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2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 2NC – L – Economic Rationality – Studies

Economic rationality is false – meta-analysis of existing studies proves that there is little evidence that demonstrates effective predictions

Nitsch et al 2022 - Comparative Psychology, Institute of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

Felix J. Nitsch, Luca M. Lüpken, Nils Lüschow, and Tobias Kalenscher July 26, 2022 “On the reliability of individual economic rationality measurements” Psychological And Cognitive Sciences 119 (31) e2202070119 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2202070119

In the present paper, we investigated the reliability of behavioral measurements of rationality as a characteristic of individual decision makers. Across multiple original and published datasets, we found that the reliability of the two most prominent rationality indices (and variations thereof) is moderate to poor. This result held independent of the choice domain (social choice, food choice, choice under risk, or choice under ambiguity), choice complexity (two or three goods), study context (laboratory or online), incentivization (incentive compatible or hypothetical), study population, sample size, task structure, measurement length, and time gap between measurements. Hence, given data from multiple datasets with sufficient methodological diversity, our conclusions not only apply to a specific configuration of rationality measurements but speak with reasonable generality for contemporary research practice. More broadly, our results align with recent work on the reliability of measurements of risk preferences, sensitivity to losses, and self-regulation (33–35).#

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 2NC – L – Economic Rationality

Economic growth under a neoclassical model promotes asset bubbles, predatory loans, debt, and economic collapse through methodological individualism and financialization.

Marszalek and Scarzec 22 – Pawel Marszalek is professor and Head of Department at Poznan University of Economics; Katarzyna Szarzec is a researcher and professor at Poznan University, [“The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Financialization Through Heterodox and Mainstream Lenses”, Bank I Kredyt 54(3), 2023, 239-258, https://bankikredyt.nbp.pl/content/2023/03/BIK_03_2023_01.pdf]RA

Regardless of some differences, within heterodox economics the core features of financialization were identified. Apart from the dominance of the financial sector in the economy, the following processes and phenomena can be indicated as more detailed distinguishing features (Brown, Spencer 2011; Hein 2012; Sawyer 2014): (1) the popularization and rapid expansion of financial markets; (2) the deregulation of financial systems and individual economies; (3) an ever-expanding range of financial instruments and institutions; (4) decisions in the field of economic and social policy favouring the development of financial markets; (5) an increase in credit sustained consumption; (6) the widespread and growing presence of institutions, instrument markets, and financial schemes in economic and social life, and (7) the development of a specific (individualistic, pro-market, utilitarian) financial culture. Those features of financialization have subsequently been analysed by other heterodox economists. As an empirical substantiation of those features, four stylized facts are usually proposed (Mavroudeas, Papadatos 2018): 1. The increased weight of the financial sector in contemporary advanced capitalist economies, exhibited in the increased share of this sector in GDP and profits, along with the proliferation and widespread use of new complex financial instruments (e.g. derivatives); 2. Big firms finance themselves through retained earnings and capital markets (rather than through banks), and the emergence of ‘shadow banking’; 3. The widespread adoption by firms of policies of shareholder value maximization that focus on enriching shareholders rather than addressing the productive prospects of any given enterprise. This reflects the rise in the prominence of institutional investors; 4. The increased indebtedness of working- and middle-class households in several advanced capitalist economies. Those stylized facts were developed and discussed along with formulated hypotheses, concerning, for example, the determinants and effects of financialization. Importantly, heterodox economics remains highly sceptical and wary of financialization and, as will be further elaborated, its consequences for society, political systems and domestic economies. As mentioned previously, in contrast to heterodox economists, mainstream economists did not initially view financialization as an interesting research topic. They tended to label this new environment, in which financial markets predominate over the outcomes of goods and factor markets, as ‘financial’ or ‘finance’ capitalism (DeLong 1991; Neal 1990). At best, mainstream economics 5 These issues are beyond the scope of the paper. One should mention only that different attitudes are presented by post- -Keynesians, Marxists, and evolutionary economists, among others. The good, the bad or the ugly... 243 noticed the phenomenon, but treated it as a natural form of market adjustment, in principle beneficial to the economy. Surprisingly, as Mavroudeas and Papadatos (2018) point out, mainstream economists abruptly dropped the inhibition of general equilibrium theory concerning a large financial sector, arguing instead that such a phenomenon contributes to economic growth (e.g. King, Levine 1993). They also praised the expanded role of capital markets, arguing that market-based financial systems are more efficient and less risky than bank-based ones. One might even say that mainstream economics, stuck in the assumptions of a new neoclassical synthesis, missed the systemic changes in the economy, brought about by a rapid development of the financial sector. A disregard for financialization was a part of the wider problem – the mainstream theories and models failed to keep up with the rapid and profound changes in the economy resulting from, among other things, technical progress. As Ratajczak (2012) emphasizes, the radical changes in the financial sphere and the entire economic world were not accompanied by adequate changes in the foundations of thinking about the functioning of the market economy. Thus, the main problem of mainstream economics was that it stayed in the circle of beliefs originating from neoclassical economics, which had been formulated in completely different institutional conditions, when society was very different. 3. General assumptions and research methods Such a remarkable discrepancy between the two theoretical approaches to financialization, as signalled in the previous section was, to a large extent, the consequence of the accepted assumptions and the applied research methods. Different attitudes and methods for analysing financialization resulted in different conclusions and perceptions of finance growth. The representatives of heterodoxy considered financial markets and capitalist societies to be inherently unstable. The acceleration and proliferation of financial institutions and instruments, along with financial engineering and changes in the money creation mechanisms available in the contemporary economy, were assumed to generate imbalances and lead to a deterioration in the structure of economic agents’ incentives, thus hampering the functioning of the economy. Various strains of heterodoxy analysed different aspects of those issues. For instance, post-Keynesians (e.g. Minsky) stressed that the fundamental uncertainty of agents’ decisions, financial investors’ tendency towards speculation, the procyclicality of credit extension are sources of financial crises. Marxists introduced research on power and class relations, and considered their impact on economic interactions in the face of financialization. Institutionalists focused, in turn, on how institutions (organisations, conventions and, more generally, rules) influence economic interaction. Taking those aspects into account, heterodox economists described financialization – its sources, nature, process, and consequences – in a rather narrative-oriented manner, without the use of formal models or advanced quantitative research. Above all, they tried to capture and understand the essence of this phenomenon in a broader economic and social context. They believed that mathematics – typical of mainstream economics – only simplified the real picture and led to false conclusions, especially with reference to such complex issues as financial and monetary areas. As a consequence, in heterodox works, issues connected with financialization have not been thoroughly operationalized and modelled econometrically. The narrative approach, which combines 244 P. Marszałek, K. Szarzec one’s own narrative of historical events, tends to dominate (Shiller 2019), or only descriptive statistics of any given times series are presented, without any rigorous econometric analysis. In contrast, mainstream economists present a rigorous mathematical and quantitative apparatus which in many cases demands adopting very strong (even counterfactual) assumptions on the market structure and behaviour of economic agents. Believing in the portfolio theory and the theory of efficient markets, they perceive markets and financial systems as always efficient and sustainable, and individual agents as rational. Therefore, the development of financial markets and the growing importance of the financial sphere are regarded as positive, in line with the needs of all market participants. Surprisingly, despite the dominance of monetary issues in mainstream macroeconomic theory, observable since the monetarist school, as well as the growing importance of monetary and financial problems, there was no serious attempt to include the institutional foundations of money creation and financial institutions in the mainstream macroeconomic models. The economists of the new neoclassical synthesis used and recommended DSGE modelling as the main macroeconomic method. However, its application did not allow for identifying the sources of monetary disorder or for proposing effective remedial actions. The social nature of money and the influence of sociological and psychological factors (including ‘animal spirits’) on its value were also ignored. As a result, those models presented the problem of money in an increasingly simplified manner and reduced the monetary system almost entirely to the monetary policy strategy of the central bank. Simultaneously, financial instruments, institutions and systems have only been analysed on a microeconomic scale, with only a few attempts to introduce them to macroeconomic models. According to Spencer (2013), the methodological foundations of mainstream economics, such as methodological individualism, the rational expectations hypothesis and the assumption of the efficiency of financial markets, contributed to promoting excessive risk and disregarding the roots of the crisis (and later to primarily downplaying problems). Assuming that investors always maximize their total expected utility, the possibility of them making a wrong decision or being guided by other premises was eliminated. These problems were also raised by Sławiński (2010a, 2010b). He emphasized that the belief in market discipline and the self-regulating economy is a result of the application of the efficient market hypothesis also to decisions made by households. It was assumed that they would not only have all the information at their disposal, but also be able to analyse it and use it appropriately in their decisions. This turned out to be quite dubious, especially with regard to the increasing complexity of the monetary and financial spheres. Investors – contrary to the efficient market hypothesis – had to deal not only with risk, but also with the uncertainty resulting from the inability to estimate the probability distributions of many variables. In this situation, their expectations were short-term and were only an extrapolation from the changing situation (see also Palley 2012; Vercelli 2019). In this context, Sławinski (2010b) drew attention to two other issues. First, he stressed that the efficient market hypothesis implied a certain attitude and behaviour of supervisory institutions over financial markets. For if it is assumed that the prices of financial assets (and the risk premiums included in them) correctly reflect the most likely course of events in the financial markets, then to ensure the stability of the banking system it is enough that banks maintain their capital at slightly higher levels than would be necessary for covering potential losses. In such a situation, supervisors should only focus on the loss calculation process and the amount of regulatory capital. Such action, however, in practice led the supervisors to disregard the erosion of prudent lending rules, which occurred when banking institutions focused on increasing the rate of return (Sławiński 2010a). The good, the bad or the ugly... 245 Secondly, adopting the efficient market hypothesis eliminates the need to include the financial sector in a model. If all the participants of economic life make rational decisions, then they make optimal decisions also with regard to the amount taken in loans – they never take them in an amount exceeding the possibility of their repayment. As Sławiński adds, in the world of the assumptions of general equilibrium models, the chances of households making optimal decisions are neither limited by any barriers to accessing sources of financing nor by the lack of futures markets that would allow them to hedge against risk. In such a situation, the financial system is so effective that it only plays the role of a neutral intermediary in the processes of production and exchange. Therefore, it is not necessary to include it in the formal analysis (Sławiński 2010b). Moreover, according to Allington, McCombie and Pike (2001), within the framework of the new neoclassical synthesis, constituting the very core of mainstream economics, it is presumed that the market essentially regulates itself. This, in turn, prompted the poor regulation of the financial sector (so-called ‘light regulation’). Meanwhile, according to these authors, the speculative bubble in the US mortgage market, which directly contributed to the crisis, was an endogenous factor, resulting from the development of financial innovations and their mass use. This allowed, along with the lack of regulation, a leap in moral hazard among subprime operators (see also, e.g. Rajan 2005). As a result of these different attitudes to research and neglect of the issue in the mainstream approach, only heterodox economists undertook macroeconomic studies on the functioning and instability of financial systems and the consequences of these phenomena. Surprisingly, the Global Financial Crisis 2007–2009 allowed the agenda of these heterodox economists to enter into wider awareness, introducing financialization as a source of the fragility and instability of individual economies, thus contributing to the outbreak of the crisis and its contagion between countries. As Spencer (2013) points out, the critique of economics – as in other crisis periods – came not only from the outside, but also from within. According to Palley (2012), it was the lack of pluralism within mainstream economics, and the neoclassical dominance within it, that caused such misdiagnosis and the inability to correctly assess the increasing threats stemming from financialization. In this context, it is above all the neoclassical core of mainstream economics that was criticized. But even after the crisis, only a few adjustments were made to the mainstream methodology and research agenda. Furthermore, they were rather modest and did not go beyond its core paradigm (Allington, McCombie, Pike 2011; Dembiński 2009; Palley 2012; Mehrling 2000). Mainstream economists still fail to incorporate the imperfections of financial markets into their macroeconometric models. Admittedly, after the crisis mainstream economists agreed in principle that financial markets could generate inefficient outcomes, but these critiques have had little impact on either the broad thinking about financial markets or the direction of economic policy. They have remained driven by the belief that deregulation and the expansion of financial markets is good for the general welfare. Moreover, the critique of financial markets was generated within mainstream grounded theoretical foundations, hence it remained structured by them. This means that the assessment of financial markets continues to be made in terms of the neoclassical hypotheses of market efficiency and rationality. They have not been seen as a part of an overall economic system that distributes power and affects the character of production and the distribution of income (Palley 2007). During this theoretical interregnum, heterodox economists were unable to propose a coherent, precise methodological framework for research on financialization, focusing rather on a narrative- -approach. The acceptance by heterodoxy of the social nature of financialization without more quantitative research on its determinants (taking into account all the shortcomings of the overly formalized approach) makes it difficult to fully understand this phenomenon and its evolution over time. The counterattack of mainstream economics contributed to a relative (unjustified) weakening of interest in financialization at the end of the previous decade.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Social Security

Neoclassical economics’ commitment to utility maximization and individuality crafts a belief that social security exists to smooth the functioning of a hyper-rationalist society. This recreates the view of the individual as a dependent, subjecting entire groups to exclusion – treatment of aging populations and people of color prove.

Jackson 94 [ William Jackson, librarian of Harvard University's Houghton Library of Rare Books and Manuscripts from 1942 until his death. He was also an internationally acclaimed bibliographer. He helped plan the Arthur Amory Houghton Library and became the first librarian of the repository of literary and historical treasures., The Economics of Ageing and the Political Economy of Old Age, , LTEC]

Formal retirement at a single retirement age is crucial in defining the elderly population. The immediate switch from full-time work to retirement has no physical justification: people do not become incapable of work at a common, unique age. Earlier retirement in recent decades has not been a reaction to worsening health among the older population. Retirement policies may have other purposes, for instance, the regulation of labour supply. Opinions on the age of retirement have changed with economic activity. The labour shortage of the 1940s and 1950s prompted calls in the UK for later retirement and increased economic activity in old age (Hopkin, 1953; Paish and Peacock, 1954). An academic literature emerged in the 1950s with the goal of showing that the elderly are capable of work after the traditional retirement ages (Dex and Phillipson, 1986). The 1960s and 1970s saw a slowing down of economic growth and a dwindling of interest in later retirement. By the 1980s the arguments had been reversed: interest was now in earlier retirement, as a palliative for unemployment (Walker, 1982). Retirement can be a regulator of labour supply with the convenient property of converting unemployment into withdrawal from the labour force. - 6 - Low state pensions tied to formal retirement cause poverty among sections of the elderly, as has long been known from empirical studies (Townsend and Wedderburn, 1965; Townsend, 1979). The upshot is a 'structured dependency' of the elderly, in which the incomes of the retired are too low to prevent hardship (Walker, 1981, 1986). Many of the elderly receive means-tested social assistance and are thus officially designated as poor. Not all the elderly are poor, however. Those with generous occupational pensions may enjoy prosperity in old age, as do a small minority who never work at any age and live from unearned incomes. The different circumstances of the retired elderly stem from their different work histories, and the ability to maintain financial independence in old age increases with earnings, job security and occupational status. Formal retirement with low state pensions may sustain, or even widen, the differential between high and low income groups. The image of state retirement pensions as benevolent social security measures offsetting the physically induced difficulties of old age may be misleading. Alongside the state, the social policy profession too has promoted the structured dependency of the elderly. The assumption has been that the elderly should be passive recipients of care administered by social policy professionals. The elderly in the residential and hospital sectors are totally institutionalised: their whole physical and social environment is structured by professional carers. A move into these sectors has come to be seen as a permanent loss of independence which is often dreaded by the elderly. Institutionalization may sometimes be necessary and desirable, but there is a danger of exaggerating the dependency of the elderly and the 'burden' they place on the rest of society. Community care has typically been organized centrally by the providers, giving the elderly little say in the extent of the care they receive. By representing elderly people as helpless and inert, this confirms their dependency. The overprovision of residential and centralized community care may be at the expense of public funding for informal or more decentralized community care, or for more generous state pensions which would allow the elderly to maintain their independence for longer. Social policy has played its part in fostering the dependency of the elderly and legitimating their humble position in society. - 7 - As with retirement policies, the elderly are being subjected to a socially created dependency that is only indirectly related to biological ageing. Notwithstanding its declared good intentions, social policy may be conducive to an increasing centralized control over the elderly and a lowering of their status in society.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Basic Income

The use of a basic income to promote fiscal redistribution assumes that the state should regulate the individual. That enables totalitarian control of the subject, codifying homo economicus.

