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2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails

a. Jammer arrays.

Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries

Stationary Jammer Arrays A jammer array is a collection of jammers which are used to collectively deny radar operations in an area. Taking advantage of the huge disparity in the 𝐽𝑆𝑅, jammers can reach signal-equivalence at very modest powers and gains. If attempting to jam multiple satellites at once, jammers could be directed to cover the entire upward facing 2𝜋 steradian. More complicated arrays could use directed apertures, such as parabolic dish reflectors, to directly illuminate overflying satellites. These would be more complex and costly, but would avoid inadvertently jamming other systems. A jammer array could be conceived of on two scales, jamming a local area and overcoming array adaptation. The more modest approach is to jam radar operations in a local area. This could be accomplished by distributing a number of low-power jammers in an area where the hider wishes to deny the seeker the ability to observe.20 One possibility would be to mount these jammers on shelters. If the shelter spacing 𝑠 is similar to or less than the beam swath width, then this would prevent the seeker from observing those shelters, or the avenues between them. The jammers could be run continuously, or toggled. If run continuously, the area spanned by the local jammer array would be a permanent gap in coverage. In effect, this would create a single distributed shelter where the TEL could operate without risk of being detected, so long as the jammers were operating. If toggled, the jammers could be turned on when a TEL deployed to the local area, kept on for long enough for the TEL to be able to move anywhere within the local jammer array area.21 The jammers could then be toggled off and the seeker would not know which of the shelters covered by the jammer array housed the TEL. The TEL could remain in that shelter throughout its patrol lifetime without needing to move. This would change the dynamics of how the seeker’s uncertainty would accrue over time. Rather than organically accruing over time, the seeker’s uncertainty would grow linearly with time proportional to TEL velocity from when the jammer array was activated until the array was deactivated or the boundary of the jammer array was reached. The hider would have a strong incentive not to move after this point (so as not to risk detection) so the uncertainty would not necessarily grow thereafter. Utilizing a local jammer array, the hider has the ability to generate positional uncertainty effectively on demand, limited only by the costs of emplacing the jammers, and the provocativeness of utilizing them (discussed below). One such array would be needed for each TEL patrol to be protected.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails

Tracking weapons is impossible. Countermeasures, weather, and coverage gaps.

TEL = transporter-erector launcher vehicles

Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries

Based on this analysis, I offer some assessments and recommendations surrounding the competition between TELs and remote-sensing. Tracking TELs requires the development of critical technologies. There are currently gaps where extant remotesensing systems are not capable of tracking TELs, namely at night and during periods of bad weather. If a state wishes to develop the capability to track TELs, they should focus their efforts on technologies which address those gaps. Similarly, when evaluating emerging remote-sensing technologies, the focus of analysis should be on the technology’s ability to close those gaps. Analysis of critical technologies should focus on countermeasures. When evaluating the potential effects of an emerging technology, analysis should focus not only on the effectiveness of that technology, but also the existence, effectiveness, and availability of the countermeasures. Broad endeavors such as tracking are only as strong as their weakest link. Critical technologies are a naturally attractive target for countermeasures as they present a single point of failure. SBR is not a promising means of tracking TELs. While SBR has the elements of a critical technology, and the ability to operate under conditions where other deployed modalities do not have tracking capability, SBR is vulnerable to simple countermeasures. While some countermeasures, such as RCSR with RAM, would require significant research and development effort, effective countermeasures such as decoys are technologically simple and should be deployable at scale for relatively low cost. Some countermeasures, such as jammers and ASAT weapons, are already in deployment as they serve other purposes, so SBR, if pursued, would be deployed into a hostile environment. Electronic warfare and ASAT weapons also present the risk of escalation through entanglement, so states should expect a decrease in their security if they choose to deploy an SBR system with capability to track (permissive) TELs. Modest SBR capability should not undermine strategic stability. One key finding of this work is that a seeker’s uncertainty in a TELs position grows during gaps in coverage of sufficient length. For the case of tracking TELs, if shelters are kilometers apart, regular gaps of length on the order of a few to ten minutes are sufficient to prevent tracking. Concern has been raised in the literature that the relatively modest collection of fewer than two dozen SBR satellites deployed by countries around the world would be sufficient to undermine the survivability of TELs [9]. Even if all deployed SBR satellites were utilized as a cohesive constellation (it is unclear if this is possible), there would be an average gap of more than twenty minutes between overflights [9].7 The U.S. collection of six SBR satellites would present more than 90 minute gaps between overflights. These gaps are sufficiently large that a motivated hider could easily exploit them. The deployment of modest numbers of SBR satellites (e.g. twenty to thirty) should not undermine TEL survivability nor provoke escalatory countermeasures on the grounds of TEL survivability. Fears that remote-sensing will inevitably undermine TEL survivability and damage strategic stability are overblown. Tracking with remote-sensing is potentially more challenging than is widely understood. In a game of hide-and-seek, the seeker does not contend with what that hider does, but what they could do. The hider does not need to be passive in the competition, as they can actively interfere with remote-sensing through countermeasures. The hider also has the advantage of being able to be reactive, they do not need to deploy countermeasures until after the seeker has committed to developing a particular remote-sensing system. That said, history has shown that countermeasures can sometimes be hard to leverage, and survivability can be undermined. Degradation of survivability is not inevitable, however. Which way the balance will tip depends on the specific technologies in question, and in the case of SBR, the advantage lays with the hider.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Lieber and Press

Counterforce fails – Lieber and Press’s analysis is flawed

Craig and Amadae 21— (Campbell, [Professor of International Relations], S.M. [S. M. Amadae is a University Lecturer of Politics in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki, and a 2020 Berggruen Fellow at the Center for the Advanced Study of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University. She is also affiliated with Science and Technology Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge. Amadae’s books include Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy (Cambridge University Press 2016); and Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (University of Chicago Press 2003).], Journal of Strategic Studies, 06-07-2021, Available Online at https://philpapers.org/archive/CRATMO-17.pdf, mysoor)

