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2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › DA › 2AC --- AI Good

The impact is Algorithmic Ablism – AI will always be indebted to the structures of ablism which influence ethical considerations behind AI development.

Tilmes 22 – Nicholas Tilmes is in the field of bioethics and researches the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and biology at Cornell University. He is passionate about applying philosophical insights to concrete ethical dilemmas posed by emerging technologies, such as genetic engineering and functional brain imaging, and the relationship between official medical knowledge and the lived experiences of patients. (Nicholas Tilmes, “Disability, fairness, and algorithmic bias in AI recruitment”, Ethics of Information Technology, Springer Link, Article No. 21, 19 April 2022, ) || PZ

Algorithmic ableism To optimize for fairness and make data portable despite the black box, disability status often is modelled as a one-dimensional variable. This tendency to abstract away environmental and social context artificially limits categories of disability and obscures the process of measuring it. In doing so, AI design unintentionally can reinforce both the form and content of the medical model of disability. By omitting the value-laden decisions involved in operationalizing disability, fair-ML flattens variations in the intensities and kinds of people’s disabilities and further marginalizes those at the intersections. Analyzing the normative commitments of this approach highlights the importance of considering a wider array of ethical concerns beyond training data and input–output relations. When data scientists tackle open-ended goals such as diversity in hiring, they must translate contested models of disability into a single target that can be measured and adjusted in the black box (Selbst et al., ). As such, bias mitigation requires rendering concepts like protected class status amenable to quantification so discrete weights can be ascribed to them. For example, Pymetrics adjusts its AI to satisfy the 4/5ths rule by assessing if scores differ based on neatly defined categories of gender, race, and age (Yoo, ). HireVue, which uses natural language processing to analyze the content of applicants’ speech during automated interviews and gamified tasks, makes similar claims (Zuloaga, ). As part of this process, HireVue explicitly designs their questions in order to elicit readily quantifiable responses (Larsen, ). AI vendors often idealize abstraction since removing context-specific data can help algorithms function more accurately across a variety of settings (Selbst et al., ). However, accuracy is hampered by the fact that most data about disabled people are not comprehensive, without comparability, and low quality (Altman & Rasch, ; Maritz et al., ). As a result, gathering more disability data and designing a shared system for classifying it plays an important role in bias reduction. Since optimizing for fairness can reduce accuracy, collecting high-quality disability data could help mitigate bias stemming from unrepresentative datasets (Chen et al., ). While better representation in training data is necessary to secure just outcomes, disclosing one’s disability status can lead to data misuse and expose one to further discrimination. However, even if people could provide information about their disabilities without fear of repercussion, what it means to identify as disabled is not always straightforward. It is not simply that some disabled people are understandably reluctant to disclose, but that if and how they identify depends on the model of disability and type of measurement at hand. Researchers have found that how people define their disabilities—if they identify as disabled at all—is predicted by a wide array of factors, such as the type of inquiry (Brown & Broido, ), intensity and stigma (Bogart et al., ), and environmental context (Santuzzi & Waltz, ). A host of other factors, such access to an official diagnosis, internalized self-doubt, and whether one’s disability is (in)visible also plausibly affect self-identification. Other studies suggest that whether and how one identifies impacts the types of bias encountered (Nario-Redmond et al., ), methods used to navigate them (Nario-Redmond et al., ), and levels of self-esteem (Bogart, ). These different understandings of disability not only call for distinct types of measurement but also are correlated with distinct outcomes. For example, official medical diagnoses seem to be good predictors of access to health care while self-identification likely is a better proxy for group and political affiliation. Data scientists cannot operationalize disability status as a single, binary variable because the category’s nature and boundaries are not self-evident even among people who seem to fit within it. While definitions of disability are fiercely contested, the ways in which disability data are collected and become legible to AI lend disproportionate weight to the medical model of disability. Given that disclosing disability status can open one up to further discrimination, disability is often quantified only when the situation demands proof of it, e.g., to make an insurance claim, secure a diagnosis, or receive treatment. Aspects of other models of disability, such as social attitudes and built environment, are difficult to measure and, when people have a chance to self-report, they typically are limited to the binary categories of census and actuarial forms. As a result, data scientists seeking to make use of what little disability data exists often turn to information gathered and stored in a narrow range of contexts and formats. In turn, the processes of selecting proxies, generating labels, and curating datasets tend to translate disability into concepts amenable to the medical model. That is, algorithms end up assessing disabled people through a lens that defines disability as a biological dysfunction isolated from structural ableism. Abstraction deprives AI designers of the information required to operationalize disability status as anything but a biomedical dysfunction. One need not deny disability’s material aspects to recognize that adopting an entirely medical understanding of disability crowds out analysis of the socio-political processes that inform it. After all, that disability becomes legible to AI in terms of measurable diagnoses does not entail that AI is objective but highlights its alignment with the medical model. For example, if disabled people score lower on a given pre-employment test, to operationalize disability without accounting for the ableist structures at the root of that performance gap cannot help but attribute that gap to bodily failures. Similarly, once social context is omitted, one can no longer appeal to hiring bias to explain why irregular eye contact adversely impacts employability, shouldering disabled applicants with that responsibility instead. Because disability cannot be reduced to biological facts, abstracting away information about one’s built environment and social context is inaccurate and renders structural ableism benign. However, efforts to remove context from or quantify aspects of disability sheds light on the value-laden nature of ostensibly objective AI design. After all, the notion that one’s competence can be understood apart from the setting it occurs in is hardly a neutral one. For instance, some researchers studying performance assessments argue competence can only be assessed in situ since it is intrinsically contextual and shifts in response to dynamic, complex workplace environments (Cate & Regehr, ; Govaerts & van der Vleuten, ). To focus solely on quantitative aspects of performance risks omitting information regarding, e.g., interactions between chronic fatigue and irregular work schedules, or moldy buildings and asthma flare ups. That such factors are often removed from AI models while more quantifiable traits are treated as legitimate markers of ‘fit’ is not objective but shaped by ableist norms. For example, while studies show that disabled people perform similarly on many aspects of employability (Houtenville & Kalargyrou, ; Lindsay et al., ), automated interviews often place great stock in easily measured factors such as a measured tone and eye contact (Whittaker et al., ). As such, assessing applicants primarily in terms of abstract, quantitative factors does not preserve objectivity so much as obscure the underlying assumptions of AI designers. By evaluating hiring outcomes for disabled people based on factors that do not resist quantification, fair-ML omits more nebulous aspects of disability and makes it difficult to identify the ways in which structural ableism shapes data. Consider that while sentencing decisions hinge on many factors, recidivism risk has been measured disproportionately. Researchers have noted that this focus disposes algorithms such as COMPAS to assess sentences in ways that prioritize incapacitation over, e.g., retribution and rehabilitation (Green, ; Selbst et al., ). Similarly, imagine a hiring algorithm that predicts employability based entirely on quantifiable traits, like employment gaps, requests for medical leave, or expected cost of reasonable accommodations. Even if designers omitted explicit references to disability, such an AI would subtly emphasize correlations to disability status without providing important context or explanation. By prioritizing quantifiable aspects of disability over those not so easily measured, fair-ML configures and restricts our understanding of and responses to algorithmic bias. While inclusive data collection practices might better capture the contexts disabled people navigate, they would struggle to assign static values to them due to disability’s dynamic and shifting nature. Given that AI designers assign and modify discrete weights to features in their models, algorithms evaluate populations in terms of several snapshots taken at certain times instead of gradually emerging outcomes, they can end up entrenching injustice. For example, hiring AI that select applicants based on similarity to previous employees may not adapt to increases in workplace diversity, thus perpetuating bias. Moreover, since disabilities such as chronic pain, asthma, depression, and so on tend to wax and wane day-by-day or over one’s life, modelling people’s capacities in terms of a single binary dimension imposes artificial fixity. One’s performance on a pre-employment assessment cannot be understood in isolation from whether, to give an example, their chronic pain is flaring up that week. It is not just that experiences of disability are inseparable from their contexts, but that disabilities are embodied in shifting ways that cannot be captured by one variable. Although two people might receive diagnoses for the same disability, how they experience that disability and the degree to which it impacts their lives might vary immensely. By removing context and assigning discrete values to disability status, algorithms flatten differences between and within disabled people. The difficulty of operationalizing disability in AI raises similar concerns about membership in other protected classes, many of which also are modelled as binary variables to facilitate de-biasing. Although the sheer multitude of disabilities and historical shifts in their boundaries shed light on the category’s instability, disability is deeply entangled with other aspects of identity. Race, gender, class, and so on intersect and overlap with disability in ways that generate distinct forms of structural discrimination that cannot be reduced to their component parts (Crenshaw, ). Crucially, intersectionality does not entail that disability is neatly analogous with other identities but that the institutions, structures, and norms shaping them are co-constitutive and mutually reinforcing (Erevelles, ). Given that fair-ML optimizes for fairness with respect to protected attributes in isolation, it artificially separates intertwined aspects of identity, which disproportionately impacts those at their intersections. For example, research has found that facial recognition algorithms exhibit higher error rates when classifying the faces of darker-skinned women than could be explained by either race or gender alone (Buolamwini & Gebru, ). Initiatives promoting more inclusive datasets and fair outcomes must reckon with the fact that classifications and the authority to shape them are mediated by discriminatory structures. Indeed, whether one receives legal recognition as disabled is impacted by intersections with these structures, as multiply marginalized disabled people may struggle to secure access to the category itself. For example, given the price of healthcare, the ability to obtain a diagnosis from the medical institutions that AI researchers often collect data from is unevenly distributed. Similarly, certification of disability status is mediated by other biases, such as many physicians’ undue skepticism about women’s experiences of chronic pain (Mingus, ) and the false belief that black people have an unusually high pain tolerance (Erevelles, ). Given that intersecting axes of oppression impact one’s ability to claim disability status, the few disabled people officially recognized as such in training datasets seem likely to be disproportionately wealthy, white, and male. Data scientists cannot merely tack disability on to a list of isolated protected classes since their intersections affect who ‘counts’ as disabled. Instead, they should attend to the ways in which subjective decisions and structural hierarchies impact AI design, situating experiences of disability in their context.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › DA › 2AC --- AI Good

Disability can’t be resisted through “legal measures”, instead we must reshape the normative assumption behind algorithms of fairness.

