Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › A2 Liberalism = Imperialism

Liberalism is key to checking imperialism—liberal ideology elevates universal rights

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 231-234. LJS

If liberal internationalism had an urge for empire, it also had an urge to oppose it. In the late nineteenth century, liberal thinkers in the United States and Europe added their voices to movements against empire and colonialism. After the world wars, many liberal internationalists, particularly in the United States, championed the League of Nations and the United Nations as institutions that enshrined principles of self-determination and sovereign equality—and thus offered a path away from empire. As the twentieth century unfolded, liberal internationalists grew increasingly committed to postimperial forms of order. These changes in orientation played out in the struggles between the United States and Britain during and after World War II over imperial preferences and global spheres of influence. The shift away from empire emerged as part of the general reimagining of liberal internationalism in the 1940s and during the Cold War, when the United States put its weight behind a world organized around sovereign states as it pursued its expanding geopolitical interests and built postwar order. In important respects, however, it was not the West that turned liberal internationalism against empire and imperialism but the non-West, which seized upon ideas and principles—universal in character but often instrumental in origin and purpose—and applied them to struggles over sovereignty, rights, and rules. Wilson-era liberal internationalism had offered global ideas, but it retained an old-style Western parochialism. The vision of liberal order put forward by Wilson and his peers was more “civilizational” than “universal.” The League of Nations would be open to the wider world, but it was organized around the Western liberal democracies. States that were considered insufficiently mature to join the community of sovereign states would have to wait until they were ready. As Edward Keene argues, the League of Nations entailed the “internationalization” of civilization—so there were limits on the universal or global scope of membership and standing. “Although ideological concerns were beginning to become more important in defining the boundaries of the civilized world, racial discrimination was still a major element in deciding which peoples were entitled to membership in the new organization and thus to have their sovereign status recognized.”62 With the rebuilding of order after World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, this civilizational view—the distinction between the “family of civilized nations” and the rest of the world—gave way to a more universalistic and inclusive conception. Keene argues, “Simply put: the United Nations was envisioned as, or quite rapidly became, an organization of all the world’s peoples, with universal participation in the projects of preserving peace and developing global civilization, whereas the League had, above all, been an organization of civilized nations, working collectively for all the world’s peoples.” Postwar notions of states, peoples, sovereignty, and civilization were becoming less based on nineteenth-century notions of the social hierarchies of peoples. As Keene notes, “the development of the UN system reflected a much more inclusive attitude toward non-European peoples, in keeping with the recognition that they were no less civilized than their European counterparts.”63 What changed between 1919 and 1945 was the conception of how peoples and societies from different regions and civilizations related to each other as moral and legal entities, a move driven in part by a fuller acknowledgment of the universal reach of the notion of sovereign equality.64 But it was also driven by the growing salience of the “rights of peoples”—the spread of the claim that all human beings, by virtue of being human, have fundamental and inalienable rights. Behind this shift were changing views of modernity and civilization. Civilization itself was weakening as an intellectual construct, and modernity was not seen simply as something spreading outward from its Western center. The new divide was not the West versus the non-West—which had become untenable—but the liberal democratic world versus the illiberal world. Modernity empowered both sides of this political universe. In World War II, the great struggle on behalf of civilization had been against Nazi Germany, a European power that was itself employing scientific theories of race to legitimate its violence and aggression—ideas that had been used in the nineteenth century to defend European imperial domination over “backward” non-European peoples.65 In this sense, the old civilizational justification for two world orders—a Western system of civilized states and a backward and uncivilized world beyond—did not fail because non-European peoples gradually joined the “family of civilized nations.” It collapsed when civilized states—Germany, Japan, and Russia—joined the noncivilized world.66 As I noted in chapter 5, this shift in thinking occurred in the United States during the war years and continued during the Cold War. The rise of fascism and totalitarianism led Roosevelt and his contemporaries to let go of their notions of civilization, race, and nation and rethink the nature of liberalism and modernity. With threats to the liberal capitalist order now coming from inside the West, what it meant to be civilized could no longer be defined by race or culture or geography. This sentiment was captured by Leonard Woolf in a short book published in 1939, Barbarians at the Gate, in which he argued that civilization was not a geographical or even a cultural construction but a way of regulating individual behavior within human communities. Europe might have found a distinctive approach to restraining violence, tyranny, and predation, but civilization was distributed more widely around the world—and so too was the antithesis of civilization, or what Woolf called barbarism. Writing on the eve of World War II, Woolf argued that “the barbarian is, therefore, not only at the gates; he is always within the walls of our civilization, inside our minds and our hearts.”67 This new sense that the dangers to the liberal democratic world came from inside that world forced American and European internationalists to rethink their principles and projects. American liberal internationalists began to make more serious efforts to separate their project from the legacies of European imperialism. This separation was driven by evolving ideas about sovereignty and self-determination, grand shifts in geopolitical interests, depression, and wartime politics within Western liberal democracies, as well as by more immediate struggles brought on by the war and the way it changed the Anglo-American relationship. The United States did not have the same attachments to empire as the British, and cracks opened up within the West on whether and how the world would transition away from empire.68 This was seen most clearly at the Atlantic Charter meeting in 1941, where Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed over the future of the British imperial preference system and the principles of sovereign rights and self-determination.69

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › Liberalism Good

Modern liberalism good—defensive liberalism is the most effective tool for emancipation in modernity and reforms solve its flaws

