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2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › FJG

FJG is neoliberal poverty governance that makes work and market contribution a prerequisite to true citizenship

Sanford F. Schram et al 9 {Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College} - ("The third level of US welfare reform: governmentality under neoliberal paternalism," Taylor & Francis, published 1-1-2009, accessed 7-12-2023, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13621025.2010.522363)//LF/

Thus, globalization and neoliberal ideology should not be mistaken for inexorable forces necessitating a single mode of social provision (Hay 2006, Schram 2006). All developed countries are experiencing global market integration and feeling political pressures to adopt neoliberal reforms, but they are responding in their own ways. The United States, with its long-standing emphasis on market-conforming welfare policy and reliance on private agents of provision (Hacker 2002), has been the predictable epicenter of a global turn toward neoliberal poverty governance that is taking different forms in different polities. To understand the relationship between neoliberalism and welfare reform, one must engage the former as a shift, not only in the state, but also in the meaning and practice of citizenship. Citizenship is an inherently relational status, defined by the ways members of a polity are positioned vis-a`-vis nonmembers, one another, the state, and other major societal institutions. Thus, as the state has been restructured to operate according to market rationalities, citizenship too has shifted toward an economic register of identity and practice. The status of the democratic citizen, positioned as one who must decide and act collectively with others to gain preferred policy outcomes, has been eroded and partly displaced by the individualistic market roles of consumer, worker, and paying customer (Crenson and Ginsberg 2002). Citizens, in this guise, are synonymous with ‘taxpayers’ who have a contractual right to expect efficient and effective institutional actions that produce a good return on their investment. They are positioned, through vouchers and choice programs, as ‘consumers’ who pursue better goods from the system by exercising their individual freedom to seek goods from other providers (exit) rather than by joining together to participate in or demand improvements in the institutions they share (voice). They are encouraged to help others, not by deciding together how to organize their communities in a just manner, but by pursuing individual work as volunteers and charitable givers and virtuous providers of services. At the same time, the obligation to work and function as a ‘self-sufficient’ actor in the market is recast as the primary responsibility of the citizen and, indeed, as a necessary precondition for ‘moral standing’ as a member of society who merits equal respect, possesses full rights, and can be presumed competent to fulfill other civic obligations (Mead 1997). Under neoliberalism, citizenship is, as Brown (2006) observes, ‘reduced to self-care;’ self-care is reduced, in turn, to the singular project of ensuring that one’s needs are met through one’s contributions to the market. Uses of policy to make ‘better citizens’ thus become indistinguishable from efforts to produce docile subjects who comply with market needs and political authorities. Neoliberalism, in this sense, entails the ‘governmentalization’ of citizenship (Dean 1999).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Fiscal Redistribution

Financial Liberty Link: the aff’s concept of giving people “financial liberty” is based in biopolitical control over people by the government.

Grenier and Orléan ’07 [Jean-Yves Grenier is a French philospher and writer, André Orléan was a former president of the French association of political economy (AFEP), “Michel Foucault: The Political Economy and Liberalism,”  Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 2007, pg. 1155-1182, https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_ANNA_625_1155--michel-foucault-the-political-economy.htm] [A.G]

In the third lecture, Foucault explains to his audience that, after having studied in his preceding books the specificity of disciplinary mechanisms in relation to the system of law, he intends in this course to reflect on the difference between discipline and the mechanisms of security. His ostensible objective is to “put a stop to repeated invocations of the master as well as to the monotonous assertion of power” (STP 83 [57]). This declaration testifies firstly to his becoming conscious of the limits and insufficiencies of a reflection on the social order in terms of discipline and constraints that does not take account of recent forms taken by the government of men. [16][16]“I said somewhere that we could not understand the… Above all, its fault is that it presents liberty, with the modern sense that this word takes on after the eighteenth century, as an ideology or a universal concept, a sort of right of man that would bring triumph in the struggle against the disciplinarization of society. Liberty, Foucault maintains, is something else entirely: it is a technique of power, a relation between governor and governed. Two political readings are possible. The first, “Foucauldian” in the narrow sense of the term, would take this affirmation as an advocacy. Let us not misunderstand: the liberty left to the population is used by power for the ends of control, and there is discipline in the liberty that modern governmentality grants us. Moreover, the fact that security apparatuses are the producers of the liberty that they consume illustrates very well this essential observation: liberties depend upon power. The second reading insists on the contrary on the fact that, governmentality being necessarily protective of liberty, it constitutes a type of power that merits reflection and that can exert a certain attraction. Both readings are possible, and one may suppose that Foucault was capable of envisioning both. The reflexive tension that runs through both courses, however, tends to make one think that, unambiguously even if never explicitly, their author seeks the second direction. A clue to this is given by the reflection he proposes on the state. Faithful to his method, he refuses to have recourse to such a general category of political philosophy. The state is not a universal, it has no essence: to understand it, we must “come from outside,” and understand it through practices, that is to say through the general technology of power. And it is precisely to avoid any risk of “circular ontology” that we must do the genealogy of the state on the basis of a history of governmental reason. This argument is only apparently exclusively methodological. For it also allows Foucault to initiate a strong critique of those who denounce the state on the pretext that it tends to acquire an unlimited power or that its expansion is historically irreversible. Such a conception is too reductive, because in fact it amounts to hypostasizing the state, according it something like an essence. Foucault situates the origin of such an approach in the German liberals of the first half of the twentieth century, whose discourse is taken up later, unknowingly, by the Left, or even leftist, critique of the seventies that identifies all affirmation of the role of the state with a form of authoritarianism, or even fascism. According to Foucault this position is unacceptable for two reasons. The first is that the interference of the state in societal affairs is from the outset limited within the configuration proposed by liberal governmentality. The second is that its intervention is necessary for the establishment of liberty.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Fiscal Redistribution

Anticyclical Link: Conditioning financial support on labor market contributions turns citizens into passive subjects whose primary moral obligation is to serve the capitalist system.

Matthew Cooper 20 {Associate Lecturer, Department of Sociology at Wentworth College} - ("‘21st Century Welfare’ in Historical Perspective: Disciplinary Welfare in the Depression of the 1930s and Its Implications for Today," Sage Journals, published 7-20-2020, accessed 7-13-2023, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1360780420937741)//LF/

Governmentality literature in social policy follows Foucault by focusing ‘on the intervention of the state through organizations, procedures, rules and categories’ (Boland, 2016: 3). Of central interest is how administrators or governors perceive subjects and populations and how ideal outcomes and subjects are constituted in discourse and translated into techniques of governance. Disciplinary power ‘‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise’ (Foucault, 1977: 170). It is a matter ‘of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose and Miller, 2010: 272). With regard to unemployment benefits, disciplinary measures seek to ‘make up’ a subject that can be (and seeks to be Peeters, 2013) re-integrated into the labour market and no longer dependent upon state funds (Dean, 1995). Foucault’s recently published (in English) lectures On the Punitive Society (2015), delivered in the run-up to the publication of Discipline and Punish (1977), provide an interesting supplement to the latter. They contain a greater focus on the development of policing, driven by developing capitalist production. They show that disciplinary social policy is not neutral regarding the labour market; economic liberalism ‘and disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with each other’ (Foucault, 2010: 66). Conditionality is a capitalist technology seeking to enforce ‘the worker’s duty to offer his labour-power on a free market’ (Foucault, 2015: 173). The conditionality increases seen in the present day depend on a view of passive subjects, ‘workless’, and ‘dependent’, who require a firm guiding hand after a period of over-indulgence. This view also provides a justification for escalations which are represented as in the ultimate interests of the claimant who has neither the capacity to refuse (as an irrational subject) nor the right to do so (as the morally indebted recipient of aid). But these interventions are not applied evenly: their application is dependent upon a system of classifications. This differentiation and ranking of individuals can entail very different forms of treatment. ‘The distribution according to ranks or grades has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it also punishes and rewards’ (Foucault, 1977: 181). In the UK, the different conditions placed upon those receiving payments, such as demands that they train, search for work, or carry out unpaid work, are stratified by the individual’s status within a liberal ‘moral order’ (Boltanski and Threvenot, 2006).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Fiscal Redistribution

The aff is an exercise in Keynesian economics – that acts as a form of social control through financialization

Lucarelli 10 (Stefano Lucarelli is a professor in economics at University of Bergamo. “Financialization as Biopower,” Semiotexte. January 1 2010. https://www.academia.edu/4949737/_Finanzialization_as_Biopower_in_Andrea_Fumagalli_e_Sandro_Mezzadra_eds._Crisis_in_the_Global_Economy._Financial_Markets_Social_Struggles_and_New_Political_Scenarios_MIT_Press_Series_Semiotext_e_Active_Agents) @ehatt

