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2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Baudrillard** › Boooooooo

Bayard 97

(The End of Seduction: A Few Words About Baudrillard's "Sex" “The End of Seduction: A Few Words About Baudrillard's "Sex"”, Pg. 113-114, Vance)

In "The Destiny of the Sexes and the Decline of Sexual Illusion" Jean Baudrillard at once mourns the loss of the shimmering artifices and alluring indeterminacies of the seductive gaze, and condemns the emancipatory discourses of sexual identity which for him amount finally to so much "leering" (Baudrillard's word loucher, bears the connotations of ogling, squinting, and gawking). The depressing social scene that Baudrillard observes in the wake of these changes in perspective are as lurid as any hyper-reality that one could imagine. Gaping at each other across a gendered divide, Baudrillard sugests, men and women consolidate their respective fantasies of power, knowledge and identity, but only as a prelude to a further and more wide-reaching cultural and psychological disaster, here rather schematically described as "the commutation of sexual polarities." The ensuing situation is profoundly counter-intuitive, not to say iconoclastic, like so many of the social landscapes that now bear Baudrillard's name; it is as if once the sexes get a hard look at each other, abandoning the suspense and the tension of the playfully seductive glances, they in effect hold each other hostage. Sexual difference - which for Baudrillard is, properly speaking, the site of seductive gaming and of illusions that are freed from any nostalgic comparison to a 'reality' - thereby collapses into a field of indetermination where the subject positions designated "man" and "woman" threaten to switch uncontrollably like an alternating current. In a strategic move that remains extremely troublesome for many of his readers, Baudrillard chooses to identify the chief assassin of seduction and the subsequent triumph of sexual in-difference with something called "feminism." An old hand at decoding the stakes, displacments, decoys, and deceits of seduction (let us not forget that his initial meditation on the beguiling art, De la seduction, was written in the late 1970s), Baudrillard has for years warned readers that the positive capacity of each sex to be the bearer of a radical illusoriness had been irretrievably undermined by the politics and the epistemologies of sexual emancipation. For Baudrillard, "feminism" in particular subtly reproduces certain humanistic and melioristic assumptions about sexual identity and the subject, committed, as it is, to giving a voice to that subject's imagined "depths," or, 14 Jean Caroline Bayard, Michael Kliffer & Daniel Simeoni in his words, to be bringing "out 'the real woman' (or the biological or psychological being, conscious or unconscious, that she is supposed to be)." This "outing" of and grounding in "sex," he contends, spells the end of its seductive illusions, or, to be more precise, the end of its existence as seductive illusion; in the supposed name of truth and freedom, subject positions instead harden to the point that they become interchangeable, and consequently in-different to the difference that might otherwise keep their radical illusoriness alive. That Baudrillard continues to speak this way about sex, notwithstanding wholesale shifts in his thinking about many other questions, puts to us just how important "seduction" remains for him as a point of critical leverage on the postmodern condition. A world devoid of seduction and of the illusion of sexual differentiation is a world in which "passion" has been evacuated from "the firmanent of concepts," as Baudrillard melancholically puts it. Baudrillard writes in an age that has seen the collapse of utopian desires and the breaking of the greatest ideological icons; the commutation of sexual difference is not unconnected to these declines, yet it is one about which Baudrillard is tellingly regretful. It is perhaps worth noting that the single figure who is perhaps most closely identified with postmodern iconoclam here flirts shamelessly with making a fetishistic idol out of both "the sexes" and the "sovereign" power of "seduction" in whose thrall the chimera of the sexes is said to thrive. Hence the passion of his lament for the end of seductive passion, a lament that it is difficult to read - not to say unacceptable to a majority of feminist thinkers, several of whom have denounced Baudrillard as naive at best, and violently sexist at worst.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Baudrillard** › Boooooooo

Baudrillard is profoundly sexist- he just disguises it through a veneer of edginess

Gallop 13

(Jane Gallop is a distinguished professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, “French Theory and the Seduction of Feminism”, published in “Men in Feminism (RLE Feminist Theory), edited by Alice Jardine and Paul Smith, pg.113-114, 2013, date accessed: 4/8/15, )

Nonetheless, Baudrillard’s contradictions seem less subtle than those of other practitioners of such theory, since he remains within a classical theoretical rhetoric of assertion, category, logic. If Baudrillard’s case is interesting to me, it is, first of all, because of the blatant enormity of the contradictions which are better hidden by the stylistic charms of a Derrida or a Lacan. And second of all (this second reason being for me the primary one – my hidden agenda, in fact), because the contradictions seem linked to a rather rabid attack Baudrillard makes on feminism. Many of us have seriously wondered about the effect of French theory on feminism’s health. Baudrillard is, to my knowledge, the male French theorist who most explicitly and most frontally adopts an adversarial relation to feminism. I would like to quote you a passage from the first chapter of De la seduction where the theoretical contradiction occurs within Baudrillard’s pronouncement of the proper course for women: “Now, woman is only appearance. And it’s the feminine as appearance that defeats the profundity of the masculine. Women instead of rising up against this ‘insulting’ formula would do well to let themselves be seduced by this truth, because here is the secret of their power which they are in the process of losing by setting up the profundity of the female against that of the masculine” (p. 22). When he writes “insulting formula,” he puts the word “insulting” (injurieuse) in quotation marks. He does not consider it an insult to say that woman is only appearance. Baudrillard is writing against the history of writing against appearances. He is for appearances, and against profundity, so when he says that “woman is only appearance” it should be taken as a compliment. Nonetheless, when I read this passage, as a woman, I feel insulted. Baudrillard would have it that my feeling of offense is a great error which stems from my inscription within the sort of masculinistic essentialist thinking which condemns appearances as misleading mediations of essences, realities, and truths. Yet, in considering the passage carefully, I decide that it is not what he says about “woman” that offends me so much as what he says about “women”: “Women would do well,” he advises, “to let themselves be seduced by this truth.” It is the phrase “would do well” (feraient bein de) that irks me. Although he puts “insulting” in quotation marks, he uses the word -“truth” (verite) straight. He knows the truth – the profound or hidden truth, I might add – about women, and women, “would do well to let themselves be seduced” by the truth he utters. He speaks not from the masculine or masculinist position (which he identifies as against appearances and for profundities) but from a position that knows the truth of the feminie and the masculine and can thus, from this privileged position beyond sexual difference, advise women how best to combat masculine power. It is his assumption from this position of superiority, of speaking the truth – more than any content of “truth” that he may utter – which offends me. Women, he wants, are in danger of losing their power, but if they would only let themselves be seduced by what he says… A line if ever I heard one. The problem may not lie with the women – the women are not “letting themselves” be seduced – the problem may lie with Baudrillard’s “technique.” Perhaps truth never seduces, or at least not self-certain truth or certainly at all. Baudrillard asserts, in this book, which is, after all, very insightful about how seduction works, that “it is by our fragility that we seduce, never by powers or by strong signs.” (p. 115) As opposed to truth, which is necessarily irreverersible (the opposite of the truth cannot be true), seduction, as Baudrillard understands it, is the very principle of reversibility. Hence the very best “technique” for seduction turns out to be that which can never be simply a technique at all. As Baudrillard puts it: “To be seduced is yet again the best way to seduce… No one, if he is not seduced, will seduce others.” (p.112) Truth cannot seduce; only seduction seduces. Baudrillard cannot seduce feminism with his truth, because he protects his truth from being seduced by feminism.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Baudrillard** › Boooooooo

