2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › Sanctions › 1nc Enforcement
Wright ’22 — Robin; a contributing writer and columnist, has written for The New Yorker since 1988. Her first piece on Iran won the National Magazine Award for best reporting. She has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as at Yale, Duke, Dartmouth, and the University of California, Santa Barbara. March 7, 2022; "Why Sanctions Too Often Fail"; New Yorker; https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-sanctions-too-often-fail; //CYang
Yet sanctions generate meaningful change only about forty per cent of the time. Years of sanctions failed in North Korea, Venezuela, and Iraq. Cuba has faced layers of U.S. trade and arms embargoes since 1960. The Communist regime is still in power. The Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, faced multiple sanctions for his brutal repression after the Arab Spring uprising, in 2011, turned into a civil war. Hundreds of thousands have died, yet Assad is still firmly entrenched in Damascus. Sanctions are often sagas. Success in South Africa took three decades. The Iran model, which the U.S. has invoked for Russia, has had gyrating effects. Sanctions also produce heartbreak. The agony is the differential in timing. A gun, shell, or bomb can kill in seconds. Sanctions take a comparative eon in the scheme of war or a humanitarian crisis. “They rarely work,” Benn Steil, of the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “But, when they do work, they tend to take a very long time.”
The main flaws are usually the exemptions, known as carve-outs, that provide financial lifelines. Humanitarian goods — food, medical equipment, education materials — are generally exempt. But enforcement of sanctions on everything else is up to individual nations, which can amend or bend the rules for their own economic needs. In 1966, the U.N. for the first time issued sanctions that sought regime change after Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, declared independence from Britain to preserve white-minority rule. The Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Rhodesia, but only on ninety per cent of the country’s exports. For years, the U.S. Congress approved an additional carve-out that allowed the import of Rhodesian chromium, a key component in American jet engines, cars, and stainless steel. (Rhodesia was then one of three major world suppliers; the Soviet Union was another.) It took more than a decade — of civil war and sanctions — for the Rhodesian regime to cede power to a democratically elected government. Along the way, some twenty thousand died.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › ILAW/Treaties › 2nc Fail No US Cred
Merelli ’18 — Amelia; senior reporter at Quartz, where they cover the intersection of public health, the healthcare business, and inequality. May 14, 2018; "It’s not just Trump. The US has always broken its treaties, pacts and promises"; Quartz; https://qz.com/1273510/all-the-international-agreements-the-us-has-broken-before-the-iran-deal/; //CYang
Well, the US is an unreliable international partner — and it has long been one, even before the current administration pulled out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris agreement on climate change, and threatened to end NAFTA. History is dotted with treaties that the US has signed but not ratified, signed and then unsigned, and even refused to sign after pushing everyone else to sign.
Capriciousness about international treaties is an old US tradition. It starts with the country’s very creation: hundreds of treaties signed with Native American tribes that were either broken, or not ratified. Today, the US is one of the countries to have ratified the fewest number of international human rights treaties — of the 18 agreements passed by the UN, America has only ratified five.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › ILAW/Treaties › 2nc Fail No US Cred
Wahal, 21 (Anya Wahal, 9-21-2021, "On International Treaties, the United States Refuses to Play Ball," Council on Foreign Relations, , LASA-CSK)
The United States enters into more than two-hundred treaties each year on a range of international issues, including peace, defense, human rights, and the environment. Despite this seemingly impressive figure, the United States constantly fails to sign or ratify treaties the rest of the world supports. It has failed to ratify treaties that tackle biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions, protect the rights of children and women, and govern international waters. For a country frequently looked to as a global leader, the United States has consistently failed to step up in international partnerships. In fact, the United States has one of the worst records of any country in ratifying human rights and environmental treaties. Why hasn’t the United States stepped up to the plate? According to scholars and policymakers, one major reason is the fear of treaties infringing on national sovereignty. The United States shuns treaties that appear to subordinate its governing authority to that of an international body like the United Nations. The United States consistently prioritizes its perceived national interests over international cooperation, opting not to ratify to protect the rights of U.S. businesses or safeguard the government’s freedom to act on national security. Politics also poses a significant barrier to ratification. While presidents can sign treaties, ratification requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Oftentimes, the power of special interest groups and the desire of politicians to maintain party power, on top of existing concerns of sovereignty, almost assures U.S. opposition to treaty ratification. The failure of the United States to lead on international treaty accession can have dangerous consequences. It can undermine the credibility of those treaties, weaken international partnerships, and raise concerns about the United States’ own commitments to matters such as human rights and environmental protection. By refusing to ratify treaties the rest of the world supports, the United States can lose other countries’ trust and gives up the influence of shaping the future direction of global rules. Furthermore, abstaining serves as a barrier to resolving critical global and regional issues, implicitly giving permission to other countries to free ride and follow the rule of law established by treaties only when it is in their best interest. Given these implications, I outline ten treaties the United States has not ratified and highlight arguments opponents cite for the lack of ratification. Many international law scholars purport that treaties are the most effective and binding source of international law.[1] However, the efficacy of multilateral treaties may be exaggerated, as demonstrated by minimal penalties for noncompliance, particularly for strong states, and the United States’ absence from and self-interested interpretation of various treaties. The promotion of credible commitment is held as an essential benefit of treaties; proponents argue that treaties raise the cost of noncompliance more effectively than informal methods and are unique in showing the seriousness of a party to a commitment.[2] These contentions lose some force after investigating three enforcement mechanisms for treaty breaches, and the lack of negative impacts thereof.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › ILAW/Treaties › 1nc No US Cred
Simone, 1/7 (Brooke Simone, J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, 1-7-2022, "Strong States’ Noncompliance, Absence, and Self-Interest: How Effective Are Treaties Really? — The Michigan Journal of International Law," Michigan Journal of International Law, , LASA-CSK)
First, while the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Article 60 allows for termination or suspension of a treaty in the event of material breach,[3] the likelihood of that termination occurring is minimal, especially for certain types of treaties. For human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, or environmental treaties, termination would undermine the global stability and norms that the parties entered into the treaty to protect.[4] States’ commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a key human rights treaty, has not wavered despite numerous breaches, even as recent as June 2020 after a United Nations’ report outlined the Philippines’ grave human rights violations.[5] Second, strong states are less likely to face retaliation or penalties as a result of treaty violation. For these states, breach does not typically threaten reputational damage severe enough to encourage compliance, nor do they fear reciprocal sanctions, political pressure, or other retorsions and countermeasures as much because of their position as economic and political powerhouses.[6] Strong states often act out of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement, reacting to power dynamics instead of legal obligations or fear of penalty[7]: according to realist Charles Krauthammer, treaties are meaningless “when dealing with countries for which law of any kind is a mere instrument, infinitely adaptable to the requirements of power.”