My thesis is that contemporary capitalism is characterized by an accumulation regime that tends to lead every specific moment of individual existence back into the process of valorization. The means through which this happens do not only include economic politics of neoliberal inspiration, but also include the command devices that are only understanable if they are put in the hybrid zone where the political economy meets social psychology (I’m referring to the wealth-effect). I will therefore try to analyze financialization as a practice of social control. In fact, it seems to me that to understand an accumulation regime unable to construct longlasting modes of regulation, there is only one alternative: assume a new point of view that immediately focuses on the problems of command and power. This new capitalism needs a social control compatible with democratic societies where order is based on the formalized participation of great masses.3 One of the new characteristics of the financialization process that involves us is its mass participation, its formal democracy. In order to articulate this line of reasoning, I will borrow a few categories from Michel Foucault, in particular biopower and governmentality (§2);4 I will then adapt them to my object of analysis, concentrating on the role that the wealth-effect assumes in the financialization process (§3). I will then illustrate the role assumed by monetary policy in the described accumulation regime (§4). Lastly, I will refer to the American economic model—intended as ideal-type—and I will propose a personal reading of the financial crisis (§5): the roots of the crisis are to be sought in the instabilities in the new accumulation regime that is characterized by a dominant technological paradigm. The new technological paradigm started with the crisis of Fordism and the so-called Smithian division of labor. In the new division of labor, along the whole productive assembly line, knowledge plays a key role in the redefinition of the capital-labor relation.5 The so-called subprime crisis then will be explained as a phenomenon endogenously produced by the dynamics of the new accumulation regime that has affirmed itself ever since the crisis of Fordism; an accumulation regime—it is important to stress—compatible only with nonauthentic modes of regulation, or ones that don’t assume the exercise of conflict as a necessary premise for a social pact. Social control (biopower) thus emerges in a new form, more difficult to perceive and contrast.6 Here, I’d like to limit myself to simply indicating another moment for the necessary consideration on the political-economic proposals in response to the crisis.7 1. Foucaultian Categories The term biopower—coined by Foucault in the area of a vaster reasoning on the rationality of western politics—refers to the great structures and functions of power; in his own words, it is a great two-sided technology, anatomic and biologic, that acts on the individual and the species: the comprehension of power cannot stop at the specific social places in which discipline is exercised, but also presupposes the analysis of the regulation of populations in their daily lives (the anatomic and biological aspects therefore participate in a political dimension). This all began to be discovered in the 18th century, when it was realized that the relation of power to the subject or, more precisely, to the individual, cannot be based merely on subjection—that permits power to take goods, riches and, possibly, even the body and blood from subjects—but that power must be exercised over individuals in as much as they constitute a kind of biological entity which must be taken into consideration if the population is to be used as a machine to produce wealth, goods or other individuals.8 The logic of biopower is the production of wealth through the daily use of the population, in opposition to anatomo-politics, which is to say the whole of mechanism and procedures limited to disciplining subjects. The new mechanisms presuppose that the population is not simply perceived as a sum of the individuals that inhabit a territory. As Adelino Zanini has rightly pointed out, what must interest the scholar is the passage from the art of government to political science, from a system dominated by structures de souverainété to one characterized by techniques du gouvernement. A passage made possible by imposing a new paradigm of the political economy.9 Political economy—according to Foucault—is the science which able to identify the law necessary for the scope of governing according to the modern logic of the gouvernment de la population: “The new governmentality, that in the 17th century had thought itself capable of entirely investing itself in a complete and unitary policing project, now finds itself in the situation of having to refer to a neutral area, which is the economy.”10 The logic of biopower therefore takes us to the exact modalities of control that Foucault called governmentality: With the word “governmentality” I mean three things. [First,] the whole of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that permit the exercising of this specific and quite complex form of power, that has the population as its main target, in the political economy the privileged form of knowledge and in the security devices the principle technical tool. Second, for “governmentality” I mean the tendency, the driving force that, in the whole West and for a long time, continues to assert the preeminence of this type of power that we call “government” over all of the others—sovereignty, discipline—with the consequent development, on one hand, of a series of specific government apparatuses and, [on the other hand,] a series of knowledges. Lastly, for “governementality” we should mean the process, rather than the result, of the process through which the state of Medieval justice, having become the administrative state in the course of the 15th and 16th centuries, gradually found itself “governmentalized.”11 Foucault didn’t elaborate his research in the direction of financial and monetary history. Yet, a history of governmentality—as I see it—cannot leave out the financial and monetary apparatuses that came into existence in the 18th century. As many important studies conducted on the history of money have shown, this century represents an incredibly significant moment for the history of money in Europe: it is the moment in which European money frees itself from the traditional configuration, that of guaranteeing account correctness and payment stability in the whole Empire. Before then, in fact, it was the duty of the Prince of conserving a treasure from which it is possible to draw upon if needed, which is to say if the community’s need imposes it, and its regulatory function is limited to this. […] The “nature” of money is exhausted in its distributive capacity and is naturally delimited by the measure in which the goods are present. In respect to such measure, money is constantly able to take account of the presence of things, but can never solicit that they come into presence: it is both measure of abundance and scarcity starting from their natural alternation in time.12 In modernity—in the course of the 18th century—the need to strengthen the territorial states shattered the imperial political-administrative equilibrium just described. The dominant need became that which money can change value in relation to the changing needs that are manifested in nation-states, which is the valorization of money. Money’s “nature” is no longer delimited by the measure in which goods are present, but consists in the urge to get rich. Grasping the trait that joints both this function of money and the regulation of populations for the production of wealth, clarifies the concrete meaning of biopower. In order to transform the Foucaultian concept of biopower in a political category useful for the analysis of the current process of financialization, it must be understood simultaneously in the two dimensions proposed above. If the quickest way to produce abstract wealth, i.e. money, is trying to realize it minimizing the risks that are run and the conflicts that come up when raw goods production is organized, it is only rational to minimize the costs of production, including state and bank control over economic activities, thus maximizing the possibility of money’s autonomously deciding what it has at its disposition. In such a way, a new power of control over the population is exerted. The risk distribution inherent to the production of money through money becomes the strategy to employ. The power that is exercised within an accumulation system dominated by finance is something different from the power exercised by a sovereign state over its citizens. The search for governmental freedom that markets claim goes right along with the management of the populations which nation-states take responsibility for. So that the population produces wealth within money’s valorization cycle, a form of social control that substantiates the different relations both between master and slave and between state and citizen. My thesis is that financialization represents the very form of social control necessary for such scope. It is in fact a form of socialization (of risk but also of the prospectives of enrichment that are complementary to it) that leads to a revolution in the concept of sovereignty. What financialization puts at stake is no longer the immediate application of sovereign power but the directing of the whole of the human behaviors necessary so that sovereignty is coherent with the financialization process. 2. Financialization and the Wealth-Effect First of all, financialization can be defined as the diversion of domestic economy savings to stock market shares.13 Ever since the 1980s, the American economy has been characterized by the process of financial market liberalization and the consequent explosion of new financial tools: thus the passage from a Keynesianism built on a pact between producers in an environment of a monetary system that binds currency and financial maneuvers—already weakened by president Nixon’s declaration of the inconvertibility of the dollar to gold in 1971—to a financial Keynesianism based on private deficit spending, in which the largest financial market deregulations are accompanied by the diminution of social incomes distributed by the welfare state. We are facing an evolution in liberal governmentality. In other words, financial Keynesianism is a modality of liberal governmentality. Shareholder value14 becomes the principle macroeconomic indicator, the scepter and the pastoral that govern both investment and consumption through the wealth-effect.15 For a psychological dynamic that would be worthy of further study but that represents a necessary condition of stability of the American economic model (here intended as ideal-type), the wealth effect induced by an increase of value in the markets affects consumption behaviors more than the expected wealth due to an increase in wages.16 The model has a high risk of instability; the fact that financial crises have followed one after another so quickly over the last few years is proof of this. The exercising of liberal governmentality means that this form of specific command over individual behavior is reintroduced each time: the rule that has been consolidated consists in passing from one bubble to the next,17 forcing individuals to believe that their wealth depends more on financial markets than demands for wages or other forms of possible claims. Following this approach, the wealth-effect represents the form of command typical of financial Keynesianism, here understood as liberal governmentality. The dynamic that goes from profit to financial market and vice-versa substitutes the principle political decisions in the Fordist-Keynesian paradigm: the productivity-wage connection and the production-mass consumption connection. The impact of financial returns on patrimonial decisions becomes the key factor in investment decisions; these must keep count of the financial returns, and not only on the variations in demand. Consumption continues to depend on the accumulation of traditional income from labor (i.e. wages) but a variable that measures the value of the financial tools that families own intervenes too. If financialization is highly developed—which is if family wealth depends more on the quote of income coming from financial markets than wages—wage moderation, favoring companies’ profitability, increases financial returns; thus a dynamic founded on the wealth-effect aimed at favoring private consumption while even facing falling real wages can be triggered. The level of production becomes a consequence of financial value. This inverts the relations between the real sphere and the financial sphere that prevailed under Fordism: the market dynamic replaces wages as source of cumulative growth. This inversion also revolutionizes social control mechanisms that concern the individuals in the modern world. In other words, the wealth-effect that supports the financial world’s thought process depends on the degree of subsumption not only of labor, but of life itself and finance (this is where biopower’s feature lies). In macroeconomic terms, this dependent relation is translated in the growing liquidity that financial markets attract starting with private savings that were previously invested in State bonds. Even so, this growing liquidity is not enough by itself. There is a second explanatory variable necessary so that the wealth-effect continues: it is the common sense that forms between individuals about the reasons that should explain the production of money by means of money, and about the hierarchy of needs to satisfy in order to maintain an acceptable social status. The logic of valorization leads to the transformation of social relations. More precisely, this means that financialization is a form of socialization that makes liberal governmentality evolve. So, it is comprehensible as to why the analysis of financialization cannot be limited to the study of the conditions of the macroeconomic sustainability of the system; it also requires paying particular attention to the social codes through which human relations are reciprocally limited. We must thus understand these conventions that settle in the population, starting from the business world. A convention furnishes a valuation system a priori, pointing out the whole of the social rules able to make the different behavior of single individuals homogeneous. Therefore, it presupposes a theory of imitation. This is the observational point that Keynes uses to explain the generation of long-term expectations: There is, however, not much to be said about the state of confidence a priori. Our conclusions must mainly depend upon the actual observation of markets and business psychology. […] Thus certain classes of investment are governed by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, rather than by the genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur. How then are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing investments carried out in practice? In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention—though it does not, of course, work out quite so simply—lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change […] Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention. 18 However, the analysis of conventions cannot be limited to the business world. The state of trust defined by conventional valuation is in fact legitimated by public opinion.19 It spills into the business world, involves the populations and becomes political object. Hence it helps in focusing the (Foucaultian) problem of the govermentality of civil society. The dominant accumulation system in contemporary capitalism supposes more than one change in the political sphere: first of all, growth conditions depend on the acceptance of a new productive model in which labor assumes a different role. It is not only a deconstruction of the Fordist union; nor is it merely the reduced importance of wages in as much as a fundamental macroeconomic variable for accumulation and therefore the annihilation of the inherent conflict in wage claims. Instead, it is the construction of a valorization process in which the acknowledged objective reasons that are at the base of the production of wealth change; valorization becomes dependent on the conventions that are asserted in the financial community. Macroeconomic stability depends largely on the interventions of the Central Banks that, facing a scarcity of liquidity in the financial markets, must be quick enough to prevent a financial crisis. The Central Banks react facing the need for liquidity, aware that they are sustaining the wealth-effect on which it plays—in Foucaultian terms—the security of the territory’s population delimited by the financial markets. The levers of power are no longer in the distribution of banking credit, nor in deficit spending. The independent variable is neither wages, nor profit, but is the accumulation rate from financial appreciation. The offer of currency is freed by the quantum of currency held by the Central Bank and is tied to the reorganization of the division of labor and the redefinition of social relations in the circulation-reproduction sphere. In other words, money supply is tied to the dynamic of capital-(living) labor: as the contributions by “Primo Maggio” workgroup on money show, monetary policy represents a modality of capitalist command.20 Today this task is no longer accomplished through the control of the quantity of currency in circulation nor merely in the name of inflationist thrusts. In the Central Bank and academic worlds, throughout the 1990s a principle was established according to which the credibility of monetary policy must realize itself either through pegging the exchange rate or through delegating monetary politics to a foreign Central Bank with elevated inflation aversion. First, this New Consensus negates Friedman’s monetary policy: the main instruments for monetary policy control are interest rates, no longer money supply. In theory, the role of the Central Bank consists in assuring the equality between the monetary interest rate and the real interest rate that regulates the balance between loanable and investment funds. When market rates (in real terms) are fixed under the natural rate, inflation is created. A restrictive monetary policy would have no negative effects and would help to control inflation. In reality, to support the rate of accumulation from financial surplus value, the highest monetary policy institutions didn’t hesitate in behaving differently: At the head of the Federal Reserve there are still people with good sense that have sacrificed, as in Greenspan’s case, their philosophic maximalism in the name of the preservation of the system even with tools completely contrary to that maximalism. But even in Europe, the maximalism of the very ECB statute was substituted by the good sense of those that manage our highest monetary organism. Greenspan didn’t hesitate to cut the Federal Fund rates 11 times in one year, bringing it to the lowest nominal level of the last 40 years. And the ECB willingly followed his example!21 Monetary policy in a finance-led growth regime must follow the needs of valorization, supporting the conventions. The monetary creation influenced by financialization is substantialized in a recovery process of capital’s profitability that involves people’s lives in financial risk. Financialization determines the times of capitalistic reorganization, facilitating the subsumption of circulation within the entire process of valorization.22 This last element is the one that connects the three phases of the financialization process ever since 1993: the boom of the New Economy (1993–2000), the reaction to its crisis (2000–2003), and lastly the real-estate bubble (2003–2007). All three phases occur in the same technological paradigm. For this reason, the conventions that regulate financial valuation are not subjected to radical changes. The valuation logics in the financial community are, for the most part, the same.