Tilmes 22 – Nicholas Tilmes is in the field of bioethics and researches the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and biology at Cornell University. He is passionate about applying philosophical insights to concrete ethical dilemmas posed by emerging technologies, such as genetic engineering and functional brain imaging, and the relationship between official medical knowledge and the lived experiences of patients. (Nicholas Tilmes, “Disability, fairness, and algorithmic bias in AI recruitment”, Ethics of Information Technology, Springer Link, Article No. 21, 19 April 2022, ) || PZ

Abstraction and fairness Despite our formal knowledge of the sources of algorithmic bias, it can be difficult to identify or take legal measures to combat it since the ways that machine learning AI analyze inputs are hidden in a black box (Sánchez-Monedero et al., ). The black box often frustrates efforts to correct inaccurate models, as it can be unclear if an AI system granted undue weight to non-causal factors or correctly identified a pattern we have yet to grasp. While seeking explanations may illuminate broad strokes of their processing, these algorithms’ inferences might simply be too complex for humans to make sense of (Selbst & Barocas, ). This inscrutability raises the broader question of whether we should turn to AI for inferences about deeply normative, difficult-to-quantify issues such as built inaccessibility and disability status. In the face of concerns about differing notions of bias, legal uncertainty, and the black box, vendors operationalized demands that AI delivers fair outcomes for protected classes. These fair-ML methods seek to translate bias into easily quantifiable terms that algorithms can understand such as error rates (Agrawal, ). For instance, by defining fairness as a mathematical constraint and optimizing for it or modifying training data until outputs conform to fairness standards, fair-ML can help mitigate disparities stemming from technical errors such as flawed input–output relations or training data. While fairness is operationalized in countless ways, most fall into one of three approaches (Corbett-Davies & Goel, ). First, anti-classification, also called fairness through unawareness, omits data about membership in protected classes as well as any traits associated with them (Zafar et al., ). For instance, one might design an AI that explicitly cannot access information about applicants’ disability status. Second, calibration holds that people who an AI scores similarly ought to end up having similar outcomes (Dieterich et al., ). For example, imagine an AI that equalizes false omission rates and negative predictive values so applicants with similar scores are equally likely to become poor employees, whether they are disabled or not. Third, classification parity defines fairness as a matter of equalizing a predictive measure across groups (Chouldechova et al., ). For example, an AI might equalize error rates such that applicants who end up succeeding are equally likely to be selected, independent of disability status. Fair-ML’s understanding of fairness reflects neither procedural nor normative concepts of the term but instead is a formal, mathematical criteria that AI outputs should not stray from (Ochigame, ). On this view, algorithms are biased if they violate a certain standard, the satisfaction of which is taken to indicate fairness (Mulligan et al., ). While conforming to these standards often is valuable, doing so ought not be taken as sufficient for securing fairness in the normative sense. Instead, fair-ML methods are best understood as pragmatic ways to render bias tractable despite the black box by replacing messy legal and normative issues with formal rules (Bennett et al., ; Green & Viljoen, ). As such, these methods can be effective at addressing mathematical errors, such as inaccurate training datasets and input–output relations. Yet, while fair-ML can reduce certain outcome disparities, it lacks a principled way of detecting bias. The gap between formal and normative concepts of fairness was brought to light when researchers at ProPublica reported that COMPAS, an algorithm which predicted recidivism risk, discriminated against black defendants (Angwin et al., ). Specifically, it had lower false negative and higher false positive rates for black defendants than for white ones, which violated classification parity. COMPAS’ developers, Northpointe (now Equivant), replied by arguing that error rates are flawed measures of fairness and noting that COMPAS exhibited equal predictive values for black and white defendants, thus ensuring calibration (Dieterich et al., ). In this dispute, whether COMPAS was racially biased seemingly hinged neither on legal procedure nor normative principle but on various fair-ML criteria. While anti-classification, calibration, and classification parity all aim to operationalize distinct notions of fairness, it is mathematically impossible to satisfy each of these definitions simultaneously in the real world (Jacobs & Wallach, ). Research has found that these standards could be reconciled only if the recidivism rate were uniform across groups, the AI was entirely accurate, or some groups never faced negative outcomes (Barocas et al., ; Chouldechova, ). Similarly, in the context of hiring, if disabled people performed worse than average on a given pre-employment assessment, calibrating employability predictions would shoulder them with higher false negative and lower false positive rates. This suggests that algorithms inevitably are unfair in that they will violate at least one fair-ML approach and reflects the conceptual tensions between the normative notions of fairness that underpin each of these approaches. Although fair-ML treats bias as the product of inaccurate input–output relations and training data, decisions about how to reduce bias are normative issues, not technical ones. Choices about which kind of algorithmic fairness to implement—anti-classification, calibration, classification parity, and so on—are intrinsically value-laden because they shape what AI designers consider to be a biased outcome. As such, it is unclear how to assess competing fair-ML strategies without appealing to normative reasons. For instance, since letting some criminals go is preferable to punishing innocents, data scientists predicting recidivism risk should be more concerned with false positives than false negatives. Yet, equalizing false negatives seems more important for AI hiring because approved candidates still face additional interviews while those screened out have little redress. At the same time, post-hoc measures for uncovering false negatives in hiring tests, such as approving a random set of lower-ranked applicants, would be much more difficult to justify in the context of recidivism. Narrow focus on abstract proxies for equality denies one the information required to evaluate the merits of different fairness standards. To define fairness as a formal constraint divorced from normative commitments and social context is to commit a category error. The difficulty of using solely technical means to secure normative ends points to broader issues with fair-ML, raising questions about how we should understand disability and fairness in light of structural ableism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › DA › 2AC --- Generic

The relation of blackness and disability is international, the institutionalization is not only in the US, to say that the slave trade only affects the US is naïve.

Stefanie Kennedy and Melanie J. Newton 16 (November 8, 2016, “Chapter 24 The Hauntings of Slavery: Colonialism and the Disabled Body in the Caribbean” , Disability in the Global South by Disability in the Global South The Critical Handbook, Editors: Shaun Grech, Karen Soldatic , https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-42488-0 )// RB

Disability and the Enslaved Body The relationship between disability, race and slavery in the colonial period was not just one of representation; rather, disfi gurement and impairment were routine results of enslavement in the British Caribbean. From the very moment of seizure in subSaharan Africa, enslaved bodies were methodically marked with slavery’s violence. The process of capture, forced march, imprisonment and forced migration that characterised the slave trade, and the physical effects of forced labour in sugar production, malnutrition, disease and legally sanctioned punishments which characterised British Caribbean plantations, often resulted in long-term emotional and physical damage. For captives who survived the passage and years of ‘seasoning’, disfi gurement, disease and impairment came to characterise their lives—they were ‘kept alive but in a state of injury , in a phantom like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity’ (Mbembé 2003 : 21). In British Caribbean slave societies, the space between fi tness and death constituted the majority of one’s life in enslavement. Legally sanctioned punishments were the most distinctive form of impairment and disfi gurement endured by the enslaved. Throughout the colonial period, the laws that governed the enslaved were written by the white planter elite and thus refl ected an‘immediate reaction of what the slave-owner conceived to be the necessities of the slave system’ (Goveia 1970 : 19).