Assia & Ross 18 [Yoni Assia, Yoni Assia is the Founder and CEO of eToro. He previously worked at WiTech Communications as a cofounder and Development, Omri Ross, Builder, founder, researcher, board member, investor. Leading blockchain research, Good Dollar Experiment, , LTEC]

A discernibly more methodological critique of the basic income principles is the axiomatic dependency on efficient markets [23, ]. Indeed, the majority of the arguments raised by prominent figures such as Friedman, rests on the neoclassical assertion that markets are efficient and that price always signals value. While the evidence for and against these hypotheses was sparse at the time, concerns raised by behavioral economists may form an opposition to these assertions. If markets are not that efficient after all, we may ask, should we base our fiscal policies on the assertion that consumers will behave as predicted – and what happens if they don't? Bureaucratic Concerns As we saw in the case of the Finnish experiment, existing complications in local taxation or welfare programmes may also play a significant role in the practical implementation of basic income programmes. Outside of purely economic concerns, an issue raised by detractors is the scale of the bureaucracy required in the execution and monitoring of cash transfers. Considering the well-documented existing inefficiencies in contemporary welfare programmes, the allocation of resources, monitoring of participants and enforcing of policies is bound to be a cumbersome task for public officials. [9, 20, 29, 38] While recent development in the digitisation of public welfare and taxation systems may inspire faith in technological development, public-sector administration may be cause for concern. If we, as van Parijs argues, harbour ambitions of a globally applicable redistributive fiscal policy, the associated bureaucracy is bound to grow beyond our means. Nevertheless, as we saw in the case of the IMF estimations for the Indian economy, an unconditional income may serve as a relief to the bureaucratic complexity associated with subsidies and other relief programmes in rural or poverty-stricken economies. While the implementation of any fiscal policy programme involves a number of complexities, the simplified aspects of a single monthly or bi-weekly cash-transfer significantly reduces the administrative overhead associated with the practical application of subsidies. Behavioural Concerns Perhaps the most familiar critique of unconditional income policies is the – somewhat conservative – argument that giving people free income will cause a decrease in productivity, as recipients of income subsidies would simply opt out of the economy and live off their stipends. Such claims are naturally too complex to prove or disprove, due to their contingency on a large array of culturally embedded norms, traditions or expectations. While, as is often the case in economics and political science, the implications and success of unconditional income policies are largely dependent on the targeted fiscal system and social context, we have seen meaningful arguments against behavioural concerns in the empirical evidence surveyed above. Set against a background of the existing welfare systems, it seems, the unconditional nature of the payments received in UBI programmes may very well be a major cause of the improvement, providing recipients with feelings of control and choice. As evident in the case of the London study [31], those perhaps most likely to be at risk for the behavioural concerns listed above appear unexpectedly susceptible to positive change given an unconditional income and the control to create their own path to growth. Thus, it seems, similar to welfare policy, conclusions relating to behavioural, cultural and social implications of fiscal policies remain an empirical question. Additionally, pre-existing cultural and social patterns in society may be enforced as a result of the lack of dependencies on labour-force participation. This may further validate cultural gender specific separations and deepen the divide between genders. Specifically, women may be more likely to succumb to cultural or traditional pressure and withdraw from the labour market if not provided with adequate incentive to work. Nonetheless, such concerns are highly contingent on socio-economic factors and the complexity of the local environment.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Jobs

Neoclassical economics OSTRACIZES the labor market, making it structurally unable to innovate. Jobs guarantee are the opium of the non-propertied masses and their employers.

Henry 15 - JOHN F. HENRY, 2015 [“Classical political economy”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, WINTER 2015, Vol. 38, No. 2 (WINTER 2015), pp. 280-301https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48540606.pdf?casa_token=DTpTdL6H0pUAAAAA:-qcapoeaiDGhGHfKOMbGTTXQ32T9MzUaP4DWBDVm0xPEC5Ww9zGxW3GA6QQoxZDs52TxjYQ9cIdFPbMfMsIJn_ZTLh4ZvOGxD-An1yI3OFuNwYx5RL4]

The Industrial Revolution and its aftermath—in particular the new Poor Law of 1834—destroyed much of the older, moral economy standard by which a just, subsistence wage was to be determined. As well, the status of the nonpropertied worker as having something of a “right” to employment—either in the capitalist or traditional sector—was quashed. This becomes clear in the famous chapter 31 of the third edition of Ricardo’s Principles in which he argues that capital accumulation coupled with technological change may result in a section of the working class becoming “redundant” (unemployed). There is little question that the momentous changes in the British economy as a consequence of the industrial revolution precipitated the anticapitalist criticisms of Owen and others and the attempt to restore a moral economy. Indeed, it was this period in British economic history that occupied much space in Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. The near-full commodification of labor that ensued following the elimination of the Old Poor Law (Speenhamland) and the creation of the New Poor Law (1834), coupled with the near-complete obliteration of the previous “traditional” society with its small holdings and domestic production coupled with the existence of the commons, led, in Polanyi’s terms, to a “fictitious” market for labor. Interestingly, Polanyi was not a supporter of Speenhamland, arguing that “the competition for scarce jobs within a chronically demand-constrained labor market…pressured the poor to accept market wages even below subsistence, as long as their overall household income was being supplemented by a non-market wage subsidy” (Seccareccia, 2015). That is, the welfare program associated with Speenhamland depressed the “market” wage, though social subsistence was maintained through public transfer payments. Much has changed since the earlier stages of capitalism’s history, but it is fairly clear that wage stagnation for the majority of workers coupled with sustained levels of significant unemployment have created increased economic (and psychological) stress for a significant segment of the population. The post–World War II welfare programs, designed in part to at least partially provide low-income people with subsistence have been eroded, and nothing has emerged to replace these. In the past two decades, various economists have put forward proposals promoting a policy where governments, at least those with “sovereign currencies” such as that of the United States, are called upon to provide jobs for all those able and willing to work at a government-imposed wage. Such proposals are framed under different designations—the “Buffer Stock Employment Model,” “Employer of Last Resort,”7 and so on—but they all amount to much the same idea. Basically, private firms cannot guarantee that all those who want a job will be offered one. Capitalist economic forms of organization almost always operate with some degree of unemployment. Indeed, capitalism is the only form of economic organization where unemployment exists.8 Because this is the case, governments, ostensibly representing the well-being of the population as a whole, have a duty to provide jobs for all those willing and able to work as well as training for those the private sector leaves adrift.9 Further, while this goes far beyond the scope of this 7This specific term can be traced to Hyman Minsky, 2008 (1986), though there are hints of such a program as early as 1923 in the work of Walton Hamilton (see Rutherford, 2013, p. 66). 8Because classical theory was developed in the period when “traditional economy” existed alongside the embryonic capitalist economy, the terms “full employment,” or “unemployment” had little or no meaning for these economists (see Weldon, 1988, pp. 16, 19). 9For brief introductions to such programs, see Mitchell (1998) and Wray (1998b). For a much fuller analysis, see Wray (1998a). As well, many papers published by the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College address these programs (http://www.levyinstitute.org). In particular, Jan Kregel, Pavlina Tcherneva, and L. Randall Wray have written extensively in the various series published by this organization. Finally, the New Economics Perspective blog of University of Missouri-Kansas City contains any number of essays and discussions addressing the employer of last resort approach (http://neweconomicperspectives.org). 292 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS This content downloaded from 63.141.49.27 on Sat, 01 Jul 2023 15:48:55 +00:00 All use subject to https paper, some form of a job guarantee program is directly linked to a government’s ability to spend without significant constraints given its control over its own money (Wray, 1998a).

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Carbon Tax

Carbon Taxation originates from a neoclassical perspective that focuses on internalizing the externalities of climate change. Despite appeals to social and political change, neoclassicism fails to understand the social conditions in which the 1AC is situated. It crowds out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in climate-friendly activities, contributing to political polarization in response to conservative opposition

Jakob 23

[Jakob, Michael, et al. "Understanding different perspectives on economic growth and climate policy." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 11.6 (2020): e677., ]

The neoclassical perspective focusses on the concept of internalizing externalities related to climate change mitigation. This conceptualization of climate policy suggests that assuming otherwise perfectly operating markets, implementing a tax at the level of the marginal social costs of the externality—in line with the classical analysis of Pigou (1920)—will lead economic agents to reduce the externality to the socially optimal level. Among economists, the notion that the GHG externality constitutes the perhaps greatest externality the world has ever seen is increasingly gaining acceptance (Stern, 2008). Despite the intense debate on whether carbon taxation or emission trading is the better option to internalize this externality (Goulder & Parry, 2008), broad consensus among climate economists and even beyond about carbon pricing being the most important climate policy instrument prevails (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017; IPCC, 2014). This is due to its feature of incentivizing all available mitigation options in a cost-efficient way by setting harmonized marginal cost of abatement that would ensure the lowest cost options are used. In contrast, all other policy instruments would either only incentivize some subset of available mitigation options, or might trigger implementation of more costly options. It is also widely accepted among environmental economists that additional market failures (e.g., in innovation markets) can justify additional policy instruments such as subsidies for low-carbon technology R&D or deployment (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). In terms of governance, the central agent in this perspective is the nation state, assumed of being capable of implementing welfare-maximizing policy instruments (Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017). To address international free-riding concerns resulting from the global commons nature of the climate problem, the importance of international agreement to ensure cooperation is emphasized. The difficulty of overcoming the free-rider effect is reflected in the slow progress of international climate negotiations. Critiques have pointed out the neoclassical perspective fails to take into account the social conditions necessary for the implementation of its recommendations. This concerns in particular the various constraints central state actors are facing due to opposition by vested interest groups. For instance, Ervine (2018) depicts carbon markets as “expressions of specific power relations rooted in the political economy of advanced capitalism, with low prices ensuring minimal disruption to business as usual”. Carbon pricing is also sometimes critically regarded as inhibiting fundamental social and political changes (Gunderson, Stuart, & Petersen, 2018) and crowding out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in climate-friendly activities (Jakob, Kübler, Steckel, & van Veldhuizen, 2017). The main critique of the view of policy instruments to internalize environmental externalities is that much broader measures are required to tackle the fundamental problems related to climate change mitigation and human well-being. For instance, Jacobs and Mazzucato (2016) have argued that “[p]ublic policies are not ‘interventions’ in the economy, as if markets existed independently of the public institutions and social and environmental conditions in which they are embedded”. At an abstract level and in the long-term, degrowth proponents aim at undermining the legitimacy of the current “rules of the game” (see Section 5.3) through academic and cultural critique, with a view to establishing radical future alternatives with significantly diminished constraints to strong climate policy (Kallis et al., 2018). These include critiques of capitalism and its core drivers of social and environmental crises (domination, profit, and accumulation) (Gunderson et al., 2018). In this regard, policies aiming at altering the dynamics driving GDP growth and GHG emissions are advocated. Salient examples include policies and governance reforms addressing consumerism, inequality, and excessive luxury consumption, campaign finance, and lobbying reform, reductions in work hours, and growth dependencies. It has been pointed out that welfare states tend to depend on economic growth to finance increasing pension and healthcare spending (Bailey, 2015), especially in countries with an aging population. To avoid contradictions between fiscal and environmental sustainability, modifications to consumption, and work policies within integrated “eco-welfare states” have been proposed (Gough, 2016). From the perspective of sustainable investment, divestment campaigns are considered as a promising means to change financial market outcomes as well as societal norms (Braungardt, van den Bergh, & Dunlop, 2019). Fundamental norm and value changes are suggested as prerequisites for ambitious climate and sustainability policy (Green, 2018). In terms of governance approach, direct democracy approaches are highly valued (Kallis et al., 2018). A critical perspective of these proposals might point out that their broader adoption will simply take too long to solve the imminent climate problem, even if eventually successful. Also, linking the climate and broader degrowth agendas may intensify opposition to climate policy from more conservative constituencies and intensify political polarization instead of reducing it. Hence, one could argue in favor of policies directly aimed at emission reductions instead of aiming for more fundamental social, institutional, and political changes.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 2NC – L – Climate Change – AT Economics Key

This is foundational to prove their models – their process of simplification functions as a means to circumvent urgency to addressing climate change in the political economy

Keen 2020 – University College London

Steve Keen “The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change” Globalizations · September 2020 DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1807856