2023 CNDI Kritik
1NC › Wonder Alt › Generic Link

The alt is wonder — it avoids the biopolitical extremes of care and subjugation, instead centering us in a relation with other beings, ideas, places, and things that does not take us to either extreme.

De Lucia ’20 [Vito De Lucia is a Professor at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, “Rethinking the Encounter Between Law and Nature in the Anthropocene: From Biopolitical Sovereignty to Wonder,” Law Critique, October 22 2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-020-09281-9#ref-CR17] [A.G]

Disarticulating the Biopolitical Aporia Through Wonder As the Earth is reframed as a vulnerable body in the Anthropocene, power shifts focus, modalities of interventions and goals, in order to reconstruct its legitimacy (challenged in the Anthropocene where all modern political certainties have been ‘irrevocably disturbed’) and to remain productive (Matthews 2019, p. 3). From a sovereign mode that appropriates and exploits the Earth and its resources, law, through biopolitics, must enter into a protective mode, caring for vulnerable bodies, fostering their capacity, enhancing their productivity. Yet biopolitics remains inevitably underpinned by an epistemology of mastery and often needs, to be operationalized, the sovereign command. Sovereignty in fact, while diminished or even dormant in a legal framework that focuses on the biopolitical notions of conservation and sustainability (De Lucia 2017a), rather than on exploitation, stands ready to be re-activated when a forceful intervention is needed to discipline recalcitrant nature. This continuous risk of transformation from a biopolitics of care to a biopolitics of death, with all its attendant sovereign choices as to who can live and who must die, is the core dilemma of this biopolitical shift. Esposito speaks in this respect of a constitutive dilemma of biopolitics, a ‘never-released tension’, a ‘lacerating effect’ (Esposito 2008, p. 32) that accompanies it, as the two poles of its articulation—life and politics—are engaged in an inevitable and insoluble struggle. The effects of this struggle are that life is caught in what Agamben calls the ‘zone of irreducible indistinction’; that is, a site where inclusion and exclusion, law and violence, life and death, the political form of life endowed with rights and the bare life which can be killed with impunity, are inextricably linked (Agamben 1998, p. 12). And it is here, in this zone of indistinction, that the protection and enhancement of life is continuously at risk of becoming, or perhaps always already is, the subjection and subjugation of life. It is here, in this zone of indistinction, that biopolitics and sovereignty find their most intimate connection. How can we then escape this dilemma, this continuous transformation of a politics of life into a politics of death? How can we resist the biopolitical enframing of the vulnerable Earth? How can we resist the total subsumption of nature under a legal power that cares? How can we break out from the continuous biopolitical oscillations between care and subjugation? Is it possible to retain the positive inflection of biopolitics without the subjugating elements? Is encaring (that is, a single gesture that simultaneously cares and enframes) inevitable in a biopolitical regime? One way is perhaps to recognize how the complexities of the Anthropocene elude ‘the possibility of “solving” it’ (Petersmann 2020). In this respect, biopolitics reflects precisely a non-negotiable entanglement of all life with death. It is not a problem that can be solved. However, the distribution of life and death, in all its complexity, can and should be problematized. Aesthetics may offer in this regard a way forward that remains attuned to such complexity. As Matthews has observed, in fact ‘one of the greatest challenges that the Anthropocene thesis poses is an aesthetic one’ (Matthews 2019, p. 3). The Anthropocene urges us to problematize how we sense the world around us, through what sensibilities (Petersmann 2020), and through what ‘modes of perception’ (Matthews 2019, p. 3). And here it is important to recover the broad semantic field of aesthetics (De Lucia 2016; Matthews 2019), which Matthews evokes, with a contrasting purpose, through the term aesthesis (Matthews 2019). This reactivated semantic field speaks of intellect and discernment as well as, importantly, of awareness and perception—a sort of ‘non-cognitive porosity’ of the body, in the words of Anna Grear (De Lucia 2016). Sensing, in this broad meaning, thus becomes a crucial dimension for thinking differently about/beyond the Anthropocene. Sensing, perception, awareness: these all require something to sense, to perceive, to be aware of; they require a relation. Although the mode of relation that is required to disarticulate the biopolitical aporia is of a special kind. Here Tolkien, as mediated and elaborated by Patrick Curry, may be of help, through the concept of wonder. Tolkien distinguishes between two ways of entertaining a relationship with the world: magic and wonder (or, better, enchantment, though I prefer the term wonder as it does not resonate with a Weberian discourse). Magic entails the wilful exercise of power with the purpose of domination; it enacts a singular relational stance to the world; and is firmly anchored in a centre from which, and for whose benefit, the world can be controlled and manipulated (Curry 2012, p. 76). Tolkien describes magic as a ‘technique’ that ‘produces, or pretends to produce, an alteration in the [world]’ in order to ‘dominat[e] things and wills’ (Tolkien 2001, p. 53). Magic coerces. Magic is thus aligned with the modern epistemology of mastery and facilities its continuous and relentless transformation into domination (Leiss 1994). In this respect, it is easy to see the continuity between magic and science, as observed by Curry: As a matter of philosophical, practical and historical fact, these two [magic and science] share extensive common ground—much more than what divides them. The principal goal of both is to engineer changes in the […] world, and both try to amass knowledge in order to predict and control that world; both adhere to the idea of laws of nature which can be manipulated for human gain. That those laws are spiritual or occult in the case of magic and material in the case of science is a point of ultimately secondary importance. (Curry 1999, p. 402) Further, as Curry still emphasizes, ‘science never rejected the occult – literally what is hidden’, but rather ‘redefined it’ (Curry 2019, p. 21). Magic is thus central to the project of modernity; is central to the exploitation of nature and the epistemology of mastery. However, magic remains also crucial once nature has been discursively reframed as vulnerable, for the biopolitical project of Earth-care, though it now underpins and enables an epistemology of care. Biopolitics in fact must know before it can regulate and ultimately care, and as such, it needs to engulf the planet, as we have seen, in its panopticist frameworks of surveillance and control. It needs to envelop the world with magic. And law is utterly dependent on this knowledge for its regulatory web to be laid on the world for its protection (De Lucia 2017b, 2018, 2019a). And this is precisely one of the mechanics through which biopolitics and sovereignty jointly operate, and through which the positive inflection of biopolitics inevitably becomes a subjugating framework of control: in order to care you need to know, and to know you need to engulf, surveil, predict. In this way, care is continuously transformed into subjugation, and only through subjugation is it possible to care. However, just as much as biopolitics is inevitably caught in the continuous process of transformation of care into subjugation, an inner tension exists between the mode of knowing we have described as magic—epistemology—and what can be described, by contrast, as the mode of knowing of wonder—which is rather an aesthetics, in the sense explained just above. Wonder, as a mode of encountering the world, is premised on relational diversity. Indeed, wonder requires a gap between each party of the relationship, over which they can meet (Curry 2019, p. 13). This encounter, in turn, ‘creates a “third thing”, something new in the world: a metaphorical you-and-me, or a this-but-also-that’ (Curry 2019, p. 13). This is crucial: wonder eschews equally hyper-separation and total unity, it is a mobile, tentative and oscillating relation that does not settle once and for all, but negotiates the tension aesthetically, through what Curry, following Keats, calls ‘negative capability’ (ibid, p. 16). Wonder thus requires the capability of ‘being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts’ (ibid, p. 16). Additionally, and this is a crucial aspect of the relational world of wonder, there is no centre in wonder, or, rather, the centre exists between the ‘two or more parties, and thus cannot simply be occupied by any one of them’ (Curry 2019, p. 15). As Curry observes, when it comes to wonder, ‘no one is in charge’ (ibid). Wonder, unlike magic, is a way to enter into a relationship in a non-coercive fashion (Curry 2012, p. 76). Wonder, thus, is ‘distinct from will’ (ibid). Finally, the parties of the wonder-full relation need not be humans—wonder puts into relation all sort of beings, things, places and even ideas (Curry 2019, p. 24), thanks to their diversity. Wonder, through its centre-less relational modality, through its way of knowing which is an entering-into-relation, may help chart a novel trajectory that does not take sides but remains, firmly, in the middle (as urged by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2011), navigates on the cusp, on the edge of the threshold, balancing without falling, yet without certainty. But what does this mean for law? How does this wonder-full, as it were, relational aesthetics help rethink the encounter between law and nature? My argument, which will be articulated in the next section, is that thinking through wonder may help chart a novel trajectory for the classical tradition of natural law. Through wonder, once again though differently, law is in the nature of things (Villey 1969), that is, in the middle of this relational world. Here it is however important to note the crucial distinction between the classical framework of natural law, which I am connecting with and re-activating, and the modern, rationalist school of natural law. In the classical school of natural law, which finds its roots in the pragmatic legal consciousness of ancient Rome, and further links with Aristotle’s notion of particular justice (Villey 2003, p. 78ff), there is no eternal, fixed law proceeding from the will of god or from the dictates of reason. Indeed, natural law is one of a multiplicity of co-existing legal orders. This natural law returns to law as an art (rather than a technique) and does not have a centre—there is no privileged subject, will, or god. As a relation, it is a measure, and is tensive, historically situated, alive, uncertain, negotiable and contestable. It is, indeed, somewhat ‘wild and unbiddable’ (Curry 2019, p. 15) like wonder, and requires, like classical natural law, a prudential and flexible approach to contingency (Villey 2001, p. 160). It is a law that, perhaps best denoted as jus, is sensed.