The 1661 Barbados slave code was the fi rst comprehensive slave law of the Americas and greatly infl uenced the establishment of other English colonial laws, including Jamaica’s 1664 An Act for the better ordering and Governing of Negro Slaves. These early laws granted slave owners almost unlimited power to punish the enslaved privately and at their own discretion. Although subsequent laws did not explicitly delegate such sovereignty, these founding laws established a mentality that it was the owner’s right to govern and punish his or her property, however he or she saw fi t (Paton 2001 : 927). In 1717 it was made illegal for masters to dismember captives on their own property, yet, ‘such provisions were by no means ubiquitous’, and very little measure was taken to limit the power of owners to damage their human property (Goveia 1970 : 29). The enslaved were frequently sentenced by the courts to have their ears cut off close to their heads, to have a foot removed and to have their nostrils slit for crimes such as theft and running away (Paton 2001 : 937–941). In addition to brutal punishments, the enslaved also experienced impairment caused by labour accidents, disease and malnutrition. Unsanitary water and extremely tight living quarters caused and helped spread a variety of illnesses and diseases including scabies, leprosy, yaws, parasites and worms, smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, measles, mumps and infl uenza. One 18th-century plantation management guide cautioned planters to the kinds of illness to which the enslaved were prone. The author described the yaws as : great ulcers that break out in various parts of the body, but chiefl y on the arms, and hips; the wounds yield very little matter, nor are they very painfull [sic]; but if not cured in time will spread in hard knots all over the body, and infect the whole mass of blood; the mussels will be contracted and the features deformed; the face swell’d with large blotches, and death the consequence—unless skillfull application be had. When any negroe is soon to have this disorder, he must be taken from amongst your other slaves, or he will infect the whole . (Dovaston 1774 : 253) Other illnesses included worms, which caused an individual to appear ‘as tho he was mad, and run about with desperate and ghastly looks, at other times the slaves will be taken with shakes and fi tts like those of an ague, and the blood be quite chill’d to their thinking’ (Dovaston 1774 : 256).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Semiocap/Psychoanalysis/Academy › 2AC --- No link (ballot/meaning)

We don’t seek to put meaning behind narratives or the performance of 1AC, rather you should understand that the world is messy and the project of the 1AC is not complete but part of an ongoing process.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 95-96, JMH]

As an inroad to an ending, I turn to the issue of whether Black madness and mad Blackness must have meaning and what that meaning must be. I disambiguate meaning and value. The former is how a concept makes sense in or has an impact on public or private space. The latter concerns an affective and sociocultural conception of relative merit or perceived worth in public or private space. In the introduction to this volume, I called this line of inquiry an act of literary theorist blasphemy because it upturns one of the basic assumptions of literary criticism: namely, that certain concepts must continue to be impactful or that those concepts must make sense in a text, that they are available to be read and understood. Yet, this kind of inquiry has a long history in Black studies and disability studies. Scholarly interventions regarding Blackness and madness call into question the utility of both meaning and value. That is, disability studies and critical race studies attend to the ways that devaluation of Blackness and madness—legally, socially, culturally, historically—contribute to the thinking of these identities as abject. This is not simply about whether these subjects remain in a position of abjection but rather about sorting through the conditions that make that meaning shift. The political impetus is that one cannot have a different meaning unless the value ascribed changes. The lives of mad people matter. Black lives matter. According to a linear progressive view of history, as the value of Blackness and madness increase, the abjection ascribed to them will dissipate or go away altogether. Indeed, the fiction of postracial discourse is that we are/ were currently in this/that cultural moment. (The operative word here is fiction.) The conversations before this moment reveal that the artists-theorists discussed in this volume provide useful disruptions to linear time and progressive narratives. In drawing an intellectual cartography, this project lays bare how these artists-theorists trouble the stativity of those ideas and, in their dynamic theorizing, intervene in the commonly held discourses about Blackness and madness. As I warned, this map would uncover, recover, and discover, at times, contradictory relationships in the folds, lingering in the cut. A small bit of redistricting: Octavia E. Butler’s work wonders whether mutual constitution functions as an adroit reading strategy. Nalo Hopkinson suggests the intraracial space may offer some disruptive aesthetic and narrative potential, which challenges Butler without dismissing the possibility for new interpretative strategy. Tananarive Due’s heuristic queries how either of the worlds Butler and Hopkinson craft became possible given the ideological concept of the human. Each conversation intertwines with the other to examine the fissures in our analyses of Blackness and madness. As a result, they raise questions about the sought after goals of understanding these narratives. In what follows, I endeavor to do what is perhaps impolite at the end of a conversation: crawl under the discussion to retrace a thread that subtends but possibly upends the entire enterprise. I ask, if the value of Black madness and mad Blackness increases, do Black madness and/or mad Blackness retain the same meanings?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Semiocap/Psychoanalysis/Academy › 2AC --- No link (Slave Narratives)

Only our neo-slave narrative blur fact and fiction, weaponizing against historical modes of knowing blackness to understanding disability as a lived experience

Sami Schalk 18 [Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin - Madison. She was previously an Assistant Professor in the English Department at the University at Albany, SUNY, March 15, 2018, Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction., p.36 – 39, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

I use the term neo–slave narrative to refer to a broad range of post Emancipation fictionalized representations of slavery. Unlike traditional slave narratives, which sought to use consciously constructed personal narratives to promote the abolitionist cause, neo–slave narratives are often viewed as attempts to recover or rediscover aspects of slaves’ experiences that were not included in traditional slave narratives. Neo–slave narratives, therefore, use history to (re)construct experiences of slavery and affectively (re)connect contemporary individuals to slavery in ways that the less literary, nongraphic, and highly pragmatic traditional slave narratives often cannot. Despite this recovery element, neo–slave narratives also recognize that due to the marginalized position of slaves and lack of access to independent publishing and education, traditional historical methods of archival research do not necessarily produce new information. As Madhu Dubey argues, neo–slave narratives “situate themselves against history, suggesting that we can best comprehend the truth of slavery by abandoning historical modes of knowing” (“Speculative Fictions of Slavery” 784). In fact, many neo–slave narratives blur fact and fiction in order to comment on and challenge our ability to read any history of slavery—including slave narratives— as unadulterated truth, encouraging us instead to consider history, especially histories of marginalized people, as inherently partial, flawed, and filtered through human interpretation. The use of metaphor and nonrealism are both essential to this counter- (rather than anti-) historical task of the neo–slave narrative genre.

Since the publication of Kindred in 1979, which “set the tone for much subsequent fiction about slavery,” this reconstructive task of reading against the historical grain is often performed through a variety of nonrealist devices, including the disruption of traditional linear narrative, ghost stories, and time travel (Ryan 18).5 The change to nonrealist representations of slavery is an important difference between neo–slave narratives and traditional slave narratives because the traditional narratives relied on realism to underscore the authenticity, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of the narrative and narrator.6 Hayden White writes that both history and fiction depend on the distinction between the real and the imaginary. She contends that in order for a text, like a traditional slave narrative, to be understood as true and real in modern discourse, it must “possess the character of narrativity” (H. White 10). As a result of this connection between traditional forms of narrative and truth, our notions of the real, both in historical and fictional texts, depend on concepts of continuity, chronology, and causality. Neo–slave narratives, however, use speculative fictional devices to refuse traditional narrative modes and thus also reject traditional notions of what constitutes the real. These literary devices that disrupt temporality and narrativity “are designed to convey certain truths about slavery that are inaccessible through the discipline of history” (Dubey, “Speculative Fictions of Slavery” 791). Speculative fictional neo–slave narratives therefore work to reclaim lost voices, to critique traditional historical methods associated with white, nondisabled men, and to use fiction and nonrealism to expose many of the untruths and absences of the historical record and cultural memory of slavery

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Paraontology

There is clear connection between the social death and its relation to blackness and disability- particularly in places like debate seek to pathologize these experiences.

Erevelles & Minear 2011 (Erevelles, N. and Andrea Minear Disability and Difference in Global Contexts : Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, ““Unspeakable Offenses: Disability Studies at the Intersections of Multiple Differences with Andrea Minear 1” . )// RB

“Spirit Murder” and the “New” Eugenics: Critical Race Theory meets Disability Studies

The three stories of Eleanor Bumpurs, Junius Wilson, and Cassie and Aliya Smith, however poignant they may appear to be, are not unique. Police brutality, false imprisonment, and educational negligence are commonplace in the lives of people of color— especially those who are located at the margins of multiple- identity categories. So common are these practices that CRF scholar Patricia Williams (1997) has argued that these kinds of assaults should not be dismissed as the “odd mistake.” On the other hand, Williams has argued that that these “mistakes” be given a name that associates them with criminality. Her term for such assaults on an individual’s personhood is “spirit murder,” which she describes as follows: I see spirit murder as no less than the equivalent of body murder . . . One of the reasons I fear what I call spirit murder or disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard, is that its product is a system of formalized distortions of thought. It produces social structures centered around fear and hate, it provides a timorous outlet for feelings elsewhere unexpressed . . . We need to see it as a cultural cancer; we need to open our eyes to the spiritual genocide it is wreaking on blacks, whites, and the abandoned and abused of all races and ages. We need to eradicate its numbing pathology before it wipes out what precious little humanity we have left. (p. 234)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Paraontology

Blackness and disability exist in a state of becoming; through the transatlantic slave trade, ability has intrinsically been tied to whiteness and disability to blackness. We should treat these as aligned instead of antagonistic to one another.

