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2023 TDI Topicality
TDI — 2023 —Topicality › Substantial › Substantial---Arbitrary

Their definition of substantial is arbitrary – there’s no consistency in US Code.

Colon 97 [Jeffrey M. Colon, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Winter 1997, San Diego Law Review, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1, Lexis Academic] TDI

n138. I.R.C. 877(e). Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates how much of a reduction in taxes is necessary in order to constitute a "substantial" reduction. The meaning of "substantial" varies from one Code section to the other. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. 368(a)(1)(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) (acquisition of "substantially all" of acquired company's assets for ruling purposes is 70% of gross assets and 90% of net assets (Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568)) with I.R.C. 1092 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) ("substantial diminution" of risk of loss).

2023 TDI Topicality
TDI — 2023 —Topicality › Substantial › Substantial---Material

"Substantial" means material change

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A) p. 460 TDI

Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; *** not seeming or imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable

2023 TDI Topicality
TDI — 2023 —Topicality › United States › US---Federal Government

Congress agrees.

Lagueux, 91 – [US District Judge; Ronald, IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF BALLARD SHIPPING COMPANY FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY Civil Action No. 89-0685L UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 772 F. Supp. 721; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13103; 33 ERC (BNA) 1996; 33 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1996; 1992 AMC 402 September 17, 1991, Decided, lexis] TDI

Claimants argue that the statute's broad, "pre-civil war" definition of "United States" -- meaning the several states and territories -- when applied to subsection (f)(1), gives Rhode Island a cause of action. Claimants also argue that the provisions in subsection (f)(4), measuring liability to include costs incurred by a state government, and subsection (f)(5), requiring a state's authorized representative to act as a trustee to recover costs of restoration, confirm that states have standing under section 311 of the FWPCA to sue the shipowner.

But this selective reading of the statute misses more direct language that only supports a cause of action by the federal government. HN6Go to this Headnote in the case.The language of the statute must be given its ordinary meaning, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766, 100 S. Ct. 2051 (1980), and this Court must be chary of reading into the statute any remedies that are not expressly stated there, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15, 18, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981). A common-sense reading of the statute compels the conclusion that states have no standing [**7] to sue under section 311. HN7Go to this Headnote in the case.Subsection (f)(1) plainly makes shipowners and operators liable only "to the United States Government" for costs incurred during the removal of oil. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988). The last sentence of this section adds: "The United States may also bring an action against the owner or operator of such vessel . . . ." Id. "United States Government" and "United States" mean the federal government.

2023 TDI Topicality
TDI — 2023 —Topicality › United States › US---Federal Government

The “United States” is the federal government---most predictable

Mitchell 15 [Paul Andrew Mitchell, BA MS, Founder of the Supreme Law Firm, previous Vice President for Legal Affairs and Counsel to an Arizona Trust, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator, ] TDI

Note also that those Articles clearly distinguished "United States of America" from "United States" in Congress assembled. The States formally delegated certain powers to the federal government, which is clearly identified in those Articles as the "United States". Therefore, the "United States of America" now refer to the 50 States of the Union, and the term "United States" refers to the federal government. The term "United States" is the term that is used consistently now throughout Title 28 to refer to the federal government domiciled in D.C. There is only ONE PLACE in all of Title 28 where the term "United States of America" is used, and there it is used in correct contradistinction to "United States": Because Title 28 contains statutes which govern all federal courts, the consistent use of "United States" to refer to the federal government carries enormous weight. Title 28 is the latest word on this subject, as revised, codified and enacted into positive law on June 25, 1948. Moreover, the elevates Title 28 to the status of supreme Law of the Land.

2023 TDI Topicality
TDI — 2023 —Topicality › Resolved › Resolved---Legislation

“Resolved” with a colon entails legislative action.