2023 CNDI Kritik
1NC › Wonder Alt › Generic Link

The terminal impact is extinction --- the politics of exceptionalism drive global destruction and turn all of their impacts

Willson, 2k [Brian – Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University, “End of Cruel U.S. Policies Demands Radical Healing of the National Ethos”, http://www.brianwillson.com/?q=node/72]

The attitudes and behaviors exhibited by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors that resulted in the cruel dispossession of the natives who already inhabited the land, formed the defining experience of the "American" Republic. Our cultural character has enabled a pattern of conduct rooted in deep-seated racism (unresolved fear manifesting in hatred) and arrogant ethnocentrism ("Manifest Destiny") that has never been adequately checked or corrected. How else can one explain our long record of rationalized interventions brutally crushing other people's quests for freedom and independence? Our civilization's ethos has been rooted in a delusional sense of moral superiority enabling a persistent pursuit of selfish interests. We have been so drunk with greed and power that we are unable to see straight! My personal experiences as a military veteran, including "service" in Vietnam, and from traveling to a number of countries studying the nature of U.S. policies has left me in deep anguish, and intense rage, as I have witnessed the resulting carnage caused by those policies. Are we so insulated from our own personal feelings and those of human solidarity with others that we are numb? Is it possible that we really don't care? Is it possible that we are not astute enough to distinguish the lies of our government from the realities on the ground? Perhaps. Or perhaps there is a collective mental illness that arguably reduces our capacity to determine right from wrong. Whatever the diagnosis--whether a product of criminal intent or mental illness--our conduct as a nation poses a severely grave, violent threat to virtually all life on the planet. The world desperately needs the perpetrators of these crimes to be immediately confronted with the nature and consequences of their behavior, and then to be engaged in a profound process of healing. But who will be able to assure the confrontation and initiate the healing? The World Court? A United Nations international peace force? A new international criminal court? Obviously not. The amount of power exerted by the U.S. government and the corporations it serves is so overwhelming, protected by historically unprecedented destructive military forces, that there are no human-created institutions able to stop this international bully. It has the power to choose the continuation of policies capable of destroying massive amount of life in an instant, and if not checked it seems intent on doing so. As one examines U.S. policies from Iraq to Mexico to Colombia, from Korea, Vietnam, and Nicaragua to Cuba and Grenada, it is striking how much pain, suffering, and death these policies have caused, and continue to cause. Similarly, as one examines the history of domestic policies relating to poor Whites, "Third World" peoples, women, dissidents, and labor organizers, a tremendous amount of suffering is uncovered. How can an allegedly intelligent, caring people, simply observe this pattern of repression and cruelty, being carried out in our name, without revolting? The abhorrent atrocities that have been a trademark of U.S. policies worldwide, when seen up close, would cause a normal person to vomit. And yet we hardly blink. Make no mistake. This pattern of malignant human behavior will be stopped, whether or not we intelligently choose to make the necessary changes. Ultimately, the balancing forces of the universe, and of Gaia, will assure a continuation of the sacred, evolving cosmos that began some 15 billion years ago. The only question is whether we as a species, but 5 million years old, will continue to be part of it. Though we are an intrinsic part of that evolution, by virtue of our terribly misguided ill behavior, we may be on a short branch leading to early extinction. We may choose to continue to defer to our inflated egos, unwilling to accept humility, unwilling to recognize the wisdom of abiding by the requirements of cooperative living with the sacred interconnected web of life that is already imprinted deeply within us since creation. Or we may choose the painful but liberating path of radical healing, away from selfishness and toward wholeness, while seeking unity through diversity. Fortunately, there are a number of people and organizations, within the United States and elsewhere, who do understand this behavior as a chronic, intentional pattern, not as a series of aberrations or mistakes, that must be addressed at both structural and psychological/emotional levels. The emerging popular movement against the cruel policies of globalization is a reminder of the importance of people power. It is this dynamic force of caring people, and only this force, that has the human capacity to make the "arrests"--to stimulate a profound process of national transformation and healing that just might save humanity from the continued assaults against its own health and the health of the earth upon which it totally depends for survival.

2023 CNDI Kritik
1NC › Wonder Alt › Generic Link

The aff’s mandate of fiscal redistribution follows the rationality of neoliberal welfare policy as a form of biopower—public finance is a tool to spread and enforce norms and fails to actually solve for inequality

Gürkan 18 (Ceyhun Gürkan is an associate professor at Ankara University. “Foucault, Public Finance, and Neoliberal Governmentality: A Critical Sociological Analysis,” Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi. December 28 2018. https://doi.org/10.18657/yonveek.449581) @ehatt