Erevelles 2011 (Erevelles, N.. Disability and Difference in Global Contexts : Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, pg 38- pg 42 “Disability as “Becoming”: Notes on the political Economy of the flesh” . )// RB

In Hortense Spillers’s (1987) essay, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” the social context in which the embodied subject becomes-in-the-world is one suffused with an ineffaceable horror. Spillers, in this essay, locates the “origins” of African American subjectivity in the (trans)Atlantic slave trade, which starts with the unimaginable violence during the Middle Passage; continues through the dehumanization of slavery; and finally concludes by exposing dominant conceptualizations of the contemporary “Black Family” as a tangle of pathology. Her analysis pierces the body to expose “the hieroglyphics of the flesh” whose “undecipherable markings” become the cornerstone of an American Grammar that continues to this day to deny the African American his/her subjectivity, such that his/her body “becomes both the physical and biological expression of otherness . . . becoming both physically and generally powerless” (p. 67). In this section, I argue that Spillers’s essay is as much about disability as it is about race, even though the word “disability” is not mentioned even once in her essay. I find this startling because the “scene[s] of actual mutilation, dismemberment, and exile” (p. 67) that Spillers describes in her essay produce disabled bodies—black disabled bodies—who in an ironic turn are transformed into commodities that are exchanged in the market or profit. I call this ironic because the dominant paradigm has conceived of disabled bodies as having little economic value except in very limited contexts where their extra-ordinariness was made hypervisible, as for example, in the freak shows—another profitable venture (Adams, 2001; Bogdan, 1988). In Spillers’s essay, on the other hand, it is in becoming disabled that the black body is at the height of its profitability, and it is the historical, social, and economic context of this becoming that I will now foreground in this section.

Before I undertake this analysis, however, I want to distinguish my position from other positions that have theorized the relationship between race and disability. For the most part, race for disability scholars and disability for race scholars are conceived of as “prosthetic metaphor[s]” (Barker & Murray, 2010, p. 219). In race studies scholarship, Ewart (2010) calls this practice “dis appropriation,” where the language of disability is used “to affirm (an often-subordinate) voice to elucidate agency and figurative empathy for other oppressed and exploited populations” (p. 152). In disability studies scholarship, disability oppression/struggle is equated with racial oppression/struggle (James & Wu, 2006). In each of these cases, both disability and race are conceived of as tropes that can be used interchangeably to foreground the ubiquity of oppression, but that fail to explore the complex ways in which “the categories of race/ethnicity and disability are used to constitute one another or the ways that those social, political, and cultural practices have kept seemingly different groups of people in strikingly similar marginalized positions” (James & Wu, 2006, p. 4). Conscious of this critique, in this section, I will show how race and disability are imbricated in their collective formation of the black disabled body that now becomes a commodity that has economic, social, cultural, and linguistic implications for transnational subjectivities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Paraontology

Failing to recognize the relationship between race and disability forms a contradictory disconnect with academia and movements outside of this space. Vote aff/neg to to build a bridge back to reality

Pitts 22 [Andrea Pitts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and they are affiliate faculty of the university’s Department of Africana Studies, Center for Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights Studies, Latin American Studies Program, School of Data Science, Social Aspects of Health Initiative, and Women’s and Gender Studies Program “” published in 2022 by Routledge (pages 237-239) accessed on July 13th, 2022 by AP]

In the context of The Cancer Journals, she intimates that writing about her experiences with breast cancer, including the patterned harms that she underwent within the clinical setting, is vital to her own survival and to the survival of other Black women. Additionally, “know[ing] without understanding” appears to refer to the inchoate existential awareness of one’s own sensations, emotions, and other embodied experiences, experiences that are not fully transparent to oneself or others. According to Lorde, the act of bringing such pre- or non-discursive forms of awareness, including experiences of pain and illness, into expression becomes a method to reshape personal and collective possibilities. On this point, Therí A. Pickens (2014) notes that Lorde “wrestles with the appropriate ethical response to her pain” and configures her writings as a means “to move toward awareness, discussion, and activism” (130–131). The importance of highlighting such a relationship between pain and expression is that Lorde is able to demonstrate the many ways in which Black lesbian women struggle through cancer and amputation. Among the themes that emerge in Lorde’s work is the dominance of the medical establishment over patients’ own narrative descriptions. Thus, describing her pain through evocations of joy and sensuality, including phantom pains, becomes a resistant act against the power of clinical medicine’s force relations. For example, after her mastectomy, Lorde writes that “the pain returned home bringing all of its kinfolk” (Lorde 2014, 31–32). Through drawing on familiar vernacular, Lorde’s description serves as a response to the insufficiency of medical discourses to describe the experiences of Black American women in pain (Pickens 2014, 132). The Cancer Journals also underscores Lorde’s decision not to wear a prosthesis following her mastectomy. Specifically, nurses and volunteer staff encourage her to wear a pink prosthetic breast following her surgery, and the reasons offered are that such a prosthesis will make Lorde and others around her feel more comfortable (1980, 42). The artificiality of the pink prosthetic contrasts with Lorde’s descriptions of her own “soft brown skin” after surgery, and her remarks critique the white aesthetic norms that exist within biomedical technologies of the flesh (44). Pickens also notes the heteronormative encounters Lorde describes while being encouraged to wear the prosthesis, including the suggestions by medical staff that wearing the prosthesis would allow her to remain attractive to men (2014, 135). In these ways, Lorde’s writings refuse these tendencies to foreclose her own appreciation of her body and desires, and her descriptions reopen a discursive space for a distinctively Black lesbian response to 238 Andrea J. Pitts the misunderstandings and erasures that stem from the medical world around her. As such, Lorde’s writings offer a counternarrative to the whiteness of clinical medicine, and provide a descriptive opening for the existential conditions of illness, pain, and pathologization experienced by queer women of color. Alongside the pivotal work by Black, Indigenous, and other women of color in the 1970s and 1980s, more recent scholarly and activist work operating through framings of disability justice has focused on the specific existential and conceptual tools necessary for disabled, queer and trans people of color. For example, although authors like Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa wrote extensively of experiences of illness, medical intervention, pain, and blindness, these authors were often reluctant to interpret themselves in terms of “disability” or as “disabled.” Along these lines, Moya Bailey and Izetta Autumn Mobley (2019) and Aurora Levins Morales (2013) have respectively explored the relationships between race and disability, examining the reasons why people of color may choose not to politically organize around disability rights or through identification as “disabled.” Namely, Bailey and Mobley note that tropes of the “crazy Black woman” are weaponized against Black women leading to high rates of violence committed against them, and that such violence occurs while simultaneously failing to address the needs of Black people with psychiatric or physical disabilities (2019, 31). Additionally, they point out that: Black women and other women of color do most of the labor in the service of disability despite the impact on their ability to care for themselves or their families. Caregivers are often engaged in debilitating work for disabled people and become disabled themselves. (32) These concerns, along with others, may thus complicate political and personal mobilization through a framing of disability for people of color. Bailey and Mobley also note, however, that growing work is currently being done among Black authors and activists to explore the terms of a disability within Black communities, including as their work attests, developing a Black feminist disability framework from which to theorize and mobilize. Along similar lines, Morales notes that for Gloria Anzaldúa, as a “dark-skinned working class Tejana lesbian,” to have affirmed disability as an identity would likely have required “a strong, vocal, politically sophisticated, disability justice movement led by queer working class women and trans people of color who understood [her] life” (2013, 5). From this insight, Bailey and Mobley, as well as disability justice activists have resisted individualist rights- and autonomy-based models of justice to focus on collective resistance to ableism in its many instantiations. Instead, disability justice activists and scholars demand a recognition of the interdependence of shared struggles against systemic oppressions and how disability functions across all forms of oppression—all of this while foregrounding the desires, joys, and networks of care among disabled people who are fighting against those systemic oppressions. For example, disability justice organizers Talila A. Lewis and Dustin P. Gibson, through their social media, workshops, and collective public actions, offer powerful critiques of the forms of systemic ableism that undergird US prison systems and policing, while also dedicating time and energy to curate Black disability solidarity music, art, film, and history (Lewis 2020; Gibson 2020). Additionally, Sins Invalid, founded in 2005 by disability justice activists Patty Berne and LeRoy F. Moore, is a performance-based artist collective composed of artists of Disability Bioethics and Race 239 color and LGBTQ/gender-variant artists that explores themes of sexuality, the non-normative body, and social and economic justice through their performances and workshops (Sins Invalid 2020). These examples of disability justice activism thus illustrate the important point made by Bailey and Mobley that there are creative aesthetic, embodied, and political contributions founded in the experiences of disabled people of color, and that organizing work done within a disability justice framework celebrates both the lives and experiences of disabled people of color while also critiquing the very systematic patterns of harm that would seek to erase, reduce, or eliminate their very existence. Lastly, regarding the relationship between disability and race, Nirmala Erevelles (2011) explores the “racialization of disability” and the “dis-abilization of race,” a process that Erevelles offers to bring both categories into material relation. Specifically, she argues that whiteness, defended as a form of property right, is “the ideological discourse that has been used to justify the racial superiority of white people over people of color by using the logic of dis-ability (e.g., inferior genes, low IQ) to decide who has the rights to citizenship” (166). By this, Erevelles suggests that the racialization of disability is the process by which white, able-bodied heterosexual cisgender men become centered as the most productive (and thereby valuable) citizens within capitalist societies. In this, the productive possibilities of such white citizens are protected through institutions such as the law, education, and health care. Regarding education, for example, the criminalization and pathologization of Black children in k-12 settings, as well as the segregation of educational institutions by “cognitive ability” seeks to shore up protected educational resources for those deemed more deserving or more capable of making “positive” contributions to society. Regarding the dis-abilization of race, Erevelles notes that people considered outside the productive metrics of advanced capitalism are often relegated to the welfare state, and thereby stigmatized as burdensome on the civic body. The responses to such so-called “dependency” on social welfare programs, however, is also a lucrative business, she argues. Testing companies, metrics and measurements for success, juvenile detention facilities, and other programs designed to manage or “uplift” children of color effectively foreground a life marked by pathologization and deviance for many people. Moreover, Erevelles proposes that the debilitating conditions of labor for many people of color in the USA also lead to increased marginalization, vulnerability, and medical precarity for such populations within advanced capitalism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Social Death