There are two ways to think of the nuclear revolution. One of them is the simple destructiveness of a general war fought with ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons. No one has put this better than Daniel Deudney: In an age when the term “revolution” is used indiscriminately, few have hesitated to use such language with full seriousness to describe the impact of nuclear weapons upon the state-centered world security order. This sense of the revolutionary stems from certain awesome facts that are beyond controversy: nuclear science and technology have given us the capability to wreak violence at an unprecedented scale and speed. To find historical analogies for a full-scale nuclear war one must look to great cataclysms like the Fall of Rome, the Mongol Invasions, the Black Plague, the European Invasion of the Americas, and the world wars and imagine several of them occurring at once and greatly compressed in time, perhaps into a single afternoon.1 A general nuclear war, fought in the all-out manner of other major wars like World War Two, would not only wreak this kind of destruction in days, if not hours; it could also eradicate human civilisation forever and possibly even kill every human being and most other forms of life on the planet. It hard to see how anyone could deny that this constitutes a revolution, and the authors of the book under review here, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, do not try to do that. It is the second way of thinking about the nuclear revolution that comprises the real debate, and this is how it has shaped the practice of international politics. Earlier theorists, most notably Robert Jervis, argued that the prospect of nuclear omnicide would discourage the world’s states, and especially those in possession of nuclear arsenals, from competing with one another intensively. They would avoid serious security competition and war: international politics at the greatpower level would settle into a condition of stability and peace. This claim has led many scholars interested in this second way of thinking to question how ‘revolutionary’ the nuclear revolution actually has been. During the late Cold War, as Brendan Rittenhouse Green has clearly demonstrated in a recent book, the United States abandoned the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and sought nuclear superiority over the USSR, apparently a plain disconfirmation of Jervis’s theory.2 And in the post-Cold War era, as the present authors under review argue, the U.S. is pursuing new counterforce and defence systems with the evident aim of achieving war-winning capability against nuclear rivals, such as Russia and China. If the nuclear revolution has so radically transformed international politics, these scholars insist, why have nuclear powers, and especially the United States, continued to engage in intense security competition with their rivals and sought to deploy war-winning nuclear arsenals? It is an exceedingly important question. In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Lieber and Press develop a careful answer. Operating from the structural realist assumption that states face a world of constant danger and security competition with their major rivals, they make two overarching claims. The first is that the development of nuclear missiles and thermonuclear bombs during the Cold War did not completely transform international politics. To be sure, nuclear weapons make deterrence far easier to achieve and the prospect of general war far more grim, but the world has not changed as radically as proponents of the nuclear revolution claim. The second, as we have already noted, is that in the post-Cold War era new military technologies may soon enable states, namely the US, to wage nuclear war without initiating a global apocalypse, either by using very small nuclear weapons in a minor war, or by launching a counterforce attack against a larger rival that would eliminate its ability to retaliate. We should note at the outset that we do not intend to dispute the book’s technical claims that the US may be on the verge of developing such war-winning military capabilities, and therefore will not be engaging with some of the book (parts of chapters 3–4) in any detail. For the purposes of our argument, we concede this point. Rather, we will deal with the book’s two larger, if sometimes implicit, claims: that the nuclear revolution has not transformed international politics; and that for the first time, the United States can and should reject nuclear stalemate and seek the ability to wage a winning nuclear war. (1) The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution? In the first part of their book, Lieber and Press make several points that seek to show that international politics under the spectre of nuclear war is not all that different from pre-nuclear eras. We have chosen three that are clearly contestable, and will deal with each in turn. The first point deals with problem of annihilation. As everyone agrees, a nuclear war threatens not simply to deliver defeat to an attacked nation but to eradicate it completely. While this might be debatable with respect to continental-size nations like the US, Russia, or Canada, it is not when it comes to compact countries like Japan, Great Britain, or the Czech Republic. The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told President Eisenhower at the height of the Berlin Ultimatum crisis in 1959 that ‘eight bombs’ would put an end to the United Kingdom, and it is likely that in the event of a general war the Soviet Union would have targeted Britain with many times that number. Such an attack would have killed just about everyone in that country and destroyed its political and economic institutions beyond repair. Is this not a revolutionary development? Lieber and Press maintain that is not: nations at war have been annihilated before. It was a common practice in the classical world, most notoriously at Melos and Carthage; during the Second World War the allies bombed Germany and Japan into submission, and the Soviet Union ravaged its sector of Germany and other states during the war’s last days. ‘Yet the possibility of suffering such serious losses,’ Lieber and Press state, ‘did not deter the combatants from going to war’ (p. 13). This is not a convincing argument. On one hand, the sacking of city-states of Carthage and Melos was a political decision, made by leaders intent on punishing their adversaries; other defeated states during the Greek and Roman empires suffered far less, and had the leaders of these two city-states known for sure what was coming they might have made different decisions. On the other, while it is true that (west) Germany and Japan were viciously attacked by their enemies during World War Two, it is equally true that they were hardly annihilated and indeed prospering not long after 1945. That would not have been the case with Great Britain after a general nuclear attack. There is a larger point. The difference between annihilation in the pre-nuclear era and nuclear annihilation today is that the latter is a function of the weaponry itself. Rome’s brutalisation of Carthage was not about the weaponry the Romans deployed but their determination to eradicate a recalcitrant enemy. The situation could not be more different in a putative nuclear war. Had the United States and the Soviet Union gone to a general nuclear war, they would have destroyed not simply one another but allied states, like Poland or Italy, without necessarily having any interest whatsoever in punishing these, or indeed any nation’s, populations. It would be nothing other than an unavoidable consequence of a large-scale nuclear war. This is a revolutionary development that distinguishes the nuclear era from previous ones. A second point is one often used by nuclear revolution sceptics, from many different sides of the debate: that nuclear states have been attacked before. If Egypt and Syria were so afraid of nuclear retaliation, why did they attack Israel? Argentina sought to take the Falkland Islands from Great Britain, another nuclear power. In late 1950, China entered the Korean War: its main adversary was the United States. This demonstrates, Lieber and Press maintain, that the fear of nuclear attack is not as powerful as revolution advocates claim. This argument, made too often, simply does not speak to the relevant claim made by nuclear revolution advocates: that nuclear powers will not wage major war upon one another, for fear of unleashing a conflagration that would kill not only themselves but trigger the kind of apocalypse described by Deudney. Since the beginning of modern international history, large powers have repeatedly attacked others with the aim of defeating and conquering them. This happened twice in the space of 30 years during the early twentieth century, but has not happened, or even come very close to happening, since then. If the fear of nuclear war explains this, as Lieber and Press seem to acknowledge (p. 18), it also surely constitutes a revolutionary development in international politics. The final point is perhaps the most important one. This is the assertion that the pursuit of arms-racing and nuclear superiority by major powers, though again primarily the United States, demonstrates in itself the fallacy of the nuclear revolution. Lieber and Press make their case clearly: We are seventy-five years into the nuclear era, and nuclear-armed states are still competing as if they lived in a pre-nuclear world. Could it really be that leaders are still misperceiving the core strategic factors that allegedly define the nuclear age (p. 5, italics in original)? This argument, echoing that made by Green and others, assumes that when states make important decisions, like building lots of nuclear weapons, and they do so consistently over years, it must be rational and strategic. There are two crucial problems with this assertion. On one hand, in referring to ‘nucleararmed states’ it does not distinguish between military planners and political decision-makers. The U.S. military developed plans to win nuclear war throughout the Cold War. Yet when the possibility of actual war loomed, for example during the Berlin and Cuban crises, the United States made major concessions to the USSR in order to avoid war, despite its massive nuclear superiority at that time. After Cuba, American and Soviet leaders steered clear of direct showdowns for the rest of the Cold War. They did so because they lived in a nuclear world.3 If ‘states’ mean military bureaucracies, and not their political leaders, then perhaps Lieber and Press’s claim may be true. But that is an odd way to define a state. On the other hand, the very claim that any policy adhered to over decades must be strategic is also debatable. The United States refused to recognise communist China for thirty years, and there was no shortage of supporters of this policy who defended it upon strategic grounds. Then it abandoned that policy, and the isolation of China is now seen by most historians as a mistake driven primarily by domestic politics. For roughly twenty years, the US regarded the survival of South Vietnam as a core national security interest, and it fought a ground war for a decade to pursue this goal. American leaders repeatedly argued throughout this period that staying in Vietnam was strategically rational and important. Then the US abandoned South Vietnam, and the war is widely seen today as an irrational disaster. These examples, and others that could be mentioned,4 show that it is entirely plausible that a state might pursue a particular policy, even for a long time, for reasons that turn out to be not strategic and rational. As Dwight D. Eisenhower suggested sixty years ago, this is particularly likely to occur when the policy relates to basic issues of national security, and when it at the same time provides employment, wealth, and influence to powerful leaders and constituencies.5 We are not claiming here that the US decision to engage in nuclear security competition during the late Cold War or in the contemporary era must be attributed to the military-industrial complex, and cannot have been driven by genuine strategic reasons. This is a very difficult argument to prove. Rather, we contend that the Lieber and Press claim that consistent behaviour over the years demonstrates, eo ipso, strategic rationality is clearly disproven by many counter-examples and appears to rule out by assertion other explanations. It runs the risk of tautology. The Defensive Realist Stability, and Offensive Realist Instability, of MAD On their way to demonstrating the myth of nuclear revolution, Lieber and Press investigate ‘how much is enough’ to preserve stalemate among nucleararmed states. This they present as a technical question with multiple parts. How many weapons with what specifications must survive a first strike in order to guarantee devastating retaliation? How survivable are the nation’s secondstrike weapons? What degree of survivability is sufficient to deter others’ aggression? The authors treat this question of how the quantity and quality of nuclear fire power affects strategic stability as a technical question with two extremes: ‘even small, potentially vulnerable arsenals are enough,’ or ‘nuclear-armed countries [must] build truly survivable arsenals’ grounding ‘assured retaliation’ (32). They deviate from earlier studies by analysing the impact of Soviet arms build up on US strategy, rather than vice versa. Furthermore, they assess the efficacy of deterrence under conditions of peace and war. They identify four US theories of deterrence: existential deterrence, minimum deterrence, assured retaliation, and assured destruction. They then provide a chronology of the development of US strategic postures: 1945–1949, US nuclear monopoly; 1950–1955, Soviet existential deterrent; 1956–1960, Soviet minimum deterrent; 1962–1964, Soviet assured retaliation; 1965–1990, mutual assured destruction. Lieber and Press argue that despite appearances to the contrary, including the fallacious ‘Missile Gap’ alarmism of the late 1950s, that US defence analysts ‘had accurate intelligence assessments of existing Soviet strategic forces’ (49). The implication here is that it is strictly a technical question of ‘how much is enough.’ It is not a question of policy choice, for example between whether defensive realism (Robert Jervis) or offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) provides a more efficacious security posture. Lieber and Press assume that US strategic intelligence is complete, and that defence officials’ response to that intelligence is fully rational. They hold that assured retaliation and assured destruction will both result in competitive security politics. In the first case nations vie to achieve assured retaliatory capability, and to deny it to others. In the second case, security competition is intense because states will seek damage limitation capabilities as well as greater offensive capability. Lieber and Press argue that during the early Cold War, the US planned an overwhelming preemptive strike on the Soviet Union were they to threaten attack (57–58). With increasing nuclear parity between the two countries, the US had to settle for assured retaliation in the 1960s. The US realized threats of initiating general nuclear war were incredible because they were suicidal. Therefore the US explored limited nuclear options to be integrated into a flexible response and graduated war plan (53). Even in the 1960s, US leaders upheld the goal of winning a war against the Soviets through a ‘rapid nuclear disarming strike’ (63). Counterforce weapons were developed to challenge the Soviets’ assured retaliatory power. Satisfied that the US strategic response to the Soviets throughout the Cold War demonstrates the instability of mutual deterrence via assured retaliation or destruction, the authors move on to argue that security competition in this dynamic, and unstable, equilibrium can be reversed. As a step to making this argument they conclude there were defence pessimists who endorse a strategic stance consistent with offensive realism. These pessimists take two actions which Lieber and Press deem rational: they endorse limited nuclear options to introduce into conventional conflict; and they back this flexible response approach with ‘substantial nuclear capabilities’ to achieve escalation dominance (96, 104). Here they accurately discuss the US persistent rejection of mutual assured destruction in favor of striving to achieve strategic dominance. Yet they refer to the Cold War years 1965–1990 as characterized by MAD (48). This is a curious, and telling, assertion. The authors have argued that despite the existential condition of mutual assured destruction, US defence pessimists, who controlled nuclear policy by 1980, in fact treated nuclear war as winnable and developed weapons capability and a strategic posture to support their aim. Lieber and Press position themselves as neutral social scientists analysing the US response to USSR nuclear weapons development to conclude that the nuclear revolution is a myth. Intense security competition throughout the Cold War, they argue, proves nuclear weapons do not offer nations the promise of stable security, even given their acquisition of a secure second-strike capability. Their evidence is the US response to Soviet military innovations. Although they acknowledge the United States turn to flexible response and limited nuclear options, they fail to recognize or discuss the fifth nuclear strategy of preparing to fight and win a nuclear war (p. 140, fn 4). Thus they fail to recount the intense nuclear security debate within the US between proponents of assured retaliation, and advocates of the war fighting school advocated by Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Colin Gray, and James R. Schlesinger during the last three decades of the Cold War. Perceptions about the precarity of MAD supported concrete bureaucratic steps to shift the US strategic posture away from accepting the stalemate imposed by assured destruction. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defence under Richard Nixon, was a chief architect of the war fighting stance. He played a fundamental role in shifting Jimmy Carter’s erstwhile support of the MAD doctrine to that of the offensive countervailing posture with the Commander in Chief’s signature on Presidential Directive 59 in 1980. This historical evidence, which Lieber and Press interestingly do not mention, complicates their straightforward account that intense security competition underneath mutual retaliatory capability refutes the concept of nuclear revolution. This is not only because the US decision to pursue a countervailing strategy in the 1970s belies their claim that the period 1965–90 was defined by mutual assured destruction. Even more important is the fact that this new strategy was not advocated as a response to new Soviet technological and military capabilities, but rather was a policy choice based upon political factors unrelated to the nuclear balance. This undermines the authors’ claim that the United States declined to overturn MAD during the Cold War because of technological limitations and the size of the Soviet arsenal.6 In the end, their assessment of US nuclear policy during the Cold War is unclear. Did the two Cold War superpowers engage in an intense security competition during its last three decades under a condition of MAD, as they state in the book and also in their famous 2006 article, ‘The End of MAD?’7 Or did the United States decide to pursue a war-winning strategy in the late 1970s, which by definition entailed a rejection of MAD and the associated logic of the nuclear revolution? And if the latter answer is correct, why do they not discuss it at all in the book? The question is not just an academic one. The United States found itself after the end of the Cold War in a position of tremendous preponderance, unprecedented in the history of modern international relations. Its erstwhile rival, Russia, was in free fall after the USSR’s collapse, and China remained a modest military power. Other powerful states around the world were allied with the US. But America could not translate its preponderance into primacy, because both Russia and China retained their second-strike nuclear arsenals, making it too dangerous not only to invade either state but even to seriously coerce them. The obvious way to overcome this problem, of course, is to develop a warwinning nuclear policy for the post-Cold War world. And as Lieber and Press show better than anyone else, the United States has gravitated toward this objective over the past two decades with its acquisition of advanced new weaponry, defence systems, and sensory and other counterforce technologies. Supporters and critics of MAD alike all acknowledge that it only holds if states possess invulnerable second-strike arsenals. If the United States becomes able to eliminate that condition with technology, then MAD does come to an end, as the two authors precisely argued in 2006. The problem here, even more so than in the late 1970s, is that such a policy cannot in any way be characterised as defensive. Neither China nor Russia possess or are seeking to possess a nuclear arsenal that could prevail over the United States, so by pursuing a war-winning strategy the US would be clearly announcing its interest in global primacy. This would be a policy choice, not a response to Russian or Chinese capabilities. Indeed, and following Lieber and Press’s own reasoning, China’s ongoing commitment to a basic nuclear deterrent and Russian political and economic weakness means that the conditions could not be more suitable for the re-establishment of Schelling’s and Jervis’s defensive, and mutually stable, condition of MAD. If the United States rejects that, it will be because it chose to do so, not because it had no alternative. An implausible, almost surreal, disinclination to acknowledge that the US is facing a strategic choice about what to do about its nuclear policy, and that what it decides to do will be far more important than anything else in affecting the policies of other nations, pervades much of the book. In their conclusion Lieber and Press state that a ‘policy implication’ of their analysis is that, ‘in some cases,’ countries will work hard to create truly survivable retaliatory forces, while their rivals will strive to hone counterforce capabilities to keep those retaliatory forces vulnerable. For example, we expect that China will continue to add significant nuclear capabilities (such as new mobile missiles) to its arsenal, as well as bolster its command-and-control capabilities—all part of a traditional path to developing a secure, survivable second-strike force. In turn, the United States will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenal and develop offensive (e.g., long-range precision conventional strike systems) and defensive (e.g. missile defence) means to counter Chinese retaliatory capabilities.8 For example? IR scholarship has long been plagued by prescription masquerading as description, but this passage takes the cake. The United States is a preponderant unipole which at present spends more on its military than the next ten or so nations combined. It is the only state on earth which now, or in the foreseeable future, could possibly ‘hone counterforce capabilities’ in order to make other large states’ ‘retaliatory forces vulnerable’, as everyone even vaguely familiar with nuclear politics today knows. The debate in Washington about what nuclear posture the US should, not ‘will,’ adopt, a debate in which Lieber and Press themselves have long been active participants, is how determinedly the US should pursue war-winning capabilities over other large nuclear states.9 No other nation is having this debate or is even capable of doing so. Moreover, everyone knows that China’s future nuclear decisions will be made entirely in response to what the United States does, because if the US develops the capability to ‘counter’ Chinese retaliatory forces, China will become vulnerable to US predation, and it will surely take the necessary steps to deal with this threat that any Realist student of international relations would expect.10 Committing fully to a comprehensive war-winning strategy therefore will not only cost the US untold billions of dollars in new military spending over the next years and decades; it is also likely to trigger an arms race and intense security competition with China that the latter state has signalled over decades it would prefer to avoid. Following this dangerous course of action is a policy choice the United States does not have to make, particularly given the fiscal demands created by the Covid-19 pandemic and the massive domestic programmes the new Biden administration has embarked upon. This is precisely why the question is so heavily debated in Washington. Lieber and Press have long made a powerful case that new US technological capabilities threaten to overturn MAD. However, their prediction of a policy outcome for which they have long advocated damages the logical consistency of their argument.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Dual Use