Parcher ‘01 [Jeff; Feb 2001; Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University; ] brett TDI

1.Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

Kant’s radical freedom thesis is false – intentions correspond with brain states which follow causal chains

Horne 12 [(Herman Harrell, taught philosophy and education at a number of prominent American universities, and published numerous books and articles. His best-known work, The Democratic Philosophy of Education (1932), was a critical analysis of John Dewey's educational theories) “Free Will and Human Responsibility,” Macmillan Publishing Co. republished by California State University Long Beach Pg 1-2. 1940, https://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/100/articles/arguments_for_determinism.html]

The typical subjective science is psychology. The last fifty years of the, wonderful nineteenth century saw psychology, hitherto rational and introspective, invaded by the scientific methods of observation, experimentation, and explanation. Since the methods of science exclude freedom of the will, it is natural that most scientific psychologists today are, as psychologists at least, determinists. The lamented Professor James is a noted exception, but his psychology has been most criticized by his fellows just on the ground of his "unscientific" retention of freedom of the will. As illustrating the contemporary attitude toward freedom, the following somewhat contemptuous and evasive reference may be cited: "We may prate as much as we please about the freedom of the will, no one of us is wholly free from the effects of these two great influences [heredity and environment]. Meantime, each of us has all the freedom any brave, moral nature can wish, i.e., the freedom to do the best he can, firm in the belief that however puny his actual accomplishment there is no better than one's best."1 The question is not whether we are "wholly free" from these influences, but whether we are at all free. The psychological defenders of determinism refer to "the working hypothesis of psychology," viz., there is no mental state without a corresponding brain-state; that the brain-state is to be regarded as the explanation of the mental state since successive mental states have no quantitative measurable relations; that the brain-state is itself to be explained not by reference in turn to the mental state but by reference to the preceding brain-state. Thus the chain of physical causation is unbroken; it is self-explanatory; it also explains the mental series; but the mental series in turn explains nothing on the physical side. This working hypothesis does effectually exclude the conscious will from all efficaciousness. In favor of this hypothesis as a working basis for psychology, it is to be remarked that our modern knowledge of localization of brain functions, of the aphasias, of the insanities, is largely dependent upon it. Psychology also emphasizes our ignorance respecting the real relations of mind and brain, and emphasizes our inability to imagine just how attention could change a brain-state, though just such an effect is attributed to attention in some theories of free will. Psychology as a science of mind also has its presuppositions respecting law. If the mental region is to be understood, it also must have its laws. These laws must be without any exception, such as free will would imply. It is the business of psychology, as a science, to deny exceptions and dis cover laws. . . . One of these laws affects our present question intimately. It is the law of motive. It asserts there is no action of will without a motive and that the strongest motive determines the will. Action is always in accord with the strongest motive, and the motives are provided by the heredity or the environment, or both. How could one choose to follow the weaker of two motives? Psychologists are better aware than others of the sense of freedom revealed to introspection. Men[humans] often feel they are free to decide in either of two ways. Such a feeling, however, the psychologists do not consider as proof of the fact of freedom. The mind often cherishes false opinions concerning matters of fact; delusions are among the commonest mental phenomena. Schopenhauer, particularly, admitted that men felt at times they were free, while he denied they were really free. A straight staff appears bent, in a clear pool, and cannot be made to appear otherwise, despite the fact of its straightness and despite our knowledge of the fact. If we had never seen it out of the pool we should probably affirm it was crooked. So most people, judging by appearances, believe in freedom because they feel they are free. There is thus a possibility of general deception respecting this belief in freedom. This possibility is appreciated if we recall some hypnotic phenomena. A man may, though awake, under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, give away some of his property; he may then sign a statement saying he did it of his own free will and accord; spectators know otherwise. . . .

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 [(Enoch, The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem) “ INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE,” Legal Theory, 2007, doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2]

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

Extinction outweighs under any framework – moral uncertainty and future generations

Pummer 15 [(Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford) “Moral Agreement on Saving the World,“ Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5/18/15, http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/]

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

Experience is the only sound justification for ethics

Schwartz No date- [(Stephen P., philosopher) “A Defense of Naïve Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting Nor Dogmatic,” pp.1-14. Ithaca College, No date Cited]

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

Pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable – they are reasons for actions in and of themselves

Nagel 86 [(Thomas, philosopher) “The View From Nowhere,” HUP, 1986]

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory [P]leasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back[ed] up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure [it is a means to their end], either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his [her] hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Util NC › Util NC

Awareness of pain and pleasure occurs via phenomenal introspection – phenomenal introspection is reliable a process of belief formation; those who did not experience pain as bad died off and their genes were removed from the gene pool