Disabled, racial bodies have been derealized, an ontological limbo manifested in an infinite paranoia unexplainable with their broader ontological claims

Omar Zahzah 20 [A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature, Undercover and Hyper-Visible: Security Poetics and Pacification Prosaics in African American and Arab American Literature, UCLA, 2020, , -ekh-]

Judith Butler’s notion of derealization may very well have become one of the premier analytics for considering the epistemological ravages performed by the so-called “War on ‘Terror’” upon countless racialized bodies and collectives (this is, of course, contemporaneous to the physical ravages of bombs, bullets, metal cages and attendant tortures). Butler qualifies the status afforded the Muslim “Other,” the enemy of the interminable “War on ‘Terror,” as a kind of ontological limbo, one fully admitted neither to life nor death:

If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness… The derealization of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. (Precarious Life 33-4)

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Perm do Both

Perm do both- black cyborg rebels, a divine, biological, and mechanical inverting of power relations for a praxis of blackness-as-resistance

Joy James 13 [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

Fanon’s “Concerning Violence” rebellion against colonization and slavery offers dreams of freedom but little vision of a posthuman or posthumanist world. His redemption appears in the same world, one now with black “sinners” leading the white “saints.” Essentially, this is the same driven world but with different persona at the helm. Power relations are inverted, not transcended, for the world remains a domain for humans trying to prove or disprove humanity and thus their right to rule. One is left to wonder about a world in which the native, fellah, and sistah relinquish the fight to be considered “human,” and subsequently folded into the national or international communities, and seek instead to become black cyborg rebels—biologicalmechanical-divine entities in service to freedom. (Some might argue that the “true” cyborg rebel comes from slavery, not from colonization; only slavery destroyed the full humanity of both the master and the enslaved as well as the terrain that gives meaning to one’s past.)

The ability to refuse blackness-as-victimization and reconstitute blackness-as-resistance may be the black cyborg rebel’s only real possession. Blackness no longer as the negation or target of white supremacy maneuvers as something no longer human, or subhuman or deficient in humanity. Human and black have been constructed as oxymoronic for at least half a millennium in the West (and longer elsewhere). The Underground Railroad, as an escape path away from the gravitational pull of whiteness-as-mastery, would entail a flight from the “human” as well.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Afropess › 2AC --- Ruse of Analogy

Ruse of analogy leads to the erasure of the black disabled body- not only are coalitions possible, but blackness and madness have collective histories that are intrinsically tied to one another.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 2-4, JMH]

Quite frankly, Kriegel’s essay is painful to read. The outdated language, the faulty analogy, the internalized ableism, the profound lack of community— all of these depict experiences of disability and Blackness detached from social and/or political context. In Kriegel’s essay, Blackness and Black social movements provide a loose social mooring. To write at the tail end of the 1960s in New York requires an engagement with Blackness as a matter of accuracy and rigor. So, Kriegel’s essay considers—as it should—the import of social positioning vis-à-vis Blackness. Thinking of the essay as an artifact, it clarifies how the Black power movements and civil rights gains of the 1950s and 1960s paved the way for disability activism around the Rehabilitation Act (1973), and, by extension, the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), among others. Frantz Fanon provides the essay’s central theoretical interlocutor, which could potentially position the “like race” idea less as analogy, shifting the discursive terrain such that the essay centralizes the projected experiences of Blackness. It doesn’t. Fanon’s theories do prove useful, however, in thinking about the social situations that difference creates and abets. Even though the essay references the world, it is not grounded in it. As a result, the analysis fails on a few registers. The “like race” analogies for disability function as missed opportunities for nuance. There are only certain well-worn paths that logic can follow. First, the comparative element leaves Kriegel little choice but to think through the relationship in hierarchical terms where one identity is more or less disenfranchised than the other. Indeed, this vacillates for Kriegel depending on the situation (i.e., the disabled have less social options, but Blacks have been victimized more), which demonstrates a kind of sophistication in understanding that each identity category operates differently depending on social context. Yet, the analogy still facilitates racist erasure: despite the fact that Kriegel’s rehabilitation facility is in Harlem, he does not think through the life of the Black disabled person, nor does he speculate about the interiority of those around him. They are merely sullen. The “as” of the simile and, by extension, the “like” of the larger analogy elide the differences between these identities because rhetorically one replaces the other. Erasure then allows for a collapse of important distinctions in experience (i.e., difference between Kriegel’s European immigrant mother and the Blacks in Harlem), and the depiction of Blackness as an abject monolith incapable of providing its own analogy and method. Placing Fanon in this context only allows him to expose and explain Blackness as a pathology of the West, rather than allow Fanon to function as a theoretician that dialogues with and about Blackness and disability (albeit one who makes certain problematic “like race” analogies himself). In its failure, Kriegel’s essay foregrounds why the “like race” analogies are missed opportunities: They potentially promise a useful engagement with Blackness and disability because they grant that the two share social similarities. However, without addressing collective histories, theoretical impulses, and subjectivities with nuance, the analogy reinscribes the erasure it originally promises to rectify. Although Kriegel’s essay was published in 1969, the theoretical and methodological residues of his project remain. To think through the relationship between race and disability requires answering several questions: How might we read race and disability outside the confines of the scripts heretofore provided? In what ways do we need to shift or challenge existing analytical paradigms? To what aesthetic practices and thinkers do we need to turn to expand our imaginations vis-à-vis these two discourses and material realities? What sacred cows or shibboleths do we need to leave behind methodologically, theoretically, aesthetically? This project, Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, turns to madness and Blackness to answer these questions about race and disability more broadly. Critical discourses about madness and Blackness tend to implicate but not include each other.4 As a consequence, the criticism recapitulates several pervasive but incomplete ideas. One of those is the loose rendering of Blackness and madness as analogous to each other. More often, the two discourses are examined as extensions of one another, too slippery to parse, yet so inseparable that one can elide or replace the other. In contrast, I theorize that madness (broadly defined) and Blackness have a complex constellation of relationships. These relationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability more generally) are constituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts. Black madness and mad Blackness then are not interchangeable or reciprocal. Rather, they foreground the multiple and, at times, conflicting epistemological and ontological positions at stake when reading the two alongside each other. In exploring these critical possibilities, I explicate how this set of relationships has, makes, and acquires meaning in the various spaces they occupy without necessarily guaranteeing emancipation or radicality. I turn to what may be an unlikely site to explore: Black speculative fiction. These artists-theorists disrupt Western epistemology such that their work becomes a locus for thinking through putatively strange Black minds.5 Allow me to explain the title as an inroad to describing our current critical moment.6 Black Madness :: Mad Blackness rests on the idea that ability and race are intertwined, as Michelle Jarman notes, “two dynamic discursive processes that inform one another.”7 Suturing madness and Blackness together, I debunk the perception that the title is redundant, oxymoronic, or excessive. In an ideological construct of white supremacy, Blackness is considered synonymous with madness or the prerequisite for creating madness. To push them together syntactically runs the risk of appearing repetitive, but it also prompts the possibility that the two must be parsed.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Capitalism › 2AC --- Root cause

They are wrong about capital. The “able / disabled” distinction over codes capitalism’s analysis of productive value.

Reynolds 22 – Dr. Joel Michael Reynolds is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Disability Studies at Georgetown University, Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Senior Advisor to The Hastings Center, and core faculty in Georgetown’s Disability Studies Program. He received his Ph.D in philosophy from Emory university, and he is the founder of and co-founder of from Oxford University Press. (Joel Reynolds, “Disability and White Supremacy”, Critical Philosophy of Race, Penn State University Press, Project Muse, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2022, pp. 50-54, DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.10.1.0048) || PZ