[8] Other enforcement mechanisms, such as internal domestic pressure and shaming by NGOs, are not unique to treaties and are just as influential for breaches of customary international law (CIL) or unilateral statements.[9] Third, the idea that treaty breach can trigger legal actions in court against the violator is actually limited in practice, as there is not always guarantee of jurisdiction. States face binding legal repercussions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under three situations of contentious jurisdiction, which are often avoided by states.[10] The ICJ has jurisdiction over leading international actors like the U.S., Russia, and China only if they signed a prior treaty agreeing to refer disputes to the court;[11] the U.S. has further limited this legal accountability. It announced in October 2018 that it would withdraw from the Optional Protocol and Dispute Resolution to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which granted ICJ jurisdiction.[12] Ambassador Bolton justified this by referring to President Reagan’s withdrawal from the Optional Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the ICJ statute and President Bush’s withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, two additional ways the U.S. has lessened its ability to be held liable.[13] Even when the ICJ or other third-party mechanisms are available options, states can be reluctant to take their disputes there.[14] For these reasons, lack of definite review before a court minimizes the threat of being held accountable for breach, thereby negating much of a treaty’s meaningfulness in promoting credible commitment and compliance. While multilateral treaties strive to create uniform, widespread agreement and enforceability, perhaps it is instead CIL – which emerges over time as binding upon all states without having to opt-in to legal review – that accomplishes that goal, enabling potential accountability for any state’s violation of the law. In addition to the lack of repercussions for treaty noncompliance, a look at the U.S.’s absence and withdrawal from various multilateral agreements suggests that treaties may not be as significant or effective as frequently argued. The U.S. has not signed or ratified several key international treaties;[15] it is not party to the VCLT or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but generally accepts their guidelines as binding under CIL.[16] This begs the question: Is codification via treaty necessary for adherence and enforcement, or can CIL be enough? Additionally, the Trump administration has recently withdrawn from numerous treaties.[17] In May 2020, the U.S. announced its intentions to withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty (OST),[18] which was formed after the Cold War to promote trust between the U.S. and Russia and allows parties to conduct unarmed surveillance flights in each other’s air space.[19] The very premise of this treaty has eroded. The U.S. accused Russia of treaty breach and is now pulling out, despite other countries expressing both continued commitment to the agreement[20] and worry regarding U.S. withdrawal.[21] So another question arises: How effective is a treaty like the OST in its objective to create a binding foundation for trust if irrational leaders can undermine just that, seemingly without concern for the other parties or for global stability? Treaties’ efficacy is also called into question by the U.S.’s wielding of economic power to cripple still-intact treaties. In 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – better known as the Iran nuclear deal – which allowed for the easing of economic sanctions in exchange for Iran restricting its nuclear program.[22] Believers in treaties’ infallible strength would likely have envisioned that the other P5+1 members could continue adhering to the JCPOA’s conditions, at least to a degree. However, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on any government that traded with Iran, using its “domination of financial markets” to “bull[y] other countries into capitulating.”[23] Another question yet: Can treaties be touted as binding and successful mechanisms if one powerful, renegade state can threaten the entire agreement through economic force?
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › ILAW/Treaties › 1nc No Enforcement
Hannum ’22 — Hurst; Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University. February 25, 2022; “International Law Says Putin’s War Against Ukraine is Illegal. Does That Matter?”; United States News; ; //CYang
Under no scenario is Russia’s armed invasion of Ukraine legal under contemporary international law and norms. Self-defense is the only justification for use of force against another country, according to international law. This condition is found in the and is binding for all 193 U.N. member countries. The charter’s only clear exception to prohibiting the use of force is self-defense, “if an armed attack occurs” against a country. Rescuing citizens who are trapped or in danger in another country is recognized as a form of self-defense. But these interventions are strictly limited to evacuating citizens, not overthrowing governments. Nothing that Ukraine has done to date could be construed as an “armed attack” on Russia and justify any Russian claim to self-defense. Even if Putin’s false claim that Ukraine is targeting Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine were true, it would not justify the countrywide attacks he has unleashed. Intervening for , such as trying to prevent large-scale loss of life or suffering, has been asserted by a few countries and activists as another rationale for use of force. But this justification has not yet been widely accepted, unless the U.N. Security Council authorizes the intervention. It did so when it authorized a U.S.-led military force in to help prevent famine. How is international law enforced? “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law … almost all of the time,” a highly respected U.S. law professor, Louis Henkin, There is no standing international police force to enforce international law. Compliance is primarily in the hands of countries themselves. The International Court of Justice, created by the U.N. and located in the Hague, Netherlands, decides disputes between countries, including alleged violations of the U.N. Charter. But only 73 countries out 195 have accepted the court’s jurisdiction. The U.N. Security Council also has the authority to authorize the use of force under the U.N. Charter in order to maintain international peace and security. This option is unrealistic in the situation of Ukraine because Russia has a permanent seat on the council — along with the other four permanent members: the U.S., U.K., France and China — and thus holds veto power over any decision. Finally, either the U.N. Security Council or individual countries may impose economic or diplomatic sanctions if necessary, have done. But such actions can have only an indirect impact on deterring or ending a war. There is probably no law, international or domestic, that enjoys universal compliance. The challenge to enforce international law remains — a challenge laid bare most recently and blatantly by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › Norms › 2nc Norms Fail – Ukraine
Domínguez-Redondo ’22 — Elvira; LLB, BA Business and Management, LLM, PhD is Associate Professor of International Law at Middlesex University, London. She is the Module Coordi NATOr of the 'United Nations mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights' at University Alcalá de Henares, Madrid. March 10, 2022; “Russian misuse of international law is final nail in coffin of post WW2 order”; IntLawGrrls; [edited for ableist language] https://ilg2.org/2022/03/10/russian-misuse-of-international-law-is-final-nail-in-coffin-of-post-ww2-order/; //CYang
[TITLE]: “Russian misuse of international law is final nail in coffin of post WW2 order” The distortion of arguments based on international law and the position of those making them have, in my opinion, completed the destruction of a system no longer suitable to prevent global armed conflict. This is not – or not only – an intrinsic flaw in the system’s design, but the inevitable by-product of intentional actions carried out by those who ought to have been most interested in preserving it. Role of Rhetoric in the Russian aggression International law has been referenced by Russia in justifying its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has advanced every possible exception to the prohibition of the use of force in different disguises including invitation, self-defence, and humanitarian intervention (Sayapin’s summary here). The weakness of the legal claims are reflected in the general rejection they have deservedly received.[1] Still, the Russian attempt to provide legal grounds to its actions is remarkable, going as far as recognising two new ‘states’ for the purpose of presenting the invasion as a consent-based ‘peace operation’.