GIGO: Garbage in, garbage out When I began this research, I expected that the main cause of Nordhaus’s extremely low predictions of damages from climate change would be the application of a very high discount rate (Nordhaus, 2007)11 to climate damages estimated by scientists (Hickel, 2018), and that a full critique of his work would require explaining why an equilibrium-based Neoclassical model like DICE12 was the wrong tool to analyse something as uncertain, dynamic and far-from-equilibrium as climate change (Blatt, 1979; DeCanio, 2003).13 Instead, I found that the computing adage ‘Garbage In, Garbage Out’ Figure 10. Kahn and Mohaddes’s linear extrapolation of the temperature: GDP relationship from 1960–2014 out till 2100 (Kahn et al., 2019, p. 6). 20 S. KEEN (GIGO) applied: it does not matter how good or how bad the actual model is, when it is fed ‘data’ like that concocted by Nordhaus and the like-minded Neoclassical economists who followed him. The numerical estimates to which they fitted their inappropriate models are, as shown here, utterly unrelated to the phenomenon of global warming. Even an appropriate model of the relationship between climate change and GDP would return garbage predictions if it were calibrated on ‘data’ like this. This raises a key question: how did such transparently inadequate work get past academic referees? Simplifying assumptions and the refereeing process: the poachers becomes the gatekeepers One reason why this research agenda was not drowned at birth was the proclivity for Neoclassical economists to make assumptions on which their conclusions depend, and then dismiss any objections to them on the grounds that they are merely ‘simplifying assumptions’. As Paul Romer observed, the standard justification for this is ‘Milton Friedman’s (1953) methodological assertion from unnamed authority that ‘the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions’ (Romer, 2016, p. 5). Those who make this defence do not seem to have noted Friedman’s footnote that ‘The converse of the proposition does not of course hold: assumptions that are unrealistic (in this sense) do not guarantee a significant theory’ (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). A simplifying assumption is something which, if it is violated, makes only a small difference to your analysis. Musgrave points out that ‘Galileo’s assumption that air-resistance was negligible for the phenomena he investigated was a true statement about reality, and an important part of the explanation Galileo gave of those phenomena’ (Musgrave, 1990, p. 380). However, the kind of assumptions that Neoclassical economists frequently make, are ones where if the assumption is false, then the theory itself is invalidated (Keen, 2011, pp. 158–174). This is clearly the case here with the core assumptions of Nordhaus and his Neoclassical colleagues. If activities that occur indoors are, in fact, subject to climate change; if the temperature to GDP relationships across space cannot be used as proxies for the impact of global warming on GDP, then their conclusions are completely false. Climate change will be at least one order of magnitude more damaging to the economy than their numbers imply – working solely from rejecting their spurious assumption that about 90% of the economy will be unaffected by it. It could be far, far worse. Unfortunately, referees who accept Friedman’s dictum that ‘a theory cannot be tested by the ‘realism’ of its ‘assumptions’’ (Friedman, 1953, p. 23) were unlikely to reject a paper because of its assumptions, especially if it otherwise made assumptions that Neoclassical economists accept. Thus, Nordhaus’s initial sorties in this area received a free pass. After this, a weakness of the refereeing process took over. As any published academic knows, once you are published in an area, journal editors will nominate you as a referee for that area. Thus, rather than peer review providing an independent check on the veracity of research, it can allow the enforcement of a hegemony. As one of the first of the very few Neoclassical economists to work on climate change, and the first to proffer empirical estimates of the damages to the economy from climate change, this put Nordhaus in the position to both frame the debate, and to play the role of gatekeeper. One can surmise that he relished this role, given not only his attacks on Forrester and the Limits to Growth (Meadows, Randers, et al., 1972; Nordhaus, 1973; Nordhaus et al., 1992), but also his attack on his fellow Neoclassical economist Nicholas Stern for using a low discount rate in The Stern Review (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007).

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 2NC – L – Climate Change – AT Economics Key

Reject neoclassical models for addressing climate change – they are self-referential and intentional exclude datasets and climate scientists from their studies to establish their conclusions

Keen 2020 – University College London

Steve Keen “The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change” Globalizations · September 2020 DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1807856

Nordhaus conducted the only two surveys of ‘expert opinions’ to estimate the impact of global warming on GDP, in 1994 (Nordhaus, 1994a), and 2017 (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017). The former asked people from various academic backgrounds to give their estimates of the impact on GDP of three global warming scenarios: (A) a 3°C rise by 2090; (B) a 6°C rise by 2175; and (C) a 6°C rise by 2090. The numbers used by the IPCC from this study in Figure 1 were a 3°C temperature rise for a 3.6% fall in GDP. Expert opinions are a valid procedure to aggregate knowledge in areas that require a large number of disparate fields to be aggregated, as the climate scientist Tim Lenton and co-authors explained in their paper ‘Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system’ (Lenton et al., 2008): formal elicitations of expert beliefs have frequently been used to bring current understanding of model studies, empirical evidence, and theoretical considerations to bear on policy-relevant variables. From a natural science perspective, a general criticism is that expert beliefs carry subjective biases and, moreover, do not add to the body of scientific knowledge unless verified by data or theory. Nonetheless, expert elicitations, based on rigorous protocols from statistics and risk analysis, have proved to be a very valuable source of information in public policymaking. It is increasingly recognized that they can also play a valuable role for informing climate policy decisions. (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 1791) I cite this paper in contrast to Nordhaus’s here for two reasons: (1) it shows how expert opinion surveys should be conducted; (2) Nordhaus later cites this survey in support of his use of a ‘damage function’ for climate change which lacks tipping points, when this survey explicitly rejects such functions. Lenton et al.’s survey was sent to 193 scientists, of whom 52 responded. Respondents were specifically instructed to stick to their area of knowledge, rather than to speculate more broadly: ‘Participants were encouraged to remain in their area of expertise’ (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 10). These are listed in Table 2. Nordhaus’s survey began with a letter requesting 22 people to participate, 18 of whom fully complied, and one partially. Nordhaus describes them as including 10 economists, 4 ‘other social scientists’, and 5 ‘natural scientists and engineers’, but also notes that eight of the economists come from ‘other subdisciplines of economics (those whose principal concerns lie outside environmental economics)’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 48). This, ipso facto, should rule them out from taking part in this expert survey in the first place. One of them was Larry Summers, who is probably the source of the choicest quotes in the paper, such as ‘For my answer, the existence value [of species] is irrelevant – I don’t care about ants except for drugs’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 50). Lenton’s survey combined the expertise of its interviewees in specific fields of climate change to compile a list of large elements of the planet’s climatic system (>1000 km in extent) which could be triggered into a qualitative change of state by increases in global temperature of between 0.5°C (disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice) and 6°C (amplified En Nino causing drought in Southeast Asia and elsewhere), on timescales varying from 10 years (Arctic summer sea ice) to 300 years (West Antarctic Ice Shelf disintegration) (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 1788). Nordhaus’s survey was summarized by a superficially bland pair of numbers – 3°C temperature rise and a 3.6% fall in GDP – but that summary hides far more than it reveals. There was extensive disagreement, well documented by Nordhaus, between the relatively tiny cohort of actual scientists surveyed, and, in particular, the economists ‘whose principal concerns lie outside environmental economics’. The quotes from the economists surveyed also reveal the source of the predisposition by economists in general to dismiss the significance of climate change. As Nordhaus noted, ‘Natural scientists’ estimates [of the damages from climate change] were 20– 30 times higher than mainstream economists’’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 49). The average estimate by ‘Non-environmental economists’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, Figure 4, p. 49) of the damages to GDP a 3° C rise by 2090 was 0.4% of GDP; the average for natural scientists was 12.3%, and this was with one of them refusing to answer Nordhaus’s key questions: Also, although the willingness of the respondents to hazard estimates of subjective probabilities was encouraging, it should be emphasized that most respondents proffered these estimates with reservations and a recognition of the inherent difficulty of the task. One respondent (19), however, was a holdout from such guesswork, writing: I must tell you that I marvel that economists are willing to make quantitative estimates of economic consequences of climate change where the only measures available are estimates of global surface average increases in temperature. As [one] who has spent his career worrying about the vagaries of the dynamics of the atmosphere, I marvel that they can translate a single global number, an extremely poor surrogate for a description of the climatic conditions, into quantitative estimates of impacts of global economic conditions. (Nordhaus, 1994a, pp. 50–51) Comments from economists lay at the other end of the spectrum from this self-absented scientist. Because they had a strong belief in the ability of ‘human societies’ to adapt – born of their acceptance of the Neoclassical model of capitalism, in which ‘the economy’ always returns to equilibrium after a ‘exogenous shock’ – they could not imagine that climate change could do significant damage to the economy, whatever it might do to the biosphere itself: One respondent suggested whimsically that it was hardly surprising, given that the economists know little about the intricate web of natural ecosystems, whereas natural scientists know equally little about the incredible adaptability of human societies… There is a clear difference in outlook among the respondents, depending on their assumptions about the ability of society to adapt to climatic changes. One was concerned that society’s response to the approaching millennium would be akin to that prevalent during the Dark Ages, whereas another respondent held that the degree of adaptability of human economies is so high that for most of the scenarios the impact of global warming would be “essentially zero”. An economist explains that in his view energy and brain power are the only limits to growth in the long run, and with sufficient quantities of these it is possible to adapt or develop new technologies so as to prevent any significant economic costs. (Nordhaus, 1994a, pp. 48–49; all emphases added) Given this extreme divergence of opinion between economists and scientists, one might imagine that Nordhaus’s next survey would examine the reasons for it. In fact, the opposite applied: his methodology excluded non-economists entirely. Rather than a survey of experts, this was a literature survey (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017), which ipso facto is another legitimate method to provide data for a topic subject that is difficult to measure, and subject to high uncertainty. He and his co-author searched for relevant articles using the string ‘(damage OR impact) AND climate AND cost’ (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017, p. 7), which is reasonable, if too broad (as they admit in the paper). The key flaw in this research was where they looked: they executed their search string in Google, which returned 64 million results, Google Scholar, which returned 2.8 million, and the economics specific database Econlit, which returned just 1700 studies. On the grounds that there were too many results in Google and Google Scholar, they ignored those results, and simply surveyed the 1700 articles in Econlit (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017, p. 7). These are, almost exclusively, articles written by economists.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Climate Change

Neoclassical economics is the foundation for all US environmental policy – economists use deliberately skewed data sets to reinforce their own biases – not only does this dampen the urgency for change, but it gives justification for companies and policy makers to reverse course based on statistical models that show a ‘negligible impact’ on their total profit

Keen 2020 – University College London

Steve Keen “The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change” Globalizations · September 2020 DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1807856