Baudrillard would sacrifice a woman in a desert if given the chance

Brodribb 92

(Somer Brodribb teaches feminist theory/politics and women’s social and political thought at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. She has worked with the Yukon Indian Women’s Association to establish an emergency shelter for Native and non-Native women, and as a Canadian contact for the Feminist International Network in Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE). She studied in the Feminist focus of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, NOTHING MAT(T)ERS: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism, First published by Spinifex Press, 1992, JKS)

Jean Baudrillard blames the failure of the “revolution” on women and change, women’s change. He sees puritanical “hysterics” everywhere whom he accuses of exaggeration about sexual abuse (1986, p. 42). The radical nostalgia which pervades his postmodern scribbling is for Rousseau’s (1979) Sophie and Lasch’s haven in a heartless world. For Baudrillard, a rapist is a violent fetus who longs for ancient prohibitions not sexual liberation (1986, p. 47). Baudrillard’s pessimism is actually his hope for a defeat of feminist initiated change and a return to man and god in contract, the eternal sacrifice of woman. His ramblings in his cups of cool whisky (1986, p. 7) are given the status of thought. He considers himself outré and daring to criticize feminists but, as anyone who has taken a feminist position knows, misogynous attack is banal and regular. Sorry, Baudrillard: it is outré to support and to be a feminist. But is this in vino veritas, when Baudrillard proposes a Dionysian sacrifice of woman to the image of beauty, purity, eternity? In Amérique, he writes: “One should always bring something to sacrifice in the desert and offer it as a victim. A woman. If something has to disappear there, something equal in beauty to the desert, why not a woman? (1986, p. 66). When queried about this “gratuitously provocative statement” Baudrillard replied, “Sacrificing a woman in the desert is a logical operation because in the desert one loses one’s identity. It’s a sublime act and part of the drama of the desert. Making a woman the object of the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest compliment I could give her” (Moore: 1989, p. 54). A compliment postmodernism will make over and over, like opera.18 Commenting on a sacrificial scene in D.H.Lawrence’s The Woman Who Rode Away, Millett writes: This is a formula for sexual cannibalism: substitute the knife for the penis and penetration, the cave for a womb, and for a bed, a place of execution—and you provide a murder whereby one acquires one’s victim’s power. Lawrence’s demented fantasy has arranged for the male to penetrate the female with the instrument of death so as to steal her mana... The act here at the centre of the Lawrentian sexual religion is coitus as killing, its central vignette a picture of human sacrifice performed upon the woman to the greater glory and potency of the male (1971, p. 292).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Cybernetics** › AT: Cybernetics

Lethal autonomous weapons are the next step in posthumanism generating a new wave of dominant subjectivities.

Jones, 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, 2018, Human Rights Clinic at the University of Essex, accessed on 6-21-2022, “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21540/7/E.%20Jones%2C%20posthumanxenofeminist%20autonomous%20weapons.pdf]/ISEE

Global military spending has been estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to have been around US$1.6 trillion in 2016. The military economy is not, however, just about state spending: direct and indirect employment within the U.S. aerospace and defence industry alone includes approximately 3.53 million people. Feminist scholars have highlighted how militarism goes further in that there are a number of key roles often played by women outside the formal work place. Militarisation can be seen as both creating and profiting from informal (unpaid) work by women, which also produces and maintains gender difference. In addition, military spending benefits companies. It does not, as two peace scholars point out, ‘compete directly with private investment. It supplements but does not supplant the private sector. Thus, its expansion will not undermine business confidence’. The military economy is a fast-moving one, creating continuous profits as technology advances and systems need replacing. Military development spending has increased over the past decade in many states including the U.S., Kenya, Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Poland and Russia. Much of this war economy is driven by the development and deployment of technology, which reaps profits not only through military use but also often later through civil use. Satellite navigation is a prime example of this. While existing weapons systems such as the PAC-3 and the Samsung SGR-A1 described below are more automated than autonomous, ‘there are significant global efforts in the research and development (R&D) of autonomous systems’. Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have seen considerable advancement in the commercial sector, which is leaving the military sector behind.11 States are beginning to note the need to “catch up with Silicon Valley”.Seeking to tap into the advancements made in the commercial sector, the creation of weapons systems with some level of autonomy has recently become a key focus for the U.S. Department of Defense through Project Maven. When establishing the project in 2017, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work stated that ‘the Department of Defense (DoD) must integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning more effectively across operations to maintain advantages over increasingly capable adversaries and competitors’. While Project Maven is currently focusing on the incorporation of algorithms into military operations, reflecting the current state of technological advancement, it seeks to consider and promote ‘all initiatives that develop, employ, or field, artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning, deep learning and computer vision algorithms’.In other words, Project Maven is not only creating more complex algorithms but is also actively seeking to ensure that the U.S. is at the forefront of the development of autonomous weapons technologies. In this paper I argue that feminist posthumanist theory is an important paradigm through which to understand our relationship to technology, and to autonomous weapons systems in particular. Feminist posthumanism uses technology (alongside the nonhuman animal and matter) to question what it means to be human, deconstructing the very notion of what the human is, noting that the concept of the human in dominant Western accounts of subjectivity creates hierarchies between humans as well as between the human and other living beings. A clear example of the way in which feminist posthuman theory challenges humanist accounts of subjectivity can be seen in Donna Haraway’s work. Haraway notes that humans are already cyborgs in that they are deeply connected to, desire, and are dependent upon technology.16 Such an understanding of technology is essential to understanding autonomous weapons systems. In noting the connection between the human and machine and deconstructing distinctions between autonomy and automation, a posthuman perspective on autonomous weapons foregrounds the need to focus not only on autonomous weapons but on the broad array of delegated killing. While current attempts at legal regulation distinguish between civil and military technologies, such a distinction becomes impossible in light of the clear links between civil and military technologies and the killing potential of many technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). This article therefore contributes to legal studies as well as the discourse on autonomous weapons. It further contributes to feminist approaches to international law, inserting such approaches into the realm of military technologies and highlighting the relevance of feminist approaches to all areas of international law. Law and gender theory is an important lens through which to analyse military technologies. Military technologies touch on several political and philosophical issues that gender theorists have long discussed. Legal articulations of subjectivity in particular are something that feminist legal theory has long problematised, and is directly relevant to the question of the ‘legal person’ as machines become more and more autonomous.20 This may require legal change to allow for ‘electronic’ subject-recognition. In addition to this, gender theories have developed a nuanced set of tools through which to analyse issues around inclusion, exclusion and justice. This can be seen in gender theory’s commitment to intersectionality, which looks at gender alongside race, sexuality, ability, class, etc. A gender perspective ensures the consideration of the multiple ways in which technologies may impact on intersecting groups, which may be missed in mainstream discussions about the use of autonomous weapons systems. Despite the many debates on autonomous weapons, there has been little consideration of such systems from a feminist posthuman perspective. Mary Manjikian appears to be the only scholar who has sought to apply feminist posthumanism to the realm of autonomous technology. Manjikian discusses the ways in which military technologies may be used to create either a less or a more militarised world, concluding that technology is more likely to create a more militarised, hyper-masculine world. Heeding Manjikian’s suspicion of the hyper-masculinity of militarism, this article works in the vein of Haraway and other feminist posthuman thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti and the ‘xenofeminists’, a collective of scholars working under the name ‘Laboria Cuboniks’ who seek to use and appropriate technology for feminist aims – to think critically about the significance of autonomous weapons systems, for the ways in which law fashions our understanding of human subjectivity. This paper adds to the discourse on autonomous weapons by proposing a xenofeminist posthuman perspective, providing a different way of understanding these systems while contributing to the development of feminist approaches to international law. While Haraway is fundamentally positive about technology’s potential to be used for feminist aims, she notes that feminists must also ensure that technology is not used to create ‘the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defence, about the final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war.’ Haraway also notes that technology is embedded within capitalism, pointing out the fact that the people usually making the machines are often poor women from the Global South.28 Haraway’s work seeks to create a feminist techno-future in spite of and while trying to avoid the risks of a possible hyper-masculine techno-future. While Haraway seeks to promote the use of technology for feminist aims, the Xenofeminist Manifesto (XFM) has a more focused feminist project in mind. The XFM seeks to destroy capitalism through the accelerated use of technology to create a post-work world, thereby directly advocating for post-capitalism as a feminist aim. Thus, the XFM insists not only on the need to accelerate our use of/dependence upon technology, but also to appropriate this technology for feminist aims, ensuring that such technology remains loyal to the politics they wish it to promote. Such feminist aims include the will to ensure the free distribution of hormones or the will to use technology to restructure gendered systems of reproductive labour and care.While the xenofeminists note the dilemmas technology brings and the need to ‘explicit[ly] acknowledge… these conditions as a target for elimination’, they do not address the fact that the creation of a post-capitalist world will not be not immediate. In the meantime, as Haraway notes, science and technology have both contributed to and changed the face of ‘late capitalism’, with more work becoming precarious and being done at home, which affects women and people of colour most. Technology is largely designed by (and profits) people who are white, male and living in the Global North, while the raw materials are mined and manufactured elsewhere, by others. While some xenofeminist scholars propose the ubiquitous use of technology as the way to a feminist future, that future is less utopic when one considers that much technology is developed, first and foremost, for military purposes. While there has not yet been a feminist posthuman reading of autonomous weapons systems which seeks to dissect the false binaries upheld within the debates on these weapons between the human-machine and autonomy automation, there has been some limited engagement with these systems from a feminist perspective by NGOs, one example being the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s disarmament programme, ‘Reaching Critical Will’. They consider the masculine nature of militarism and the ways in which this would only likely get worse if machines stripped of empathy engage in killing, instead of soldiers in face-to-face combat. It is interesting to note that many of the posthuman perspectives which currently exist on the topic of conflict and technology do come from a gender perspective. These works come from outside the legal discipline, however, and tend to focus on drone warfare. Posthuman theory, however, could have a key impact if applied to legal studies and the debates around autonomous weapons. In refusing to see the machine as other, noting the links between the machine and the human, a posthuman approach would refuse the exceptionalism promoted by existing discourses on autonomous weapons, allowing for discussions to encompass a wider range of human-machine life/death decision-making. Killing machines may not be created as killer robots but may come into existence through other civil or military technological developments, such as artificial intelligence (AI) which may not have been designed to kill, but may ultimately be used to kill.38 More mundane but equally dangerous are developments in algorithm-driven decision-making.39 Further to this, given the vast advances in wearable military technologies and human enhancement technologies, a killer machine of the dystopian kind envisaged by many NGOs may, in fact, come about through technologically enhancing soldiers and turning them into superhuman soldiers. While such cyborg soldiers would not be deemed autonomous weapons under existing understandings of such systems, they will beg the same ethical questions around control and accountability, something which has not yet been recognised by the existing work on autonomous weapons. After all, at what point does a technologically mediated human become more machine than human? While job automation may indeed help create a post-work, post-capitalist society,40 such systems pose vast ethical issues around control and accountability. ‘Fully automated luxury communism’ seems less luxurious in the face of machines taking professional killing jobs.41 Drawing on the XFM, this article concludes by proposing the need for a posthumanxenofeminist discourse on autonomous weapons systems and other civil and military technologies. This means that we do not need to ‘abandon’ technology, but rather to use it warily, drawing on the wisdom of intersectional critiques and seeking a post-capitalist vision of society.42 This article therefore makes several key contributions. First, the paper adds to the debate on ‘autonomous’ weapons by challenging existing definitions of such systems. The paper also analyses the international debates on these systems from the as-yet unapplied perspective of posthuman-xenofeminism, highlighting both what feminist posthuman and xenofeminist theory may add to the debates on autonomous weapons systems. Further, this article adds to feminist approaches to international law by situating them within discussions of autonomous weapons, proposing a new posthuman-xenofeminist methodology for such approaches. I conclude that there is a need for feminist posthuman intervention into the legal regulation of all technologies – one that understands the ways in which humans-machines work in connection while seeking to prevent the creation of all killer machines, thereby refusing current attempts at technological legal regulation which distinguish between civil and military technologies.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Gender Essentialism** › It’s Performative