[2] Russia also declared that sanctions used against its economy as countermeasures are akin go an act of war, reviving legal arguments that equate use of armed force to coercive means of enforcing international law. [3] The swift engagement and prompt response of the European Court of Human Rights, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court is remarkable and a revealing testimony of the centrality of international law in the means used to address the conflict. [4] Beyond repair – (another) wake up call to replace the system The United Nations was established in 1945 with the primary objective of protecting future generations from the scourge of war. This mission relied on two pillars: stopping the use of armed force, and creating a Security Council with unique responsibility for maintaining global peace and security. Russia (then the Soviet Union), China, the United Kingdom, France and the United States have since occupied a privileged position with permanent seats and veto powers. In practice this means that outside the confines of self-defence, the use of armed force is only legal if the States most likely to provoke a third world war are in agreement. In other words, the system is based on granting extraordinary powers to a few countries that would, in exchange, act as guardians of international peace and security. What is often referred to as ‘paralysis’ [inaction] has been the cornerstone of a system designed to prevent a third world war. As I have explained elsewhere (here and here), the legitimacy of the Security Council has been irreversibly undermined by previous illegal uses of force in Kosovo, Syria and Iraq by other permanent members of the Security Council (mainly the USA and the UK, but also France). States’ attempts to address the Russia/Ukraine conflict through dispute settlement mechanisms, with an emphasis on legal arguments manifested in an exceptionally prolific use of international courts, consolidates the strength of legal rules involved in this scenario. However, unanimous condemnations of Russia contained in emerging decisions derived from applying standard frameworks are unlikely to stop the war. This conflict will likely end at a negotiation table, potentially with a peace agreement, hopefully in the short-term, to prevent further suffering, loss of life and weapons induced accelerated planetary destruction. The strength of the rule prohibiting the use of force is likely to rise and States that have progressively broadened the scope of exceptions to legitimise their lethal enterprises may reconsider their positions. This is not the case for the system established to monitor and guarantee compliance with the rules through the United Nations Security Council. The destruction of the pillars on which the collective security system was built in 1945 has been completed by those who benefited most from it and who were in charge of preserving its worth as an effective mechanism to prevent a global armed conflict and total annihilation. End of the Security Council Whatever the outcome, it is hardly conceivable that the weakened legitimacy of the Security Council can survive this final blow in neither its current nor reformed form. Those in power will seek to in articulate and enforce rules maintaining the status quo of their privileged position. Because it requires legitimacy to be acceptable to the majority away from power, law also embeds some form of public morality and fairness. We are at a crossroad: while the prominence of the international legal order in times of crisis has been evident, it is not possible to save the system designed to prevent and/or stop a global war only by rewriting it (as suggested by Johns and Kotova). Paraphrasing Castellino, the logic leading to the obliteration of this system has highlighted how outdated its premises are. This underscores the imperative urgent need for a radically new approach to international relations, perhaps beyond the political organisation of the state and the conception of a ‘nation’ underpinning it.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › Norms › 1nc US Cred
Hirsh ’5-11 — Michael; senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. May 11, 2022; "Why Biden’s Anti-Putin Democracy Crusade Is Failing"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/us-russia-war-ukraine-democracy-autocracy/; //CYang
In the beginning, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine appeared to be an ideal rationale for U.S. President Joe Biden’s global democracy campaign. What better endorsement could there be than the spectacle of a brave, doughty democracy fighting off a brutal autocrat? As Biden put it in a major speech in Poland in March, Ukraine was now “on the front lines” in “the perennial struggle for democracy and freedom.” But despite Ukraine’s success on the ground against Putin’s military, the White House’s efforts in the months since to frame the conflict as a titanic worldwide battle between democracy and autocracy don’t appear to be working very well. Outside of Western European allies and longtime U.S. partners such as Japan, much of the rest of the world simply isn’t signing on. Problem one: Most of these countries either aren’t democracies or are so deeply flawed as democracies that they’re less than inspired by the rhetoric. Problem two: In the eyes of much of the world, the country that’s doing the preaching — the United States — is a badly broken democracy that ought to heal itself first. These problems were evident at the White House this week, when Biden welcomed leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), most of whom are autocrats or represent one-party states that show no signs of going democratic. Among them: Cambodia’s longtime strongman Hun Sen; Thai Prime Minister Pravuth Chan-ocha, a former general who seized power in a 2014 coup; and the authoritarian leaders of Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei. To Biden’s relief, the head of Myanmar’s junta, Min Aung Hlaing, another ASEAN member, was not among them. On Wednesday, Kurt Campbell, Biden’s lead White House advisor on East Asia, acknowledged that the talks would be “maybe a little bit uncomfortable at times” but did not directly address the issue of flagging democracy in the region. “I do think we will have a full exchange and we acknowledge that there are differences of view,” he said at a forum at the United States Institute of Peace. Most of these countries have indicated they are nonaligned in the struggle between Russia and the West; Indonesia, another leading ASEAN member and a democracy, has even invited Putin to the G-20 summit it is hosting in November. The ASEAN countries are joined by nations across the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America, and Africa — countries that include a number of democracies but also a quasi-rogue gallery of autocrats and dubious democrats who represent the majority of the world’s population. And they are not persuaded that Russia, a major source of oil and gas supplies, needs to be cut off from the global system. “Their attitude is, ‘Who are you to be telling us what to do or telling us what our rights are? People in your country who win the popular vote don’t even get elected president. So don’t preach to us!’” said Michael Coppedge, an expert in democratization at the University of Notre Dame who is one of the managers of an exhaustive international study by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, released last month. According to a report by Freedom House, “Reversing the Decline of Democracy in the United States,” “[A]mid a 16-year decline in global freedom, democracy in the United States has suffered serious erosion.” The report found that the United States had dropped to level of flawed democracies like Panama, Romania, and South Korea and concluded, “The weakening of American democracy did not start with [former U.S.] President [Donald] Trump’s direct pressure on democratic institutions and rights, and his departure from the White House has not ended the crisis.” Critics say that while the Biden administration’s framing of the conflict is working well within NATO and the West — joined by firm U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea — the U.S. president needs to rethink his approach if he wants to corral more allies in his efforts to isolate and weaken Russia. The real issue being tested, they say, is not democracy per se but rather an issue that most countries can identify with more readily: the sanctity of their borders under post-World War II norms upheld by United Nations-sanctioned international law. “This is about territorial integrity and non-use of force to change borders, along with international norms. Those are the core issues,” said Bruce Jentleson, a political scientist at Duke University and a former senior foreign-policy advisor to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. “In that respect, it’s akin to Kuwait 1990,” when then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush won a broad international consensus against then-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. In an email, Jentleson added that while he has “great admiration” for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s wartime leadership, Ukraine itself has long been known to be a “questionable democracy” and one of the world’s most corrupt countries. Chas Freeman Jr., a former senior U.S. diplomat who helped to frame George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” concept