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 294-303. LJS

On what grounds can we defend liberal internationalism? This question can be answered by looking at six major debates that liberal internationalists have had among themselves over their project’s scope and character. In these debates, they have grappled with the trade-offs between efficiency and social stability, sovereignty and interventionism, and global openness and political community. They have debated the nature of “the global”—the forces and logic shaping the modern world and their implications for the security and well-being of liberal democracy. As they did in past crises, liberal internationalists must again debate the character, limits, and possibilities of their project. Efficiency versus Social Stability A core strand of liberal internationalism has been a commitment to open trade. Countries linked by trade and open markets gain both economically and politically. Ideally, trade generates efficiency and welfare gains for countries that participate, thus facilitating their growth and advancement. These mutual gains and interdependence have political effects, including heightened incentives to settle disputes peacefully. From the British repeal of the Corn Laws to the post-1945 building of a multilateral trading system, liberal democracies have consistently looked for ways to realize the gains of trade. Winners win more than losers lose, so if the winnings are distributed in ways that compensate the losers, everyone comes out ahead. But open trade is a disruptive threat to workers and communities, and the social bargains that soften the impact of economic dislocation are imperfect. In giving national governments space and policy tools to pursue economic stabilization and development, the “embedded liberalism” behind the reconstruction of the postwar Western world tried to reconcile open trade and free-market capitalism with social protections and economic security. As we saw in chapter 8, this compromise has broken down. The embrace of neoliberal policies and the deregulation and global integration of capital markets that accompanied the post–Cold War spread of economic and political liberalism have been driving forces. The Western governments’ capacity and willingness to maintain their social democratic commitments has waned. Even under the best of conditions, the model of international trade at the heart of economic liberalism oversimplifies reality. “It neglects all the noneconomic considerations that so often turn governments away from its prescriptions, such as the social and cultural side-effects of trade, or the frequent neglect of public goods, collective equipments, and education,” writes Stanley Hoffmann. “Above all, it ignores factors of inequality: the benefits from free trade spread slowly, if at all, and unevenly through the formidable barriers of privilege, class, and status within societies (in which small groups often monopolize the rewards) and the obstacles of unequal endowments and levels of development in the world.”1 Not all the rise in inequality or the breakdown in economic and social protections is traceable to the liberalization of trade and capital flows. Technological changes in the workplace and shifts from manufacturing to services also play a role.2 But efficiency gains from deeper economic integration seem to be slowing relative to the rise of economic insecurity and inequality. Dani Rodrik argues that the advanced industrial countries have already passed the point beyond which expanded trade does more to redistribute wealth within their societies than to increase efficiency and growth. Although economic globalization is intensifying the gaps between the winners and losers, it is not generating sufficient economic gains to compensate the losers.3 In making the case for economic openness, liberal internationalists will need to reestablish the foundations of embedded liberalism—that is, managed openness that reconnects trade and markets with social security and shared gains. The industrial world cannot return to the early decades of the Bretton Woods system, but it can look for new ways to balance openness and social protections. The aim of reforming international rules and institutions should be to enable national governments to make good on their social democratic commitments. “Democracies have a right to protect their social arrangements,” Rodrik argues, “and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way.”4 Economic openness can last in liberal democracies only if it is tied to a social ethic of fairness and shared benefits. Without inaugurating a new era of protectionism, liberal democracies have to reestablish the multilateral system of rules and institutions that allows states to manage openness, guided by the liberal norms of multilateralism, reciprocity, and nondiscrimination. They need to rebuild the social contract at home and renew the international rules and norms that balance openness with social stability. Sovereignty versus Interventionism The norms of sovereign equality and national self-determination are integral to the modern liberal international vision. As we have seen, by the second half of the twentieth century, the liberal international project was firmly built on a Westphalian foundation. To be sure, the United States and other liberal states have repeatedly practiced all the dark arts of power politics. Throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War decades, they have transgressed sovereignty norms through military intervention, covert action, and coercive regime change. But the norms and principles of state sovereignty remain firmly embedded in the institutions and legitimating rationale of the post–World War II liberal international order. American military interventionism during the Cold War played out as part of the geopolitical and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. The Korean and Vietnam Wars were the most tragic and costly of the dozens of armed interventions carried out by the United States across the Cold War periphery. Since the Soviet Union fell, the reasons for interventions have expanded to include humanitarian disasters, human rights violations, and nonstate terrorist threats. In areas of humanitarianism, economic policy, and democracy promotion, the Western liberal states look increasingly as if they are trying to impose their own values and interests on weaker states.5 In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between two versions of liberal internationalism: defensive and offensive.6 Defensive liberalism is the older liberal orientation anchored in the norms of self-determination and the right of countries to maintain their own institutions and doctrines. Offensive liberalism is the more recent universalizing agenda that involves the reordering of other societies.7 Rising states such as China, India, and Brazil tend to embrace defensive liberalism and resist the intrusiveness of the newer liberalism. In accommodating these rising powers, liberal internationalism will need to rethink their offensive liberal impulses. Gaining agreement on the broader principles of order—sovereignty and multilateral rules and institutions that allow states to manage their interdependence—should take precedence over efforts to force convergence on the details of development or governance. In the areas of human rights and transnational terrorism, the dilemmas are less about the imposition of liberal values on unwilling states than about the circumstances under which the international community needs to act.8 When a state commits mass domestic violence such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, the outside world cannot simply look away. If a state is collapsed or unable to prevent transnational terrorist groups from operating on its territory, these circumstances might also require the international community’s intervention. The response proposed for these occasions is the evolving norm of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which was adopted by the United Nations in 2005 and remains controversial.9 R2P is not a license for great powers to unilaterally intervene in weaker states. It is meant to stimulate international agreement on the circumstances under which agents of the international community—authorized by the United Nations—are morally obliged to prevent or stop atrocities. The burden of the norm is actually Westphalian in implication. Its goal is to strengthen the presumption that national governments must make good on their obligations as sovereign states and that the international order should help them do so. Only in the absence of this Westphalian state capacity—and under extreme conditions defined by the international community—do outside powers intervene. The goal for liberal internationalists should be to seek as wide an agreement as possible on the legal bases for intervention.10 Clubs and Open Systems The postwar liberal international order was built around exclusive groupings of states, such as NATO and the European Union, as well as wider multilateral organizations with more open membership, such as the United Nations. When the Cold War broke the world into bipolar blocs, the United States and its partners put their efforts into building the Western economic and security order. This Western political grouping resembled a club. It was a clearly defined, exclusive group of like-minded states with a shared identity based on their regime characteristics, geography, and historical experience. There was little doubt about who was inside and who was outside the order.11 As I argued in chapter 6, the club character of the postwar liberal order was important for its functioning. To be inside was to have rights and responsibilities. The club offered protection and provided governments with institutions and capacities to facilitate cooperation and problem solving. The compromises of embedded liberalism were organized within its confines. That there were barriers to entry only reinforced commitment and cooperation. In chapter 8, I argued that the erosion of this club-like nature is a defining feature of the current crisis. Open systems of multilateral cooperation, which reflect the Westphalian norms of sovereign equality and nondiscrimination that are embedded in the wider global order, are also integral to the liberal international vision. Membership in these organizations is predicated not on regime character, but only on recognition of a state’s sovereign status and its commitment and ability to carry out the responsibilities of membership. If the legitimacy of the club of liberal democracies lies in their shared social purposes, the legitimacy of open systems of order derives from the universalism inherent in Westphalian principles of sovereignty. An open system’s strength is its inclusiveness. For many realms of international relations—including arms control, pandemic disease prevention, environmental regulation, and management of the global commons—regime type is not relevant to cooperation. Addressing these problems requires as wide a participation of states as possible. The weakness of open systems is in enforcement. If the rules say that any state can be in or out as it chooses, the benefits of membership cannot be predicated on embracing a suite of values and responsibilities. Liberal internationalists, including Woodrow Wilson, have spoken up for both types of order. Initially, in offering American support for a postwar organization, Wilson argued in favor of open and universal membership. In his speech to the League to Enforce the Peace in May 1916, Wilson said the United States “shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence.” This was why it would be in the nation’s interest to participate in a “universal association of the nations . . . to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.” Eager not to be seen as committing the United States to upholding an unjust status quo, Wilson advanced general principles that would guide the settlement, including famously asserting that “every people” had “a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live,” and small states were entitled to “the same respect for their sovereignty and for their integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.”12 During the years of American neutrality, Wilson did not once mention that the peace settlement would be linked to the way states were internally governed or the character of their regimes.13 In January 1917, Wilson’s “peace without victory” speech explicitly called for a settlement between existing states and regimes. It was only after Wilson brought the United States into the war that he shifted the focus to freedom and democracy as prerequisites for peace. In his War Address in April 1917, Wilson now asserted that “a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic governments. No autocratic state government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.”14 Wilson was now envisaging a more exclusive grouping of democracies that would be bound together ideologically and oriented toward building a democratic peace. After the war was over, Wilson essentially reverted back to the open and universal version of his program. For Wilson, in the end, the establishment of a League of Nations was more important than the specific logic of its membership. The question today for liberal internationalism is: How much of the clublike character of liberal order should and can be rebuilt? The goal is not to undermine or ignore the Westphalian principles that set the terms of wider global cooperation. But what is the future of the deeper, more exclusive cooperation among liberal democracies? In security relations, human rights, and the political economy of industrial society, liberal democracies have specific interests and values that illiberal states do not. Exclusive groupings within the wider international order are still an important means for advancing these values. So too is it important to strengthen the mechanisms of conditionality and the enforcement of norms and principles within the club. The European Union is struggling to respond to member states that transgress its common standards. NATO has also found itself struggling to deal with alliance members that lose their democratic character.15 The irony of the rise of China and Russia as overt challengers to Western liberal democracy is that it may strengthen the identity and functioning of the liberal democratic world as a political grouping, even as it gives illiberal states an alternative club to join. Relations with the Illiberal World Dealing with illiberal great powers is one of the oldest problems facing the liberal international order. Do you invite them in, anticipating that they will become socialized and move toward liberal democracy? Do you exclude them? Do you actively seek to confront their revisionist agendas, or seek peaceful coexistence? At different times over the past two centuries, liberal states have pursued all these strategies. The underlying reality is that the liberal international order—open, rules-based, and organized around a core of liberal democracies—is a threat to illiberal states. From their perspective, the United States and the liberal capitalist order are revisionist. The American grand strategy at the end of the Cold War was to invite the illiberal states into the liberal order. Once China and Russia gained the benefits of trade and exchange, went the reasoning, they would understand that it was in their interest to become “responsible stakeholders.” Implicit in this logic was the expectation that these states would engage in self-initiated regime change. They would slowly shed their autocratic and authoritarian institutions and move closer to the Western liberal democratic model. This has not happened, and liberal internationalists must now reassess their assumptions and consider new approaches. One option is to seek accommodation with these illiberal states by making the liberal international order less revisionist. This might mean curtailing efforts to promote “offensive” liberalism”—that is, efforts to push and pull these states toward the liberal democratic model. In effect, this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order. The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the “defensive” liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.16 Another option is to confront illiberal states more aggressively. The assumption here is that China and Russia are the vanguard of a broader longterm challenge to the liberal international order. If it cannot contain the ambitions of these countries, the liberal order itself is threatened. This view hinges on a key claim about China: that it hopes to perfect an authoritarian model of industrial society that can compete with—and even surpass—the long-term growth capacity of liberal democracy. The jury is still out.17 But if China does succeed in offering the world an illiberal pathway to modernity, the stakes for the liberal democratic world rise and the rivalry can easily become a Cold War–style struggle between deeply antagonistic ideological and political projects. Finally, liberal internationalists might pursue a mixed strategy of looking for opportunities to cooperate with China and Russia on the playing field of Westphalian internationalism, focusing on shared functional problems such as arms control, environment, and the global commons, while actively seeking to consolidate and strengthen cooperation across the liberal democratic world. Here the assumption is that the liberal democracies—particularly if they are organized worldwide—have long-term advantages that will bend the grand struggle in their favor. The key is to renew and defend liberal democracy within like-minded states and to strengthen the institutions, functionality, and legitimacy of the liberal international order.18 Hegemony and Restraint on Power Over the past century, the liberal international project has become deeply entangled with the exercise of American power. Woodrow Wilson carried liberal internationalist ideas to the Paris Peace Conference. After World War II, the United States built a liberal hegemonic order organized around open, rules-based relations and a core of Western liberal democracies. As I argued in chapter 6, this liberal hegemonic order both amplified and legitimated American power as well as shaped and restrained it. The United States tied itself to the other leading liberal states and exercised power through an array of economic, political, and security institutions. How restrained it was during the postwar era is a subject of much debate. Institutional restraints were certainly not an iron cage, and the United States reserved the right to act unilaterally when it chose. Power politics was hardly eliminated from the democratic world. Nonetheless, this liberal hegemonic order did manifest important features of consent. The United States and the other Western liberal democracies used institutions to establish restraint and commitment, and in doing so, they created an order that was somewhat independent of balance-of-power and imperial logics. The presence of liberal institutions allowed these states to dampen the two forces that typically shape international order—anarchy and empire. These forces never totally disappeared, of course, but they retreated enough to define the Western order as a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics.19 Liberal internationalism has both benefited and suffered under American hegemony. Like Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth century incorporated liberal internationalist ideas and projects into its hegemonic order building while pursuing other great-power strategies. Great Britain held on to its empire, and the United States engaged in crude imperial ventures and cultivated close relations with illiberal states. But particularly after 1945, it is difficult to see how liberal internationalism— defined as open and rules-based order with progressive social purposes— would have fared any better if it were not closely tied to America’s efforts to organize and dominate the postwar international order. As I argued in chapter 6, American postwar leaders recognized the value of binding the nation to other liberal democracies and operating within the postwar system of multilateral institutions. This strategy made American power more legitimate and enduring. The liberal great power’s pursuit of enlightened self-interest was integral to the rise and spread of liberal ideas and projects. Yet the United States also demonstrated, repeatedly, that it can be an unfaithful steward of liberal internationalism. Under the Trump administration, it is actively seeking to undermine the liberal features of the existing global order. The challenge for liberal internationalists is to try to recover the connections between hegemony and liberal order. The reasons powerful liberal states might want to build and operate within a system of open, rules-based relations are clear enough. As I argued in chapter 8, the hollowing out of the security-community character of the existing liberal order is one reason it is now in crisis: today it is easier for leaders to offer alternative narratives of the American national interest. The Trump administration’s claims that the liberal order generates more costs than benefits for the United States also register with some voters. Yet the costs that the United States incurs from seeking to operate outside the rules and norms of liberal international order are also real—and over the long term, they are much greater. They include the loss of influence, credibility, and the cooperation of friends and allies. America’s democratic allies clearly want the United States to remain within this order. During the high tide of American unipolarity, it was possible for US officials to see less value in liberal rules and institutions. But in an era of declining American power, the value of cooperation with other liberal democracies should grow. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, bargains—these aspects of the postwar liberal order draw our attention precisely because the Trump administration ignores and undermines them. Yet lurking in this new danger is an opportunity to renegotiate the hegemonic character of liberal internationalism or, short of this, build a post-hegemonic consortium of like-minded states that could collectively underwrite a reformed liberal order.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › State Good › Liberalism Good