Phenomenology=study of consciousness from a first person POV, lived experience

Nelson 20 [(Joe, PhD in philosophy from Duke University) “A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism,” Duke University, 2020. ]

In summary, the explanandum says that in at least some cases, feeling things is part of the process by which you become aware of being in a state of pleasure or pain. It does not say that feeling things is always part of this process. Nor does it say that having a feeling is ever a necessary part of this process. Nor does it say that any specific feeling must be involved. It only says that some feeling is part of the process on some occasions.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Kant NC › Kant NC

Promissory infidelity violates the categorical imperative – if false promises were willed as universal law, the institution of promising would cease to exist. Thus, false promises entail a contradiction in conception.

Effectiviology citing Kant no date [(Effectiviology, a website about psychology and philosophy that have practical applications) “Kant’s Categorical Imperative: Act the Way You Want Others to Act,” citing Immanuel Kant's 1785 "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals," based on Allen W. Wood's 2002 translation, https://effectiviology.com/categorical-imperative/] TDI

In addition, the following is a comprehensive example of the categorical imperative, which shows how it can be implemented and explains the rationale behind it, as proposed by Kant himself:

“When I am in a tight spot, may I not make a promise with the intention of not keeping it?

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Kant NC › Kant NC

Independently, reducing US military presence amounts to promise breaking – the US abandons its commitment to its allies when it withdraws from the region

Fetouri 21 [(Dr Mustafa Fetouri, Libyan academic and freelance journalist. He is a recipient of the EU's Freedom of the Press prize) "After Afghanistan, US allies must feel a sense of abandonment," Memo, 9/2/21, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210902-after-afghanistan-us-allies-must-feel-a-sense-of-abandonment/] TDI

Do any of America's allies still trust its commitment to them? After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, they must feel a sense of abandonment by the US.

Critics point out that what happened in Afghanistan was decided by Washington without even consulting its allies. The former Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani had first-hand experience of this when the then US President Donald Trump negotiated with the Taliban last year without him.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Kant NC › Kant NC

We have a perfect duty to coerce states that fail to respect human rights – failure to hold states accountable is tantamount to a failure to respect the dignity of their constituents. States that fail to protect human rights have failed as a state, and thus, do not have claims against coercion.

Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI

In violating another person’s dignity, I fail as a moral as well as a rational being in that I fail to act upon a maxim that can be conceived and willed as a universal law.35 Others are then permitted and required to coerce me, if coercion is needed to obstruct my wrongdoing. Although the underlying reasoning is clearly moral, Kant defends the permission to coerce as a juridical permission, according to which one person may force another to act rightly; that is, we may obstruct wrong actions.36 This conception of coercion is based on the idea that the wrongdoer and the victim are both members of a moral community of mutually accountable equals. The moral norms that regulate the moral community are merely the standards of respect for the equal dignity of all members. All members of the community have equal standing to demand compliance. When those standards are violated, the victims have a claim on the wrongdoer, and they have grounds for complaint if he does not comply.

Membership in a community of mutual respect and accountability helps us to see that human rights are claims to which we are entitled as persons. As Joel Feinberg points out, having rights makes claiming possible; but it is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance. This feature of rights is connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be a human being. Having rights enables us . . . to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal to anyone.37

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Kant NC › Kant NC

Defending against human rights abuses is a perfect duty as it is grounded in duties of respect for humanity, not duties of charity – upholding this perfect duty requires military intervention.

Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI

In the case of humanitarian intervention, the issue of identifying the appropriate agency certainly arises. But this is a political issue that concerns proper authority. Whether perfect or imperfect, a duty applies to all rational agents. Specifically, then, in case of serious violation of human rights, everybody, that is, the entire international community, is bound by the obligation to protect the victims of human rights abuse. How should we collectively handle this moral responsibility? This is not a question of allocation deriving from the broadness of the duty to protect. Rather, this is a political problem of how to institutionalize a response that should be voiced by the international community as a whole.