‘Governmentality’, a neologism by Foucault, is a complex and sustained historical process that has started in the sixteenth century and established a general economy of the power execution in which the problem of government has been positioned at the core of politics as a result of the displacement of the central place of sovereign and disciplinary modes of power in the course of time (Foucault, 2007: 108). In a more general context, governmentality signifies a radical change in the rationality and exercise of political power in the sixteenth century. Governmentality gains its historical meaning in a complex process in which “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics” develop so as to allow a new economy of power to function by taking “population as its target”, “political economy as its major form of knowledge”, and “apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (2007: 108). The notion of governmentality at present denotes the modern mode of power incidental to security and risk management concerns according to which the past modalities of power (i.e. sovereignty and discipline) have been radically reconfigured. That said, Foucault analyses liberalism and neoliberalism as part of his explorations into the history of governmentality. On this ground, neoliberalism is understood as a specific political reason and an assembly of techniques that bear on the conduct of individuals in private and social realms and carve out public policies for the state in accordance with the aim of ‘economization’ of all aspects of life (Brown, 2015). In addition to the constant and endless economization of the non-economic fields of reflection and practices, Foucault’s analysis shows that neoliberalism as an “active governmentality” (Foucault, 2008: 121) is a constructivist political reason. What is significant in Foucault’s analysis of classical liberalism and neoliberalism is that he does not regard them as ideologies and political philosophy. Instead, (neo)liberalism for Foucault (2008) is an ensemble of governmental techniques whose hinge joint is economics as the ‘knowledge-power’ and the market as the governmental rationality. At this juncture, the context of Foucault’s focus on public finance issues is the role of the fiscal system in establishing certain neoliberal norms in the conducts and habits of thought of individuals as well as in the state reason and policies. In this framework, Foucault (2008: 202-207) considers ‘negative tax’ to demonstrate the neoliberal governmentality of public finance. The negative tax in Foucault’s discussion appears as the instrument of a new social policy that is geared towards establishing a new social security system in transition to neoliberalism in France during the 1970s. The aim of the negative tax is to replace the social/public expenditures of the state for social security and protection. According to the economics of neoliberal governmentality, public expenditures cannot ensure an effective social protection and security for the poor and the needy. As it leads to a widening collective consumption, the wealthiest part of the population receives the most benefit and the effective allocation of sources in the economy comes to grief. In a sense, for neoliberal economics, any collective consumption somehow paves the way for the increasing monopoly consumption. The supporters of the negative tax argue that instead of the employment of public expenditure which stems from the will of the state external to the market logic and rationality, a direct cash payment should be provided at the minimum level for the poor and the needy so as to keep them always being ready for “looking for work and getting back into the economic game” (2008: 204). Therefore, replacing the traditional public expenditures targeting society as a whole, the negative tax monetizes economy as a field of game following the commodification and individualizing logic of the market. Foucault identifies three features of the negative tax. First, the negative tax does not seek to remove the causes of poverty. It deals with the ‘effects’ of poverty instead of its ‘causes’. In fact, this is not peculiar to neoliberal governmentality. Foucault shows that the physiocratic doctrine was the first to formulate this security rationality that accords privilege to effects over causes. This is so because to govern according to causes is more expensive than governing according to effects and consequences (Agamben, 2013). This consequentialist security rationality which leads people to “live dangerously” (Foucault, 2008, 66) does not seek to prevent the crisis or damaging developments, instead, it deals with managing them through consequences they made for. As such, “[t]he negative tax will never function at the level of the causes of poverty but simply at the level of its effects” (2008: 204). The second aspect of the negative tax is to abolish the social policy that redistributes income in favor of those who need social security. The third is concerned with changing the function of public finance and taxation into the imposition of neoliberal norms, subjectivity and ways of behaving on individuals such as enterprising subjectivity, self-responsibility, risk-taking manner and competition not as the market rule but a social rule. Thus, as the negative tax provides “a general security at the lowest level”, it ensures that the economic mechanism of the game, the mechanisms of competition and enterprise, will be allowed to function in the rest of society. Above the threshold everyone will have to be an enterprise for himself or for his family. A society formalized on the model of the enterprise, of the competitive enterprise, will be possible above the threshold, and there will be simply a minimum security, that is to say, the nullification of certain risks on the basis of a low level threshold (Foucault, 2008: 206). By this account, public finance in the neoliberal context can be described as a constructive governmental technology that carves out state policies and a type of public organization at the macro level and conducts the behaviors of individuals at the micro level of everyday life in a way to spread the market logic to the fiscal and, in turn, non-economic social domains. Public finance, thus, in the neoliberal logic becomes a tool of producing and spreading norms and rationality of the market logic in an economization process. This governmentality conception of public finance extends the scope of fiscal policies and tools beyond their classical range of effectuations and applications identified with e.g. the legitimization and justice in taxation, and budgetary discipline geared for capital accumulation. This conception of public finance based on the analytics of governmentality reveals that the neoliberal restructuring and programming of the state, society, and individuals occur within a broader societal framework that involves forming macro policies plus governmental rationality, power relations and normative value system. Thus, public finance, a strategic instrument of the state, as part of “the politics of truth” (2001c: 13) that aims to create neoliberal subjectivations and conducts becomes an essential dispositif in constructing a “governmentalized society” (2007: 248) in which entrepreneurial risk-taking and self-responsible individualization are the most predominant norms and governmental mechanisms. In line with these sentiments, it is fair to say that public finance has achieved a strategic place in the neoliberal context of the state and society in imposing neoliberal norms onto individuals since the 1980s. Budget deficits, for instance, have always been strategically deployed to weaken the belief in the welfare state and central-planning government, thereby, enforcing budget discipline to open the ways for the entrepreneurial model of public management. By the same token, competition, consumerism, and policies relying on subjective points of view have become the essential hinges of taxation. Therefore, fiscal policies and discourses are also the components of the broader neoliberal-framed policies and tools that disseminate certain norms and habits of thought all over the society. In this context, public finance has become a strategic tool and an instrument not only as the essential part of austerity policies after the 2008 crisis to stabilize the dynamics of financial accumulation and secure profits but also imposing and spreading neoliberal norms, disciplinary power, and individualization over the society at large to socialize the debt and debt burden. At this juncture, it should be noted that Foucault’s analytics of government is in continuity with his analytics of power. In other words, government as practice and rationality is not dissociated with power and power relations. Foucault analyzes three power regimes which formed a complex of the power structure in which government takes place: ‘sovereignty’, ‘discipline’ and ‘management/security’. Sovereign model of power basically relies upon juridicolegal mechanisms and assumes a central power like the king or the state. Foucault (1978: 135-145; 2003: 239ff) is highly critical of the view that takes sovereignty as the unique source and the single model of power. The modern order of power relations is a decentralized system that is dispersed horizontally and vertically across society. Against the theoretical domination of the sovereign type of power regime for the understanding of society, economy, and politics, Foucault develops new insights into the order of power and in his ground-breaking book Discipline and Punish (1995) he describes another dimension of power, that is, discipline. Central to discipline are individualization, normalization, imposition of norms, hierarchization, and confinement. Finally, management and security as a model or regime of power relations are directly linked to liberal and neoliberal society. Management through security mechanisms involves certain (neo)liberal governmental apparatuses such as risk management, calculative rationality, competition, self-responsibility, free market economy, circulation of risks, construction of the market mechanism in the broader framework of social and political life, and extension of the market subjectivity to the non-economic realms. It is essential, for Foucault (2007: 8), to recognize that these three main models or regimes of power do not signify the distinct historical ages in succession in the sense that first sovereign/king/law (the Renaissance period), then discipline (17th-18th century) and finally the management of security in (neo)liberal power order from 18th century onwards came out. Foucault presents them as a historical series of power model that follow one another throughout history and this has led many to have an impression of the linear series of power regimes. However, this teleological reading of Foucault (Lemke, 2012: 89) limits the explanatory vigor of his analytics of government and power. For Foucault, the historical distinction between sovereign, disciplinary and security-management models/regimes of power is analytical to demonstrate their specific and evident characteristics. All these models/regimes of power have their own history of techniques but this does not mean that they proceeded and developed in history in a way to completely eliminate one another. Instead, in different historical epochs, each seized hold of the dominant place in the then regime of power relations by articulating others to its own. For Foucault, this complex assemblage of mechanisms of different regimes/models of power produces “the general economy of power” (Foucault, 2007: 10). This means that the present society of security is made up of the diverse components of power apparatuses of the sovereign and disciplinary regimes of power modified in accordance with the management model of security mechanisms. In Foucault’s words, “technologies [of security] consist. . . in the reactivation and transformation of the juridico-legal techniques and the disciplinary techniques” (2007: 9). In the following, he adds, “the security is a way of making the old armatures of law and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security” (2007: 10). Foucault’s remarks on the security-type power regime in relation to other modalities of power i.e. discipline, sovereignty, and domination, are of great importance to fathom the essence of neoliberal governmentality. Foucault himself informs governmentality as a complex assemblage of ‘technologies of domination’ and ‘technologies of the self’. “This encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self”, writes Foucault, “I call ‘governmentality’” (1997: 225). Foucault’s emphatic emphasize on the combination of different modalities of power is as important as his insights into the analytical and historical distinction between them to achieve an understanding of the role of the state and fiscal regime as part of broader neoliberal power and governmental regime. The 2008 crisis has blatantly demonstrated that neoliberal fiscal policies and rationality do not revolve around the presumed ideal norms and mechanisms of the laissez-faire market economy, but they are closely tied into disciplinary and domineering norms and techniques. Therefore, the neoliberal governmentality of public finance can be explained in the framework of Foucault’s triangle of power regimes that signifies the inextricable integration of sovereignty, discipline, and security management. The following section presents an evaluation of the neoliberal governmentality of public finance in its relation to the combined effects of diverse power regimes. II. THE CHANGING PATTERNS AND CONDITIONS OF NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND PUBLIC FINANCE AFTER FOUCAULT In looking at the literature, few authors draw attention to the public finance from the perspective of governmentality after Foucault. Amongst them, Nikolas Rose (1993; 1996) and Peter Miller (2008, with Rose) refer to budget and budgetization as the mechanism of self-technology and rationalization pertain to neoliberal governmentality in advanced liberal countries. Budget and budgetization are seen as the essential sites and means of advancing expert knowledge, calculative rationalities and self-disciplinary procedures in governing individuals and population. Taking inspiration from Rose and Miller, Stephan Collier (2007; 2011) makes an important contribution to the analysis of budget as social technology and budgetization as the rationalization of government in the context of and transition to neoliberalism. Collier’s studies are based upon the case of the Russian industrial city Belaya Kalitva in the post-Soviet period and aim to explain how the city has gone under a great transformation towards a social modernity managed by neoliberal governmentality. Following Max Weber’s distinction between formal and substantive rationality, Collier argues that neoliberal governmentality and budgetary processes are not limited to the formal/calculative rationality which is carved out by the market logic. Collier identifies the substantive dimension of neoliberal governmentality and budget/budgetary rationalization, which suggests that governing population and individuals requires taking into consideration the long-term historical structures, norm systems, relations and cultural attitudes of the population. In doing so, Collier shows that neoliberal governmentality is not only concerned with the elimination of the centralized bureaucratic social welfare and planning system through the market mechanisms and formal rationality but also with the transformation and reconstruction of the embedded social structures, milieu, norms and values. This means that instead of pursuing a sharp rupture with the past, neoliberalism works on the continuity of the past values by articulating them to the grid of new societal system. The budget as a social technology is at the service of the neoliberal art of government to rebuild and govern society within its actual, historical and substantive conditions. Based upon the case study Collier argues that life at its micro and macro extent is the target in the process of constitution of social modernity through neoliberal budgetary practices and procedures which would be considered to be ‘biopolitical’ technologies of neoliberal governmentality concerned with both continuities and discontinuities. Thus, budget as a neoliberal social and biopolitical technology engages in the redistribution of the sources among the races, ethnicities, genders, sexualities and other specific classifications of the life with an eye to improving and spreading the market rationality. Following Collier, it is fair to say that budget as a biopolitical technology in neoliberal governmentality comes into play with strong microeconomic effects. As budgetary policies and rationalization which seek to establish symmetry between the budgets of official administrative units and those of households target the substantive and institutional transformation of individuals and society, the formalist rationality and calculative reasoning are, on the other side, founded on rational political-economy choices of individuals as opposed to central economic/fiscal planning. Budget becomes the managerial grid of extensive economic and political rationalization processes and it is deployed both as a constructive technology of the social control and self-technology in a way to make individual sovereign through the modification of his/her substantive habituation which is still subject to the macro-fiscal discipline. What is more, this does not exclude expert knowledge and management, and rational calculation of budgeting; they shift from the domain of central units of government to individuals. In this sense, Collier characterizes neoliberal governmentality and biopolitical government as the microeconomic critique of the welfare state bringing forward individuals’ choices geared towards re-programming of the society on the basis of micro foundations of power relations. As public choice theory contemplates, the calculative/formal rationality of taxation and expenditures is highly decentralized and becomes dependent upon choices, preferences and the power of political bargaining of the autonomous individuals and local units. The scope of public finance is not confined to the subject of scarce resource allocation managed by the central economic/fiscal planning institutions. Neoliberal governmentality employing budget as a biopolitical apparatus targets to undermine the ‘social capitalism’ in which individuals are envisioned as living encapsulated in an ‘iron cage’ that forces them to act like the state officials in their daily and private lives regulated by the bureaucratic rules instead of an autonomous and free individuals acting out of their own will to decide around self-preferences and -choices (Sennett, 2006: 33).

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › Multipolarity Now

Multipolarity now — Balance-of-power shifts prove.

Daniel Araya, 22, CIGI senior fellow, a senior partner with the World Legal Summit, and a consultant and an adviser with a special interest in artificial intelligence, technology policy and governance, 10-5-22, "America’s Global Dominance Is Ending: What Comes Next?," Centre for International Governance Innovation, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/americas-global-dominance-is-ending-what-comes-next/; Pen-MK

According to Oxford historian Peter Frankopan, we are witnessing the unravelling of the global order. In a period of history marked by a Western financial crisis, a global coronavirus pandemic, war in Europe, rising government debt and political instability across advanced democracies, the Western era is winding down. Indeed, the global order has been steadily moving toward a “post-American World” or “post-Western World” for some time. At the heart of this shift is the rise of China and the emergence of a multipolar system.

While we have grown used to thinking of globalization in terms of liberal democracy and Western-led multilateralism, globalization within a multipolar order will increasingly favour regional autonomy and a struggle to define a new balance of power. Taken together, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Brazil are becoming regional powers within a loosely coupled global system.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › Multipolarity Now

Unipolarity is unsustainable- China and Russia prove that multipolarity is coming now

Huygens, ‘17 (Addison Daniel Huygens, BA in Political Science from Iowa State University, Assistand Professor at Iowa State University, Iowa State University, 2017, “American decline and changing global hegemony” - Emery)

Others have argued that the United States achieved hegemony in the latter half of the century. In 1991 the global balance of power was shaken up with the geopolitical equivalence of a 9.0 earthquake. The Soviet Union, which for nearly five decades had balanced against the United States, collapsed. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that the United States was peerless in the global balance of power. In the unipolar years following the Cold War, the United States had achieved global hegemony, notwithstanding Mearsheimer’s criteria that no actor has ever been able to achieve a level of global hegemony.76 Others have argued that American hegemony is not in jeopardy at present because it was not a hegemon to begin with. Ian Clark argues that hegemony is not a matter of material dominance, but of perceptions of a state as a legitimate leader of an international society. According to his interpretation of social theories of hegemony, America has not had the consent and approval of the other states in the system and thus has not been a hegemon.77 American hegemony has been viewed as declining at several times since its rise to preeminence in the postwar world including the perceived missile gap in the 1960s and the controversial outcome of the Vietnam War in the 1970s. During the 1980s, rapid growth in the Japanese economy again raised speculation that the United States was in decline. However, all of these predictions proved to be largely exaggerated. The most recent claim of American decline stems from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 78 A combination of slow economic recovery, a resurgent and aggressive Russia, the rise of global instability, and an increasingly assertive China, led to a new wave of declinists claiming that the global balance of power has shifted away from the American centered model.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › Counterbalancing

China and Russia are challenging the US now

Sarmad Ishfaq 23- independent researcher and writer whose work has been published by Harvard Kennedy School Review, the Diplomat, Open Democracy, Paradigm Shift, Mondoweiss, and Eurasia Review, and has a master's degree in International Relations from the University of Wollongong in Dubai where he was recognized as the 'Top Graduate'. - 4-17-2023, "Waning US Hegemony, De-Dollarization, & the Incoming War with China," Paradigm Shift, https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/china-us-world-order/ //nvb