William Nordhaus was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Mirowski, 2020) in 2018 for his work on climate change. His first major paper in this area was ‘World Dynamics: Measurement Without Data’ (Nordhaus, 1973), which attacked the pessimistic predictions in Jay Forrester’s World Dynamics (Forrester, 1971, 1973) on the grounds, amongst others, that his predictions were not firmly grounded in empirical research: The treatment of empirical relations in World Dynamics can be summarised as measurement without data…Not a single relationship or variable is drawn from actual data or empirical studies. (Nordhaus, 1973, p. 1157; italics in original, subsequent emphases added) There is no explicit or apparent reference to data or existing empirical studies. (Nordhaus, 1973, p. 1182) Whereas most scientists would require empirical validation of either the assumptions or the predictions of the model before declaring its truth content, Forrester is apparently content with subjective plausibility. (Nordhaus, 1973, p. 1183) Sixth, there is some lack of humility toward predicting the future. Can we treat seriously Forrester’s (or anybody’s) predictions in economics and social science for the next 130 years? Long-run economic forecasts have generally fared quite poorly…And now, without the scantest reference to economic theory or empirical data, Forrester predicts that the world’s material standard of living will peak in 1990 and then decline. (Nordhaus, 1973, p. 1183) After this paper, Nordhaus’s own research focused upon the economics of climate change. One could rightly expect, from his critique of Forrester, that Nordhaus was scrupulous about basing his modelling upon sound empirical data. One’s expectations would be dashed. Whereas Nordhaus characterized Forrester’s work as ‘measurement without data’, Nordhaus’s can be characterized as ‘making up numbers to support a pre-existing belief’: specifically, that climate change could have only a trivial impact upon the economy. This practice was replicated, rather than challenged, by subsequent Neoclassical economists – with some honourable exceptions, notably Pindyck (2017), Weitzman (2011a, 2011b), DeCanio (2003), Cline (1996), Darwin (1999), Kaufmann (1997, 1998), and Quiggin and Horowitz (1999). The end product is a set of purported empirical estimates of the impact of climate change upon the economy that are utterly spurious, and yet which have been used to calibrate the ‘Integrated Assessment Models’ (IAMs) that have largely guided the political responses to climate change. DeCanio expressed both the significance and the danger of this work very well in his book Economic Models of Climate Change: A Critique: Perhaps the greatest threat from climate change is the risk it poses for large-scale catastrophic disruptions of Earth systems… Business as usual amounts to conducting a one-time, irreversible experiment of unknown outcome with the habitability of the entire planet. Given the magnitude of the stakes, it is perhaps surprising that much of the debate about the climate has been cast in terms of economics… Nevertheless, it is undeniably the case that economic arguments, claims, and calculations have been the dominant influence on the public political debate on climate policy in the United States and around the world…It is an open question whether the economic arguments were the cause or only an ex post justification of the decisions made by both administrations, but there is no doubt that economists have claimed that their calculations should dictate the proper course of action. (DeCanio, 2003, pp. 2–4) The impact of these economists goes beyond merely advising governments, to actually writing the economic components of the formal reports by the IPCC (‘Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change’), the main authority coordinating humanity’s response, such as it is, to climate change. The blasé conclusions they reach – such as the following from the 2014 IPCC Report (Field et al., 2014) – carry far more weight with politicians, obsessed as they are with their countries’ GDP growth rates, than the much more alarming ecological warnings in the sections of the Report written by actual scientists: Global economic impacts from climate change are difficult to estimate. Economic impact estimates completed over the past 20 years vary in their coverage of subsets of economic sectors and depend on a large number of assumptions, many of which are disputable, and many estimates do not account for catastrophic changes, tipping points, and many other factors. With these recognized limitations, the incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for additional temperature increases of ∼2°C are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income. (Arent, Tol, et al., 2014, p. 663; emphasis added) This is a prediction, not of a drop in the annual rate of economic growth – which would be significant even, at the lower bound of 0.2% – but a prediction that the level of GDP will be between 0.2% and 2% lower, when global temperatures are 2°C higher than pre-industrial levels, compared to what they would have been in the complete absence of global warming. This involves a trivial decline in the predicted rate of economic growth between 2014 and whenever the 2°C increase occurs, even at the upper bound of 2%. Given the impact that economists have had on public policy towards climate change, and the immediacy of the threat we now face from climate change (Amen et al., 2008; Gills, 2020; Gills & Morgan, 2019), this work could soon be exposed as the most significant and dangerous hoax in the history of science. Fictional empirics The numerical relationships that economists assert exist between global temperature change and GDP change were summarized in Figure 1 of the chapter ‘Key Economic Sectors and Services’ (Arent et al., 2014b) in the 2014 IPCC Report Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Field et al., 2014). It is reproduced below as Figure 1. The sources of these numbers – as I explain below, they cannot be called ‘data points’ – are given in Table SM10-1 from the supplement to this report (Arent et al., 2014a, p. SM10-4).1 Four classifications of the approaches used were listed by the IPCC: ‘Enumeration’ (ten studies); ‘Statistical’ (5 studies); ‘CGE’ (‘Computable General Equilibrium’: 2 studies – one with 2 results); and ‘Expert Elicitation’ (1 study). Enumeration: it’s what you don’t count that counts The bland description of what the ‘Enumeration’ approach entails given by Tol makes it seem unobjectionable: In this approach, estimates of the “physical effects” of climate change are obtained one by one from natural science papers, which in turn may be based on some combination of climate models, impact models, and laboratory experiments. The physical impacts must then each be given a price and added up. For agricultural products, an example of a traded good or service, agronomy papers are used to predict the effect of climate on crop yield, and then market prices or economic models are used to value the change in output. (Tol, 2009, pp. 31–32) However, this analysis commenced from the perspective, stated in the very first reference in this tradition (Nordhaus, 1991), that climate change is a relatively trivial issue: First, it must be recognised that human societies thrive in a wide variety of climatic zones. For the bulk of economic activity, non-climate variables like labour skills, access to markets, or technology swamp climatic considerations in determining economic efficiency. (Nordhaus, 1991, p. 930; emphasis added) If there had been a decent evaluation process in place at this time for research into the economic impact of climate change, this paragraph alone should have raised alarm bells: yes, it is quite likely that climate today is a less important determinant of ‘economic efficiency’ today than ‘labour skills, access to markets, or technology’, when one is comparing one region or country with another today. But what is the relevance of this cross-sectional comparison to assessing the impact of drastically altering the entire planet’s climate over time, via the retention of additional solar energy from additional greenhouse gases? One sentence further on, Nordhaus excludes 87% of US industry from consideration, on the basis that it takes place ‘in carefully controlled environments that will not be directly affected by climate change’: Table 5 shows a sectoral breakdown of United States national income, where the economy is subdivided by the sectoral sensitivity to greenhouse warming. The most sensitive sectors are likely to be those, such as agriculture and forestry, in which output depends in a significant way upon climatic variables. At the other extreme are activities, such as cardiovascular surgery or microprocessor fabrication in ‘clean rooms’, which are undertaken in carefully controlled environments that will not be directly affected by climate change. Our estimate is that approximately 3% of United States national output is produced in highly sensitive sectors, another 10% in moderately sensitive sectors, and about 87% in sectors that are negligibly affected by climate change. (Nordhaus, 1991, p. 930; emphasis added) The examples of ‘cardiovascular surgery or microprocessor fabrication in ‘clean rooms’’ might seem reasonable activities to describe as taking place in ‘carefully controlled environments’. However, Nordhaus’s list of industries that he simply assumed would be negligibly impacted by climate change is so broad, and so large, that it is obvious that what he meant by ‘not be directly affected by climate change’ is anything that takes place indoors – or, indeed, underground, since he includes mining as one of the unaffected sectors. Table 1, which is an extract from Nordhaus’s breakdown of economic activity by vulnerability to climatic change in US 1991 $ terms (Nordhaus, 1991, Table 5 p. 931). Since this was the first paper in a research tradition, one might hope that subsequent researchers challenged this assumption. However, instead of challenging it, they replicated it. The 2014 IPCC Report repeats the assertion that climate change will be a trivial determinant of future economic performance: For most economic sectors, the impact of climate change will be small relative to the impacts of other drivers (medium evidence, high agreement). Changes in population, age, income, technology, relative prices, lifestyle, regulation, governance, and many other aspects of socioeconomic development will have an impact on the supply and demand of economic goods and services that is large relative to the impact of climate change. (Arent et al., 2014b, p. 662) It also repeats the assertion that indoor activities will be unaffected. The one change between Nordhaus in 1991 and the IPCC Report 23 years later is that it no longer lumps mining in the ‘not really exposed to climate change’ bracket (Nordhaus, 1993).2 Otherwise it repeats Nordhaus’s assumption that anything done indoors will be unaffected by climate change: FAQ 10.3 Are other economic sectors vulnerable to climate change too? Economic activities such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining are exposed to the weather and thus vulnerable to climate change. Other economic activities, such as manufacturing and services, largely take place in controlled environments and are not really exposed to climate change. (Arent et al., 2014b, p. 688; emphasis added) All the intervening papers between Nordhaus in 1991 and the IPCC in 2014 maintain this assumption: neither manufacturing, nor mining, transportation, communication, finance, insurance and non-coastal real estate, retail and wholesale trade, nor government services, appear in the ‘enumerated’ industries in the ‘Coverage’ column in Table A1. All these studies have simply assumed that these industries, which account for of the order of 90% of GDP, will be unaffected by climate change. There is a ‘poker player’s tell’ in the FAQ quoted above which implies that these Neoclassical economists are on a par with United States President, Donald Trump, in their appreciation of what climate change entails. This is the statement that ‘Economic activities such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining are exposed to the weather and thus vulnerable to climate change’. Explicitly, they are saying that if an activity is exposed to the weather, it is vulnerable to climate change, but if it is not, it is ‘not really exposed to climate change’. They are equating the climate to the weather. While this is a harsh judgment to pass on fellow academics, there is simply no other way to make sense of their collective decision to exclude, by assumption, almost 90% of GDP from their enumeration of damages from climate change. Nor is there any other way to interpret the core assumption of their other dominant method of making up numbers for their models, the so-called ‘statistical’ or ‘cross-sectional’ method. The ‘Statistical approach’ While locating the fundamental flaw in the ‘enumeration’ approach took some additional research, the flaw in the statistical approach was obvious in the first reference I read on it, Richard Tol’s muchcorrected (Tol, 2014) and much-criticised paper (Gelman, 2014, 2015, 2019; Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017, p. 10), ‘The Economic Effects of Climate Change’: An alternative approach, exemplified in Mendelsohn’s work (Mendelsohn, Morrison, et al., 2000; Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, et al., 2000) can be called the statistical approach. It is based on direct estimates of the welfare impacts, using observed variations (across space within a single country) in prices and expenditures to discern the effect of climate. Mendelsohn assumes that the observed variation of economic activity with climate over space holds over time as well; and uses climate models to estimate the future effect of climate change. (Tol, 2009, p. 32) If the methodological fallacy in this reasoning is not immediately apparent – bearing in mind that numerous academic referees have let pass papers making this assumption – think what it would mean if this assumption were correct. Within the United States, it is generally true that very hot and very cold regions have a lower level of per capita income than median temperature regions. Using the States of the contiguous continental USA for those regions, Florida (average temperature 22.5°C) and North Dakota (average temperature 4.7°C), for example, have lower per capita incomes than New York (average temperature 7.4° C). But the difference in average temperatures is far from the only reason for differences in income, and in the greater scheme of things, the differences are trivial anyway: as American States, at the global level they are all in the high per capita income range (respectively $26,000, $26,700 and $43,300 per annum in 2000 US dollars). A statistical study of the relationship between ‘Gross State Product’ (GSP) per capita and temperature will therefore find a weak, nonlinear relationship, with GSP per capita rising from low temperatures, peaking at medium ones, and falling at higher temperatures. If you then assume that this same relationship between GDP and temperature will apply as global temperatures rise with Global Warming, you will conclude that Global Warming will have a trivial impact on global GDP. Your assumption is your conclusion. This is illustrated by Figure 2, which shows a scatter plot of deviations from the national average temperature by State in °C, against the deviations from the national average (GDP per capita) of Gross State Product per capita in percent of GDP (the source data is in Table A2), and a quadratic fit to this data, which has a coefficient of −0.00318,3 and, as expected, a weak correlation coefficient of 0.31.4 This regression thus yields a very poor, but not entirely useless, ‘in-sample’ model of how temperature deviations from the USA average today slightly influence deviations from average US GDP per capita today. In words, Equation (1) asserts that Gross State Product per capita falls by 0.318% (of the national average GDP per capita) for every 1°C difference in temperature (from the national average temperature) squared: GSPPC(DT) = −0.318% × DT2 (1) An absurd ‘out of sample’ policy recommendation from this model would be that the US’s GDP would increase if hotter and colder States could move towards the average temperature for the USA. This absurd recommendation could be ‘refined’ by using this same data to calculate the optimum temperature for the USA’s GDP, and then proposing that all States move to that temperature. Of course, these ‘policies’ are clearly impossible, because the States can’t change their location on the planet. However, the economists doing these studies reasoned that Global Warming would achieve the same result over time (with the drawback that it would be applied equally to all regions). So they did indeed calculate optimum temperatures for each of the sectors they expected to be affected by climate change – with their calculations excluding the same list of sectors that the ‘enumeration’ approach assumed would be unaffected (manufacturing, mining, services, etc.): Both the reduced-form and cross-sectional response functions imply that the net productivity of sensitive economic sectors is a hill-shaped function of temperature (Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, et al., 2000). Warming creates benefits for countries that are currently on the cool side of the hill and damages for countries on the warm side of the hill. The exact optimum temperature varies by sector. For example, according to the Ricardian model, the optimum temperatures for agriculture, forestry, and energy are 14.2, 14.8 and 8.6°C, respectively. With the reduced form model, the optimum temperatures for agriculture and energy are 11.7 and 10.0. (Mendelsohn, Morrison, et al., 2000, p. 558) They then estimated the impact on GDP of increasing global temperatures, assuming that the same coefficients they found for the relationships between temperature and output today (using what Tol called ‘the statistical’ and Mendelsohn more accurately labels the ‘cross-sectional’ approach) could be used to estimate the impact of global warming. This resulted in more than one study which concluded that increasing global temperatures via global warming would be beneficial to the economy. Here, for example, is Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, et al. (2000) on the impact of a 2.5°C increase in global temperatures: Compared to the size of the economy in 2100 ($217 trillion), the market effects are small…The Crosssectional climate-response functions imply a narrower range of impacts across GCMs: from $97 to $185 billion of benefits with an average of $145 billion of benefits a year. (Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, et al., 2000, p. 41; emphasis added) The, once more, explicit assumption these economists are making is that it doesn’t matter how you alter temperature. Whether this is hypothetically done by altering a region’s location on the planet – which is impossible – or by altering the temperature of the entire planet – which is what Climate Change is doing – they assumed that the impact on GDP would be the same.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Links › 1NC – L – Carbon Tax

A carbon tax directly promotes neoclassical economics by initiating an incentive structure to individuals through market interaction. The assumption of perfect substitution ignores structural factors preventing adoption, guaranteeing more emissions.

Towler 19 – [Markey‐Towler, Brendan: Researcher, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. Author of An Architecture of the Mind: A Psychological Foundation for the Science of Everyday Life (2018). PhD from the University of Queensland, Australia with a thesis entitled Foundations for Economic Analysis: The Architecture of Socioeconomic Complexity, advised by Professors John Foster, Peter Earl and Michelle Baddeley. Email: brendan.markeytowler@uqconnect.edu.au. "The new microeconomics: A psychological, institutional, and evolutionary paradigm with neoclassical economics as a special case." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 78.1 (2019): 95-135. Ghs – ib]

The new paradigm of psychological economics not only advances our understanding of socioeconomic systems from an institutional-evolutionary perspective. It also has significant practical value in improving the formulation and implementation of strategy and policy. It expands the means by which policy and strategy may be implemented, shows why traditional incentive-based methods may be limited, and proposes alternative or complementary methods. One such method has a readily applicable and simple algorithmic structure (Markey-Towler 2017, 2018a). We can see its practical value by applying it to some microeconomic policy problems. Predicates of Privatization: Institutional and Technological Knowledge Applying a psychological and institutional-evolutionary approach to the problem of privatization, we readily discover the truth of what Intriligator (1994) suggested with respect to the former Soviet Union: the success of shock therapy and especially privatization was predicated on a range of non-incentive factors. Without them, the predictions of incentives based neoclassical economics would not hold. There was no state of substitutability between modes of behavior in a Communist system and in a free-market system. Specifically, there was little knowledge of how to enter into markets with new businesses to challenge monopolies. In order for competition to operate, ex-Soviet citizens needed time to develop the knowledge of how to make use of Western production technology and how to meet regulatory requirements. They also need a relatively stable regulatory system, but that was not forthcoming. Even more basically, they needed knowledge of how to operate within the new legal system, but it first had to be formulated. In other words, there was insufficient knowledge of the radically new institutions within the former Soviet bloc, and the institutional system was too unstable for states of substitutability to exist between prior modes of socioeconomic behavior and new modes for any sort of meaningful competition to develop. The newly freed market failed to emerge before state capture occurred. The incentives-based neoclassical theory was not "wrong,” but it was rendered moot, for the necessary preconditions had not been established. If we take the Australian experience of privatization, now we see reasons why it was, relatively positive, while still mixed. The Australian regulatory and legal environment was stable for the period of privatization. Reforms were extensively debated in public and systematically planned before being implemented. Nevertheless, while knowledge was available of the technologies that allowed new entrants to markets, knowledge of how to apply them effectively was insufficient to guarantee a state of substitutability between previous modes of behavior in a monopolistic market and a competitive market. It is no small matter to go into competition with a major ex-government telecommunications monopoly like Telstra. One must have vast resources before being able to meet the requirements imposed by customers for telecommunications services, let alone provide complementarities like landline, mobile and internet packages. Or take the Big Four banks that monopolize the financial market, including the ex-government Commonwealth Bank. Regulatory requirements alone make it prohibitive for new banks to enter the market, and the only real competition they have encountered has come from allowing other financial institutions to offer banking services. Notwithstanding the ability to develop the requisite institutional knowledge to compete with newly privatized monopolies, technological and logistical knowledge are also essential before the incentives-based neoclassical theory could be applied to predict an increase of efficiency from privatization. Incentive-based neoclassical economic theory is not wrong so much as it is incomplete. That theory assumed a state of substitutability between behavior in a heavily nationalized economy and in a privatized economy that was open to competition. But it did not exist in reality because the institutional structure of society was too disrupted and unsettled for the requisite knowledge of how and why to behave in new ways to emerge. The failure to apply a psychological institutional-evolutionary economic perspective in both the Soviet and Australian experience left massive, inefficient institutions more or less unchallenged by competition. Effective Climate Policy = Markets x Technology x Framing Policies to produce emissions of greenhouse gases provides another arena in which to compare competing theoretical perspectives. Incentives-based neoclassical theory provides a disarmingly simple suggestion to solve this problem. To align private incentives and a given policy, neoclassical theory proposes to tax emissions directly, or to put a price on emissions to reveal the "true" incentive structure to individuals through market interaction. This is straightforward neoclassical economics. But rational choice theory about incentives is predicated on the theory of substitution, and there is no reason to assume that a state of substitution exists between existing technologies that create emissions and new technologies that do not. In Australia, neoclassical economics was directly applied to the formulation of climate change policy. An incentives-based policy was adopted, in which a tax was introduced (later to become a floating price) on carbon emissions, to be compensated by transfers (Jotzo 2012). Standard incentives-based modelling by Meng, Siriwardana, and McNeill (2012) predicted that the change of incentives would cause a substitution away from emissions-intensive industries with a mild economic contraction accompanying it. The policy was repealed after a change of government and replaced with a “command and control” policy, but the results from its brief existence suggest that the policy did not have the predicted outcomes. Carbon emissions increased by several megatons, even while household electricity prices increased by at least 10 percent (Robson 2014). This does not even account for an earlier price rise likely brought about by an uncertain policy environment. This is not especially difficult to understand with our psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective. Electricity is a necessity for most households and businesses, and they require a certain quanta of it regardless of prices (unless those prices become prohibitive). But there was no readily available substitute technology in Australia by which that electricity might be produced without incurring a substantial tax on emissions. The critical assumption of substitutability, on which neoclassical analysis in favor of the tax was based, was incorrect. The technologies exist by which emissions might be reduced (natural gas, solar, wind, water), but they were not adopted, in part due to regulated requirements of security, resilience and redundancy across the system, as well as simple, but massive infrastructure requirements imposed by engineering concerns. It may have been the case, were the tax implemented for longer, that such technologies might have emerged, though one might be rightly skeptical, since only a half-hearted attempt was made to stimulate and encourage investment in a renewable energy sector. Yet a further barrier to incentives-based policy existed which one would only notice by adopting a psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective. This is the problem of framing. Without the environment having been framed in such a way that households and business could substitute between electricity suppliers, all neoclassical incentive-based considerations were moot. Changing electricity suppliers is no small matter in Australia. It only became possible in the decade before the carbon tax was introduced, and the bureaucratic entanglements alone were a nightmare. Furthermore, there were few means of comparing supply contracts (which can be complex even for persons with knowledge of the market). That might have constrained perception of the possibility of changing suppliers. The Australian government made no effort to frame the environment of households and businesses in a way that they could perceive the possibility of substitution to a low-emissions supplier. Without that possibility, all theories about substitution from high to low emissions technologies were entirely moot. Once again, the incentives-based neoclassical theory of how one might respond to climate change was not wrong but rather incomplete. The assumption of substitutability upon which it was predicated was not met in reality due to regulatory and engineering requirements, and very little consideration was given to framing choices so that consumers could consider alternative electricity supply technologies. The results of not considering a psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective on the socioeconomic system were that many families, especially poorer ones, faced higher electricity prices, and very little was achieved by way of emissions reduction.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Thesis › Thesis 3