during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, agreed with this assessment. And Biden has indeed condemned Russia’s invasion as “a flagrant violation of international law.” But Freeman said the United States would have to work hard to restore its credibility on that front in the wake of its own more recent violations of international norms, including the use of torture and the invasion of Iraq. “We need to return to the basic principles of international law that we foolishly set aside, but that’s going to be a problem,” Freeman told Foreign Policy. “The United States sponsored, created, and enforced what is now called the liberal international order after World War II. So you have the U.N. Charter, which lays out the basic principles of international law. You can’t go to war without a justification from the U.N. Security Council, which we had [in 1990-91]. But that was the last time we observed those norms. After that, every principle of international law that we pioneered, we violated.” Returning to those basic principles, with appropriate mea culpas, may be the only course forward if the United States is to win over much of the world, Freeman said. What won’t work, he added, is evangelizing about the glories of democracy — an old American habit, and one that he believes the Biden team is resorting to for largely domestic political benefit. “I’ve thought from the beginning that frankly this is a load of crap,” Freeman said. “It’s a very American conceit. And it’s particularly ironic that it should come to the fore during a period when our own democracy is manifestly in deep trouble and we’re not even sure we’re going to have a peaceful transition in 2024.” Biden’s credibility problem extends to other major nations that have not gone along with Biden’s campaign — and which continue to temporize over the Russian invasion. For India, the issue has little to do with democracy and everything to do with border security, said Rani Mullen, a scholar at the College of William & Mary. Its increasingly autocratic leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is a populist fanning sectarian hatred between Hindus and Muslims while on the international stage, he pursues relations with both Moscow and Washington. Since the beginning of the year, India has dramatically stepped up its purchases of discounted Russian oil — which Modi desperately needs to shore up India’s weakening economy. Modi’s stance is entirely about realpolitik, said Mullen, an expert in South and Central Asia. And that means maintaining workable relations with Russia so as not to encourage a deeper partnership between Moscow and China, the Indians’ most feared potential aggressor along with Pakistan, which has a cozy relationship with Beijing. For New Delhi, the most paramount issue is border integrity under the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement (which the Chinese call the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”) between India and China. “Ultimately, India’s stance is driven by thinking that alienating Russia will undermine its security,” Mullen said. “Democracy? What does it care? That’s the reality of it. It’s all about China. So framing Russian actions in a way that would guarantee mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity — that would strike a different chord.” More broadly, the stark fact Biden must confront is that democracy has been in retreat since the Cold War. “The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 is down to 1989 levels. The last 30 years of democratic advances are now eradicated,” a report by the V-Dem Institute said. “Dictatorships are on the rise and harbor 70% of the world population—5.4 billion people.” The study found that liberal democracies can now be found in only 34 nations, down from its peak of 42 in 2012, which are home to only 13 percent of the world’s population. A key fence-sitter in this global struggle over international norms is authoritarian China, which has sought to find a middle ground between Russia and the West. Chinese President Xi Jinping is sticking by his partnership with Putin, yet Beijing has mostly observed economic sanctions against Russia. Chinese officials say their country is loath to choose sides, but Washington has made that difficult by portraying the conflict as one that is primarily about Western-style democracy rather than global norms. As Robert Manning, a former U.S. intelligence official and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote in Foreign Policy this week: “The logic of ‘democracies only’ could lead to a bifurcated or maybe trifurcated world.” China covets Taiwan much as Russia does Ukraine, but even Washington still officially embraces its long-time “one China” policy, acknowledging that Taiwan is part of a single China. Beijing is angry that this diplomatic mainstay is also fraying, with Biden’s State Department removing such language from its official guidance website, which no longer states that Washington “does not support Taiwan independence.” Nor has the Biden administration offered up any new initiatives to wean Beijing away from Moscow. Other major nations, even those that are democratic, also are making calculations based on factors that have little to do with the threat to democracy. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recently said he would continue to support Russia’s participation at international forums, such as the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Some experts say the inconsistencies in Biden’s approach to democracy have hurt him as well. The president’s virtual democracy summit at the end of last year was widely criticized for the seemingly arbitrary way some countries were invited while others were snubbed. The Philippines’ anti-U.S. president, Rodrigo Duterte, was welcomed for example despite his violent campaign of extrajudicial executions, whereas Washington-aligned Singapore, which was rated “partly free” in Freedom House’s annual study of rights and liberties worldwide, was excluded. Singapore’s Freedom House ranking was also higher than some other invitees, such as Angola, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Lebanon. In the Philippines, Duterte will soon be replaced by Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of the country’s long-time dictator, who has said he wants to draw closer to Beijing. “Countries that are not democratic are being treated as democratic. It’s completely a fool’s errand,” said Raffaello Pantucci, a visiting senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “It alienates people on the ground.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › CIL › 1nc Fails
Joyner, 18 (Daniel H. Joyner, 10-31-2018, "Why I Stopped Believing in Customary International Law," Cambridge Core, , LASA-CSK)
So again, I think there is a big problem here. The problem is that the agencies that are looked to as identifiers of CIL—international courts, the ILC, and academics—have been demonstrated to typically go about that exercise in methodologically bankrupt ways. And we don’t just do it because we are lazy or incompetent, we do it so that we can use the resulting assertions of CIL obligations in instrumentalist ways, typically to expand international law to apply in areas where states have not given their explicit consent to be bound through agreed treaty text. The asserted rules of CIL which the short-cut methodologies of identification create, are therefore of low credibility in the eyes of states, who are understandably reluctant to have judges and academics creating new legal obligations for them. This problem is so difficult to address because it is so institutionally entrenched. Courts and the ILC and many academics have every reason to continue to support the orthodox approach to CIL identification, which is so susceptible to this methodological mischief, because it serves their instrumentalist purposes. The ILC’s ongoing study on this topic, which will almost certainly provide yet another reaffirmation of the orthodox approach, will only further institutionalize the problem. Again, my problem is not with CIL itself as a source of law. In a theoretical sense, I have no problem with the idea that states can collectively make law that governs their interactions with each other, through an evolving process that is not necessarily written down in one law-making moment. Particularly under the modern approach that places emphasis and priority upon opinio juris, states can manifest their recognition of an obligation, and their consent to be bound thereby, through their subjective statements of legal understanding. The problem is that we simply do not currently have a structural framework within the international legal system that can support this method of law creation in a manner that satisfies concerns about objectivity and empirical verifiability of that positivistic manifestation of affirmation and consent. And without this institutional structure, the black magic that stands in for identification of CIL in practice undermines the credibility of every assertion of CIL. It also, by extension, undermines the credibility of the international legal system itself.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 1nc ILAW Fails