I agree with Kok Chor Tan’s argument in this volume that if the duty to protect is imperfect in the absence of collective institutions, the proper conclusion is that states must cooperate to improve those institutions, not that they are free individually to ignore the duty.20 There clearly is a problem as to how to institutionalize the moral responsibility to intervene, but it is not exactly a problem of allocation: the problem is a political one and concerns how to institutionalize the responsibility. Furthermore, this political problem does not depend on the fact that humanitarian intervention is at best an imperfect duty. In fact, the problem remains even when we take the duty to intervene as a perfect duty generated by respect for humanity.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › Kant NC › Kant NC

Our humanity, which consists in our autonomous rationality, endows us with the capacity to decide what is valuable. It is this feature that belies our dignity and renders us each an inviolable, unconditional source of value. That we are each unconditional sources of value bounds us to respect each other’s humanity. This requires that we only act on those maxims that can be willed as universal law.

Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI

What is humanity, then? According to Kant, humanity is what characterizes us as persons; it consists in the capacity to decide what is valuable and what is not. This decision is not a mere whim, but the very capacity for rationally setting ends of one’s own.4 A person is a special locus of value in that it is also the origin of value. Kant calls “dignity” the peculiar kind of value that persons embody insofar as they are themselves sources of value. Originating value is a law-like activity: it requires that we are capable of setting ends by conceiving maxims that can be willed as universal laws. This also requires that we are capable of self-legislation and therefore of prescribing obligations for ourselves. This activity of self-legislation is tantamount to the autonomous exercise of rationality. Hence, humanity is tantamount to autonomous rationality, and it is the feature that makes persons inviolable.5 We cannot view persons as indistinguishable units of value insofar as persons embody a peculiar kind of value, dignity. The recognition that somebody is a person makes a claim on us: it demands that we respect such a person as an autonomous source of value.

Armed intervention is “humanitarian” when it is undertaken for the sake of protecting the dignity of persons, that is, the value of their humanity. Human rights are necessary to express and exercise our humanity; they are fundamental to being a person. When we appeal to the idea of human dignity, we make a moral case for intervention, that is, one that applies universally and unconditionally.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › AT Sovereignty AC › AT – AC Contention

Discharging our moral obligation to establish a civil condition requires forced democratization of non-Republican states. Forced democratization doesn’t violate state sovereignty since non-Republican states aren’t governed by an omnilateral will.

Desch 08 [Michael C. Desch, The Packey J. Dee Professor of International Relations and founding director of the Notre Dame International Security Center) "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy," The MIT Press, Winter 2007/2008, ] TDI