Thesis Card

Temesgen et al. 19 – A.K. Temesgen, V.M. Storsletten, and O.D Jakobsen are researchers and theorists about neoclassical economics and economics broadly. They are all deeply interested in economics. They are also deeply interested in neoclassical economics, [“Circular Economy – Reducing Symptoms or Radical Change?Philosophy of Management, DOI: 10.1007/s40926-019-00112-1]RA

Neoclassical Economics (NE) is still firmly rooted in the 18th century's mechanical worldview. The influence of Newtonian mechanics is pervasive in the Neoclassical paradigm (Schlaile et al. 2018). For example, William Stanley Jevons, one of the central theorists of neoclassical economics defined utility as ‘force of attraction’ between a consumer and a desired object, in the same spirit as the gravitational force of mechanical physics (Schlaile et al. 2018, p.11). Individuals are envisaged as isolated atoms. NE ‘assume[s] that society is simply the sum of its individuals, the social good is the sum of individual wants, and markets automatically guide individual behavior to the common good’ (Costanza et al. 2014, p.30). Economic agents are perfectly rational (rationality here is defined as maintaining stable and consistent preferences), and with full information and no transaction costs they make choices that maximize their individual utility. The NE worldview ‘gives no regard to the experience of human beings in their other economic roles as producers, regulators, merchandisers, etc. (let alone other roles, such as citizens, parents, and so on)’ (Goodwin 1991, p.2). This ontological view of individuals as isolated and ‘passive agents in a static closed system …justifies… [the] formulation of social reality as typified by regularities … allowing the methodology of deductive reasoning and mathematical formalism’ (Spash 2012, p.44). The epistemology of neoclassical economics is characterized by the dominance of logical positivism. The association of utility with revealed preferences is a logical positivist view that people’s actions in the market represent their motivations. It seems to say ‘all we can scientifically know about people is their actions’ (Goodwin 1991, p.2). Others criticize its ontological and methodological individualism (that is, the implication that the social good can only be explained by looking at the individual and that social phenomenon is not more than the sum of its parts (Lukes 1968; Robeyns 2005). Neoclassical Economics limits itself to studying the economic sphere with little interaction with other disciplines such us ecology, sociology or anthropology. This indicates that it operates in a multidisciplinary epistemological space where different disciplines operate in parallel and do not interact with each other (Max-Neef 2005). When examining the foundations of NE, it is important to examine the values embedded in the paradigm (i.e., axiology). It is difficult to find a good account of the NE value-system because the field considers itself to be value-free. In standard undergraduate textbooks of economics, positive (value free) economics is differentiated from the normative and regarded as more ‘scientific’ (Spash 2012, p.37). However, this claim of achieving separability of facts from value is highly criticized (Putnam 2004). We can discern the values in NE by looking at the focus it has on individuals as utility maximizing consumers and on organizations as profit maximizing firms. No other roles are assigned to individuals or organizations. This limited framework legitimizes ‘specific values, thinking patterns and behavior of various actors in society, be they business leaders, politicians or ordinary citizens’ (Söderbaum 1999, p.163). The rhetoric of self-interested competition as the dominant form of individual action, material growth as a social good and free-markets as the preferred institution of economic interaction can justify the actions of ‘corporations and governments extracting resources, dislocating indigenous populations and creating environmental destruction’ (Spash 2012, p.44). These morally questionable practices are often justified as ‘being 8 good for the economy, for creating jobs, and boosting profit to businesses’. This is value monism whereby monetary value is the deciding factor between different courses of action. In the mechanical worldview of NE, nature is depicted merely as an input into the production process. NE emphasizes the instrumental value of nature. Environmental problems that may be caused by the economic system are portrayed as externalities and are exogenous to the economic models themselves. Attempts to address these externalities have to be justified by cost-benefit analyses where the impacts are converted to monetary value and are evaluated by their consequences for the economy (Spash 2009). Natural resources are subordinate to the economy and are depicted as ‘essentially limitless due to technical progress and infinite substitutability’(Costanza et al. 2014, p.58) (see figure 1)

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Thesis › Thesis 2

Neoclassical economic models rely on specific market conditions to demonstrate any reliability – not only are these models unrealistically utopian, but they exacerbate inequalities by dismissing any challenge.

Ackerman and Beggs 2013 – editor @ Jacobin and editor at Jacobin and a lecturer in political economy at the University of Sydney

Seth Ackerman and Mike Beggs 09.03.2013 “Don’t Mention the War” https://jacobin.com/2013/09/dont-mention-the-war

But beyond the abstract debates over ethical systems or the narrow empirical disputes, the picture that emerged from this noisy exchange was, if you looked closely enough, one of broad agreement over certain unspoken fundamentals. Mainstream economics, despite its image of bloodless scientism — and despite its own denials — possesses what can properly be called a unified “social vision”: a coherent moral-philosophical account of how our society works, and how it ought to work. This is not an economic theory that dispenses some uniform set of policy conclusions. It’s a meta-theory. And this meta-theory is almost universally shared by both liberal and conservative economists. Like many philosophers, economists begin their story by imagining a fictional utopia. Mankiw calls it the “classical benchmark.” But there are other names for it — “the standard competitive model,” “perfect markets,” “an Arrow-Debreu world.” The central principle of this utopia is that it’s an absolutely free market: a pure night-watchman state, with no restrictions on voluntary exchange between self-interested individuals, hence no minimum wages or rent controls, and no income taxes. It’s further assumed that in such a market, everyone earns the marginal product of their labor — or, as Mankiw puts it, “compensation congruent with their contributions.” Now, ever since its birth more than a century ago, there’s been debate about whether the theory of marginal productivity actually constitutes an ethical theory of just deserts, as Mankiw believes. Certainly several of its late nineteenth-century architects agreed with him, seeing the doctrine’s conservative implications as one of its main attractions — most famously John Bates Clark, one of the founders of the American Economic Association. The theory holds that under perfect markets, competition will drive the market wage for a given type of worker toward that worker’s marginal productivity, which can be defined as the amount of revenue a firm would lose, due to foregone output, if one such worker were removed from production. (An analogous process involving the “marginal product of capital” is said to determine the profit rate.) Figures like Clark and Mankiw have held that this marginal increment of revenue can be regarded as the worker’s “contribution” to production, thus legitimating her wage. Others, such as Alfred Marshall, have seen this last step as an ethical leap of logic, since the theory itself points to a whole range of factors that will help determine a worker’s marginal product but have nothing to do with her own personal actions or attributes: fluctuations in the prices of various goods, the structure of demand, random shifts such as harvests or the weather, technological changes inside or outside the worker’s own industry. And, of course, the theory says nothing about how individuals acquired their endowment of factors (labor or capital) in the first place, or why the alleged contribution of capital should be regarded as the contribution of its owner. But whether or not it actually does justify capitalist income distribution, the marginal productivity theory certainly sounds like an ethical theory — especially to impressionable freshmen in lecture halls or traveling businessmen browsing the op-ed page. As Mankiw’s textbook puts it, in answer to Ricardo’s classic question: “We can now explain how much income goes to labor, how much goes to landowners, and how much goes to the owners of capital. . . . Labor, land, and capital each earn the value of their marginal contribution to the production process.” For eight decades, starting in the 1870s, many of the finest minds of economics tried to prove mathematically that if this imaginary perfect free-market economy did exist, it would be both rational and beneficent; that through the blind workings of the free market, supply and demand for every good would spontaneously match and the results would be desirable. (Or at least they tried to discover what conditions would be necessary to guarantee that outcome.) The culmination of that work, in Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu’s Nobel Prize-winning 1954 proof, was long seen by many as the profession’s defining achievement. Arrow and Debreu proved that such an economy would always contain at least one potential configuration of prices and products in which supply and demand would match in every market, and that this configuration would be “optimal,” in the sense that no one could be made better off without someone else being made worse off. This is where the neoclassicals derive their moral-philosophical vision of society: they posit a quasi-metaphysical thought experiment in which our real-life capitalist economy is held up as merely a messy, imperfect copy of the perfect benchmark. Then they stipulate that we can never really deem anything in our own economy unsatisfactory (“suboptimal”) without first showing that it results from some specific divergence from the fictional utopia. The logic of this move is impeccable: since the pure-market model produces optimal results on paper, those who claim our own society falls short must identify the specific impurity at fault. The same goes for wages, which must be assumed equal to marginal productivity — “congruent to contribution” — unless a specific “distortion” or “imperfection” can be documented. In the words of Franklin Fisher, an eminent MIT theorist, the theorems underpinning this thought experiment constitute “the central set of propositions that economists have to offer the outside world — propositions that are, in a real sense, the foundations of Western capitalism. . . . They underlie all the looser statements about the desirability of a free-market system.” Politically, the communicants of this faith divide sharply over the question of how often “imperfections” actually occur in real life — and therefore how much human meddling in nature’s plan should be allowed. For example, Professor Mark Thoma, a Paul Krugman-style liberal with an influential economics blog, strenuously disputes the idea that markets are always the best solution: “There is nothing special about markets per se — they can perform very badly in some circumstances. It is competitive markets that are magic.” Some free-market policies could actually be harmful: they could “move the outcome further from the ideal competitive benchmark rather than closer to it.” This is where the discipline’s technocratic and philosophical sides collide: any policy proposal may be advocated; but the moral-philosophical framework must be respected. We can fail the model, but the model can never fail. And yet the model does fail. All models in social science are unrealistic. But the “ideal competitive benchmark” (the Arrow-Debreu world and its family of general equilibrium models) is not just unrealistic. It depicts a world that is neither possible nor imaginable — and yet it is also undesirable. Here are some of its assumptions: All markets must be perfectly competitive (whereas most of ours are not); if such a world existed, the requirement of perfect competition would rule out any division of labor or long-run economic growth. There must be an infinite number of futures markets — one for every good in existence, delivered at every future date, for the rest of time. And yet, in the model, time doesn’t really exist: all economic decisions for all of human history were made in an auction at the beginning of the world. Moreover, far from being harmonious, this theoretical world has been discovered to be chaotic — perpetually in random motion, never actually arriving at any of its “optimal” configurations except by accident. This finding alone nullifies the very meaning of the theory. That is why some of the leading theorists who developed these models — towering figures like Frank Hahn and Kenneth Arrow — use words like “sterile,” “arid” and “empty” to describe them. Yet this is the benchmark — the light in the sky by which our ships are supposed to be guided. Counterfactuals play a useful role in any science. But the model on which economists claim to base so many judgments is not a counterfactual. It describes a state of the world that could never actually exist, and would be undesirable if it could. Such judgments, and the entire intellectual framework that generates them, represent not scientific conclusions, but a system of belief — no more true or false than the statement “Man is born free but is everywhere in chains.” This belief system — this social vision underlying mainstream economics — is deeply flawed. Its analytical foundations are broken and its moral vision venerates as its highest ideal an impossible laissez-faire dystopia. We need to seek our vision from other sources.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › Thesis › Thesis 1

The 1AC’s predilection towards utility maximization and hyper-rationality engrains a commitment to neoclassical economics.