Gender is not stable, rater it is a socially encoded state of doing – making gender performative.

Mikkola 17 [Mari Mikkola (Junior Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-University, Berlin), 2017, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ] // st

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one's gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one's hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are. Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman. The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction: social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person's gender is just as real or true as anyone else's who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278).[5] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways. For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Gender Essentialism** › No Link !

Gender binary is the object of critique, not the method

Sjoberg, PhD, 17

(Laura, PoliSci@Florida, Towards Trans- gendering International Relations? http://www2.hhh.umn.edu/uthinkcache/gpa/globalnotes/Sjoberg.Towards%20Transgendering%20IR.docx)

Generally, “sex” is perceived membership in the biological categories of “male” or “female” based on (perceived) distribution of sex organs and sexed bodies. While most feminists see more than two “sexes” (including varieties of intersex and trans- bodies), we often talk about sex as dichotomous (male/female) either out of convenience or out of an interest in focusing on gender issues presented dichotomously in global politics (e.g., Keohane 1989). While some theorists have argued that “sex” is itself a social construction (Fausto-Sterling 2005) or a performance (Butler 1993), many continue to refer to sex as a biological fact. If “sex” is usually characterized as biological and dichotomous, “gender,” is usually characterized as social and a continuum (Hooper 2001). Gender is a set of socially and culturally constructed characteristics that are associated with persons based on their perceived sex. People understood to be “men” are expected to be “masculine” and associated with masculinity, while people understood to be “women” are expected to be “feminine” and associated with femininity (Tickner 1992; Sylvester 1994). These traits are organized hierarchically, where characteristics associated with masculinity are often symbolically and actually valued over characteristics associated with femininity (see Peterson 2010). In these terms, sexism is the assumed or explicit preference for men over women; gender hierarchy is the assumed or explicit preference for masculinities over femininities; and sex/gender discrimination is the enacting of these preferences in interpersonal interaction (see Enloe 2007).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Gender Essentialism** › No Link !

Their essentialism argument misreads our evidence- gender is a social construction which is enforced contingently

Sjoberg 09

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence, Security Studies 18.2, JKS)

In order to understand feminist work in ir, it is important to note that gender is not the equivalent of membership in biological sex classes. Instead, gender is a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics. As Lauren Wilcox explains, “gender symbolism describes the way in which masculine/feminine are assigned to various dichotomies that organize Western thought” where “both men and women tend to place a higher value on the term which is associated with masculinity.”23 Gendered social hierarchy, then, is at once a social construction and a “structural feature of social and political life” that “profoundly shapes our place in, and view of, the world.”24¶ This is not to say that all people, or even all women, experience gender in the same ways. While genders are lived by people throughout the world, “it would be unrepresentative to characterize a 'gendered experience' as if there were something measurable that all men or all women shared in life experience.”25 Each person lives gender in a different culture, body, language, and identity. Therefore, there is not one gendered experience of global politics, but many. By extension, there is not one gender-based perspective on ir or international security, but many. Still, as a structural feature of social and political life, gender is “a set of discourses that represent, construct, change, and enforce social meaning.”26 Feminism, then, “is neither just about women, nor the addition of women to male-stream constructions; it is about transforming ways of being and knowing” as gendered discourses are understood and transformed.27

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Gender Essentialism** › LAWS = Essentialism

LAWS reinforce gender norms, the aff critiques them.