That is to say, the process and apparatus of making abled and disabled emerges not simply out of capitalism, but out of the racial subsidies upon which it is based, producing the twin needs to humanize those who control the means of production and dehumanize those who do not and do so at varying levels of stratification depending upon context, locale, political exigency, extant social mores, etc. As Ryan Fics puts this matter, “disability and ability aren’t necessarily the product of capital, but, rather, they are co-originary with that which informs and arranges capital, especially the white supremacy that undergirds” its historical formation and emergence.25 Yet another component of this co-originary logic is that of extermination. The extreme and systematic acts of violence and murder by white Americans against Black Americans has been a historical mainstay.26 Making Black bodies disabled and making Black bodies dead is at the center of the structural intertwining of ableism and anti-Black racism upon which this country is founded. Along with the racial subsidies upon which the power of capture, influence, and polarization is afforded to those who are racialized as white comes also the production of social identity. When James Baldwin claims that whiteness must be seen in terms of the “protection of . . . identity,” I take him to be pointing to the way that whiteness becomes constitutive of the very sense of self of white Americans, of those who live in its possibilities of violence and capital gains without limits—as well as living with limits to their own exposure to certain types of living and labor conditions.27 But a central feature of capitalism, like any economic system, turns on the distribution, accumulation, and transferal of abilities. The ability to build, to buy, to negotiate, to insure, to sell, and to move capital (both social and financial) just is, among other things, a particular economy of this way of distributing ability. And insofar as the birth of the (modern) racial subject is linked to the history of capitalism, then this is at the same time to claim that the birth of the (modern) disabled subject is linked to the history of capitalism. One of the intellectual tasks at hand, I think, is to better see how the social value of any given “human” ability has become refracted through whiteness, which is to say, how whiteness inflects (and, certainly, infects) what any individual or group is taken to be able to do and whether that ability is held to carry any value, any capital. Sylvia Wynter explicitly links disability (both physical and cognitive) with the meaning of Blackness and the legacy of anti-black racism and settler colonialism in the United States more generally. “The bottommost role of Black Americans in the United States is systemically produced . . . a parallel and interlinked role is also played by the category of the Poor, the jobless, the homeless, the ‘underdeveloped,’ all of whom, interned in their systemically produced poverty and expendability, are now made to function in the reoccupied place of the Leper of the medieval order and of the Mad of the monarchical, so as to actualize at the economic level the same dysgenic or dysselected-by-Evolution conception.”28 On my reading, Wynter is here claiming that white supremacy in the United States has relegated Black Americans to disabled outcasts. This means, among other things, that being disabled cannot somehow offer protection for those who are black, as Curry’s analysis assumes in principle, whether through increased pity, consideration, social supports, or what have you.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Capitalism › 2AC --- Materiality

Not all revolutions bring freedom – only the 1AC’s weaponization of violence against violence turns the colonized world disorderly, rendering one divinebiomechanical, thus, a cyborg

Joy James 13 [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

In “Concerning Violence,” Fanon offers a definition of revolutionaries in search of freedom predicated on truth not deception: “the fellah, the unemployed man, the starving native do not lay a claim to the truth; they do not say that they represent the truth for they are the truth” (1963: 49).4

For Fanon, “Truth is the property of the national cause. . . . Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners” (1963: 50). He sounds apocalyptic, but his commitment here is for the nation-state, not for “humanity” in general. Fanon preserves the native in human form and recognizes that truth is about change. Change is inevitable. Progress is not. Revolutions bring about change, true, but not all revolutions bring freedom. For Fanon, the native can challenge imposed immobility if and when he or she “decides to put an end to the history of colonization—the history of pillage—and to bring into existence the history of the nation—the history of decolonization” (51).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Capitalism › 2AC --- Individualism Link

The aff is not just discourse- our challenging of ableism spills up against material structures.

Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 34-35, JMH]

Elsewhere, I have argued similarly—that we ought to attend to the way that Blackness and whiteness function in the interracial multiability encounter. In my article on television’s Monk, I proposed that Blackness and madness cannot take up the same space within one interaction. I read the protagonist’s unnamed obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disability that “misfits” with other (usually minor) characters’ Blacknesses.30 At times, one is used for comedic fodder or erased in favor of representing the other or eclipsed as a way to demonstrate white liberalism. My article describes the relationship between these two identities as mutually constituted, but it evinces some slippage when attempting to discern why the protagonist’s disability erases the other characters’ Blackness. Since Blackness and madness do not reside in the same body, the various drama-comedy scripts tergiversate about what difference among difference can mean, often mobilizing white liberalism to police disability and Blackness. Rereading my own work with an eye toward the breaks, I find that we not only lack a critical vocabulary for describing Blackness and madness simultaneously, but it is also assumed that one must take priority over the other. The end result is that in this interracial encounter—whether fictionalized, theorized, or criticized—either Blackness or madness must be erased. Important for this conversation is that the multiracial, multiability encounter shifts depending on the social position of the characters. Blackness cannot and should not be marshaled as the radical space for white liberalism to mount its critique of ableism or racism. When Blackness and madness exist in the same space, multiple ways of reading should become possible, some of which eschew the possibility of radicality and others that might usher it in. The multiability interracial encounter also allows for Blackness and madness to be erased when improperly thought of as agentive. Because both discourses are often conceptualized as unspeakable or illegible, their presence can facilitate and consolidate the power that creates abject material conditions. Nirmala Erevelles makes this point most forcefully: “The analytic category of disability is useful in destabilizing static notions of identity, exploring intersectionality, and investigating embodiment, [yet] I argue that the effectiveness of much of feminist disability studies remains limited because of its overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality.”31 In other words, Blackness and disability have the potential to destabilize the rhetoric of normalcy that holds them as abject, but they are curtailed in doing so when mislabeled as agentive. In Erevelles’s exploration of the lived conditions of war, she argues that when disability (both physical and mental) intersects with Black and brown bodies in the developing world or in disenfranchised communities within the developed world, their confluence indicts unchecked multinational corporate greed because it reveals the politicized nature of impairment. With this in mind, there can be no ableist or racist narrative available that prioritizes individualized achievement (read: overcoming) or bemoans bad luck (read: pity) because the root cause implicates specific governments, companies, the people who run them, and those who are complicit in them. In addition, Erevelles resists ascribing agency to the disabled people of color she discusses, perhaps because, in this version of David and Goliath, Goliath is winning. More to the point, the material conditions for celebration and agency require material resources not available to everyone, and mere knowledge of one’s situation cannot be proxy for freedom from it, nor does awareness equal agency

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Capitalism › 2AC --- Turn

We create models of crip-collectives, anti-neoliberal spaces that reject eugenicist impulses their movements inevitably collapse into

Jess Whatcott 21 [Crip Collectivity Beyond Neoliberalism in Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), , -ekh-]

Octavia Butler’s novel Parable of the Sower exemplifies a cripistemological critique of neoliberal governance. Butler has a created a Black femme protagonist with a disabling impairment. Devalued under the terms of neoliberalism due to her impairment, racial status, and gender assignment, this protagonist gains specific knowledge about how to survive disabling precarity. Further, the character critiques the solutions for crisis proffered by neoliberal governance—namely, privatization and deregulation that facilitates medical industrial cure. In Parable, the Black feminist cripistemologist protagonist orchestrates the emergence of a collective that offers a powerful alternative to reliance on the eugenicist solutions of the neoliberal state. 

Parable follows Lauren Oya Olamina, a teenager living with her family in a walled-off community near Los Angeles in the year 2024. Outside of the neighborhood walls awaits starvation, rape, sexual exploitation, addiction, and murder. Olamina (as she was called by Butler) lives in a neighborhood that has banded together to survive by rigging up security systems, growing food, collecting water, schooling children, and worshipping together at a makeshift church. When Olamina’s family is murdered and the neighborhood burned down, she forges a new destiny. She creates a multiracial chosen family that she encourages to walk from Los Angeles to the far northern part of California, with the promise of building a more intentional community on more secluded land. 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Capitalism › 2AC --- Perm

Perm – Cripistemologies create spaces to critique neoliberal governance while ignoring the coercion of state politics the alt alone doesn’t resolve

Jess Whatcott 21 [Crip Collectivity Beyond Neoliberalism in Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), , -ekh-]

In the 2013 special issue of the Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert McRuer identify cripistemologies as forms of “prohibited knowledge” that emerge out of the experience of disability. Johnson and McRuer’s essay contributed to ushering in a critical form of disability studies, joining other work such as earlier issues of Lateral that featured Julie Avril Minich, Jina B. Kim, and Sami Schalk. Johnson and McRuer’s contribution to this conversation was to coin “cripistemology,” as a way of dismantling the expectation of knowledge from disability “experts,” and prioritizing instead the knowledges of those whose bodyminds cannot or will not be cured into normativity. Johnson and McRuer are insistent on taking a capacious view of what experiencing disability means, and consequently who is capable of producing knowledge through cripistemological methods; Johnson and McRuer include, importantly, the knowledge gained from being in relation with another who has been disabled. 

Decentering the disability expert explodes the conventional disability studies canon. In a section called “Sensational Crips,” Johnson and McRuer ground their theory in women of color feminisms and queer theory. What distinguishes expertise on disability (conventional disability studies) from their conceptualization of cripistemology (critical disability studies), is this specific genealogy that insists on reading disability in and through imbrications with gender, sexuality, class, and race. For example, Jina B. Kim imagines a “crip-of-color critique” that links together women of color feminist texts that explore themes of chronic illness (Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa), with recent disability scholarship that foregrounds race (Jasbir Puar, Therí Pickens), through a coalitional framework of queer of color critique (Cathy Cohen, Rodrick Ferguson). In the present study, I pick up on the radical political economy thread within critical disability studies that also marks it as a distinct formation. Just as feminist of color and queer of color theory is grounded in Marxist political economy, Johnson and McRuer’s conceptualization indicates that critical disability studies offer a unique critique of formations of capitalism, and specifically the disabling conditions of precarity under neoliberalism. 

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Crip Pess › 2AC --- Afrofuturism turn

Disability is key to understanding what makes black people non-human under white supremacy. Retheorizing Afrofuturism through the lens of the black disabled cyborg can tell the story of how blackness overcame antiblack violence, accounting for its multifaceted presence in the future.