China, Russia, and the De-Dollarization Endeavour The Russia-Ukraine war and impetuous Western sanctions on Russia have had ill-fated consequences on the US and its European allies. It has catalyzed the process of subverting the once ubiquitous US dollar – also known as de-dollarization. The West’s pressure and a supercilious crackdown on Russia – from removing the country from SWIFT to freezing its dollar assets – has allowed the China-Russia alliance to bolster further, economically and otherwise.In Russia, the yuan has now become the most traded currency. Trade between both countries reached a record high of $190 billion last year with most of these payments made in their respective currencies. Furthermore, China and India became the two biggest importers of cheap Russian hydrocarbons after the war started which has kept Russia afloat. In his recent meeting with President Xi, Putin exclaimed that he is in favor of using the yuan for settlements between Russia and countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.Due to the US’s iniquitous weaponization of the dollar, witnessed with Russia and previously in the unilateral sanctions placed on Iran under Trump, many countries are following China and Russia’s lead. China and Europe are in the process of building an alternative to the SWIFT system while India is using non-dollar currencies to settle oil purchases from Russia. Saudi Arabia is also flirting with the idea of the petroyuan in contrast to the default petrodollar.On April 1, 2023, India and Malaysia also agreed to settle trade in Indian rupees while UAE and India are in talks of using the Indian rupee to settle non-oil trade. Furthermore, Malaysia has revived a decades-old plan to introduce an IMF alternative called the Asian Monetary Fund. The Malaysian PM has said that there is no reason for the country to continue depending on the dollar, with China welcoming this move. Most ambitiously, however, has been BRICS’s desire of introducing a new currency altogether. Alexander Babakov, deputy chairman of Russia’s State Duma explained that the nations were in process of introducing a currency backed by gold and other rare-earth materials. This would be a drastic change as no country in the world today uses the gold standard. Furthermore, the rise of cryptocurrencies, being explored by many countries including China, has decreased dependency on traditional fiat currencies. All the above factors combined have led to the contraction of dollars in global central bank reserves which has dropped from around 70% 20 years back to less than 60% today – and continues to descend steadily. In America itself, the economy is not the bulwark that it once was. Three banks recently collapsed and furthermore, the growing cost of food and fuel, due to the Ukraine war, might signal that the worst is yet to come. While the dollar has had its share of vicissitudes in the past, it has perhaps never been challenged this much, especially exogenously

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › Counterbalancing

China and Russia are counterbalancing – cooperation and populism prove

Dr. Alfredo Toro Hardy 22, former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada, PhD in international relations from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline?, pg. 88-91, Blitz

Beijing-Moscow: Strategic Partnership or Axis? China and Russia have shaped a strategic partnership with two main objectives—the stabilization of their respective political regimes and the counterbalance of Western and American influence. For China, the partnership with Russia was a major help in bolstering its efforts to become a global power as Russia provided it with military, diplomatic, and technological support. Thanks to Russia, China made significant advances in modernizing its armed forces and gaining access to energy sources uncontrolled by the Western world. Currently, both countries pursue the strengthening of a multipolar world and have coordinated their foreign policies in relation to multiple issues. The latter includes Iran, Iraq, NATO, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and common positions within the UN Security Council. At the same time, they have acted together in the development of a sub-regional security system in Eurasia. Experts have argued that if American hostility to China and Russia increases, both countries may appeal to some sort of military alliance as a counterbalancing instrument. In 2019, Moscow and Beijing re-labelled their relationship as a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era”. The two parties have expressed their willingness to create a new geopolitical order where the West is excluded from their respective areas of influence. In that sense, according to some analysts, theirs would be a true geopolitical bloc in the making, whereas for others an axis between them already exists. Actually, the Kremlin calls its connection to Beijing as an “allied relationship”, while the latter has asserted that there are “no restricted areas” and “no upper limit” to their partnership (Kim, 2021; Rozman, 2014; Shambaugh, 2020 [1, p. 354]; Tetrais, 2021; Voskressenski, 2020, pp. 233–250).

Some of the highlights of this strategic partnership have been the following: China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin have held nearly thirty meetings since 2013; in the military area both countries conducted 111 multiple high-level exchanges, strategic coordination meetings, and joint military drills between 2003 and 2018, while undertaking together equipment and technology developments; in 2021 they reached a bilateral trade of US$140 billion; 40 million tons of crude and 4 billion cubic meters of LNG are transmitted yearly from Russia to China; China remains as the largest export destination for Russia’s agricultural products; China and Russia inked a Memorandum of Understanding to build a shared international scientific research station on the moon; and they have supported each other in fields such as vaccine development, epidemic control, and treatment plans (Feng, 2021; Saunders, 2020, p. 202).

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › Counterbalancing

China Russia counterbalancing is happening now - emerging powers are creating a new international order to exclude the West

Cooley and Nexon 20’ [Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon; Alexander Cooley is Professor of Political Science @ Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institue, Deniel H. Nexon is Associate Professor of Government @ Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreigh Service @ Georgetown University; “How Hegemony Ends, The Unraveling of American Power”; Foreigh Affairs; 6/9/20; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends]//ahl

In April 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged “to promote the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order.” For years, many Western scholars and policymakers downplayed or dismissed such challenges as wishful rhetoric. Beijing remained committed to the rules and norms of the U.S.-led order, they argued, pointing out that China continued to benefit from the current system. Even as Russia grew increasingly assertive in its condemnation of the United States in the first decade of this century and called for a more multipolar world, observers didn’t think that Moscow could muster support from any significant allies. Analysts in the West specifically doubted that Beijing and Moscow could overcome decades of mistrust and rivalry to cooperate against U.S. efforts to maintain and shape the international order. Such skepticism made sense at the height of U.S. global hegemony in the 1990s and even remained plausible through much of the following decade. But the 1997 declaration now looks like a blueprint for how Beijing and Moscow have tried to reorder international politics in the last 20 years. China and Russia now directly contest liberal aspects of the international order from within that order’s institutions and forums; at the same time, they are building an alternative order through new institutions and venues in which they wield greater influence and can de-emphasize human rights and civil liberties. Xi hosts guests at the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Beijing, China, October 2014 Takaki Yajima / Reuters At the United Nations, for example, the two countries routinely consult on votes and initiatives. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they have coordinated their opposition to criticize Western interventions and calls for regime change; they have vetoed Western-sponsored proposals on Syria and efforts to impose sanctions on Venezuela and Yemen. In the UN General Assembly, between 2006 and 2018, China and Russia voted the same way 86 percent of the time, more frequently than during the 78 percent voting accord the two shared between 1991 and 2005. By contrast, since 2005, China and the United States have agreed only 21 percent of the time. Beijing and Moscow have also led UN initiatives to promote new norms, most notably in the arena of cyberspace, that privilege national sovereignty over individual rights, limit the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, and curtail the power of Western-sponsored human rights resolutions.

China and Russia have also been at the forefront of creating new international institutions and regional forums that exclude the United States and the West more broadly. Perhaps the most well known of these is the BRICS grouping, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Since 2006, the group has presented itself as a dynamic setting for the discussion of matters of international order and global leadership, including building alternatives to Western-controlled institutions in the areas of Internet governance, international payment systems, and development assistance. In 2016, the BRICS countries created the New Development Bank, which is dedicated to financing infrastructure projects in the developing world.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › AT: Will Cling to Power

Sooner is better; delays make adjusting to hegemonic decline more difficult and raise the risk of conflict.

Regilme & Parisot 18 [Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr., Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, PhD in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin; James Parisot, PhD in Sociology from Binghamton U, teaches sociology at Temple University, American Hegemony and the Rise of Emerging Powers: Cooperation or Conflict, p. 4, 2018, Routledge Press, NY, NY, wyo-sc]

In a sense, only time will tell. But if these changes are not analyzed, and potential sources of international conflict not realized, then appropriate political and policy strategies to manage the risk of global conflict in a quickly changing world might not be able to catch up with the erosion of cooperation and the rise of tensions. World War III may not be on the horizon, but a growing wave of increasingly authoritarian leaders have come to power across the globe suggesting that the tendency towards international conflict may be increasing. Yet this shift may not necessarily lead to the outbreak of great power conflict as in previous ages. In response to Trump's election, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a speech at the Davos World Economic Forum calling for sustained vigilance towards continuing economic globalization.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › AT: Taiwan Invasion

China won’t invade Taiwan – Xi wants to be perceived as a peacemaker and the Ukraine conflict has deterred them from taking military action.

Ian Bremmer 23 – a foreign affairs columnist and editor. He is the president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs. He teaches applied geopolitics at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. 4-12-2023, “Why China Won’t Invade Taiwan Anytime Soon”, https://time.com/6270599/china-invade-taiwan///AN

Though China will not show Taiwan, the U.S., or anyone else exactly how it would launch a full blockade or invasion of Taiwan, China’s armed forces find it very valuable to practice. After all, Chinese troops haven’t faced a shooting war since a brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Finally, Taiwan will hold national elections next year. Though China’s latest intimidation may not lead to military conflict anytime soon, it may have an effect on how Taiwan’s voters imagine the future.

All that said, the actual risk of imminent Chinese military action against Taiwan remains low. Beijing always flexes military muscle when highest-level U.S. and Taiwanese officials meet face to face. Yet, though Speaker McCarthy’s visit with Taiwan’s president marks the highest-level U.S.-Taiwan meeting on US soil since 1979, China’s latest response was less militarily threatening than its reaction to last summer’s visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi – and Beijing is well aware that Washington will notice that.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › AT: China Can’t Challenge

Chinese modernization is sufficient to trigger a regional war with the U.S. even if it cannot compete for global hegemony.

Kupchan 14 [Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, SECURITY STUDIES, “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana,” Volume 23, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 219-257, accessed 5-20-2015: academic search premiere //wyo-tjc]

Should diplomacy fail to avert rivalry, Sino-American competition may nonetheless fall short of the bipolar enmity of the Cold War. China and the United States are economically interdependent whereas the Soviet Union and the United States carved out separate economic blocs. Moreover, China's geopolitical ambition, at least for the foreseeable future, seems focused primarily on East Asia, suggesting that rivalry with the United States could be more contained than the global competition that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union. China's regional ambitions are, however, poised to clash head-on with America's determination to maintain strategic primacy in Northeast Asia. Even if it does not match the hostility of the Cold War, the resulting confrontation could well resemble the naval race between Great Britain and Germany that commenced at the turn of the twentieth century. Although Wilhelmine Germany did not threaten the global dominance of the Royal Navy, its naval buildup in the European theater fueled a spiral of hostility that culminated in World War I. On the socioeconomic front, China has successfully fashioned a stable compact between its ruling elite and its rising bourgeoisie. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Imperial China was particularly adept at co-opting a rising merchant class into the existing political order. The same goes for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today. The CCP has deliberately incorporated China's rapidly expanding middle class into the centralized state, ensuring at least for now that the spread of private wealth does not undermine the party's unitary grip on power. As Kellee Tsai notes, “China's capitalists are pragmatic and creative but they are not budding democrats.” “Economic growth,” she concludes, “has not created a prodemocratic capitalist class.” The status quo certainly faces challenges from economic inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, factional strife within the CCP, and restive minority populations. But meritocratic entry into public service, the continued competence of China's leaders, and governance that is broadly aimed at shared societal gains rather than rent-seeking augur in favor of political stasis. From this perspective, China's ascent should not be expected to transform its socioeconomic order along Western lines any time soon. On the contrary, its domestic order is likely to continue shaping its economic and geopolitical ascent, favoring policies that advantage the compact between the party and the middle class. If so, China is poised to emerge as a hegemonic power well before it democratizes, meaning that the world's leading economy will not ascribe to the dominant political norms associated with the Western liberal order.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › AT: No China Rise

The US cannot win – China leads in the majority of emerging technologies.