Fischerkeller, 6/20 (Michael P. Fischerkeller, 6-20-2022, "Current International Law Is Not an Adequate Regime for Cyberspace," Lawfare, , LASA-CSK)
States increasingly agree that international law, specifically the U.N. Charter and rules of customary international law (CIL) derived from the charter’s principles, applies to cyberspace. Yet both are a poor fit for cyber activities. The charter reflects a bias toward what has been termed the conventional strategic environment, and CIL has evolved in the shadow of both the conventional and nuclear environments. In these environments, states threaten international stability by seeking strategic gains through either coercion or brute force. The cyber strategic environment differs in that threats to stability derive from exploitation—that is, states unilaterally using code to take advantage of others’ cyber vulnerabilities for the purpose of realizing strategic gains. It should be unsurprising, then, that states have struggled to offer comprehensive and in-depth opinio juris on how international law applies to the cyber context. States will struggle to find cyber relevance in international law until new instruments of international law—or adaptations of current law—account for the core features of the cyber strategic environment, the state behaviors they obligate, and how strategic advantage can be achieved lawfully and unlawfully through those behaviors. The rule of nonintervention is a good candidate for adaptation. Strategic Environments Cyber persistence theory, which informs U.S. Cyber Command’s doctrine of persistent engagement, is premised on the argument that cyberspace is not merely a domain but a strategic environment—and, importantly, one distinct from the nuclear and conventional strategic environments. Whereas U.S. warfighting domains—air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace—describe military operational “space,” strategic environments comprise core features that condition states’ security behaviors. Simply stated, the core features of the nuclear environment are segmentation, that is, a feature that manifests as territorial boundaries, and incontestable costs (that is, there is no valid defense against nuclear weapons), which lead to a dominant behavior of coercion in the form of a deterrence strategy (that is, mutually assured destruction). The conventional strategic environment also comprises segmentation but is coupled with contestable costs (conventional capabilities, unlike nuclear weapons, may be defended against). This leads to dominant, episodic behaviors of brute force or coercion, where the latter takes the form of a deterrence strategy threatening to impose costs or a compellence strategy imposing costs through conventional war. Post-World War II international law, specifically the U.N. Charter and subsequent CIL interpretations of the charter, was conditioned by the weight of these core features. With the objective of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” these rules of state behavior are centered on sovereignty, nonintervention, coercion, threat or use of force, and armed attack. The cyberspace strategic environment is distinct from the nuclear and conventional environments, which poses a challenge to the relevance of these rules. Cyber persistence theory argues that, simply stated, the core features of the cyber strategic environment comprise interconnectedness (not segmentation), a condition of constant contact (not the prospect of episodic action), an abundance of organic vulnerabilities, and macro-resilience (an ability to recover from exploitation of those vulnerabilities). Consequently, states face a security imperative to persist in seizing and maintaining the initiative to set the conditions of security in their favor in and through cyberspace. States can do so through various strategies, policies and activities that reduce the potential for exploitation of their own vulnerabilities and exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 2nc Norms Fail
Tsuchiya ’19 — Motohiro; professor of Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University in Japan and Deputy Director at Keio University Global Research Institute. December 5, 2019; "A Difficult Road to International Norms for Cybersecurity"; GCSC; https://cyberstability.org/news/a-difficult-road-to-international-norms-for-cybersecurity/; //CYang
In an anarchic international community, norms are not binding. There are no penalties if you do not abide them. However, if there is a norm that everyone can agree on, those who deviate from it must be prepared for criticism. Individual and collective sanctions may also follow. It takes a long time to form international rules. The ocean has existed throughout human history, but in 1996 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea came into effect in Japan. In the meantime, various norms around ocean use existed, but it took thousands of years to become a treaty. The treaty is also interpreted differently from country to country. It’s no wonder that it takes decades to establish a norm around cyberspace. The Japanese government is actively working to form international norms for cyberspace. In addition to the GGE mentioned above, Ambassadors from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated in various multilateral meetings. In mid-November, a meeting will be held in Beijing to boost cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea. Bilateral consultations are also held with more than 10 countries and regions such as the United States. The Vienna Conference, held in 1814 after the Napoleonic Wars, was slow as “The conference went on, but there was no progress”. Conferences on cybersecurity are also being held around the world. However, cyber-attackers will not join the conference. It is being tested whether state-led diplomacy will function in a new area where non-state actors will thrive.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 2nc Norms Fail
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)
America’s approach to building cyber norms should adapt to the following realities. First, the United States is not in a hegemonic position to define the agenda for norms in cyberspace. For a single actor to set the public agenda and drive a convergence of behavior, it would need to have control over the primary incentives and disincentives within the system, which the United States does not possess. Nor is there a clear manner in which the United States could obtain such primary control, due to the highly diffuse nature of cyberspace. Second, what is and what is not currently acceptable varies greatly depending on national perspectives, even among liberal democratic states. Despite the stated desire of the United States to establish norms through international cooperation, such norms have not emerged. The result is intense competition to drive a convergence of expectations on behavior in cyberspace. An alternative yet related approach to building norms is to model good behavior. Convergence of norms will occur over time as other actors see that more beneficial outcomes flow from modelled good behavior than from bad behavior. This approach presents several challenges. First, behavior that might be categorized as unacceptable still produces benefits that outweigh costs. Second, adversaries cite various allegations of American bad behavior in cyberspace — global surveillance and the Stuxnet hack of the Iranian nuclear program are two examples — in labeling the United States a hypocritical standard-bearer for norms. Third, as both state and nonstate actors continue to advance their interests through behaviors that the United States considers unacceptable, modelling can easily be misunderstood as tacit acceptance.41
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 1nc Norms Fail
Katagiri, 21 (Nori Katagiri, M.A., Columbia University, M.A., University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, professor of political science, 18-2-2021, " Why international law and norms do little in preventing non-state cyber attacks" Journal of Cybersecurity, , LASA-CSK)