China’s missile modernization means counterforce fails

Ian Bowers ’22, Associate Professor at the Centre for Joint Operations, Royal Danish Defence College. “Counterforce Dilemmas and the Risk of Nuclear War in East Asia”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament: Volume 5, 2022, pp. 6-23 // gbs

China’s emphasis on rapid and significant improvements in its missile capabilities is driven by the strategic desire to hold at risk US and allied naval forces throughout North and Southeast Asia. China’s so-called anti-access/area-denial strategy seeks to deny the United States and its allies the secure use of the sea and reduce their operating capacity on land (Congressional Research Service 2022, 4). Conceptually, this would allow China to rapidly achieve military objectives while holding off immediate efforts to counter them. The range of these missile systems would include the East and South China Seas (the first Island chain) and arguably extend into the Western Pacific in the open seas between Japan and Guam. To enact such a strategy, China must have the ability to overwhelm missile defenses and still disrupt significant facilities such as airfields, C4 ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers [C4] Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [ISR]) nodes, ports, and ships at sea. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces’ (PLARF) conventional missile capabilities, therefore, provide Beijing with either a powerful tool to shape the operational picture should war break out or a potent first-strike capability aimed at degrading the enemy’s capabilities before they can respond. China’s current phase of modernization seems to have made substantial inroads into undermining traditional areas of US military strength. Numerous reports now suggest that China has attained the capability to overwhelm US naval platforms and facilities in Japan and the ROK, potentially destroying capabilities before they are deployed (Shugart and Gonzalez 2017; Townshend, Thomas-Noone, and Steward 2019). Targeting moving naval vessels is a harder proposition. However, China now possesses increasing numbers of advanced sensors capable of covering multiple domains, including over-the-horizon radar and surveillance satellites that, when networked with other capabilities and effective data processing and analytics, provide near-constant coverage of strategically important areas such as the East and South China Seas and the Western Pacific (Bowers and Kirchberger 2021, 629). China’s military modernization over the preceding 20 years has resulted in rapid developments in its missile and rocket capabilities. China reportedly possesses a potent array of intercontinental, intermediate, medium, and short-range ballistic missiles alongside a large inventory of air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles. One analysis suggests that these numbers have risen significantly over the past fifteen years (US Department of Defense 2019a, 47). Numerical growth is only one element of China’s missile modernization. Recently introduced capabilities include multiple and maneuverable terminal stages/warheads, deep penetrating warheads, and increased accuracy (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). China’s inventory of SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) include the DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, and DF-16 family of missiles, with ranges between 250 and 1000 km. These missiles are capable of carrying multiple types of warheads, and incremental developments indicate a focus on increased accuracy (later models of the DF-11 and −15 may have a circular error probability of 50 m), maneuverability, and stealth (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). The medium-range DF-21 series has also seen substantial development since its introduction in 1991. The DF-21C introduced in 2006 reportedly possesses greater accuracy and greater range than the original missile. The 1500-km range DF-21D is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has attained some notoriety in US defense and media circles, gaining the moniker “carrier killer” due to its suspected mission of targeting US aircraft carriers operating in waters proximate to China (Missile Defense Project 2016). Similarly, the DF26, which entered service in 2015, has a range of 3000– 4000 km. It is the first conventional Chinese missile to be able to target Guam and, if deployed at Chinese facilities in the South China Sea, US facilities in Australia (Gomez 2017). It has been reported that in the summer of 2020 China successfully tested the DF-21D and the ASBM variant DF-26B against a moving target in the South China Sea (Kaziani 2020). Importantly, the DF-26 is capable of both nuclear and conventional capabilities; some analysis suggests that DF-26 units in the field have both warheads available to them (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). Exactly why China would do this is impossible to fully explain. One possible reason is to hide the number of nuclear missiles that China has, in a form of shell game. A second is protection: To reduce the risk of US attack, a dual capability puts doubt in the minds of opposition tactical planners about the nature of the target and the potential of uncontrolled escalation from conventional to nuclear war (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). This would make a conventionally armed DF-26 more survivable in any conventional war-fighting scenario as targeting it would be fraught with potential risk.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – General

Tech has changed counterforce calculations – nuclear capability alone is insufficient

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 21 – Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester, Honorary Fellow at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, member of the Cyber-Nuclear Threats Task Force run by the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative; Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, tanton Junior Faculty Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University; “Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age;” February 2021, European Journal of International Security, 6(3), 257-277. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.2

We stand on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age. If this new era comes to pass, the main characteristics of the global nuclear order are likely to see considerable challenge.1 This shift is being driven by the development of a suite of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW)2 and enabling technologies, in conjunction with a fundamental political shift relating to perceptions of nuclear threats and debates about how they should be addressed. Together, these trends fundamentally challenge the canon of academic and policy thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear stability, and mean that decision-makers must contemplate new risks of inadvertent escalation, miscalculation, and nuclear use, and the possibility of counterforce missions unencumbered by the political and moral restraints associated with the nuclear taboo.3 Essentially, we are set to move from a global nuclear order based on the assumption that developments in nuclear weapons are the primary driver of stability and instability, to one in which non-nuclear capabilities play an equally, if not more important role. Thus, the defining feature of the Third Nuclear Age will be that nuclear geopolitics, risks, crises, deployments, postures, balances, arms control, and non-proliferation will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons.