RCW NBD Rcw, NO DATE, "Critical issues," Reaching Critical Will, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/7972-fully-autonomous-weapons]#//mb24

Gender and fully autonomous weapons Throughout history, we have seen that weapons symbolise power. The association of weapons with power comes from a very particular—and very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. Fully autonomous weapons are being developed in the context of the aforementioned norms of gender and power. Scholars of gender and technology have long argued that gender relations are “materialised in technology”. That is, the meaning and character (the norms) of masculinity and femininity are “embedded” in machines. These scholars argue that technological products bear their creators mark. If technology is developed and utilised primarily by men operating within a framework of violent masculinity, their creations will be instilled with that framework of thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation. Fully autonomous weapons, as tools of violence and of war, will likely have specific characteristics that may simultaneously reinforce and undermine hegemonic gender norms. The use of fully autonomous weapons can lead to gender-based violence against men. In conflict, civilian men are often targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age.While men are not necessarily targeted solely because they are men, taking sex as a key signifier as identity and exacting harm on that basis constitutes gender-based violence. That is to say, if someone uses sex as a basis for assessing whether or not a person is targeted, or if an attack is allowed (are only men present?), or in determining the impact of an attack later (i.e. during casualty recording), then they are using the sex of that person not as the motivation for the attack but as a proxy for identifying militants, or “acceptable targets”. This is gender-based violence. This erodes the protection that civilians should be afforded in conflict and violates many human rights, including the right to life and due process. It alsohas broader implications in the reinforcement of gender norms, including violent masculinity. Assuming all military-age men to be potential or actual militants or combatants entrenches the idea that men are violent and thus targetable. This devalues male life—it suggests men are relatively more expendable than women. It increases the vulnerability of men, exacerbating other risks adult civilian men face such as forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and summary execution. The gendered culture of violent masculinities that surrounds the development of autonomous weapons, likely to be embedded within the technology and its use, will create new challenges for preventing violence, protecting civilians, and breaking down gender essentialisms or discrimination. Understanding how autonomous weapons are likely to be perceived in a gendered way by their developers, operators, and their victims is crucial to developing policies that can help break the cycle of violence. This could include an understanding that the operation of weapons without meaningful human control, weapons programmed to target and kill based on pre-programmed algorithms of who is considered to pose a threat, used without consent in foreign lands or in the streets of local cities, will result in civilian casualties, psychological harm, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. That this in turn will result in a violent masculine response from affected communities, reinforcing gender inequalities and oppressions. What efforts have been taken to address the development and use of fully autonomous weapons? During the Human Rights Council session in April 2013, 24 states attended the presentation of the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, and discussed the issue of autonomous weapons. Participating states expressed concerns regarding the use of fully autonomous weapons and indicated an interest in continuing discussions. At the meeting of states parties of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in November 2013, governments decided to convene a four-day meeting of experts on the topic of fully autonomous weapons. The CCW, adopted in 1980, regulatesweapons which are not derived from chemical, nuclear, or biological sources. Since 2014, the states parties of the CCW have discussed how to address the threat of killer robots. In 2016, the Fifth Review Conference of CCW decided to begin a formal process in 2017 to discuss autonomous weapon systems. The meetings since have focused on building a common understanding about the meaning of human control and the risks of fully autonomous weapons. Most governments, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have reached the conclusion that humans must maintain control over programming, development, activation, and/or operational phases of a weapon system. A growing number of states are calling for a pre-emptive ban on killer robots (currently 28 states). Furthermore, the Non-Aligned Movement, the largest bloc of states operating in the UN, has called for a legally binding instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations of such weapons; Austria, Brazil, and Chile support the negotiation of “a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions” of weapon system. A few others have expressed their interest in non–legally binding mechanisms, such as a political declaration proposed by France and Germany. Additional support for a prohibition has also come from thousands of scientists and artificial-intelligence experts. In July 2018, they issued a pledge not to assist with the development or use of fully autonomous weapons. This comes on the heels of broader activism from the scientific and technology community against misuse of technology. For example, 4000 Google employees recently signed a letter demanding their company cancel its Project Maven contract with the Pentagon, which was geared toward “improving” drone strikes through artificial intelligence. Twelve hundred academics announced their support for the tech workers. As a response, Google renounced its work on Project Maven. Furthermore, more than 160 faith leaders and more than 20 Nobel Peace Prize laureates back the ban.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – AT: Cap/Neolib** › Perm / Gender DA

The alternative is worse. Anti-capitalist movements bolster gender-based oppression because feminized labor is rendered invisible.

Coleman and Bassi 11

(Lara Montesinos, Serena A., June, University of Bristol, UK and University of Warwick, UK, Deconstructing Militant Manhood MASCULINITIES IN THE DISCIPLINING OF (ANTI-)GLOBALIZATION POLITICS, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:2, pgs 207-208, JKS)

Gendered hierarchies and cultural scripts are not a side issue for movements that aim to contest the globalization of capitalism. Materialist feminists have highlighted how capitalism has relied upon concealed, underpaid or unpaid female labour (e.g. Eisenstein 1979; Barrett 1980; Fuentes and Ehren- reich 1983). As Rosemary Hennessy (2000: 6) puts it, ‘women provide most of the world’s socially necessary labor – that is, labor that is necessary to col- lective survival – but much of it is rendered invisible, both in and outside the value system of commodity exchange’. Materialist analyses have also highlighted the relationship between heteronormative and capitalist social relations. Leslie Feinberg (1997: 231, see also Hennessy 1996), for example, theorizes the oppression of transgender people under capitalism through a Marxist analysis of how an ideology of binary gender became hegemonic with ‘the rise of private property, the male-dominated family and class divisions’. Moreover, the power-laden performances through which gender is produced are intricately bound up with cultural scripts deployed in the imposition of capitalist relations across the world. J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996: 120–47), for instance, draws a parallel of globalization’s ‘tightly scripted narrative of differential power’ that celebrates ‘the inevitability of capitalist penetration’ in every corner of the world and the script that normalizes and naturalizes the rape of female bodies (1996: 120–1). Lara Coleman (2007) has explored how the violent imposition of neoliberal development in Colombia has mobi- lized gendered imaginative geographies, through which spaces targeted for ‘civilizing’ interventions are marked out in terms of sub-ordinate gender identities counterposed to the identity of an ideal citizen cast in terms of a hegemonic, bourgeois-rational masculinity. Similarly, Penny Griffin (2007) has highlighted the way in which dominant forms of heterosexual masculinity mark out the norms of successful human behaviour reproduced in the neoliberal discourse of the World Bank. The reiteration of gendered cultural scripts within (anti-)globalization politics does not only shore up capitalism’s unequal effects on women (cf. Sullivan 2005: 9). It also bolsters other effects of gender-based oppression on women, transgender people and men with non-hegemonic gender performances. Moreover, this reiteration of hierarchically ordered gender identities should be understood as reinforcing capitalist relations at a much deeper level, in that it restates the cultural scripts that capital deploys to normalize its interventions and policy ‘solutions’. There is a circular element to this too. Who is visible and who can speak within (anti-)globalization politics, and which bodies are privileged or excluded, derives from the gendered performance of ‘resistance’. Cultural texts assign roles defining, for example, who is able to speak with authority and who is confined to a walk-on appearance as a ‘movement housewife’ (Roth 2001). This in turn forecloses the possibilities for contestation and re-signification within spaces of ‘resistance’, reinforcing the tendency to re-iterate those cultural scripts that enhance the status quo.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – Top Level** › AT: K’s of NATO

Interaction with NATO inevitable, only the AFF can expose the cracks in the project of NATO.