THE KANTIAN ROOTS OF LIBERAL ILLIBERALISM It was rather Immanuel Kant, author of the essay "Perpetual Peace," who has had the greatest influence on U.S. foreign policy, primarily through the theory of the "democratic peace."18 Although his essay was penned at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant's influence really took hold at the end of the nine-teenth century, eventually becoming the philosophical rationale for efforts tswil promote peace through the spread of democracy under the auspices of interna-tional institutions such as Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations.19 Kant's objective was to establish a system of perpetual peace that ended war without the need for an overarching world government.20 For such a system to function effectively, all countries would need the same republican domestic po-litical order. Kant's "first definitive article of perpetual peace" states that "the civil constitution of every nation should be republican."21 He reasoned that po-litical systems in which individuals who are likely to bear the direct costs of wars also have a say in whether it is waged are less likely to engage in them.22 Kenneth Waltz describes Kant's solution as "the 'power' to enforce law [, which] is . . . derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection."23 Subsequent Liberals, according to Leo Strauss, learned from Kant "that the prosperous, free, and just society in a single country or in only a few countries is not possible in the long run: to make the world safe for Western democra-cies, one must make the whole globe democratic, each country in itself as well as the society of nations. Good order in one country presupposes good order in all countries and among all countries."24 Pierre Hassner argues that this link-age accounts for the paradoxical nature of Kant's "political philosophy [, which] seems more than ever to be compounded of an abstract morality not of this world and an amoral politics too much of it."25 The abstract morality is Kant's categorical imperative that states have a duty to leave the international state of nature, and bring other states out of it as well, through the spread of representative government domestically and internationally. Kant's politics are amoral, however, because he countenances illiberal means such as coercive regime change through outside intervention and global hegemony to actualize this Liberal dream of perpetual peace. Unlike earlier social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Locke, Kant regarded the international state of nature as so perilous that its dangers could be ameliorated only through the radical transformation of countries' do-mestic orders and the international system.26 Given this, he concluded that leaving the system was an "unmitigated duty."27 Kant accorded to republican states the right to end the international state of war by forcing other states to embrace republicanism. He explained, "For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand that others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each."28 Because non-republican states, and those that do not join what Kant referred to as the "republican league," threaten to perpetuate the unacceptable international state of nature, interven-tion to change these regimes or the use of coercion to force states to join the league is not inconsistent with his system.29 Here, Kant makes a dramatic break from classical international law—particularly the work of Hugo Grotius—with its unqualified commitment to state sovereignty. At first glance, this right to demand that other states leave the state of nature seems to contradict Kant's proscription, in his fifth preliminary article, of inter-ference in the domestic politics of other countries.30 For Liberals, state sover- eighty ultimately derives from the rights of individuals in the state of nature. When individuals surrender their natural liberty to the commonwealth through the social contract, it then inheres in the state.3' Intervention in the affairs of such a representative state violates the individual rights of its citizens.32 If a state is not truly representative, however, it does not enjoy the same right of nonintervention.33 Kant framed this in the context of an "unjust en-emy," which he defined as "one whose publicly expressed Will, either in word or deed, betrays a maxim which, if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of peace among the nations impossible, and would necessarily perpetuate the state of nature."34 In other words, an unjust enemy is a state that fails to embrace republicanism. "There can be talk of international right only on the assumption that a state of law-governedness exists," Kant main-tained, "for in the state of nature, in the absence of law-governedness, only pri-vate right can exist."35 The larger principle here is that absent an international social contract, states enjoy no international rights. Kant even allowed that a republican hegemon could act as the catalyst for the establishment of the republican league: "For if good fortune should so dis-pose matters that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace), it will provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in or-der to guarantee a state of peace among nations."36 By inspiring other states to embrace republicanism at home and abroad, this hegemon was to be more than just a "beacon of hope" or a "shining city on a hill." Indeed; by viewing the presence of non-Liberal states as threatening, Kantian Liberalism can serve as the philosophical justification for intervention and hegemony.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › AT Sovereignty AC › AT – AC Framework

Neither basic justice nor self-determination justify sovereign statehood – basic justice could be served by a cosmopolitan state and self-determination is a contingent justification at best.

Schutter 21 [(Helder De, professor of social and political philosophy at KU Leuven. He works on the moral justifications of language rights, federalism, and nonterritorial political autonomy) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration, a Review by Helder De Schutter," Ethics and International Affairs, Spring 2021, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/journal/territorial-sovereignty-a-philosophical-exploration#author] TDI

This leads me to my second qualm. If not occupancy, do Stilz’s other two interests— basic justice and self-determination—bring us to the states system? Basic justice does not. A single territorial world state and other forms of political cosmopolitanism could protect basic justice. All depends, then, on self-determination. Any state is coercive, but for that coercion to be legitimate, it must be backed by a collective authorization by the population. Stilz argues that that authorization is lacking for the world state. This argument is persuasive. Yet, it shows the contingency of Stilz’s case against the world state. Whether that authorization is lacking is an empirical matter. There is no principled argument here against political cosmopolitan efforts to create a global “we” feeling (or a European state feeling, for that matter). If in due time, people are willing to form a global political community, the argument for the current world of states evaporates.

Moreover, Stilz’s reasoning allows for a second way for that argument to disappear, even in the absence of such global identification. As we saw above, the self-determination constraint against alien coercion should for Stilz be lifted when, in the absence of the coercion, decent governance is threatened and grave social harms occur. All thus depends on the assessment of the urgency of threats such as climate change and global terrorism, or of the injustice of the absence of the fulfillment of basic needs for all humans. If these are compelling enough—and if the international pressure that Stilz justifies in her preferred international system is insufficiently effective—basic justice considerations counsel in favor of establishing a global territorial state, even where this frustrates the self-determining and anti-alienation wishes of portions of humankind.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Kant/Util NEG › AT Sovereignty AC › AT – AC Framework

Our interest in occupancy is not an argument for state sovereignty – place-based ties could equally ground an argument for a world state.