This article exposes at least two ironies, one regarding international law and the other about cyberspace norms. The first irony is that international law has promoted state centrism for so many years that, once in the cyber age, the very legal foundation that is supposed to protect states has become the major obstacle to promoting state security. The other irony is about norm politics; major powers in cybersecurity – especially the USA, Russia, and China, each of which have promoted norms – have been among the greatest violators. This article suggests that all kinds of moral charges can be made about embedded hypocrisy and the double standard of words and deeds. Worse, these powerful states are not just violating each other’s norms but creating a strategic environment that permits norm contestation and overlooks further violations, including those committed by nonstate actors. The hypocrisies, however, precisely underscore the true state of cybersecurity where power and interest forge around powerful states, and there is limited space for international law and norms to play a larger role in regulating their behavior. This article indicates the need for the reconsideration of state commitment to the existing international legal and norm system as a preventive mechanism against nonstate OCO. Space limitation precludes further discussions of specific policies on international law and norms beyond the ones that I presented above. This analysis, however, provides a sufficient narrative that reform is necessary for the international system to be effective against nonstate OCO. It is apparent that cyberspace norms – especially principles like those of distinction, due diligence, and proportionality – must be updated to reflect the growing influence of nonstate actors in cyberspace. At the same time, it remains true that states have sought to reform the system and make norms robust over the years without achieving meaningful change. Rather than promoting international law and norms as a means of preventing cyberattacks, states and private actors are likely to depend more on themselves to prevent nonstate attacks. For one, scholars have called for a variety of active defense countermeasures to be adopted. A reasonable action we can expect states to take is the consideration of how international law and norms can aid state conduct of active defense in cyberspace. In this context, what is required is a series of examinations regarding what specific aspects of international law ought to be reformed and which one of the many ideas and principles can be facilitated to generate more effects than before.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 1nc Data Concerns
Michael Chertoff 20 - the Co-founder and Executive Chairman of the Chertoff Group and a former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (“The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship in Cyberspace,” 10/06/2020, )
Over the last decade, perhaps no feature of the transatlantic relationship has been more fraught than our approaches to cyberspace. Issues such as technological competition, data protection, free speech, and cybersecurity have become sources of controversy. As U.S. technology companies and social media platforms have taken a commanding position on the internet, European regulators have increasingly (and understandably) focused on antitrust enforcement. Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has subjected American companies to new requirements for ensuring data privacy and allowing users control over how their data is used. European approaches to hate speech and disinformation also differ from traditional laissez-faire U.S. practice. And, finally, while both sides of the Atlantic are concerned with securing the cyber domain, the United States has recently become more concerned about Chinese products on Western communications systems.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 1nc Data Concerns
Selga, et al 21 - Non-Resident Fellow with the Digital Innovation Initiative and Transatlantic Leadership program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Ēriks is a former Digital Innovation Baltic Fellow at CEPA and is a Visiting Researcher at the Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Associate Scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and a current Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law, where he is studying the intersection of law and innovation in the context of FinTech and other datafication trends. Ēriks holds a Master’s degree in International Law from Temple Beasley School of Law. Ēriks research will focus on data governance in the transatlantic space and will explore how NATO has adapted to transatlantic digitization. Abigail LaBreck is a rising Senior at Harvard University pursuing a concentration in Government on the Public Policy track, a secondary field in European History, Politics, and Societies. (“Data Divergences Torpedo Transatlantic Cybersecurity Plans,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 10/12/2021, ) PJW
Beyond these basic similarities in encouraging cybersecurity, the two sides disagree on key points. Although the U.S. and Europe vow to cooperate on cybersecurity, the two sides’ divergent approach to data protection threatens to undermine these ambitions. Europe, which often struggles to set common continent-wide rules, employs a centralized privacy regulation. In contrast, the U.S. takes a fragmented approach. Europe takes a tough line, treating all personal data with the sweeping General Data Protection Regulation. The U.S. prefers to judge harm case by case. A fundamental philosophical gulf explains these differences. Europe focuses on protecting personal data, ensuring that individuals retain control. Data privacy and protection are pillars of the European Union charter and the EU is adopting a comprehensive Data Strategy. The U.S. prefers a laissez-faire approach. Data privacy legislation remains limited to the state level (witness California’s privacy law) or industry by industry. The U.S. Federal Data Strategy sets a foundation for collecting and using data in federal agencies, without cross-agency data centralization. Both Europe and the U.S. do at least agree on the urgency of the cybersecurity challenge. Recent hacks of critical infrastructure at SolarWinds, Colonial Pipeline, and NotPetya highlight a common transatlantic vulnerability. Ubiquitous IoT devices and smart infrastructure create a growing danger of cyberattacks. In response, Europe and the U.S have established cybersecurity agencies. The EU has set up the Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). The U.S. has the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). These agencies urge both governments and businesses to deploy what Europe calls “state of the art” security and the U.S. designates “industry best practices.” Beyond these basic similarities in encouraging cybersecurity, the two sides disagree on key points. Europe’s NIS Directive mandates the private sector to take concrete actions. The U.S.’s NIST Framework limits itself to urging voluntary action. Certification represents another dividing line. The EU wants ENISA to “certify” cybersecurity preparedness. The U.S. has not acted on certification and some U.S. tech companies say certification monitoring could be dangerous, opening up systems to attacks. Perhaps the most crucial divergence concerns incident reporting. When a company discovers a hack, when should they be required to report it to regulators and customers? If it goes public before facts are clear, it risks spreading incomplete or even false information – and sparking an unneeded panic. Report too late, though, and the untreated danger could spread. The two sides’ divergent privacy policies result in a dangerous split to deal with this dilemma. Europe imposes a high, centralized standard to report data breaches, with a single set of rules for all companies. If an individuals’ data is divulged, the individual must be informed – full stop. The U.S., as with privacy protections, is less stringent. Under many state laws, companies are not required to notify consumers until, after a “reasonable” investigation, it is determined that customers have suffered actual harm.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Cyber › 1nc Terminology
JANCZEWSKI 19 (Robert Janczewski currently works at the Cybersecurity, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej. Bob does research in Qualitative Social Research, Communication and Media and Sociocybernetics. Studies and Teaches at War Studies University,Warsaw, Poland. “TERMINOLOGY AS A BARRIER TO NATO’S INTEROPERABILITY IN CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS”, file:///Volumes/GoogleDrive/.shortcut-targets-by-id/1HqF1gyuw9ptRdF1lgmLCd9TH05202uR1/Camp%202022/Lily/Research/Cyber%20interoperability.pdf)
The reason for the tendency to create still new terms based on the root cyber is the term cyberspace, and not as it could be assumed cybernetics. The analysis and critical review of subject literature conducted by the authors revealed that words formed with the prefix-cyber are very popular terms of the turn of the 20th and 21st century. Nonetheless, regardless of their popularity, they have not been defined with the use of commonly accepted definitions. Different NATO member states use those concepts with varied meanings. Thus, it is impossible to provide unequivocal referent of cyberspace, which from the pragmatic point of view creates a barrier to NATO’s interoperability at the time of cyberspace operations. The obvious lack of explicitness in defining terms relating to operations in cyberspace allows to draw a conclusion that a piece of new reality formed as a result of civilization development of societies is not sufficiently defined and examined, if it is at all. Lack of clear-cut terminological convention is a serious obstacle for NATO’s interoperability at the time of operations run in cyberspace. Lack of agreement between both the scientists and practitioners in terms of one commonly accepted definition of a piece of reality called cyberspace contributes to disagreement in terms of one undisputable referent of cyberspace. A common language is the basis for proper, effective, supra-sectional cooperation both at the time of peace and war as well as crisis situations. It should be consistent and univocal. Partners should use not only the same terms but also the definitions of the terms should