We argue that a Third Nuclear Age will be a product of that which has preceded it: Second Nuclear Age thinking about the benefits of deploying SNNW combined with the return of the kind of major power competition associated with the First Nuclear Age, is likely to make the Third Nuclear Age a highly dangerous one. While we may only be on the cusp of this transition it could hardly be timelier to begin thinking about the impact of these dynamics on the management of the global nuclear order. This is important given that, as we argue further below, there is nothing preordained or irreversible about the onset of a Third Nuclear Age. This new era will be one of our own making.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – General

Deeply buried facilities, mobile strategic systems, improved defenses, and increased proliferation means counterforce is a fantasy

Gallagher and Cevallos 21 [Mark, [School of Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology WPAFB OH], Michael [School of Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology WPAFB OH] “What Threat Do China’s New Missile Silos Pose to the US?“, Journal of Military Studies, 08-10-2021, Available Online at , mysoor)

Abstract: A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent’s nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when harden- ing and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make execut- ing a counterforce strategy against an adversary’s nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multi- ple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary’s nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider strik- ing with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country’s remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from respond- ing. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be con- trolled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes. 1 Introduction Nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation if attacked (Lieber and Press 2017). Mazarr (1991) states ‘one of the crucial aspects of nuclear deterrence is a strategy for targeting a retaliation to achieve the greatest deterrent effect.’ Gray (2007) concludes ‘there has to be a nuclear strategy’ indicating the intended response to a nuclear strike to deter an adversary. The goal of counterforce attacks is to disarm the adversary’s nuclear forces. The United States and the Soviet Union transitioned from targeting cities to a coun- terforce strategy during the Cold War as weapon delivery accuracy improved and weapon yields increased. Argu- ments for a counterforce strategy include limiting nuclear retaliation by destroying an adversary’s offensive nuclear capabilities. Ewers (2016) contends, ‘The United States should maintain a counterforce targeting strategy to hold the nuclear forces at risk and provide restraint from esca- lation with the peers and near-peers.’ Additionally, attack- ing an adversary’s nuclear weapons is considered a more moral approach than targeting cities. A common current nuclear approach contends that adversaries are deterred from attacking a country with nuclear weapons because the attacked country could respond with any of their surviving nuclear weapons (Ewers 2016). In other words, if an adversary cannot execute a counterforce strategy that completely cripples their target’s nuclear capabilities, they will not attack with nuclear weapons. This article challenges the notion that a counterforce strategy, which targets an adversary’s nuclear capabilities, effectively deters all nuclear attacks. Consider a hypothetical situation where two coun- tries each have over a thousand nuclear weapons. One country attacks the other with a single nuclear weapon. Would the attacked country strike back or be deterred by their adversary’s remaining arsenal? What if the nuclear attack caused significant economic damage but didn’t directly kill anyone? Would the attacked country strike back against the other’s population? If neither side can destroy the other side’s nuclear weapons, what types of targets might they attack? This paper examines targets that do not fall under the current counterforce strategy, not as advocates of these targets, but to ensure that all types of nuclear attacks are deterred. Before discussing possible attack and appropri- ate responses, we first examine three trends which may undermine a country’s ability to execute a counterforce strategy, improved weapon system survivability, enhanced defences, and expanded proliferation (Gallagher and Sorice 2014). 1.1 Survivability States with nuclear weapons have improved the surviv- ability of their nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems in case of an adversary attack, even with nuclear weapons. The initial efforts included reinforcing fixed sites to withstand nuclear blasts. These efforts have expanded into creating deeply buried facilities. Another approach has been to increase the mobility of strategic nuclear delivery systems, thus ensuring that they are challenging to find and target. For example, aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons have always been mobile targets that could shift from one airfield to another to reduce the chance of being destroyed. Additionally, land-based ballistic missile launchers are being deployed on either trucks or trains to make them difficult to target. The sea-launched ballistic missile submarines have combined mobility and hardening; the submarine’s strength to withstand water pressure is also effective pro- tection against nuclear blast overpressure and dynamic pressure. Additionally, these submarines operate in the world’s largest thermal sink, which reduces their suscep- tible range to thermal effects. Hence, submarines are not only challenging to find, but they are also highly resistant to nuclear weapon effects should they be detected. While decreasing their nuclear forces in total numbers, the United States and Russia have steadily increased the percentages of their nuclear forces that are survivable through mobility. Lieber and Press (2017) and Long and Green (2015) contend that improvements in intelligence technology will eventually track and target current mobile delivery methods; however, future sensing capabilities may be rapidly overwhelmed with decoys and other new countermeasures. We also presume that a country initiating a strike would expend their vulnerable weapons and maintain their more survivable weapons in reserve. For this article, we postulate a future where hard- ening, mobility, deception, and other means will con- tinue to make targeting an adversary’s strategic systems increasingly much more difficult. 1.2 Defences Nations are also increasing their defences to reduce any adversary’s ability to penetrate to their targets. Defences are not new (Cimbala and McDermott 2015). Countries threatened by adversaries attacking with bombers and cruise missiles have established air defence networks. For a while, stealth technology mitigated the advances of air defences; however, the improved sophistication of integrated air defence networks may significantly reduce the ability of bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate to targets. Along with enhanced detection, the range of inter- ceptor missiles has dramatically increased. Local area defences against ballistic missiles have existed for decades. Recent trends have indicated an increase in the size of the defended area and the effective- ness of the interceptors (Lowther and Cimbala 2017). For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019) in the 2019 Missile Defense Review states, ‘The United States is protected against a limited ICBM [inter-continental bal- listic missile] attack.’ One possible counter to improved defences is faster penetrators, such as hypersonic weapons. A few weapons with such advanced penetrative capabilities may even be able to assist in deterring an attack from a country with an extensive defence network. Zala (2019) concludes the ‘new non-nuclear weapon technologies – such as bal- listic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and pre- cision-strike missile technology – will make nuclear deterrence relationships that were once somewhat stable less so.’ 1.3 Proliferation Proliferation is another challenge to a counterforce strat- egy (Mazarr 1995; Jo and Gartzke 2007). During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only had to be concerned about the size of their arsenal relative to their single adversary. Now, each country must also consider its nuclear arsenal relative to all potential nuclear-armed adversaries and coalitions. An extensive exchange between two countries might leave the third country with the most remaining nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris 2018). 1.4 Study assumptions For this discussion, we postulate a future world where the following holds. Multiple states have nuclear weapons. No state or coalition of states can execute a counterforce first strike that sufficiently eliminates an adversary’s nuclear weapons to not be concerned about a nuclear counter-strike in response. No countries have an effective global defence system, rendering all vulner- able to strategic attacks. Each nation needs to consider multiple adversaries. Contrary to our assumptions, Lieber and Press (2017) contend that ‘hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing’ and further ‘countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and keep their forces survivable, albeit with considerable cost and effort.’ In contrast, Mazarr (2007) states that the United States cannot achieve any of its counterforce goals.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – General