Schutter 21 [(Helder De, professor of social and political philosophy at KU Leuven. He works on the moral justifications of language rights, federalism, and nonterritorial political autonomy) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration, a Review by Helder De Schutter," Ethics and International Affairs, Spring 2021, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/journal/territorial-sovereignty-a-philosophical-exploration#author] TDI

While compelling in many respects, the book’s core argument suffers in my view from two shortcomings. First, it remains unclear why occupancy, the first interest above, is an argument for states. The right to occupancy is grounded in place-based ties that structure the life of individuals. But the sum totals of the places to which people are attached do not necessarily map on to the territories of states. For many people, states may be too cramped for their life plans: if my family members live overseas or if my religion involves visiting holy places abroad, then my life plans are better served by a world state, or they in any case demand rather idiosyncratic state boundaries.

Stilz herself allows for granting occupancy rights without statehood: “Suppose,” she argues, “that in the future, Alaska were to secede from the United States. It would be wrong for Alaska to close its borders to people from other US states who have family ties or associational or occupational commitments in the area: it ought to allow these people to continue to come and go freely, reside there, and so on” (p. 57). But this is puzzling. If granting access to an independent Alaska to U.S. citizens who have Alaska-based life plans suffices to protect their occupancy rights, occupancy does not ground states.

2023 TDI Affirmative
Sovereignty Kant AFF › 1AR – Kant NC › AT – Promise Breaking

Military withdrawal is not an example of a false promise – failing to fulfill one’s commitment is distinct from making a promise one intends to break.

Byrd and Hruschka 05 [(B. Sharon and Joachim, a Professor of U.S. Law at the School of Law, Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany and Joachim Hruschka is a Professor of Law at Friedrich-Alexander University in Erlangen, Germany) "Kant on 'Why Must I Keep My Promise?'" Chicago-Kent Law Review, December 2005, https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3521&context=cklawreview] TDI

Why is it that I must keep my promise? Immanuel Kant,1 in his "Doctrine of Right,"'2 tells us that everyone easily understands "I must." The duty to keep promises is a categorical imperative. 3 Kant says that any fur- ther proof of this imperative is simply impossible-indeed as impossible as it would be for a geometer to prove that I need three lines to construct a triangle. 4 One may quickly fall into the trap of believing Kant's claim because of his arguments in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,5 where Kant uses false promising as his most convincing example for the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."'6 The example posits an individual in need of money who knows he will never be able to repay a loan. 7 Still, to get the needed funds, he also knows that he must firmly promise to repay it. Can he make the promise? Kant states that the maxim of his action is, "When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen." 8 Such a maxim cannot be universalized without contradiction; thus, it cannot become a universal law. The individual acting on this maxim relies on the institution of promising, without which his promise would be ineffective, while simultaneously contradicting the nature of the institution of promising. Although this example seems to convincingly support Kant's Categorical Imperative, does it provide support for the legal duty to perform a contractual obligation? Two distinct questions are raised here. The first is whether the duty in connection with the false promising example Kant discusses in Groundwork is a legal or an ethical duty. The second is whether the duty, be it legal or ethical, is a duty not to make false promises, referring to the duty relevant at the time the promise is made, or a duty to perform as promised earlier, which first becomes relevant when performance is due.

At first blush, the duty Kant discusses in Groundwork is the duty not to lie, which is an ethical duty but not necessarily a legal duty. For Kant, legal duties are duties one owes to others; ethical duties are duties one owes to oneself.9 The duties one owes to others are legal duties if their nonfulfillment constitutes a violation of someone else's freedom of choice, thus violating Kant's universal principle of law: "Act externally so that the free use of your choice can co-exist with everyone else's freedom under a universal law."' 0 Because the non-fulfillment of duties constitutes a violation of someone else's freedom of choice, one can be coerced to fulfill these duties."l In the Groundwork example, the individual considers lying to gain an advantage. Kant notes in several places that lying violates an ethical duty one owes to oneself, 12 but lying violates a legal duty only if the lie infringes upon someone else's rights. 13 In the "Doctrine of Right,"