, Time Magazine ran a cover story that superimposed a glowing headline, “Nuclear Nightmare,” over an image of the plant. Nightmare? More like a dream. What other major industrial technology can suffer a catastrophic failure and not kill anyone? Remember when the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig caught on fire and killed 11 people? Four months later, a Pacific Gas & Electric natural gas pipeline exploded just south of San Francisco and killed eight people sleeping in their beds. And that was just one year, 2010. The worst energy accident of all time was the 1975 collapse of the Banqiao hydroelectric dam in China. It collapsed and killed between 170,000 and 230,000 people. Nuclear’s worst accidents show that the technology has always been safe for the same, inherent reason that it has always had such a small environmental impact: the high energy density of its fuel. Splitting atoms to create heat, rather than than splitting chemical bonds through fire, requires tiny amounts of fuel. A single Coke can of uranium can provide enough energy for an entire high-energy life. When the worst occurs, and the fuel melts, the amount of particulate matter that escapes from the plant is insignificant in contrast to both the fiery explosions of fossil fuels and the daily emission of particulate matter from fossil- and biomass-burning homes, cars, and power plants, which kill seven million people a year. It's not that nuclear energy never kills. It's that nuclear's death toll is vanishingly small. Consider nuclear's global death toll in context. These are just annual deaths. - walking: 270,000 - driving: 1,350,000 - working: 2,300,000 - air pollution: 4,200,000 By contrast, nuclear's death total is likely to be around 200.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative › 2AC › 2AC---AT: AI Arms Race Fake

Even if AI doesn’t reach the level of an Arms Race – their author concedes there are risks in investing into AI more

Paul Scharre, 21, (Paul Scharre, 6-29-2021, Center for New American Security , Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory, 6-26-2022) SCade

In 2015, a group of prominent AI and robotics researchers signed an open letter warning of the dangers of autonomous weapons. “The key question for humanity today,” they wrote, “is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable.”1 Today, many nations are working to apply AI for military advantage, and the term “AI arms race” has become a catchphrase used by both critics and proponents of AI militarization. In 2018, then-Under Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin, calling for the United States to invest more in AI, stated, “There might be an artificial intelligence arms race, but we’re not yet in it.”2 In a 2020 Wired article, Will Roper, then chief acquisition officer for the U.S. Air Force, warned of the risks of falling behind in a “digital arms race with China.”3 The so-called AI arms race has become a common feature in news headlines,4 but the arms race framing fails to match reality. While nations are clearly competing to develop and adopt AI technology for military use, the character of that competition does not meet the traditional definition of an arms race. Military AI competition nevertheless does pose risks. The widespread adoption of military AI could cause warfare to evolve in a manner that leads to less human control and to warfare becoming faster, more violent, and more challenging in terms of being able to manage escalation and bring a war to an end. Additionally, perceptions of a “race” to field AI systems before competitors do could cause nations to cut corners on testing, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems that are at risk of accidents that could cause unintended escalation or destruction. Even if fears of an “AI arms race” are overblown, military AI competition brings real risks to which nations should attend. There are concrete steps nations can take to mitigate some of these dangers.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative › 2AC › 2AC---AT: OCO Intel & OCO Good

US pledging OCOs for NATO military use disrupts their intelligence gathering capabilities – makes them exclusively used to hack targets not gather intel

Trey Herr, 18, (Trey Herr, Trey Herr is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. Jacquelyn Schneider is an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College., 10-10-2018, Council on Foreign Relations, Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato, 6-26-2022) SCade

Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies. The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies. With this announcement, the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement moves NATO partners closer to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The DoD announcement is a sign of the continued, if nascent, normalization of cybersecurity under the current administration and in Europe. Even where offensive cyber operations may not rise to the level of war, they provide decision-makers with options to influence the geopolitical environment. This aligns with recent trends in the U.S. military to integrate cyber capabilities into maneuver units and large exercises, and reflects the shift towards more risk acceptant and offensive measures to counter cyberattacks found in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy. Moving cyber capabilities into the same strategic frame as conventional weapons, especially with NATO, reflects a shift in institutional cyber arrangements within the United States and the growing power of the military relative to the intelligence community. For the United States, cyber capabilities have always had a complicated relationship with the intelligence community, in particular the National Security Agency (NSA). When Cyber Command stood up in 2010 as a sub-unified combatant command within the Department of Defense, it moved into the NSA’s headquarters, staffed its management ranks with longtime NSA employees, borrowed networks and technical capabilities, and to this day shares a dual-hatted commander. In the immediate years after the command was created, it was logical that the structure of partnerships with allies looked more like the special signals intelligence relationships formed around the NSA rather than traditional alliance networks in NATO and Asia. The recent announcement aligns cyber operations more closely with Department of Defense missions, which are more likely to posture capabilities for deterrent effects, than intelligence missions, which view capabilities as assets to be carefully husbanded. Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions. Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD’s announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative › 2AC › 2AC---AI Arms Race Bad