Liberalism is key to checking oppression—policy reforms key to maintaining the liberal world order

Traub 22

James, nonresident fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. "Liberalism Isn’t Dead—but It’s Very Sick", Foreign Policy, 5/10/2022, LJS

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has played out like a terribly grim, but so far at least, profoundly ennobling laboratory experiment in the relative virtues of autocracy and liberal democracy. Yet evidence that a (more or less) liberal democracy can defeat or withstand an autocracy even in war—the one sphere that so obviously favors the latter—hasn’t, and probably won’t, meaningfully diminish the forces that have undermined liberalism in the West and around the world. Indeed, the sharp division between Western democracies that regard the invasion as an intolerable violation of moral principle and non-Western and barely liberal ones like India and South Africa that have treated it as geopolitics as usual only reinforces the idea that liberal democracy occupies a diminishing space in the world. It is possible that liberal democracy was a historically contingent experiment that depended on underlying conditions that no longer obtain. In his 2018 book, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Harvard scholar Yascha Mounk described those limiting conditions as broadly shared prosperity, relative demographic homogeneity, and sources of information that encompass the whole population. That was the last century, not this one. Yet if you believe that all alternatives to liberal democracy are much worse—indeed, unbearable—then you must proceed as if the illness it suffers from is curable. That is the premise of Mounk’s new work, the more optimistically titled The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure, as well as Liberalism and Its Discontents by Francis Fukuyama, also a long-standing combatant in the liberalism wars. Liberalism, as Fukuyama describes it, functions as a political technology for the management of otherwise irreconcilable differences. Liberals from the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century have erected a series of procedural rules and normative principles—above all, the rule of law and the rights of individuals to pursue their own preferences—to limit the reach of absolutist doctrines. Liberal rules and norms allow people of different views not only to get along but to subscribe to the implicit “contract” on which democratic government rests. Liberalism is endangered when the “factions,” to use James Madison’s term, that arise naturally in society cease to respect the rules and norms. But liberalism has a problem when those factions consist not of like-minded individuals but of tribes: ethnic or religious groups bound together less by changeable beliefs than by immutable characteristics. A “diverse democracy,” in Mounk’s sense, is a heterogeneous one. In such states, “where virtually everyone votes along religious or ethnic lines,” Mounk observes, “a large portion of the population forms a permanent minority,” locked out of power, while majorities use their power to dominate or marginalize minorities, as white people did to Black people in the American antebellum and Jim Crow South and as Hindus now do to Muslims in India. Liberalism addresses people as equal, free-standing citizens; but Mounk has concluded that the wish to stand apart from kin, culture, and state is less primordial than we think. Both experience and social science research show us that people are by nature “groupish.” The chief threat to liberalism over the last decade has been majoritarian nationalism provoked by real or alleged threats to collective identity—whiteness in the United States and Europe, Hinduism in India, Judaism in Israel, and Islam in Turkey. Against this rage, liberal universalism, the idea that we all have equal rights based in our common humanity, has steadily retreated. No one has developed an entirely convincing answer to the problem of diverse democracy. The “consociational” model, where power is allocated among groups that enjoy formal status, has worked out well in the Netherlands, divided between Catholics and Protestants, but very badly in Lebanon, where power-sharing among different religious factions has currently produced a vacuum of governance very close to anarchy. Slightly over 40 percent of the French public just voted for a presidential candidate who promised to restore the primacy of natives over newcomers and, not coincidentally, white people over people of color. The first wave of rise-of-illiberalism books—including Mounk’s and Fukuyama’s earlier books as well as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die and my own What Was Liberalism?: The Past, Present, and Promise of a Noble Idea—focused almost entirely on the right-wing nationalism of former U.S. President Donald Trump, French politician Marine Le Pen, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and others. That’s old news by now. One of the features of the new generation of liberalism-in-peril books is worry over the rise of an identitarian left that is equally contemptuous of liberal restraints. Fukuyama writes of a species of identity politics that “sees the lived experiences of different groups as fundamentally incommensurate.” White people cannot understand what it means to be Black; racism is not an individual attitude but is rather imprinted in the structures of power, and thus in collective consciousness. Mounk describes the “strategic essentialism” of those who insist that we treat race or gender as ineradicable essences. This is the new groupishness of the left. Anyone who has spent time in the advanced institutions of American culture—universities, art museums, foundations, newspapers—will recognize this mentality. It is, however, striking that while right-wing nationalism has circled the globe, the so-called woke left is an almost entirely U.S. phenomenon. It explains nothing about illiberalism in India or Poland and very little about France or Germany. Why is it that the most advanced progressive thinking in the United States, but not elsewhere, is obsessed with the policing of group boundaries and the honoring of group rights? Perhaps because of the unique role that racial anger and racial shame play in the United States. The effect, in any case, is to set up a kind of reciprocal tribalism, where the left and right goad each other to greater extremes. Both agree on the need to weed out evil books from libraries but disagree violently over the books in question; meanwhile, what historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called the “vital center” recedes to an ever more distant horizon. What is to be done? Fukuyama’s answer is to defend the citadel. In this slim volume (a euphemism for a long magazine article by a famous author that publishers are eager to issue in book form), Fukuyama, in the manner of philosopher Isaiah Berlin, traces the evolutionary path of the new illiberal ideologies, locating their origin in the postmodern critique of rationality of philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, a doctrine of the radical left later picked up by the right. And then, like a stout crusader of liberalism, he smites them one and all. Fukuyama first refutes what might be called the neoliberal or free market heresy of liberalism, noting that while humans are indeed self-seeking, “they are also intensely social creatures who cannot be individually happy without the support and recognition provided by their peers.” But neoliberalism is a heresy, or a perversion, for liberal societies created the redistributionist state that promoted equality in the 20th century. Fukuyama goes on to note that liberalism is not so obsessed with the individual as to inevitably atomize society, as many Catholic conservatives claim: “Private associational life has grown enormously” in the liberal societies of the West. Nor must liberal states plead guilty to colonialism. How, after all, should we explain the rise of liberal East Asian states innocent of that charge? Fukuyama reminds liberals of what they stand for and why they are right to stand for it. Of course, that’s not a solution. Mounk writes that big books about ideas tend to be far better at explaining the problem than at offering solutions. Another way of putting it, though, is that illiberalism is the kind of problem to which solutions inevitably feel inadequate because the problem is not a failure of policy but of collective belief. How do you create conditions that will favor a restoration of a vanished consensus? For Mounk, that comes down to the question of mechanisms to contain and channel the tribalism that one cannot wish away. Ranked choice voting, for example, will help gain representation for minorities, he argues. Much of Mounk’s agenda resembles the current Democratic Party platform: broad-based economic growth, progressive taxation, and opportunities for social mobility—all designed to create a sense of collective rather than tribal good. In that vein, he argues—against the progressive left—for universal rather than race-conscious policies and for limits on immigration, a flash point for the nativist right. These are good solutions, but I do not see how they will cure the patient. (For the record, I was not entirely convinced by the solutions I offered in What Was Liberalism?) Mounk doesn’t entirely disagree: He writes that liberalism ultimately must be defended at the level of private and social behavior. He advises all of us to think for ourselves and be prepared to criticize our own side and restrain the impulse to vilify the other. I am guessing that most readers of his book will not need that advice, whereas the tribalists of left and right would sneer at it. I read The Great Experiment while thinking about India, the biggest and most diverse of the world’s democracies. India is also among the sickest patients in the liberal democracy ward. Born under the star of secularism and tolerance, India under Modi has increasingly become a theistic and intolerant society that advances the cause of Hinduism at the expense of its more than 200 million Muslims. I asked myself whether Mounk had anything to offer the many Indians who believe in the nation’s secular values and deeply fear their demise. The answer is: not much. Some diseases prove fatal; others can only be cured very slowly, as the patient’s own defenses finally rally. I am in favor of everything Mounk suggests; I am even more in favor of Fukuyama’s rousing call to truth. Only liberalism, as both authors argue, can allow us to live safely and prosperously in a diverse world. But I recognize that the restraints imposed by liberal rules and norms ask a great deal of citizens, far more than nativism, nationalism, or majoritarian tyranny do. We need to keep fighting for what is right even as we recognize that the road will be long.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Links › A2 Econ Link