Hurley, 19 [Matthew Hurley is interviewee the Senior Lecturer in Politics & International Relations at Sheffield Hammond University, Interviewer Christina Cheng, accessed on 6-30-2022, Millennium, vol. 47, no. 2, Jan. 2019, pp. 210–230, “Feminist Experiences of ‘Studying Up’: Encounters with International Institutions.,” https://eprints.ncl.ac.uk/file_store/production/240565/029E15C4-CD65-4507-96FD-263C80BAD706.pdf /]/ISEE

International institutions shape and are shaped by human behaviour. We conduct most of our lives within institutions and interacting with them; working with them, supporting, opposing, resisting them. This complex interplay between these conscious and unconscious interactions is an important reason why institutions matter. Since institutions are often treated in mainstream IR theory as unified and homogeneous, they are often discussed in shorthand. My research is on NATO’s adoption and interpretation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, but particularly how that impacts the reconstruction of militarised masculinities and femininities within NATO. One of the key questions for me is: ‘what is NATO’? As feminists we should seek to ‘crack open’ and expose the complexities and contradictions within institutions such as NATO to problematise shorthand understandings and what they have come to signify. Feminists should also care about international security institutions because institutions are never static. They are never constant. So they can never, in a sense, be fully understood. A constant, collective, critical feminist gaze achieved through a multiplicity of research methods, approaches, projects and theories is needed to account for this constant change and flux.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Kritiks** › **2AC – Top Level** › Framework – Abstraction DA

Their abstract theorizing allows material harm to continue against marginalized women – we should instead focus on concrete particulars as a starting point as the only ethical strategy

Matsuda 88 (Mari, Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, “When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method”, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7 1989)

The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is accessible to all of us. We should know it in its con- crete particulars. We should know of our sister carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 a.m. in a shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on the West Bank, and in Nicaragua. The jurispru- dence of outsiders teaches that these details and the emotions they evoke are relevant and impor- tant as we set out on the road to justice. These details are accessible to all of us, of all genders and colors. We can choose to know the lives of others by reading, studying, listening, and ventur- ing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono work may be the most effective means of ac- quiring a broader consciousness of oppression. Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression. Abstraction, criticized by both feminists and scholars of color, is the, method that allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the aspirational mode of liberalism with no connection to what those con- cepts mean in real people's lives. Much in our mainstream intellectual training values abstrac- tion and denigrates nitty-gritty detail. Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to op- erate both within the abstractions of standard ju- risprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge. Whisperings at Yale and elsewhere about how deconstructionist heroes were closet fascists remind me of how important it is to stay close to oppressed communities. High talk about language, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask racist and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sis- ter who is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel, as I have, that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, re- sist! Read what Professor Williams, Professor Scales-Trent, and other feminists and people of color are writing.' The reality and detail of op- pression are a starting point for these writers as they enter into mainstream debates about law and theory.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – AT: Politics DAs** › Expediency Focus Bad

Prioritizing expediency is bad---leads to worse decision making.

Christen, 17 [Markus Christen, Thomas Burri, Joseph Chapa, Raphael Salvi, and Filippo Santoni de Sio John Sullins, No Date, accessed on 6-30-2022, Philarchive, October 2017, "An Evaluation Schema for the Ethical Use of Autonomous Robotic Systems in Security Applications", https://philarchive.org/archive/CHRAES-3]/ISEE

Risk transfer and lowering the threshold for the use of lethal force: Earlier we discussed these concerns in detail in our discussion of autonomous systems in general. However, these problems take on a more tragic character when decision makers realize the political expediency of risk transfer. Since lethal danger is transferred from the human warfighters to machines, this can cause increased, and less thoughtful, deployment of lethal autonomous systems. When this happens there is far less political risk to those who decide to take us to war, thus potentially leading to more armed conflict (Strawser 2013). This problem follows into the civil use of these systems where the use of them may be chosen over more traditional policing methods that might be more expensive or difficult. This would lead to an increased use of lethal force over the capture of those suspected of crime.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – AT: Politics DAs** › Expediency Focus Bad

We must not shrink in favor of political expediency, leads to bad policy---covid proves.

Russel, 20 [Stuart Russel, is a Professor of Computer Science & Engineering at UC Berkley, date not clear, but about covid so earliest it could be is 2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Future of Life Institute, "Stuart Russell | UC Berkeley - Future of Life Institute", https://futureoflife.org/background/stuart-russell/]/ISEE

We can analyze what went wrong this time and put in place the necessary resources and plans to avoid these problems next time. Clearly there has to be a capability to roll out testing at scale and to provide surge capacity for hospitals. We also need much more sophisticated and flexible models that capture the patterns of contacts and transmission at an individual level, can predict the effects of different kinds of intervention, etc. It seems that the best model of the US was the one created at Imperial College London, which should be concern for US policy makers. However, nothing can be done if knowledge and expertise are discarded in favor of political expediency and prejudice. Undoubtedly there will be a massive public relations war after the pandemic dies down, to try to blame events on anyone but those responsible. Indeed, this war is already beginning, with attacks on China, doctors, journalists, old people, epidemiologists, etc.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – AT: Politics DAs** › Case Turns DA

Political leaders’ resistance to ban LAWs demonstrates their impulse to increase control and surveillance---even if they win the DA we are winning a root cause to long term governmental stability.

Sullins, 13 [John Sullins works for Sonoma State University’s department of philosophy, PhD, January 2013, accessed 6/30/22, 978-1-4799-0450-1, Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2013 5th International Conference on Project: The Morality of Military Robotics, “An ethical analysis of the case for robotic weapons arms control,” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261238028_An_ethical_analysis_of_the_case_for_robotic_weapons_arms_control/]/ISEE