Shahar 18 [Zaynab Shahar is a Ph.d student at Chicago Theological Seminary, specializing in comparative religion and gender/sexuality in Judaism and Islam. She holds an M.A in Religious Studies from CTS and a B.A in Jewish Studies from Hampshire College. Zaynab divides her time between organizing, academic scholarship, and writing. She has written about queer/trans poetics and black women’s poetics for Bitch Magazine and Autostraddle. “The Body to Come: Afrofuturist Posthumanism and Disability” published on September 4th, 2018 by Uncanny Magazine, accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Last year, my queer platonic partner gifted me the graphic novel version of Octavia Butler’s Kindred. For us, this gift served as the meeting place of our passions—a book that bridges her love of comics and graphic novels with my love of gut-wrenching, meaty speculative fiction. Upon receipt, I made an effort to read the novel before reading the graphic novel to see the translation of prose to imagery. PhD life took over though, and instead of finishing the novel first, I found myself curled up one evening carefully making my way through Damian Duffy and John Jennings’s graphic novel adaptation. Reading the graphic novel adaptation of Kindred was nothing short of difficult for me. Watching Dana’s evolution from subject to circumstance to active abolitionist reminded me of watching Cicely Tyson’s tour de force performance in “A Woman Called Moses” as a child. “A Woman Called Moses” is a biographical TV movie chronicling Harriet Tubman’s journey to founding the Underground Railroad. In both Kindred and “A Woman Called Moses,” the disablement of black women’s bodies is central to the plotline as Dana and Harriet endure acts of physical violence at the hands of their slave masters. Experiencing the disabling effects of bondage are the catalysts that propel both Harriet and Dana to seek liberation—for themselves and others. Through Dana and Harriet’s perspectives, both narratives reimagine life during antebellum slavery, particularly the possibilities and difficulties associated with liberation from bondage. Reimagining presents a language of fugitivity—freedom from antiblack violence and the spectre of white supremacy that looms over both plantations Dana and Moses are entrenched in. Yet for all the speculative possibilities these stories present, I realized a language about disability is largely absent from what it means to seek liberation from bondage, despite its centrality to both stories. By and large, Kindred and “A Woman Called Moses” are not discussed as slave narratives whose protagonists are explicitly named as disabled black women. Subsequently, the disablement Dana and Harriet endure is often belted under the frame of antiblack violence as an explanation as to why they sought freedom from bondage, but not what it means for disabled black women to be architects of fugitivity. When disability is named, it is usually done by black disabled folks who are trying to assert disability as integral to the terrain of black struggle. Such a reluctance to explicitly name Dana, Harriet, and other figures of slave narratives as disabled not only highlights the absence of a language around disability and afrofuturism, but the implications of such silences in terms of how the future is envisioned as a space of black liberation. So much of afrofuturism’s liberatory potency and radical imagination comes from the ability of black people to be the architects of their own futurity. Florence Oyeke says as much when she suggests that, “afrofuturism dares to suggest that not only will black people exist in the future, but that we will be makers and shapers of it, too.” One way black futures are crafted is through declaration: the act of naming the existence of black people in the future, the roadmap to which is charted in afrofuturist works. An example of this is Alisha B. Wormsley’s billboard declaration, “there are black people in the future.” This declaration was born out of frustration not only from noticing the absence of nonwhite faces in science fiction films and television shows, but also the rapid demise of the black American neighborhood. Both Oyeke and Wormsley demonstrate the power of naming within the afrofuturist imagination, its significance in shaping the terrain of possibility. Naming a future that’s free from different manifestations of antiblack violence means determining a different relationship with time. Temporal difference not only shapes the creation of narratives, but also the body-minds at the center of those narratives—what body-minds exist in the future and the stories told about their becoming. Representations of afrofuturist body-minds are very much a function of what people desire to make visible, absent, or marginal within the schema of narrative construction. It’s often when I encounter body-minds in afrofuturist works that I’m left wondering about the shaky existence of black disabled body-minds in afrofuturism and the general absence of language around disability. Too often I look at what constitutes a body-mind in the afrofuturist imaginary and am left wondering, “which black people are in the future?” Take, for example, the prevalence of the posthuman in afrofuturism. On the one hand, there is the posthuman cyborg, most famously Janelle Monae’s alter ego Cindi Mayweather. Monae’s android persona is an example of how cyborgs in afrofuturism aren’t automatically understood as disabled subjects the way they might be for crip futurists, crip cyborgs, or Donna Harroway’s cyborg manifesto. Monae doesn’t use any language around disability to describe her conception of androids in relation to Cindi Mayweather. Instead, Monae understands Cindi as the mediator between flesh and hand, “the oppressed and the oppressor.”¹ Similarly, Kristen Lillvis notes the dual symbolism of Cindi’s “Digital Auction Code” (DAC) featured on the Electric Lady album cover artwork. The DAC represents the branding of enslaved Africans at the same time it marks her liberation from bondage—Cindi is not for sale.² The lack of language naming Cindi as a disabled cyborg suggests that while it’s possible to interpret her as such, cyborg and disability are not inherently synonymous in afrofuturism. Similarly, there’s the afrofuturist posthuman with supernatural abilities. In Parable of the Sower, Laura Olemina’s hyperempathy distinguishes her from other characters. As Sami Schalk notes, hyperempathy is understood as a condition as a result of a birth defect.³ In an interview with Juan Williams on NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Butler explains that Laura’s mother was addicted to the small pills. As a result, Laura is born with hyperempathy.4 The question in interpretation becomes whether hyperempathy is understood as a disability and based off what criteria. Schaulk uses the example of Williams assertion that Laura isn’t disabled. In response to an ableist remark William’s makes, Butler asserts that she never said Laura wasn’t smart, to which Williams concludes that intelligence cancels out hyperempathy as a form of disability.5 When considering existing conceptions of afrofuturist body-minds, I wonder about the seduction of the posthuman. The trend of afrofuturist posthumanism points to a particular consciousness around the possibilities of black bodies in the future. Lillvis understands afrofuturist posthumanism as a form of consciousness that responds to the conceptual construction of blackness that occurs because of the Middle Passage.6 Thus, afrofuturist posthumanism provides a space to think about black identity independent of white supremacy.7 Building on this, I understand the prevalence of the non-disabled afrofuturist posthuman as a way of envisioning black bodies outside the spectacle of antiblack violence as opposed to “facilitating its objectifying qualities.”8 Afrofuturist posthumanism is a way black people have explored the effects of the Middle Passage on flesh, consciousness, and time.9 It names how the enduring legacy of antiblack violence is enshrine through the marking of black body-minds through enslavement. It names the process of how violence marks the black body-mind as non-human, and how non-human status justifies the continued subjugation. As Zoe Samudzi and William Anderson note, the marking of the flesh is about personhood as much as it is about the social status of the enslaved African.10 At the same time, afrofuturist posthumanism names how the afterlife of slavery perpetuates black suffering, it also provides a view of black futures free from white supremacy. As Ytasha Womack notes, afrofuturism flips conventional thinking about blackness on its head by rejecting stereotypes, dystopian fatalism, and hopelessness often associated with black characters. Instead, afrofuturism demonstrates that within the terrain of the speculative, fatalism is not synonymous with blackness.11 Black suffering is visible, but it is not an entranchant condition. If afrofuturism is about envisioning black futures free from violence and suffering, then to paraphrase Lillvis, new types of consciousness around the black body-mind must emerge.12 The black body-mind undergoes a conceptual shift—from enslaved to liberated subject. It is no longer a site of fatalism, but a site of possibility for the future. In this way, if blackness is ascribed the status of non-human under white supremacy, then the afrofuturist posthuman is an attempt to envision the black body-mind as one that is “fully human.” Afrofuturist posthumans are creative visions of the body-minds to come, the body-mind that is free from violence that is no longer the spectacle of suffering on the world’s stage. The body-mind to come is the afrofuturist posthuman that enjoys the humanity of the black human that doesn’t currently exist. But like any attempt at worldbuilding or futurism, omitting disability from schemas of afrofuturist posthumans has consequences. If alternative worldbuilding means imagining better futures, then the afrofuturist posthuman as predominately non-disabled demonstrates the complexity of mapping an emerging conception of humanity onto the black body. In linking disablement primarily with enslavement or past history, disability is symbolized as a vestige from an oppressive past to be done away with. Disability gets understood as part of what makes black people non-human under white supremacy. In making these links, it fails to interrogate why an emerging consciousness around afrofuturist posthumanism assumes that excluding disability inherently facilitates the transition from non-human to post-human in black futures. It fails to interrogate how a future without black disabled body-minds is symbolic of black liberation from white supremacy. Subsequently, it fails to ask why the black disabled body-mind isn’t already considered post-human. What are the underlying assumptions about the relationship between black liberation and posthumanism that would justify the exclusion of black disabled body-minds? What about black disabled body-minds provokes anxieties about the overarching status of “non-human” assigned to black people under white supremacy? In many respects, linking disability to past oppression is ironic given that afrofuturism attempts to move away from conceiving of black body-minds as sites of fatalism. For all its liberatory aspirations, afrofuturist posthumanism has yet to envision disability as part of an emergent consciousness of black body-minds conceptualized independent of white supremacy. It has yet to engage a vision of the future where the presence of black disabled folk signals to a vision of liberation from violence exists in multiple manifestations. The presence of black disability in afrofuturist posthumanism doesn’t have to connote to the sort of fatalism afrofuturism seeks to avoid. It can represent the liberation of the black body-mind, a radical shift in existence where one doesn’t have to be able-bodied to have a chance at surviving into the future. The black disabled body-mind can explore the abundant possibilities for the world to come, in our body-minds to come. The black cyborg, as an explicitly disabled cyborg, can signal the onset of a new world where advanced adaptive technology isn’t cost prohibitive and thus financially inaccessible. The black disabled cyborg can also signal to a world where adaptive technology is given to black disabled people as part of reparations for histories of violent, non-consensual medical experimentation. The presence of the black disabled cyborg can usher in a world where black disabled folks finally reap what white supremacy in medicine has sown at the expense of our ancestors’ pain and exploitation. Similarly, the inclusion of black disabled body-minds in the future can be represented in the physical restructuring of society. The predominantly black neighborhood Wormsley’s billboard highlights the disappearance of can be redesigned to fuse accessibility with the tenants of self-sufficiency, environmental, and economic sustainability that have become cornerstones of black liberation movements. Black neighborhoods can re-emerge, victorious in the fight against gentrification; replete with accessible and sustainably designed infrastructures and community resources. In essence, the presence of black disabled body-minds in afrofuturism can tell the story of how our people overcame antiblack violence, accounting for our multifaceted presence in the future, our thriving, as opposed to our extinction. “A Woman Called Moses” and Kindred are examples of this, the power of the black disabled imagination in carving out pathways to liberation. The disablement both Dana and Moses experience plays a role in their choice to seek freedom from antiblack violence. It not only gave them an idea of the world they didn’t want to live in, but the world they did want to live in. It plays a role in how they seek to change the present to affect the future, and how they sought to accomplish liberation. The existence of their narratives show how black disabled body-minds are powerful architects of black futures, one that can truly be understood through an evolving language of afrofuturism that accounts for disability it all its complexity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Pomo › 2AC --- Turn