Policy is key to economic gender equality—even gender-blind policies can contribute to feminist goals

Espino and de los Santos 21

Alma, Professor at the Institute of Economics of the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Administration (FESA), University of the Republic (UDELAR), and coordinator at the “Development and Gender Area” at the Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies (CIEDUR), Uruguay; Daniela, sociologist and works as a researcher in the Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies, Uruguay. “20 LABOR MARKETS AND INFORMAL WORK IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH.” The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Economics. Pp 202-204. LJS

For labor market and social protection policies to fulfill their role, they need to adapt and respond to the nature of current labor markets. Economic growth does not automatically translate into new and better jobs. Since the 1980s, austerity macroeconomic policies have led to increasing unemployment in formal labor markets while increasing informal employment (UN Women 2017). While women’s labor force participation has been growing, limited decent job opportunities constrains women’s employment options in formal labor markets. In Latin America, the best outcomes in terms of formalization in the early 21st century have occurred in contexts of accelerated economic growth and institutional interventions and comprehensive policies, such as changes in legislation, labor enforcement of labor regulations and employment policies (Salazar-Xirinachs and Chacaltana 2018). Some of the formalization strategies specifically aimed at work with considerable informality rates. For instance, in several Latin American countries special taxation schemes were designed for micro and small enterprises and own-account workers and pieces of legislation were passed to regulate minimum wage and working hours of domestic and rural workers. However, thus far, informality rates have not changed dramatically, suggesting that there is a strong structural component in the regional labor market segmentation (UN Women 2017).Informal work in the Global South 203 The debate on benefits of formalization includes the perspective of organized women informal workers of the Global South. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) argues that the right to the city (i.e., a claim to recognize the city as a co-created space) as well as economic rights should prevail when discussing, for instance, street vendor’s activities. A legalist approach that forces them to formalize may have negative effect on women’s well-being as this may push them out of employment. Alternatively, there are good examples of regularization via complex public, private and community partnership models such as in Bhubaneshwar. This city is among the first ones in India to acknowledge street vendors as an integral part of the city by establishing aesthetically pleasing fixed kiosks in legally sanctioned vending zones (Kumar 2012). Some public policies tend to be gender blind and lack awareness regarding the importance of promoting women’s autonomy and economic empowerment to move toward a more egalitarian society. Accordingly, policy changes regarding work formalization in Latin America do not have clear objectives regarding the gendered constraints women face in informal employment (except for those addressing domestic service work). However, in 2016–17, a growing number of economies in the Global South have implemented employment policies and measures based on both gender equality principles and formalization of the informal economy. Even when policy is gender-blind, it can benefit women. Otobe (2017) describes two such experiences: the National Human Resources and Employment Policy for Sri Lanka and the National Employment Policy of Mozambique. While articulation of policy measures on formalization of informal employment is not necessarily gender inclusive or responsive in either case, policy measures stated under gender issues could contribute to formalization by promoting formal employment for both women and men equally. Feminist insights on the impact of informal employment Remunerated work opportunities vary from low-waged precarious forms of informal employment to formal jobs, which normally offer higher wages, more stability and a certain level of social protection and security. Informal work may lead to economic and social empowerment as it contributes to poverty alleviation at the household level (USAID 2005) and it may ease the “double burden” of paid and unpaid work, through more flexible work schedules. However, freer access to informal labor markets will not eliminate the disadvantages arising from male-biased institutions (Meagher 2010). For example, gender pay gaps are often wider in informal employment compared to formal employment. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, the gender pay gap is 28 percent in informal employment compared to 6 percent for formal workers. In the informal economy, men predominate among employers and employees while women are over-represented among the least-secure and lowest-paying occupations (e.g., homeworkers and contributing family workers) (UN Women 2017). On the other hand, informal work could allow women to have their own incomes and access to the public sphere, thus reducing their dependence on male income-earners (Kabeer 2008, 2012). In their study of the Ecuador, Vega et al. (2016) conclude that the economic livelihood strategies are not necessarily translated into empowerment processes. Nevertheless, they argue that particularly young women see informal activities as temporary, in which case these strategies may be a means to enhance social mobility and to improve their prospects. Moreover, there are examples of informal, poor women workers organizing and being empowered, such as through SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Association) and WIEGO. Agenda for decent work Most studies of informal employment have not incorporated a critical perspective that examines gendered power relations (Chant and Pedwell 2008). They also lack an intersectional approach that takes into account the differences and relations among women. An in-depth study of these aspects requires quantitative and qualitative research, which will shed light on the processes and subjective elements and their impact on women’s autonomy and economic empowerment. Gender-blind analyses of the mechanisms and features of informality in labor markets lead to partial explanations and therefore partial solutions to informality. Thus, addressing economic and social causes of informal employment is as important as identifying and examining the implications of gender discrimination and employment segregation and the gender division of paid and unpaid work that contribute to informality. Moreover, it is necessary to incorporate an intersectional perspective, which addresses not only gender but a range of axes of social differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, nation, religion and ability (Chant and Pedwell 2008). Considering that informal employment is principally a problem of weak labor demand, macroeconomic policies should target increasing labor demand. Particularly, to tackle gender inequality in the labor market, there is a need to invest in public care services and create decent job opportunities in the areas of health, education, child and elderly care services (ILO 2018d). The redistribution of unpaid household work and care work not only within households (between women and men) but also among public and private sector actors should be included as part of public policies based on principles of equity and social co-responsibility. Public policies that facilitate equitable sharing of care work allow women to enter the labor force and to avoid precarious forms of work. These policies include parental leave policies and public provision of child and elderly care services. To combat occupational segregation, public interventions are important to address its root causes, including differences in educational attainment, training and experience as well as stereotypes about the roles of women and men in society. To provide women with income opportunities beyond informal employment it is also necessary to strengthen women’s income security, for example, by providing access to unemployment protection and public work programs (UN Women 2017). Addressing informality and decent work deficits require changes in the design and application of social protection programs. As the 101st Session of the International Labor Conference made clear in Recommendation No. 202, the social protection floor is a means of extending social security coverage where the contributory and noncontributory benefits operate in conjunction (ILO 2012). This combination may have positive impacts on job quality and may promote formalization. Given higher levels of participation of women in informal, precarious forms of work and the interruption of their work career because of their reproductive role and disproportionate care work burden, a strong non-contributory pillar of social protection scheme could be the key to promoting gender equality in social protection.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › China

Chinese technological supremacy upends the balance of power ensuring nuclear Armageddon

Kroenig 18—Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy (Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin), 11/12/2018, “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ] AMarb

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › China

Chinese cyber hacking through OCOs enables successful military modernization to overtake the US

Johnson 19—Senior staff writer at FCW, covering governmentwide IT policy, cybersecurity and a range of other federal technology issues [Derek B. Johnson, 5/6/2019, “How China uses cyber theft and information warfare”, FCW, ] AMarb

Beijing is leveraging increasingly sophisticated cyber operations and widespread theft of technological secrets in the digital domain as one of the key pillars of its military modernization strategy, a new Pentagon report finds.