The US has fundamentally misunderstood Chinese nuclear strategy – they have centered resources on establishing a survivable nuclear arsenal rather than quantitative increases – and they’ve succeeded

Brown 21 — (Gerald C., [Gerald C. Brown is an analyst with Valiant Integrated Services focusing on nuclear deterrence and East Asian security.], “Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces“, Arms Control Association, 06-2021, Available Online at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/features/understanding-risks-realities-chinas-nuclear-forces, mysoor)

In its recent annual threat assessment, the U.S. intelligence community described how China is pursuing “the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history” and is intending to “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade.” Although deeply concerning, this description should be put in context. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China’s deployed nuclear forces to number in the low 200s. Even if doubled, this is substantially lower than the approximately 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear forces the United States maintains on alert daily under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Despite the rising numbers, China seems unlikely to quantitatively outpace U.S. nuclear forces in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, China’s capabilities represent a substantial threat that must not be ignored. Quantitative comparisons of nuclear arsenals are a relatively crude manner of understanding nuclear risks and, in the case of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, wholly insufficient. More than ever, U.S. policymakers need to understand Chinese nuclear strategy. In the U.S.-Chinese context, policymakers should be more focused on how conventional weapons and related strategies could impact the nuclear calculus between the two countries. Chinese Nuclear Strategy Unlike Russia and the United States, China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent, with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.1 Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility, while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.2 In that sense, China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen, China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”3 Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns, China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest, secure, and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate, even with only a few warheads, Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit. Since China’s first nuclear test in 1964, it has consistently maintained a public, declaratory no-first-use policy, adhering to what it describes as a “self-defensive nuclear strategy” that would anticipate using nuclear weapons only as a “counterattack in self-defense.”4 Western analysts have rightfully pointed out that a no-first-use pledge may not be entirely credible on its own. Although the pledge may be sincerely held, during a crisis, escalation could be unpredictable. Additionally, a small number of Chinese analysts have suggested that what China defines as a counterattack may be ambiguous under certain, limited conditions, such as conventional attacks seeking to neutralize China’s nuclear forces.5 Despite Western doubts, the fact remains that Chinese strategists believe that the pledge holds true. An unambiguous no-first-use stance remains the official stance of the Chinese government, and China’s nuclear strategy is built around this concept. Authoritative texts on Chinese military thinking have described three major missions for Chinese nuclear forces. In peacetime, they seek to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war with China. In wartime, they constrain the scope of war, preventing a conventional conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange. If war does escalate to nuclear conflict, they serve to conduct nuclear counterattacks.6 The texts consistently describe only one envisioned use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear counterattack operation, in response to a nuclear strike.7 Operational practices have reinforced this. Beijing maintains a highly centralized nuclear warhead storage and handling system, with warheads typically thought to be stored unmated from their delivery vehicles rather than loaded and ready for launch.8 Further, training for nuclear brigades reflects the practice of counterattacking under nuclear conditions. Yet, there are indications of evolution. Recent U.S. government reports have suggested that some People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) brigades may spend time on higher alert and may seek to shift to a launch-on-warning posture in the future in order to increase survivability under nuclear attack. China has been developing a space-based early-warning system with assistance from Russia that could support this.9 Nuclear Force Projections As the U.S. annual threat assessment noted, there are signs of recent substantial changes in Chinese nuclear forces. The most important changes have been primarily qualitative, but notable quantitative changes are also occurring. These are understandably alarming to U.S. policymakers. Although the size of Chinese nuclear forces may still be dwarfed by the U.S. arsenal, its growth represents a substantial complication for the United States. Further, although the United States and Russia are modernizing their arsenals, they have been reducing their stockpiles over the past few decades slowly but significantly. China’s nuclear expansion represents a concerning shift away from its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to reduce its arsenal, and that is likely to impact U.S. and Russian decision-making. Yet, understanding these changes in the context of China’s nuclear strategy is important. Instead of trying to reach parity with or exceed the U.S. nuclear arsenal, China seems intent on ensuring that it has an assured retaliatory capability following U.S. strikes. Given U.S. nuclear and technological superiority, China likely has never had a sufficiently survivable nuclear deterrent against the United States, a goal that was more aspirational than anything else. Revolutions in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons, have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force, further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability. For the first time in history, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of executing a second strike. Research suggests that Chinese nuclear expansions and modernization are oriented toward creation of a more mobile and redundant force that can survive U.S. counterforce capabilities, including conventional systems such as the Conventional Prompt Global Strike system, and its missiles being able to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.10 Consequently, although China’s nuclear force size will expand, it does not appear likely to expand to the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the near future. There is understandable doubt about the claim of China doubling its nuclear arsenal, but it does not appear to be out of the question. China is fielding an increasing number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle weapons, such as the DF-5B deployed in 2015 and the recently deployed DF-5C and DF-41, that improve the ability of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal to penetrate the U.S. missile defense system.11 Defense Department estimates do not appear to include the DF-41, which is just starting to be deployed. Installing multiple warheads on these weapons will quickly expand the number of nuclear weapons in China’s arsenal. Further, PLARF brigades have been increasing at an unprecedented rate. The number of PLARF brigades reportedly increased from 29 to 40 between 2017 and 2020, and brigades continue to be added as new missile types are fielded.12 China’s shift to a nuclear triad will further increase the number of its nuclear warheads as these new systems are equipped. China is creating a more survivable nuclear submarine force, expanding the number of Type 094 ballistic missile submarines and developing the quieter Type 096 submarine with the JL-3 sea-launched ballistic missile as a complement. The PLA Air Force is also adopting a nuclear mission by developing a new air-launched ballistic missile that may be nuclear capable, as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 strategic bomber.13 Significantly, not all of China’s nuclear weapons are intercontinental forces capable of striking targets located in the continental United States. China has invested in nuclear weapons that specifically threaten the immediate region. Its new air capabilities, along with recently deployed midrange and intermediate-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-21E and the DF-26, hold regional adversaries and U.S. overseas bases at risk. China also recently deployed a new hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF-17, that may be nuclear capable. Importantly, although China’s nuclear expansion may be oriented toward a strategy of assured retaliation, that does not prevent Beijing from orienting its expanding nuclear capabilities toward a more threatening posture in the future. As China’s capabilities expand, its operational doctrine may well follow suit.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Chinese Retaliation

Laundry list of psychological factors.