If you are a politician in a liberal democracy, then the technology of unmanned weapons is the answer to your dreams. While armed aggression between liberal democracies is rare, they are involved in many military conflicts driven by clashes with nondemocratic countries or interventions in unstable regions of the world. Given the norms and values espoused in liberal democracies there is a political will to spread the virtues of democracy and check the aggressions of non-democratic powers. But other values and norms such as the distribution of political power to the voting population, severely hampers the governments of these countries who try to act on their military aspirations. There are massive political costs to be paid when it comes to deploying large numbers of troops in foreign lands. Sauer and Schörnig (2012), note that the governments of democracies want to engage in military activities but the citizens of democracies demand that these adventure be low cost with no casualties from their own military and low casualties inflicted on the enemy and local population. [T]he need to reduce costs, the short-term satisfaction of particular ‘risk-transfer rules’ for avoiding casualties, and the upkeep of a specific set of normative values – constitute the special appeal of unmanned systems to democracies” (Sauer and Schörnig, 2012, p. 365). Unmanned weapons systems would seem to allow all constituents within a liberal democracy to achieve their goals. The weapons are not expensive compared to the massive expense of building, deploying and maintaining manned systems. The missions are secret and so small they hardly warrant mention in the daily news back home. There is almost no risk to military personnel in their use and the number of enemy casualties per strike is relatively small. Also, politicians such as President Barack Obama have made claims that these weapons are far less indiscriminate and more tightly controlled in their killing than alternative modes of attack (Landler, 2012). We should note that this claim is backed up by what appears to be questionable methods used in the official calculation of civilian casualties since every adult male in the blast of the weapon is often considered a combatant by default, a claim that is often disputable (Qazi and Jillani, 2012). So the more precise targeting available on modern drones does not necessarily correspond to less civilian casualties (ibid). These weapons also come with a moral veneer that comes from the assumption that a more ethical conduct of war is possible using these machines. Sauer and Schörnig go on to conclude that the political goals along with the normative drives of liberal democracies necessitates that unmanned systems will continue to be armed with more powerful weaponry and that they will be given more demanding missions which will require greater autonomy from the machine (Sauer and Schörnig, 2012, p. 370). This argument shows that we can expect the research into autonomous weapons systems to increase and for these systems to proliferate into every aspect of military activities across the globe. Recent history has given ample empirical evidence to back this theory up. Even though President Obama was elected largely on an anti-war vote, it has been reported that there has been an 8% increase in the use of drones during his first term and in 2011 drones were used in, “…253 strikes – one every four days…. [And] Between 2,347 and 2,956 people are reported to have died in the attacks – most of them militants” (Woods, 2011). This trend has only increased since that time. Other countries such as Israel and Italy are known to operate reconnaissance drones but recently the German government has announced plans to invest in both armed and unarmed drones (Kim, 2013). As the enthusiasm for this technology grows, a mounting opposition movement has also emerged that claims that this technology is not a cheap, easy, casualty free means of propagating just war. Instead they claim that these technologies contribute to unjust military adventures and a indefensibly immoral push button warfare that claims the lives of thousands of innocents caught in the cross fire. In the interest of furthering the ethical use of these technologies, it is important that we give these counter arguments our full attention in this paper. We should note that some technologies can cause what philosophers of technology call reverse adaptation; “…the adjustment of human ends to match the character of the available means” (Winner, 1978, p. 229). This is where the social and political milieu of a society changes to accommodate the inflexibility of a technology, rather than waiting to deploy the technology when it is more suited to the human environment. A prime example would be the way that human societies changed due to the adoption of mass production necessitating all manner of social upheaval that proved to be the fault lines of human conflict over the last two centuries. There are many other examples of this in recent history, think of the social disruption caused by the introduction of the automobile or cellular telephone, etc. It is obvious that autonomous weapons are again confronting our societies with the problems of reverse adaptation. These weapons are completing a trend in technological warfare begun in the nineteenth century that is making traditional notions of ethics in warfare largely untenable. These notions were always on shaky ground to begin with, but the tradition of just war that reaches back to the middle ages has become almost mute in its ability to influence decisions made on the modern battlefield. If this was not worrisome enough, as aging drone technologies are replaced with better equipment, the surplus will find use in civilian law enforcement duties, this will complete the circle and technologies that liberal democracies gladly used to control their enemies will now be used in ways that challenge and potentially curtail cherished civil liberties at home. Because of this, it is vital that we engage in discussion of these technologies at every opportunity. We will take up this issue again and apply it to the problem of creating a realistic robotic arms control at the end of this paper.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – AT: Politics DAs** › Enloe – Must Read

Set aside concerns with political will or scarce resources - it’s what makes violence against women possible

Enloe 04 [Cynthia, prof of IR, The Curious Feminist, p. 74]

Thus we need to become more curious about the process of trivialization. How exactly do regimes, opposition parties, judges, popular movements, and the press go about making any incident of violence against women appear trivial? The gendered violence can be explained as inevitable- that is, not worth the expenditure of political capital. Or it can be treated by the trivializers as numerically inconsequential, so rare that it would seem wasteful of scarce political will or state resources to try to prevent it. Third, trivialization can be accomplished by engaging in comparisons: how can one spend limited political attention on, say, domestic violence or forced prostitution when there are market forces like global competition, structural adjustment, or nuclear testing to deal with- as if, that is, none of those had any relationship to the incidence of violence against women? Finally, trivialization may take the form of undermining the credibility of the messenger. As early as the 1800's trivializers already were labeling women who spoke out publicly against violence against women as "loose," "prudish," or disappointed (it would be the trivializers twentieth century successors who would thing to add "lesbian").

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – AT: Terrorism DA** › Turn

LAWs strengthen terrorist groups and causes proxy escalation.

Ray 19 Trisha Ray [junior fellow with the Cyber Initiative, ORF] Machine-driven weapons need an international system of accountability, February 22, 2019, SM

In March 2014, hundreds of mysterious gunmen in camouflage appeared on the streets of Crimea and began taking over local government buildings. While Russia initially denied the existence of the “little green men”, as they came to be known, President Vladimir Putin admitted that they were Russian military at the one-year anniversary of the Crimean occupation. Ethical issues and the complete violation of the Geneva Conventions notwithstanding, the logic behind this tactic was quite straightforward and compelling: Aid pro-Russian forces while creating enough uncertainty about Russian involvement so as to prevent NATO retaliation and global backlash. The tactic itself has been deployed by rogue states before, but usually through proxies. Pakistan, for instance, has a history of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir. Yet with fewer remaining strategic partners and important resources connecting it to more powerful states, Pakistan no longer possesses the leverage needed to shield itself from international backlash as Russia did. In such an environment, states like Pakistan may be tempted to turn toward new methods to achieve their goals. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) — which can detect, select and attack targets without human intervention — are one such avenue. International rules around LAWS are relatively underdeveloped, and in the absence of clear norms on human accountability and attribution for autonomous weapons, we could see states like Pakistan deploy LAWS for operations outside their borders. LAWS present several benefits for “middle powers”: They increase the reach and effectiveness of forces, reduce casualties and enable persistent presence in vast, inaccessible terrains. Countries like India or South Korea, which operate in a complicated geostrategic context, can therefore use LAWS to effectively police and protect their territory. On the flipside, LAWS can be used by state and non-state actors to engage in asymmetric tactics. This could take three forms: A state could directly deploy LAWS against an adversary state; a state could equip proxies such as insurgent or terrorist groups with autonomous weapons units; a non-state actor steals or otherwise illegally acquires autonomous systems or units. With this destabilising potential in mind, external state actors that actively aid insurgencies and terrorist organisations will be tempted to deploy autonomous systems and claim they are stolen or rogue units. While LAWS are still in the development stage and are fairly inaccessible for most states — let alone non-state groups — due to high costs, and lack of skilled AI talent and operators, it is not a complete stretch of imagination to envision a future where autonomous weapons are within the reach of any state or non-state actor that wants them.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › U.S. Leadership

“Global leadership” is code for masculine protection. The aff is the benevolent masculine protector who attempts to save feminized groups from insecurity, which requires women to forfeit autonomy to gain protection.