Cyber and information operations are two areas that are seeing increased investment and emphasis from the Chinese military, according to the report. While traditional intelligence gathering remains an important goal, the use of cyber capabilities to conduct economic espionage has taken greater precedence in recent years.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › North Korea

Damage limitation based on intelligence solves a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula

Manzo 18—Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis [Vince A. Manzo and John K. Warden (Senior Policy Analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation), Policy Roundtable: Are There any Good Choices When it Comes to North Korea?, “The Least Bad Option: Damage Limitation and U.S. Deterrence Strategy toward North Korea”, Texas National Security Review, , language edited change denoted by brackets] AMarb

A central element of U.S. long-term strategy for deterring a nuclear-armed North Korea and assuring South Korea and Japan should be to maintain robust “damage-limitation capabilities” to keep pace with North Korea’s advancing nuclear forces. By damage-limitation capabilities, we mean military capabilities that would allow the United States – in a conflict – to use offensive and defensive means to significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to conduct successful nuclear strikes against it and its allies. Broadly, these capabilities would include three key elements: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to locate and track North Korean nuclear forces, strike capabilities to disable [stop] nuclear-armed delivery vehicles or disrupt their command and control, and defenses to intercept nuclear-armed missiles once North Korea has launched them.

Of course, the United States has significant ISR, strike, and missile defense capabilities today. But as North Korea’s nuclear weapons force becomes larger and more sophisticated, the United States will need to keep pace, which will require examining North Korean nuclear forces as a network and ensuring that the United States has the appropriate tools to exploit weak points. One key shortcoming of the current U.S. posture is an overreliance on nuclear weapons to conduct strikes against North Korea’s nuclear forces.43 Massive nuclear strikes may not be credible in Pyongyang’s eyes, making it critical that the United States improve its conventional options, particularly against high-value targets like ICBMs. This might involve the deployment of additional strike platforms to the Korean peninsula or the fielding of intercontinental-range conventional strike capabilities.44

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › North Korea

Strategic intel based OCOs enables successful damage limitation against North Korea

Long 17—Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was previously an Associate Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs [Austin, 2017, “A cyber SIOP? Operational considerations for strategic offensive cyber planning”, Journal of Cybersecurity, 3(1), 19–28, doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyw016, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

In contrast, strategic OCO may be very useful for achieving damage limitation objectives, particularly against regional powers like North Korea. Indeed former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Harvey has called for a comprehensive effort to negate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, including: Cyber capabilities to disrupt warhead arming and firing systems, or cause flaws to be introduced into warhead designs, so that any arriving warheads are duds. On this last point, foreign “assistance” to North Korea’s nuclear program is a problem, but it is also an opportunity. Under such conditions, North Korea’s leaders would no longer “own” their nuclear weapons — in a sense, we would. A bit fanciful? Not necessarily. The technologies, subsystems and capabilities exist today to address each one of these goals notwithstanding the need for a bit of luck here and there. It is well within the realm of technical possibility [23]. Thus, the target choice would be less restricted in planning for damage limitation than in escalation control – essentially everything would be fair game. Yet this has escalation risks unique to OCO – establishing the accesses needed for OCO could be escalatory, as discussed in the next section.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › Terrorism

Terrorism causes nuclear war

Arguello 18—Founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network, degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security, previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. She is a member of the Steering Committee of the Fissile Materials Working Group, and a Chatham House Associate Fellow. Since 2010, she has participated in all the official non-governmental events at the Nuclear Security Summits [Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis (a lawyer specializing in international law. He holds a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), a Master’s in Human and Social Sciences from the University of Paris/Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a postgraduate diploma in national defense from the National Defense School. Currently he is a professor in international law at UBA, and co-director of the UNICEN Center for Human Rights in Azul. He is also a researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation), February 2018, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:2, 114-119, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › Terrorism

OCO enabled Intelligence is essential for counterterrorism

Bronk 17—Assistant Professor of computer and information systems at the University of Houston’s College of Technology [Dr. Chris Bronk and Gregory Anderson (Master’s candidate for the Information Systems Security program at the University of Houston and is currently a research assistant under Dr. Chris Bronk and Dr. Arthur Conklin), Winter 2017, “Encounter Battle: Engaging ISIL in Cyberspace”, The Cyber Defense Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 93-108, , Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

There will no doubt be difficulties incorporating cyber operations components into overall US strategy countering ISIL and other non-state adversaries; however, it is clear national security leadership in Washington will leverage cyber capabilities more significantly. One issue that will continue to dog offensive cyber operations and intelligence activities is the equities question—should the US government turn over knowledge it accrues regarding cyber vulnerabilities to the technology industry so that they may be repaired. For instance, is it more desirable for USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA) to keep information regarding broken encryption implementations or software as was alleged in the Heartbleed bug in the OpenSSL software libraries? Issues such as this will be a major policy question to consider.

Ultimately, the cyber conflict against ISIL will serve as a template for future cyber action against terror groups, insurgents, and violent transnational criminal syndicates. Looking backward, we can see the effective application of robust signals intelligence capabilities have been. Consider US support of Colombian operations against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). There can be little doubt that the Colombian military and police were made significantly more effective with the addition of US intelligence capabilities. Policymakers are keen to eradicate or at least damage ISIL but will need to ask how cyber weapons can frustrate it as much as anything else can. The more cyber tactics can short-circuit ISIL’s operational capabilities, the better. What is necessary for US cyber operators are clear objectives from senior leadership on what they want to produce. The engineers that build USCYBERCOM’s tools and the hackers that serve as its operational forces can easily enough push back on what they believe is the art of the possible.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › OCOs Solve

Cyber intelligence solves and is better suited than deterrence---the US can effectively reduce the fog of war and reduce the severity of OCOs

Rovner 20—Associate professor in the School of International Service at American University, in 2018 and 2019 he served as scholar-in-residence at the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command [Joshua Rovner, 3/26/2020, “The Intelligence Contest in Cyberspace”, Lawfare Blog, ] AMarb

The ongoing competition in cyberspace is largely an intelligence contest. Although the technology is different, the underlying contest exhibits all the characteristics of traditional spy-versus-spy battles.

An intelligence contest is an effort to steal secrets and exploit them for relative advantage. Great powers today are using cyberspace with vigor, seeking to steal communications in transit and data at rest. China’s effort to steal intellectual property via cyberspace was famously described as the “most significant transfer of wealth in history.” China has attempted to exploit this effort to improve its military capabilities, with mixed results. Russia has also become more active in cyberspace espionage, targeting the United States and its partners abroad.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › OCOs Solve

NATO needs to be more offensive when dealing with cybersecurity – waiting to respond will cause NATO to lose the fight in Cyberspace

Kramer et al ‘20

D. Kramer; Distinguished fellow and board director at Atlantic Council. Expert in cybersecurity, defense policy, and non-traditional threats; Lauren M. Speranza; Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA); Conor Rodihan; Associate director at Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-continuous-responses-in-cyberspace/

Third, NATO should coordinate a strategy of persistent engagement to reduce Russian and Chinese activities to undercut the Alliance in cyberspace. The concept of persistent engagement was developed by US Cyber Command, but the rationale likewise applies to NATO, deriving from the need to combat the continuous campaigns of cyberattacks coming from Russia and China. Persistent engagement involves tracking adversaries, understanding their goals, analyzing the tools used for attacks, and taking actions to degrade their capabilities to blunt ongoing, or prevent future, attacks. The Alliance needs a persistent engagement cyber strategy as a key element of its deterrence and defense. Customary international law, including the law of countermeasures, pleas of necessity, and other cyber norms, provides the international legal basis for a strategy of persistent engagement. Because NATO Allies have already been attacked and are continuously being targeted by these adversaries, offensive actions to counter such activities are justified, as long as they are conducted proportionately. While persistent engagement arguably could increase instability in cyberspace, Alliance inaction is far more dangerous. If Russia and China perceive no consequences to their malign actions in cyberspace, they will only continue and even intensify them. Inasmuch as NATO capabilities generally reside in nations, NATO nations are the appropriate vehicle to implement persistent engagement. However, many Allies lack the capacity to undertake persistent engagement on their own. As a result, NATO should leverage its collective nature to help Allies coordinate a strategy of persistent engagement. NATO should focus its persistent engagement efforts in three areas of high consequence to member nations: 1) disruptions of key critical infrastructure (e.g. electric grids, telecommunications networks, energy pipelines, and finance systems); 2) cyber espionage to undermine NATO military capabilities and advanced defense technologies; and 3) manipulation of Allies’ democratic processes, such as elections. NATO support to Allies in these areas is fundamental to its core task of collective defense and security. To accomplish persistent engagement effectively in an Alliance context, NATO should leverage its intelligence and defense planning capacities to develop a system for Allies to constantly track cyber threats from Russia and China. Through its Intelligence and Security division, NATO should gather intelligence on which Allied critical infrastructure, military capabilities, or democratic processes are being targeted. Using this information, NATO’s Cyberspace Operations Center (CYOC) could outline ways to diminish Russian and Chinese capabilities to execute such attacks. The CYOC should share its analyses with pre-designated Allies who would work with targeted countries and employ their own cyber effects against the identified threats. Nine NATO nations have already volunteered to provide such effects in support of NATO activities. These cyber-capable Allies would be responsible for persistently disrupting adversaries’ cyber activities based on NATO’s guidance. This model would make NATO’s CYOC a planning hub for an Alliance-wide approach to persistent engagement. It would allow NATO to empower its members to take individual or multilateral actions against adversaries’ hybrid campaigns in cyberspace. While NATO remains a defensive alliance, waiting to respond to each cyber incident it suffers will cost NATO the “fight” in cyberspace. Facing continuous hybrid campaigns from Russia and China, NATO needs a more proactive cyber approach to support Allies, even before the Article 5 collective defense threshold is met. By building resilient cybersecurity architectures, adopting active cyber defense, and coordinating a strategy of persistent engagement, the Alliance can create its own continuous response campaign to effectively respond to attacks in cyberspace.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › OCOs Solve