Pomo theorizing of the body always paints illness and disability as the negative for the means of critique gender hierarchy, there lack of understanding of the disabled body in their theory reifies oppression.

Samuels 2002 (Ellen Samuels , NWSA Journal , Autumn, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies “Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of Disability (Autumn, 2002), pp. 58-76, Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press, , Transcribed via OCR)// RB

One reading of Butler would suggest that her sustained concern with the normative criteria that form legible, bounded, human bodies versus illegible, uncontrolled, inhuman bodies attempts to recuperate sexuality at the expense of disability. By exposing and explicating the cultural pro cesses at work, Butler aims to demonstrate the unfixed and constructed nature of sexuality/gender, thus destabilizing the hierarchy of normal. (hetero) vs. abnormal (homo) forms. However, in doing so she must necessarily acknowledge and discursively materialize a realm of abnormal bodies, only to rescue queer bodies from inside it. But what remains? Some clues are offered in Butler's discussion of Freudian hypochondria, in which the physically ill body emerges as the product of inappropriately abjected sexuality, forced into psychosomatic emergence through socio psychological prohibition (1993, 58-64). The ill body and the homosexual body emerge, in Butler's paradigm, as ontological opposites whose co existence is the product of oppressive social schemas. It naturally follows for Butler to oppose the "metaphorics of illness that pervade the description of sexuality," especially in the context of AIDS and the subsequent re-pathologization of homosexuality (64). To question Butler on this point is not to endorse the pathologization of gayness, or to imply that queer and ill/disabled bodies have any natural or presumed commonalties. It is, however, to point out that Butler's liberatory approach to sexuality takes as a matter of course that "metaphorics of illness" are always negative, and that somewhere, somehow, bodies do exist which deserve patholo gization based upon the very material, biological "realities" which she seeks to destabilize.

Mitchell and Snyder describe this problem as the "representational double bind of disability" in which, "while disabled populations are firmly entrenched on the outer margins of social power and cultural value, the disabled body also serves as the raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible" (1997, 6). Thus, "any attempt to distance disenfranchised communities from the fantasy of deformity further entrenches the disabled as the 'real' abnor mality from which all other nonnormative groups must be distanced" (6). This "double bind" also emerges in Thomson's critique, cited earlier, of feminist theories that attempt to de-pathologize the normative female body at the expense of the physically deviant or ill body. While Mitchell, Snyder, and Thomson focus their critique of postmodern body theory on the reliance of that theory upon the disabled body as a constitutive Other, Susan Wendell is concerned that postmodern theories focus too exclu sively upon the body-as-construction and thus elide the lived experience of "actual" bodies, particularly the "negative body," i.e., the body which is disabled, ill, or suffering (1996, 166-8).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Pomo › 2AC --- Perm do both

Perm do both - resolves the link using postmoderist body as a tool of disability studies, we know the creation of the body is not perfect but when combined with disability studies it goes beyond the incomplete theorizing of the body

Samuels 2002 (Ellen Samuels, NWSA Journal , Autumn, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies “Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of Disability (Autumn, 2002), pp. 58-76, Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press, , Transcribed via OCR) // RB

One reading of Butler would suggest that her sustained concern with the normative criteria that form legible, bounded, human bodies versus illegible, uncontrolled, inhuman bodies attempts to recuperate sexuality at the expense of disability. By exposing and explicating the cultural pro cesses at work, Butler aims to demonstrate the unfixed and constructed nature of sexuality/gender, thus destabilizing the hierarchy of normal. (hetero) vs. abnormal (homo) forms. However, in doing so she must necessarily acknowledge and discursively materialize a realm of abnormal bodies, only to rescue queer bodies from inside it. But what remains? Some clues are offered in Butler's discussion of Freudian hypochondria, in which the physically ill body emerges as the product of inappropriately abjected sexuality, forced into psychosomatic emergence through socio psychological prohibition (1993, 58-64). The ill body and the homosexual body emerge, in Butler's paradigm, as ontological opposites whose co existence is the product of oppressive social schemas. It naturally follows for Butler to oppose the "metaphorics of illness that pervade the description of sexuality," especially in the context of AIDS and the subsequent re-pathologization of homosexuality (64). To question Butler on this point is not to endorse the pathologization of gayness, or to imply that queer and ill/disabled bodies have any natural or presumed commonalties. It is, however, to point out that Butler's liberatory approach to sexuality takes as a matter of course that "metaphorics of illness" are always negative, and that somewhere, somehow, bodies do exist which deserve patholo gization based upon the very material, biological "realities" which she seeks to destabilize.

Mitchell and Snyder describe this problem as the "representational double bind of disability" in which, "while disabled populations are firmly entrenched on the outer margins of social power and cultural value, the disabled body also serves as the raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible" (1997, 6). Thus, "any attempt to distance disenfranchised communities from the fantasy of deformity further entrenches the disabled as the 'real' abnor mality from which all other nonnormative groups must be distanced" (6). This "double bind" also emerges in Thomson's critique, cited earlier, of feminist theories that attempt to de-pathologize the normative female body at the expense of the physically deviant or ill body. While Mitchell, Snyder, and Thomson focus their critique of postmodern body theory on the reliance of that theory upon the disabled body as a constitutive Other, Susan Wendell is concerned that postmodern theories focus too exclu sively upon the body-as-construction and thus elide the lived experience of "actual" bodies, particularly the "negative body," i.e., the body which is disabled, ill, or suffering (1996, 166-8).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › Queerness › 2AC --- Link Turn

The terms “queer” and “crip” are inherently connected, due to their shared history of change and their past of being used for harm. Reclaiming the words can help move forward with deconstructing the systems of discrimination that have oppressed groups of people for centuries.

Sandahl 03 (Carrie Sandahl an associate professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “QUEERING THE CRIP OR CRIPPING THE QUEER? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance” pg 49-50 04/10/03)

The power of these performances lies in their ability to assert pride while drawing the audience’s attention to the political and social issues of being crip and queer. Along with asserting pride, Clare maintains, comes the responsibility of “bearing witness”: Both witness and pride strengthen identity, foster resistance, cultivate subversion. . . . Yet we also need to remember that witness and pride are not the same. Witness pairs grief and rage with remembrance. Pride pairs joy with a determination to be visible. Witness demands primary adherence to and respect for history. Pride uses history as one of its many tools. Sometimes witness and pride work in concert, other times not. We cannot afford to confuse, merge, blur the two.57 We must not forget that even as we appropriate the terms queer and cripple, they retain the taint of their power to injure. This taint provides the fuel for a rearticulation.58 As an act of witnessing, solo performance reminds audiences of the crucial social and political work that needs to be done. Queer crips also challenge audiences by raising questions about intragroup dynamics as well as the alliances between queers and cripples. Galloway points out that everyday disability performances are crafted not only for the nondisabled but also for insiders: QUEER AND CRIP IDENTITIES IN SOLO AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCE 49 At the end of the summer was award night [at the cripple camp]. . . . You had this steady stream of kids going up to the stage to get their awards. But I was the only kid who was mobile. . . . these were kids without legs, kids with artificial legs, kids on crutches, kids in braces, kids in wheelchairs, in wheeled beds, kids drawn there by pulleys. So when it came time for me to accept my award, I limped all the way up to the stage. As I limped back—on the other leg—I was thinking, even with all the paraphernalia making my handicaps visible—among those kids I’d just never be handicapped enough.59 With this story Galloway uses humor to critique the crip community’s often divisive, painful hierarchy of disability identities. Neither crip culture nor queer culture offers utopian spaces free from the need to perform stigma management.