Young 03

(Iris Marion, Department of Political Science University of Chicago, The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2003, vol. 29, no. 1], pgs 4-5, JKS)

The logic of masculinist protection contrasts with a model of masculinity assumed by much feminist theory, of masculinity as self-consciously dominative. On the male domination model, masculine men wish to mas- ter women sexually for the sake of their own gratification and to have the pleasures of domination. They bond with other men in comradely male settings that give them specific benefits from which they exclude women, and they harass women in order to enforce this exclusion and maintain their superiority (MacKinnon 1987; May 1998, chaps. 4–6). This image of the selfish, aggressive, dominative man who desires sexual capture of women corresponds to much about male-dominated institutions and the behavior of many men within them. For my purposes in this essay, however, it is important to recall another apparently more benign image of masculinity, one more associated with ideas of chivalry. In this latter image, real men are neither selfish nor do they seek to enslave or overpower others for the sake of enhancing themselves. Instead, the gallantly masculine man is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in relation to women. He faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from harm and allow them to pursue elevating and decorative arts. The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a protector. The “good” man is one who keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and readily risks himself in the face of threats from the outside in order to protect the subordinate members of his household. The logic of masculinist protection, then, includes the image of the selfish aggressor who wishes to invade the lord’s property and sexually conquer his women. These are the bad men. Good men can only appear in their goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are aggressors who wish to attack them. The dominative masculinity in this way constitutes protective masculinity as its other. The world out there is heartless and uncivilized, and the movements and motives of the men in it are unpredictable and difficult to discern. The protector must therefore take all precautions against these threats, remain watchful and suspicious, and be ready to fight and sacrifice for the sake of his ones (Elshtain 1987, 1992). Masculine protection is needed to make a home a haven. Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate relation of those in the protected position. In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy. When the household lives under a threat, there cannot be divided wills andS I G N S Autumn 2003 ❙ 5 arguments about who will do what, or what is the best course of action. The head of the household should decide what measures are necessary for the security of the people and property, and he gives the orders that they must follow if they and their relations are to remain safe. As Stiehm puts it: “The protector cannot achieve status simply through his accom- plishment, then. Because he has dependents he is as socially connected as one who is dependent. He is expected to provide for others. Often a protector tries to get help from and also control the lives of those he protects—in order to ‘better protect’ them” (1982, 372). Feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a violent and overbearing bully. The feminine woman, rather, on this construction, adores her protector and happily defers to his judgment in return for the promise of security that he offers. She looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world for her sake. That he finds her worthy of such risks gives substance to her self. It is only fitting that she should minister to his needs and obey his dictates. Hobbes is the great theorist of political power founded on a need and desire for protection. He depicts a state of nature in which people live in small families where all believe some of the others envy them and desire to enlarge themselves by stealing from or conquering them. As a conse- quence, everyone in this state of nature must live in a state of fear and insecurity, even when not immediately under attack. Households must live with the knowledge that outsiders might wish to attack them, espe- cially if they appear weak and vulnerable, so each must construct defensive fortresses and be on watch. It is only sensible, moreover, to conduct preemptive strikes against those who might wish to attack and to try to weaken them. But each knows that the others are likely to make defensive raids, which only adds to fear and insecurity. In Hobbes’s state of nature some people may be motivated by simple greed and desire for conquest and domination. In this state of nature everyone has reason to feel in- secure, however, not because all have these dominative motives but be- cause he or she is uncertain about who does and each person understands his or her own vulnerability.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Terrorism

Their seemingly benign understanding of terror only regenerates masculine war-making.

Athanassiou 12

(Cerelia, PhD candidate at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol, UK. Her research is on conceptualisations of security post-9/11, focusing specifically on the discursive strategies used by the Obama administration to disempower the Global War on Terror., ‘Gutsy’ Decisions and Passive Processes THE WARRIOR DECISION-MAKER AFTER THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2014, Vol. 16, No. 1, 6–25, JKS)

Analytically, the exceptionality of the GWOT most usefully serves in high- lighting its continuities with ‘normal’ politics (see Grewal 2005: 197; Puar 2007: 76; Richter-Montpetit 2007: 40; Parpart and Zalewski 2008: 5). The effects of the Obama administration’s efforts to roll back the GWOT’s overt militarization with a ‘return to the rule of law’ do not signify change from the masculine ‘war machine’, but rather generate this ‘war machine’s’ very conditions of existence. It is, after all, the warrior’s logic that is privileged and channelled through every decision, and it is this logic that subordinates other, seemingly more passive, processes. The Washington Post editorial on the killing of Osama bin Laden quoted Senator Lindsey Graham’s rationaliz- ation of the decision to kill and not capture: ‘From a Navy Seal perspective, you had to believe that this guy [Osama bin Laden] was a walking IED [impro- vised explosive device]’ (Washington Post 2011). A militarized understanding and treatment of ‘national security’ continues to re-write itself into the workings of the State, enabling the hegemonic masculinity of the warrior decision-maker to keep privileging itself, preventing meaningful change from happening. If we heed Enloe’s (2000: 3) invaluable advice on the matter, we notice that these are exactly the workings of militarization, and through that, of a continuing GWOT: ‘The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal’. It is this veneration of militarism, and its associated gender and race hierarchies, that offer the clue on the lack of change. Obama’s insistence on reintroducing the rule of law went against the tra- ditional understanding of ‘security’ because masculine posturing, not feminine public negotiation, is traditionally seen as being most effective in protecting the nation-state and its ‘women and children’ (Enloe 2007: 60–1). However, articulations on the importance of the law also prop up the warrior’s agenda: Abdulmutallab’s prosecution is an aspect of an operation geared pre- cisely towards achieving the effects of the bin Laden episode (see Cohen 2011). With the most recent debates centring on the validity of extrajudicially killing US citizens, we are shown a system in which the status of the warrior has not diminished (see Holder 2012), despite the promise in 2008 that different atti- tudes might be prioritized. Carver (2008: 84) provides valuable support here, because he points to the overarching framework of international politics that ‘incorporates a myth of a unitary, unproblematic masculinised being – “warrior man”/“economic man” – whose world is not in fact bifurcated by a war/peace distinction, but is rather one world of competitive, aggressive, self- interested and somewhat paranoid strategic interaction’ (emphasis in original). In such a framework, the ‘rational decision-maker’ alone cannot deliver any meaningful change when he is so closely correlated to the ‘warrior’; this was demonstrated by Obama’s reintroduction of the ‘rule of law’ only to keep subor- dinating it to the demands of the GWOT’s framework of war. The hegemonic masculinity of the executive decision-maker clearly has to privilege warrior definitions of ‘toughness’ over dangerous forays into public deliberation and accountability; and that is the masculine reality of national security.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Russia/Putin

The disad reinforces a gendered understanding of Putin’s national identity, which turns the DA

Riabov and Riabova 14

(Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabova (2014), Oleg Riabov is professor of philosophy and director of the Center for Ethnic and Nationalism Studies at Ivanovo State University, Russia. Tatiana Riabova is professor of sociology at Ivanovo State University The Remasculinization of Russia?, Problems of Post-Communism, 61:2, 23-35, DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216610202, JKS)

Representing Nations: Masculinizing Us, Feminizing Them

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › National Security

National security is profoundly gendered- it relies on binaries like protector/protected that sanitize global violence and shut down questions about militarism

Eroukhmanoff, PhD, 17

(Clara, IR@LondonSouthBank, A feminist reading of Foreign policy under Trump: Mother of All Bombs, wall ‘and the “locker room banter”‘, Critical Studies on Security, DOI: 10.1080/21624887.2017.1355156