NATO OCOs key to win cyberwar---prevents nuclear meltdowns and financial collapse

Iftimie ’20 [Ion A.; May; PhD, Eisenhower PhD Candidate Fellow, NATO Defense College, and Senior Advisor, European Union Research Center, George Washington University School of Business; NDC Policy Brief, “NATO's needed offensive cyber capabilities,” no. 10]

Cyber as a hybrid threat to, and enabler of, military operations

All future military confrontations are expected to be fought with cyber weapons. These offensive cyber capabilities in the hands of adversaries pose a significant threat to the military forces and critical infrastructure of NATO member states; and the Alliance recognizes that cyber-attacks (as hybrid threats) can be as damaging as conventional ones. This is because malicious cyber activities against computers that control physical processes can be as dangerous as threats that are purely physical in nature and could lead to explosions, nuclear meltdowns, blackouts, or financial crises. As put by NATO Secretary General, “in just minutes, a single cyberattack can inflict billions of dollars’ worth of damage to our economies, bring global companies to a standstill, paralyze our critical infrastructure, undermine our democracies and cripple our military capabilities”.4

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › AT: OCOs DA › OCOs Solve

Developing an integrated OCO doctrine among NATO allies solves cyberconflict

Lewis ’15 [James; October; Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; "THE ROLE OF OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS IN NATO’S COLLECTIVE DEFENCE,” Tallin Paper No. 8, A NATO CCDCOE Publication on Strategic Cyber Security, https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/TP_08_2015_0.pdf]

The central question for NATO’s cyber doctrine is how the lack of an articulated offensive cyber capability affects its ability to deter or defend. Put another way, can any military force credibly claim to have advanced capabilities if it does not include offensive cyber operations in its arsenal? Offensive capabilities, unlike NATO’s current defensive posture, involve deliberate intrusions into opponent networks or systems with the intention of causing disruption, damage or destruction. The question of NATO and offensive cyber capabilities touches on a range of sensitive political issues that militate against any change in policy in the near term.

The US has always been overly secretive about its offensive cyber capabilities, even after a flood of media leaks have made the most sensitive doctrine publicly available. This secrecy has carried over into NATO, and is unhelpful in that it increases the likelihood of opponents miscalculating as they consider the risks of using force or coercion against NATO members or interests. A lack of public discourse on offensive cyber operations undercuts the legitimacy of NATO operations by failing to build public understanding, and leaves NATO open to charges of sinister plots, since denial of offensive capabilities is not credible when two NATO members are world leaders in cyber operations.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S - US Key

US leadership is key.

Williams et al ’21 (Brandon Williams with contributions from Veronica Chinchilla, Evan Lisman, Amanda Tobey, and Emilyn Tuomala. Brandon is a PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research. “US. AND ALLIED CY BER SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC,” Center for Global Security Research, March 30, 31 and April 1, 2021, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217)-mikee

Cooperation improves when threat perceptions converge and when the United States exercises thoughtful leadership. It erodes when efforts to promote convergence lapse, when tactical responses take precedence over strategic trust building, and when the United States sets aside the effort to promote cooperation. US. leadership is essential, as every US. ally faces real restraints and limits in improving cyber security on its own. The United States has an abundance of bureaucratic resources compared to its allies, but it still lacks a clear vision on how to build a collective and collaborative capacity in a domain centered on secrecy and rapid response. Leadership must be built on meaningful engagement and consultation on all these matters and an appropriate modesty about our collective capacity to meet the challenges ahead. Looking to the future of cybersecurity cooperation among the United States and its Indo- Pacific allies, it is easy to identify numerous challenges, usually arising from frictions over threat assessments, desired end-states, doctrine, language, and the different public-private sector relationships in each country. But these challenges also represent opportunities, places where concrete progress can be made and where frictions lend themselves to concerted action. Progress in working one will reinforce progress in working the others. Unity of command may be a bridge too far, near-unity of action is attainable. An achievable goal is to a place where the US and its allies can convey to an adversary that ”to beat any one of us, you to have to beat all of us.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – NATO Key

NATO is key to preventing war– it keeps Russia at bay

Hooker 4/21/22

Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council [ March 2022 “How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond.” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/. Accessed 26 Apr. 2022.

Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is transforming Europe’s security architecture, as well as NATO’s strategic priorities and its defense and deterrence posture. Russia’s ruthless aggression and NATO’s response increase the possibility of purposeful or inadvertent escalation in Europe. Whether this takes the form of heightened conflict in Ukraine, increased tension across the whole or parts of NATO’s eastern flank—from Ukraine and the Black Sea to the Baltic Region and the High North—or in non-kinetic, subthreshold domains, understanding how these dynamics might degrade transatlantic stability is critical. This study will seek to identify key rungs on the escalation ladder around the war in Ukraine; assess how the current crisis might escalate inside Ukraine and across NATO’s eastern flank; explore how the US and NATO posture can prevent or limit escalation; and offer recommendations for how the United States and NATO can adapt their strategy, posture, and activities to manage escalatory dynamics. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the West has imposed stinging sanctions, disrupting the Russian economy and forcing the Kremlin to burn through its financial reserves. Major Russian banks have been disconnected from SWIFT, the international system that facilitates financial transactions, while some oligarchs have been sanctioned. Many allies and partners have provided massive financial and material aid—in the form of funding, as well as anti-tank and air-defense systems and other military equipment—to bolster Ukrainian resistance. This assistance has helped to stiffen an already stout Ukrainian defense, which has inflicted heavy losses on the Russian military. Vladimir Putin now faces the real possibility of a stalled offensive, or even outright defeat. In this circumstance, Russia still has cards to play. Failure in Ukraine places Putin’s political survival at risk and he is, therefore, unlikely to withdraw. His present difficulties are more likely to provoke escalation within or around Ukraine, both in the military realm and in other domains. As he climbs the escalation ladder, Putin’s risk tolerance will increase, as his key subordinates will surely realize. The ultimate risks, however, are removal from office, imprisonment, or even execution. Accordingly, Putin is far more likely to press harder in Ukraine than to acquiesce to a negotiated settlement that leaves him without tangible gains.¶ The following discussion of Russian escalatory options is linked to the progress of the campaign in Ukraine and presents alternate scenarios based on Russian progress or failure and the degree to which the West provides critical support and/or direct intervention. Escalatory steps are described in ascending order of severity and risk. Response options to control or mitigate Russian escalation follow. It is important to note that Russian, Ukrainian, and Western perspectives or “lenses” on what is escalatory may differ significantly in both time and space. This factor must be borne in mind when assessing adversary actions. As Putin and his senior advisers consider options, conditions on the ground will drive their calculus. Should the Russian military manage to recover its footing and resume progress, however halting, more extreme options may be held in reserve. If the campaign evolves into a “frozen” conflict, like the Donbas but on a larger scale, Putin’s focus will shift to destabilizing the Volodymyr Zelenskyy regime in Kyiv and sanctions relief. Should Ukraine achieve decisive success in recovering its national territory, Putin’s survival may be at risk, and incentives to employ harsher and more high-risk measures will grow. Escalation to each of the below “rungs” will depend on Putin’s perception and assessment of how the campaign is progressing and the prospects for ultimate success or failure. Though speculative, likely triggers for escalation into each subsequent phase of the conflict might include: An assessment that the campaign has stalled temporarily and different approaches are needed to regain momentum; An assessment that the campaign has stalled outright and recovery is unlikely without more extreme measures; and An assessment that defeat is imminent, and that Putin may fall from power, placing all his options on the table. As the conflict drags on, NATO and European Union (EU) actions can be decisive one way or the other, as described further below.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – NATO Key