Joshua Rovner ’17, Political scientist specializing in intelligence, strategy, and U.S. foreign policy. “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia”, Journal of strategic studies Vol. 40, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 696-730 // gbs

The first is psychological. Cognitive biases may cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions, mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information, and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts, when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Carl von Clausewitz dwelt on the problem in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, noting that intelligence reports were often contradictory and unreliable “in the thick of fighting.” Despite advances in intelligence and communications, the fog of war remains an enduring problem. Organized violence is an iterative process, and each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary. Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing, and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment. “In short,” Clausewitz concluded, “most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.” 9

Wartime leaders are prone to attribution bias, or the belief that their counterparts are inherently evil. Leaders in conflict are likely to assume the worst about their rivals or else they would not have picked a fight in the first place. Attribution bias causes them disregard the notion that their enemies have limited goals and are willing to accept partial victories. They are also prone to reject peace overtures as meaningless gestures at best, or as efforts to lull them into passivity before escalating the conflict.10 Finally, prospect theory tells us that individuals will fight harder to avoid losing a possession than they will to gain something new. If leaders equate settling with losing, then they will be tempted to risk escalation. All of these psychological pressures are exacerbated under stress and tight time constraints.11

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Chinese Retaliation

First strike causes retal – “use it or lose it” dilemma, and planners favor offensive action

Joshua Rovner ’17, Political scientist specializing in intelligence, strategy, and U.S. foreign policy. “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia”, Journal of strategic studies Vol. 40, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 696-730 // gbs

Finally, inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk. Under these conditions, the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent, the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation, planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Chinese Retaliation

Yes nuc retal !

Michael O’Hanlon ‘19, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, p. 49-50 //GBS

This somewhat sanguine conclusion is far from certain, however. It hinges in part on a willingness in Washington to accept many thousands of American battlefield dead and at least some risk of nuclear escalation. Even though U.S. nuclear forces far exceed those of the PLA, China might conclude that its disproportionate interests in the Taiwan issue warranted nuclear brinkmanship, especially if China had already possibly lost thousands of its own people in conventional combat, which would heighten the stakes as well as the reputational importance of the outcome of the conflict. These concerns could be amplified if the United States, intentionally or not, began to strike the nuclear assets of the PLA in the course of conventional fighting near Taiwan. If that happened, China might face a “use them or lose them” dilemma.101 Nuclear attack against a carrier, or a high-altitude nuclear airburst over a base like Kadena (designed to destroy people and equipment immediately below, without generating lots of fallout), might seem particularly attractive options to Beijing.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › BMD Fails › 2AC – Impossible

An improvement in missile defense still won’t be effective- chances of nuclear weapons hitting are high and outweigh

Grego, 18 – (Laura Grego- Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT's Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, on leave from the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, where she is senior scientist and research director, "US Ground-based midcourse missile defense: Expensive and unreliable", 6-28-2018, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486592)//mishelle

Where dissuasion is concerned, many factors inform a country’s decision making about whether to develop ICBM technology, and at what cost. But a strategic missile defense system would have to be very effective to alter an adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. A marginally effective missile defense system, or a system of unknown effectiveness, may well create an incentive to build more, or more sophisticated, missiles than states would otherwise build. No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. The dramatic increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal deployment and development. Similarly, Iran has continued to develop its long-range missile technology, launching four small satellites into orbit between 2009 and 2015 and developing its more capable Simorgh booster. What about deterrence? The primary way a missile defense system helps deter an attack is by creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals. Under Cold War thinking, if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union (or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against hardened US military targets, and if effective missile defenses existed, the adversary might be uncertain how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic, missile defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike. The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea, Iran, or even China might consider. These countries’ missile arsenals are too small and inaccurate to mount an effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets; they would necessarily target cities and civilian infrastructure. Central in deterring North Korea from launching nuclear weapons against the United States is the certainty of a devastating US response. The presence or absence of US missile defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and conventional forces. That brings the discussion to defense against a missile attack. While North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests of the last few years indicate that Pyongyang is within reach of the ability to build a nuclear-armed missile that can reach the United States, these missiles are and will remain relatively inaccurate – whether or not North Korea ceases its test program. North Korean missiles cannot be used to credibly threaten hardened targets such as US nuclear command and control or missile silos, and would instead be targeted on larger, less protected sites, such as cities. For this reason, the GMD system would need to be very effective if it were to influence US decision making, as even one nuclear-armed missile could devastate a city. Reliably defending against an all-out assault is not feasible. While President Trump stated on television17 last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time,” testing data show there is no basis for expecting interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time, even under the easiest and most generous conditions.18 Using multiple interceptors against each target can improve these odds, but this approach does not fundamentally change the situation; the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high. Consider an attack with five missiles.19 Using four interceptors against each target, each with a kill probability of 50 percent, the odds that one warhead would get through are 28 percent – or higher, if the failure modes are not independent of each other (for example, if the guidance systems of all the interceptors are faulty in the same way). The odds may yet be worse if the adversary uses numerous credible decoys that the GMD system cannot distinguish from legitimate targets, and so must engage. Thus, while the GMD system may provide some defense against the simplest threats, it cannot provide the type of robust defense necessary to substantially change decision making calculus.20

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFF › BMD Fails › 2AC – Tests Prove

Even if funding goes into BMD recent testing proves they are ineffective

Lockie, 18 – (Alex Lockie- former news editor and a military and foreign-policy blogger at Business Insider, "US ballistic missile defense just doesn't work — but we keep spending billions and billions on it", 2-2-2018, Business Insider,

The US tried and failed to intercept a missile on Wednesday, and also announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on missile defense interceptors. The US has spent more than $40 billion on missile defense projects over the last 15 years, and has no real credible capability to show for it. Ballistic missile defense plays into the complicated game of nuclear deterrence, which some say provides theoretical protection, but nobody can prove that. The US public learned on Wednesday that the US Navy tried and failed for the second time in a year to intercept a missile with an SM-III missile from the defense contractor Raytheon. On the same day, the Pentagon announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on 20 more missile interceptors for the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD), which is meant to protect the US homeland from missile attacks from North Korea or Russia. But the GMD has a bad track record. It recently had a successful test that may have calmed the fears of some in the US amid nuclear tensions with North Korea, but a recent paper on the test shows it was unrealistically generous. Laura Grego and David Wright, leading experts in the field of ballistic missiles, writing for the Union of Concerned Scientists, found that the so-called intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) the GMD knocked down was flown on a favorable trajectory, slower than the real thing, and without any of the tricks or savvy North Korea might use in an actual attack. The paper concludes the US has no reliable ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland. That capability, or lack thereof, comes after the US has spent more than $40 billion over the last decade in a half on ballistic missile defense. During that time, Boeing, Raytehon, and Lockheed Martin, key players in the BMD scene, have all posted record profits — and they continue to get contracts with the Pentagon. To be clear, the US can defend against some, shorter-range missiles. Aegis-equipped ballistic missile destroyers at sea have a good track record of defending themselves, but they're not meant to go after ICBMs. Patriot missiles have saved some lives from short-range missile attacks on the battlefield, though that has been historically over-hyped or just lied about.

2022 Michigan Negative
Say No › 2NC – AT: Silence Procedure

It’s up to the secretary general and any country can protest

Rasmussen ’10 [Anders Fogh, former NATO secretary general, 8-12-2010, “NATO Military Concept for Strategic Communications,” NATO, , St. Mark’s, AM]

I do not believe the document requires discussion by Council. Therefore, if I do not hear to the contrary by 17.30 hours on Wednesday, 18 August 2010, I shall assume that the Council has approved the Military Concept for NATO Strategic Communications.