This article offers a gendered reading of three recent events under newly elected Donald J. Trump: the attempt to build a ‘beautiful wall’ between Mexico and the United States, the recent Mother Of All Bombs (MOAB) military strike in Afghanistan and the ‘locker room talk’ scandal that emerged during the 2016 election campaign. I relate these events to international security by disturbing the cultural grammar on which these events are founded and respond to the feminist call that ‘the personal is international and the international is personal’ (Enloe [1989] 2000). A feminist American foreign policy analysis of ‘100 Days of Trump’ brings attention to the ways in which bordering practices like wall-building and military interventions are rendered legitimate through constructed gendered tropes that, in turn, transform the wider war on terrorism into a private ‘family affair’. In this light, military strikes are not political acts requiring legitimation in the public sphere but instead are necessary disciplinary tools unqualified for political discussion. The field of International Security addresses questions about the interactions between more or less secure sovereign states in an anarchical international system but tends to ignore questions about gender. In this view, states are considered as clearly separated entities in an anarchical international system ‘who’ become ‘alive’ by being attributed anthropomorphic qualities: they have a ‘body’ (the nation) and a mind (the state) with a capacity to think ‘rationally’ (Wadley 2010, 38). As Wadley (2010) notes, ‘this means that states are gendered, and are gendered in much the same way as people are: through repeated performances’. An example of this performance is the recent launch of the MOAB attack in the Nangarhar province. On 13 April 2017, the US military sent the largest non-nuclear bomb to Afghanistan, which impact, according to Afghans, ‘felt like the heavens were falling’ (Rasmussen for The Guardian, Rasmussen 2017). This colloquialism, which has dominated most accounts of the attack, has three important functions. First, it feminises the Other (the Islamic State) by forcing the Islamic State to be passive through the act of a feminine actor, the ‘Mother’. According to White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer (2017), the ‘Mother’ was launched to deny the Islamic State ‘operational access’. In turn, the feminisation of the Islamic State reaffirms US masculinity and agency. Linda Åhäll (2015) argues that ideas of motherhood and maternalism are valued as agency in International Relations (IR). Indeed, the ‘Mother attack’ is written as a powerful manifestation of US power. The strike is described with action verbs underpinned by sexualised masculine tropes of aggression, all in the active voice. The MOAB, is ‘designed for destroying underground targets but is not a deep-earth penetrating weapon’ (Rasmussen 2017 emphasis added). It ‘exploded above a complex of caves and tunnels’ and ‘killed dozens of ISIS fighters’ (CNN 2017 emphasis added). This excitement was shared by Fox News talk show host Geraldo Rivera and guests, who broadcasted the video over the top of country singer Toby Keith singing ‘courtesy of the red, white and blue’ and praised the attack as ‘what freedom looks like’ (Jamieson 2017). Making weapons exciting is not new. Carol Cohn (1987) has written in length about the phallic imagery that suffused the world of defence intellectuals during the Cold War. Cohn (1987) suggests that the words that described nuclear weapons as ‘vertical erectors, thrustto-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration’ constitute a form of distance by removing military strategists from the possibilities of nuclear destruction and instead making them thrilling. As Duncanson and Eschle (2008, 549) argue, ‘it makes the nuclear arms race seem the stuff of funny locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly consequences’. While action and sexualised verbs describing the strike has the potential to make military endeavours exciting while minimising harm, the reference to a ‘Mother’ also associates the strike with something that is instinctive, maternal and thus the product of a natural order. The work of Ruth Bloch (1978) on the rise of the Moral Mother in America in the mid-nineteenth century is quite insightful here. From the eighteenth century onwards, printed literature began to stress the unique value of the maternal role (Bloch 1978, 109). It merged New England Puritan ideas about women as ‘help-meet’, a form of domestic competence in assisting roles for men and essentially female subordination to them, and eighteenth-century notions of purity, femininity and ornamental refinement. In examining childcare books of this period, Bloch (1978) finds that mothers, who were considered as the natural carers of their infant, were also expected to ‘establish gentle but firm discipline as early as possible’. In this ‘MOAB’ war story, the United States is made the natural and legitimate actor who can nurse the Islamic State and be in charge of their physical management (‘denying them operational space’). More importantly, this war story equates the attack to a moral mission, just as women were idealised above all as ‘transmitters of moral values’ (Bloch 1978). Concomitantly, the ultimate goal of the strike becomes one of protection, moral directive and nurture, defining the relationship between a Moral Mother and her infant, and not one of war, aggressiveness or masculinity. Launching the GBU-43/B in the Nangahar province is a moral duty of care, just as Moral Mothers had a duty to protect their infant. Therefore, calling the largest airdrop munitions in the US arsenal a ‘Mother’ also infantilises the Islamic State. In this construction, bombing the Islamic State is not an act of war, but a necessary act of discipline of badly behaved children.1 Family tropes shape perception of military interventions by making certain interpretations more visible than others. For instance, referring to NATO at the end of the Cold War as a ‘nuclear family’ that welcomed ex-Soviet countries who ‘just got divorced’ and ‘looking to get married immediately’ attempt to naturalise unequal relations of power between countries in the international system (Costigliola 1997, 163). The second repeated performance reaffirming the gendered nature of the United States involves the practice of wall-building. At the heart of ‘America First’ and ‘make America great again’ is the idea of a community that is in decline. Not only does America ‘not win anymore’ but America is letting others control and dominate the American nation. On the one hand, the nation is gendered by acquiring a status of being threatened and in need of protection. ‘Bringing back borders’ here constitutes a practice that protects this gendered community against the ‘ravages of other countries’ (Trump 2017), which according to Trump, can be made secure again by the erection of a wall. Indeed, the ‘American carnage stops right here and stops right now’ (Trump 2017). On the other hand, the wall reinstates the state as masculine protector of the nation. This wall is ‘physical, tall, powerful, beautiful, southern’ and importantly, it is ‘impenetrable’ (Trump 2016b). The raison d’être of the nation-state is thus preserved through the fencing of the border, by physically locking out immigrant Others and other threatening states. Other security practices, by contrast, lock bodies in. On 7 October 2016, at the height of Donald J. Trump’s campaign, a lewd video revealed Trump boasting about ‘grabbing women by the pussy’ and ‘moving onto a woman like a bitch’ (Trump 2016a). This language was described as illustrating ‘rape culture’ (Dirks 2016) according to the New York Times, ‘constitut- [ing] rape culture’ (Mahdawi 2016) according to The Guardian, and ‘directly contributing to rape culture’ (Rivesz 2016) according to The Independent. Trump constructed the locker room as a non-political space, in which the agency of female bodies was irrelevant or was subjected to the power of a masculine other. Indeed, ‘they [women] let you do it, you can do whatever you want’ (Rivesz 2016). In response, Trump 2016a apologised ‘if anyone was offended’ and stated that his words were ‘locker room banter, a private conversation that took place many years ago’. By dismissing this incident as ‘locker room banter’, it implied that what goes on in the locker room should be left and ‘locked in’ the private sphere. Yet Trump’s comments in the ‘locker room’ are not simply a private matter of female agency. It entails a much more complex construction of a gendered subject along national lines. Forms of power between men and women in seemingly ‘private’ spaces are connected to forms of power in the international system (Enloe 2013, 40). ‘National security’ is gendered by reproducing the protector (state)/ protected (nation) script. As Hansen (2000, 59 original emphasis) notes, ‘gender security’ cannot be examined outside of the concept of ‘national security’ but ‘the discourse of “national security” might silence women’s security problems when “women’s problems” conflict with the securities of the national community’. Indeed, addressing gender security in the locker room may entail unlocking the American nation to encounter the Other, which is far from Trump’s strategy in building the beautiful wall. For feminist scholars of security and foreign policy, the research agenda is widened by expanding the analysis beyond war and international conflict to include poverty, patriarchy, domestic violence, rape (Sjoberg 2010, 4) and essentially ‘locker room banter’. The goal here is one of internationalising the locker room by examining the scandal as a security problem, not only of women in the locker room, but embedded in the construction of the American nation as an insecure community. Disturbing the cultural grammar2 of foreign policy thus involves seeing the gendered nature of military interventions entwined with what goes on in the locker room. The US–Mexico wall attempts to materialise and maintain gendered dichotomies between the national and the international, the inside and the outside, and importantly between the private/locker room and the public/political room. It is not only a wall between two states; it can be problematised to border two sets of spaces: the American nation and the locker room. ‘Winning again’ by regaining borders is thus tantamount to locking power hierarchies in the locker room and not simply a matter of ‘national security’. (1-3)