Daniel Hurst 23 – Guardian Australia's foreign affairs and defense correspondent. 2-3-2023, “China leading US in technology race in all but a few fields, thinktank finds”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/02/china-leading-us-in-technology-race-in-all-but-a-few-fields-thinktank-finds//AN

The United States and other western countries are losing the race with China to develop advanced technologies and retain talent, with Beijing potentially establishing a monopoly in some areas, a new report has said.

China leads in 37 of 44 technologies tracked in a year-long project by thinktank the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The fields include electric batteries, hypersonics and advanced radio-frequency communications such as 5G and 6G.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Transition › AT: No China Rise

China is ahead in artificial intelligence – the private sector has already adopted it, boosting economic growth.

Ryan Heath 23 – journalist, moderator, and author for Axios, retired chief-of-staff for political leaders. 5-8-2023, “China Races Ahead of U.S. on AI Regulation”, https://www.axios.com/2023/05/08/china-ai-regulation-race//AN

While American leaders fret that China might eventually overtake the U.S. in developing artificial intelligence, Beijing is already way ahead of Washington in enacting rules for the new technology.

Driving the news: Chinese officials will close consultation Wednesday on a second round of generative AI regulation, building on a set of rules governing deepfakes agreed in 2022.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Russia

US Russia war goes nuclear

Hallinan 16 Conn Hallinan, FPIF, May 2, 2016. , NATO’s Dangerous Game: Bear-Baiting Russia: After the Cold War ended, many of the safeguards preventing war between Russia and the West have been allowed to lapse., http://fpif.org/natos-dangerous-game-bear-baiting-russia/

Since March 2015 there have been over 60 incidents that could have triggered a major crisis between Russia and the United States. Pictured: artist’s rendering of hypersonic glide vehicle. (Photo: Wikipedia / Public Domain) “Aggressive,” “revanchist,” “swaggering”: These are just some of the adjectives the mainstream press and leading U.S. and European political figures are routinely inserting before the words “Russia,” or “Vladimir Putin.” It is a vocabulary most Americans have not seen or heard since the height of the Cold War. The question is, why? Is Russia really a military threat to the United States and its neighbors? Is it seriously trying to “revenge” itself for the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union? Is it actively trying to rebuild the old Soviet empire? The answers to these questions are critical, because, for the first time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, several nuclear-armed powers are on the edge of a military conflict with fewer safeguards than existed 50 years ago. Consider the following events: NATO member Turkey shoots down a Russian warplane. Russian fighter-bombers come within 30 feet of a U.S. guided missile destroyer, and a Russian fighter does a barrel roll over a U.S. surveillance plane. Several U.S. Senators call for a military response to such encounters in the future. NATO and the U.S. begin deploying three combat brigades—about 14,000 troops and their equipment—in several countries that border Russia, and Washington has more than quadrupled its military spending in the region. U.S. State Department officials accuse Russia of “dismantling” arms control agreements, while Moscow charges that Washington is pursuing several destabilizing weapons programs. Both NATO and the Russians have carried out large war games on one another’s borders and plan more in the future, in spite of the fact that the highly respected European Leadership Network (ELN) warns that the maneuvers are creating “mistrust.” In the scary aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the major nuclear powers established some ground rules to avoid the possibility of nuclear war, including the so-called “hot line” between Washington and Moscow. But, as the threat of a nuclear holocaust faded, many of those safeguards have been allowed to lapse, creating what the ELN calls a “dangerous situation.” According to a recent report by the ELN, since March of last year there have been over 60 incidents that had “the potential to trigger a major crisis between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance.” The report warns that, “There is today no agreement between NATO and Russia on how to manage close military encounters.” Such agreements do exist, but they are bilateral and don’t include most alliance members. Out of 28 NATO members, 11 have memorandums on how to avoid military escalation at sea, but only the U.S., Canada and Greece have what is called “Preventing Dangerous Military Activities” (DMA) agreements that cover land and air as well. In any case, there are no such agreements with the NATO alliance as a whole. The lack of such agreements was starkly demonstrated in the encounter between Russian aircraft and the U.S. The incident took place less than 70 miles off Baltiysk, home of Russia’s Baltic Sea Fleet, and led to an alarming exchange in the Senate Armed Services Committee among Republican John McCain, Democrat Joe Donnelly, and U.S. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, soon to assume command of U.S. forces in Europe. McCain: ”This may sound a little tough, but should we make an announcement to the Russians that if they place the men and women on board Navy ships in danger, that we will take appropriate action?” Scaparrotti: “That should be known, yes.” Donnelly: “Is there a point…where we tell them in advance enough, the next time it doesn’t end well for you?” Scaparrotti: “We should engage them and make clear what is acceptable. Once we make that known we have to enforce it.” For the Americans, the Russian flyby was “aggressive.” For the Russians, U.S. military forces getting within spitting range of their Baltic Fleet is the very definition of “aggressive.” What if someone on the destroyer panicked and shot down the plane? Would the Russians have responded with an anti-ship missile? Would the U.S. have retaliated and invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, bringing the other 27 members into the fray? Faced by the combined power of NATO, would the Russians—feeling their survival at stake—consider using a short-range nuclear weapon? Would the U.S. then attempt to take out Moscow’s nuclear missiles with its new hypersonic glide vehicle? Would that, in turn, kick in the chilling logic of thermonuclear war: Use your nukes or lose them? Far-fetched? Unfortunately, not at all. The world came within minutes of a nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis and, as researcher Eric Schlosser demonstrated in his book “Command and Control,” the U.S. came distressingly close at least twice more by accident. One of the problems about nuclear war is that it is almost impossible to envision. The destructive powers of today’s weapons have nothing in common with the tiny bombs that incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so experience is not much of a guide. Suffice it to say that just a small portion of world’s nukes would end civilization as we know it, and a general exchange could possibly extinguish human life. With such an outcome at least in the realm of possibility, it becomes essential to step back and try to see the world through another’s eyes. Is Russia really a danger to the U.S. and its neighbors? NATO points to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia and its 2014 intervention in eastern Ukraine as examples of “Russian aggression.” But from Moscow, the view is very different. In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pledged to then Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward, nor recruit former members of the East bloc military alliance, the Warsaw Pact. By 1995 NATO had enlisted Pact members Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and signed on Montenegro this year. Georgia is currently being considered, and there is a push to bring Ukraine aboard. From Moscow’s perspective NATO is not only moving east, but encircling Russia. “I don’t think many people understand the visceral way Russia views NATO and the European Union as an existential threat,” says U.S. Admiral Mark Ferguson, commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe. Most NATO members have no interest in starting a fight with Russia, but others sound like they think it wouldn’t be a bad idea. On April 15, Witold Waszczykowski, the foreign minister of Poland’s right-wing government, told reporters that Russia is “more dangerous than the Islamic State,” because Moscow is an “existential threat to Europe.” The minister made his comments at a NATO conference discussing the deployment of a U.S. armored brigade on Poland’s eastern border. Is Russia reneging on arms control agreements? The charge springs from the fact that Moscow has refused to consider cutting more of its nuclear weapons, is boycotting nuclear talks, deploying intermediate range nuclear missiles, and backing off a conventional weapons agreement. But again, Moscow sees all that very differently. From Moscow’s point of view, the U.S. is continuing to spread its network of anti-missile systems in Europe and Asia, which the Russians see as a threat to their nuclear force (as does China). And as far as “reneging” goes, it was the U.S. that dumped the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, not Russia. The U.S. is also pouring billions of dollars into “modernizing” its nuclear weapons. It also proposes using ICBMs to carry conventional warheads (if you see one coming, how do you know it’s not a nuke?), and is planning to deploy high velocity glide vehicles that will allow the U.S. to strike targets worldwide with devastating accuracy. And since NATO is beefing up its forces and marching east, why should the Russians tie themselves to a conventional weapons treaty? What about Russia’s seizure of the Crimea? According to the U.S. State Department, redrawing European boundaries is not acceptable in the 21st century—unless you are Kosovo breaking away from Serbia under an umbrella of NATO air power, in which case it’s fine. Residents of both regions voted overwhelmingly to secede. Georgia? The Georgians stupidly started it. But if Russia is not a threat, then why the campaign of vilification, the damaging economic sanctions, and the provocative military actions? First, it is the silly season—American elections—and bear baiting is an easy way to look “tough.” It is also a tried and true tactic of the U.S. armaments industry to keep their production lines humming and their bottom lines rising. The Islamic State is scary but you don’t need big-ticket weapons systems to fight it. The $1.5 trillion F-35s are for the Russkies, not terrorists. There are also those who still dream of regime change in Russia. Certainly that was in the minds of the neo-cons when they used The National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House to engineer—at the cost of $5 billion—the coup that toppled Ukraine into NATO’s camp. The New American Century gang and their think tanks—who brought you Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria—would to leverage Russia out of Central Asia. The most frightening aspect of current East-West tension is that there is virtually no discussion of the subject, and when there is it consists largely of distorted history and gratuitous insults. Vladimir Putin might not be a nice guy, but the evidence he is trying to re-establish some Russian empire, and is a threat to his neighbors or the U.S., is thin to non-existent. His 2014 speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club is more common sense than bombast. Expansionist? Russia has two bases in the Middle East and a handful in Central Asia. The U.S. has 662 bases around the world and Special Forces (SOF) deployed in between 70 and 90 countries at any moment. Last year SOFs were active in 147 countries. The U.S. is actively engaged in five wars and is considering a sixth in Libya. Russian military spending will fall next year, and the U.S. will out-spend Moscow by a factor of 10. Who in this comparison looks threatening? There are a number of areas where cooperation with Russia could pay dividends. Without Moscow there would be no nuclear agreement with Iran, and the Russians can play a valuable role in resolving the Syrian civil war. That, in turn, would have a dramatic effect on the numbers of migrants trying to crowd into Europe. Instead, an April 20 meeting between NATO ministers and Russia ended in “profound disagreements” according to alliance head Jens Stoltenberg. Russian ambassador to NATO Alexander Grushko said that the continued deployment of armed forces on its borders makes it impossible to have a “meaningful dialogue.” We are baiting the bear, not a sport that ever ends well.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Russia