Nato key to Global stability—Nato radiates security

David Wemer; July 5, 2018; ”Here’s why the United States needs NATO”;New Atlantist;https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/here-s-why-the-united-states-needs-nato/

NATO promotes peace within Europe and deters major US adversaries from launching large-scale conventional wars. World War II cost the United States more than 400,000 lives and an estimated $4.1 trillion (in 2011 dollars). NATO has been key to preserving peace within the European continent and preventing other adversaries from launching a major conventional war. According to credible sources, a major conventional war today could cost the United States upwards of $2.5 trillion per year. NATO also promotes the American values of democracy and rule of law. Twenty-six of the twenty-nine NATO member states were labelled as “free” by Freedom House in 2018. By comparison, just 39 percent of the world’s population lives in “free” countries. NATO is a force multiplier that gives the United States access to military tools in greater numbers than it can achieve by itself. Non-US NATO members have 1,857,000 active duty service members and 1,232,290 reservists. The seven largest non-US NATO member armies have the same number of active duty troops as the United States (1.3 million). Non-US NATO members can deploy 6,983 battle tanks, 34,000 armored vehicles, 2,600 combat aircraft, 382 attack helicopters, 252 major naval craft (including submarines), and 1,582 patrol and surface combatants. France and the United Kingdom alone provide 30 percent of the Alliance’s ballistic-missile-submarine fleet. NATO’s European members are beginning to host the first stages of the Alliance’s new ballistic-missile-defense system aimed at preventing long-range attacks by rogue states on the United States and Europe. NATO members frequently share intelligence across the Alliance, aiding US operations and intelligence-gathering. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany alone add 40,000 intelligence personnel to the Alliance’s intelligence capabilities. Non-US NATO members host twenty-eight US main operating bases in Europe, which cut down on the time needed for the United States to respond to a crisis and are critical for US missions in the Middle East and North Africa. In 2009, for example, Germany contributed $800 million to offset and improve its US bases. NATO undertakes numerous missions to protect member states and promote security around the globe. NATO has five active missions around the world deploying 18,000 troops. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has completed thirteen missions including two in the United States (Hurricane Katrina relief and post-9/11 air reconnaissance patrol). NATO allies contributed thousands of troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, including 38,000 in 2011, saving the United States an estimated $49 billion that year. The operation in Afghanistan was the first and only time NATO’s mutual defense commitment was invoked. Non-US members sustained more than 1,000 combat deaths in Afghanistan, with an additional one hundred lost by NATO partners. Non-US NATO members contributed more than 60 percent of assets for Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Non-US Coalition members flew one-third of all coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Operation Inherent Resolve. NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield against piracy in the Gulf of Aden has been led at different times by Denmark, Spain, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Portugal. NATO supports and protects the economies of Europe, which are critical to the health of the US economy. US trade with the European Union reached $699 billion in 2015, only made possible because of the security and stability provided by NATO. US exports to the former Communist NATO member states (not including East Germany) grew from $0.9 billion in 1989 to $9.4 billion in 2016. Non-US NATO members rely heavily on the US defense industry to supply their forces. Currently, European members are planning to purchase as many as 500 new F-35s from the United States.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – NATO Key

Reinforcement of NATO crucial - The invasion of Ukraine shows the need for a greater strategic cooperation against Russia

Cordesman and Hwang 2/16/22

Anthony H. Cordesman is the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy. Grace M. Hwang holds Ph.D. & M.S. degrees in Biophysics and Structural Biology from Brandeis University. Her doctoral dissertation was on computational neuroscience where she specialized in analyzing cohorts of human brainwaves to understand the neural basis of visual and verbal memory formation. She developed novel nonparametric statistical techniques for high-dimensional data that enabled robust across- and within-subject multi-factorial analysis. NATO and Ukraine: Reshaping NATO to Meet the Russian and Chinese Challenge, CSIS,

If the Ukraine crisis ends in anything other than a major conflict, the U.S. and its NATO allies must now take a far more serious look at how they are shaping the future defense of Europe, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean if NATO is to hold together; create an effective structure of deterrence and defense; and ensure that the West, other democracies, and other major powers can compete with both Russia and China. In doing so, the U.S. and all of its strategic partners in NATO must focus on correcting the major shortfalls in the military and deterrent capabilities of each member state, instead of fixating on NATO-wide concepts or common funding efforts. This is not simply a matter of setting broad priorities and issuing new strategies. Military reality is not an exercise in writing more vague generic statements of good intentions. The Russian threat to Ukraine has made it all too clear that the U.S. and its allies must create and actually implement meaningful force plans instead of issuing more strategic rhetoric. NATO must work together to assess the role each country should play in creating a more effective alliance rather than referring to NATO-wide generalities. Member countries must develop credible Cordesman: NATO and the Lessons of the Ukraine Crisis February 16, 2022 4 force plans, programs, and priorities that reflect the radically different capabilities of given NATO countries, and they must find solutions to their radically different funding needs and capabilities by developing a suitable mix of very different national defense budgets. In doing so, the U.S. must fully recognize its own blunders in focusing on burden-sharing. The U.S. needs to fully consult with its NATO and other strategic partners. The U.S. needs to make it clear that there is no case for some “European” solution to Western security, and it must avoid any future cases like the casual way in which the U.S. engaged Australia and the UK in a closer alliance by suddenly substituting U.S. nuclear submarines for French conventional submarines. As is the case in the Middle East and the rest of the world, the U.S. cannot afford to constantly raise new series of doubts about the ability to rely on the U.S. as a strategic partner. The U.S. also needs to revitalize its focus on NATO and Europe. China’s emergence as a major strategic challenge is all too real, but Europe and Russia are just as critical to an effective U.S. strategic posture as are China and Asia. The recent U.S. focus on the Chinese threat is all too necessary, but so is the U.S. focus on NATO, Russia, and the rest of the world. The U.S. must treat all its strategic patterns as real partners, and the U.S. needs to recognize that its strategic force plans must continue to be global – not swing from region to region. At the same time, Europe needs to be far more realistic about its strategic dependence on U.S. forces and the major shortfall in most European forces. European members of NATO need to do far more to improve the modernization, interoperability, sustainability, and deployment capabilities of many of its member states. They need to recognize there is no credible European alternative to NATO and an Atlantic alliance, and they should focus on nation-by-nation force improvements, rather than burden-sharing and arbitrary spending levels. As the following summary analysis of current national forces shows, NATO not only must deal with many individual sets of national military weaknesses, it must address a wide range of “emerging and disruptive” technologies that are steadily reshaping military forces, tactics, and capabilities.1 Once again, it must be stressed that this cannot be done by announcing new NATO strategies in broad terms or setting common goals for the entire alliance. It also cannot be done by repeatedly issuing equally vacuous national defense white papers that do not commit countries to specific actions, plan, programs, and budgets or that do not honestly address the problems in current national forces. Both the U.S. and European nations need to properly assess national defense spending levels in terms of actual country’s individual military requirements and spending capability. NATO-wide quotes are pointless. At the same time. Such efforts need to be driven by net assessments of the relative size of Russian and Belarusian military forces, modernization, and spending, and they need end the present emphasis on burden-sharing by arbitrary percentage of GDP and equipment spending. The following data on Russian, U.S., and NATO European military spending alone make it clear that the U.S., all other member countries, and NATO as an organization need to use such net assessments of their present and future capability to deter and defend against Russia, determine what actions member countries should actually do to improve their forces, and set individual national goals for given forces on modernization at a time when there is an ongoing revolution in military affairs that will last for at least the next few decades. They also need to plan collectively Cordesman: NATO and the Lessons of the Ukraine Crisis February 16, 2022 5 to deal with the ongoing emergence of China as a far larger and more effective military superpower than Russia – and in doing so to create a stable balance of deterrence in dealing with both Russia and China.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Training

NATO should enhance cyber protection by developing uniform cybersecurity regulations – aggressive cyberattacks increasing

Lete & Dege ‘17 [Bruno & Daiga; 2017; senior fellow or security and defense policy in GMF’s security office; trainee in office, “NATO cybersecurity: a roadmap to resilience, ]