have strict, univocal and identical semantic scopes. Meanwhile, cooperation seems to be hindered since partners in NATO use various referents of cyberspace. This leads to the assumption that there is no agreement in terms of operational sphere. The definitions of cyberspace observed in the USA, Poland and Germany can be used as an example. According to the views held in the US Armed Forces cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers [2]. Such definition is also included in the latest dictionary [3] determining standard US military terminology and the interrelated terminology applied in the activity of the US Armed Forces. The military and the interrelated concepts, alongside with their definitions, are approved by the US Department of Defense and are destined to be used universally by all components of the US Department of Defense. According to the definition included in the Cybersecurity strategy for Germany [4] cyberspace is the virtual space of all information technology systems networked at the data level worldwide. The cyberspace is based on the Internet as a publicly accessible connection network, which can be extended by any other data network. Similarly to the German view, the European Union identifies cyberspace with virtual reality, which is envisaged in its definition where cyberspace as the virtual, global and common domain within the information environment consisting of all interconnected and interdependent networks of global, organisational, and national information infrastructure, based on the Internet and telecommunications networks, to be extended by other networks, computer systems and embedded processors, and containing also stand-alone systems and networks [5]. In the Polish doctrine cyberspace is understood as the space where information created by ICT systems is processed and exchanged together with the existing bonds and relations with users [6]. Where ICT systems are understood as groups of cooperating IT devices and software which assure processing, storing, as well as sending, and receiving of data through ICT networks with the use of an end device proper for a given type of ICT network designed to connect directly or indirectly to the end of the network. The above examples show that cyberspace is understood at the same time as a domain, space, virtual space, a virtual domain. Thus, it is difficult to find a univocal referent. The above presented examples as well as the authors’ analysis and critique of doctrinal documents of NATO member countries revealed that there are no paradigms in the field of cybersecurity. However, there is multitude of cyber terminology. Concepts are given different meanings. Sometimes such differences observed in them point to different referents of the same concepts. Such a state of affairs poses a barrier to the interoperability in cyberspace. Lack of common conceptual apparatus in unfavourable conditions can lead to the infeasibility of effective cooperation. Lack of understanding of what is e.g. cyberspace, cyberattack, or cyber defence can significantly impede or even preclude the achievement of a common goal. Taking into consideration the above one should be aware that for ‘good job’ it is well grounded to achieve a common ground of understanding. While in the technical dimension of cybersecurity it is clear what a router, an ARP board, an IP address, or a worm or virus is, operational concepts, generally speaking, are not clearly cut, and more interestingly there is no agreement in this field among practitioners as well as theoreticians in terms of the views on this dimension of running military operations.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 2nc Fails Private Sector
Bellasio et al., 21 (Jacopo Bellasio, Linda Slapakova, Luke Huxtable, James Black, Theodora Ogden and Livia Dawaele, RAND Europe, 7-2021, " Innovative technologies shaping the 2040 battlefield," STOA | Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, , LASA-CSK)
Existing literature documents significant concerns that many emerging biotechnologies are susceptible to single points of failure for essential components. 144 For example, while the bioengineering of silkworms to generate 'dragon silk' could produce advanced body armour, silkworms survive on mulberry leaves, and would require over 6,000 acres of mulberry trees for large-scale production. Current examples of such production processes, such as those pursued by the US Department of Defence (DOD), highlight the reliance of the production process on farming cooperatives in Vietnam, which require international contracts, embassy approvals and a complex supply chain, representing a potential singlesource point of failure. 145 Inequality of access represents a further potential barrier for the adoption of biotechnological advances such as gene editing. Within the military, uniformity is used as a mechanism to instil discipline and garner compliance with rules and directions, which is intrinsically tied to the chain of command structure. 146 Making some human enhancement technologies available to some, but not others (e.g. special forces personnel only) may lead to dissent, potentially allowing soldiers to refuse deployment on the basis that they have not been afforded the same protection as others.147
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 1nc Fails Private Sector
Dieuliis 18 (Diana, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and leads studies on biosecurity, biodefense and the synthetic biology industry. Dr. DiEuliis is a biologist by training and served for over two decades in various capacities at the Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House. “BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR THE BATTLEFIELD: IN NEED OF A STRATEGY” https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/biotechnology-for-the-battlefield-in-need-of-a-strategy/)LR
Acquiring Biotech and the ‘Valley of Death’ Even if all needs for biotechnology were clear, the Defense Department would still need to improve the way it acquires biotechnology for the battlefield. Which capabilities should continue to be built in the department’s service research labs, and which ought to be acquired from external companies? One option is to simply adopt useful commercial products off the shelf as they are innovated in the private sector, particularly since many innovative biological materials can be dual-purposed for both consumers and the military. For example, in addition to its promise as lightweight body armor, spider silk can be used in ordinary clothing, textiles, construction materials, and novel medicines. Alternatively, the Defense Department could ask the private sector to create defense-specific products from the ground up. A third option is to generate prototype products within the department, then use the private sector to scale and deliver them. Right now, the inability to scale up synthetic biology products from prototypes is a bottleneck hindering the broad adoption of biotechnology and the private sector is already investing in scaling solutions — whether for commercial markets or defense. While the answer is likely a combination of all these approaches, the Defense Department needs to communicate clearly with biotechnology performers, since the private sector is not likely to make choices for manufacturing products for national security on its own. The well-recognized “valley of death” that prevents technological innovations from being translated into medicines, equipment, and warfighter benefits is a problem much broader than biotechnology. Since World War II, there has been a steady decline in the defense industrial base, as fewer companies are able to provide products specific to defense. Supply chains have become burdensome and unwieldy. For example, the successful genetic engineering of silk worms to make “dragon silk” for warfighters is promising. But producing dragon silk at scale will require thousands of silkworms — which in turn require a large acreage of mulberry trees not readily available in the United States. The company creating dragon silk hopes to use farming cooperatives in Vietnam to resolve the problem, but this will perpetuate the same kind of burdensome and costly supply chain that plagues defense acquisitions — working through foreign company contracts and embassies, and generating potential single points of failure through reliance on sole suppliers outside the country. To reduce these types of inefficiencies, defense planners must envision biotechnology products from inception through their full development and manufacture pathways that allow these technologies to be successfully shepherded through nimbler and more secure industrial supply chains. The “valley of death” also prevents technology companies from seeing the Defense Department as an attractive customer. The Pentagon’s traditional models for acquisition tend to be time-consuming and less cost-effective than commercial contracts. Recently, a report commissioned by the president on the state of the U.S. industrial base described the uncertainty of federal spending, the unintended consequences of government acquisition behavior, and the loss of skills in the domestic workforce as “unprecedented” challenges to defense manufacturing. America’s global competitors could be closing the technology gap because of process failures, rather than a lack of technology talent or innovative ideas.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 2nc Say “No” No US Cred