Gueldry 15 - Prof. Michel Gueldry’s background is in political science and international relations. He has taught at the University of Memphis, University of Oregon, Bryn Mawr College (Avignon, France), the Institut d’Etudes Politiques of Grenoble, the Institut des Hautes Etudes Européennes et Internationales in Nice (France), Leipzig University, and the Wuppertal Institute, [ “The Double Discipline of Neoclassical Economics: When the Map Both Hides and Reveals the Territory,” Real-World Economics Review, 73, 27-57]RA

This conflation of muscular Christianity, nationalism, and capitalism is nothing new in the Anglosphere. The English political economist, famed free trader and polyglot John Bowring (1792-1872) was the fourth governor of Hong Kong (1854-1859) and a noted colonial administrator. He famously stated: “Jesus Christ is Free Trade and Free Trade is Jesus Christ” (Bowring, 2014, 19; Johnson, 2012, 2) – and he was a liberal-radical in his age! John Quincy Adams, sixth president of the United States, echoed such views: “The moral obligation of commercial intercourse between nations is founded exclusively upon the Christian precept to love your neighbor as yourself” (Johnson, 2). Oceans apart, but the same ideology: both men made these strikingly parallel statements in 1841 as justification of the Opium Wars (1839-1860) that started the dismemberment of China by Western imperialists. For its defenders of yesterday and today, Christian libertarianism promotes individual rights, freedom of conscience and action, and insures the greater good through emphasis on individual agency. For its critics, it is another step in the secularization and cooptation of religion by Mammon and expresses a very American sense of narcissistic entitlement. The Gospel of Wealth and neo-classical economics laud materialism, consumption, and conspicuous consumption; both reject social liberalism and government reformism. Both explain capitalism in terms of superior forces (religious for Christianity, universal laws for economics), rather than messy, subjective human contingency and bitter power struggles, and believe that human agency must serve the system – not challenge it. Both cultivate fantastical notions: belief in an individual, separate, and sovereign self; concurrent celebration of narcissism and entitlement; an aversion to critical history and politics (since God’s infinite good will and objective market rules determine winners and losers); and a bizarre estrangement from the natural world (since God and objective market mechanisms promise prosperity everlasting). Indeed, as countless critics observe, our current environmental crisis is also a moral-spiritual crisis, a crisis of meaning (Warner, 2004). Methodological individualism: social atomism as prerequisite for elite domination All conceptions of society, politics, and economics rest on conceptions of human nature, of people’s rights and duties, and on the founding social compact, both in its horizontal dimension (citizens interacting among themselves) and its vertical dimension (relation between citizens and authority). In this respect, neoclassical views reflect a particular Western bias that emerged in the 18th-century (Adam Smith’s baker’s self-interest) and solidified in the 19th: that of the isolated, rational, utility-maximizing actor. Today, economic conservatives and libertarians are animated by an anti-community understanding of individual freedom. Milton Friedman opens up his classic Capitalism and Freedom, a key reference for modern free-marketers, with a fiery declaration of radical individualism: “To the free man, the country is the collection of individuals who compose it, not something over and above them” (Friedman, 1971, 1-2). In his equally famous anti-Corporate Social Responsibility article published in 1970, he doubled-down: “Society is a collection of individuals and of the various groups they voluntary form.” (Friedman, 1970). In 1987, Margaret Thatcher also famously contented that “There is no such thing [as society]! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first” (Thatcher, 1987). In fact, for Friedman, individuals are Robinson Crusoe (Friedman, 1971, 13, 165-66). Economic libertarians celebrate such contentions as common-sense calls for personal responsibility and freedom; opponents bemoan them as wicked selfishness. The expression homo economicus is attributed to John Stuart Mill who clearly stated that political economy does not address “…the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (Mill, 1874, Essay 5, paragraphs 38, 48). What John Stuart Mill proposed as a deliberately fragmentary definition or a working framework became, in part under the influence of rational choice theory, neoclassical orthodoxy. Neoclassical views of humans as homo economicus describe only one aspect of social agents’ behavior and sell the part for the whole. Veblen famously ridiculed this conception of social beings: “The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent not consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium […] self poised in elemental space” (Camic and Hodgson, 2011, 153). Cost-and-benefits analysis is methodologically true in a very broad sense but economic calculus bears countless exceptions, is context-dependent and is anthropologically and philosophically lacking, not to mention socially and environmentally destructive. While it is true that in a market economy most economic decisions are made in a decentralized fashion and are widely distributed among large numbers of individuals, companies, and groups, economic agents are not disembodied entities floating in the ether; and methodological and practical individualism – loneliness – carry high cost in our mass societies. Paradoxically, many orthodox economists celebrate methodological individualism yet underline the importance of social capital – social connections and networks, voluntary associations, trust in neighbors, associates, partners, adherence to common social expectations and behaviors, respect for the law and social norms of business – as a foundational element of an open, rule-based market. The American sociologist Robert Putnam confirms these findings: “For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the ‘I’ into the ‘we’, or (in the language of rational-choice theorists) enhancing the participants’ ‘taste’ for collective benefits” (Putnam, 1995, 67). The French sociologist Émile Durkheim showed the role that anomie – a term he coined to describe the erosion of social links and of one’s sense of belonging – plays in individuals’ anguish and self-destructiveness. In his noted Bowling Alone (2001), Robert Putnam shows how from the 1950s to the 2002, Americans have become increasingly disconnected from family, friends, neighbors and collective structures. And social activists and community organizers stress the high cost of individualism, from the erosion of the family unit to individual pathologies (addictions, suicides, teen pregnancies, etc.) and all manners of deviant social behavior. Free marketers also pay insufficient attention to societal scales and to the paradox of collective action: “rational” behavior at the micro level create sub-optimal results at the aggregate level. In this respect, road traffic is an apt metaphor for the market: if people were motivated by utility maximization and rationality in complex situations, roads would be much safer. It makes individual sense to leave the office around 5 o’clock every night, but this aggregate behavior creates traffic jam, stress, and accidents. Anarchic and anti-social impulses in a highly complex and fluid environment (the road, the market) that are not channeled by regulatory powers put individuals on a collision course with others. In the absence of monitoring or coordinating mechanisms (police on the road, regulatory authorities in market), individual agents pursuing their own interest based on incomplete information may individually advance but on a social level they create “sub-optimal outcomes” or “disamanities,” to use economics newspeak. Rationality and utility-maximization, already debatable concepts at the individual level, become even shakier at the aggregate level. With its exaggerated emphasis on decontextualized individual agency, neoclassical economics also ignores a key finding of feminist scholarship, that of intersectionality, the combination of various forms of inequality and domination that hinders agency for some groups and individuals. For instance, women are exposed to specific biological, legal-societal, and cultural constraints that create specific challenges to the full realization of their potential. Neo-classical theories defend a legal-formalistic conception of individual freedom (free floating, foot-loose economic decision-makers) in order to obliterate historical-sociological realities (individuals are embedded in situations and communities and seldom function as homo economicus) that stand in the way of capitalistic accumulation. Theories regarding atomistic agents moving freely across market opportunities are invalidated by multiple frictions (“stickiness”) within markets, by power formations that freeze the advantage of some agents over others, by rent-seeking, by regulatory capture (control of regulatory mechanisms by vested interests), etc. Whereas capital and corporations move freely and fast across vast distances and borders, people and small businesses are embedded in real families, communities, and situations; they have a different relation with time and space. In other words, there is a natural “stickiness” (resistance) of groups and individuals to the logic of capitalistic accumulation, to hyper-mobile markets, while symbolic, dematerialized capital roams around. It is no accident that the neo-classical views of footloose, hyper-rational agents describe best the financial sector, which has proven to be the most socially destructive part of neoliberalism. If these theories are incorrect, why are they defended? A first explanation touches on reflexivity: defining reality is bending and shaping it. The Boston University feminist economist Julie A. Nelson proposes a nuanced explanation for what she calls the “simplistic view of economics,” “the cookie-cutter content of the most popular K-12 teaching materials, standardized test, university introductory and intermediate microeconomic and macroeconomic theory textbooks and graduate “core” theory courses.” She explains that framing economic relations as “a free standing, fundamentally private, mechanical and ethics-free sphere,” as impersonal and purely technical, “stack[s] the deck in favor of individualism and selfishness” (Nelson, 2012). If the hegemonic culture describes individuals as selfish and exploitative, it feeds our fears of survival, encourages self-protection and isolation, and substitutes for organic social connections in the form of materialistic consumption. This self-fulfilling prophesy confirms the concept of positive feedback loop, which is central to systemic analysis: the energy a system sends out comes back to reinforce the dynamics of the system. In this instance, intellectual-cultural preferences (energy) in favor of economic libertarianism emanate from economists (originating sub-system) and come back as facts to reinforce the general system in the direction of the original message. Sociology and psychology have long established the importance of socialization and internalization of collective messages in the definition of self. In Cultural Violence (1990), Johan Galtung (a key creator of the field on conflict resolution) illuminates a second function of methodical individualism for the hegemonic classes: “A violent structure leaves mark not only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impending consciousness formation and mobilization, two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. Penetration, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with segmentation, giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on, will do the first job. And marginalization, keeping the underdog on the outside, combined with fragmentation, keeping the underdogs away from each other, will do the send job” (Galtung, 1990, 294). Thus individualism is the organizing principle that underlies elite’s policies of penetration, segmentation, marginalization and fragmentation. Ayn Rand on the far-Right and Garrett Harding on the Green Left show this connection between radical individualism and Social Darwinism. Rand provides the potent brew of self-aggrandizement, narcissism, Nietzscheism (the entrepreneur as transcendent hero) and Social Darwinism needed by the libertarian right to assert its hegemony. She systematically reduces altruism to a vice and elevates selfishness and will to power as paramount virtues and conditions for individual freedom (Rand, 2015). Harding, despite his “tragedy of the commons” fame and environmental credentials, is vindictive toward the weak, the poor, and the immigrants. He advocates a lifeboat philosophy where the powerful ought to reject and punish the poor and vulnerable in order to save the environment (Harding, 1974a, 1974b, 1991, 2001). For labor and consumer markets to be “optimally competitive” and “frictionless,” corporations need an atomized society and will do their utmost to make reality conform to the neoclassical paradigm. This is why the labor market and the marketing machine have a vested interest in isolated and selectively desocialized individuals. Community bonds, family solidarity, local communities, churches, voluntary groups and the whole web of civil society ties are essentially res extra commercium – things outside the commercial realm. They provide their members with non-monetarized common goods such as strong civic culture, solidarity, a sense of belonging and identity that are detached from consumption. Therefore they must be brought into the merchant sphere by both the intellectual and social disciplines. The marketing machine does not like fully-informed citizens and organic communities: it needs to increase isolation, envy, and competition where they already exist, and introduce them when they do not. This is precisely the role played by mass individualism and materialism.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › 1NCs › 1NC Climate

The Alternative is to reject neoclassical economics in favor of complexity economics. Complexity economics refuses to describe long-run economic evolution through fallacious modeling and denies the assumption of stable aggregate patterns. Orienting politics towards exogeny and randomness – rejecting the atomistic model of economic agents – sees the economy and society as intertwined. This is the only way to prevent climate extinction.

Roo and Hoffart 20 – Dr. Michael Roos is a professor and researcher in the field of green technology and economics; Dr. Franziska Hoffart is an economic transition researcher interested in energy transition, hydrogen, climate crisis, and scenario analysis at DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research, [“What’s Problematic About Mainstream Climate Economics?” Chapter from “Climate Economics”, Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-48423-1_4]RA

In the ontological dimension, neoclassical economics differs markedly from the other schools of thought. The most distinctive feature is the exclusive focus on scarcity as the central economic question. In their introductory textbook, Samuelson and Nordhaus (2009, p. 4) write: Economics is the study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable goods and services and distribute them among different individuals. Similarly, the textbook by Robert and Rubinfeld (2018, p. 26) says: Much of microeconomics is about limits—the limited incomes that consumers can spend on goods and services, the limited budgets and technical know-how that firms can use to produce things, and the limited number of hours in a week that workers can allocate to labor or leisure. But microeconomics is also about ways to make the most of these limits. More precisely, it is about the allocation of scarce resources. Note that these (and other mainstream) authors do not qualify their definition to apply only to neoclassical (micro-)economics, but regard it as a general definition of economics. Other topics like dominance, change or uncertainty that are key to other schools of thought are not at the core of neoclassical economics. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) argue that the paradigmatic core of neoclassical economics consists of the three axioms methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological equilibration. Individuals are clearly the starting point of all analysis, which is reflected by the requirement that even all macroeconomic analyses need “rigorous microfoundations” (Wren-Lewis 2007, 2011 for a discussion). The second feature that distinguishes neoclassical economics from all other schools of thought is the atomist perspective on individuals. Individuals have their private preferences and make choices independent of other individuals and their social context. They make optimal choices given their preferences and the respective budget constraints. Importantly, neoclassical economics assume that preferences are fixed and characterised by deep parameters and observed changes in behaviour are to be explained by changes in the budget constraint, that is, prices and income, but not by preference changes. Every behaviour is interpreted as a conscious, deliberate choice among alternatives. In the same way as individuals are assumed to be isolated against social influences, the economy is separate from the larger social system and typically also from the natural environment. The economy is seen as a closed system without external impacts that could alter the system. Since the components of the economic system, for example, consumers and firms, are atomistic and independent of each other, their behaviour follows stable deterministic or probabilistic laws. The rational pursuit of self-interest and competition leads to equilibria in interactions, for instance, in markets. Hence markets are, apart from temporary random disturbances, assumed to be stable. Due to this inherent stability, uncertainty is not fundamental, as in many other schools of thought. Instead, neoclassical economics interprets uncertainty as risk that can be well described by known probability distributions over known events. Neoclassical economists assume that there is an objective real world that can be studied independently from the observer by the use of the appropriate research tools in a similar way as natural systems can be analysed. It cannot be the aim of the researcher to describe reality in all its facets. The interest of neoclassical economists lies in general, universally applicable laws that can be uncovered by “the scientific method”. According to Samuelson and Nordhaus (2009, p. 5) [e]conomists use the scientific approach to understand economic life. This involves observing economic affairs and drawing upon statistics and the historical record. … Theoretical approaches allow economists to make broad generalizations … In addition, economists have developed a specialized technique known as econometrics, which applies the tools of statistics to economic problems. Using econometrics, economists can sift through mountains of data to extract simple relationships. In order to find these universal simple relationships, neoclassical economists look at stylised facts, which are broad generalisations that summarise data, and use abstraction, stylisation and simplification. They are disinterested in social, institutional, political or historical details, which are regarded as distracting peculiarities that clutter the underlying economic laws. The main criterion whether the stylisation, which may even be in conflict with observed facts, is valid is predictive power. Neoclassical economists like to compare themselves with classical physicists as the following quote from Robert and Rubinfeld (2018, p. 28) shows: No theory, whether in economics, physics, or any other science, is perfectly correct. The usefulness and validity of a theory depend on whether it succeeds in explaining and predicting the set of phenomena that it is intended to explain and predict. Theories, therefore, are continually tested against observation. As a result of this testing, they are often modified or refined and occasionally even discarded. The process of testing and refining theories is central to the development of economics as a science. When evaluating a theory, it is important to keep in mind that it is invariably imperfect. This is the case in every branch of science. In physics, for example, Boyle’s law relates the volume, temperature, and pressure of a gas. The law is based on the assumption that individual molecules of a gas behave as though they were tiny, elastic billiard balls. Physicists today know that gas molecules do not, in fact, always behave like billiard balls, which is why Boyle’s law breaks down under extremes of pressure and temperature. Under most conditions, however, it does an excellent job of predicting how the temperature of a gas will change when the pressure and volume change, and it is therefore an essential tool for engineers and scientists. The situation is much the same in economics. For example, because firms do not maximize their profits all the time, the theory of the firm has had only limited success in explaining certain aspects of firms’ behavior, such as the timing of capital investment decisions. Nonetheless, the theory does explain a broad range of phenomena regarding the behavior, growth, and evolution of firms and industries, and has thus become an important tool for managers and policymakers. Given this epistemological position, it is not surprising that deductive mathematical models and econometric techniques are the only acceptable research methods. Most other methods, with the exception of economic experiments, are seen as unscientific, subjective and unreliable. Likewise, neoclassical economists see themselves as neutral observers of the economy and insist that their research is value-free. There should be a clear separation of positive analysis, which neutrally describes causal relationships, from normative analysis involving value judgements. Neoclassical economists do not feel equipped with the appropriate instruments for normative analyses: There are no right or wrong answers to these questions because they involve ethics and values rather than facts. While economic analysis can inform these debates by examining the likely consequences of alternative policies, the answers can be resolved only by discussions and debates over society’s fundamental values. (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009, p. 6) However, most would agree that inefficiency is unjust, because someone could be made better off without making someone else worse off. 4.3.2 Ontological Problems From a complexity perspective, but also in line with evolutionary economics, Austrian economics, and ecological economics, neoclassical climate economics does not deal adequately with the dynamic and uncertain nature of the economy. DICE and other IAMs do look at economic growth, which is a dynamic phenomenon. However, they do so in a very special way, because they do not allow for an evolution of the system that involves transformation and structural change. The economic core of the DICE model is the aggregate production function (equation [4] in Chap. 3). While all variables in this equation depend on time and change over time, the function itself does not change. Two important drivers of growth—population growth and technological progress—are exogenous and the respective growth rates are assumed to be constant. Furthermore, climate change affects only output, but not the capital stock and the capital stock includes only produced capital, but not natural capital. All this is highly questionable in the context of climate change. The point is not only that variables are missing or assumed to grow at constant rates, although there might be good arguments to assume that they are affected directly by climate change. From a complexity view, the more important point is that these models attempt to describe long-run aggregate relationships by stable functional forms that are unlikely to be stable, if there are major technological, environmental and social changes. According to Boulton et al. (2015), the future is the emergent and path-dependent outcome of a complex interplay between patterns of relationships and events. Processes at the micro and meso levels of the economy lead to emergent patterns at the macro level that appears robust and stable. The famous stylised facts of economic growth proposed by Kaldor (1957) can be seen as such patterns. They describe relationships between variables, for example, that output per worker and capital per worker grow at constant and identical rates over time, implying that the capital/output ratio is roughly constant over time. As any textbook on neoclassical growth theory explains, neoclassical growth models (of which DICE is a variant) are designed to match these stylised facts and to generate a balanced-growth path. While such patterns may be roughly stable for some time period, they are always under threat of disruption by events. These events might be major external shocks such as pandemics, tsunamis, wars, climate change or migration … Events may also be internal variations from the norm—a higher-than-average birth or death rate, or the death or arrival of a significant leader. And of course what we regard as internal and external depends on how we draw the boundaries around the problem. (Boulton et al. 2015, p. 30) The crucial ontological difference between neoclassical and complexity economics is that these events can change the aggregate relationships. In neoclassical DSGE models, events are captured by random shocks added to stable relationships. While they can cause temporary deviations of macroeconomic variables from the balanced growth path, they do not change the path and equilibrating mechanisms leading the system back on the balanced growth path over time. Complexity economics and all other schools of thought that emphasise the importance of change deny that the long-run evolution of the economy can be described and understood by models assuming the stability of aggregate patterns of relationships. If every event potentially can alter the patterns of relationships, every hypothetical path of the economy’s evolution will be different, depending on the unique sequence of events. To make things even more complicated, many “events” that are relevant in the context of climate change are unlikely to be exogenous or random. The occurrence of heat waves, droughts, floodings, international conflicts or major migratory movements depends directly on economic and political decisions. When, where and how strongly abatements measures are undertaken will affect the likelihood of these events. If the future is path-dependent, the time-invariant damage function (5‘) that depends only on temperature does not make sense. A related ontological problem is that neoclassical economics treats the economy as a closed system, which is separate from the rest of society. In the DICE model, there are almost no policy variables and there is no reference to any kind of institutions. The main policy variable is the emissions reduction rate μ that enters the abatement function Λ (equation [6] in Chap. 3). Besides the consumption level, the emissions reduction rate is the central control variable of the model, but it is not explained how it is determined. The social planner chooses its level such that welfare is maximised subject to the respective constraints, but it remains unclear how this is achieved. Many public policy issues are introduced into the DICE model as exogenous assumptions or constraints. As discussed in Sect. 3.3, Nordhaus introduces exogenously given temperature targets into the model and uses the model to simulate the impact on the economy and the climate system. Many non-mainstream schools of thought would argue that both economic and climate conditions affect policy choices such that the political and societal responses should be endogenous. One might, for instance, assume that severe global warming could have an intentional or unintentional effect on productivity growth, either because society deliberately wants to slow down economic growth or because social tension and conflict inhibit research and development activities. Finally, all non-mainstream schools of economic thought reject the atomistic model of economic agents, which is related to the refusal of treating the economy and society as separated systems. The atomistic agent shows up in the utility function (equation [2] in Chap. 3), in which utility is only obtained from individual consumption. There are no explicit social influences and the utility function has a fixed functional form with constant parameters. The only objective of individuals and society is the maximisation of this utility from consumption. Although Nordhaus interprets consumption in a broad sense, it is still directly coupled to produced output as shown in equation (7). The pursuit of what, for example, Maslow (1954) would call psychological needs and self-fulfilment needs or the axiological needs proposed by Max-Neef (1991), which depend crucially on the interaction with a social group and, in many cases, are unrelated to produced output, does not play a role. Furthermore, the parameter α in the utility function does not depend on social influences and is fixed over time. The same is true for the much debated rate of time preference ρ in the discount factor R (equation [3]). Assuming fixed preferences of an individual in the short run might be acceptable to explain everyday economic choices. For whole societies, however, it is undeniable that values and the cultural context of preferences change over the course of generations (see Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Value change might be of particular relevance for the analysis of environmental problems, since both private and political mitigation efforts might be a function of how society evaluates nature.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › 1NCs › 1NC Econ/Generic