The core of NATO cybersecurity efforts lie at the member-state level. NATO is responsible for protecting its own institutional information and communication systems, but it has little say in coordinating how member states develop their national cyber defense capabilities. Despite having signed the Cyber Defense Pledge at the Warsaw NATO Summit, many member states still struggle to implement and evaluate their national cyber-security plans. As a result NATO’s efforts at developing uniform, alliance-wide cybersecurity are undermined by significant inconsistencies across the national level of the member states and NATO’s collective security and deterrence in cyberspace still show serious vulnerabilities against the backdrop of a growing number of attacks. For NATO to operationalize cyberspace as a domain of NATO defense policy and planning — as was agreed at the NATO Warsaw Summit — the Alliance should have authorizations from member states to do more than just provide advice, expertise, training, or education. Similar to how NATO coordinates Allied military forces in the conventional domain, NATO could also be asked to evaluate how member states can develop, synergize, and complement their mutual national cyber defenses. At a minimum, NATO should develop standards and better indicators that allow a standardized measurement of a nation’s annual progress — and should be tasked with testing and measuring members’ capabilities annually. To achieve this objective, a strong cooperation with the European Union is essential. NATO and the EU could work together to design minimum cybersecurity requirements and benchmarks that would also be adopted by the European Defense Agency. Rapid Assessment and Decision-Making Tools The scale, speed, and intensity of today’s cyber-attacks demand a new approach to respond at the political, military, and civilian level. To develop a rapid decision-making process when facing a cyber-attack NATO can take a few effective measures across its organization. First, more resources must be allocated to accurately and quickly detect and define hostile cyber actions. Further work on indications, warnings, and situational awareness is critical. In this context, NATO’s various civil and military intelligence units, inter alia, could have a useful role. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) could be granted more powers by the North Atlantic Council in authorizing some of the preparatory procedures. At the same time, NATO headquarters should increase the number of exercises that test rapid decisions-making procedures in complex and demanding cyber crisis-conflict scenarios. Much can also be done at the member-state level. Allies and willing partners should continue to work on improving and updating threat assessments, and facilitating closer intelligence cooperation. In this light, Allies should identify information sharing as a clear requirement and task. NATO could also intensify its interaction with national intelligence services and establish supply chain management partnerships with national industries. Cyber threats come in the form of networks and it takes a similarly well-organized network of international and cross-sector cooperation to defeat those threats. Common Rules of Engagement NATO has not commonly defined the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force may apply if one of its member states suffers a cyber-attack. Triggering the authorization to use force in the context of Article 5 may be more obvious if a member state faces a large-scale, devastating cyber-attack where the source of the attack can be clearly attributed. But the need is much more urgent to define when and how NATO must respond against the day-to-day cyber intrusions that fall below the threshold of being perceived as a clear act of aggression. NATO policy still allows for too many gray zones that are being exploited by adversaries who are clever enough not to cross a line that would trigger a common response from the Alliance. Cybersecurity incidents like the alleged Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee’s emails show that the United States and the NATO Allies are still unclear about the conditions and manner to respond in cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual published by the NATO CCDCoE offers a set of guidelines on how states can define rules of engagement, countermeasures, retaliation operations, and other forms of response within the context of the international law if they are to face an act of cyber aggression. But NATO is still far removed from having adopted a common view and interpretation on the subject. The North Atlantic Council would still need to assess each individual cyber-attack case by case without the support of standard measurement tools and indicators that can help NATO formulate a proportionate political or military response. As more cyber policies and laws are taking shape, NATO could demonstrate political, military, and intellectual leadership by clearly defining rules of engagement in cyberspace. Consider Offensive Cybersecurity NATO now recognizes a serious cyber-attack as a potential Article 5 trigger. But the doctrine and crisis management conditions enshrined in NATO’s cyber policy puts the emphasis on a defensive posture only. As such, the Alliance fails to recognize cyber as a force multiplier that could be of importance to the defense of NATO nations. Russia for instance considers offensive cyber capabilities to be an integral part of its military power and especially as a way to make up for its relative lack of conventional forces compared to NATO. The rise in connectivity, smartphone proliferation, cloud computing, growth of application development, and other technological advances open new avenues to attackers and force defenders to cover an ever-increasing number of fields. In the long run, NATO’s defensive approach is not sustainable. It is time for NATO to start a debate on offensive cybersecurity and map the feasibility of coordinating counter strikes, and to establish a significant offensive cyber capability. NATO could center this debate on projecting offensive cyber warfare capabilities as a means of deterrence, similar to the perceived value of nuclear weapons to deter attacks against NATO. Offensive security will allow the Alliance to better control the virtual battlefield. There are valuable cyber capabilities worth attaining, including the ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, intercept communications, or deny resources and access. NATO may find increasing support to have a conversation on offensive cyber security with its allies. As member states are increasingly preoccupied with defense and deterrence issues in cyber-space they will show more receptivity to cooperation with NATO on developing centralized offensive cyber capabilities. NATO and Cyber Industry Cooperation Cybersecurity is largely market-driven. Government intelligence capabilities increasingly find it hard to keep up with the requirements for combating the surge in cyber threats. NATO should play a crucial role in facilitating contacts between those member states that seek stronger links with the private sector and encourage the role that industry can play in cyber threat deterrence and intelligence sharing. Flagship initiatives, such as the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, are important steps in that direction but there is still a need to build more access and trust between NATO governments and industry. Educating member states and partner nations about the role of the private sector in cybersecurity is key. To make the partnership with the industry more effective NATO could play a more important role in mapping and evaluating what kind of cyber defense technologies and intelligence gathering methods the private sector offers, share lessons learned with the member states and encourage capitals to integrate the best practices into capabilities, policy, and implementation planning. NATO can also play an essential role in improving communications and information sharing between the private and the public sectors. More can be done at the NATO level to identify what kind of information between governments and companies can or cannot be shared, to develop standardized methods and formats for information sharing, and to encourage the use of automated platform capabilities to share this information quickly. Build a Robust Public Diplomacy Campaign The first frontier of cyber defense is the individual. Citizens who are digitally empowered, cyber aware, and cyber educated will display a more responsible behavior and automatically increase NATO’s collective security in cyberspace. NATO needs a narrative on why cybersecurity matters beyond public belief that a major cyber-attack is improbable. What can NATO do in cyberspace that national security agencies cannot do? Which level of cybersecurity is needed rather than which one we can afford? NATO societies should be exposed to debate through parliaments, media, nongovernmental organizations, and academia. Externally, the Alliance must adapt to the reality that countries hostile to NATO will continue to use their own cyber capabilities and massive state propaganda organizations to attack NATO systems and discredit everything the Alliance does. NATO has to be able to engage in and win this information war at the elite decision-maker and opinion-former levels rather than simply raise awareness of its existence and activities among a global public.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Interoperability

NATO must strengthen its threat identification, network protection, intrusion detection, etc to defend itself against cyber attacks.

Susan Davis 19, general reporter of NATO, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE”, STC, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-09/148%20STC%20Davis%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE%20-%20fall%20revision%20-%20clean%2011.9.19.pdf

As armed forces around the world, including in potential adversary states, build up their cyber capabilities, NATO and its member states must devise strategies and policies to counter the threat of serious state-directed cyber attacks. Overall, NATO is leaning heavily on the same general strategies it uses to counter other attacks: dissuasion by denial and deterrence by punishment. However, Allies should continue to support work on international norms and engage in serious discussions if and how strategies such as persistent engagement, as outlined above, can supplement overall NATO strategy. 1. Norms in Cyber Space 25. Due to the specific characteristics of malicious cyber code, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation measures very likely remain beyond reach for now, most importantly because verification seems impossible. However, the further development of norms in cyber space could become an important pillar of support against such attacks. NATO continues to argue that international law applies to cyber space, including international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter. This is also in line with the declaration of the 2013 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE, 2013). The Alliance has declared its support for “work on voluntary international norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures regarding cyberspace” (NATO, 2016b). Allies furthermore made clear that they “stand to benefit from a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace” (NATO, 2018a). However, it is unrealistic to expect that NATO, as an Alliance of 29 sovereign nations, could become the primary driving force for the further development of norms. Instead, individual Allies must continue to drive this effort in the international community and encourage other member states to do the same. 2. Cyber Security and Defence 26. Strategies of dissuasion by denial aim at “dissuading an action by having the adversary see a credible capability to prevent him from achieving potential gains adequate to motivate the action” (Davis, 2014). In other words, the defender must make such an attack look futile: the attacker should either fail or, at the very least, not benefit from a cyber attack (Nye, 2017). Such cyber dissuasion is squarely premised on strong cyber security and defence, which is primarily a national responsibility, but NATO must and does play a role, which the next sub-sections show (see also Box 4). 27. In theory, cyber security and defence is a straightforward proposition. Defenders try to reduce vulnerabilities, block access points, and minimise the impact of payloads. Cyber security and defence include a range of preventive, passive, and active measures. Those seeking to protect their networks must strengthen their capabilities in several areas: threat identification; network protection; intrusion detection; responses against attacks; and resilience and recovery (US NIST, n.d.; see Box 5). Determined intruders are often very agile and adapt rapidly to circumvent new cyber security or defence measures. Allies, thus, often turn to more active cyber defence. For example, the US DOD, under its active cyber defence concept, can synchronise defence across all government and critical infrastructure networks. In other words, they defend more than just the networks owned and operated by the DOD. A step beyond is the so-called ‘defend forward’ concept, adopted by the United States in 2018 for example. When defending forward, defenders can cross over into the attacker’s networks to conduct intelligence operations; try to disrupt ongoing or even planned attacks; quickly reverse damage from attacks; and, in extreme situations, punish attackers (Hoffman and Levite, 2017; US DOD, 2018).