Hanling, 3/22 (Wang Hanling, 3-22-2022, "US military bio-research violates international law," No Publication, , LASA-CSK)
The US military's bioresearch in Ukraine and other countries violates the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC, which are an important part of the international law to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And as a pillar of international peace and security, the BTWC has the support of an overwhelming majority of the countries in the world. The state parties to the BTWC have ensured that it remains effective and is continuously strengthened. However, the US refuses to allow international monitoring of its weapons research facilities, and has not stopped research into biological and chemical weapons. In 2001, the US unilaterally withdrew from the negotiations on the development of an additional protocol to the BTWC, according to which an independent body, the "Technical Secretariat", was supposed to monitor the microbiological research activities of all countries. The US military used on its own territory a combat biological formulation of anthrax strain, Ames strain, resistant to all antibiotics and not amenable to treatment, according to the Russian Academy of Sciences. Worse, the US has been blocking the establishment of the BTWC's verification mechanism for more than 20 years. It is clear therefore that the US resorts to double standard on bioresearch, as it does on many other issues of global concern. And yet it made outlandish accusations against China that the novel coronavirus had leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology without providing any evidence.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 2nc Say “No” France
Kuntz 14 (Marcel, is a Director of Research at CNRS but is not the spokesman of the institution for which he works. “The GMO case in France: Politics, lawlessness and postmodernism”, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5033180/)//LR
On April 13, 2005, MPs Jean-Yves Le Déaut and Christian Ménard16 issued a report for the “Information Mission of the National Assembly on GMOs. “Their conclusions aimed to be “nuanced and if possible, reassuring.” The report reveals clearly the political divide over this topic: Socialists, Communists, and of course the Greens, being opposed to GMOs, whereas the Center and the Right parties being rather in favor (at least supportive of research), with dissenting voices on each side. In an attempt to placate opponents, the report recommended not to allow any new field trial in 2005. It also recommended unpractical burdens on field trials, such as proposition n° 24 “to perform, during the Bt crops field trials, a study of insect populations including bees (number, behavior, reproduction)” or new obstacles prior to marketing, such as performing socio-economic impact studies (as already recommended in the 2000 Aubert report, illustrating the spread of “Green” views). The report is also embedded in typical postmodernist views (see discussion below) such as “to involve the public and local community representatives and associations” (propositions 53 and 55). The French government moved from a precautionary doctrine in 1997 (which occasionally lost sight of science for political reasons) to the development of its own parallel “science” from 2008 onwards (again for political reasons). While successive governments maintained some rhetorical support for “research on GMOs” for years, the last GMO field trial in France (poplar trees as part of an INRA experiment) was terminated on July 13, 2013 (because Minister Le Foll declined to give an answer to an application by INRA to prolong the experimentation). Such a drift from a precautionary approach in 1997 to a de facto ban illustrates the impact of the precautionary principle. The official “public debates” organized in France also moved from the objective of providing information to the decision makers (with a direct link between the latter and experts), and to the public, to a negotiation-type of debate between “stakeholders” and the government, with a limited role for experts (as was the case for the 2007 “debate” on environment). Public debates also became relativist in nature (scientific knowledge is considered as an opinion just like any other opinion, a characteristic of the postmodern ideology).20 Obviously, these debates have not appeased confrontations concerning GMOs. On the contrary, they have encouraged opponents to become more radical asking for more concessions, until the total eradication of GMOs. For example, on May 23, 2011, a group of activists invaded the agronomical research institute (INRA) center in Angers for a “citizen inspection” of a confined experiment using GM pears. This clear act of intimidation was on the pretext that no dialog had been implemented. GMO experimentation sites have gradually become a lawless area for activists. The reason is clear: the strength of the anti-GMO lobbies is directly correlated to the weakness of politicians. With no more GMO fields to destroy in France, they have since started targeting mutagenized varieties employing the same tactics as used against GMOs (they call mutagenized varieties “hidden GMOs”).29 The fact that the term “genetically modified” is semantically vague can be used by opponents to target all new breeding techniques since their final goal is to destroy seed trade which is perceived as “smothering peasants” (see Fig. 1A). Thus, activists have also occasionally invaded Monsanto's facilities (although the company no longer actually sells GM seeds in France) or agricultural organizations’ premises for diverse reasons but usually linked to seed business or seed regulation. In conclusion, GMO cultivation in France is totally blocked (including field trials and GM research) for political reasons, with no foreseeable way to reverse this situation.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 2nc Say “No” GMOS
Paarlberg, 21 (Robert Paarlberg, 2-1-2021, "Opinion: Europe Is Sinking Biotech—Again," Scientist Magazine®, , LASA-CSK)
When it comes to modern agricultural biotechnology, Europe’s caution has been slowing progress for more than two decades. It started in the 1990s, when Europe began rejecting crops modified using recombinant DNA, or DNA from other species—crops branded as genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Now it is doing the same for gene-edited crops improved using CRISPR. European scientists have objected to this new blockage, but they are not the only ones paying a price. Using CRISPR, researchers are now working to make crop plants that have higher yields, resist disease or stress, or are tastier, more nutritious, or more convenient than conventionally bred varieties. As farmers seek to adapt to climate change, gene editing could become an even more valuable tool in agriculture—if regulators will allow it. Decades ago, it was transgenic modification that seemed poised to help increase drought tolerance, disease resistance, and crop yields, and to curtail insecticide use. But consumers in Europe were scared away from the resulting GMO foods by activist organizations, while governments stifled the products with strict regulation; most farmers there have never planted them. GMO consumer foods are also not imported into Europe, due to a burdensome tracing rule that requires all operators in the marketplace to maintain, for five years, a record of every single GMO they handled, where it came from, and where it went. Rather than take on this logistical nightmare, food companies in Europe reformulated their products completely away from GMO ingredients, and those exporting to Europe now do the same or plant no GMOs at all. In the US, where GMO regulations are more permissive, farmers have planted GMO cotton, plus GMO corn and soybeans (mostly for animal feed and auto fuel), but they voluntarily avoid GMO wheat, rice, and potato, partly for fear of encountering commercial rejections in Europe. As I discuss in my new book, Resetting the Table, Europe’s policies ignore a consensus among science academies around the world—including in Europe—that GMO crops pose no new risks either to human health or to the environment. Even the European Commission concurs with this view, concluding in a 2010 analysis that “biotechnology, and in particular GMOs, are not per se more risky than e.g. conventional plant breeding technologies.” Now Europe’s rejection of new agricultural biotechnology is being repeated for gene-edited crops. First reported in 2012, CRISPR should have been less controversial than transgenic work because it does not rely on bringing in genes from unrelated species, and it closely resembles the natural process of genetic mutation. The EU’s own advocate general offered a preliminary nonbinding opinion that CRISPR crops should not fall under the strict regulatory requirements of Europe’s GMO Directive, but the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (the EU equivalent of the US Supreme Court) concluded in 2018 that gene-edited organisms should be regulated like GMOs.