The alternative is Ecological Economics. This view of the economy as deep ecology refuses to treat individuals as anything but interconnected, rejects value-neutral statements, and asserts “every economic activity should be a servant of life.”

Temesgen et al. 19 – A.K. Temesgen, V.M. Storsletten, and O.D Jakobsen are researchers and theorists about neoclassical economics and economics broadly. They are all deeply interested in economics. They are also deeply interested in neoclassical economics, [“Circular Economy – Reducing Symptoms or Radical Change?Philosophy of Management, DOI: 10.1007/s40926-019-00112-1]RA

Foundations of Ecological Economics Ecological Economics adopts an organic worldview where ecosystems and social systems are comprised of closely interacting and interdependent subsystems. The earth itself and all its living and non-living components are interrelated and the human being is a member of this integral community. Every system is connected to and depends on all the others in continuous evolving processes. Deep ecology, an influential thought on a holistic worldview, emphasizes the intrinsic value of nature and rejects isolating constitutive parts of nature. Everything is interconnected and, at the same time, continuously changing. Deep ecology replaces the objective of material growth with sustainable qualitative development; it is critical of the prevailing economic system and locates the fundamental causes of ecological problems in social structures and cultures (Næss et al. 1989). Fig2 The worldview of Ecological Economics Capra and Jakobsen (2017) take the systems view of life approach to ecological economics and highlight four guiding principles for the field. The first envisions the economy as a nested system within other living systems (ecology, society, culture) (see figure 2 above). They assert ‘every economic activity should be a servant of life’ (Capra and Jakobsen 2017, p.836). The second principle emphasizes the importance of networks and relationships in the economy. It derives this principle by looking at (and learning from) how life in the ecosystem is a set of interrelated networks and relationships. The third principle deals specifically with material flows. Here, too, the source of inspiration is the ecosystem. ‘All living systems need to be open to continual flows of energy and matter, and all living systems produce wastes. In nature, however, organisms form communities, ecosystems, in which the waste of one species is food for the next so that matter cycles continually through the ecosystem, while energy is dissipated at each stage. ... Circular value chains make it possible to reduce both the consumption of virgin natural resources and the amount of waste that goes back to nature’ (Capra and Jakobsen 2017, p.840). Circular flows are also characteristics of the flow of knowledge in the economy. Knowledge informs economic activities (for example, finding better ways of producing goods and services) and the experience gained in these activities improves our knowledge (Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen 2007). The last (and fourth) principle highlights the role of ethics in the economy. ‘It is … most urgent to reintroduce an ethical framework within the context of communicative cooperation between co-responsible economic actors on all levels. …[E]thics always has to do with community; it is behavior for the common good’(Capra and Jakobsen 2017, p.842). The absence of an ethical framework guiding the global economic and financial systems has resulted in a glaring inequality and social injustice and therefore, introducing an ethical framework is an important part of transforming the economy. Ecological Economics adopts an ontological collectivism where ‘community relations define who people are, affect what they want, facilitate collective action, and have a historical continuity of their own’ (Costanza et al. 2014, p.30). This contrasts sharply with the atomistic view of individuals in NE. A call for an organic worldview engenders a shift from a multi-disciplinary focus to inter- and transdisciplinarity. A worldview that recognizes complexity in social and natural systems calls for a new way of understanding reality. In transdisciplinary research a disciplinary cross-fertilization makes the borders between the different sciences more transparent. Unlike specialized knowledge, a transdisciplinary and holistic approach can help prevent a domination of reductionism, and thus, to a certain extent, reduce the risk of falling into the trap of abstraction. Such an approach also loosens up the theoretical and methodological restrictions imposed by traditional disciplinary boundaries and opens up a range of methodological perspectives. Contrasting the axiologies of NE and EE, we find that EE makes explicit value judgements while NE claims it is a value-free, positive science. We will select a few ideological beliefs (which represent strong value judgments) presented by Spash (2012) as foundations for Ecological Economics and compare that with NE’s (often implicit) value standpoints. Spash (2012) defends both human and non-human inhabitants of Earth as morally considerable. This indicates assigning intrinsic value to our non-human cohabitants of Earth. In NE, non-human beings are considered either as consumption goods or as inputs to the production process. They have only an instrumental value to the economy and the consumer. He also assigns a more meaningful aspiration to human existence than hedonism. This is an explicit position that moves away from equating wellbeing with consumption and gives a node to eudemonia or the good life where the focus is the flourishing of human culture and community within environmental limits. In EE, inequality across genders, social groups, generations and geographical positions is morally indefensible and should be addressed through policy measures as opposed to NE’s requirement of pareto optimality to any redistributive changes.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › 1NCs › 1NC Econ/Generic

Neoclassical economics is a pseudoscience that wishes to know nothing about warfare. The proliferation of interstate conflict is central to maintaining the mythos of peaceful economic growth.

Allio 20 – Renata Allio is an economic historian, professor, and researcher at the University of Turin, Italy, [“War in Economic Theories Over Time Assessing the True Economic, Social and Political Costs”, Palgrave Macmillan, 4/21/2020, ISBN: 978-3-030-39617-6]RA

The Peaceful World of Economics I The disinterest of economists in the themes of warlike conflict is particularly evident in university-level teaching of economics, generally undertaken by professors who take marginalist doctrine as their reference point. Neither in the past nor today has war been considered of interest in university textbooks. Besides, economic history texts, especially the more recent ones, have dedicated little or no space to the war economy, considering it more or less as an anomalous situation not worth taking up because it would not offer anything useful for developing interpretive ideas of a general character. The war economy was altogether particular, run by the “socialist” state (Mises’s definition) and orientated above all to furnish military supplies and obtain victory. It appeared as a break, as a cut-off, which bore no interest for the study of economic laws. While the silence in university courses in economic history and economics in the 1960s and 1970s received some justification, nowadays, war is not even mentioned, even though it still has a major influence on the economies of many countries. Similarly, the texts for management, company finance and company and industrial accountancy courses do not offer any particular idea about the companies that produce for war, evidently considering them as not unlike those who produce for the civil economy, in their management organization, independently of the fact that they may be state controlled or operate under a semi-monopolistic and/or monopsonic regime. As far as militarism and the arms race were concerned, along with their influences on the economy are concerned, it fell to Michael Mann (1980, pp. 27–28) to complain about the post-war silence of both liberal and Marxist economists. In particular, he analysed dozens of books and hundreds of articles written in the 1960s and 1970s by authors of the Marxist tradition that dealt with the capitalist state. Mann showed that almost none of them contained a single word on what was one of the principal activities of many capitalist states: “preparing for, or conducting war”. The same result can be obtained from the collection published by Bob Jessop in the “Cambridge Journal of Economics” in 1977 on theories related to the capitalist state and its functions. As far as the history of economic thought is concerned, Edmund Silberner published a book in Paris in 1939 on war in economic thought from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, extending this to the nineteenth century in 1957. In it, he complained that apart from his own studies, no exposé doctrinal had been dedicated, in France or elsewhere, to an examination of the relationships between wars and political economy. It does not seem that there have been subsequent studies of a general character, except for two very brief summaries, both in French: a “Que sais-je?” series book La Guerre by Gaston Bouthoul published in 162 R. Allio 1959 and the previously cited thick volume by Armelle le Bras-Chopard (1994) concerning theories and ideologies related to war, which includes a brief chapter on economic theories. In 1971, Seymour Melman, an engineer by training and Professor of Industrial Economics at Colombia University, published a collection of essays concerning the American military economy, the particular characteristics of war industries, their impact on the economy overall and the problem of reconversion of military production to civil production. He stressed in the preface how reflections, concepts and data that were presented on that occasion were not taken into consideration in economics texts. Just as well, studies in industrial management did not offer analyses of the administrative characteristics of military-oriented companies. More generally, he recalled that war and its massive economic implications on both micro- and macro-levels were systematically ignored by economists. Melman returned to the question of the “peaceful world of economics I” in 1974 (Melman 1974, p. 127), to show how university textbooks for first year economics students mentioned neither the war economy nor the existence of military industry corporations. His observation still holds perfectly true for today’s reality. The texts Melman examined in 1974, those in widest use at the time, did not deal in any way with the problem or at most conceded one to three paragraphs to the argument. In particular, none of the textbooks stressed the unproductive nature of economic growth that derived from war investments. Paul Samuelson provided some space for war in his well-known textbook Economics (1948), which had then reached its eighth edition. He criticized the general optimism derived above all from the studies made by Clive Trebilcock on the spin-off technology that cascaded down from the military sector to be adopted beneficially in civil industry. Samuelson also spoke of the inflationary role of expenditure on the war underway in Vietnam, but even he did not make any distinction between productive and unproductive economic growth, thereby underestimating the damage of the war economy. The peaceful world of economics I, according to Melman, appeared then as “an orderly civilian world, making and exchanging goods and services. In this world, individual consumers and private profit-making 6 firms dominate the field, although there is a ‘public sector’ and government ‘regulates’ industry and the levels of economic activity. Military industry, by implications, is one industry among others, and is not differentiated in quality, in terms of control, or in effects on the rest of the economy. The corporation serving the Pentagon is not distinct from other corporations” (Melman 1974, p. 147). None of the texts provided data on the worrying growth of American state enterprise in the military armaments sector. No one asked if this state capitalism, in its form of “Pentagon Capitalism”, was or was not becoming the dominant force in industrial capitalism in the United States and the effects that could derive from this domination. No one faced up to the problem of a new type of industrial enterprise controlled by the state, which, unlike private corporations, did not aim at reducing costs in order to maximize profits. Productivity was obviously recognized as a fundamental aspect in economic growth, but the damage caused by the military appropriation of capital and human resources was not correlated with progress in productivity. For the world of the economic experts in the President’s council, the war economy simply did not exist (Melman 1970, p. 151). The tools required in evaluating the operations of military industries and their management were not provided to the students of the day, as is still the case now, not just for American students, who as a result were and are kept far from making critical evaluations (Melman 1970, p. 151). Contemporary neoclassical economists do not ask about the relations between the economy and war, either historically or immutably. More simply, they do not ask why war takes place and persists in the capitalist world in a generally freetrading global economy. It is students of other disciplines or pacifist militants who operate outside the university environment who write more to ask what are the advantages of disarmament or rearmament or what are the economic causes and effects of wars. Nevertheless, recent years have seen the appearance of university courses and textbooks dedicated to peace economics, understood as a branch of economic science, which investigates latent or open conflicts between states, organizations and social groups. The research methods used are the instruments of rational choice and contemporary economic analysis. According to Caruso it is not limited just to the study of conflicts, but instead presents an intrinsically normative nature […] therefore peace economics enters with full rights in the modern economics of institutions, thanks to the fact that institutions, interpreted as ‘the rules of the game’ that discipline potential conflicts between rational actors, constitute, in the final analysis, the drivers in long-term of the development of society. (Caruso 2017, pp. 17– 18).