We are in a second Cold War with Russia—continued U.S. hegemony ensures nuclear annihilation

Johnstone 2/3 [Caitlin Johnstone "The Increasing Likelihood Of Nuclear War Should Straighten Out All Our Priorities", Feb 3, Medium, ]

A Russian pilot has been killed by US-armed terrorists in Syria. The Ron Paul Institute‘s Daniel McAdams writes the following about this new development: “The scenario where a US-backed, US-supplied jihadist group in Syria uses US weapons to shoot down a Russian plane and then murders the pilot on the ground should be seen as a near-nightmare escalation, drawing the US and Russia terrifyingly closer to direct conflict.” McAdams is not fearmongering; he is stating a plainly obvious fact. The Trump administration has just announced that it is restructuring its nuclear weapons policy to take a more aggressive stance toward Russia than that which was held by the previous administration. This is coming after this administration’s decision to arm Ukraine against Russia, a move Obama refused to take for fear of escalating tensions with Moscow, as well as its decision to continue to occupy Syria in order to effect regime change, along with numerous other escalations. The Council on Foreign Relations, which is without exaggeration as close to the voice of the US establishment as you can possibly get, is now openly admitting that the “United States is currently in a second Cold War with Russia.” In a recent interview with The Real News, leading US-Russian relations expert Stephen Cohen repeated his ongoing warning that “this new Cold War is much more dangerous, much more likely to end in Hot War, than was the 40-year of Cold War, which we barely survived.” In a previous interview with the same outlet, Cohen elaborated more extensively: “We are in new cold war that is much more dangerous than the last cold war for various reasons. One is that the new cold war today, as we talk, includes three fronts. U.S.-Russian fronts, they’re fought with hot war. That’s Syria. That’s the reckless NATO military build-up on Russia’s western boarders, which has resulted in a situation today that ordinarily artillery, not missiles, ordinary artillery, can hit Russia’s second city of Saint Petersburg. Just think about that and the instability. And the third front is Ukraine.” Cohen explains how the political pressures placed on Trump by the ongoing fact-free allegation that he is a Kremlin puppet makes it far more difficult for him to negotiate on these multiple fronts agilely, thus making it much more likely that Trump will choose to advance when he should retreat, hold his ground when he should back down, and generally be locked into patterns of aggression and forward movement rather than the back-and-forth finesse required for safe cold war negotiations with a nuclear superpower. We came within a hair’s breadth of nuclear annihilation on more than one occasion during the last cold war, and the further things escalate in this new one the more likely we are to tempt fate again. The only reason we survived the extremely tense stand-offs in the last cold war ultimately boiled down to pure dumb luck in some cases, and there’s no legitimate reason to believe we’ll get lucky again. To be clear, I am not saying that the US or Russia actually want nuclear war. Two men with guns pointed at one another in a conventional standoff generally don’t want either weapon to discharge, either. What I am saying is that we learned in situations snatched from the brink of disaster by men like Stanislov Petrov and Vasili Arkhipov that there are too many small, unpredictable moving parts involved in a nuclear standoff for cold war escalations to unfold safely and predictably, and the more tense things get the more likely it becomes that a nuclear warhead gets discharged in the chaos and confusion. Once a single warhead goes off, Mutually Assured Destruction comes into play. Add into that the hot war dynamics and political pressures described by Stephen Cohen and we’re looking at some very uncomfortable odds as a species. In my view most of the political disagreements I have with people ultimately boil down to this. I see us as facing an immediate existential crisis as a species that needs to be dealt with right now, and people say I should be more worried about this or that conservative figure saying rude things on Twitter. We are facing the very real possibility of near-term human extinction; I don’t know how to care about the petty sectarian squabbles in America’s various political factions. It really is time for us to all get over ourselves and grow up. This unprecedented crisis should be drawing us together, yet we’re more politically divided than ever. It is evolve or die time, and we’re all still arguing over airplane peanuts while the plane is in a full nose dive. Thought experiment: Imagine if you wake up one morning and turn on the TV to an emergency broadcast alert that a nuclear weapon has been discharged by either the US or Russia in the chaos and confusion of this convoluted new cold war, and saying that you need to seek shelter immediately. What thoughts will go through your head as the realization dawns that this is really happening? Do you imagine that you will be spending much time thinking about how Trump said “shit hole countries”? Will you spend your last moments on earth mentally shaking your fist at Antifa and “libtards”? Or will you instead perhaps wish that you and your brothers and sisters around the world had more aggressively opposed these new cold war games your leaders have been playing? It is entirely possible that you will one day in the near future find yourself in this very situation and answering the questions I just asked you for yourself. Let’s skip that part of our story together, please. The reason they need to work so hard to manufacture consent for these escalations is because they require that consent. If we all loudly raise our voices and say “No. Enough. This ends now,” they will necessarily have to obey. The Russiagate psyop exists because the western power establishment is trying to cripple the Russia-China tandem in order to ensure US hegemony, and if they tried to thrust us all into a new cold war without our permission they’d shatter the illusion of freedom and democracy they depend on to rule you. If we all rise as one voice and withdraw that permission, they will be forced to obey. Can we do this, please? Can we make ensuring our survival into the future a priority right now and put bickering over identity politics and the president’s tweets on the back burner until then? We’ll have a whole future ahead of us to sort that stuff out if we survive the urgent crisis we are facing right now.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › LIO

A liberal international order is impossible to achieve, what current powers claim as “liberal” hegemony is an illusion

Fraser, ’22 (Sam Fraser, researcher and senior communications associate at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, B.A. in International Relations from Claremont McKenna College, studies focused on U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, Responsible Statecraft, August 29, 2022, “Why US hegemony is incompatible with a ‘rules-based international order’” - Emery)

There is no shortage of bad ideas circulating in U.S. foreign policy discourse. On occasion, however, a particularly poor argument can be helpful insofar as it reveals something noteworthy about the assumptions and ideology that produced it. With an article in The National Interest entitled “Don’t Rule Out Intervention in the Solomon Islands,” Julian Spencer-Churchill provides such an example. The piece — which makes the case that Australia and the United States ought to consider military intervention to topple the government of the Solomon Islands in the wake of the small nation’s adoption of a security pact with China — presents an inartful mix of threat inflation, outright factual error, and regurgitations of basic international relations theory, and is not particularly worth engaging with in and of itself. Yet Spencer-Churchill’s argument is useful in that it draws out some important contradictions in the strategy of liberal hegemony that drives U.S. foreign policy, and the “rules-based international order” it supposedly upholds. The piece begins with a brief recitation of the origins and importance of self-determination and state sovereignty to the international system. This is immediately followed by a claim on behalf of the “coalition of democracies” to a right to violate these principles more or less at will. This coalition, Spencer-Churchill writes, has “legally and morally valid justifications for intervention in a foreign country” first, “when there is a dire security threat that emerges within its sphere of influence” and second, “because liberal democracies have an unprecedented understanding of the world population’s aspirations for human rights-based rule of law and innovation-based prosperity for middle-income countries.” The policies of liberal democracies, he asserts “are moving in concert with the broader direction of history.” The citation for this last statement is a link to a brief summary of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History.” The first claim bears a notable resemblance to Russia’s justifications of its ongoing aggressive war against Ukraine. Such claims of “dire security threats” can be asserted by great powers with little evidence and no need for ratification by any third party, and, as Spencer-Churchill demonstrates, it is easy to gin up a grave security threat out of developments that pose no significant danger. The second claim is even more striking. In essence, Spencer-Churchill argues that all peoples self-evidently desire liberal democratic capitalism, and therefore capitalist democracies like the United States have a right to deliver this system to them by force, whether asked for or not. This contention, of course, is nothing new. It has helped sell numerous U.S. military interventions since the Second World War and itself is only a refinement of the “civilizing missions” of earlier European imperialisms. Yet, in a year when the United States has rallied global opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the name of upholding the rules-based international order, state sovereignty, and self-determination, the absurdity of Spencer-Churchill’s claims is shown in stark relief. In Spencer-Churchill’s formulation, the United States and its allies serve as the guarantors of a rules-based international order, but also enjoy license to violate these rules under broad circumstances of their own determination. While it is not often laid out so bluntly, this is largely how American foreign policy has operated for over seven decades. The United States points to a liberal order as the justification for and result of its predominant military power and global influence, and will invoke that order in the face of other parties’ abuses, but will accept no restraints on its own freedom of action. This is well demonstrated by Washington’s habitual rejection of international treaties produced by the United Nations system (the creation of which, of course, was led by the U.S. itself). The U.S. will nonetheless wield these treaties against the behavior of other nations, as it does with China’s maritime claims and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the United States has neither signed nor ratified. When proponents of liberal hegemony acknowledge this tension, some argue that it is necessary, even beneficial to the project of building a stable, liberal world order. The international system is anarchic and actors worse than the United States abound, ready to fill any power vacuum left vacant by Washington or its close allies. Such an order needs a powerful state to enforce it, and sometimes it may be necessary to bend or even break rules in defense of higher principles. In a recent article for The Atlantic, journalist Tom McTague made such a case, examining the “idea that convinces U.S. leaders that they never oppress, only liberate, and that their interventions can never be a threat to nearby powers, because America is not imperialist.” McTague recognizes that this – the notion that the U.S. is driven by universal values and acts in the universal interest – is both a “delusion” and “lies at the core of [the United States’] most costly foreign policy miscalculations.” Yet McTague asserts that this delusion is necessary to sustain America’s commitment to upholding global order and keeping more malicious powers at bay. Never mind that some of the heroic interventions McTague cites — like the Korean War — were in fact atrocity-ridden debacles that could not credibly be presented as defenses of democracy at the time they actually took place, his larger case is also unpersuasive. Outside of the U.S. and Europe, what he calls the “necessary myth” of American benevolence has been hemorrhaging credibility, and the hypocrisy at the heart of the liberal international order is not a means to its perpetuation, but rather to its steady undoing. Decades of lawless interventions in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have left nations of the Global South deeply and rightly skeptical of the United States as an upholder of international law. Younger Americans increasingly reject U.S. exceptionalism and global military dominance as well. As America’s relative power declines and we move toward an increasingly multipolar international system, the contradictions inherent in Washington’s version of the liberal order will become even harder to ignore. A United States that faces more and greater challenges to its power will likely turn to increasingly coercive means to defend that power, rendering its “liberal” guise increasingly threadbare. It is clear that, going forward, the laudable goal of creating a global order based on international law and mutually agreeable rules of conduct is incompatible with U.S. hegemony — or for that matter, the hypothetical hegemony of any other power. Any state possessing a preponderance of power will, as the U.S. has, reject external restraints on that power. Any “rules-based order” put forward by a hegemon will be wielded in service of hegemony, not the other way around.