2022 Michigan Negative
Say No › 2NC – AT: Silence Procedure

NATO’s silence procedure can be broken by any member state—it’s functionally consensus

PDO ‘3 [PDO, 2-11-2003, "France, Belgium Break NATO's Silence Procedure on Iraq Issue," People’s Daily Online, , St. Mark’s, AM]

NATO's Secretary-General George Robertson invoked the "silence procedure" last Thursday, setting 0900 GMT Monday as the deadline. If no member state breaks the silence, NATO would regard it as a consensus on the issue and would immediately set out making military plans in this respect.

The move of France and Belgium was widely regarded as a clear indication of the deepening divide among NATO member states on the Iraq issue.

2022 Michigan Negative
Say No › 2NC – Normal Means – Yes Consensus

Normal means is consensus – every decision at all levels is required to use it

Traugutt ’16 [Loren G, June 2016, "NDC Research Report," NATO Defense College: CSS, , St. Mark’s, AshritM]

The treaty does not specify how the Alliance should make decisions, except for Article 10 which states that “unanimous agreement” is required to invite new members into the NATO Alliance.3 Beyond this clear directive on decision-making, the rest of NATO’s decision-making process was left by the founders of the Alliance to determine for themselves. While decision-making through consensus is nothing new within alliances and organizations, its sole use in determining all decisions at all levels of an organization is unique. Numerous other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, utilize the consensus principle as part of their decision-making process, but none of them use it as their sole process.4 Despite a growing Alliance where reaching consensus will become harder and harder, keeping NATO’s current “consensus rule” is paramount for the Alliance to maintain its legitimacy and influence throughout the ever-changing global security environment. As described on the NATO website, “All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country … [an] expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance. This principle is applied at every committee level and demonstrates clearly that NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries … The consensus principle applies throughout NATO.”5 Three times in its history NATO has undergone a thorough review of its committee organization and structure. The first took place in 1990 following the end of the Cold War, again in 2002 following the 9/11 terror attacks, and the most recent review was in June 2010. In all three instances, the Alliance retained the principle of consensus decision-making, applying it within every committee and working group at all levels of NATO.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › T › 2NC---Violation

PGMs and AI are distinct.

John R. Hoehn 6-1-2021, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs, "Precision-Guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45996.pdf, DL

Emerging factors that may affect PGM programs. Another potential issue for Congress is how DOD’s programs for developing and procuring PGMs might be affected by emerging factors such as

 the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty;96

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › T › 1NC---T-Semi-Autonomus

Violation. PGMs are semi-autonomous.

Heather Roff 1-16-2015, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations and Research Scientist at the Global Security Initiative, "Autonomous or 'Semi' Autonomous Weapons? A Distinction Without Difference", HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/autonomous-or-semi-autono_b_6487268, DL

We have roughly four functions on a weapons system: trigger, targeting, navigation, and mobility. We might think of these functions like a menu that we can order from. Semi-autonomous weapons have at least one, if not three, of these functions. For instance, we might say that the Samsung SGR-1 has an "autonomous" targeting function (through heat and motion detectors), but is incapable of navigation, mobility or triggering, as it is a sentry-bot mounted on a defensive perimeter. Likewise, we would say that precision guided munitions are also semi-autonomous, for they have autonomous mobility, triggering, and in some cases navigation, while the targeting is done through a preselected set of coordinates or through "painting" a target through laser guidance.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Various Advantage CPs › Hotlines CP

That solves.

Walker 21 – Leah Walker is a future digital security fellow at the Institute for Security and Technology. (Leah Walker, "Zoom Won’t Stop a Nuclear War," Foreign Policy, 4-19-2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/zoom-hotline-red-telephone-nuclear-war-cuban-missile-crisis/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

As nuclear-armed states seek to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in a new era of multipolar great-power competition, rethinking hotlines should be at the top of their agenda. In many ways, this is low-hanging fruit that could serve as the technical catalyst for expanded trust and dialogue. Indeed, France, as the new chair of the P5 Process, has embraced the concept of “strategic risk reduction” and will make improving crisis communication technologies like hotlines a key priority for discussion among the United Nations Security Council’s permanent five members ahead of and beyond the planned Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty this August.

In turn, various governmental and nongovernmental voices have made broad proposals for nuclear-weapons states to consider whether they are serious about improving the security environment. For example, the 16 countries participating in the Stockholm Initiative have identified a list of “stepping stones” toward nuclear disarmament, which includes improving hotlines. At the same time, another coalition of 12 countries that form the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has also included the need for crisis-proof communication lines in its “landing zones,” or areas of potential agreement, to reduce nuclear risks. The Global Enterprise to Strengthen Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has also pointed out that communications links between nuclear weapons states “are not universal, and those that do exist warrant review.”

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Terrorism Turn › 1NC Terrorism Turn

They’re a game changer. Escalates global terrorism and Mexican cartel fighting, and causes Middle East war.

Itamar Lifshitz 11-17-2020, fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "The Paradox of Precision: Nonstate Actors and Precision-Guided Weapons", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-paradox-of-precision-nonstate-actors-and-precision-guided-weapons/, DL

Nonstate actors are increasingly using precision weapons systems. The destructive effects of this trend are not theoretical. This is evident almost anywhere one looks in the Middle East. In Lebanon, Hizballah is investing heavily in making its vast ballistic arsenal more sophisticated and precise, including efforts to acquire the necessary manufacturing capability and know-how. In Yemen, Houthi rebels have used armed drones to target Saudi oil infrastructure. The abundance of precise systems is not exclusively an outcome of Iranian-backed proliferation — the Islamic State has also used weaponized drones on multiple occasions in Iraq and Syria.

This phenomenon is by no means confined to the Middle East. Surface-to-air missiles launched from pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory in the Donbass shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. There have been reports of Boko Haram using attack drones in Nigeria. Simultaneously, across the globe, criminal organizations are beginning to harness aerial capabilities. The adoption of drones for violent uses has apparently already begun in the war between Mexican drug cartels.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Terrorism Turn › 1NC Terrorism Turn

Reducing the cost and increasing the abundance of precision-guided munitions causes it to fall into the hands of terrorists.

Itamar Lifshitz 11-17-2020, fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "The Paradox of Precision: Nonstate Actors and Precision-Guided Weapons", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-paradox-of-precision-nonstate-actors-and-precision-guided-weapons/, DL

On Feb. 16, 2016, the secretary general of Lebanese Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that “a missile on these ammonia plants [in Haifa] is equal to an atomic bomb.” This implicit threat to attack Israeli chemical plants with precision munitions demonstrates the paradox of precision: Weapons that allow traditional militaries to reduce collateral damage can be used by nonstate actors to target critical infrastructure and threaten civilians.

Precision-guided systems and standoff capabilities have become abundant and cheap. As a result, these systems are proliferating into the hands of nonstate actors who easily evade the legal norms surrounding their use. Existing arms control and legal frameworks fail to define and address the unique and severe threats posed by the transfer of precision standoff capabilities and technologies to nonstate actors, as they are focused primarily on denying proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. An explicit norm banning these transfers would help states tackle a growing security threat, through regulation and interdiction, and would also reduce the international legitimacy of the proliferation of precision standoff technologies.