2023 UTNIF Kritik
Negative › 1NCs › 1NC Econ/Generic

Neoclassical economics’ reliance on financialization and shareholder capitalism plunders the working class, guarantees economic, ideological, and analytic collapse.

Marszalek and Scarzec 22 – Pawel Marszalek is professor and Head of Department at Poznan University of Economics; Katarzyna Szarzec is a researcher and professor at Poznan University, [“The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Financialization Through Heterodox and Mainstream Lenses”, Bank I Kredyt 54(3), 2023, 239-258, https://bankikredyt.nbp.pl/content/2023/03/BIK_03_2023_01.pdf]RA

The causes of financialization Bearing in mind this polarization of research methods and approaches, it is not surprising that no single determinant of financialization was identified and accepted as being the most important. Nor is it surprising that heterodox economists were those who paid more attention to financialization issues. They argued that when analysing the determinants of financialization it is necessary to consider a combination of many, mutually stimulating factors, both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. The former refers to enterprises, households and specific markets, while the latter refers to the state’s decisions (i.e. those of governments and central banks) made in the area of social and economic policy, and regulations. The determinants of financialization identified by heterodox economists have often been divided into micro and macroeconomic ones (see e.g. Bhaduri 2011; Palley 2007). The micro causes of financialization can be further divided into changes in the structure and functioning of financial markets and changes in the behaviour of non-financial entities. Among the macro causes one might identify social and economic policy and socio-demographic factors. All the determinants are presented in Diagram 1, and the most important of them are briefly described below. At the very core of financialization stand financial innovations and technological changes that made it possible to trade money very quickly (Fiasanos, Guevarra, Pierros 2016). Technological factors (mainly IT technologies), leading to the so-called economy 4.0., were particularly eagerly used by financial institutions in projecting and distributing brand new types of financial instruments. Financial innovations (e.g. securitization and structured financial products like ABS, CDO’s or CDS), in turn, have played a key role in the development of recent financial practices. As Lapavitsas (2013) argues, innovations, financial liberalization, increasing pace and magnitude of financial transaction, speculative trading, asset securitization, shadow banking, internet finance, etc., have been shifting economic activities to financial markets (which has led to the gradual separation of finance from the real economy). All these factors have allowed the financial sector to overcome regulatory barriers and contributed significantly to the fast progress of financialization, both in individual countries and globally (Davis, Kim 2015; Pozsar, Singh 2011; Jurek, Marszałek 2014). Another boost to the creation of financial innovations was given by the liberalization of economies, which enabled massive capital flows. This process became visible in the US economy in the 1980s, and subsequently accelerated, with the Glass-Steagall Act being gradually relaxed by the Fed and eventually repealed in 1996. At the same time, US financial institutions, becoming increasingly active and aggressive in the global markets, lobbied for loose regulations (Komai, Richardson 2011). Finally, the reform of FDIC (The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) into FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act) in 1991 institutionalized the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine (Komai, Richardson 2011) and increased incentives for moral hazard on the part of banks (see also Kregel, Tonvenarochi 2014; Orhangazi 2008; Toporowski 2010). The specific manifestations of financialization and, at the same time, its determinants, are also the aftermath of the following factors: the increase of the financial sector’s share in GDP (including banks and other financial institutions) as well as the increase of its share in total employment (Krippner 2005; Sawyer 2017). At the same time, it is also manifested in the high global penetration of financial institutions’ transactions among countries, the substantial financial penetration of developed countries into developing countries, and the faster growth rate of the total amount of international capital flows over the growth of world output (Bonizzi 2013). Among the microeconomic determinants of financialization connected with the activity of non- -financial agents, representatives of heterodoxy pointed to the increasingly important position of financial operations in the overall activity of non-financial enterprises. This means that financial 248 P. Marszałek, K. Szarzec products have become an element of the offer of these entities (Milberg 2008). Moreover, non-financial enterprises have started acting according to the ‘risk and return’ paradigm. Such phenomena as pharmacy financialization, commodity financialization, water financialization, financial talents, and financial investment funds controlling the scale of industrial capital, have gradually become more common (Basak, Pavlova 2016). As a result, a larger proportion of non-financial corporate profits was generated from financial channels (Krippner 2005). This was connected with another factor: the increased role of financial activities as a determinant of the pay packages of the top management of non-financial corporations. In particular this includes corporate CEOs, whose incentives shifted towards more risky decisions and financial investments (Lazonick 2013). When it comes to the macro determinants of financialization, the economic and social policies introduced in developed countries since the 1990s are indicated. They were a projection of the predominant neoliberalist worldview that contributed to market liberalization and subsequently to the acceleration of the supremacy of finance. Two terms – neoliberalism and financialization – became closely related in the political and economic debates. In particular, one should mention here the actions of policymakers being made in accordance with the principle of the limited role of the state in economic life6 (e.g. by departing from the welfare state doctrine and economic interventionism, to liberalization, privatization, and changes in pension systems). Those actions resulted in making the labour market more flexible (e.g. by weakening the role of trade unions, limiting the level of the minimum wage and unemployment benefits), rigorous price stability, and promoting globalization by the liberalization of capital flows and macroprudential policy (Palley 2012; Hein 2012; Toporowski 2010). Some of the macro determinants are connected with institutional changes, such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the expansion of flexible exchange rates, the full dominance of fiat money within monetary regimes, the new political agendas set forth by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s, as well as the creation of the ECB (gradually) leading to central bank independence, zero inflation targeting, and the abandonment of the goal of full employment in favour of the so- -called New Consensus Monetary Policy (Arestis, Sawyer 2005). These processes brought about a clear deflationary policy bias in central banks (Palley 1996). At the same time, the tendency towards free market orientation was succeeded by a policy regime in which fiscal instruments played a critical role in economic activity, which additionally created demand for financial instruments. It is worth noticing that many of the described micro and macroeconomic causes of financialization were a consequence of applying the principles and recommendations (and ideological optics) of mainstream economics in practice. Thus, one might say that mainstream ideas contributed in a way to spreading and fostering financialization. For mainstream economists, the growth of the financial sector is a natural process of market development and tends to bring benefits for the economic system as a whole. They were aware of financialization but did not perceive the phenomenon as a problem in any way. Quite the contrary, they supported the development of finance as being consistent with the mainstream theories and their policy recommendations (based on the New Neoclassical Synthesis). It would be an oversimplification to state that mainstream economists did not devote much attention to the causes of financialization. It would be rather more accurate to say that they perceived those causes from a completely different perspective than did heterodox economics. They regarded them not as factors contributing to the harmful and disastrous phenomenon of financialization, 6 Yet, the role of the state (government) in financialization is rather ambiguous and very complex (see Ratajczak 2020). The good, the bad or the ugly... 249 but rather as factors allowing for the introduction of a desirable mainstream political agenda. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, one might state that both theoretical strains of theories agree on the causes of financialization. The difference lies in their perceptions of financialization and its consequences: mainstream economists treat it and its effects as a natural economic phenomenon,7 while heterodox economists focus on its harmful nature and negative effects. 5. The effects of financialization It should come as no surprise that the effects of financialization are multifaceted and complex. The main effect is the importance of financial institutions and markets, and their growing autonomy in relation to the rest of the economy (including supervisory and monetary authorities). Among heterodox economists it is believed that the effects of financialization are purely negative. According to them, it generates serious problems that are economic and social in nature. In the first case, the process has: complicated business activities outside the financial sector and contributed to a greater dependence of economic entities on what happens on volatile financial markets; shortened the time horizon of economic decisions; created the pressure to undertake risky ventures; and accelerated the pace of economic life. Under such circumstances, enterprises (especially small and medium-sized ones) and households depend to a large extent on the financial system, and modify their activities according to the requirements of financial institutions that provide them with financial services.8 Those entities also embody a specific “financial culture” and behaviour. Financialization also involves the complicated activities of policy makers and financial supervision institutions. It became increasingly difficult to enforce the prudential compliance of financial institutions due to the blurring of differences between types of financial institutions, the emergence of large financial holdings, the use of various “creative” accounting techniques, and the extensive use of financial engineering. Moreover, the growing burden of public debt has also made many governments dependent on funds raised in financial markets. Governments have, in a way, become “hostages” to financial institutions. Implementing monetary policy has also become more complicated, as financialization has changed the institutional foundations of money creation, the form and nature of money, and the relationship between a central bank and commercial banks. All these economic consequences of financialization were reflected in the following three processes: the weakening of economic growth (Assa 2012; Jayadev, Epstein 2005), the changing shape of the business cycle (Palley 2007), and the growing vulnerability of economies to financial crises, with the most expressive manifestation of this being the Global Financial Crisis 2007–2009 (Hein, Detzer, Dodig 2016; Toporowski 2010). Financialization also generates serious problems of a social nature. It creates specific attitudes, previously inherent only in the market economy, particularly in its aggressive variant. This in turn, contributes to social exclusion (Lavoie 2013), increases inequalities in society (Kedrosky, Stangler 2011; Sawyer 2017), causes unfavourable tendencies in the structure of wages and their amount (Orhangazi 2008; Palley 2012) and promotes egoistic, extremely utilitarian attitudes (Fine 2013). While heterodox economists are very critical of financialization, the mainstream, as was already mentioned, usually praised financialization, suggesting it contributed to increasing the overall prosperity through so-called ‘financial deepening’ (development of financial markets and instruments). For them, financialization is a manifestation of market efficiency and the effective allocation of resources.9 Financialization was also praised as a factor conducive to globalization – which for mainstream economists is clearly a positive process – and a remedy for the so-called ‘financial repression’ hypothesis (Shaw 1973). The deregulated and liberalised financial markets following (but also accompanying) financialization were greeted with the approval of mainstream economists, the World Bank and the IMF, becoming a key part of the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). Those institutional solutions were recommended for implementation as a part of the financial systems reforms package for developing countries, aiming at getting ‘interest rates right’ (World Bank 1989). Deeper and liberalized financial markets, larger financial institutions operating on the supranational level, and the intense financial activity of non-financial entities, were welcomed as a new, successful stage of the capitalist economy. With the so-called Great Moderation (Bernanke 2004) in the global (and especially the US) economy since the mid-1980s and the triumph of free market liberal democracy, this finance-led capitalism, approved in a way by mainstream economists, appeared to be good for the whole economy as well as for individual agents. Mainstream economists also praise and support the impressive increase in private households’ stock market participation – even through institutional investors rather than direct ownership. They described it as the ‘democratization of ownership’, and as ‘shareholder’ capitalism. Therefore, all the arguments in favour of allegedly negative financial attitudes and behaviour were rejected. Instead, they argued that greater involvement in financial investments and operation might rather be interpreted as a manifestation of rationality and seeking the best investment decision. Such an optimistic perception of financialization and its effects, presented by mainstream economists, was undermined by the outbreak of the global financial crisis. It brought about profound changes in the financial systems and the real economy in many countries, changes in the hierarchy of financial institutions, and decreased trust in banks and other financial institutions. These shed new light on the conditions necessary to ensure economic stability. Importantly, mainstream economists finally admitted that it was financialization and the processes and phenomena connected with it, identified and described by heterodox economists, which were the cause of the crisis. According to Vercelli (2019), the consensus point of view of mainstream economics on the causes of the crisis was that: – the subprime crisis triggered a “bank run” in the shadow banking system; – the effects of this bank run were rapidly transmitted and amplified by the new “originate and distribute” model of banking, which created incentive problems; – the excessive risk generated by the two abovementioned factors contributed to the collapse of the world financial system. These problems, however, have not been treated as contrary to the mainstream agenda. As Mishkin (2010) pointed out, “none of the lessons from the financial crisis in any way undermines or invalidates the […] basic principles of the science of monetary policy developed before the crisis.” Yet, as Vercelli (2019) stresses, after the initial critical self-evaluation of mainstream economics, the criticism started to fade rather fast in favour of a re-assertion of its validity, and since 2010 the financial system has been progressively discharged of its responsibilities. The crisis came to be explained as an aftermath of some mistakes in economic and social policy, and the result of some factors deviating from mainstream recommendations on organization and functioning of the financial and economic system, not as the consequence of the flaws in the overall mainstream programme. Heterodox economists, on the other hand, for several reasons, were not able to impose their narrative and convincingly express and explain the problems brought about by financialization.

2023 UTNIF Kritik
UTNIF GRIPE File – Neoclassical Economics K – 2023 › Authors’ Note

FYI: Neoclassical economics rests on three axioms as normative foundations: 1) methodological individualism, 2) methodological instrumentalism, 3) methodological equilibrium

Arnsperger and Varoufakisv 2006 - University of Louvain, Belgium and University of Athens, Greece

Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis “What Is Neoclassical Economics?

The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power” Panoeconomicus, 2006, 1, pp. 5-18

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › Basic Income › Basic Income = Everyone

Basic Income means everyone in said society gets the income.

Red Renta Basica ND “What is the RB?” – Website *Translated from Spanish WW(AC)

Basic income can be defined in different ways. On the web, the Basic Income Network has used this definition: basic income is an income paid by the state, as a right of citizenship, to each full member or resident of society even if they do not want to work for pay, without taking into account whether you are rich or poor or, in other words, regardless of what other possible sources of income may be, and regardless of who you live with.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › Basic Income › Basic Income = Meet Basic Needs

Basic Income means people meet basic needs.

Basic Income Canada ND “Basic Income Canada Network Reseau Canadien pour le revenue garanti” – Website WW(AC)

A basic income is an unconditional cash transfer from government to individuals to enable everyone to meet their basic needs, participate in society and live with dignity, regardless of work status. 

It is a simple, common-sense alternative to an income security system that is full of gaps and problems, privilege for some and disadvantage for others. In our fast-paced, precarious world we all face financial risk at times. As individuals—and as a society and economy—we need better options to weather setbacks, stay well, manage transitions and create opportunity.