The best move is to not play in the arms race at all

Paul Scharre, 19, (Paul Scharre, 6-1-2019, Foreign Affairs, Killer Apps, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/killer-apps?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220626, 6-26-2022) SCade

THE ONLY WINNING MOVE IS NOT TO PLAY Today’s AI technologies are powerful but unreliable. Rules-based systems cannot deal with circumstances their programmers did not anticipate. Learning systems are limited by the data on which they were trained. AI failures have already led to tragedy. Advanced autopilot features in cars, although they perform well in some circumstances, have driven cars without warning into trucks, concrete barriers, and parked cars. In the wrong situation, AI systems go from supersmart to superdumb in an instant. When an enemy is trying to manipulate and hack an AI system, the risks are even greater. Even when they don’t break down completely, learning systems sometimes learn to achieve their goals in the wrong way. In a research paper last year, a group of 52 AI researchers recounted dozens of times when AI systems showed surprising behavior. An algorithm learning to walk in a simulated environment discovered it could move fastest by repeatedly falling over. A Tetris-playing bot learned to pause the game before the last brick fell, so that it would never lose. One program deleted the files containing the answers against which it was being evaluated, causing it to be awarded a perfect score. As the researchers wrote, “It is often functionally simpler for evolution to exploit loopholes in the quantitative measure than it is to achieve the actual desired outcome.” Surprise seems to be a standard feature of learning systems. Machine-learning systems are only ever as good as their training data. If the data don’t represent the system’s operating environment well, the system can fail in the real world. In 2018, for example, researchers at the MIT Media Lab showed that three leading facial recognition systems were far worse at classifying dark-skinned faces than they were at classifying light-skinned ones. When they fail, machine-learning systems are also often frustratingly opaque. For rules-based systems, researchers can always explain the machine’s behavior, even if they can’t always predict it. For deep-learning systems, however, researchers are often unable to understand why a machine did what it did. Ali Rahimi, an AI researcher at Google, has argued that much like medieval alchemists, who discovered modern glassmaking techniques but did not understand the chemistry or physics behind their breakthroughs, modern machine-learning engineers can achieve powerful results but lack the underlying science to explain them. Every failing of an AI system also presents a vulnerability that can be exploited. In some cases, attackers can poison the training data. In 2016, Microsoft created a chatbot called Tay and gave it a Twitter account. Other users began tweeting offensive messages at it, and within 24 hours, Tay had begun parroting their racist and anti-Semitic language. In that case, the source of the bad data was obvious. But not all data-poisoning attacks are so visible. Some can be buried within the training data in a way that is undetectable to humans but still manipulates the machine. Even if the creators of a deep-learning system protect its data sources, the system can still be tricked using what are known as “adversarial examples,” in which an attacker feeds the system an input that is carefully tailored to get the machine to make a mistake. A neural network classifying satellite images might be tricked into identifying a subtly altered picture of a hospital as a military airfield or vice versa. The change in the image can be so small that the picture looks normal to a human but still fools the AI. Adversarial examples can even be placed in physical objects. In one case, researchers created a plastic turtle with subtle swirls embedded in the shell that made an object identification system think it was a rifle. In another, researchers placed a handful of small white and black squares on a stop sign, causing a neural network to classify it as a 45-mile-per-hour speed-limit sign. To make matters worse, attackers can develop these kinds of deceptive images and objects without access to the training data or the underlying algorithm of the system they are trying to defeat, and researchers have struggled to find effective defenses against the threat. Unlike with cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which can often be patched once they are uncovered, there is no known way of fully inoculating algorithms against these attacks. Governments already have plenty of experience testing military, cyber-, and surveillance tools, but no testing method can guarantee that complex systems won’t experience glitches once they’re out in the real world. The first time F-22 fighter jets crossed the International Date Line, their computers crashed and the aircraft were nearly stranded over the Pacific Ocean. Testing AI systems often takes even more time and money than testing traditional military hardware. Their complexity, which makes them more capable, also creates more opportunities for unexpected glitches. Imagine that a government develops an AI system that can hack into its adversaries’ computer networks while avoiding detection. The first government to deploy such a system would gain a huge advantage over its competitors. Worried that an adversary was developing a similar tool, the government might feel compelled to cut testing short and deploy the system early. This dynamic has already played out in other industries, such as self-driving cars. The consequences of accidents caused by national security AI tools could be far worse. AI wouldn’t be the first case of governments relying on a powerful but unsafe technology. That’s exactly what happened with computers, which play critical roles in everything from trading stocks to guiding missiles even though they suffer from enormous vulnerabilities. In 2018, investigators at the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that U.S. weapons systems were riddled with cybersecurity loopholes that could be exploited with “relatively simple tools and techniques.” Even worse, Defense Department program managers didn’t know about the problems and dismissed the GAO’s findings, claiming the tests were not realistic. Computer security vulnerabilities aren’t limited to government-run systems. Company after company has suffered major data breaches. Digital security is already too often an afterthought. A world of widespread, unprotected AI systems isn’t just a possibility; it’s the default setting.